

**Discourses of Morality:
The News Media, Human Rights and Foreign Policy
in Twentieth-Century United States**

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Advisor: Hazel Dicken-Garcia
MAY 2000

UMI Number 9966256

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Acknowledgments

Every completed dissertation is the end result of one person's writing but many people's contributions. A few of these contributions are acknowledged here. My advisor, Hazel Dicken-Garcia, not only provided guidance but inspiration as well. Her example showed me what being an intellectual, being an academic and being a good person is all about. I hope that in my own work and life I can be as inspiring, caring and professional. Tsan-kuo Chang courteously relinquished me to Hazel when my research interests changed during the course of my studies. Yet he continued to be available for advice about jobs, publications and the loan of many books. Thanks must also go to Michael Griffin, Kathryn Sikkink and Lary May who each contributed in many ways to my work. John Finnegan Jr. also graciously agreed to serve on my committee at the last moment

I don't even know where to start in thanking Remo. You were the reason I came here to start graduate school and the reason I was able to finish my degree. In between you provided inspiration, feedback and support in so many ways. Isabella — you are the single best thing that has happened in our lives. Thank you.

I also have to thank Isabel Searson, my high school history teacher. Little did you know when you were drilling your two students in 'O' Level History that I would one day be writing about the Treaty of Versailles and the Paris Peace Talks while thinking back to your class. My lasting fondness for Woodrow Wilson carries over from those days.

I am also grateful to the School of Journalism and Mass Communication for supporting my research with a Kriss grant that enabled me to spend two weeks at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. Thanks too must go to Michelle Treptau and Jim Freebersyser who invited a complete stranger into their home and provided so much hospitality during ray time in D.C.

For Remo and Isabella

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Chapter One

The News Media, Human Rights and Foreign Policy

Human rights are seen by many to be an essentially modern concern. Modern concern, in this context, is defined as a late twentieth-century process of international debate about human rights that began with the foundation of the United Nations and came to prominence in the United States during the presidential campaign of Jimmy Carter. Human rights are a powerful issue because the concept implies not only the way the world is — that is, by intimating that essential rights exist for every human being — but also the way the world should be — by suggesting goals for the protection of individuals. Thus, statements about human rights are essentially ideological, especially in that the concept of ideology presents, in the words of the historian Peter Novick, “(1) a picture of the way the world is; (2) a picture of the way the world ought to be; (3) a set of propositions about the relationship between the first and the second.”¹

The goal of research for this dissertation research was to examine the construction in the twentieth-century United States of an ideology of human rights by looking at political rhetoric and media representation of the role of human rights in foreign policy. While chapter two more fully outlines definitions of human rights, what is meant here is the fundamental equality of all human beings and the innate entitlement of each to protection of rights that come from being human — what political scientist Jack Donnelly calls the “rights one has simply because one is human.”²

These rights are generally perceived in terms of how governments treat their citizens but Donnelly identifies human rights at their most basic level as “paramount moral rights.”³ This immense goal of examining the discourse of human rights in terms of twentieth century American foreign policy can be broken down into manageable research questions, answers to which can contribute towards building up a picture, albeit partial, of this developing ideology. The period of study extends beyond post-World War Two events because this ideology was the product of specific historical circumstances and was not created in isolation. These historical circumstances were studied through media coverage of diplomatic events and through primary diplomatic and political materials.

A broad question addressed by the research — informed by the theory of hegemony outlined below — is how certain ideas come to be seen as “common sense” in a society. The early twentieth-century Italian marxist⁴ thinker, Antonio Gramsci, referred to common sense as the “traditional conception of the world” or the “traditional popular conception of the world - what is unimaginatively called ‘instinct,’ although it too is in fact a primitive and elementary

¹ Peter Novick, (1996), *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University), p.20.

² Jack Donnelly, (1993), *International Human Rights*, (Boulder, CO: Westview), p.19.

³ Donnelly, (1993), *International Human Rights*, p.20.

⁴ The term marxism is used throughout this text without capitalization in order to indicate that it is not a single concept or theory but a term that covers a number of approaches. Using marxism as a proper noun indicates that it is a fixed notion or approach rather than different ways of thinking based on certain assumptions common to the writing of Marx and subsequent writers.

historical acquisition.”⁵ Thus, common sense is a view of the “way things are” that has, through various historical processes, become the “natural” view — that is, the seemingly only right way to see them.

The particular ideas of interest here are the “discourses of morality,” defined here as discourses that draw on values and ideas concerned with distinctions between right and wrong and universal or societal standards of human behavior. Another way of defining discourses of morality is to say that they are located outside the realm of pragmatism; that is, utility is not seen to be the standard against which behavior -- of individuals, institutions or governments -- is judged. Discourses of morality tend to use lexicons composed of dichotomous sets of terms such as right/wrong, good/bad, appropriate/inappropriate, and just/unjust. A contemporary American example is the current debate over the behavior of President William J. Clinton who compromised his office through sexual dalliance with a young woman working in the White House. Opponents of Clinton set the discourse clearly in the domain of morality by saying that leadership of the country is associated with certain standards of morality that have been violated. On the other hand, supporters attempted to sustain this debate as a political discourse — arguing that personal attacks on Clinton are really political attacks — and focused attention on the political affiliations of prosecutors.

The concept of human rights encompasses many such discourses for, while debate over human rights draws strongly from ideas of universal standards of human behavior and judgments of right and wrong treatment of individuals, it also includes political argument.

Western, and more specifically, North American, interpretations of human rights have come to dominate international discourse about human rights since the end of the second world war. Thus, in order to understand how international norms of human rights came to exist the role of the United States in the norm-making must be examined. As a student of media, my assumption is that both mass and popular media play important roles in the creation of “common sense.” In the case of foreign policy, it seems that news media have a larger role than do other forms of media in defining and articulating meaning for the general American public because the news media may be the only source of information for many Americans on foreign policy. However, many scholars assume that news media do not usually play a role in the formation of foreign policy; rather, some scholars assume that media tend more towards support than advocacy of specific policies.⁶ The interaction of the press and national or international policy is a complex process. By examination of foreign policy documents and relevant events, one may answer the question of whether human rights and policy were linked first in public policy or in the press.

In addition to addressing the question of how ideas come to be seen as “common sense,” then, this research could potentially make contributions in several areas. One contribution may be increased understanding of present-day human rights discourse in the United States. Also analysis of a specific case may contribute by focusing attention on the role of news media in the social construction of national identity and discourse. In addition, understanding

⁵ Antonio Gramsci, ‘The Modern Prince’ in Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (Translated and edited), (1971), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, (New York: International Publishers/London: Lawrence and Wishart), p.197 and p.199.

⁶ Tsan-kuo Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy: The Illusion of Sino-American Relations, 1950-1984*, (Norwood, NJ: Ablex), pp.1-3.

of how American notions of human rights came about could contribute to understanding of international human rights discourse.

Questions and Broad Research Outline

The guiding research questions for this project ask when and how linkages between foreign policy and human rights issues became common in the American news media. When did foreign policy become seen as a weapon of, or a tool for, the spread of American ideals, specifically the ideals of human rights? What statements about human rights are found in the press at certain vital times in the twentieth century when the American role and identity in the world were being questioned by Americans? What statements about human rights in the news media were identified as being linked to United States ideals and identity? Were these ideals linked to foreign policy? Finally, what is the construction of various “stories” about human rights? And what do these constructions tell us?

These questions will be dealt with here in the context of media case studies of historical issues relating to national identity and the “appropriate” role of the United States in the world. Periodization of history is always fraught with controversy, but, in the context of the development of American human rights ideas, certain events represent distinct changes or developments in ideas about human rights. Historian Gene Wise argued that “historical ideas don’t just grow out of other ideas, nor do they just reflect circumstances around them; instead they come from precise moments of confrontation between idea and circumstance.”⁷ Thus, certain events can be central in the creation of a discourse. Political scientist Jack Donnelly identifies four crucial phases in the development of United States human rights policies as being: initial enthusiasm (1945-1948); subordination to the cold war (1949-1973); human rights as prominent in public diplomacy (1974-1980) and the new cold war era (1981-1988).⁸

Donnelly’s focus is entirely on the post-World War Two period, but the roots of so-called “modern” concerns for human rights can be traced to a much earlier time - particularly the founding of the League of Nations in 1919. Donnelly agrees that the League of Nations was concerned with the protection of the rights of some minorities and that the International Labor Organization was involved in the protection of the rights of workers, but he says that, ‘With these marginal exceptions, before World War II broke out in 1939, human rights had not been a topic of international relations.’⁹ Analysis of news coverage and congressional debate of 1919 shows that human rights ideas were very much part of political discourse at the time. In fact, while the focus for this dissertation is the twentieth century, links can be drawn between the discourse of human rights and the discourses of nineteenth-century American imperialism and concepts of manifest destiny.¹⁰ Alan Brinkley, in an essay linking effects of World War Two to the tradition of American innocence, argues that a powerful ideological force operated in the postwar period (and earlier) that saw “America as a special moral force in the world; America as a society with an unique mission, born of its righteousness.”¹¹ This “discourse of morality” that Brinkley refers to is important because it

⁷ Gene Wise, (1980), *American Historical Explanations: A Strategy for Grounded Enquiry*, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota), p.153.

⁸ Donnelly, (1993), *International Human Rights*, p.99.

⁹ Donnelly, (1993), *International Human Rights*, p.6.

¹⁰ (1949), *Human Rights: Unfolding of the American Tradition - A Selection of Documents and Statements*, Division of Historical Policy Research, Office of Public Affairs. Department of State, foreword.

¹¹ Alan Brinkley, (1996), ‘World War II and American liberalism’, in Lewis Erenberg and Susan Hirsch (Eds.), *The War in American Culture: Society and Consciousness During World War II*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago), p.323.

has close ties to human rights discourse. Indeed, in much of the media, congressional and other documents examined for this dissertation, these discourses are conflated, making difficult the identification of specific human rights discourses compared to more general discourses about morality and values.

For this research project Donnelly's World War Two focus was a useful point at which to begin, but two additional periods were added — one pre-dating his work and the other post-dating it. Post-World War One discussions about the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations and media coverage of Chinese human rights incidents from 1989 into the 1990s were studied. Thus, news coverage of the following events and issues were studied for this dissertation.

Period I: Paris Peace Talks, 1919-1920 encompassing the United States' decision not to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and not to join the League of Nations.

Period II: San Francisco Conference: 1945 and the creation of the Charter of the United Nations.

Period III: Carter presidential campaign, 1976.

Period IV: Tiananmen Incident, 1989.

Theoretical Framework

The concept of ideology is a vital part of the theoretical framework of this dissertation. Definition of the term and its uses could take up several volumes, so only a brief outline of essential historical development of the term and an explication of its use in this work are offered here.

Use of the term "ideology" has long been associated with marxist theory, which offers an useful point from which to start. Jorge Larraín does an elegant job of summarizing the changes in the meaning and use of ideology, even within marxist thought. Larraín argues that Marx and Engels used the term ideology exclusively with negative connotations, stating that:

... the critique by Marx and Engels seeks to show the existence of a necessary link between 'inverted' forms of consciousness and men's material existence. It is this relationship that the concept of ideology expresses by referring to a distortion of thought which stems from, and conceals, social contradictions. Consequently from its inception ideology has a clear-cut negative and critical connotation.¹²

This inversion refers to ideology representing what does not exist in reality. For example, in religion, Larraín argues that Marx saw that ideology "compensates in the mind for a deficient reality; it reconstitutes in the imagination a coherent solution which is beyond the real world in order to make up for the contradictions of the real world."¹³

It was only when Marx and Engels began to examine the idea of historical materialism that the notion was introduced that the function of ideology was to serve the interests of the ruling class. At this time ideology was still being used as a negative concept because, as Larraín argues, "Ideological distortions cannot be overcome by criticism, they

¹² Jorge Larraín, (1991), 'Ideology', in Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kierohan and Ralph Miliband (Eds.), (1982/1991), *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, (Oxford: Blackwell), p.248.

¹³ Larraín, (1991), 'Ideology', p.248.

can disappear only when the contradictions which give rise to them are practically resolved.”¹⁴ In Marx’s third stage of theorizing, ideology such as “freedom and equality,” was seen as a tool for concealing the truth about the economically determined realities of life. Larrain argues that after Marx’s death, the concept of ideology emerged as a more neutral concept, as both “the totality of forms of social consciousness - which came to be expressed by the concept of ‘ideological superstructure’ - and the conception of ideology as the political ideas connected with the interests of a class.”¹⁵ Lenin is seen in the marxist perspective as the major contributor to developing the concept of ideology as neutral. Ideology no longer is seen as a distortion; rather use of the term generally merely refers to class consciousness, whether bourgeois or proletarian.¹⁶

Larrain presents the ideas of Althusser as the most influential modern ideas about ideology, referring specifically to Althusser’s distinctions between a theory of ideology and specific ideologies. In the theory of ideology, “the function of ideology is to secure cohesion in society” while, for specific ideologies, “the former general function is overwhelmed by the new function of securing the domination of one class.”¹⁷ Critical theory has been the main beneficiary of Marx’s contributions to the examination of ideology and society, but Iring Fetscher argues that these concepts and approaches themselves have become part of a “Marxist world view,” or ideology, and that as such they have been devalued as theory.¹⁸

Fetscher’s argument ignores the major contribution to the study of ideology by cultural studies and by British cultural studies in particular. British cultural studies scholar Stuart Hall describes ideology as “practices and rituals” and argues that “ideologies are the frameworks of our thinking and calculation about the world • the ‘ideas’ which people use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they *ought* to do.”¹⁹ For Hall one of the main contributions of marxist thought is the idea that, in any analysis of society, individual and group experiences have to be taken into account as much as do structure and production.²⁰

In contrast to the different marxist perspectives, the historian Peter Novick uses ideology very generally to mean “simply an overarching, and at-least-tacitly-coherent outlook on the world.”²¹ As mentioned above, Novick also sees ideology as a relationship between the way a person sees the world and the way that person sees how the world should be.²² He further categorizes ideology as being dominant, accommodationist and oppositional. Dominant ideology perceives the way the world is as identical to, or close to, the way the world should be. Accommodationists perceive some differences between the way the world is and the way it ought to be but remain hopeful about closing the gaps — what Novick describes as perhaps militant “but not...disaffected; often troubled, they remain at least moderately, and often

¹⁴ Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, p.249.

¹⁵ Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, p.249.

¹⁶ Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, pp.250-251.

¹⁷ Larrain, (1991), ‘Ideology’, p.251.

¹⁸ Iring Fetscher, (1991), ‘Development of Marxism’ in Bottomore et al. p.349.

¹⁹ Stuart Hall, (1996), ‘Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates’ in James Curran, David Morley and Valerie Walkerdine (Eds.), *Cultural Studies and Communications*, (London: Arnold), p.19.

²⁰ Colin Sparks, (1996), ‘Stuart Hall, cultural studies and marxism’, in David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, (London and New York: Routledge), p.81.

²¹ Novick, (1996), *That Noble Dream*, p.61.

²² Novick, (1996), *That Noble Dream*, p.62.

immoderately, optimistic.”²³ Oppositional ideology sees the world as very different from the way that it ought to be and the gap between these as almost insurmountable.

The perspective that grounds the use of the term, ideology, in this dissertation draws on both a marxist perspective and Novick’s simple model of ideology as the relationship between “reality” and an ideal world. Novick’s model is attractive in its very simplicity and in its assumption that ideology can be identified wherever a discrepancy is perceived by someone between the way things are and the way things should be; that is, ideology exists wherever reality is seen to diverge from perfection. This first level of definition — the identification of a gap between perceptions of the way the world is and the way it should be — is perhaps the easiest form of ideology to identify.

While Althusser distinguishes between the functions of a theory of ideology and those of specific ideologies, the demarcation between functions is not always clear-cut. It is at this point that the ideas of the Italian marxist thinker, Antonio Gramsci, contribute to the discussion (although Gramsci wrote during an earlier period than did Althusser, theoretical development is not always linear). Gramsci’s ideas about hegemony draw together the theory of ideology and its practice. In Gramsci’s view, cohesion in society is achieved by the ruling class through a combination of coercion and consent — that is, through hegemony rather than straightforward imposition of power.²⁴ Analysis of power requires careful examination of relationships between actors and institutions to elicit the aspects of coercion and consent that constitute the process of hegemony.

Coercion and consent are not simple concepts in their own right and may not be overtly displayed in practice. Norman Fairclough argues that “Hegemony is about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes, through concessions, or through ideological means, to win their consent.”²⁵ He goes on to argue that hegemony works on two main levels and should not be conflated with discourse itself, for “Hegemony is a process at the social level, whereas most discourse has a more local character, being located in or on the edges of particular institutions...However, hegemony still provides both a model and a matrix.”²⁶ This characterization of hegemony as both a model and a matrix is valuable for trying to understand not only what hegemony is but how it is constituted and how it operates. As a model, hegemony operates as described above; that is, by the creation of alliances rather than through sheer imposition of dominance. Alliances, Fairclough says, are created through “constitution of and struggle around local orders of discourse.”²⁷ Hegemony operates as a matrix by integration of institutions and power relations, that is, at a social or structural level. The creation of “common sense” plays an important part in the processes of hegemony and the production of ideology.

The creation of common sense is a by-product of ideological struggles within discourse, which is itself a part of the hegemonic process. Fairclough argues that:

²³ Novick, (1996), *That Noble Dream*, p.62.

²⁴ Antonio Gramsci, (1949), *Quaderni del carcere: Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politico e sullo Stato moderno*, pp.102-103 in Hoare and Nowell Smith, (1971), *Selections*, footnote 49, p.80.

²⁵ Norman Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, (London and New York: Longman), p.76.

²⁶ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.78.

²⁷ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.78.

perhaps the relationship between discourse and hegemony is a matter of the latter limiting the potential of the former: there is no specifically discursive reason why there should not be an unlimited articulation and rearticulation of elements. It is hegemony – history that curtails the discursive potential and constrains which articulations actually come about, their durability and so forth.²⁸

The process of constructing common sense can be seen as the “fixing” of certain definitions or the constraint of options in talking about a subject. Another way of talking about common sense is to talk about the naturalization of ideology. As ideologies are “naturalized” they become invisible as ideologies. Fairclough argues that: “the naturalization and opacity of ideologies is a significant property of discourse...Naturalization gives to particular ideological representations the status of common sense, and thereby makes them opaque, i.e. no longer visible as ideologies.”²⁹ Stuart Hall refers not to naturalization of ideology but to the “naturalistic illusion,” saying that the “point at which we lose sight of the fact that sense is a production of our systems of representation is the point at which we fall, not into Nature but into the naturalistic illusion: the height (or depth) of ideology.”³⁰

Hegemony exists wherever unequal power relationships exist as one class or group seeks to maintain dominance over another or several others. Unequal power relationships give rise to ideology as groups struggle for the right to define meaning and discursive boundaries. This right is significant because the power to define the terms of discourse (whether through creation of common sense, defining boundaries and meanings, or through other means) is central to social, cultural, economic and political dominance. Thus, hegemony can be seen as the exercise of power through coven means — what Fairclough describes as the “broad shift from coercion to consent, incorporation and pluralism in the exercise of power.”³¹ Jon Stratton and Ien Ang explain the coven and ideological nature of hegemony by arguing that “hegemony derives its effectivity from a self-presentation as universal, one that does not acknowledge its own particularity.”³² The concept of hegemony provides a more nuanced approach to analysis of the function of ideas and institutions in society than does a purely structuralist or historical analysis.

It is important to remember that institutional ideologies are not the same as beliefs and views held by individuals. Ideology may be implicit in certain institutional ways of doing things or talking about the world, but it does not imply a coherent thought-out pattern of beliefs on the part of an individual. Fairclough refers to ideologies as “ways of seeing” and suggests that the

acquisition of normative “ways of talking” associated with a given subject position must simultaneously be the acquisition of the associated “ways of seeing” (ideological norms); that is, since any set of discursive norms entails a certain knowledge base, and since any knowledge base includes an ideological component, in acquiring the discursive norms one simultaneously acquires the associated ideological norms.³³

²⁸ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp.81-82.

²⁹ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp.41-42.

³⁰ Stuart Hall, (1996), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp.24-25.

³¹ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.80.

³² Jon Stratton and Ien Ang, (1996), ‘On the impossibility of global cultural studies: “British” cultural studies in an “international” frame’, in Morley and Chen, (1996), *Stuart Hall*, p.364.

³³ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.42.

Any analysis of discourse must then examine both event and institutional structure because ideology is located in both. Thus, a comprehensive analysis in Fairclough's view includes three dimensions: "social practice, discursive practice (text production, distribution and consumption) and text" and relationships between/among these.³⁴

One problem that often arises in the study of ideology is a focus limited to trying to identify ideological meaning in texts only from the perspective of the producer -- that is, trying to identify the meaning of texts rather than looking at the range of potential meanings within the text. Neither a focus on the producer nor an exclusive focus on audience reception provides a comprehensive picture of the processes of the circulation of ideology. Stuart Hall's notion of "preferred meaning" provides an useful insight in this regard. By this, Hall means that while audiences bring their own experiences to interpretation of media messages, messages are often "coded" to be interpreted in a certain manner. Therefore, analyses of text must examine both the dominant code or the "preferred meaning" encribed within a message and audience decoding of the dominant code as well as the audience's resistant interpretations.³⁵ Hall further integrates structure and experience in his analysis, suggesting that "[s]tructures exhibit tendencies - lines of force, openings and closures which constrain, shape, channel and in that sense 'determine'. But they cannot determine in the harder sense of fix absolutely, guarantee."³⁶

The ideas outlined above about ideology, hegemony and the creation of common sense are central in this dissertation. An assumption underlying the research was that the state and dominant groups in society produce and maintain popular ideas and practices that become "common sense." This process is by no means a sinister conspiracy on the part of the state; rather it is here assumed to be a natural process of the maintenance of power in society that occurs on many levels. In most cases, subordinate groups adhere to these ideologies, allowing the state to remain in power. In order to consolidate power, state mechanisms operate to absorb opposition, or if that cannot be done, to transform meanings in support of state authority.³⁷ By being able to define the "rules of the game," state apparatuses can also define political legitimacy and social relationships. One element of defining the rules is the production of foreign policy that is able to define what is the "other" and what is "not American" at a national and international level. This identification of the "other" may be important in understanding the creation of an American ideology of human rights as "common sense." This Gramscian perspective informed the research of media coverage of human rights and foreign policy.

A fundamental assumption underlying this work is that language is not a neutral medium.³⁸ Thus, language itself must be examined as well as the context of language production and the media of language transmission. This is not a linguistic project, but a study of the communication of ideas and the institutions within and between which ideas are created, constrained, transmitted and circulated. It is also a study of power and of the exercise of

³⁴ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp.73-74 and p.49.

³⁵ Stuart Hall, (1973), *Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse*, Birmingham: University of Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, unnumbered stencilled paper, p.16 in Colin Sparks, (1996), pp.86-87.

³⁶ Hall, (1996), *Encoding and Decoding*, p.16.

³⁷ Michael Omi and Howard Winant, (1994 - Second Ed.), *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, (New York and London: Routledge), pp.66-68.

³⁸ Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., (1995), *Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse*, (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap), p.260.

power through ideology. Ideology seeks acceptance as common sense. One task of critical scholars is to identify and reveal ideology whether for the purpose of resistance or for other scholarly purposes, without, of course, merely imposing their own ideologies.³⁹ The ultimate purpose here is to identify the ideology of the rhetoric of human rights in order to gain insight about alternative or multiple conversations about definition, power, international relationships, national identity and the role of the domestic history of individual nations in international discourse about human rights. The roles of domestic actors and institutions in the processes of foreign policy-making are often ignored in the examination of international relations. The purpose here was not to examine the international discourses of human rights — that is another dissertation entirely — but to examine the American discourse of human rights and foreign policy in the twentieth century to begin to develop a basis for later examination of international discourses which are assumed to be multiple conversations.

Having outlined the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation, other important literature must be examined, such as the historical role of human rights in foreign policy, the importance of the concept of sovereignty in understanding human rights, who is responsible for the making of foreign policy and the role of the media in the construction of national discourse.

The Making of Foreign Policy

Since the 1960s in the United States, a huge body of work has been painstakingly constructed around the concept that human rights considerations should play a role in foreign policy. Library shelves are lined with texts on the subject, far more than any one researcher could adequately tackle. Yet the task is made easier by the fact that a number of common themes runs through the literature. These themes encompass ideas about the historical role of the nature of the United States in the development of a world concept of human rights; the role of World War Two in prompting global discussions about basic rights of individuals; sovereignty and international norm-making; institutional and individual actors in the processes of codifying international norms; and outcomes of policies related to human rights. In extremely general terms, it can be said that research has divided along disciplinary lines, with political scientists and historians focusing attention on foreign policy outcomes and the role of different actors in the creation of policy whereas mass communication research (of which little exists) has focused on analysis of amount and content of media coverage of human rights issues. Little research has attempted to integrate these differing approaches or to explicitly examine the roles of media institutions, journalists or media coverage in the foreign policy process.

Very little work exists on the connection between human rights and foreign policy in the early part of the century. However Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points speech of 1918 outlining his proposed model of peace, the formation of a league to maintain this peace and suggesting international guarantee of various rights is often mentioned in the context of an American historical association with human rights.⁴⁰ Thus, the focus here is general twentieth-century literature about human rights and foreign policy. For each work several questions are addressed: what definition(s) of human rights are being used; what is identified (implicitly or explicitly) as the connection between human rights and foreign policy? When

³⁹ Norman Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp.82-83.

⁴⁰ *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, pp.680-681 in Ruhl J. Bartlett (Ed.), (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), pp.459-460.

did this connection (if identified) begin? What parties are identified (explicitly or otherwise) as playing a role — first, in the creation of foreign policy and second, in making human rights part of foreign policy? What theoretical and methodological approaches and paradigms are used? Finally, what areas still need to be studied and how can such research be done?

Before these questions can be addressed, a basic outline of foreign policy processes be sketched out to identify the legal and customary roles of different actors in the policy-making process. Some concepts basic to an understanding of foreign policy and the human rights debate must also be noted. Among the latter, sovereignty and allocation of responsibility for foreign policy are discussed below.

The Concept of Sovereignty and Human Rights

Much debate concerning the role of human rights in foreign policy arises out of issues related to national sovereignty. As a sovereign state in a system of nation-states, the United States retains exclusive authority in domestic governance while having authority also to establish relationships with other nation-states. Sovereignty comes not from the United States Constitution but is plenary; that is, it comes from the nature of the United States as a nation.⁴¹ Though Elmer Plischke calls the concept of sovereignty a “legal fiction,” this concept is essential to understanding the difficulties in establishing norms of behavior for nation-states at both the international and domestic level. Political scientist Kathryn Sikkink argues that the “doctrine of internationally protected rights offers one of the most powerful critiques of sovereignty as the concept is currently understood.”⁴² It does so by undermining a nation’s exclusive domestic authority and by providing recourse for a citizen external to that citizen’s nation, for example, by allowing individuals to appeal to international treaties when decisions of domestic courts fail to meet treaty provisions.⁴³

Responsibility for Foreign Policy

In the United States, constitutional responsibility for foreign policy is retained exclusively for the federal government (Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution).⁴⁴ However, responsibility is divided between the executive and legislative branches in the classic “checks and balances model.” Plischke argues that the United States Constitution identifies the executive and legislative branches of government as “joint trustees” of foreign policy.⁴⁵ Legislation proposed by congress can be vetoed by the president, but congress can overturn this veto. In the area of foreign policy, however, the initiative usually comes from the president and the executive branch, with support, though it may be conditional, from congress. David Forsythe argues that this support comes from a continuing belief in congress that a need exists for bipartisanship in foreign policy in order to show an united front to the world.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Elmer Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand), p.57.

⁴² Kathryn Sikkink, (1993), ‘The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keobane (Eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, (Ithaca: Cornell University), p.141.

⁴³ Sikkink, (1993), ‘The Power of Principled Ideas’, p.141.

⁴⁴ Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, pp.58-59.

⁴⁵ Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, p.65.

⁴⁶ David P. Forsythe, (1988), *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered*, (Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida), p.138.

Mass communication scholar Tsan-Kuo Chang argues that the executive branch is central in foreign policy, with a few elite players involved in making decisions.⁴⁷ Plischke seems to concur, although his conception of the executive branch involves “any administrative individual or agency that the President might legitimately use.”⁴⁸ While foreign policy may be announced by the president in addresses to congress or the nation, Plischke argues most foreign policy initiatives and formulations come from within the U.S. Department of State.⁴⁹ However, even if a foreign policy initiative comes from the U.S. Department of State, it “must be construed as having presidential approval.”⁵⁰ Both Chang and Plischke see a greater measure of power in the executive branch than in the legislative branch. Using the governmental politics models of G.T. Allison and R. Hilsman, Chang depicts the executive branch as being the inner circle of decision-making. The role of congress is in the second or third circle.⁵¹ Plischke argues that the greatest power of congress lies in the “power of the purse.”⁵² However, while congress can limit foreign policy by refusing funds or attaching explicit instructions to appropriations, these may not be defined or placed in context. In the area of human rights, terms such as “freedom,” “fundamental rights,” “democracy” and “civil society” are used without clear definition. Many of these terms can be argued to be culturally relative, yet they are often used in media content apparently without consideration of alternative definitions.

Media and the construction of National Discourse

While many individuals may not be exposed to news media on a daily basis, media merit study because they can “reproduce in miniature the contradictions in our thought, action, and social relations.”⁵³ As James Carey emphasizes in defining the ritual view of communication — that is, “not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs” — media serve functions beyond merely informing people.⁵⁴ This emphasis on media’s role in sharing of beliefs is also evident in Benedict Anderson’s perspective on the role of newspapers in the creation of national identity. To Anderson, one of the ties binding together a nation is the simultaneous consumption of the newspaper every day by individual citizens.⁵⁵ However, both Anderson and Carey emphasize the constructed nature of that shared identity. Anderson refers to the “newspaper-as-fiction” and the “profound fictiveness” of newspapers as a cultural product; and Carey, who refers to a “theory of fictions,” defines communication as “a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed.”⁵⁶

This extremely brief overview of some perspectives on the role of media in creating common sense, emphasizes the social constructionist model of media studies that was used in research for this dissertation. The social constructionist approach basically sees ideas and ideology as

⁴⁷ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.15.

⁴⁸ Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, p.67.

⁴⁹ Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, pp.67-69.

⁵⁰ Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, p.69.

⁵¹ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.13.

⁵² Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, p.81.

⁵³ James Carey, (1989), *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman), p.9.

⁵⁴ Carey, (1989), *Communication as Culture*, p.18.

⁵⁵ Benedict Anderson, (1991), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, (London and New York: Verso), pp.34-36.

⁵⁶ Anderson, (1991), *Imagined Communities*, p.35 and p.33 and Carey, (1989), *Communication as Culture*, p.23.

socio-historic constructions that both shape and are shaped by social structures.⁵⁷ This approach focuses on what some scholars have called the “ongoing processes of making history and meaning” and “takes communication to be the primary social process by which we create meanings and engage in cultural practices.”⁵⁸ Fairclough argues that any analysis of text needs to focus on the institutions and discourses associated with it because the “social institution is an intermediate level of social structuring, which faces Janus-like ‘upwards’ to the social formation, and ‘downwards’ to social actions.”⁵⁹ Fairclough further cautions that institutions are not monolithic in ideology or discourse, and that different ideological and discourse options exist not only at different times and places within an institution; they may also coexist as the result of internal organizational power struggles.⁶⁰ Following this brief overview of some perspectives on the role of media in creating common sense, a review of further relevant literature follows, focused on definitions and paradigms of human rights in foreign policy, the history of human rights and foreign policy and the role of the press in foreign policy.

Literature Review

The conceptual foundation for the research purpose and method used here become clearer from a review of relevant literature. The review below explores definitions of human rights in foreign policy literature; connections between human rights and foreign policy; and the role of the press in foreign policy. Recent scholarship has suggested that the power relationship between the executive and legislative branches is not static but continually shifting. As discussed below, in recent years the role of congress in the formulation and execution of foreign policy has expanded.

Human Rights in Foreign Policy: Definitions and Paradigms

One of the notable features about literature on human rights and foreign policy is the lack of an agreed upon definition of human rights. This may be due to authors’ reluctance to explicitly state positions in the human rights debate or the difficulty of pinning down a definition as a concrete concept. In monographs on the subject, discussion of ideas about human rights and their philosophical bases are relegated to the second, third or even later chapters, with the bulk devoted to policies and concepts that apparently are presumed to embody implicit definitions of human rights.⁶¹ Some individual essays within collections on the subject seem specialized to the point that such basic definitions seem to be deemed unnecessary.⁶² However, definition is important because human rights are not a simple, universally comprehensible concept. It is important to understand exactly what values researchers include in talk about rights so one does not impose one’s own definitions onto the framework of others’ arguments. For example, I may include the right to food and shelter as a fundamental human right and think this is included in claims about universality of rights, but

⁵⁷ Omi and Winant, (1994), *Racial Formation in the United States*, preface.

⁵⁸ Alberto Gonzalés, Marsha Houston and Victoria Chen (Eds.), (1994), *Our Voices: Essays in Culture, Ethnicity, and Communication, An Intercultural Anthology*, (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury), xvi.

⁵⁹ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.37.

⁶⁰ Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp.40- 41.

⁶¹ Charles Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series 241. Chapter 3: The Idea of Human Rights and Chapter 4: The Philosophical Rationale for Human Rights. David P. Forsythe, (1989), *Human Rights and World Politics*, (Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska), Chapter 7: The Political Philosophy of Human Rights, though to his credit, Forsythe identifies in the first few pages exactly what he means by human rights.

⁶² See bibliography for lists of essay collections.

another making those claims may mean only civil and political rights as universal human rights.

Human rights ideas have been categorized into three “generations” that roughly correlate with the French revolutionary slogan of “*liberté, égalité, fraternité*” and with their appearance in the discourse of human rights.⁶³ First-generation rights (*liberté*) are generally identified as civil and political rights — the rights of freedom. Second-generation rights (*égalité*) incorporate social, economic and cultural rights— rights of equality and fair distribution of resources. Third-generation rights (*fraternité*) are what have been called “solidarity rights to peace, to development, to a healthy environment, to the common heritage of mankind, and to humanitarian assistance.”⁶⁴ In general, American foreign policy has focused mainly upon first-generation rights, and these are what are being discussed when human rights are linked to foreign policy. However, this antecedent is rarely explicitly stated in the literature, perhaps because authors may share (or assume their readers share) this conception of human rights.

Political scientist Charles Frankel defines human rights as “claims by the individual which organized society is under a binding obligation to fulfil; [human rights] define the elementary duties which governments assume as a condition of their right to govern.”⁶⁵ While this definition clearly focuses on civil and political rights, Frankel does avoid the common error of conflating American democracy and human rights.⁶⁶ For Frankel, clear differences exist between suggestions about what would be good versus what would be rights. In his perspective, rights tell us about what has outraged people’s consciences, and “they [rights] express a resolution so as to organize the affairs of nations that such outrages will not take place.”⁶⁷ Frankel views these considerations of justice for individuals independent of and superior to the claims of government as having been associated with the United States since its inception.⁶⁸ He argues that Americans have long hoped that their concepts of rights are more than an American concept and that “[t]he creation of the American form of government, with its affirmation of these rights meant... the introduction into the world of a new standard by which the behavior of all governments might be judged.”⁶⁹

While Frankel makes a conscious effort to present different perspectives on human rights as part of the mission of the Foreign Policy Association Headline Series, the theoretical paradigm within which he works is clearly that of Western historic progressivism. The concept of human rights is portrayed as gradually developing alongside Western Enlightenment, industrialization, and the foundation of the United States. Human rights are naturalized as the domain of “reflexive and morally conscientious people” to whom “philosophical assurance satisfactory to all reasonable people can be offered, as things now stand, that in believing in human rights they are standing four-square with the Higher Reason of the universe.”⁷⁰ However, “the modern doctrine of human rights... in the non-Western

⁶³ Richard Pierre Claude and Bums H. Weston, (1992), in Claude and Weston, (Eds.), *Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action*, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania), p.6

⁶⁴ Forsythe, (1989), *Human Rights and World Politics*, p.6.

⁶⁵ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.19.

⁶⁶ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.42.

⁶⁷ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.34.

⁶⁸ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.3.

⁶⁹ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.4.

⁷⁰ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, pp.19, 33.

world ... is still capable of provoking surprise among many people.”⁷¹ Thus, his claim to universality of rights is undermined by his own argument in suggesting that universal rights may cause surprise among non-Western people. This progressive paradigm, however, suggests that one party or nation, by setting the terms of the discourse and through vague and generalized definitions of key components, is able to define the achievements and progress, indeed the level of civilization, of another.

Political scientists Peter Brown and Douglas MacLean’s collection of essays focuses mainly on the foreign policy aspect of human rights. However, in their introduction to the collection, they define human rights as the “universal requirements of social justice,” saying that “all persons have them, all persons share them equally, they do not depend on any special status of relations, and they can be claimed from or asserted against the actions of any and all other humans and institutions.”⁷² Definition of these rights for all people is based on three categories used by (1977-1980) Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance: rights of personal security (the rights to life, liberty, fair trial and freedom from torture); civil and political rights (“thought, religion, speech, the press and movement”); and economic rights (“food, shelter, healthcare and education”).⁷³ In spite of the wide spectrum of rights identified in the book’s introduction, the chapters deal only with civil and political rights — the so-called rights of freedom. Mark Schneider argues in the first chapter that the “United States Government frequently defined individual freedom, self-determination, and civil liberties in statements condemning violations of human rights by other governments.”⁷⁴ It is possible that this emphasis on civil and political rights is an artefact of the area under study. That is, foreign policy itself emphasizes this type of rights. Or perhaps these rights are the only type that foreign policy can properly address. On the other hand, the American discourse about human rights has traditionally emphasized civil and political rights above others, according to literature reviewed.

Transcending even that discourse, Tom Harkin, congressional author of two major human rights laws, argues that “Human rights is a sine qua non of civilization.”⁷⁵ He further asserts that “[t]he other achievements and progress of a culture are meaningless unless the dignity of individual people - their human rights - is protected and affirmed in the daily life of nations.”⁷⁶ This again illustrates the progressive paradigm visible in much writing about human rights.

Tracy Strong’s stance on human rights means he can be characterized as a “moderate proponent” of American exceptionalism. While he perceives the United States as special due to the circumstances of the country’s founding, he sees a future where Americans will not stand out in the world community. However, this American position would emerge not because other nations espouse similar human rights principles — that is, no country would “be constituted by an attitude toward any human being that would make our [the American]

⁷¹ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.19.

⁷² Peter G. Brown and Douglas Maclean, (1979), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books), xix.

⁷³ Brown and MacLean, (1979), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, xx.

⁷⁴ Mark L. Schneider, (1979), ‘A New Administration’s New Policy: The Rise to Power of Human Rights’, in Brown and MacLean, (1979), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.3.

⁷⁵ Tom Harkin, (1979), ‘Human Rights and Foreign Aid: Forging an Unbreakable Link’, in Brown and MacLean, (1979), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.15.

⁷⁶ Tom Harkin, (1979), ‘Human Rights and Foreign Aid’, p.15.

attitude ‘exceptional’.”⁷⁷ He argues that a source of legitimacy for America as a nation is the concept that rights are universal.⁷⁸ With relation to the founding of the United States, Strong suggests that “Americans have argued that America’s existence as a nation entitled it to speak out and to act in the name of those principles upon which it was founded.”⁷⁹ However, a cautionary note is sounded with the argument that American conceptions of rights cannot be seen as universal just because they are held to be so. He states that “the general characteristics of human beings appear as self-evident when we *hold* them to be so. The naturalness of the physical realm depends on the volition in the act of founding” (italics in original).⁸⁰

The essays on human rights in *The Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy* display a distinctly pragmatic bent in that they focus on the reality of the implementation of human rights policies rather than on philosophical approaches to the concept of human rights. Political scientist Richard Falk argues that individual stances on human rights are strongly correlated to ideological stances and positions in the United States political spectrum.⁸¹ As a self-described pragmatic realist, he suggests that human rights can only move forward when the relationship between different actors and sectors is in the right balance.⁸² Although political rhetoric, particularly from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, included economic and social rights among essential human rights, Falk’s perspective is that the political focus has been entirely on civil and political rights.⁸³

Echoing Falk’s pragmatic realism, political scientist Robert Borosage introduces a note of cynicism when he argues that human rights, or “liberal evangelism,” is not humanitarianism but a political stance “providing moral purpose for intervention abroad and a logical excuse for military expenditure, secrecy, and repression at home.”⁸⁴ In contrast to this perspective on human rights policy as a renewal of anti-communism, political scientist Bruno Bitker concludes that human rights history in general, and the American experience in particular, focuses on the protection of the rights of individuals.⁸⁵ This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech of 1941 (freedoms of speech, expression, and religion; freedoms from want, from fear and physical aggression⁸⁶) and from Carter’s 1978 Paris speech in which he claimed that “[t]here is one belief above all others that has made us what we are ... belief that the rights of the individual inherently stand higher than the claims or demands of the state.”⁸⁷

⁷⁷ Tracy B. Strong, (1980), ‘Taking the Rank with What Is Ours: American Political Thought, Foreign Policy, mid Questions of Rights’, in Paula Newberg (Ed.), *The Politics of Human Rights*, (New York and London: New York University), p.58.

⁷⁸ Strong, (1980), ‘Taking the Rank with What Is Ours’, p.51

⁷⁹ Strong, (1980), ‘Taking the Rank with What Is Ours’, p.45.

⁸⁰ Strong, (1980), ‘Taking the Rank with What Is Ours’, p.49.

⁸¹ Richard A. Falk, (1981), ‘Ideological Patterns in the United States Human Rights Debate: 1945-1978’, in Natalie Kaufman Hevener, (Ed.), *The Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction), pp.37-45.

⁸² Falk, (1981), ‘Ideological Patterns’, pp.37-40.

⁸³ Falk, (1981), ‘Ideological Patterns’, p.43.

⁸⁴ Robert L. Borosage, (1981), ‘Domestic Consequences of United States Human Rights Policies’ in Hevener, (1981), *The Dynamics of Human Rights*, pp.54-55.

⁸⁵ Bruno V. Bitker, (1981), ‘The United States and International Codification of Human Rights: A Case of Split Personality’, in Hevener, (1981), *The Dynamics of Human Rights*, p.79.

⁸⁶ Bitker, (1981), *The United States and International Codification of Human Rights*, p.81.

⁸⁷ James Carter, Paris, January 4, 1978, U.S. Department of State News Release (New York: Bureau of Public Affairs in Hevener, (1981), *The Dynamics of human Rights*, p.96.

This emphasis on the civil and political rights of individuals is the focus of political scientist Lars Schoultz's 1981 comprehensive analysis of United States human rights policy in relation to South America. Schoultz's focus is even narrower than general civil and political rights in that he exclusively examines so-called "antitorture rights," that is, the rights to "life, liberty, and the integrity of the person in the sense that [these rights] cannot be denied without the impartial application of due process of law."⁸⁸ He argues that these antitorture rights do not transcend or "trump" other rights but have been the main focus of United States policy towards Latin America.⁸⁹

Political scientist David Forsythe has written extensively about human rights, with three books published since 1988. While each book addresses different, though often overlapping, areas of human rights, his general perspective has remained consistent. His working definition of human rights as a balance of civil, political and socioeconomic rights, while acknowledging the historical importance for the United States of civil and political rights, takes a middle-of-the-road approach.⁹⁰ However, his perspective is both progressivist and activist, with an emphasis on the central role played by the United States on the world stage. His work incorporates ideas about the revolutionary aspect of world human rights policies and the concept of the world starting on a gradual path upon which it has some distance to go.⁹¹ Thus, there is a clear progressivist theme but the actual goal of the progress remains unclear.

Historical Connections Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy

A constant theme through the literature on human rights and foreign policy is the need to balance moral concerns with geopolitical realities. While the theme is constant, emphases differ as to the relative importance of each aspect. Self-described realists tend to emphasize national security concerns and national interest while idealists, as *defined* by realists, are seen to make unreasonable demands for ephemeral moral concerns. Idealists naturally see their own position as reasonable and realistic while they see the so-called "realist" stance as amoral, if not immoral, and unbecoming to American traditions and ideals. A consensus seems to exist however, that since World War Two, U.S. foreign policy has been tied to human rights concerns, but the extent has varied, depending on the context and contemporaneous geopolitical concerns. Frankel argues that "considerations of justice and moral principle have a legitimate place in U.S. foreign policy,"⁹² and that this is related to "history, tradition and basic national interest."⁹³ However, he concedes that, while human rights may have a legitimate place in foreign policy, they must be balanced with geopolitical reality and be "realistically deliverable."⁹⁴ In a variation on the "means to an end" argument, he says the demands of the Cold War and fears of nuclear proliferation make it an "imperative of American foreign policy - to maintain American security within an [...]"

⁸⁸ Lars Schoultz, (1981), *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p.3.

⁸⁹ Schoultz, (1981), *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, p.3.

⁹⁰ Forsythe, (1989), *Human Rights and World Politics*, xiv.

⁹¹ Forsythe, (1989), *Human Rights and World Politics*, xiv.

⁹² Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.9.

⁹³ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.5.

⁹⁴ Frankel, (1978), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, pp.45, 53.

Strong emphasizes the difficulties in the incorporation of human rights into policy when he argues that the “pursuit of human rights goals in foreign policy tends to place the policymaker in a contradiction between that which he is obliged to acknowledge as an American and that which is possible and desirable for a state.”⁹⁵ Strong’s solution to this contradiction is that policy should not focus on the status of individuals within a country but should emphasize a relationship between states in order to “promote policies... to produce changes in the social fabric of a particular society.”⁹⁶

In a more pragmatic turn, Falk argues that the only way to deal with the contradictions between the perceived different goals of human rights legislation and traditional foreign policy is to focus on results rather than rhetoric. Human rights rhetoric should be ignored unless it can be seen to actually influence policy action.⁹⁷ Falk presents a two-page checklist for assessing human rights policy that calls attention to diplomatic settings, government settings, policy domains and domestic implementation in the United States.⁹⁸ By use of such a list, he expresses a hope that researchers and academics can step outside the endless and mostly useless debate over the relative importance of different foreign policy concerns. Schoultz in a similarly pragmatic tone asserts that “in no case has a commitment to increase the importance of human rights considerations in foreign policy been to deny the legitimacy of other competing values. Thus, the impact of human rights is always a function of the other potential interests and values that impinge upon any given policy decision.”⁹⁹ Congress was seen (in the literature) to play a vital role in bringing human rights concerns firmly into foreign policy considerations. Tom Harkin sees foreign policy as a coalition among people, the executive branch and congress, in which the role of congress is not only to publicize human rights issues through resolutions, censures and cutting aid, but also to institutionalize human rights concerns through legislation.¹⁰⁰ In contrast, Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State from 1973-1977 argued that foreign policy was not the best way to deal with issues of human rights because it was “too inflexible, too public, and too heavyhanded.”¹⁰¹ MacLean argued that congress is vital in the foreign policy process because if policy is left entirely to “experts” in the U.S. Department of State and other administrative branches, pragmatism dominates over “right.”¹⁰² John Salzberg concurs with this assessment and adds that the State Department in its reports to congress is constrained by the tension between congressional requirement for honest information and maintenance of friendly relationships with other countries.¹⁰³

Political scientist Paula Newberg argues that congress was pushed into an active role in the 1970s because of presidential reluctance to incorporate human rights concerns in foreign policy. Congress saw human rights as a “powerful antidote to the ideological force of communism and therefore an issue to be pursued vigorously.”¹⁰⁴ Newberg raises an important

⁹⁵ Strong, (1980), ‘Taking the Rank with What Is Ours’, pp.56-57.

⁹⁶ Strong, (1980), ‘Taking the Rank with What Is Ours’, p.58.

⁹⁷ Falk, (1981), ‘Ideological Patterns’, p.47.

⁹⁸ Falk, (1981), ‘Ideological Patterns’, pp.48-49.

⁹⁹ Schoultz, (1981), *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, p.109.

¹⁰⁰ Harkin, (1979), ‘Human Rights and Foreign Aid’, p.16.

¹⁰¹ Kissinger in 75 Department of State Bulletin 603, (1976) in Douglas MacLean, (1979), ‘Constraints, Goals, and Moralism in Foreign Policy’, in Brown and MacLean, (1979), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.94.

¹⁰² Douglas MacLean, (1979), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, pp.93, 101.

¹⁰³ John Salzberg, (1979), ‘Monitoring Human Rights Violations: How Good is the Information?’, in Brown and MacLean, (1979), *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, p.178.

¹⁰⁴ Paula Newberg, (1980), ‘Introduction: Dimensions of the Problem’, pp.1-2.

issue overlooked in much of the literature — that human rights and morality are often conflated, not only in public debate but also in analysis and academic research. She argues that “separating human rights as an operational dimension of foreign policy from the broader, familiar issue of morality in politics has proved to be a difficult issue to overcome, both domestically and internationally.”¹⁰⁵ Much analysis of U.S. historical links with human rights concerns does not attempt to, or perhaps cannot, separate these concepts.

Newberg also presents a useful summary of the different perspectives on the role of human rights in foreign policy discussed above. The first perspective sees human rights as a weapon in an ideological war. A second perspective sees human rights as the “touchstone,” or beginning point of all action. Other perspectives approach human rights as either an independent issue in policy or as a component of all issues.¹⁰⁶

Robert Boettcher argues that congress, through such committees as the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House International Relations Committee, played an important role — not only in formulating policy but in changing the role of the U.S. State Department in the early 1970s. He argues that even before Carter’s emphasis on human rights, congress forced human rights onto the agenda of the executive branch and the State Department in particular.¹⁰⁷ Forsythe places similar emphasis on the role of congress. However, he argues that, although congress put human rights on the foreign policy table, congress remains subordinated to the executive branch in most aspects of foreign policy.¹⁰⁸ Congress is limited to three types of actions: hortatory statements (general statements about what “should be,” also known as “dead letters”); general norms (laws to which congress tries to ensure executive compliance); and specific rules, either country- or function-specific.¹⁰⁹ Within the boundaries of these three types of actions, congress has four possibilities for enforcement. The first is to make general policy statements — in a way, statements of notice to the executive. Attempts to enforce these policy statements can be by withholding consent on treaties and presidential appointments, passing legislation requiring reporting either before taking action or accounts of exact action, and by refusing or limiting executive appropriation requests.¹¹⁰

However, Forsythe argues that congressional influence on human rights policy is limited in two major ways. The first is that human rights action within congress is heavily dependent on individual concerns and personalities. For example, Representative Donald Fraser was able to have the House Subcommittee on International Organizations renamed to include human rights in the title as part of his personal interest in the area.¹¹¹ Once individual members lose interest or leave congress, attention may focus on other areas. Congress is also limited by the belief that foreign policy requires bipartisanship. Thus, according to Forsythe, ‘Congress usually acts by way of compromise. It does not say ‘no’ to an administration; it says ‘yes, but’”¹¹² Even if congress places financial restrictions on the administration, the administration

¹⁰⁵ Newberg, (1980), ‘Introduction: Dimensions of the Problem’, p.4.

¹⁰⁶ Newberg, (1980), ‘Introduction: Dimensions of the problem’, p.5.

¹⁰⁷ Robert B. Boettcher, (1981), ‘The Role of Congress in Deciding United States Human Rights Policies’, in Hevener, *The Dynamics of human Rights*, p.279.

¹⁰⁸ Forsythe, (1988), *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered*, (Gainesville, FL:University Presses of Florida), ix and p.138.

¹⁰⁹ Forsythe, (1988), *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp.5-7.

¹¹⁰ Forsythe, (1988), *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp.138-139.

¹¹¹ Forsythe, (1988), *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp.141-144.

¹¹² Forsythe, (1988), *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p.147.

can continue to rhetorically support a perceived violator of human rights.¹¹³ However, Forsythe concludes that congressional action regarding human rights has “psychological and political importance” and that “Congress has made an important contribution to United States foreign policy by its insistence that what happens to people matters.”¹¹⁴ Yet, he is still able to argue in a later work that, in a world nation-state system, priority must be given to security over human rights.¹¹⁵

In contrast to emphasizing the role of congress, Borosage sees the role of the president as extremely significant in policy because the president establishes the framework for public discussion. This is an important role because, “in his choice of themes, a president creates a new language for the bureaucracy, structures argument in Congress, provides grist for learned milling, and creates hopes and expectations in the citizenry.”¹¹⁶ Chang’s perspective is similar in that he sees the inner circle of policy makers, of which the president is the central figure, as able to define the “terms of play” or the “rules of the game.” This in turn circumscribes the roles of so-called ad hoc “players,” such as congress, the media and the public.¹¹⁷

Using a slightly different approach, Weissbrodt and Sikkink see non-government organizations as playing a central role in the incorporation of human rights concerns into foreign policy. In conjunction with this idea, both also see human rights as a multilateral policy issue in addition to bilateral policies. Weissbrodt argues that interest groups may not try to directly influence policy, but “their information-gathering and publicity about human rights violations may have important impacts on U.S. policy.”¹¹⁸ Congress remains important because it is the traditional focus for activities of non-governmental organizations. The U.S. State Department tends to resist outside input into policy-making, but congress remains one of the few institutions through which the public can influence policy.¹¹⁹ This receptivity to public influence may be due to demands of constituents. In addition, individual members of congress may pass information to the administration that may generate responses or practical help for individual human rights victims.¹²⁰ Sikkink argues that non-governmental organizations play a vital role as “carriers of transformative ideas.”¹²¹ She argues that these transformative ideas have brought concerned individuals together into international “principled issue networks” that can influence both multilateral and bilateral human rights policies.¹²²

The Role of the Press in Foreign Policy

The argument that the public can participate in foreign policy by gathering information and creating publicity may apply to the media as non-governmental actors. However, most of the literature discussed above largely omits discussion of the role of the media. Some

¹¹³ Forsythe, (1988), *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p.149.

¹¹⁴ Forsythe, (1988), *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p.169 and p.174.

¹¹⁵ Forsythe, (1989), *Human Rights and World Politics*, p.123.

¹¹⁶ Borosage, (1981), ‘Domestic Consequences of United States Human Rights Policies’, p.33.

¹¹⁷ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, pp.15-16.

¹¹⁸ David Weissbrodt, (1981), ‘The Influence of Interest Groups on the Development of United States Human Rights Policies’, in Hevener, p.230.

¹¹⁹ Weissbrodt, (1981), ‘The Influence of Interest Groups’, pp.234, 239.

¹²⁰ Weissbrodt, (1981), ‘The Influence of Interest Groups’, pp.238-239.

¹²¹ Sikkink, (1993), ‘The Power of Principled Ideas’, p.170.

¹²² Kathryn Sikkink, (1993), ‘Human rights, principled issue-networks, and sovereignty in Latin America’, *International Organization*, 47/3, p.411

acknowledge a public opinion role in the formation of foreign policy (or at least a slight influence) but apparently are reluctant to suggest that policy may be influenced by (unelected, unrepresentative) private corporate institutions. Yet others implicitly allocate the press a role but do not explicitly examine that role. Plischke's perspective is that "by virtue of American freedom of speech and the press, an unpopular foreign policy would soon be undermined abroad if it were not popularly supported at home"¹²³; and "in the long run the decisions made remain subject to subsequent popular approval and this in itself is a powerful check on the executive foreign relations authority."¹²⁴ However, he makes no attempt to elucidate this assertion, and it remains just that — an assertion.

Historians and political scientists seem to see the media role as that of a conduit between public opinion and elected officials.¹²⁵ Schoultz does discuss the role of the press in the creation of positive attitudes about violators of human rights in Argentina and other Latin American countries. However, he does not examine actual coverage and effects. Rather, he notes only that journalists whose visits to Latin American countries were subsidized tended to produce much more positive reports about that country and its government than did the reports of unsubsidized journalists.¹²⁶ Thus, the implicit assumption is that the press can influence opinion but have no explicit importance in the policy-making process.

As no formal or systematic system exists within the executive branch or congress for assessing public opinion, the media are seen by members of congress as useful for gauging public opinion — but in conjunction with opinion polls (whether reported in the media or presented directly to the administration) and letters from constituents.¹²⁷ Schoultz's interviews with individual legislators and administrative staff in congress showed that letters from constituents were often defined as public opinion because an "issue public" was seen to exist.¹²⁸ He further argues that "many foreign policy makers believe that citizens are concerned about human rights in an abstract sense but that their level of interest in the issue of U.S. policy toward human rights violations is extremely low"¹²⁹

The most significant examination of the role of the press in foreign policy comes from Chang's comprehensive review of three decades of literature on the subject. Chang concludes that the media are an important link between people and the government, and while they play a role in political and social structures, they cannot be considered as independent actors in the policy-making process. He argues that:

the foreign policy environment is a playground where only a very few selected players are allowed. As such, the structure of decision apparatus, and its rules of the game at the national level, tend to limit the role and power of the press in the game of international politics, thus decreasing its initiative and capability as a watchdog over governmental actions, let alone as a strong competitor in the process of decision making.¹³⁰

¹²³ Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, p.83.

¹²⁴ Plischke, (1967), *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, p.88.

¹²⁵ Schneider, (1979), 'A New Administration's New Policy', p.5.

¹²⁶ Schoultz, (1981), *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, pp.51-52.

¹²⁷ Schoultz, (1981), *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, pp.41-42.

¹²⁸ Schoultz, (1981), *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, pp.43-44.

¹²⁹ Schoultz, (1981), *Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America*, p.23.

¹³⁰ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.5.

Especially during times of war, the government is able to define situations and set limits on press coverage that restrict the influence that the press can have on policymaking.¹³¹ Furthermore, the executive branch, and especially the president, is seen to set the agenda for the press.¹³² While Chang accepts that the media are ad hoc players in foreign policy, with press content shaped by policy makers, he sees the press playing a role when foreign policy debate moves to the public arena.¹³³ At this point the press gives information to the general public about government policy while giving information to the government about public opinion — “the press becomes a constant tie connecting the government and the public in the world of foreign affairs and international politics.”¹³⁴

Chang then identifies five ways in which the media are important after foreign policy debate moves to the public arena: as a source of foreign affairs knowledge for the general public; as a link between the government and people interested in foreign policy; as a measure of public opinion for the government; as informal information channels between governments; and as “a standard source of factual information” for diplomats and the inner circle within the executive.¹³⁵ Chang also sees media coverage as important in the formation of public opinion in that there are links between media coverage of issues and the public’s rating of issues as important.¹³⁶

While some argue that the press does not play the part of an independent actor in foreign policy-making, the sources reviewed seem to suggest that the press does have some role, even if primary power is vested in the executive. It has been suggested that American leaders get a great deal of their knowledge about foreign affairs from the media. Still questions remain as to the role of the media. A question is raised by the idea common in agenda-setting research that the media serve to circulate ideas and symbols generated by policy makers.¹³⁷ This idea, and ideas reviewed above about public opinion, grant agency to the general public and the branches of government, but they grant none, or little, agency to the media. While this may be the case in general foreign policy, the question remains as to whether the media have played a greater role in the incorporation of human rights concerns into foreign policy.

Political scientist Jay Ovsiovitch takes an important first step towards addressing this question when he says that “news coverage of human rights is important for education, the protection of rights, and the development of foreign policy.”¹³⁸ However, he focuses attention on the “different slants and biases that are being reported” and in only one brief paragraph deals with the “clear importance” of the media role.¹³⁹ What role the media actually play in the making of foreign policy remains unclear. One area that seems particularly promising for research is examination of media content over time to identify origins of the ideas and symbols that represent human rights. Are these symbols generated by the government and passed unchanged through the media to the public? Do they originate within the government

¹³¹ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.6.

¹³² Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.18.

¹³³ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, pp.24-26.

¹³⁴ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.27

¹³⁵ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.24.

¹³⁶ G. Funkhauser, (1973), ‘The issues of the sixties: An exploratory study of the dynamics of public opinion’. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 37,62-75 and M. Madmen and S. Coombs, (1981), *More Than News: Media Power in Public Affairs*, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage), in Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.25.

¹³⁷ Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy*, p.26.

¹³⁸ Jay S. Ovsiovitch, (1993), ‘News Coverage of Human Rights’, *Political Research Quarterly*, 46, p.671.

¹³⁹ Ovsiovitch, (1993), ‘News Coverage of Human Rights’, pp.671-672.

but are transformed into different ideas via the media? Or are they generated in the media and picked up by formal players in the policy-making process?

The intention of this research was not an examination of media content for accuracy and amount of coverage — the explicit content of media — but the implicit content; that is, how are ideas constructed and talked about? In other words, what discourse of human rights exists in the media? Is it the same discourse that exists in other parts of society, such as the political arenas or civil society? If it is not, has it influenced other discourses? This approach may provide insight about the role of media in foreign policy-making, at least in the area of human rights. In order to examine this, three main types of texts were used to create a picture of twentieth-century human rights discourse: newspaper articles from leading mainstream newspapers, congressional records and presidential statements.

The analytical methods, critical discourse analysis and narrative analysis, are discussed in more depth in Chapter Two. Thus, the next chapter outlines the specific research questions, details the method used and introduces the case studies. Chapters Three through Six present findings from, in turn: Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Talks; The United Nations conference at San Francisco; the Carter Presidential campaign of 1976 and the United States response to China following the events of Tiananmen in 1989. Each chapter describes the type of discourse in each case, the stories being told about human rights, definitions of human rights used in each and the possible impact of United States domestic discourse on international human rights discourse. Final analysis and discussion of the discourses and narratives of human rights and United States foreign policy in the twentieth century follow in the final chapter.

Chapter Two

Studying the Narratives and Discourses of Human Rights

This dissertation focuses on representations in media content of, and political rhetoric about, human rights in foreign policy. Such representations are an important part of any contemporary analysis of society, and political rhetoric is fundamental to understanding the goals of and reasons for foreign policy. This chapter outlines some essential definitions for the work and the method used to study the texts -- a combination of narrative and critical discourse analysis.

Defining human rights

As a point of departure for this study, human rights are defined using the 1948 United Nations' Statement of Essential Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights are defined as *the equality of all individuals and the entitlement of each to equal protection and equal guarantees of rights*. In summary, these rights include: the freedom of religion, opinion, speech, assembly, and association; freedom from wrongful interference (torture, arbitrary arrest, punishment), from retroactive laws; rights to a nationality, to leave and return to a country, fair trial, education, work and fair conditions (including adequate remuneration, hours of labor and equal pay for equal work), food and housing, social security, participation in government, property rights (including intellectual property). These rights are limited only by the rights of others and the requirements of the democratic state (the "just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare").¹⁴⁰ The democratic state where the will of the people is the basis of government expressed by "periodic and genuine elections" with universal suffrage by 1 "secret vote or equivalent free voting procedures" is seen as the ideal type of government to provide these rights.¹⁴¹ Given the historically different terrain of each period under examination here however, contemporaneous definitions of human rights are identified and incorporated at each chronological stage in the study. In these contemporaneous definitions of human rights, ideas about rights and morality were often intertwined — that is, ideas about rights that fall outside the definitions contained in the UDHR were part of the discourse. Thus, analysis of context was necessary to separate discourse about rights and more general moral and/or religious discourses. However, this dissertation attempts to illuminate the evolution of a twentieth-century ideology of human rights and "discourse of morality" and thus, all of these discourses are important

Method

To examine how human rights ideas are constructed and talked about in media content and in congress, and to identify the discourse(s) of human rights — bearing in mind Fairclough's admonition that texts must be interrogated at multiple levels — methodological questions must be addressed. Three main types of text were examined for this dissertation: newspaper articles and editorials; congressional records; and presidential statements. Press content and

¹⁴⁰ William Draper Lewis and John R. Ellingston (Eds.), 'Essential Human Rights', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 243, January 1946, pp.18-26.

¹⁴¹ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), 10December 1948 in Jack Donnelly, (1993), *International Human Rights*, (Boulder, CO: Westview), pp.165-168.

congressional records are separately addressed while presidential statements are interwoven throughout analysis both of media content and congressional debate. Archival materials filed at the Library of Congress from individuals within the U.S. State Department and from journalists are used here for supplementary background information. Both critical discourse analysis and narrative analysis were used to approach texts at different levels although the findings are presented as a single analysis. Text types were compared to identify different types of discourse and possible differences in the type and scope of stories that were told. For example, newspaper articles were compared with congressional records and presidential statements to illuminate within case differences. Cases studies were also compared to examine changes in discourse and narrative over time.

The questions guiding research were when and how linkages were made between foreign policy and human rights. Were these linkages related to constructions of American identity, and how were human rights stories constructed by the media and in political discourse? These questions were asked in the context of the larger question of how ideas come to be seen as common sense in society ~ in this case, how certain constructions of human rights came to be seen over time as the story of human rights, not only an American story but an universal story.

To answer these research questions, discourse analysis was used to reveal how the stories were being told. This required answering the following questions: What statements about human rights appear (selected under terms of the UDHR)? What definition(s) of human rights are being used (other ways of talking about human rights outside the terms of the UDHR)? What is identified (explicitly or implicitly) as the connection between human rights and foreign policy? Are statements about human rights linked to United States ideals and identity? If so, in what ways? What domains of discourse can be identified in statements about human rights (political, social, economic, religious, general morality)? What symbols and ideas are linked with human rights? What parties are credited as having a role in the creation of foreign policy? What parties are identified as having a role in the incorporation of human rights in foreign policy? (Necessary definitions of terms in these questions are given below.)

Narrative analysis focuses on the specific stories being told in each text to determine whether an overarching story of human rights is being told or whether several different narratives of human rights are being created. Research questions guiding the narrative analysis were: What story(ies) is/are being told about human rights in the text? Who is telling the stories? How are these stories being told?

Finally, the findings resulting from application of these interwoven analytical approaches are used to inform speculation on questions such as: Why are these particular stories being told? What are the results of the fact that certain stories are being told and not others? Whose interests are being served or considered? What does the telling of the American human rights story(ies) reveal about: a) how ideas are circulated in society? b) the function of ideology in foreign policy? c) sanctioned actors in foreign policy? d) the role of the print media in foreign policy and in circulating ideas in society?

Narrative Analysis

Narrative analysis has traditionally been the domain of literary analysis, largely focusing on works of fiction. However, recent developments in qualitative research have led to its

increasing use in ethnography and other fieldwork-based research.¹⁴² As use of narrative analysis has spread, definitions of narrative have proliferated. Matters are further complicated by confusion over the differentiation of narrative and discourse. Historian Hayden White presents the difference between narrative and discourse as being that narrative is “objective” because the narrator is absent and events are simply presented as having occurred. In contrast, discourse is seen to be “subjective” because the narrator or the “ego” is present as someone or something that constructs the discourse.¹⁴³ It is clear, however, that White does not see narrative as being literally objective; rather, in the absence of an identified narrator, narrative is perceived as recitation of fact rather than as a discourse imbued with context and ideology or a specific point or points of view. In fact, White points out the clear subjective nature of narrative because he says it requires that events must be arranged to form a storyline (a process that he refers to as narrativity). The most useful distinction here is that involving the narrator — that, ironically, narrative is narratorless while discourse exists only by virtue of the presence of a narrator. The question that can and must then be posed by any student of the mass media is whether, using such a definition, news reports would be considered narrative or discourse. I will return to this question after considering further some other relevant definitions.

Some scholars focus on differentiating between story and discourse rather than narrative and discourse. Rhetorician Seymour Chatman refers to the story as *what happened* versus discourse as *how a story is told*. He uses the example of story order as being A, B, C, D, where each letter represents the linear progression of events. In contrast, discourse may present the story in the order A, C, B, D for the reasons of the narrator.¹⁴⁴ Further complicating the issue, English scholar and semiotician Robert Scholes speaks about narration as “a sequencing of something for somebody”¹⁴⁵ while a story is a “higher (because more rule-governed) category” of narrative.¹⁴⁶ English scholar Barbara Herrnstein Smith offers an even broader definition in referring to narrative discourse as “someone telling someone else that something happened.”¹⁴⁷ So perhaps all that is clear is that scholars of narrative agree on no single definition of the terms narrative, discourse and story.

This dissertation was informed by the work of historian Marilyn Robinson Waldman, who argues that a “full” narrative requires “formal elements of stories, explicit comments on connections between events, and some kind of ‘moralizing’ closure.”¹⁴⁸ Closure is the point to which events lead, or more simply the conclusion of the story. With reference to Chatman, a story is defined here as the content, or “what happened,” and discourse is defined as how the story is told. Therefore, narrative can be summarized as:

¹⁴² See for example, the use of narrative analysis in life story and psychological research such as that of Amia Lieblich, Rivka Tuval-Mashiach and Tamar Zilber, (1998), *Narrative Research: Reading, Analysis, and Interpretation*, Applied Social Research Methods Series. Volume 47, (Thousand Oaks: Sage).

¹⁴³ Hayden White is drawing here on the ideas of Gérard Genette and Emile Benveniste. Hayden White, (1980), ‘The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’, in W.J.T. Mitchell (Ed.), *On Narrative*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago), p.3.

¹⁴⁴ Seymour Chatman, (1980), ‘What Novels Can Do That Films Can’t (And Vice Versa)’, in Mitchell, *On Narrative*, pp.119-120.

¹⁴⁵ Robert Scholes, (1980), ‘Language, Narrative, and Anti-Narrative’, in Mitchell, *On Narrative*, p.205.

¹⁴⁶ Scholes, (1980), ‘Language, Narrative, and Anti-Narrative’, p.206.

¹⁴⁷ Barbara Herrnstein Smith, (1980), ‘Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories’ in Mitchell, *On Narrative*, p.228.

¹⁴⁸ Marilyn Robinson Waldman, (1980), ‘The Otherwise Unnoteworthy Year 711’: A Reply to Hayden White’, in Mitchell, *On Narrative*, p.240.

narrative = story (what happened or the plot) + discourse (connecting events + closure)

The question of whether news is narrative or discourse can then be answered in several ways. One may use the definition above — that news reports are narratives because they involve an account of what happened and how, and often, they include the conclusion of events or the point to which events lead. The conjunction of Hayden White's distinction between the subjective nature of discourse and the objective nature of narrative and standard modern journalistic beliefs in objectivity leads to the conclusion that news is indeed a narrative. Events may well be organized to form a storyline, but the narrator is absent and events are presumed to speak for themselves. Thus, analysis of news requires examination of both story and discourse (how the story is told) to delineate the narrative.

This then raises another issue — whether narrative analysis, having derived mainly from literary studies, can be applied to texts constructed explicitly as non-fictional accounts — such as news reports, congressional debates and presidential statements. The Oxford English Dictionary defines narrative simply as “a spoken or written account of connected events in order of happening.”¹⁴⁹ Thus, it can be argued that narrative analysis can be applied to a wide range of texts as long as the texts are accounts of connected events — and that these texts need not necessarily be fictional accounts. Literary scholar Jeremy Tambling argues that:

...perhaps the distinction between fact and fiction is not very useful anyhow. To explain anything, you have to move into the area of narrativizing it, putting events into a sequence, and representing processes (even scientific processes) in forms that can be conceptualized - and the idea of representation means that we are already half-way to fictionalizing something, realizing that you cannot talk exactly about how things are; you have to find a suitable form to do it in.¹⁵⁰

Tambling says that any event represented in a textual or verbal form as a sequence becomes a narrative, even if it is a simple recounting of facts, such as “The king died and then the queen died.”¹⁵¹ Thus, his argument is that no form of history and no account of events, such as news reports, can avoid being a narrative. He argues that this perspective runs counter to the views of Hayden White, whom he presents as seeing morality or a “moralizing impulse” as an essential component of narrative, thus rendering narrative history as inappropriate.¹⁵² Tambling argues that White is misled by an Aristotelian concept of narrative that requires a narrative plot progression of “beginning-middle-end,”¹⁵³ whereas alternative definitions of narrative and plot can, and do, exist. However, White's argument seems to be much simpler than presented by Tambling. White argues that by imposing artificial closure on historical accounts — that is, by telling history as a story -- historians are invoking a particular social perspective that can be seen as moralizing simply because of the selection of a point in history as the end of the story. This is especially relevant to any examination of human rights

¹⁴⁹ Judy Pearsall and Bill Trumble (Eds.), (1995), *The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary*, (New York: Oxford University), p.962.

¹⁵⁰ Jeremy Tambling, (1991), *Narrative and Ideology*, *Open Guides to Literature*, (Milton Keynes & Philadelphia: Open University), p.66.

¹⁵¹ Tambling, (1991), *Narrative and Ideology*, p.99.

¹⁵² Hayden White, (1980), ‘The Value of Narrativity’, pp.22-23 and Tambling (1991), *Narrative and Ideology*, p.98.

¹⁵³ Tambling, (1991), *Narrative and Ideology*, pp.62-63, 99.

— stories whose conclusions have yet to be, if they ever will be, decided. This dissertation, as discussed below, focuses on American stories of human rights rather than the story of twentieth-century American human rights.

Thus, Tambling's idea that all recounting of events form narratives is important here. The purpose of this research was not to study events themselves but representations of events; that is, the emphasis was not what happened but what were presentations or interpretations of what happened — the story rather than the event itself. Analysis of narratives is important because, as Tambling argues, "[N]arratives construct ways of thinking for us - which we accept as natural and take for granted. They give us ways of seeing and ways of representing reality in an imaginary form."¹⁵⁴ This imaginary form is not fiction but a representation — whether in news reports, congressional statements, presidential speeches or some other form of story-telling. A researcher interested in ideology and/or the creation of common sense cannot then ignore narratives. Tambling maintains that narratives not only contain ideology; they are inherently ideological because "any narrative works by interpellation, affirming its way of seeing things - its ideology - to be a natural and inevitable way of reading reality."¹⁵⁵ Narratives not only reveal important details about what individuals and institutions consider important; they also reveal what is considered unimportant and therefore excluded.

Narrative analysis takes many forms, but a central focus is plot. Classical studies have referred to plot as *muthos* or myth.¹⁵⁶ Tambling argues that "in Plato a *muthos* is a story or fable embodying a series of propositions about the world."¹⁵⁷ Examination of series of propositions about the world is very close to the type of discourse analysis suggested by Teun van Dijk when he analyzes news stories for semantic macropropositions. Thus, a combination of narrative analysis and discourse analysis was used here to examine the narrative of human rights (the stories told) and the discourse of human rights (how the stories were told) in selected media and political documents across nearly a century.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis entails three necessary processes, according to Fairclough: "*description* of text, *interpretation* of the relationship between text and interaction, and *explanation* of the relationship between interaction and social context."¹⁵⁸ These three processes translate into three levels of analysis when applied to individual texts — context, text and meaning.

Analysis of context focuses on analysis of text production, reception (target audience, way of receiving information and possibilities for response), institution and structure. For example, differences between press institutions and congress as an institution will affect all aspects of text production and reception. Textual analysis requires investigation of form and content. Analysis of meaning requires looking at the relationship between context and text with attention to relations of power (such as struggles between congress and the executive branch over authority to conduct foreign affairs), the identification of specific discourses (such as specialized lexicons and articulations of constraints and norms) and the production and transmission of ideology. The language and content of newspaper reports differ from those of

¹⁵⁴ Tambling, (1991), *Narrative and Ideology*, p.66.

¹⁵⁵ Tambling, (1991), *Narrative and Ideology*, p.67.

¹⁵⁶ Tambling uses the Greek term *muthos* in preference to the more familiar (to lay people) Latin term, *mythos*.

¹⁵⁷ Tambling, (1991), *Narrative and Ideology*, p.52.

¹⁵⁸ Norman Fairclough, (1989), *Language and Power*, (London and New York: Longman), p.109.

presidential statements or congressional records. An important question, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, is what impact these differences have on the production of ideology and the creation of specific discourses. A goal of analyses here was to enable comparison across time periods both within and between text sources in order to identify the discourses of morality and their associated ideologies and to examine changes in these and discuss the implications of particular discourses and ideologies for national and international debate about human rights.

Context

The production of texts, traditionally the focus of analyses of context in mass communication research, while important, is not a focus here. Extensive literature exists on the influence of institutional structures on media content. One example is Gaye Tuchman's sociological study of newspaper production.¹⁵⁹ One criticism of this traditional focus has been that it privileges production over reception; communication cannot take place without reception, it is argued. The introduction of cultural studies approaches to communication research has shifted attention to sites of reception with such already classic works as Ien Ang's series of studies on inter-cultural reception of the television show "Dallas" and Janice Radway's analysis of women's romance-novel reading habits.¹⁶⁰ In many ways, the pendulum has swung the other way in some more recent works, which privilege reception as the only possible source of meaning. However, the process of reception is excluded here to avoid rendering unmanageable an already nearly unwieldy topic. The primary focus here is message content because the purpose was to identify what discourses about human rights existed and how they were constructed. Thus, while both production and reception are obviously important in the analysis of any message, the attention here remains primarily on the message.

Fairclough argues that individuals in an institution are constrained by norms of that institution and that they operate within implicit parameters of discourse. However, any analysis of institutions must acknowledge that even text aimed at audiences outside a specific institution may be part of institutional discourse. Fairclough states that "some institutions have a 'public' to whom messages are addressed, whose members are sometimes assumed to interpret these messages according to norms laid down by the institution, but who do not interact with institutional subjects directly."¹⁶¹ This consideration seems to be important in analyzing two text types used for this dissertation — congressional records and presidential statements. The context of presidential statements is especially complex because the "public" to whom messages are addressed may be both the general public and institutional "publics," including congress.

Text analysis identified themes visible in content that talked about human rights. Analysis of context examined these themes for how they reflect the perceived audience plus the conditions of production and reception. The final step was analysis of meaning. While ideological meaning cannot be "read-off"¹⁶² from texts, an important question is how particular ways of defining and talking about human rights serve the interests of various

¹⁵⁹ Gaye Tuchman, (1978), *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality*, (New York; Free Press).

¹⁶⁰ Ien Ang, (1982), *Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination*, (New York: Methuen) and Janice Radway, (1984), *Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy and Popular Literature*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina).

¹⁶¹ Fairclough, (1995), *Language and Power*, p.39.

¹⁶² Fairclough, (1995), *Language and Power*, p.71.

constituencies — whether at the level of production or reception. Comparison of discursive similarities and differences across periods may help to answer this question.

Press content

As discussed in chapter one, case studies were developed on the basis of the importance attached to certain events by historians of human rights. Specific time frames were chosen to encapsulate the major events of the cases for each case study, and a week of news coverage and opinion items was selected for study. Within this week, articles were selected on the basis of three criteria: explicit connection in the article between the United States' foreign policy stance and issues of human life and rights; portrayal of the United States as unique because of respect for and good treatment of its citizens; and human life and rights were clearly valued by the writer and this value was the motivating factor for the article.

Among primary sources, the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, and the *Washington Post* were studied because of their continuous publication from the nineteenth century (in the event the research extends to nineteenth century sources) and to allow for potential regional variation in reporting content and style. These sources were selected also because of their position as major newspapers that extensively cover foreign news. Media historians Michael and Edwin Emery and Nancy Roberts state that “Wherever journalists gather, or opinion polls are taken, there is remarkable consensus in identifying the preeminent American newspapers. The *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Washington Post* stand tall as a trio of highest quality.”¹⁶³ These three newspapers are assumed to be influential with policy makers and influence news coverage in other media — that is, many media simply repeat stories from these papers. Communications scholar Tsan-Kuo Chang argues that the news services of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* serve at least 350 major dailies across the country.¹⁶⁴ The collaborative news service between the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times* is estimated to rival the New York Times News Service as the “world’s largest supplementary agency.”¹⁶⁵ The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* was included to allow, as noted, for possible regional variation of news coverage. Emery, Emery and Roberts argue that the *New York Times* has consistently been “staunchly internationalist in world outlook but essentially conservative in domestic affairs.”¹⁶⁶ The *Los Angeles Times* until the 1970s had long been seen as “strictly conservative.”¹⁶⁷ However, according to Emery, Emery and Roberts, the newspaper gradually moved away from this staunchly conservative pro-Republican stance toward one of “open-mindedness and independence” thus gaining national respect.¹⁶⁸ The *Washington Post* is another newspaper whose editorial policies have changed over time. Now seen as “strongly internationalist in outlook,” the *Washington Post* in earlier times was against U.S. involvement in World War I but became pro-war once the war was declared.¹⁶⁹ As a smaller metropolitan newspaper, the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* has depended heavily on news services for foreign news. However, it has also consistently carried its own news commentary. In 1962 it was bought by Samuel I. Newhouse, Sr., becoming part of his

¹⁶³ Michael Emery and Edwin Emery with Nancy L. Roberts, (1996), *The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media*, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon), p.549.

¹⁶⁴ Tsan-kuo Chang, (1993), *The Press and China Policy: The Illusion of Sino-American Relations, 1950-1984*, (Norwood, NJ: Ablex), p.90.

¹⁶⁵ Emery et al., (1996), *The Press and America*, p.532.

¹⁶⁶ Emery et al., (1996), *The Press and America*, p.552.

¹⁶⁷ Emery et al., (1996), *The Press and America*, p.552.

¹⁶⁸ Emery et al., (1996), *The Press and America*, p.553.

¹⁶⁹ Emery et al., (1996), *The Press and America*, pp.554,257.

ownership of numerous major metropolitan dailies. Newhouse was known for a policy of allowing local editorial autonomy, and inclusion of this newspaper was considered valuable for presenting another piece of American newspaper discourse.¹⁷⁰ Individual editorial changes in the newspapers are not considered in this dissertation (although editorial influence is important in studying media discourse), because the intention is to examine what was said about human rights at each period in the print media in general, rather than what was said in each specific newspaper ~ that is, the overall discourse of the print media, rather than that of the *New York Times* or the other newspapers studied.

In all of the newspapers studied, only news stories and items explicitly identified as editorials were considered while general opinion items were excluded. Many of the latter came from nationally syndicated columns and were duplicated across sources and thus, there were no regional variations to analyze. Each of these sources was read in microfilm format and thus each was the final or record version of any daily — for example, the final evening city version of the *Los Angeles Times*.

The specific time periods for research are as follows:

Period I: Paris Peace Talks, January 1-30, 1919. Press coverage was examined for the conclusion of the period that President Woodrow Wilson was in Paris negotiating the treaty (January 24-30, 1919).

Period II: San Francisco Conference, 1945. Press coverage of the opening week of the conference itself was examined — April 25 to May 1.

Period III: The bulk of the Carter presidential campaign took place during October and November 1976. However, the week of news coverage examined covers the period of Carter's second television debate with Gerald Ford. This debate was on October 6, 1976, focused on foreign policy and defense issues. News coverage leading to the debate and in the immediate aftermath was intense. Thus, the week of October 4 to October 10 was selected for close study.

Period IV: Tiananmen Incident, June 1989. Examination of news coverage of this event focuses on the week beginning the day news of action against students in China first reached U.S. newspapers. The period of focus is June 3 through June 10, with emphasis on coverage of U.S. response to the events rather than the events themselves.

Two main approaches were used to analyze the news texts. First, a simplified discourse analysis as proposed by Teun van Dijk was used, van Dijk argues that all texts have global coherence through the use of codified themes and/or topics. He says that “[S]uch topics can be described as semantic macro-propositions, that is, as propositions that are derived from sequences of propositions in the text: for instance by macro-rules such as selection, abstraction, and other operations which reduce complex information.”¹⁷¹ One example of such reduction of complexity is reference to geographical groupings instead of individual nations, such as news reports about the “Asia-Pacific,” the “West” or the “Moslem” response. These terms assume previous knowledge and assumptions on the part of the listener, similar to those of the reporter — this is what is meant by intertextualization in discourse analysis, van Dijk argues that these semantic macropropositions are revealed in the headline and lead paragraph of news stories. In addition, concentration on specific topics in the derivation of

¹⁷⁰ Emery et al., (1996), *The Press and America*, p.541.

¹⁷¹ Teun A. van Dijk, (1991), ‘The Interdisciplinary Study of News as Discourse’, in Klaus Bruhn Jensen and Nicholas W. Jankowski (Eds.), *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communication Research*, (London and New York: Routledge), p.113.

macro-propositions can have ideological significance.¹⁷² van Dijk uses the example of a news report concerning expulsion of a Sri Lankan refugee in which one newspaper focused on the expulsion itself while another emphasized the protests and demonstrations associated with the expulsion. Such differences of emphasis may reveal ideology predominating in the content of individual newspapers. Use of a simplified discourse analysis here means semantic macropropositions are not formally identified. Rather, research sought to identify themes within texts regarding human rights, the location of human rights within particular discourses (political, social, economic, etc.), ways of talking about human rights and who/what was identified as having agency in the foreign policy process.

The headline of each article that meets the definition of human rights (stated in the opening paragraph of this section) within sampling periods and themes within the entire text were identified, van Dijk suggests that in typical news formats, the headline and lead paragraph alone of newspaper articles reveal macrostructures within the text.¹⁷³ However, news formats have not remained static across history, so the whole text rather than a partial text was studied to capture potential differences in story construction from early to late twentieth century. Themes from each newspaper sample were analyzed. Themes and structures (collections of themes into coherent arguments or propositions) were then compared across sources; for example, it was assumed that a comparison of the coverage in the *New York Times*, *New Orleans Times - Picayune* and the *Washington Post* would reveal regional differences or a nationally cohesive discourse.

The news texts were also examined as complete narratives in order to illuminate the particular stories of human rights being told. Each text was closely read to answer the questions of what story(ies) was/were being told about human rights and who was telling the stories. This involved identification of themes and particular representations of ideas.

Congressional records

Congressional records are an unique type of text in that what is in the official record may not be identical to what was said on the floor of congress. Congressional records must be used with an awareness that they are a record for posterity of the perspectives of individual congresspeople rather than a verbatim transcription of congressional debate. However, they remain a valuable source for study of political discourse at a national level. Indices for the years relevant to this dissertation were used to locate speeches and documents — of both the Senate and the House of Representatives — related to the periods and events of interest. In addition, indices were used to locate specific references to human rights, on the assumption that those references might shed light on definitions and uses of the term, human rights.

An attempt was made to locate every congressional reference to the events relevant to this research. However, for Periods I and II — those relating to world wars one and two — human rights issues were not classified separately from general war issues, so documentation may not be complete due to the mass of material. Every attempt was made to obtain a comprehensive record of debates and speeches related to human rights during these periods.

Congressional statements were analyzed as a whole text. The focus of analysis in the congressional records was to identify the definition of human rights, the role of human rights in foreign policy and who was seen to play a part in the creation of foreign policy. Particular

¹⁷² van Dijk, (1991), 'The Interdisciplinary Study of News as Discourse', p.113.

¹⁷³ van Dijk, (1991), 'The Interdisciplinary Study of News as Discourse', p.113.

attention was paid to the perceived role of human rights in foreign policy — asking whether and how congress saw human rights considerations in the case study periods as playing a part in foreign policy decisions. In common with news texts, each congressional text was interrogated to answer questions about the specific stories and representations of human rights being told.

Presidential statements

Analysis of presidents' statements focused on the questions outlined above regarding definition of human rights, role of human rights in foreign policy, who was seen as helping create foreign policy, as well as questions regarding the specific tales of human rights being told. Of particular interest were choice of terminology in defining and talking about human rights because presidential leadership was assumed to be important in this regard -- potentially influencing both media coverage and congressional debate.

Comparisons

Comparisons were made at three levels. The first is an intra-case comparison, that is, comparison between each type of text within a case. For example, newspaper articles were compared to congressional records compared to presidential statements. This level of comparison allows building a picture of contemporary dialogue about human rights. The second level of analysis involves a comparison of texts across time, that is, search for any changes that may occur within each text type over time. This allows for identifying possible changes not only in content but also style and discourse ~ the ways of talking about human rights. The third level of analysis is a holistic approach comparing cases with each other. It is hoped that a picture will be built of each case in its historical context and that insight might be gathered about historical change and also changes within institutions as reflected in changes within text *types*.

The next four chapters present the findings from each of the case studies in chronological order from the earliest example selected — the Paris Peace Talks — to the most recent -- the Tiananmen Square Incident. The human rights discourse and narratives of each case study are identified and fitted into the overarching twentieth-century American discourses of morality and human rights. The final chapter speculates on the implications of the findings for addressing larger questions about discourses of human rights, the processes of societal discourse and the role of the media in the social construction of national identity and discourse — that is, the role of the media in articulating and circulating ideas in society.

Chapter Three

The Great War, Peace Talks and the League of Nations: Case Study I

Before examining in detail across sources how human rights were talked about in 1919, it is worthwhile to look at the overall narrative of human rights in that year. That is, before examining the construction of the discourse, the story or the plot one needs to step back from the details to study the overall picture being presented by that construction. Two questions are important here: what story or stories of human rights were being told in 1919, and who were the people telling those stories?

Answering the question of who is perhaps easier than answering what. Other than the obvious narrators of the stories, such as the individual newspapers, members of congress and the president all of whom can be called the primary narrators — other narrators were clearly present as revealed by primary narrators' reference to them. Although secondary narrators are not themselves telling the story, they influence the discourse by making decisions about foreign policy and by talking about human rights in a particular way.

For the print media in 1919, the president of the United States was a central narrator of foreign policy. Leaders of other countries and congress were seen as having lesser roles in narrating foreign policy. Public opinion, the American Constitution and administrative divisions of the executive branch were also seen as playing minor roles. Although the president and other elites were attributed a great measure of agency in the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy, the general public was also seen to have a significant voice as were international organizations, such as the League of Nations itself, and a range of interest groups. Thus, it can be concluded that in the story of foreign policy, the print media presented the narrators as being in descending order, the president, other heads of government, congress, then the minor voices of public opinion, the constitution and bureaucrats. However, in the telling of the human rights story, minor narrators of the foreign policy were depicted as having a greater measure of agency. In contrast, members of congress clearly perceived the only narrators of foreign policy as themselves and the president, with the only question being the proportion each contributed to the story. The president's perception of agency seems to have been similar, seeing the majority of power residing within the executive branch, a smaller measure of power being held by congress and a still smaller measure held by public opinion. However, President Woodrow Wilson seemed to clearly see himself as an ambassador of the people rather than as a servant of congress.

In the story of human rights being told in the print media, rights were defined in terms of personal security, national self-determination and world civilization — a civilization based on certain ideals of principles and right. The major components of human rights were security and freedom from wrongful interference, peace, justice, law, equality, democracy and self-determination. The provision of these rights was couched in terms of common interest choice, humanity, principles, emancipation, moral law, responsibility for the welfare of others, right and civilization in general. Furthermore, provision of human rights was beginning to be identified with Western democracy, industrialization and progress and contrasted with

Bolshevism. Minor components of human rights included labor rights, economic and political development and suffrage.

Congressional stories of human rights were both more specific and more general. Attention was focused on the provision of specific political rights through democracy and the establishment of legal standards as well as on the right of individuals to speech, food, cultural development and to a free press. However, the human rights story was also told in general terms related to sweeping ideas of civilization, community, Christianity, morality, service and duty, humanitarianism, progress. The American constitution was talked about as a model for the provision of human rights.

We may now return to more detailed discussion of the construction of the discourse of human rights. This discourse was identified by asking questions not only about how human rights were defined and who or what was portrayed as playing parts in the creation of foreign policy; also questions were asked about the language of human rights (the symbols and metaphors used to talk about human rights), the connections made in the discourse about the role of human rights in foreign policy, linkages between human rights and ideas about American identity and the location of the discourses of human rights — that is, what areas of society were related to human rights. Some answers to these questions are discussed following a brief historical background to the period of study.

The Peace Talks and the League of Nations

On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson addressed a joint session of congress and asked it and the American people to formally acknowledge that Germany's recent acts against the United States were the acts of a government at war and to respond appropriately. Simply, put, Wilson asked congress to declare the United States at war with Germany. After asking congress to declare war, Wilson suggested that the purpose of this war was not to be selfish or to acquire land:

Our object now, as then [Wilson's previous addresses to congress in January 1916 and February 1917], is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles... We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.¹⁷⁴

Wilson's movingly worded plea was warmly received despite the fact that the United States had declared neutrality on August 4, 1914, and had maintained this stance throughout the war until this point. However, the declaration by the Imperial German Government of a submarine blockade of all ports in Great Britain, Ireland, the western coasts of Europe or ports in the Mediterranean controlled by enemies of Germany, as well as subsequent sinking of allied and American ships, pushed the United States into action.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ President Wilson's War Message, April 2, 1917, *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 55, Part I, p.102 in Ruhl J. Bartlett (Ed.), (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), pp.456-457.

¹⁷⁵ Bartlett, (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy*, p.455.

Even before the United States had officially entered the war, Wilson had spoken about his idea for a league of nations, which would create a new world order and maintain peace. This new order would be based on the Monroe Doctrine, that is, that every nation should be left free to determine their own way of life and actions — what was referred to as determining one's "own polity... own way of development."¹⁷⁶ These principles upon which peace was to be based were argued as not only American but universal. In the same speech asking congress for a declaration of war against Germany, Wilson argued that these principles were "American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail."¹⁷⁷

Thus, an outline of a dialogue of human rights begins to emerge from early twentieth-century political rhetoric. This dialogue will be examined in detail later, but, at its most basic level across the period included in this dissertation, it consists of the notions of universal morality, justice, individual rights and of progress and modernity. By 1949 an U.S. Department of State publication on human rights summed up the official historical construction of human rights thus:

When our forebears sailed westward across the Atlantic Ocean to seek a new start in a new land, they brought with them various aims, plans, and aspirations. One hope common to most of them, however, was a fuller freedom for the individual ~ religious and political. The new national way of life which they founded in the New World represented the fusion of many elements — the teachings of the Holy Bible regarding the worth of every human soul; Greek thought and civilization, in which the elevation of the individual was a prevailing principle; Roman civil law; the philosophic utterances of influential thinkers of East and West; Anglo-Saxon parliamentary government. In the New World, the early settlers molded this legacy into a way of life characterized by greater stress on the rights of the individual than the world had ever seen.¹⁷⁸

Germany capitulated on November 11, 1918, and the long process of negotiating the peace began. Even before Germany's capitulation, Wilson had laid out fourteen points he said were the only basis for peace. Wilson's plan for a league of nations appeared to be influenced by ideas laid out by Frederick Jackson Turner in a paper that Wilson read and annotated on the trip to Paris. In this paper, Turner suggested that any league would require a legislative body so that international political parties or alliances (using the model of the American federal political system) would operate as checks on nationalism and "national feeling" that would otherwise paralyze action.¹⁷⁹ Turner proposed a league focusing on legislation with "limited but real powers."¹⁸⁰ Thus, in addition to the fourteen points, Wilson brought a number of

¹⁷⁶ Address of President Wilson to the Senate, January 22, 1917, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1917, Supplement, Vol. I, pp.24-9 in Bartlett, (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy*, p.454.

¹⁷⁷ Bartlett, (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy*, p.455.

¹⁷⁸ (1949), *Human Rights: Unfolding of the American Tradition - A Selection of Documents and Statements*, Division of Historical Policy Research, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, foreword.

¹⁷⁹ Frederick Jackson Turner, November 1918, 'International Political Parties in a Durable League of Nations', p.6 in a collection of papers noted as having accompanied Woodrow Wilson to Paris, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Series 5 A: Peace Conference Correspondence -1917 November 1 to 1919 July 9, The Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, p.1623.

¹⁸⁰ Turner, (1918), 'International Political Parties in a Durable League of Nations', p.6.

ideas to the conference about the structure and function of the proposed organization. However, the European Allies wanted retribution and restitution more than discussions about an ephemeral new world order. Wilson's idealism was applauded but the peace talks bogged down in discussions over war reparations. Wilson insisted on leading the American delegation to the Paris peace talks, and this period during the month of January 1919 is the basis for the first case study here.

Before turning to the case study, the final outcome of the peace talks must be briefly addressed. At first, American public opinion supported ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, but Republican opposition was growing and gaining public support. In the 1918 elections, the Democrats lost their majority in both houses and the Republicans claimed this as a repudiation of Wilson and his policies.¹⁸¹ Opposition to ratification of the treaty was spearheaded by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge offered fourteen reservations to counter Wilson's fourteen points, but Wilson refused to amend his peace plan in any way.¹⁸² On November 19, 1919, ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was rejected. As part of that treaty, U.S. membership in the League of Nations was also rejected. Finally on August 25, 1921, a separate peace with Germany was signed by the United States in which the United States requested and was granted all of the "rights and advantages" of the Treaty of Versailles without the international obligations, "not withstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States."¹⁸³

Human Rights in the Newspapers of 1919

The term "human rights" was rarely used in the early part of this century, though the concerns that led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 were clearly present in early twentieth-century media and political discourse. The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times* and the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* were studied from January 24 to 30, 1919. Two years remained before the United States would finally sign a peace treaty with Germany, but the Paris Peace Talks were drawing to an end — as was President Wilson's time in Europe. Each newspaper had daily reports of Wilson's European activities and speeches as well as the responses of the European statesmen and public to the peace talks. It is useful at this point to reiterate that the newspaper articles studied were selected on the basis of the writer displaying a concern for human rights; a clear linking of the United States to a concern for human life and rights and portrayal of the United States as unique in its treatment of individuals, that is, as valuing human life and rights. These selection criteria operated whether or not the explicit phrase "human rights" was found in texts. In conjunction with this, study of discussions of human rights does not mean that the term itself was always used, but that ideas related to the concept of human rights as established by the operational guidelines of this study were expressed.

¹⁸¹ Alan Brinkley, (1993), *The Unfinished Nation: A Concise History of the American People*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) pp.619-624.

¹⁸² See Wilson's Fourteen Points in *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, p.680 in Bartlett (1960), pp.459-461 and "The Lodge Reservations to the Ratification by the United States of the Treaty of Versailles" in *Congressional Record* (Senate) 66th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 58, pp.8777-8888 in Bartlett, (1960), pp.470-472.

¹⁸³ "Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Germany" in *The Statutes at Large of the United States*, Vol. 42, PL 2, pp.1939-45 in Bartlett, (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy*, pp.482-483.

Statements About and Definitions of Human Rights in the Print Media

One of the first questions addressed in studying the newspaper coverage was how human rights were defined. Two levels of definition were considered important. The first addressed whether human rights were defined according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the United Nations' General Assembly on 10 December 1948 (Resolution 217A (III)) and has since remained the touchstone for talking about human rights. This was a reference point for this research because it was a negotiated definition of human rights and can be used as a form against which other definitions can be measured. The second question addressed what other definitions of human rights were used, allowing for determining whether definitions of human rights existed at given times, and for the inclusion of those.

Understandably, the primary focus for many people after World War I and thus, newspaper coverage, was the need, and indeed the entitlement of all people, to security, peace and justice in the aftermath of the war. These three ideas were prevalent in the sources studied, although individual newspapers differed as to emphasis. The *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times* coverage "talked about" human rights as security for people. Coverage in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* emphasized peace, and emphasis was placed on justice in *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* coverage.

In addition to defining human rights as security of person, the *New York Times* coverage also defined human rights as equality, democracy, law, self-determination and common interest. Each of these definitions falls under those used in the UDHR. In addition to these definitions, the *New York Times* coverage included other ways of talking about human rights, such as choice, humanity, principles, emancipation, moral law and right.

Articles in the *Washington Post* used a much broader definition of human rights than did those in the *New York Times*. In common with the *New York Times*, human rights were talked about in the context of security and freedom from wrongful interference, democracy and peace. In addition, trade and labor issues played a role in the coverage as well as ideas about economic security, nationality and freedom. Other definitions of human rights included ideas about law and punishment, the burden of war, civilization and tyranny. Also at this point in American history, the concern for individual lives and rights shown by democratic political systems was starting to be set up as a contrast to the ideas and goals of Bolshevism.

The *Los Angeles Times* coverage of the peace conference used similarly broad definitions of human rights as in the *Washington Post*. In addition to defining human rights in terms of security, justice, democracy, freedom and self-determination, several articles incorporated ideas about labor rights, economic and political development and suffrage. Other definitions of human rights included ideas about civilization, humanity and absence of anarchy; a grouping of definitions centered on concepts of responsibility and concern for the welfare of others, solidarity and paternalism; and ideas about industrialization and progress.

Definitions of human rights in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* were much narrower than those found in the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times*. Definitions using the UDHR were limited to discussion of ideas related to peace, freedom, undefined general rights and labor issues. These discussions used definitions very similar to those found in the other newspapers. However, when other definitions of human rights are considered, a range emerges. Rights are discussed in terms of civilization, progress and ideals, and punishment of

war crimes. Many of the news stories in the *Times* on the peace conference in the week of the sample were from the *London Daily News* and extensively quoted views of British Prime Minister Lloyd George.

Security, Peace and Justice

The *New York Times* featured prominently President Wilson's declaration that: "We are bidden by these people [the older men, women, children, the homes of the civilized world] to make a peace that will make them secure."¹⁸⁴ This issue of security is a central definition of human rights within the UDHR, which declares that all humans are entitled to "life, liberty and the security of person."¹⁸⁵ The *Washington Post* coverage of President Wilson's address to the Paris peace conference in 1919 clearly identified it as being about security and relief of individual suffering. The subhead said "Conferees' Duty Is to Make Peace Secure, He Declares, Picturing Sufferings of Women and Children."¹⁸⁶ Security and peace were portrayed as by-products of democracy by the statement that "The wish of the people, therefore, must be heard. The war had swept away those old foundations by which old coteries had 'used mankind as pawns in a game.' Nothing but emancipation from the old system, he contended, would accomplish real peace."¹⁸⁷

Articles in the *Los Angeles Times* tended to define security broadly — as not only rectifying the damage wrought by war but also as developing ways to avoid repetition of wars of such magnitude. This approach is illustrated by a report on the speech of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to the conference. The report suggested, "His speech was chiefly notable for the vivid picture of the ruins of France and the need of setting up some system to take the place of this 'organized savagery.'"¹⁸⁸ Over and over, the phrase "provide safeguards against war" was used in conjunction with such terms as "international obligation," "international agreement" and "international justice."¹⁸⁹ War was referred to as the "most horrible calamity that can come to a community" and as the "fever of the world."¹⁹⁰ This horror of war was directly connected to a belief that the world itself had changed so that people and nations would no longer condone war. One article carried the subheading "No Parliament Ever will Sanction Armed Conflict" over a report that U.S. Senator Gilbert Hitchcock of Nevada, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had said, "The world will be shown that mankind will no longer tolerate war as a means of settling disputes."¹⁹¹ Nations were portrayed as no longer condoning war and as having turned entirely to a new way of conducting international relations — "not to see how great the spoils they can command for their various nations out of the wreck and ruin of war, but to see what

¹⁸⁴ January 26, 1919, 'Text of Wilson's Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations', *New York Times*, p.1.

¹⁸⁵ Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Jack Donnelly, (1993), *International Human Rights*, (Boulder, CO: Westview), p.166.

¹⁸⁶ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Conference Adopts League of Nations Project; President's Ringing Speech Brings Decision', *Washington Post*, p.1.

¹⁸⁷ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Conference Adopts League of Nations Project; President's Ringing Speech Brings Decision', *Washington Post*, p.1.

¹⁸⁸ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Conference Adopts World League Project', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

¹⁸⁹ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Conference Adopts World League Project', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and January 26, 1919, 'Conquest Wars Forever Ended: Senator Hitchcock Says America Heads Ideal World', *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

¹⁹⁰ January 26, 1919, 'Conquest Wars Forever Ended: Senator Hitchcock Says America Heads Ideal World', *Los Angeles Times*, p.2 and January 26, 1919, 'The Fever Passes', *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

¹⁹¹ January 26, 1919, 'Conquest Wars Forever Ended: Senator Hitchcock Says America Heads Ideal World', *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

way justice may be done, and to seek the remedy that will the surest cure the fever of the world [sic].”¹⁹² The rhetoric about this new way of doing things was florid. Under the heading “The World’s New Standards,” an article proclaimed the “era when international right was the right of the strongest is definitely closed ... the subjects of international disputes will be judged according to a code of friendliness and fairness unknown to the peace conferences of the past”¹⁹³ (Immediately after the devastation of a world war there was hope and indeed, conviction, that such a war would never again be allowed and that nations themselves would change to meet the challenge.)

Equality of Peoples

Equality of peoples is one of the central notions of the UDHR. The preamble states that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”¹⁹⁴ The notion of equality of peoples was a radical idea in early twentieth century international power politics, when political power came from controlling colonies and when paternalism towards so-called “lesser-peoples” was the rule. Wilson’s argument that a new way of doing things was needed was translated in the *New York Times* thus: the “select class of mankind are no longer the governors of mankind. The fortunes of mankind are now in the hands of the plain people of the whole world.”¹⁹⁵ Wilson was further quoted as arguing:

Those foundations [of the war] were the holding together of empires of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms. Those foundations were the power of small bodies of men to wield their will and use mankind as pawns in a game. And nothing less than emancipation of the world from these things will accomplish peace.¹⁹⁶

Democracy

Emancipation was linked clearly with democracy in the *New York Times* coverage, and the American task was to “see that every people in the world shall choose its own masters and govern its own identities, not as we wish but as they wish.”¹⁹⁷ Not only were people to be free, but countries too were to be free because “self-determination is a right.”¹⁹⁸

In the light of U.S. history, it is tempting to assume that a focus on democracy as central to human rights is a particularly American perspective. However, Article 21 of the UDHR states that:

- 1 -Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- 3 - The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal

¹⁹² January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

¹⁹³ January 27, 1919, ‘The World’s New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

¹⁹⁴ Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Donnelly, (1993), *International Human Rights*, p.165.

¹⁹⁵ January 26, 1919, Text of Wilson’s Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations’, *New York Times*, p.1.

¹⁹⁶ January 26, 1919, Text of Wilson’s Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations’, *New York Times*, p.1.

¹⁹⁷ January 26, 1919, ‘Text of Wilson’s Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations’, *New York Times*, p.1.

¹⁹⁸ January 26, 1919, ‘The League for Right’, *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.¹⁹⁹

Given Western, and especially United States, influence in the United Nations and the crafting of the Universal Declaration, it can still be contended that democracy as a human right comes from a Western perspective. As results of this research (discussed later) show, democracy as a fundamental human right is an American concern that extends across all sources and time periods.

Common Interest. Morality and International Standards

It is clear that Wilson's perspective included an entirely new way of "doing world politics" that required sweeping out traditional notions of power politics and instituting the notion of common interest. Wilson said that the role of a league of nations should be as "the eye of the nations, to keep watch upon the common interest."²⁰⁰ This idea of common interest, of nations keeping an eye on each other, was the precursor of a concept central to any statement of universal human rights — that certain issues override sovereignty of individual nations and that domestic issues can be a matter of international concern. In 1919 one of these issues was the idea that an individual, the Kaiser, could be held responsible for "crimes done in the name of war, but contrary to the laws of war and therefore not excused by hostilities."²⁰¹ The idea of relationships between nations based on law was tied to the concept of the existence of moral laws governing international behavior. An editorial presented the idea that:

There are not two laws, one for Germany's punishment and another for the Allies' profit. There is but one world law, and for the first time it is to be enforced in the Old World as a mandate of conscience as well as of cannon [sic]... Powers need to be tried by an acid test of their conformity to the common good under universal law.²⁰²

Common good, conscience, common interest, moral law and right were all terms used both by Wilson and in the *New York Times* when the proposed league of nations was discussed. An editorial in the *New York Times* said, in concurring with Wilson, "As President Wilson said at Manchester, 'Interest does not bind men together. Interest separates men. Only one thing can bind men together, and that is common devotion to right.'"²⁰³ The editorial went on to argue, "Self-determination is a right, but not the only right, not even the chief right. The right of all is superior to the right of any, and large nations must make sacrifices as well as small if the world hereafter is to be ruled by law instead of by self-interest and force."²⁰⁴ As will be seen in later discussion of other sources, media discourse established a clear contrast between the old way of doing things by force and a new way of organizing the world and participating in world politics. This new way was undergirded by an emphasis on democracy, self-determination and emancipation — fundamentally suggesting choice as both a right and as a guiding principle of international politics.

¹⁹⁹ Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Jack Donnelly, (1993), *International Human Rights*, (Boulder, CO: Westview), p.166.

²⁰⁰ January 26, 1919, 'Text of Wilson's Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations', *New York Times*, p.1.

²⁰¹ January 26, 1919, 'The League for Right', *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²⁰² January 26, 1919, 'The League for Right', *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²⁰³ January 26, 1919, 'The League for Right', *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²⁰⁴ January 26, 1919, 'The League for Right', *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

Trade, Labor and Economic Development

While *Washington Post* articles did not extensively treat trade and labor issues, these issues were raised as appropriate concerns for a new world organization. An editorial on the peace conference cited the “necessity of drafting international legislation on industrial and labor questions.”²⁰⁵ These industrial and labor questions included a “scheme for the international regulation of conditions of employment,” the establishment of an international commission on trade regulation and intensive consultation with British trade unionists.²⁰⁶ The issues of trade and conditions of employment were explicitly linked to the concept that nations should provide physical and economic security for their citizens through concern for “life, liberty and welfare.”²⁰⁷ However, in spite of acceptance of the idea of international regulation of conditions of employment, it was argued strongly in an editorial that “[n]ations must determine their own standards of living according to their ability.”²⁰⁸ A new world organization did not mean that nations were willing to relinquish sovereignty on economic and trade issues even for the sake of international assistance in rebuilding.

In contrast, *Los Angeles Times* coverage closely connected the devastation of war in Europe with a need for economic development. European countries were described as “writhing in the agony of anarchy and lawlessness, murder and unbridled lust ...”²⁰⁹ The new standards for international relationships were portrayed as such that:

Peoples no longer desire to live by conquest and exploitation of their neighbors... it is with the rights of peoples and not with the interests and perquisites of princes and royal houses that the judges are concerned. The right of conquest is no longer recognized. A bandit is none the less a brigand because his servants wear livery and he wears a crown... Neither economic nor political servitude is longer tolerable.²¹⁰

This acknowledgment of the need for economic development to take place alongside political developments, such as the introduction of democracy and the removal of anarchy, is an important addition to discussions of human rights. The need for democracy as a guarantee of freedom seems to have been so obvious to the news writers that they did not elaborate it as a major theme. In contrast, the need for economic rights at the individual and national levels emerged as a more elaborated topic. Economic rights were portrayed as including fair labor conditions, the right to join unions and for nations to enjoy economic sovereignty. Labor issues were tied to suffrage by the issue of working conditions for both men and women.²¹¹ In the economic domain, concerns similar to those in the political domain were raised by delegates to the conference ~ that is, how international regulation or oversight of agreements and conditions could impinge upon the sovereign rights of nations.²¹²

²⁰⁵ January 27, 1919, ‘The Peace Conference at Work’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

²⁰⁶ January 30, 1919, ‘Communiqués Issued by Peace Conference’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁰⁷ January 30, 1919, ‘No Substitute for Free Nations’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

²⁰⁸ January 30, 1919, ‘No Substitute for Free Nations’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

²⁰⁹ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²¹⁰ January 27, 1919, ‘The World’s New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²¹¹ January 24, 1919, ‘Decline to Meet Reds: Envoys from Omsk Refuse Parley’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and January 27, 1919, ‘Wilson Tells Women Peace Conference Cannot Settle Suffrage Problem of Nations: States Decide Equal Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²¹² January 24, 1919, ‘Decline to Meet Reds: Envoys from Omsk Refuse Parley’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

National Identity, Internationalism and Idealism

A concern in the *Washington Post* coverage of the peace conference was about national identity — that is, how the new way of organizing world politics would influence, not only national identity, but also how the new spirit of internationalization would be manifest in the everyday realities of world politics. A January 30 article carried the extended headline and subheading:

Colonies To Be Prize: Allies Demand Hun Possession Despite Wilson's Idealism:
Opposed To Rule By League: Conquerors Maintain Annexation Is Indispensable to
Own Safety: Entente Willing To Retain Spirit of Wilson Principles Only to Extent It
Does Not Interfere With Plans for Spoils - British Opinion Veering From Support of a
League. Ideals Held A Danger.²¹³

The concern was that idealism would only go so far and that old ideas about war spoils and the rights of colonial powers would continue to influence any league of nations. The same January 30 article argued that the “crux of the situation is that France, Great Britain, the British dominions, Japan and Belgium want German colonial possessions and intend to get them by one means or another regardless of the fact that in doing so they obviously violate the idealism of the President's preconceived peace program.”²¹⁴ The article went on to quote the *London Daily Mail*, which portrayed the situation as being that the allies were “seeking a plan which, while giving the practical power desired by the nations who want the German colonies for their own, will still provide some shadowy form of internationalization for the purpose of satisfying Mr. Wilson's ideals.”²¹⁵ It becomes clear, when linkages between human rights and foreign policy are pursued, that newspapers such as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* portrayed a dichotomy between pragmatism and idealism in foreign policy. Pragmatism was portrayed as attending to issues of real politics while idealism concerned such issues as justice, human rights and internationalization — in the American context, defined as involvement in world affairs rather than the traditional ideal of isolation from the affairs of the Old World.

Editorials in the *Washington Post* particularly concerned nationality and how national identity would be affected by post-war world reorganization. Terms such as “super-nation” and “United States of the World” were beginning to be used -- in talk about the proposed league of nations. One of the major concerns was whether individual nations, and freedom in general, would be weakened by participation in a “universal league of nations.”²¹⁶ One editorial argued this point, suggesting:

The civilized peoples of Europe have just saved themselves from slavery by the exercise of their strength organized in separate distinct nations... These nations are far from perfect organizations, but they are the best working systems yet devised by man for making his life, liberty and welfare reasonably secure... Governments organized and maintained by free peoples are effective barriers against the tyranny of both autocrats and anarchists. Any project which aims at weakening free nations is therefore dangerous, if not fatal, to liberty.”²¹⁷

²¹³ January 30, 1919, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²¹⁴ January 30, 1919, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²¹⁵ *London Daily Mail* in *Washington Post*, January 30, 1919, p.1.

²¹⁶ January 30, 1919, ‘No Substitute for Free Nations’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

²¹⁷ January 30, 1919, ‘No Substitute for Free Nations’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

Punishment and Law

By labeling punishment as a component of the definition of human rights, what is meant here is that individuals are seen to have rights, the violation of which constitutes a crime deserving punishment. For example, the headline of one article in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* proclaims, "Plans Are Made To Punish War-Guilty." War-guilty are defined as the German empire and allies who committed "breaches of the laws and customs of war," and a committee was reported as being established "regarding responsibility and punishment of the war-makers."²¹⁸

As is usual in the aftermath of major wars, the victorious nations sought ways not only to prevent immediate resumption of war, in some cases seeking to prevent war ever recurring, but also to punish the perpetrators of war. Punishment and law were major themes through much of the coverage of the peace conference. Delegates to the conference sought to create a commission to "inquire into breaches of laws and customs of war committed by Germany and her allies... as well as the degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, 'including members of the general staffs and others, however highly placed.'"²¹⁹ A further radical notion associated with the creation of a league of nations was that a permanent international court would be established to adjudicate criminal matters between nations. The goal of this court was not only to resolve reparations and criminal issues arising from the war but to help prevent that kind of war occurring again. The concern arising out of this was that such a court as the tribunal of The Hague "only appealed to moral law and was without means of enforcing its decisions."²²⁰ Moral law was seen to be an inadequate means of conducting foreign affairs. A January 27 article in the *Washington Post* presented the viewpoint that "senators are not inclined to be unduly excited over any form which expression of principles or declarations of moral purpose may take. They assume that the nations will not find it difficult to agree on matters of abstract principles as long as the element of international force does not enter into the question."²²¹

The Threat of Bolshevism

A further major theme that emerged in the *Washington Post* coverage of the peace conference was the positioning of democracy as representing freedom. This was further linked with civilization in such phrases as "if civilization is to be saved ..." and "free and civilized peoples."²²² Civilization was contrasted with tyranny; tyranny was linked with anarchy and anarchy was tied to Bolshevism. In a particularly strong statement an editorial argued that:

There should not be any league of nations on the original plan. It is in its essence internationalism, destructive of nations, and therefore dangerously resembling bolshevism ... Autocracy decreed there should be only one nation; bolshevism decrees there shall be no nations. The free and civilized peoples beat one of their assailants by sticking to the plan of fighting by nations. The fight with the other assailant in now

²¹⁸ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Congress Unanimous In Vote for Nations League Urged By President Wilson: Plans Ate Made To Punish War-Guilty', *New Orleans Times -Picayune*, p.1.

²¹⁹ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Conference Adopts League of Nations Project; President's Ringing Speech Brings Decision', *Washington Post*, p.1.

²²⁰ January 27, 1919, 'The Peace Conference at Work', *Washington Post*, p.6.

²²¹ January 27, 1919, 'League Drops Force: Wilson Speech Indicates Base of Plan is Moral Influence', *Washington Post*, p.1.

²²² January 30, 1919, 'No Substitute for Free Nations', *Washington Post*, p.6.

beginning ... They will resist the destructive effect of direct attack by bolshevism, or go down in universal anarchy.²²³

Thus, the editorial stance of the *Washington Post* was that President Wilson's plan, while it represented high ideals, lacked practical application and was, in fact, dangerous because it opened the door to the destruction of civilization by Bolshevism. The same editorial concluded with the statement that "President Wilson's original league of nations, the United States of the World, armed with military and naval power, and bound to suppress any nation that should dare to disturb the world's peace, has gone glimmering into the shadows of Never-Never land."²²⁴

Suffrage

President Wilson spoke forthrightly while traveling in Europe about women's suffrage. On meeting a group of French working women, Wilson expressed his admiration of them and support for their cause while putting forth his belief that working women's concern was an issue that the peace conference was ill-equipped to resolve. While the conference sought "an arrangement for the peace and security of men and women everywhere," and Wilson expressed his "admiration for the women of all the nations that have been engaged in the war" and "the indomitable power of women and men alike, to sustain any burden if the cause was great enough," little hope was offered for women seeking assistance of the international organization in achieving their goals.²²⁵

Progress and Civilization

Threaded throughout the *Los Angeles Times* coverage of the peace conference was a strong theme that linked ideas about freedom, peace, security and other rights with ideas about civilization and humanity. Simply by implying the presence of international standards by which the behavior of nations could be judged, discourse was shifted from the political to the moral domain. A later section will more explicitly examine the domains of discourse, but it is useful at this point to discuss definitions within the moral domain. The goals of the peace conference were explicitly linked with enlightenment and progress by the use of such phrases as "all civilized nations," "the history of civilization," "all self-respecting nations," "the world has passed into a new era" and similar phrases.²²⁶ Such discussions of progress were further linked with the achievements of industrialization. Writers in the *Los Angeles Times* painted a picture of the achievements of cooperation leading to a league of nations as the direct result of industrialization and progress. One article declared that:

Industrialism...has turned the thought of the world from conquest to production: it has made possible the substitution of justice for armed force... The star of conquest has set; its light is forever dimmed and the peoples of the world are now guided by the light of industry... Industrialism is the force that makes the new League of Nations possible. It has turned the thought of the world from conquest to production ...²²⁷

²²³ January 30, 1919, 'No Substitute for Free Nations', *Washington Post*, p.6.

²²⁴ January 30, 1919, 'No Substitute for Free Nations', *Washington Post*, p.6.

²²⁵ President Wilson in January 27, 1919, 'Wilson Tells Women Peace Conference Cannot Settle Suffrage Problem of Nations: States Decide Equal Rights', *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²²⁶ See for example, January 26, 'Peace Conference Adopts World League Project', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and January 26, 1919, 'Conquest Wars Forever Ended: Senator Hitchcock Says America Heads Ideal World', *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²²⁷ January 27, 1919, 'The World's New Standards', *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

Industrialism or industrialization is itself endowed with moral value in such statements as “Industrialism is the child of peace and righteousness” and the argument that “the Holy Alliance fell because it was supported by force, not by justice and self-determination. It was formed a hundred years too soon; the age of industrialism had not yet dawned.”²²⁸

Progress was seen to not only arise from industrialization but also from general humanitarian development. The same article that extolled the virtues of industrialization claimed that “Human nature has not changed... but social and political standards and values have definitely changed.”²²⁹ The main area of change is portrayed as that individual rights have become the main concern in national life and international relations rather than only the needs of the political elite. Along with this concern for individuals is portrayed a new sense of responsibility for the welfare of others that comes out of religious beliefs and conviction. In an editorial resonating with Biblical overtones, this concern is voiced as being:

We have however, our fellow human beings of other lands and of other races to think of. If we be not exactly our brother's keeper, there is still a responsibility that we cannot escape. It is that common responsibility that each man must bear for the welfare of his fellow-man... No man who has never made a sacrifice knows what real happiness is. And no nation that has insulated itself in selfishness ever produced a race of men worthy to be called the sons of God.²³⁰

This concern for the welfare of others is cast in this editorial as universal, yet it carries overtones of paternalism. These overtones are stated more overtly in the same edition of the newspaper in an article entitled “Share Burden of White Man: America may be Called on to Govern Arabia.”²³¹ The burden is described as “the care and tutelage of specific struggling peoples” and as acting as a “wet nurse.”²³²

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage linked this move away from the destruction of war with the notion of progress toward a new world “being brought in to redress the balance of power of the old world.”²³³ Discussion of this new world uses such terms as “civilized,” “saner” and a covenant based on the “unalterable lines of principle,” while illustrating the “ideals of liberty” and “humanitarian ideals.”²³⁴

Linkages Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Print Media

One of the main ways human rights and foreign policy were linked in the newspapers studied was through the idea that values (whether expressed as morality, principles or idealism) were

²²⁸ January 27, 1919, ‘The World's New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²²⁹ January 27, 1919, ‘The World's New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²³⁰ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²³¹ January 26, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²³² January 26, ‘Share Burden of White Man: America may be Called on to Govern Arabia’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²³³ January 28, 1919, ‘Ideal Of Liberty Seen In Adoption of Wilson's Plan: British Press Differs as to How League of Nations Will Work Out’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.2

²³⁴ January 26, 1919, ‘Peace Congress Unanimous In Vote far Nations League Urged By President Wilson: Plans Are Made To Punish War-Guilty’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1 and January 28, 1919, ‘Ideal Of Liberty Seen In Adoption of Wilson's Plan: British Press Differs as to How League of Nations Will Work Out’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.2.

a valid consideration in making policy decisions. All of the newspapers studied portrayed tensions as existing between idealism and pragmatism, but only the *Washington Post* coverage argued that idealism was inappropriate in foreign policy. Coverage in the *New York Times* expressed this idea that idealism had a role in foreign policy by suggesting that certain beliefs and values overrode expediency and selfish interests. Law, right and appropriate - or civilized — behavior were presented as at times being more important than acquisition of power and land. One article quoted Wilson's statement that there existed a "single cause of justice and liberty for men of every kind and place."²³⁵ Another article pointed out that countries might have to sacrifice some of their own interests.²³⁶ The behavior of those who served this cause was clearly linked with values associated with civilization as defined by the victors of war. An editorial declared that the peace conference would create a "settlement according to unwritten law recognized by the practice of all worthy to be included in the league of civilization."²³⁷

In contrast, the *Washington Post* coverage discussed how the ideals identified as being associated with human rights values did not, or should not, play a part in foreign policy. While articles reported the perspective of Wilson and some of the delegates to the conference that idealism played a role in foreign policy, the newspaper's editorial stance was clearly not of the same opinion. One article reported the support of both the Italian premier, Vittorio Orlando, and the Chinese delegates for the "high ideals" and "lofty ideals expressed" by President Wilson's proposal for the league of nations.²³⁸ This support was contrasted with an editorial statement indicating that inclusion of idealism in foreign policy is too difficult, saying:

... the league is in its last analysis to be merely an expression of principles, with some provision to perpetuate study of the subject through special committees. The President's address is regarded as escaping the faintest suggestion of anything concrete or definite... for the reason that his original plan has been so altered that he has abandoned all hope of seeing the details worked out in the near future.²³⁹

In spite of an editorial stance against idealistic proposals in the peace talks that could negatively affect nations' freedom of action, specifically the United States, the *Washington Post* reported extensively on President Wilson's perspective that foreign policy should have a responsibility to meet people's needs and that nations have responsibilities towards each other. The newspaper reported Wilson's declaration that "'We are bidden by these sufferers to make peace secure for them and see to it that the strain need never be borne again.'"²⁴⁰ In addition, it reported his statement that "It [the league] should be the eye of nations, an eye

²³⁵ January 26, 1919, 'Text of Wilson's Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations', *New York Times*, p.1.

²³⁶ January 26, 1919, 'The League for Right', *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²³⁷ January 26, 1919, 'The League for Right', *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²³⁸ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Conference Adopts League of Nations Project; President's Ringing Speech Brings Decision', *Washington Post*, p.1.

²³⁹ January 27, 1919, 'League Drops Force: Wilson Speech Indicates Base of Plan is Moral Influence', *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁴⁰ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Conference Adopts League of Nations Project; President's Ringing Speech Brings Decision', *Washington Post*, p.1.

which never slumbers,” and suggested that this meant that “a league of nations must be a vital thing and not casual or occasional. It must have continuity.”²⁴¹

Idealism and values were seen in *Los Angeles Times* coverage to be increasingly important in world politics and therefore American foreign policy. In an article entitled “The World’s New Standards,” the perspective is presented that “The old standards of political weights and measures no longer apply... Petitions filed with the Peace Conference are viewed not as questions of claims, but of rights.”²⁴² This approach, using new social and political values, was portrayed as “a force that will amalgamate national ideals, cast in the great melting pot, into an indissoluble whole which will mark the realization of the ideal of humanitarians of the last ten centuries.”²⁴³

The reference to national ideals is discussed further in the next section in connection with American values and expressions of human rights. This idea, that nations might be motivated more by ideals and humanitarianism than by self-interest in developing foreign policy, was not new but is a central notion in study of American discourses of human rights.

The discourse being gradually articulated throughout the pages of the *Los Angeles Times* was that certain notions related to humanitarian ideals, such as justice, freedom, democracy and law were valid considerations in foreign policy. Inclusion of these values was seen to benefit individuals rather than governments, for “it is with the rights of people and not with the interests and perquisites of princes and royal houses that the judges are concerned.”²⁴⁴ Furthermore, incorporation of these ideals in foreign policy was seen as potentially of practical benefit for the United States, with increased peace and security, decrease of anarchy and the satisfaction of moral virtue. However, it was made clear that along with the benefits of peace and security would come the costs of involvement in world affairs. An article otherwise discussing the potential of the United States sharing the “white man’s burden” argued that:

A League of Nations is not an academic thing — a pretty ornament which can be brought home from the Peace Conference and set up to gather admiration and dust on a shelf in the State Department A real League of Nations will be a tremendous world-wide organization costing much money, time, attention and doubtless the lives of many American soldiers and sailors as time goes on.²⁴⁵

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage suggested that cooperation between nations was necessary in order to achieve and maintain peace. Quoting a *London Morning Post* article, the *Times* presented the perspective that:

Mr. Wilson can afford to be an idealist because ‘his country is not endangered by ideals but our countries are...There is the question of tariffs, and there is the question of territory. America opposed the Monroe Doctrine to the German desire for

²⁴¹ January 26, 1919, ‘Peace Conference Adopts League of Nations Project; President’s Ringing Speech Brings Decision’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁴² January 27, 1919, ‘The World’s New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁴³ January 27, 1919, ‘The World’s New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁴⁴ January 27, 1919, ‘The World’s New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁴⁵ January 26, 1919, ‘Share Burden of White Man: America may be Called on to Govern Arabia’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

expansion in the New World. Would they be prepared to renounce that doctrine? These are the two questions which seem to us to constitute a practical test. If the United States will not sacrifice these two bulwarks of her territorial and economic security for the alternative form of security offered under the League of Nations, it appears a trifle unreasonable to expect other nations which are more immediately and imminently threatened to make even greater sacrifices of security.²⁴⁶

The quoted *Morning Post* article had continued, saying: “The war occurred not because there was no machinery of arbitration, but because Germany wanted war...if we want guarantee [sic] of peace we must put that ambition beyond her power.”²⁴⁷ Thus was the pragmatic perspective stated in its bluntest form — that peace would come from traditional forms of post-war reparations and punishments, not through establishment of any international organization for peace.

In contrast to this perspective, another British newspaper was seen to support the notion that nations needed to cooperate in order to guarantee peace. The idea of cooperation and community gradually emerges in human rights discourse over the course of the century, but at this time the notion was still embryonic with the idea simply being that:

the new world being brought in to redress the balance of power of the old world...henceforth the New World must be in partnership with the Old, for it is only by that happy necessity that we are able to look forward to the abolition of the institution of war and the organization of the world on a basis of peace.²⁴⁸

While the role of idealism was one of the central elements of discussion about foreign policy in these newspapers, it was closely linked to discussions of the conflicting interests of sovereignty and self-interest as well as of sovereignty and potential external interference in domestic affairs. This conflict between the perceived goals of idealism and pragmatism was illustrated in a *Washington Post* article headed “Allies Demand Hun Possessions Despite Wilson’s Idealism.” For example, some phrases were “the long expected conflict between idealism and practical statesmanship”; “American senators and others... resent the idea of camouflage involved in trying to make practical acts of annexation look like the carrying out of some idealistic plan”; “if only a very small percentage of the President’s idealism remains intact after the conference”; and “trying to save too much of the idealism against the advice of practical statesmen.”²⁴⁹ The same article further identified the conflict as between the “so-called internationalization doctrine and the aims of the powers.”²⁵⁰

The *Washington Post* took a very strong editorial stance on the issue of potential decrease of sovereign power associated with membership in the international organization for peace. The

²⁴⁶ January 28, 1919, ‘Ideal of Liberty Seen In Adoption of Wilson’s Plan: British Press Differs as to How League of Nations Will Work Out’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.2.

²⁴⁷ January 28, 1919, ‘Ideal Of Liberty Seen In Adoption of Wilson’s Plan: British Press Differs as to How League of Nations Will Work Out’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.2.

²⁴⁸ January 28, 1919, ‘Ideal of Liberty Seen In Adoption of Wilson’s Plan: British Press Differs as to How League of Nations Will Work Out’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.2.

²⁴⁹ January 30, 1919, ‘Colonies To Be Prize: Allies Demand Hun Possessions Despite Wilson’s Idealism’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁵⁰ January 30, 1919. ‘Colonies To Be Prize: Allies Demand Hun Possessions Despite Wilson’s Idealism’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

proposed league was seen to potentially weaken individual nations because, “In order to live such a league of nations would have had to draw its strength from the nations, and therefore each nation would have been left weaker than before.”²⁵¹ With regard to the United States, the editorial declared that “Sovereign nations like the United States will remain sovereign, determining for themselves, absolutely without interference, upon such course of action at any time as seems best to them. The world is merely to have another advisory, statistical, rhetorical headquarters.”²⁵² The question remaining was whether nations would agree to a decrease in individual freedom of action in order to avoid another world war. An earlier article asked a similar question and concluded that, “if the desire for selfish profit and advantage should still be a ruling force, it will be difficult to set up a power to which all must bow.”²⁵³

In common with the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, a great deal of attention in the *Los Angeles Times* was paid to the issue of sovereignty versus international regulation or enforcement of peace. Discussion of these conflicting interests operated alongside discussion of whether the United States should follow a policy of isolationism or internationalism. In an interesting foretaste of current American use of “most favored nation status” to reward and punish other states for their human rights records, the architect of the British proposal for an international labor commission “Asked as to what power the commission would have back of it to enforce its rulings,... replied in substance that if any nation refused to play the game she might be brought to reason by depriving her of trade privileges with sister states.”²⁵⁴

Three main issues dominated discussion in the *Los Angeles Times* of the conflict between sovereign interests and international enforcement of agreements made at the peace conference. The primary issue was that of maintenance of peace and how aggression by nation-states could be checked. The compromise reached at the conference was that “a distinction must be realized between justiciable [sic] disputes and nonjusticiable [sic] disputes and that each state must be the final judge whether or not a dispute is justiciable [sic].”²⁵⁵ A primary concern of the Americans was that participation in a league of nations would mean becoming embroiled in Old World disputes in attempts to maintain peace. As will be seen in discussion of Congressional documents, Wilson’s support of participation in the league again raised heated discussion of the isolationism versus internationalism debate. One side of the debate argued that “Americans will not stand again idly by ... America is ready to assume her full responsibility for guaranteeing the maintenance of a peace founded on justice.”²⁵⁶ The other side, led by Senator Albert Cummins, “would have this country reassume a position of splendid isolation, avoiding alliances that might embroil us in a dispute among European states... he thinks our country should act strictly in an admonitory capacity.”²⁵⁷

Two other issues were encompassed by the sovereignty debate — regulation of labor and suffrage. There was intense concern that cooperation with the proposed international labor commission would lead to interference in American industry by a league comprised of

²⁵¹ January 30, 1919, ‘No Substitute for Free Nations’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

²⁵² January 30, 1919, ‘No Substitute for Free Nations’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

²⁵³ January 27, 1919, ‘The Peace Conference at Work’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

²⁵⁴ January 24, 1919, ‘Decline to Meet Reds: Envoys from Omsk Refuse Parley’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

²⁵⁵ January 26, 1919, ‘Peace Conference Adopts World League Project’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

²⁵⁶ January 28, 1919, ‘Wilson Versus Cummins’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁵⁷ January 28, 1919, ‘Wilson Versus Cummins’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

nations with competing business interests. Readers of the *Los Angeles Times* were assured that “The international labor commission, or bureau, will not deal with purely internal problems of the nations. Capital and labor will still work out their local differences, as before.”²⁵⁸ President Wilson saw these labor issues as similar to the problem of international adjudication of demands for women’s suffrage. While supporting women’s right “to take their full share of the political life of the nations to which they belong,” he also argued that the issue:

is necessarily a domestic question for the several nations. A conference of peace settling the relations of nations with each other would be regarded as going very much outside its province if it undertook to dictate to the several states what their internal policy should be. At the same time these considerations apply also to the conditions of labor...²⁵⁹

While dashing hopes that he would support international enforcement of women’s suffrage, he still raised hopes by placing the issue of women’s suffrage on a par with labor issues — a significant step.

Human Rights and American Identity in the Print Media

Texts were examined to see if statements about human rights as defined above were linked to U.S. ideals and identity and, if so, how this was done. It is clear from presidential rhetoric that Wilson saw a clear linkage between American identity and proposed participation in the peace plan. Linkages are less clear in the newspaper discourse, although the *New York Times* linked events in Europe to the settlement of the American Civil War. An editorial argued, “In the present situation there is something which distinguishes it from previous occasions in which the Allies have enforced their wills in Europe, and which likens it to the settlement of our civil war. That was an unconditional surrender to written law in our Constitution.”²⁶⁰ American altruism was expressed in the statement that “Interests are not the chief motive force of any league to which the United States is a party.”²⁶¹ Not only was the United States portrayed as altruistic in its involvement, but, some people argued, American citizens in general were disinterested in any involvement expressed as the “general dislike here for the creation of a superstate to control the policies, interests, and conduct of individual sovereignties.”²⁶² This disinterest can be tied to the argument by proponents of isolationism that the United States should not participate in the peace conference lest the country be sullied by the political machinations of the Old World.

This perspective was also evident in the *Washington Post*. Very few linkages were portrayed between American ideals and involvement in the peace process other than negative linkages. That is, American identity required non-involvement rather than involvement. This is illustrated by the statement the “intimation that the representatives of the American people are demanding this league is regarded as entirely unjustified by the facts. In other words, the

²⁵⁸ January 24, 1919, ‘Decline to Meet Reds: Envoys from Omsk Refuse Parley’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1

²⁵⁹ January 27, 1919, ‘Wilson Tells Women Peace Conference Cannot Settle Suffrage Problem of Nations: States Decide Equal Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²⁶⁰ January 26, 1919, ‘The League for Right’, *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²⁶¹ January 26, 1919, ‘The League for Right’, *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²⁶² January 26, 1919, ‘The League for Right*’, *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

enthusiasm ascribed to the American people in this regard simply does not exist.”²⁶³ Not only is a lack of enthusiasm by the American people argued to exist, but participation in the league is seen as a personal crusade of President Wilson -- who is portrayed as a dangerous idealist lacking the “robust common sense” of former President Theodore Roosevelt.²⁶⁴

The *Los Angeles Times* offered the widest range of linkages between American identity and statements about human rights. One of the clearest linkages was that the United States could teach the world about democracy because of its own experiences.²⁶⁵ Not only did the United States have experience with democracy but she also was portrayed as pure and untouched by the events in Europe.²⁶⁶ Thus, the United States is portrayed as being able to share her ideals with the world because of her history and unblemished record. Senator Hitchcock of Nevada was reported as saying that “America, with ‘her idealistic principles, will stand at the head and the iredescent [sic] dreams of the past, will become the facts of the future.’”²⁶⁷ These idealistic principles were compared with those of physicians, and Wilson was portrayed as being in Europe to “help cure the world of its fever.”²⁶⁸ This medical metaphor was continued in the conclusion that “We Americans must watch through the night and we must pray. We shall be glad that we have done what we could. When the fever is spent and the sick world arises again in health and happiness we shall rejoice that our hands were reached out to cure.”²⁶⁹

American principles were portrayed as being the central factor in her involvement in the peace conference, and in fact as driving American foreign policy in general. The United States was represented as being “actuated by ideals of humanity and not by selfish interest.”²⁷⁰ In addition to ideals, a reason given for the involvement of the United States was sympathy for the difficulties experienced by those in Europe, especially the French.²⁷¹ Wilson told the French, “‘We have followed your sufferings with a feeling that we were witnessing one of the most heroic, and ... at the same time, satisfactory things in the world — satisfaction because it showed the strength of the human spirit.’”²⁷² In spite of the image of the United States as witness to the events in Europe, an implicit connection between American identity and definitions of human rights is offered by the representation of the United States as located at the center of events — as the driving force behind peace and associated ideas about human rights. Wilson is represented as a central figure at the conference -- “surrounding the figure of the President of the United States are the statesmen of Europe.”²⁷³

²⁶³ January 27, 1919, ‘League Drops Force: Wilson Speech Indicates Base of Plan is Moral Influence’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁶⁴ January 30, 1919, ‘Colonies To Be Prize: Allies Demand Hun Possessions Despite Wilson’s Idealism’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁶⁵ January 26, ‘Share Burden of White Man: America may be Called on to Govern Arabia’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2 and January 26, 1919, ‘Conquest Wars Forever Ended: Senator Hitchcock Says America Heads Ideal World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²⁶⁶ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁶⁷ January 26, 1919, ‘Conquest Wars Forever Ended: Senator Hitchcock Says America Heads Ideal World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²⁶⁸ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁶⁹ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁷⁰ January 28, 1919, ‘Wilson Versus Cummins’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁷¹ January 27, 1919, ‘Wilson Tells Women Peace Conference Cannot Settle Suffrage Problem of Nations: States Decide Equal Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²⁷² January 27, 1919, ‘Wilson Tells Women Peace Conference Cannot Settle Suffrage Problem of Nations: States Decide Equal Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²⁷³ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

Coverage of the peace conference in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* was again heavily dependent on British sources of news. The British press connected American identity and human rights ideals by referring to the Declaration of Independence. The ideals deriving from the Declaration of Independence were seen to be driving American involvement in the peace efforts. An ironic twist is offered by the *London Daily News*, which credits Britain for American involvement, saying:

[W]e must go back to the Declaration of Independence. That declaration was only the expression in new and larger terms, of the ideals of liberty which the English people had given to the world, and we may legitimately claim that inspiration which comes from America today, since it springs from the same fountain. Indeed, the bread we cast upon the waters in the seventeenth century has come back to us after many days.²⁷⁴

The *Times*' own writers portrayed the involvement of the United States in the peace conference as deriving not from "fear of its safety, but [was] the result of humanitarian ideals."²⁷⁵

Domains of Human Rights in the Print Media

After describing specific definitions of human rights and linkages between human rights and foreign policy created in the use of these definitions, as well as human rights and American identity, it is useful to think about the domains of discourse in which the print media placed human rights. Domains of discourse means such subject categories as political, social, economic, religious, general morality, legal or other. For example, a phrase such as "unalterable lines of principles" would be classified as general morality whereas reference to Biblical principles would be classified as within the domain of religion. Thus, references to conscience or right are classified as general morality even though they may originate from religious beliefs. Explicit mention of God, the Bible, prayer or other religious phrases means the discourse was categorized as religion. References to civilization, humanity, progress and development of ideas were categorized as in the social domain. The economic domain encompassed ideas about economic development, industrialization, labor issues and general economic rights. Discourse classified as political contained references to government, democracy, sovereignty and issues of nation, among others.

The discourse of human rights in the print media examined was categorized overwhelmingly in the political, social and general morality domains. Each newspaper studied contained statements about human rights within these three domains. In addition, *New York Times* statements about human rights were classified in the legal domain if they contained such references as "world law," "unwritten law," an "international law and order committee," the "league to enforce law by the sword, the world's first" and the "law of right," among others.²⁷⁶ The *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times* and *New Orleans Times - Picayune* contained statements about human rights that were classified within the economic domain. These statements were overwhelmingly about labor, trade and industrial issues. However, the

²⁷⁴ January 28, 1919, 'Ideal Of liberty Seen In Adoption of Wilson's Plan: British Press Differs as to How League of Nations Will Work Out', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.2.

²⁷⁵ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Congress Unanimous In Vote for Nations League Urged By President Wilson: Plans Are Made To Punish War-Guilty', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

²⁷⁶ January 26, 1919, 'The League for Right', *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

Washington Post also contained statements about standards of living. The *Los Angeles Times* was the only newspaper with human rights statements that were classified in the religious domain. A statement illustrating this was the editorial declaration that “no nation that has insulated itself in selfishness ever produced a race of men worthy to be called the sons of God.”²⁷⁷ In addition, the editorial referred to Americans praying on “bended knee” for “succor and for help” and the need to “thank the Living God for the blessings we enjoy.”²⁷⁸

Symbols of Human Rights Discourse in the Print Media

An important part of studying discourse is examination of the way discourse is itself constructed. Both overt and implicit definitions are important as are the domains of discourse within which these definitions are placed. Symbols and metaphors are also an important part of the construction of discourse -- they can be called the building blocks. Much of the coverage in the newspapers studied described human rights in terms of symbolic oppositions — contrasting provision of human rights with their absence. This was particularly noticeable in the language of *Washington Post* articles but was also evident in the language of the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*. *Washington Post* coverage identified several dichotomies, including contrasts of the old and the new; idealism versus reality; freedom, versus anarchy; and sovereignty versus international regulation. Ideas about liberty, order and freedom were positioned as the opposite of slavery, anarchy and disorder. This dichotomy was symbolized by the image of democracy confronting Bolshevism.²⁷⁹ Closely tied to this image were images of national sovereignty versus international regulation — independence of thought and national decision-making versus forced adherence to international regulations and the intervention of possibly hostile nations in domestic affairs.

New Orleans Times - Picayune writers contrasted civilization with anarchy; peace with aggression; new world with the old world; and isolation with cooperation. Civilization and sanity were compared with the brutality and devastation of the war — what British Prime Minister Lloyd George described as “beautiful things of the world disfigured beyond repair.”²⁸⁰ The Old World and its system of the balance of power worked out through aggression between isolated nations was contrasted with a new world of cooperation and peace symbolized by the United States and the American model of democracy.²⁸¹

Writers for the *New York Times* depended heavily on the use of metaphors in their coverage of the peace conference and its potential outcomes rather than setting up descriptive dichotomies. The metaphors used can be divided into several general categories: metaphors of the body; textiles; games; architecture; religion and vigilantism. Metaphors of the body included such phrases as the “heart of humanity/” “pulse of the world” and the “eye of nations.”²⁸² The world and the attempt to create peace were described in terms of weaving a fabric. This idea of creating a new world and new way of doing things was echoed in architectural metaphors, such as “fountains of enthusiasm” and references to justice as

²⁷⁷ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁷⁸ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁷⁹ January 30, 1919, ‘No Substitute for Free Nations’, *Washington Post*, p.6.

²⁸⁰ January 26, 1919, ‘Peace Congress Unanimous In Vote for Nations League Urged By President Wilson: Plans Are Made To Punish War-Guilty’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

²⁸¹ January 28, 1919, ‘Ideal Of Liberty Seen In Adoption of Wilson’s Plan: British Press Differs as to How League of Nations Will Work Out’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.2.

²⁸² January 26, 1919, ‘Text of Wilson’s Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations’, *New York Times*, p.1.

“keystone of the arch.”²⁸³ Game metaphors were used both to describe the “old way of doing things,” where people were seen as “pawns in a game,” and the “new way,” where national leaders were called “champions of this cause” of peace.²⁸⁴ International relations were also described in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage as a game in a reference to any nation that “refused to play the game.”²⁸⁵

In some cases religious metaphors were used in the *New York Times* to say the cause of justice required “parting of the raiment of the sinners.”²⁸⁶ Justice and peace were also portrayed as requiring a “vigilance committee of good citizens, extemporized for the occasion.”²⁸⁷ Other metaphors of vigilantism included such phrases as an “international law and order committee” and “law by the sword.”²⁸⁸

Aside from this heavy use of metaphors, the two symbols that dominated *New York Times* coverage of the peace conference were democracy and civilization. These two concepts were presented as going hand-in-hand in the creation of the peace and a new way of conducting international relations. The proposed League of Nations was portrayed as an organization of civilized nations united in the causes of civilization, democracy and self-determination for nations. Coverage in the *Los Angeles Times* also emphasized civilization and positioned it opposite images of the war, using such phrases as “organized savagery,” “Hun atrocities,” “monster,” and “calamity.”²⁸⁹ Contrasted with these phrases were images of reason, civilization, “idealistic principles” and progress — “We have passed through the greatest crisis in the history of civilization.”²⁹⁰ Images of progress included suggestions that the world had “passed into a new era” and that “the era when international right was the right of the strongest is definitely closed.”²⁹¹ Surviving the war era is depicted through mixed metaphors of progress and travel with the suggestion that “Humanity has passed through four years of strife and bloodshed ... as through a tunnel to emerge into a new country.”²⁹² This new territory brought into existence by peace is described using metaphors of light. Light is especially associated with the new industrialization in such declarations as “the star of conquest has set; its light is forever dimmed and the people of the world are now guided by the light of industry.”²⁹³

Language related to such ideas as nobility, moral virtue, sacrifice and selflessness from within the domain of general morality also appeared conspicuously in *Washington Post* coverage. The new way of conducting international affairs at the peace conference was

²⁸³ January 26, 1919, ‘Text of Wilson’s Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations’, *New York Times*, p.1.

²⁸⁴ January 26, 1919, ‘Text of Wilson’s Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations’, *New York Times*, p.1.

²⁸⁵ January 24, 1919, ‘Decline to Meet Reds: Envoys from Omsk Refuse Parley’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

²⁸⁶ January 26, 1919, ‘The League for Right’, *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²⁸⁷ January 26, 1919, ‘The League for Right’, *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²⁸⁸ January 26, 1919, ‘The League for Right’, *New York Times*, Section 3, p.1.

²⁸⁹ January 26, 1919, ‘Peace Conference Adopts World League Project’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and January 26, 1919, ‘Conquest Wars Forever Ended: Senator Hitchcock Says America Heads Ideal World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²⁹⁰ January 26, 1919, ‘Conquest Wars Forever Ended: Senator Hitchcock Says America Heads Ideal World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

²⁹¹ January 27, 1919, ‘The World’s New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁹² January 27, 1919, ‘The World’s New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁹³ January 27, 1919, ‘The World’s New Standards’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

represented as “emancipation from the old system” and tearing up the “old foundations.”²⁹⁴ However great the need for escape from the old system, many proposals at the peace talks, including the proposal for a league of nations, were labeled as idealistic and divorced from reality. Wilson’s idealism was depicted as “abstract principle” that excluded “more important practical and vital subjects at issue.”²⁹⁵ Furthermore, it was argued that “the practical plans of the French would clash with some of the President’s principles and ideals.”²⁹⁶ The same article went on to refer to the proposed league as an “international quilting circle.”²⁹⁷

Articles in the *Los Angeles Times* contained the widest range of symbolic language. Of all the newspapers studied. In addition to the symbols already discussed, the most elaborate symbolic language appeared in an editorial, entitled “The Fever Passes” that used an extended medical metaphor to describe both the war and the peace negotiation. In this metaphor disease and poison were positioned opposite health, happiness and remedies. European nations were portrayed as “weak and sick from their own wild excesses”; as “sick lands” and as having a “fever of unrest in [their] bones.” Delegates to the peace conference were depicted as “the world’s earnest physicians ... cooling the fever in the world’s blood.” Their task was to “remove the very cause of the disease,” and they were “step by step ... bringing the sick lands out of the fevers that bum them.”²⁹⁸

Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy in the Print Media

Who/what was viewed as having agency in news articles was determined by studying who or what was portrayed as making decisions or being involved in the foreign policy process. This participation could be formal, such as that of the president and congress, or informal, such as reports of delegations presenting petitions to the president or congress. Each newspaper in the sample attributed agency in foreign policy to the president. In the articles examined, only the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times* attributed agency to congress. The *Washington Post* reported extensively on the lack of support within congress for President Wilson’s plans, saying:

It is incontestable that the enthusiasm which the President feels for his ideals at the peace conference and for his league of nations is not reflected by public opinion in the United States. No one in the Senate or the House understands what the President’s particular reasons are for advocating so-called internationalization, and necessarily there is no support for the idea...²⁹⁹

In an article specifically examining congressional opposition to Wilson’s plans, the *Los Angeles Times* called attention to the role of congress in foreign policy, saying, “A number of Senators have expressed themselves in advance as opposed to the President’s policies and it

²⁹⁴ January 26, 1919, ‘Peace Conference Adopts League of Nations Project; President’s Ringing Speech Brings Decision’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁹⁵ January 27, 1919, ‘League Drops Force: Wilson Speech Indicates Base of Plan is Moral Influence’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁹⁶ January 27, 1919, ‘League Drops Force: Wilson Speech Indicates Base of Plan is Moral Influence’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁹⁷ January 27, 1919, ‘League Drops Force: Wilson Speech Indicates Base of Plan is Moral Influence’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

²⁹⁸ January 26, 1919, ‘The Fever Passes’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

²⁹⁹ January 30, 1919, ‘Colonies To Be Prize: Allies Demand Hun Possessions Despite Wilson’s Idealism’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

must not be forgotten that these treaties must be approved by a two-thirds vote ' of the Senators present' - not of the Senate - when the treaties are offered for ratification."³⁰⁰

Articles in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* attributed agency to public opinion and the general public. They did so through reports on President Wilson's statement that:

We are associated under very peculiar conditions of world opinion. I may say, without straining the point, that we are not the representatives of Governments, but representatives of the peoples ... For these [our fellow citizens] are a body that constitute a great democracy. They expect their leaders to speak; their representatives to be their servants ... We have no choice but to obey their mandate.³⁰¹

In addition to the president, congress and public opinion, coverage in the *Washington Post* attributed agency to an abstract concept — "facts and the reasoning that is based on them."³⁰² Similarly, coverage in the *Los Angeles Times* attributed agency to the U.S. Constitution, warning that, although important, the Constitution should not be relied on as the sole authority because, "If the American Constitution were not subject to amendment, it would have long ago been discarded."³⁰³ The *Los Angeles Times* was the only newspaper of the four in which agency in foreign policy was specifically attributed to the U.S. State Department. This came through reports on actions and statements of both the department in general and of the Secretary of State.³⁰⁴ The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* alone assigned agency to the five Great Powers and their leaders.

When attribution of agency is examined with regard to the incorporation of human rights in foreign policy, some interesting ideas emerge. The *New York Times* writers considered concerns about human rights ideas to be the domain of national governments and peoples in general. The *Washington Post* writers attributed agency to the president, public opinion — "the public mind over all the world"³⁰⁵ — leaders of other "Great Powers" and, with regard to trade and labor issues, to trade unionists. The *Los Angeles Times* writers presented the same list of parties, including the League of Nations itself and such associated organizations as the international Committee on Labor Regulation, the U.S. State Department and interest groups in general. These interest groups included trade unionists, employer groups, suffragettes and "Physicians ... watchers ... saints" who had an interest in reforming the world.³⁰⁶ The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* writers named only the general public, President Wilson and the military as having an interest in incorporating ideas of human rights into foreign policy. The inclusion of the military appeared in an article quoting British Prime Minister David Lloyd George as saying that the proposed league and associated plans for peace were the result of "an irresistible appeal made to me by civil rulers and military staffs."³⁰⁷

³⁰⁰ January 28, 1919, 'Wilson Versus Cummins', *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

³⁰¹ January 26, 1919, 'Text of Wilson's Speech to Peace Conference Pointing Out Need of a League of Nations', *New York Times*, p.1 and January 26, 1919, 'Peace Conference Adopts League of Nations Project; President's Ringing Speech Brings Decision', *Washington Post*, p.1.

³⁰² January 30, 1919, 'No Substitute for Free Nations', *Washington Post*, p.6.

³⁰³ January 28, 1919, 'Wilson Versus Cummins'. *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

³⁰⁴ January 26, 'Share Burden of While Man: America may be Called on to Govern Arabia', *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

³⁰⁵ January 27, 1919, 'The Peace Conference at Work', *Washington Post*, p.6.

³⁰⁶ January 26, 1919, 'The Fever Passes', *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

³⁰⁷ January 26, 1919, 'Peace Congress Unanimous In Vole far Nations League Urged By President

Human Rights in Congress, 1919

Human rights were not listed as a subject category in the *Congressional Record* of 1919. Ideas identified for this dissertation as related to human rights were encompassed within discussions of general war issues. Thus, the period January 1 to 30, 1919, was selected for study. This time period covers the entire time that President Wilson was in Paris and contained the bulk of discussions about proposals for a League of Nations as well as war issues related to human rights.

Congressional Definitions of Human Rights

Definitions of human rights that included ideas about the rights of people to peace and security, to freedom from wrongful interference, as well as the notion of self-determination, dominated congressional debate during January 1919. Other definitions used by members of congress encompassed democracy, justice, law, cultural, speech and press rights, right to food and general, or undefined, rights. The most prevalent models of human rights outside those outlined by the UDHR referred to rights in terms of civilization, Christianity and morality. In addition, rights were discussed in terms of progress, service, duty, humanitarianism — and with reference to the American Constitution.

The idea that peace and security could be seen as a right is illustrated by such declarations as: “what we demand in this war... is that the world be fit and safe to live in.”³⁰⁸ Such statements imply a certain standard of safety in which people are entitled to live. This standard of peace and security was violated by the war, which left:

a yearning for peace ... in the hearts of the civil populations of the world, who have seen their loved ones wounded and bleeding and dying on the battle fields, who have seen their homes destroyed and their lands desolated, and who have seen their women violated and their innocent children tortured and crucified.³⁰⁹

The carnage of war was portrayed in congressional discourse as one of the greatest violations of the rights of individuals. Senators used such language as “atrocities,” “murdered... without cause,” “pillage,” “shocking brutality,” and the “most horrible war and devastating outrage upon humanity.”³¹⁰ The Germans, and specifically the Kaiser, were portrayed as having stepped outside the boundaries of acceptable behavior. Senator Henry Myers depicted the Kaiser as having:

launched a vile criminal war... and that he waged war in a way which *violated every principle of international law, civilized warfare, humanity, civilization, Christianity, and common decency... He waged war in a way which brought the blush of shame to everybody who has any respect for international right, civilized warfare, or common decency*, in a way that brought agony to the hearts of women and palled the souls of men. He bombed hospitals and undefended towns; he murdered thousands of innocent women and children, mangled and maimed little school children at their desks, while pursuing the innocent pastimes of childhood; he cut the hands off of little boys,

Wilson: Plans Are Made To Punish War-Guilty’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

³⁰⁸ *Congressional Record*, Volume 57, 65th Congress: 3rd Session, 1918-1919, January 1-30, 1919, pp.978-2423.

³⁰⁹ Mr. Pollock, *Congressional Record*: 1918-1919, p.2340.

³¹⁰ *Congressional Record*: 1918-1919, pp.1327,1869.

ravished women and girls, murdered thousands of noncombatants, and carried other thousands into captivity and slavery.³¹¹ (Italics added)

It is sometimes difficult to separate ideas about self-determination from ideas about freedom of individuals. It is not always clear that the speakers themselves make such a differentiation. In general, self-determination refers to the right of nations and national groups to determine their own allegiances and government. This definition is illustrated by such statements as “we should accrue to each nation, notwithstanding its intellectual inferiority, its just and inalienable rights, the right to live and work out its own destiny”³¹² and “The right to preserve its racial character, its customs, ideals, institutions, and a form of government that conforms to that character, is the most sacred, as well as the most vital, right of every real nation.”³¹³ However, other statements tend to conflate the notions of self-determination and freedom, such as the declaration that the United States needs to make: “a single declaration... that she stands for the maintenance of life and liberty and independence of all the civilized nations of the world, hating none and sympathetic with all.”³¹⁴ Perhaps the clearest statement of how individual rights were defined in congressional dialogue is that by Senator William Kirby that the goal was “peace to the world and fair treatment to the weak and small and subject peoples of the earth and protection from exploitation by the strong and powerful...”³¹⁵

Democracy was defined not only as a right but as a goal and as a standard to be reached. It was presented as a standard that the United States embodies and that other nations wish to achieve, or should wish to achieve. Members of congress referred to the goal of the peace negotiations as being “a freer and more democratic world” and argued that “the new spirit of democracy... is engulfing autocratic and arbitrary power all over the world.”³¹⁶ President Wilson was portrayed as “lifting high before the peoples of the world the standards of a virtuous democracy.”³¹⁷

Justice and law were often discussed in tandem as goals of the peace process. Senator Myers argued that justice was needed before any other rights could be guaranteed or peace obtained:

[T]his world can not be satisfactorily conducted upon any other plane other than that of justice. I believe justice is one of the greatest things in the world. If justice is not to prevail in the world the world can not be safe for democracy or safe for any other virtue that goes to make it a fit place to live. Justice should be the first consideration. We should be just before we are generous.³¹⁸

Justice, or what was called “fair dealing,” was linked with humanity and was to be achieved through the establishment of codes of international law.

Senator Myers’ reference to the need to place justice before generosity is tied to one of the greatest debates of the postwar period — the type and amount of aid that should be given to

³¹¹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1320.

³¹² *Congressional Record. 1918-1919*, p.1083.

³¹³ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1087.

³¹⁴ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1087.

³¹⁵ *Congressional Record’ 1918-1919*, p.2423.

³¹⁶ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1824.

³¹⁷ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1423.

³¹⁸ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1321.

war-torn Europe. This same debate was echoed in congressional debates following the Second World War, but it had roots in discussions of how best to aid Europe in this earlier time. Some members of congress saw the role of the United States as being ‘To take from our store and feed the world’s hungry, to alleviate distress and want, to succor those who were suffering, and generally to be the good Samaritan to all on earth.’³¹⁹ Other members considered that welfare should begin at home before non- Americans would be considered. However, the key point here is that freedom from hunger was implicitly considered to be a right Senator Henry Hollis supported this perspective, saying, “I do not believe it is ever excusable to allow anyone to starve in the United States of America; and I hope the time will come when no one ever will be permitted to starve anywhere in the world, friend or enemy.”³²⁰

Other rights covered in congressional debate included cultural rights and the freedom of speech and press. The freedom of speech and press was portrayed in congressional debate as one of the central rights of humankind, or at the very least, of Americans. One House member declared that “Every citizen has the right to think and speak.”³²¹ These rights were also implicitly referred to by a debate over censorship of information from Europe, which talked about the “evils of that sort of suppression of information.”³²² A league of victorious allies was portrayed as essential to “respect the rights, the religion, and the aspirations of other and smaller peoples, encourage education, the development of arts, sciences and all the peaceful pursuits of man.”³²³ This league also represented “mutual sympathies... mutual struggle... mutual ideals in the cause of free government and the rights of humanity.”³²⁴ These undefined rights included those discussed above as well as a whole range of more ephemeral, or more-difficult-to-define, rights.

In many cases, the ideas of justice and law discussed above were associated with Biblical law and the tenets of Christian morality. In one case, justice was talked about in the context of “justice in the immutable laws of God.”³²⁵ Another orator talked about peace in the context of the “era of a peace that could be had through Christianity of men and justice of nations.”³²⁶ Senator William Pollock explicitly identified peace and rights with Christianity with reference to peace as the “plans of God.” Arguing for participation of the United States in the peace process, he said, “They have an opportunity, this whole body has an opportunity, the Nation, the world, has an opportunity that was never afforded before to hasten the coming of the kingdom of God on earth.”³²⁷

Though morality was most often associated with Christianity in congressional discourse, a general morality that guided behavior and by which rights could be defined was also identified. Reference was made to an “international conscience” and the “conscience of the world,” and the war effort was for “the supremacy of the moral forces of the world.”³²⁸ The notion of moral forces encompassed ideas about humanitarianism and duty with reference to

³¹⁹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1797.

³²⁰ *Congressional Record 1918-1919*, p.1796.

³²¹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1416.

³²² *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1804.

³²³ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.998.

³²⁴ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1314.

³²⁵ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1320.

³²⁶ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.992.

³²⁷ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.2342, 2344.

³²⁸ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.1838, 2340, 1422.

“widest humanitarianism and the greatest liberty for all” and “definite, independent human responsibility.”³²⁹ While not themselves rights, these are seen as foundations on which rights could be built and through which such rights as freedom could be provided. The American constitution was seen as a further foundation for rights as illustrated in such statements as the “just principles of the rights of humanity as set forth in our Declaration of Independence.”³³⁰

Human rights were further implicitly defined in terms of civilization and progress. Not only was the war portrayed as having been fought for the defense of civilization, but civilization was pictured as the end result of progress. This perspective is illustrated by Senator Pollock’s statement: “There was a time when individuals settled their differences by might, regardless of right; likewise families and neighborhoods and clans settled their differences; but the human race has advanced, civilization has progressed, and law and order has evolved out of brute force.”³³¹ This progression allowed a “new code of international relations and conduct” that emphasized “human justice and human liberty and human progress.”³³²

Congressional Linkage of Human Rights and Foreign Policy

Perhaps because the idea that notions of rights had a place in foreign policy was fairly new, extensive and wide-ranging debate took place in congress over the connection between human rights and foreign policy. These connections were identified as being that community or participation in world affairs was important. This idea was contrasted with concerns over potential loss of sovereignty by cooperation with other nations and the argument that non-intervention in world affairs was the ideal model of foreign affairs. Other connections between human rights and foreign policy were encompassed in debates over morality versus self-interest and the role of morality itself in foreign policy; idealism versus pragmatism; immediate versus long-term goals and the argument that international relations should be similar to personal relations.

The idea of community as important in world affairs comes through very clearly in congressional debate at the time. The notion that nations were connected through interests and that actions of one nation affected others created an awareness that foreign policy decisions were important. This discourse of community had two strands. One was that the affairs of nations were interconnected. The other was a sense of solidarity that had grown out of the United States fighting alongside other nations and sharing a common task. This sense of solidarity was illustrated by such declarations as “[W]e have defended together the same sacred cause; we have together saved mankind; we are friends forever.”³³³ The more important strand in this discourse was that of the belief that the United States was part of a world community. This belief demonstrated in congressional discourse echoed the conviction of President Wilson that “unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.”³³⁴ A statement by Representative John Rogers of Massachusetts illustrates this belief as well as the belief that the United States had reached a position of responsibility as a world leader. He said that:

³²⁹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.1385, 1838.

³³⁰ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1396.

³³¹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.2340.

³³² *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.1083, 1385.

³³³ *Congressional Record 1918-1919*, p.1314.

³³⁴ President Wilson, Jan. 8 speech to the nation also in *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, x.

it is perhaps not too much to say that we are to-day the great world power. Hitherto we have, as a Nation, thought and dealt in terms of a continent. Henceforward we must inevitably think and deal in terms of a planet... The basis of our future world life must be a constant and an accurate store of information concerning our copartners in world trade, world thought, and world enterprise. Only as we possess this information can we advance intelligently and build wisely.³³⁵

Similar ideas were expressed by Senator Pollock who, argued that:

conditions have changed, our situation has been altered, distance has been destroyed, and time has been annihilated; we do not longer occupy a position of aloofness and isolation from the balance of the world; we to-day have reached that position in our upward march that we are not only a great country and a wonderful Nation, but we are to-day a very large and important part of the whole world and of the whole human race.³³⁶

In marked contrast to the linkage of human rights and foreign policy through membership in a world community was the fear that cooperation would lead to loss of sovereignty. The most vocal opponent of membership in the proposed league was Senator William Borah, who quoted H.G. Wells in saying, "No man can join a partnership and remain an absolutely free man."³³⁷ It is worth quoting Senator Borah at length because his argument neatly ties together ideas about potential loss of sovereignty, American fear of entanglement in European affairs, the isolationist position and an American ideology of individualism and moral superiority. Borah asserts:

I want America, disenthralled and disentangled, by precept and example, through influence and counsel, to continue her lead in the grand march of civilization — in the world struggle for free government... *give us something that is our very own*, which we may love and for the preservation of which men are willing to die, and you will have an America, a United States, which will exert far more influence and dispense greater happiness and lead more certainly to world contentment than an America *shorn of her individuality and embarrassed in her free movements by alliances or sickened and enfeebled by the international virus*. I beg you to believe that there is nothing to take the place of this old-time Americanism ... I do know that there was brought into being on this western continent nearly 150 years ago an experiment in government which has weathered every storm, which was baptized with the wisdom of the greatest leader of this or any other age, which has excited the emulation and inspired the efforts of people in every quarter of the globe, which has given freedom and prosperity to the people at home and precept and example and inspiration to the world abroad.³³⁸ (Italics added)

This disinclination to become involved in the affairs of the world ultimately led to the United States declining membership in the League of Nations.

³³⁵ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1826.

³³⁶ *Congressional Record' 1918-1919*, p.2343.

³³⁷ Senator Borah quoting H.G. Wells in *Congressional Record' 1918-1919*, p.1385.

³³⁸ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.1386-87.

Among the many arguments for isolationism, two in particular dominated discourse in congress. One was that the United States could provide better leadership by maintaining distance from the rest of the world. This perspective is illustrated both by the passionate declaration above of Senator Borah and by such statements as those of Senator Miles Poindexter that the “United States can do more for Poland and for the world by preserving our liberties, our peculiar ideals and traditions upon this continent, affording a refuge in the future as we have in the past... than we can by involving ourselves in a perpetual war in the name of peace.”³³⁹ The second argument was based on fear that once the United States intervened and provided aid to other countries, those countries would become dependent on American assistance. In the words of Senator Myers, the United States was:

about to assume the role of- being the big rich uncle to all the remainder of the world; that we are going to be a big rich uncle to all of Europe, friend and foe alike; and that if anyone needs help over there or gets into trouble, they will turn to Uncle Sam, their big rich uncle, for assistance ... it will encourage the unstable, restless, dissatisfied peoples of the remainder of the world to engage in revolution, in uprisings, in civil strife, in internecine warfare; to bum and destroy; to leave their vocations and destroy each other's crops and products; to neglect the cultivation of the soil; and to spend their time in Bolshevism and revolution and contentions among one another.³⁴⁰

In congressional debate during January 1919 the role of morality in foreign policy was a major issue. This issue was composed of several strands: the competing interests of morality and self-interest; the demands of idealism versus pragmatism; and whether morality had any part to play in foreign policy making. These strands were not always cleanly separated. Even President Wilson blurred the lines between idealism and pragmatism by arguing that humanitarian aid to Europe would have the practical side-effect of limiting the spread of Bolshevism. In this belief, he was in tune with the beliefs of Senator Poindexter, who argued that “there is no idealism ... that is worthy of the admiration of mankind that is not based on a sound material foundation.”³⁴¹ Senator Warren Harding, however, dissented, saying that “every experiment of that kind which has ever been made calls for the renewal of the shower; and you can not [sic] reach practical results through an avenue of dreams.”³⁴²

Senator Harding vigorously opposed what he again called a “maze of dreams” in foreign policy and argued: “I would not want a republic without impelling and inspiring ideals, but I should like for a little while to see the American Republic following the lines of common-sense practicality.”³⁴³ While those opposed to American involvement in European affairs presented the debate as being between idealism and pragmatism, as mentioned earlier, those in favor of the league and giving humanitarian aid to Europe argued that idealism was in fact pragmatism. Senator Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin summed up the former argument by this statement:

I expect to vote for this bill not as a charity, because I do not believe that Congress has any constitutional right to vote money for pure charity. I shall vote for it because I

³³⁹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.1802-03.

³⁴⁰ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1870.

³⁴¹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1806.

³⁴² *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.1808-09.

³⁴³ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1808.

believe that the appropriation of this money will bring a resulting benefit to the people of the United States commensurate at least with the money that is involved.³⁴⁴

Congressional consensus emerged only in the belief that the United States had not entered the war in defense of democracy or “any other high-sounding platitudinal reason” but purely to “vindicate American honor and to establish American rights.”³⁴⁵ Senator Harding argued that the only reason for cloaking American involvement in the language of idealism was so as not to offend the American-German voting bloc.³⁴⁶

As to whether morality had any role to play in foreign policy, consensus was impossible. One side of the debate argued firmly for a league “to make all nations of the world do what is right,” saying there existed “an ever-growing sense of international honor and integrity in the world ... and a deeper world sense of abhorrence against international bad faith.”³⁴⁷ The other side, led most vocally by Senator Borah, argued that these dreams were just dreams. He caustically remarked:

If you think you can do what the living God has not been able to do, standardize the human family; If you feel you can undo what He in His inscrutable wisdom did when He planted race prejudice in the hearts and stamped color upon the faces of men, then give us your prospectus. We will be glad to look it over.³⁴⁸

Two further themes addressed the links between human rights and foreign policy. One argument said that such long-term goals as the league had no place in a world seeking an immediate peace and dealing with the ravages of war. This argument was illustrated by such comments as “Our first duty is to act in the living present, to bring peace to the world in the year 1919, before we undertake to make a peaceful world in the year 2000.”³⁴⁹ The second theme was that relationships between nations should be on the same bases as relationships between individuals. If morality and responsibility guided relations between individuals, these same principles, some argued, apply also to relations at the international level. Senator Porter McCumber argued that moral laws, such as the Golden Rule, that guide individual behavior should govern relations between nations, “which are but collections of individuals.”³⁵⁰ Along the same lines Representative Andrew Montague, asked:

Why, for example, should individual homicide be crime and collective homicide directed by the state be innocence? Why should not crimes committed by a state be the concern of all of the family of nations as much so as a crime by the person is the concern of every individual of the State? Why should criminal law apply to the crimes of persons and the civil law, the law of property and of contracts, apply to the crimes of nations? May not a league of nations afford the medium by which a rational and moral reclassification of the law of nations may be made to fit the crimes of the state?³⁵¹

³⁴⁴ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1860.

³⁴⁵ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.1790-91.

³⁴⁶ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1808.

³⁴⁷ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.1330-31, 1084.

³⁴⁸ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1385.

³⁴⁹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.974.

³⁵⁰ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1084.

³⁵¹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1422.

Congressional Allocation of Agency in Foreign Policy

One of the great debates in congress during this time was over the issue of agency in foreign policy. It was not a simple dispute between the president and congress; rather it was a complicated discussion of who had authority for foreign policy under the constitution and in practice. Henry Cabot Lodge was vocal in his disapproval of President Wilson's independence in foreign policy ~ condemning the fact that Wilson was not supplying congress with all the details of the negotiations in Paris. The debate was further complicated by the fact that it was not simply about who had authority over foreign policy but about who at what point had authority. Senator James Lewis argued that when the president needed advice, congress could offer counsel, but until that time, "Congress should not project itself upon his foreign negotiations."³⁵² Furthermore, he said that congress should comment only on a finished treaty, not on the negotiations leading up to the treaty — "the Constitution invests in this body the privilege to advise and consent to a finished thing — the treaty."³⁵³ Others said that both the Senate and the House should be kept fully informed of what proposals Wilson was submitting to the peace conference. Senator Thomas Sterling, while saying the president could have consulted more fully with congress, conceded that the president was under "no moral or legal obligation to consult the Senate" and that the Senate has "no right, legal or moral, to ask the President to disclose to the Senate his purposes or views."³⁵⁴ However, he argued that in such a serious case with significant circumstances, "harmony of thought and action between the President and Senate with the resulting public benefit would flow from some exchange of views."³⁵⁵ Taking the center ground, Senator Charles Thomas presented the division of authority as thus:

The President originates; the Senate accepts, changes, or rejects it. The President is the author; the Senate the reviewer. The President erects the structure; the Senate takes it over with the power to alter the plan as it may desire or throw it into the discard if preferred. With the utmost respect for opposing opinions, I affirm that dissent from this view springs from an undue regard for senatorial authority or a reluctance to clothe the Executive with unlimited control over foreign affairs.³⁵⁶

Opposition to President Wilson's independence came largely out of a view that congress was being slighted by the president and his entourage. Senator Hiram Johnson of California complained that:

We here, a part of the treaty-making power, with ... before us, the solemn assurance given to the world, accepted by every power on earth, that there should be 'open covenants of peace, openly arrived at,' are today told, when they are dealing with the very blood and hope of this Republic, 'that satisfactory arrangements yesterday were made.' There ought to be some means by which there would be some information authentically brought to this body. I do not know how it can be accomplished. We are dependent upon the newspaper correspondents, and I hesitate to comment upon much that they say; but nevertheless, we are left in confusion and in doubt and without the facts. We do not know what is transpiring, when to all the world we have said that not

³⁵² *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.982-83.

³⁵³ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.984.

³⁵⁴ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1314.

³⁵⁵ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1314.

³⁵⁶ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.995.

only the world but we ourselves should know just exactly what was occurring from minute to minute and from day to day.³⁵⁷

While the congress and the president debated who had treaty-making authority based on differing interpretations of the constitution, agency in foreign policy was assigned to the general public. Interest groups such as the League to Enforce Peace and other petitioners were mentioned as part of this public but, in general, public opinion was referred to in much less specific terms — in many cases, as an independent entity. Reference was made to the “tribunal of public opinion in the United States” and to the fact that “public opinion must approve any treaty to make it valuable to the world.”³⁵⁸ Representative William Mason concluded that after all the debate over authority to make treaties and conduct foreign policy, “back of us are the people themselves, who make and unmake Presidents and Congresses.”³⁵⁹

The American Discourse of Human Rights in 1919

Although it has been argued that human rights did not exist as a major topic of international relations in the early part of the twentieth century, it is clear that the concept of human rights was very much part of the media and congressional discourse of 1919. The threads which were woven together in this human rights discourse were those of security, justice, peace, equality (of all people and in terms of gender) and the rule of law; morality, conscience, common interest and humanity; self-determination and the democracy associated with it; and civilization and order. Congressional definitions of human rights were both more specific than in the media (for example, discussions of specific freedoms, such as those of press and speech) and more overtly related to notions of Christianity and morality. As will be seen in the later case studies, the way that human rights were talked about in 1919 bears strong resemblance to the ways in which human rights are talked about in 1945, 1976 and 1989. What will emerge from the case studies is a twentieth-century American discourse of human rights — a reasonably continuous narrative with remarkably few digressions.

The history of the United States played a large role in the crafting of the discourse of the war and the peace. American satisfaction was evident that the United States had successfully created a nation based on moral principles and free of the taint of the secret power-politics of Europe — referred to by Wilson as the “little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools.”³⁶⁰ Thus, media coverage and congressional discussions portrayed the war and post-war devastation in Europe as the result of an “old way of doing things” that could be changed by following the example of American history. Americans were portrayed as having a special role to play in the creation of a “new order” because they could teach the world about democracy from their own experience and could thus “cure” the world.

Linkages between human rights and foreign policy were evident in media coverage of the Paris Peace Conference, congressional discussions about peace proposals and President Wilson’s public statements. This is significant because it is a much earlier linkage than many historians suggest. Foreign policy was clearly linked to ideals and values emerging from the American historical experience and to ideas of world community and responsibility of nations

³⁵⁷ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.2423.

³⁵⁸ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, pp.2423,1417.

³⁵⁹ *Congressional Record: 1918-1919*, p.1417.

³⁶⁰ President Wilson’s War Message, *Congressional Record* 65th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 55, Part I, p.102 in Bartlett, (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy*, p.457.

towards each other. Many of these ideas are developed more fully in human rights discourse of 1945 (and later years), but they existed at this much earlier date. To many, the United Nations is synonymous with human rights; thus, the following chapter treats the discourse of human rights emerging from the San Francisco conference of 1945. Again, congressional and presidential discussions of foreign policy are discussed, as is media coverage of the conference.

Chapter Four

The United Nations and the San Francisco Conference, 1945: Case Study II

The story of human rights in the print media in 1945 included specific rights, such as freedom from wrongful interference and security of person, religion, equality and antidiscrimination, property, nationality, migration. It was also a more general story of peace, law, justice, equality and undefined human rights. Values such as freedom, unselfishness, generosity, truth, morality, religion, community, cooperation, service, civilization and humanity were important components of the story. Political rights were the main focus of the narrative, but social, cultural and economic rights were also included. Congressional stories of human rights focused attention on a narrative of political rights related to peace, justice, law, freedom, democracy, equality, self-determination, freedom of speech and individual rights. Economic, social and cultural rights were included as sub-narratives related to the provision of rights as a guarantee against the recurrence of war and as a bulwark against totalitarianism. Again, values were an important part of congressional stories of human rights, including general moral values and specifically Christian values, as well as idealistic values related to progress, humanity and civilization.

In 1945 the print media were unanimous in telling the foreign policy story through the voice of the president of the United States and through the voices of leaders of other nations — that is, the story of foreign policy was told through elite narrators. The voice of congress was heard more strongly in narrating the human rights story than in narration of general foreign policy. State and local government and general public opinion were presented as minor narrators of foreign policy. Important narrators of human rights stories were a broad range of interest groups bringing specific stories to the conference and international conference delegates who also brought distinctive human rights narratives to the overall story of human rights in 1945. Again members of congress presented the only narrators of foreign policy and human rights stories as themselves and the president —with debate over whose voice was to be heard at which time. Although the print media and congress both assigned a great measure of agency to the president in telling the human rights story, the president was remarkably absent from the conference's human rights narrative. Other than opening the conference, the president seemed to have a very small role to play. However, his administration played a large role through the extensive involvement of the U.S. State Department in both the San Francisco conference and the preceding Dumbarton Oaks conference.

The San Francisco Conference

The San Francisco conference was organized by the victorious allies of World War Two to discuss the establishment of a world security organization to replace what was then considered an obsolete League of Nations. Many details of the peace and post-war settlements had been decided at the Yalta conference of February 1945 and the earlier Dumbarton Oaks conference in Washington D.C. August 21 to October 7, 1944. Economic issues were to be discussed at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1945, and the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were to be established there. Some of the issues brought to the San Francisco conference had already been extensively discussed at Dumbarton Oaks. Thus, the San Francisco conference was designed to decide the framework of the post-war era and the creation of an organization

rather than sort out specific details of war settlements and reparations and the economics of the new world organization.

It was difficult for some members of congress to accept that the “international security organization” outlined in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was any different from the League of Nations. Senator Arthur Vandenberg asked Benjamin Gerig at the U.S. State Department to explain the difference in purpose of these two organizations. Gerig’s reply in a memo dated January 24, 1945, in part said, “The Proposals specifically provide that the Organization should promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. No such general provision was contained in the League Covenant.”³⁶¹

This focus on human rights and fundamental freedoms in the drafting of the United Nations Charter and later the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is what makes the San Francisco conference so important in any examination of the development of ideas of, and ways of talking about, human rights. As mentioned in chapter one, many scholars date international discussions of human rights from this period.

The Preamble to the United Nations Charter

A preamble, designed as an introduction to a document, often outlines the central ideas and goals of that document- It is useful here then to briefly examine some proposals put forward for the preamble to the charter of the United Nations because they reveal some central concerns of the document relevant to a study of the language of human rights. Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish was particularly concerned about the preamble. Addressing Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and sending copies of the letter to Leo Pasvolsky and Alger Hiss, MacLeish wrote:

When I arrived in San Francisco, Dean Gildersleeve asked me if I would take a crack at the Preamble. The Preamble was said to be in a bad way.

“Bad way” puts it mildly, in my opinion. I have never seen a more complete literary and intellectual abortion.

I also agree that it is extremely important that the Preamble should be something more than a piece of drafting. It should move men’s minds. To do so, it should be written - not constructed like a crossword puzzle out of political and academic odds and ends.

It is impossible, I think to over estimate the importance of the Preamble. The sentences of the Declaration of Independence, which have influenced history, are the sentences of the first few paragraphs - not the long indictment or the announcement of action ... for God’s sake, let’s do something and do something fast about the present dreadful text.³⁶²

This “present dreadful text” was the result of several years of discussion by various officials within the U.S. State Department as well as proposals from outside sources, such as other delegations to the conference. Durward Sandifer, assistant chief of the Division of Political

³⁶¹ Memo from Benjamin Gerig to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, *The Papers of Benjamin Gerig*, (1894-1976), The Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 2, Folder 5.

³⁶² Archibald MacLeish. writing to Secretary of State Stettinius, June 8, 1945 in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), The Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 1.

Studies in the State Department, Benjamin Cohen of the Office of War Mobilization, and Benjamin Gerig, exchanged ideas on a number of proposals. A June 1943 proposal suggested for the preamble:

The High Contracting Parties:

determined that war as the greatest scourge of civilization shall be banished from the earth;

convinced that the rule of law shall be firmly established as the inviolable mode of conduct among governments;

dedicated to the attainment of that human dignity and freedom for which millions have made the supreme sacrifice;

resolved to devote their energies and resources to attain that better life which science and modern knowledge has made possible for all peoples.³⁶³

Benjamin Cohen's proposal used similar language, referring to the "scourge of war among nations" and outlining the role of the United Nations to "establish the rule of law" with the goal of "peace, security, welfare, dignity and freedom of all peoples."³⁶⁴ A later draft by Benjamin Gerig initially suggested that the task of the new organization be "freeing all people everywhere from the tyranny of fear and want"³⁶⁵ This suggestion was scratched out in pencil and replaced by a list of goals:

to rid the world of war,
to remedy conditions that imperil peace,
to uphold the principles of justice,
to ensure the rule of law among nations, and
to advance the liberty and well-being of all peoples.³⁶⁶

As time passed and numerous drafts of the preamble were written, attention came to focus more and more upon the ideas about law, liberty and well-being. MacLeish's draft suggested the idea of nations living as "good neighbors in a common belief in the dignity and worth of man" and identified the goal of the organization as being to 'improve the lot and condition of mankind.'³⁶⁷ A draft preamble submitted by the president of the First Commission mentioned human rights for the first time by identifying the goal as being "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small... to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."³⁶⁸ The Netherlands delegation to the San Francisco conference suggested that the goal was "to maintain international peace and security in conformity with the elementary principles of morality and justice and on the basis of due regard for international law."³⁶⁹

³⁶³ Durward Sandifer and Benjamin Gerig in *The Papers of Benjamin Gerig*, (1894-1976), Box 2, Folder 10.

³⁶⁴ Benjamin Cohen in *The Papers of Benjamin Gerig*, (1894-1976), Box 2, Folder 10.

³⁶⁵ Memo from Benjamin Gerig to Leo Pasvolsky dated April 5, 1945 in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 11

³⁶⁶ Memo from Benjamin Gerig to Leo Pasvolsky dated April 5, 1945 in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 11

³⁶⁷ Archibald MacLeish, writing to Leo Pasvolsky, June 22, 1945 in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 1.

³⁶⁸ June 23, 1945 in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 1

³⁶⁹ *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 1

The final version of the charter incorporated many of the above ideas and reads as follows:

We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war... and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and ... to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors... to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples...³⁷⁰

The language of such an official document is of necessity both grandiose and general. Even the American proposals rarely identified specific rights when talking about human rights. Human rights or general ideas about rights are mentioned in many of the drafts, but the specifics of human rights did not seem to be of great concern at the time. Of greater concern to people in the U.S. State Department were the details of international settlement and law related to strategic and economic security. In the hundreds of pages of State Department documents examined in the papers of Pasvolsky and Gerig, only in one place were the State Department's definitions of human rights found outlined. A declassified internal paper dated October 4, 1944, outlining the responsibilities of the Special Subcommittee on Legal Problems of the President's Advisory Committee, identified the following "principal groups of rights":

(1) personal rights, such as freedom of speech, religion, and education, and equality before the law; (2) property rights, defined as equality before the law with respect to property; (3) social rights, including the right to work and to enjoy minimum standards of economic, social, and cultural well-being, the right to form associations, and freedom from discrimination; (4) political rights, such as the right of assembly and petition and the right to citizenship; and (5) procedural rights, including the right to a fair speedy, and public trial, and freedom from punishment except in accordance with pre-existing law.³⁷¹

The Legal Subcommittee stated an assumption that the "recognition and guarantee of basic human rights would be conducive to the development of conditions favorable to the maintenance of international peace."³⁷² A secondary assumption operating in this assumption, was that whatever human rights were identified, any so-called international bill of rights would have been designed in a way that "could be adopted in some form by all states as an international guarantee of the rights stated."³⁷³ Thus, it was clear that the contents of a bill of rights would have to be negotiated to be agreeable to all parties — that is, that it would have to be less a statement of universality in ideals than one of pragmatism.

³⁷⁰ Department of State, Publication No. 2368, Conference Series 76 in Ruhl J. Bartlett (Ed.), (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), p.676.

³⁷¹ October 4, 1944, 'Work in the Field of International Organization in the Department of State Prior to October 1943', in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 5.

³⁷² October 4, 1944, 'Work in the Field of International Organization in the Department of State Prior to October 1943', in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 5.

³⁷³ October 4, 1944, 'Work in the Field of International Organization in the Department of State Prior to October 1943', in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 5.

In a lecture delivered at the University of Michigan on July 14, 1947, Yuen-li Liang said that the United States and other members of the United Nations were initially interested more in security than in creating laws to protect individual citizens of member nations. A copy of this lecture was sent to Leo Pasvolsky. In it Liang argues:

Security was set above justice and the establishment or restoration of order and peace was to precede the reign of law. In fact, it was thought that the introduction of legal standards or criteria in connection with the maintenance of peace might even hamper those preventative and enforcement measures which the proposed organization was authorized to take when a threat to international peace and security arose.³⁷⁴

Liang's view was that it was only through pressure from lawyers, statesmen and politicians in the United States and other countries in the period between the Dumbarton Oaks talks and the San Francisco conference that international law as a means of guaranteeing individual rights and security was brought to the forefront of discussion. It was subsequently included in the preamble of the United Nations charter.

Human Rights in the Newspapers of 1945

The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times* and the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* were studied from April 25 to May 1, 1945. This period was selected to encompass the opening week of the San Francisco conference.

Defining Human Rights in the Print Media

On the basis of the UDHR definition, human rights were discussed in the *New York Times* coverage in terms of freedom from wrongful interference and security of person, general freedom, religion, equality and anti-discrimination, property, nationality, migration and undefined human rights. Other ways of defining and identifying human rights were in terms of individual rights as well as an international bill of rights; ideas associated with values, such as unselfishness, generosity and truth; morality and religion; and civilization and humanity.

Human rights in the *Washington Post* coverage were defined largely in relation to establishing peace. Thus discussion centered on ideas about law, justice, freedom from wrongful interference and equality. Other discussions included ideas about economic and social rights, rights relating to sovereignty of nations, and undefined human rights. Definitions of human rights outside those of the UDHR included discussions of punishment, conscience and right versus wrong as well as definition of human rights in terms of progress towards creation of a "better world." Notions of community, cooperation, service and society also played a part in these discussions.

The human rights discourse in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage was very similar to that of the other newspapers in this study for this period. Human rights were defined in terms of justice, law, peace and freedom. In addition, rights related to the state and migration were included. When rights were talked about on a more general basis, definitions of human rights included discussion of principles, morality and right — encompassing the related areas of humanity, unselfishness, ideals, dignity, responsibility, unity and cooperation, religious belief and the notion of progress and world improvement.

³⁷⁴ Yuen-li Liang, (1947), 'International Law, the United States, and the United Nations', Lecture delivered at the University of Michigan, July 14, 1947 in the series "The United States in World Affairs", pp.1-2 in *The Papers of Leo Pasvolsky*, (1893-1953), Box 11 signed "With compliments Yuen-li Liang."

Peace, freedom, justice and international law were the primary definitions of human rights in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*. Educational and cultural rights were included in discussions of human rights, as were undefined general rights and human rights — that is, use of the phrases without additional definition. Other ways of talking about human rights included ideas about cooperation and community, hope, progress and civilization, duty and moral law, as well in the context of a dichotomy between domination and freedom.

Security. Freedom from Wrongful Interference and Equality

The central problem driving human rights concerns immediately after World War Two was Nazi treatment of the Jewish people. Not only were the Allies concerned with the protection of and restitution for Jews and guaranteeing equal rights for all people, the debate over the establishment of an international bill of rights was being driven by members of the American and British Jewish communities, concerned to prevent any repeat of the atrocities of the war. While many rights discussed in the print media were understood to be rights shared equally by all people, discussions were often couched as relating specifically to the treatment of Jewish people and ways of preventing a recurrence of the Holocaust. The president of the American Jewish Committee, Mr. Proskauer, referred to freedom from wrongful interference generally in terms of “security and contentment for citizens of every nation” as well as specifically referring to the six million “victims of Nazi aggression.”³⁷⁵ A statement issued by the American Jewish Committee outlined the fundamental principle underlying Jewish concerns as being that “all people are morally entitled to defend their rights to survival and self-fulfillment.”³⁷⁶ However, Proskauer related the two concerns by saying that “the ultimate safety of the Jewish populations of Europe will rest upon the international enforcement of justice and equality of treatment to men of every race and creed.”³⁷⁷

This idea of equality was a central concern of Proskauer and the American Jewish Committee. Proskauer made reference to “fundamental freedoms, religious liberty and racial equality” and focused attention in his speeches to delegates at the conference on what he saw as the basic principle of “non-discrimination between racial religious and ethnic groups.”³⁷⁸ Non-discrimination and security of person were discussed in terms of rights to choice of religion, property, nationality and freedom of migration. All these rights were vital concerns for Jewish communities after the war. Not only were there thousands of people without homes in Europe, but many were also without nationality — displaced by war and by the creation of new boundaries between nations. With reference to this concern, Proskauer proclaimed that “every human being is entitled to live under his own vine and fig tree in his own country.”³⁷⁹ While this statement acknowledged the rights of all humans, the concern of the American Jewish Committee was the Zionist goal of “opening of the doors of Palestine for unrestricted Jewish immigration, and its reconstitution as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.”³⁸⁰

³⁷⁵ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit ‘Security’ Program’, *New York Times*, p.11 and April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

³⁷⁶ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit ‘Security’ Program’, *New York Times*, p.11

³⁷⁷ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

³⁷⁸ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

³⁷⁹ April 30, 1943, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

³⁸⁰ April 30, 1943, ‘Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit ‘Security’ Program’, *New York Times*, p.11.

The *Washington Post* coverage also positioned discussions incorporating definitions of rights as freedom from wrongful interference in relation to Nazi treatment of Jews and other minorities. References were made to the “perpetrator of atrocities,” “recent Nazi atrocities,” “Nazi torturers,” and “Nazi atrocity camps.”³⁸¹ The House Foreign Relations Committee defined these atrocities as “oppression, or pillage by political, military or economic means.”³⁸² Freedom from wrongful interference was seen as important not only for the sake of individual security, but also for the sake of civilization. President Harry S. Truman argued that, “With ever increasing brutality and destruction, modern warfare, if unchecked, would ultimately crush all civilization.”³⁸³

The perceived connection between the right of the individual to security and larger issues is clearly illustrated by New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey’s statement that “The large and powerful nations must acknowledge the principle that as all individuals are equal before the law of their state, all nations are equal before the law of nations.”³⁸⁴ While the notion of equality of all before the law was strongly endorsed by delegates to the conference and in media coverage, this idea of nations being subject to an international law was troubling to many because of continued definition of national sovereignty as a fundamental right. An editorial in the *Washington Post* argued that the “sovereignty of the national state still lives, in individuals as well as governments, as an idol to worship and protect. In places the state continues to be God walking on earth.”³⁸⁵ The San Francisco conference proposed to replace this idol with the concept of a community of nations — referred to as the “community of mankind,” as an “organized society... embracing all nations,” as a “lasting community” and as “voluntary cooperation of all peaceful nations, large and small.”³⁸⁶ President Truman cautioned the delegates: “If we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to live together in peace.”³⁸⁷ However, making it clear that sovereignty was a concern that could not simply be ignored, the terms of this cooperation could only be those of “full respect for the equal sovereignty of each.”³⁸⁸

Justice, Law and Peace

Justice and human rights were clearly linked in an editorial in the *Washington Post* commenting on President Truman’s address to the conference: “Mr. Truman made it abundantly plain that he expects the world organization to be built on a foundation of justice...His sincere appeal to the conference to give Right the force of Might in the world is ample indication that the United States has not changed its policy.”³⁸⁹ Justice was not merely depicted as the concern of the Americans. The Chinese delegation reportedly was queried on the basis of the argument that justice is always relative — “For answer the Chinese snatched

³⁸¹ April 23, 1943, ‘U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt, If Necessary’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

³⁸² King resolution from the House Foreign Relations Committee in April 23, 1945. ‘U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt, If Necessary’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

³⁸³ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

³⁸⁴ April 29, 1945. ‘4 World Court Issues Left for Parley to Face: Court Crucial • Dewey’, *Washington Post*, 9M.

³⁸⁵ April 25, 1945, ‘Great Community’, *Washington Post*, p.8.

³⁸⁶ April 25, 1945, ‘Great Community’, *Washington Post*, p.8 and April 27, 1945, ‘Red Minister Blocks Election of Stettinius to Chairmanship’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

³⁸⁷ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

³⁸⁸ April 27, 1945, ‘Red Minister Blocks Election of Stettinius to Chairmanship’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

³⁸⁹ April 26, 1945, ‘Speaking for Humanity’, *Washington Post*, p.10.

a handkerchief out of his questioner's pocket 'Is that justice?' he queried blandly and the delegate had to admit that there is an absolute yardstick for justice."³⁹⁰

The related ideas of justice and law were prominent in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage of the San Francisco conference. An editorial outlined the purpose of the conference this way: "Both the great and the small nations are confronted with the basic question of whether they prefer world affairs to be governed by the rule of uncurbed force or by the rule of law and order supported by peace-loving nations willing to act in concert."³⁹¹ The idea of relationships among countries operating under the rule of law, combined with principles of justice was strongly endorsed by editorial commentary. Another editorial argued that:

a peace based wholly on brute force, with no consideration of justice and law, would be at best an uneasy truce. Sometime and somewhere, repressed injustice would burst the bonds...if everyone at the conference realizes that the world cannot afford another great war, but, even more, cannot afford the perpetuation of injustice, it will reach agreement.³⁹²

Justice was explicitly linked with human rights by such comments as the statement that the United States leadership wanted all members of the new organization to "settle disputes in accordance with justice and fundamental human rights."³⁹³

This emphasis on the idea of justice was connected to definition of peace as a right. Not only was peace talked about as a concept in itself; discussions about peace in the *Los Angeles Times* were presented in the context of war being unjust. This way of talking about peace was most clearly illustrated in President Truman's speech to the delegates when he said that the delegates "speak for the people who have endured the most savage and devastating war ever inflicted upon innocent men, women and children... We can no longer permit any nation, or group of nations, to attempt to settle their arguments with bombs and bayonets."³⁹⁴ Similar ideas were expressed in an editorial that referred to the war as "a background of carnage and human degradation unequalled in the history of the long struggle of man to become civilized" and that referred to the potential for further battle as the "hideous specter of war, possibly on an even larger and more bestial scale."³⁹⁵ A concern for human lives affected by war was the central notion in such conceptions of justice and peace.

Peace is defined as a right when it is presented as something to which all people are entitled. Use of such phrases as a "just and lasting peace," or linkage of peace with justice, underline this definition of peace as a right.³⁹⁶ Secretary of State Stettinius outlined the task of the conference as being a step "toward 'sure and just peace - peace that man can trust'"³⁹⁷ Similarly, the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* identified the conference purpose as to erect a

³⁹⁰ April 29, 1945, 'Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community', *Washington Post*, IB.

³⁹¹ April 25, 1945, 'Hope of a War-Wearied World', *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

³⁹² April 26, 1945, 'The Conference is Opened', *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

³⁹³ April 30, 1945, 'Russians Link Polish Problem With Argentina', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

³⁹⁴ April 26, 1945, 'Text of Truman Address to Security Conference', *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

³⁹⁵ April 25, 1945, 'Hope of a War-Wearied World', *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

³⁹⁶ April 26, 1945, 'Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

³⁹⁷ April 25, 1945, 'Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

“world peace structure” that would “establish and maintain a just and durable peace.”³⁹⁸ Reference was made to Truman’s promise that “humanity is to achieve a just and lasting peace.”³⁹⁹

Peace, justice and law were extensively intertwined in this newspaper’s coverage of the peace conference. In a report on a regional meeting of the Catholic Association for International Peace, the views of Reverend Charles C. Chapman, S J., were presented: “[O]ur first objective is not peace, it is the establishment of justice in international affairs through the co-operation and active participation of all nations” -- the goal was “rectifying mistakes and eliminating injustices which may from time to time arise.”⁴⁰⁰ Injustices were to be eliminated and peace attained through the “rules and principles of international law” and “with due regard for the principles of justice and international law.”⁴⁰¹ Above all, this task of establishing an organization for peace was at the behest of the people of the world who “crave peace and international justice.”⁴⁰² British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden gave another reason for pursuing this goal; “Either we must find some means of ordering our relations with justice and fair dealing while allowing nations great and small full opportunity to develop their free and independent life, or we shall soon head for another world conflict which this time must bring the utter destruction of civilization.”⁴⁰³

Freedoms

The concept of freedom was also important in definitions of rights. The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* cited Reverend Chapman’s references to “free men and free nations secured under law.”⁴⁰⁴ This goal was to be obtained through “cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small whose peoples in heart and in mind are dedicated to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance.”⁴⁰⁵ Such specific reference to rights was balanced by general references to the rights of people, such as those earlier made by Chapman to the “natural rights” of citizens and the need to guarantee people the “full enjoyment of their rights.”⁴⁰⁶ A similar reference was made by Secretary of State Stettinius, who talked generally about the need to “foster respect for basic human rights” without any clarification of these rights.⁴⁰⁷

³⁹⁸ April 25, 1945, ‘Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1 and April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8.

³⁹⁹ April 26, 1945, ‘Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴⁰⁰ April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴⁰¹ April 25, 1945, ‘Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴⁰² April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8.

⁴⁰³ April 27, 1945, ‘Parley Thrown Into Deadlock: Molotov Blocks Stettinius as Chairman’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴⁰⁴ April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴⁰⁵ April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴⁰⁶ April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴⁰⁷ April 27, 1945, ‘Parley Thrown Into Deadlock: Molotov Blocks Stettinius as Chairman’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

In a speech quoted in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, President Truman made clear his conception of freedom of thought as a right, saying, ‘In recent years, our enemies have clearly demonstrated the disaster which follows when freedom of thought is no longer tolerated. Honest minds cannot long be regimented without protest.’⁴⁰⁸ A number of other rights were identified in an article covering the presentation to the conference by the American Jewish Committee. Rights included in the proposal — which was printed in full by the newspaper — were rights to a state, freedom to immigrate and outlawing of discrimination (specifically anti-Semitism).⁴⁰⁹

Values, Common Interest and Morality

Discussion of rights in the *New York Times* coverage was firmly in the realm of morality and religion as in the discourse of civilization and humanity. An article covering the mass held to commemorate the opening of the conference clearly related any discussion of rights to religion, saying, “[T]here will go up to God a constant prayer for an enduring peace upon earth, based upon a recognition of God, the supremacy of the moral law, the inalienable rights of the individual, the sovereignty of each nation and the unity of the human race.”⁴¹⁰ This notion of unity was linked with ideas about the concomitant need for unselfishness and generosity: the “primacy of power” was replaced by the “primacy of unselfishness.”⁴¹¹ The view was presented that only through acts of unselfishness could civilization continue and unity be maintained.

Many definitions in *Los Angeles Times* coverage existed in the domain of morality. Language included reference to ideas like principle, right, decency, ideals, dignity and right, among others. The goal of the conference was presented as being to “express the principles which shall guide the nations in their relations with each other.”⁴¹² These principles included unselfishness — portrayed as rising “above personal interests”; decency — with the task of the conference being to answer the “hopes of all decent people”; dignity — a new world was to be created “in which the eternal dignity of man is respected”; responsibility — both in international rejection of force as a weapon and in taking responsibility for setting things right for Jews who survived the Holocaust; and cooperation — where human rights are a “platform on which all men ought to agree.”⁴¹³

Morality and right were explicitly linked in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage with human rights by references to the “everlasting moral force of justice” and “those lofty principles which benefit all mankind.”⁴¹⁴ Often these ideals and principles were tied to religious belief and conviction. Truman’s speech had strong religious overtones, with references sprinkled throughout to “Divine guidance,” “firm faith in our hearts” and God’s “own righteous path of peace.”⁴¹⁵ The task of the conference was guaranteed success in the statement that “none of

⁴⁰⁸ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴⁰⁹ April 30, 1945, ‘Parley Hearing Sought by Jews’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.9.

⁴¹⁰ April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, *New York Times*, p.10.

⁴¹¹ April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, *New York Times*, p.10.

⁴¹² April 25, 1945, ‘“Parley Must Not Fail,” Is Spirit of Delegates’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴¹³ April 26, 1945, ‘Truman Asks Delegates Forego Own Interests to Make War Impossible’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; April 25, 1945, ‘“Parley Must Not Fail,” Is Spirit of Delegates’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.2; April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.2; April 26, 1945, ‘The Conference is Opened’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4

⁴¹⁴ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴¹⁵ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

us doubt that with divine guidance, friendly cooperation, and hard work, we shall find an adequate answer to the problem history has put before all of us.”⁴¹⁶

The concept of community and cooperation was tied in *Washington Post* articles to ideas of neighborliness and world inter-reliance. Governor Earl Warren of California in welcoming delegates to San Francisco illustrated this, saying, “We recognize that our future is linked with a world future in which the term ‘good neighbor’ has become a global consideration. We have learned that understanding of one another’s problems is the greatest assurance of peace and that true understanding comes only as the product of free consultation.”⁴¹⁷ Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew was quoted as saying that Americans had realized “that never again can we or any other people find security in isolation” and that a “true parliament of man” must be created through the new peace and security organization.⁴¹⁸

Cooperation and community were also important notions in defining human rights in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*. In addition to the notion of “cultural cooperation” previously discussed, other references included such ideas as the “interests of harmony,” “common interests,” “common grounds on which to build” and “co-operation and active participation of all nations.”⁴¹⁹ These notions of community, unity and cooperation arose out of concerns with moral law, duty and the idea of hope for the future. President Truman proclaimed, “Other voices were raised in expressions of confidence and hope — the hope of a world scourged for years by burning steel — that delegates from many lands will weld their polyglot tongues into the mighty voice for enduring tranquillity among nations.”⁴²⁰ The *Times* discussed the “enormous duty” resting on these delegates and quoted Stettinius’ statement that no one could afford failure because “[e]ach of them knows too well what the consequences of failure would be.”⁴²¹ These hopes and ideas of duty came out of dedication to a international “moral law.”⁴²²

Economic and Social Rights

Economic and social rights were presented in *Washington Post* coverage as essential in any discussion of human rights. Secretary of State Stettinius outlined the task of the new organization as being:

to solve these common problems upon which the security and the economic and social advancement of their peoples so largely depend. There can be no end to the tyranny of fear and want unless the proposed world organization commands the allegiance of both the mind and the conscience of mankind.⁴²³

⁴¹⁶ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴¹⁷ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴¹⁸ April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4.

⁴¹⁹ April 25, 1945, ‘Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1, April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8 and April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴²⁰ April 26, 1945, ‘Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴²¹ April 26, 1945, ‘Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴²² April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴²³ April 27, 1945, ‘Red Minister Blocks Election of Stettinius to Chairmanship’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

This idea that security could come as much from meeting economic and social needs of people as from traditional emphasis on security and strategic issues became a central notion in the UDHR. The Economic and Social Council of the General Assembly of the United Nations was given the specific task of “planning to raise the social and economic level of the nations of the world” and “promoting education and other forms of cultural cooperation.”⁴²⁴

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage of the conference also referred to cultural rights in a discussion of the responsibilities of the proposed economic and social council of the United Nations. Specific cultural rights discussed included those of education, economic development and more generally, “social issues” and “cultural cooperation.”⁴²⁵ Stettinius also referred to economic and cultural rights when he voiced his concern to “solve those common problems upon which the security and the economic and social advancement of their peoples so largely depend.”⁴²⁶

Punishment and International Standards

A central notion related to expressions of repugnance at Nazi treatment of individuals was that of punishment. Herman K. Pell, former U.S. representative on the United Nations War Crimes Commission, was described in the *Washington Post* as having presented the task of the Allies as being to “punish perpetrators of atrocities and members of the Gestapo.”⁴²⁷ A Gallup Poll found that the American public strongly favored punishment of Nazis determined to be war criminals.⁴²⁸ Thus, one task of the Allies and the new United Nations would be to foster acceptance of the idea that “no perpetrator of atrocities be permitted to find sanctuary behind neutral borders.”⁴²⁹

In discussions of punishment and justice, an idea was increasingly becoming central in the discourse of human rights — that an absolute definition of right and wrong existed by which international behavior should be governed. This perspective was illustrated in the *Washington Post* presentation of the Dutch delegation’s argument that “there is a canon of right and wrong which mankind recognizes and which should be written into any charter which professes to set up a society of nations ... a society... established on common standards of behavior, with appeal to a common law in the event of a departure from those standards.”⁴³⁰ President Truman’s comments implied existence of standards of behavior with reference to the “lofty principles which benefit all mankind” and to what he called God’s “own righteous path of peace.”⁴³¹ Governor Dewey referred to establishment of the World Court as the “conscience of mankind determining under principles of justice, the disputes which would otherwise bring down on us another holocaust.”⁴³²

⁴²⁴ April 25, 1945, “‘Big Four’ Accept Plan For World Rule of Law”, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴²⁵ April 25, 1945, ‘Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴²⁶ April 27, 1945, ‘Parley Thrown Into Deadlock: Molotov Blocks Stettinius as Chairman’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴²⁷ April 25, 1945, ‘U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt If Necessary’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴²⁸ April 27, 1945, ‘The Gallup Poll: U.S. Public Favors Punishing Minor Nazis for War Crimes’, *Washington Post*, p.12.

⁴²⁹ April 25, 1945, ‘U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt If Necessary’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴³⁰ April 29, 1945, ‘Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community’, *Washington Post*, IB.

⁴³¹ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴³² April 29, 1945, ‘Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community’, *Washington Post*, IB.

Progress and Civilization

The ideas of progress and of changing society for the better were both a motivation for the talks and a way of talking about human rights. President Truman emphasized that the sacrifices of the war needed to be justified by changes in society and in the way that nations interacted.⁴³³ Joseph Grew referred to the new organization as “permitting mankind to live and progress in confidence, security and peace.”⁴³⁴ Interaction among nations was to be based on the ideas of community and cooperation outlined above, as well as ideas of service — what Truman referred to in his address to congress as the “responsibility of the great states ... to serve and not dominate the peoples of the world.”⁴³⁵

The *Los Angeles Times* coverage talked about human rights in terms of improving the world, or solving the problems of the world, and as progress — creating a new way of doing things out of the ruins of the Old World. An article referred to the conference as creating a “framework which may be able to solve some of the world’s difficulties.”⁴³⁶ Truman identified the task of the conference as being: “We must build a new world — a far better world” and he called the delegates the “architects of [this] better world.”⁴³⁷ This task was not merely presented as an exercise in problem-solving; in the words of one *Los Angeles Times* writer “The stakes are too high — nothing less than the future of humanity.”⁴³⁸

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage of the conference also associated human rights with progress and civilization — Truman’s “better world” where “differences are adjusted through reason and mutual understanding,” rather than the picture painted by Eden of the annihilation of civilization.⁴³⁹ Writers also established a dichotomy between the old way of doing things — “imperialist policies and the exercise of arbitrary power by the Big Three for the domination of other nations” — and the new model of “sovereign states co-operating” for the mutual benefit of all nations and people.⁴⁴⁰

Undefined Rights

In contrast to the specificity of Jewish concerns about nationality, statehood, property, reparations for damages and losses and guarantees of security of person and freedom, other discourse about rights in the print media tended to generalities and to the non-specific. References were made to such notions as the “inalienable rights of individuals” without explanation of the specifics of these rights.⁴⁴¹ Rights were identified as the “patent truth” and as related to “moral issues” without extensive discussion of what they included.⁴⁴²

⁴³³ April 26, 1945, ‘Speaking For Humanity’, *Washington Post*, p.10.

⁴³⁴ April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4.

⁴³⁵ April 26, 1945, ‘Speaking For Humanity’, *Washington Post*, p.10.

⁴³⁶ April 25, 1945, “‘Parley Must Not Fail,’ Is Spirit of Delegates’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴³⁷ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴³⁸ April 25, 1945, “‘Parley Must Not Fail,’ Is Spirit of Delegates’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴³⁹ April 26, 1945, ‘Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1 and April 26, 1945, ‘Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴⁴⁰ April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8 and April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴⁴¹ April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, *New York Times*, p.10.

⁴⁴² April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

Linkages Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Print Media

All of the newspapers studied presented several connections between human rights and foreign policy. The *Washington Post's* coverage of the San Francisco conference contained the broadest range of perceived linkages between human rights and foreign policy of the four newspapers examined. The *Los Angeles Times* and *New York Times* coverage linked human rights and foreign policy in a narrower range of ways, as did the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*. All of the newspapers presented the idea that morality and idealism were valid components of foreign policy. The *New York Times* coverage perspective was that ideas about God and the existence of moral laws were compatible with the process of international relations. In an article covering the mass held for the opening of the conference, this perspective was illustrated by the description of prayers for enduring peace to be achieved through the application of moral laws to relations between nations.⁴⁴³

A central idea in coverage in the *Washington Post* was also that idealism either does or should play a role in foreign policy. Underlying this notion in the coverage was the belief that international standards of behavior or moral norms existed and should guide policy choices. This belief was discussed above in connection with definitions of human rights as "common standards of behavior" and in relation to "common laws."⁴⁴⁴ Idealism was discussed many different ways. One editorial argued that without idealism, any plans made at the conference would fail because "it is the spirit that counts," and "no matter what new model is promised at San Francisco, this new model will fail just as decisively as the League failed if there is no improvement in the spirit behind it."⁴⁴⁵ Another article discussed the need for idealism, saying "preservation of a high aim is nonetheless important."⁴⁴⁶ Other discussions of idealism positioned it opposite pragmatism. Idealism was portrayed as a "society embracing all nations," with pragmatism as the old model of alliances of the "big powers" while lesser nations merely lent their stamp of approval.⁴⁴⁷ An editorial called this new model a "holy alliance of power-holding nations ... the wolves looking after the sheep."⁴⁴⁸ The implied fear was that this new society would bind the United States to involvement in affairs from which she would rather remain aloof.

The response to this fear of involvement as identified in articles in the *Washington Post* was that policies of isolation had failed and that cooperation between nations was a requirement of this new world. Governor Warren of California referred to the concepts of neighborliness and globalism wherein the fate of all nations was intertwined.⁴⁴⁹ Truman talked about living together in peace rather than dying together in war.⁴⁵⁰ Stettinius argued that cooperation would result in material benefit—that solving "these common problems" and the "tyranny of fear and want" through the "voluntary cooperation of all peaceful nations" was the only solution to prevent war.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴³ April 30, 1945, 'Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000*', *New York Times*, p.10.

⁴⁴⁴ April 29, 1945, 'Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community', *Washington Post*, 1B.

⁴⁴⁵ April 25, 1945, 'Great Community', *Washington Post*, p.8.

⁴⁴⁶ April 26, 1945, 'Speaking For Humanity', *Washington Post*, p.10.

⁴⁴⁷ April 25, 1945, 'Cheat Community', *Washington Post*, p.8 and April 29, 1945, 'Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community', *Washington Post*, 1B.

⁴⁴⁸ April 25, 1945, 'Great Community', *Washington Post*, p.8.

⁴⁴⁹ April 26, 1945, 'President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges', *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁵⁰ April 26, 1945, 'President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges', *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁵¹ April 27, 1945, 'Red Minister Blocks Election of Stettinius to Chairmanship', *Washington Post*, p.1.

Articles in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* portrayed the keystone of the organization proposed at the San Francisco conference, and indeed of international relations, as moral law — justice, equality and rights. Secretary of State Stettinius' concern that only a focus on human rights would meet the “high purpose” of the conference was quoted, along with full coverage of the call by the Catholic Association for International Peace for “elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance.”⁴⁵² However central the concern for human rights, a final issue raised was that human rights considerations had to be balanced by sovereign concerns — that nations should cooperate but should also “develop their free and independent life”; and participation in the world organization had to be balanced with what Stettinius called “full respect for the equal sovereignty of each.”⁴⁵³

As a result of the incorporation of human rights in foreign policy, the idea emerged in media coverage that nations needed to take care of human rights concerns in order to create a New World and a new way of conducting international relations. The New World Order that would provide security and contentment for all needed to guarantee such basics as human rights.⁴⁵⁴ This argument was similar to that made after World War I, except that the United Nations was presented as a better guarantor of human rights than the League of Nations.

The proposed world organization was presented in *Los Angeles Times* articles as a solution to the problems faced by the modern world — especially the problem of war and its “carnage and degradation.”⁴⁵⁵ An editorial discussing this attempt to solve these problems stated that “If the San Francisco conference measures up to the hopes of all decent people, the answer to that question will not be long in doubt and 25 years from now the nations will not be forced into another world war.”⁴⁵⁶ Truman presented the options as between the “continuation of international chaos — or the establishment of a world organization for the enforcement of peace.”⁴⁵⁷

This organization to bring about peace was also portrayed as doing so through the application of justice — as already discussed extensively above. Justice as an element of foreign policy was part of the discourse in two ways. First, the concepts of justice and ideals were presented as being appropriate considerations in the making of foreign policy. Truman declared of the war-dead: “They died to insure justice. We must work and live to guarantee justice — for all.”⁴⁵⁸ Truman also referred to the “ideals this conference is called upon to perpetuate.”⁴⁵⁹ The second way in which justice was part of the discourse was the perspective that peace would result if justice was served. An editorial in the *Los Angeles Times* argued that “repressed injustice would burst the bonds” if the cause of peace became submerged in the everyday pragmatics of international relations.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵² April 27, 1945, ‘Parley Thrown into Deadlock: Molotov Blocks Stettinius as Chairman’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1 and April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴⁵³ April 27, 1945, ‘Parley Thrown Into Deadlock: Molotov Blocks Stettinius as Chairman’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴⁵⁴ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁴⁵⁵ April 25, 1945, ‘Hope of a War-Weary World’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

⁴⁵⁶ April 25, 1945, ‘Hope of a War-Weary World’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

⁴⁵⁷ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴⁵⁸ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴⁵⁹ April 26, 1945, ‘Truman Asks Delegates Forego Own Interests to Make War Impossible’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁴⁶⁰ April 26, 1945, ‘The Conference is Opened’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

Two further linkages were identified between human rights and foreign policy in the *Los Angeles Times*. One, discussed above, was that of responsibility and duty — all countries had a responsibility to help the cause of peace and to ensure the rights of individuals rather than simply to attempt to gain the most from each other through war and political manoeuvring. Truman also argued that the delegates to the conference had a responsibility towards future generations, saying, ‘If we should pay merely lip service to inspiring ideals, and, later do violence to simple justice, we would draw down upon us the bitter wrath of generations yet unborn.’⁴⁶¹ The other connection, emphasized by Truman in his speech to the delegates, was the need for cooperation rather than each nation existing and operating in isolation. He portrayed the situation as being that “we dare not become isolated in peace” and, “for lasting security, men of goodwill must unite and organize.”⁴⁶²

This idea of responsibility was found in all the newspapers studied. Coverage in the *New York Times* articulated this idea by suggesting that looking after one group of people, in this case specifically European Jews, would lead to security for all. Proskauer, president of the American Jewish Conference, argued this point most clearly, saying that the universal guarantee of human rights would result from “attention to the wrongs which have especially been inflicted on the stricken Jews of Europe by the holocaust of war and the bestiality of Hitler.”⁴⁶³

The *Washington Post* coverage suggested that powerful nations have responsibilities in world affairs and that foreign policy decisions can be held responsible for violations of human rights. President Truman’s opening speech at the conference clearly delineated what he saw as the responsibility of the “victors in this great conflict” and the “great states” to create a “system through which world peace can be assured.”⁴⁶⁴ In a similar vein, Secretary of State Stettinius argued that “those peace-loving nations which have the military and industrial strength required to prevent or suppress aggression must agree and act together against aggression.”⁴⁶⁵ Herman K. Pell, former United States representative on the United Nations War Crimes Commission, outlined how he saw American foreign policy decisions as responsible for human rights violations by the Nazis. His views were described in an article as being that:

the State Department’s legal advisers are largely responsible for the recent Nazi atrocities because they failed to act on the commission’s proposal to punish Nazi torturers as war criminals. ‘The legal advisers don’t want the responsibility of making a decision,’ Pell said in a press conference. ‘Therefore they have sidetracked proposals to punish perpetrators of atrocities and members of the Gestapo.’... Pell also blamed the British Foreign Office for not acting on proposals made 10 months ago. He said the committee’s recommendations never reached high ranking United States or British officials.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶¹ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴⁶² April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴⁶³ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁴⁶⁴ April 26, 1945, ‘Speaking for Humanity’, *Washington Post*, p.10.

⁴⁶⁵ April 27, 1945, ‘Red Minister Blocks Election of Stettinius to Chairmanship’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁶⁶ April 25, 1945, ‘U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt, If Necessary’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

In making such claims, Pell not only was saying that policy decisions could, and should, be held responsible for atrocities; he was also implicitly saying that the United States had a responsibility to act to protect human rights around the world.

Similarly, articles in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* suggested that the more powerful nations in the world had a responsibility to take the lead in world affairs: "More and more nations are swinging to the thought that perfecting an instrument for peace depends in large measure on unity among the Big Three, on statesmanship and guidance from the powers with the big guns and big industries."⁴⁶⁷ To fulfil these responsibilities, a world organization was required to "establish and maintain a just and durable peace."⁴⁶⁸ The governor of California said that this new organization needed to "develop a sound pattern of world affairs with a new measure of security for all nations."⁴⁶⁹

Another connection between human rights and foreign policy made in media coverage was that special conditions of injustice existed that demanded integration of human rights concerns into foreign policy. This perspective was most evident in discussions of Nazi treatment of Jews and the imperative of prevention of further such atrocities. Jewish groups argued that it was "elementary justice that the voice of the Jewish people, first victims of the Nazi aggression should be heard at the world conference."⁴⁷⁰ In a statement from the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, these special conditions of injustice were acknowledged. The statement conceded that the:

conference agenda had to be limited to drafting the charter of the new world conference, which conference officials had given as a reason for not taking up the Jewish problem...Nevertheless, as the leaders of the United Nations come together, we believe they should consider the tragic plight and future position of the Jewish people in the last twelve years which have brought death to 6,000,000 of their number.⁴⁷¹

Articles in the *Washington Post* raised two additional important ideas relevant to any study of linkages between human rights and foreign policy. These ideas were that human rights concerns overrode diplomatic norms and that issues of human rights overrode traditional classifications of sovereign concerns. The former idea was raised in relation to public calls for the United States to "ignore treaties if necessary" and to "cross neutral borders if necessary... 'irrespective of the limitations of any treaties of extradition'" in order to pursue accused Nazi war criminals.⁴⁷² The latter idea was connected to the notion of pursuing and punishing war criminals -- no actions deemed as violations of human rights could be classified as "acts of state" and thus the perpetrators escape punishment.⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁷ April 25, 1945, 'Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴⁶⁸ April 25, 1945, 'Federation of the World', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8.

⁴⁶⁹ April 26, 1945, 'Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁴⁷⁰ April 30, 1945, 'Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit 'Security* Program', *New York Times*, p.11.

⁴⁷¹ April 30, 1945, 'Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit 'Security' Program'. *New York Times*, p.11.

⁴⁷² April 25, 1945, 'U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt, If Necessary', *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁷³ April 25, 1945, 'U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt, If Necessary', *Washington Post*, p.1.

Finally, a number of other ideas linked human rights and foreign policy in the *Washington Post*. One idea was that economic and social concerns had a role in international deliberations -- that concern for economic, social and cultural needs was important in the creation of peace and international cooperation.⁴⁷⁴ Another was the notion that peace was impossible without law and justice -- that efforts to create a court of international justice were what Governor Dewey (New York) called the “‘heart and soul of all our efforts’ for peace.”⁴⁷⁵ Finally, human rights and foreign policy were linked through the idea that progress in civilization and for humanity could only come through outlawing violent force and basing international relations on the moral laws discussed above.⁴⁷⁶

Human Rights and American Identity in the Print Media

Press coverage of the San Francisco conference was examined to see if statements about human rights were linked to United States ideals and identity, and, if so, how this linkage was made. In general, very few such linkages were found. The *New York Times* coverage emphasized that “all people of good will everywhere” supported the work of the conference and linked human rights concerns to a “New World order” and issues of world security.⁴⁷⁷ The *Washington Post* coverage focused on Stettinius’ arguments that the United States was only one of the nations needed to work for creating the new world.⁴⁷⁸ Such general terms as the “hopes of suffering humanity” and “millions of hopeful people the world over” were also used.⁴⁷⁹ However, some implicit linkages were found. An editorial made a connection between the peace process and American history, saying, “[I]f we mean to create a real society, power must be used not only to keep the peace but also in defense of justice, as administered by courts of law. *That is how the frontier was made safe for peaceful living.*” (italics added)⁴⁸⁰ Extensive coverage of President Truman’s speech and American leadership in the peace process also implicitly suggested linkages between American ideals and human rights policies. Truman himself said that “we hold a powerful mandate from our people” and referred to “our desire to work with other nations” and “our friendly policies.”⁴⁸¹ However, one article suggested that this move towards support for internationalism rather than isolation in foreign policy came only out of a “reluctant realization” that Americans needed to participate in world affairs.⁴⁸² Americans in general were portrayed as not only supporting the process to create a new organization for peace but also as supporting punishment for Nazi war criminals. An article about the results of a Gallup Poll on the subject contained the statement: “The American public, as might be expected, shows little willingness to be lenient on Hitler... As for minor officials in the party, they too need not look for sympathy in the United States.”⁴⁸³

⁴⁷⁴ April 25, 1945, “‘Big Four’ Accept Chinese Plan For World Rule of Law”, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁷⁵ April 25, 1945, “‘Big Four’ Accept Chinese Plan For World Rule of Law”, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁷⁶ April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4.

⁴⁷⁷ April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, *New York Times*, p.10 and April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁴⁷⁸ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁷⁹ April 26, 1945, ‘Speaking for Humanity’, *Washington Post*, p.10.

⁴⁸⁰ April 25, 1945, ‘Great Community’, *Washington Post*, p.8.

⁴⁸¹ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁸² April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4.

⁴⁸³ April 27, 1945, ‘The Gallup Poll: U.S. Public Favors Punishing Minor Nazis for War Crimes’, *Washington Post*, p.12.

In general, the *Los Angeles Times* coverage painted a picture of the world as a whole moving towards incorporation of human rights ideals in policy decisions through the new world organization. An editorial stated that there was general American support for peace but that “only about one-third of the persons who had heard or read of the conference appeared to have a reasonably correct idea of what its objectives are.”⁴⁸⁴ The same editorial went on to say that:

While the man in the street may find it difficult to follow some of the arguments over proposed amendments, there can be little doubt as to his desire and hope that a workable plan for an effective beginning of world co-operation to insure peace be adopted at San Francisco.⁴⁸⁵

As in the language of Stettinius, the metaphor of early American pioneers appeared in the coverage to describe the task of the conference: “Both had faced great difficulties but the American pioneers who reached the great western ocean had believed all things were possible and the task of creating an effective peace organization must be met in the same spirit.”⁴⁸⁶ Use of such metaphorical language makes an implicit linkage between American ideals and experiences and human rights. Further implicit linkages were made through language comparing “them” and “us,” such as Truman’s statements that “our enemies have clearly demonstrated the disaster which follows when freedom of thought is no longer tolerated” and references to the “fundamental philosophy of our enemies, namely that ‘might makes right.’”⁴⁸⁷ Truman, in paying tribute to Franklin D. Roosevelt also made an implicit linkage in saying, “[T]his conference owes its existence in a large part to the vision and foresight and determination of Franklin Roosevelt.”⁴⁸⁸ Finally, an article on internal disputes at the conference attributed the inclusion of “justice and fundamental human rights” in the charter to the work of the United States.⁴⁸⁹

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* credited the work of the United States for inclusion of human rights in the conference agenda. An article about the opening evening of the conference stated, “It was Stettinius ... who told reporters of the United States’ delegation stand on specifying ‘justice’ in settling disputes” and “The American delegate, Senator Vandenberg, Republican, Michigan, also had been hammering for a pronouncement specifically embracing the word ‘justice’.”⁴⁹⁰ However, the remainder of its coverage of the opening week of the conference portrayed the inclusion of human rights on the agenda as the objective of all participants.

Domains of Human Rights in the Print Media

Across the four newspapers studied, discussions of human rights appeared most frequently in the domains of political discourse and general morality. Other common domains of discourse were religious and legal. The domains of society and economics were included in some discussions of rights but to a lesser extent Social and economic issues were most often

⁴⁸⁴ April 25, 1945, ‘Hope of a War-Weary World’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

⁴⁸⁵ April 25, 1945, ‘Hope of a War-Weary World’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

⁴⁸⁶ April 26, 1945, ‘Truman Asks Delegates Forego Own Interests to Make War Impossible’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁴⁸⁷ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴⁸⁸ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁴⁸⁹ April 30, 1945, ‘Russians Link Polish Problem With Argentina’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁴⁹⁰ April 25, 1945, ‘Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

discussed in relation to the plight of European Jews, who were referred to in the *New York Times* as “displaced men and women” who experienced migration and statelessness as a result of “economic and social upheaval.”⁴⁹¹ Economic and social issues included indemnification and reparations for damages, and “relief, rehabilitation, resettlement.”⁴⁹² In the *New York Times* coverage, discussions of human rights were overwhelmingly in the political and general morality domains, with a nod to the social and economic concerns of post-war Europe, while the news and editorial stance also identified human rights as a prime concern for religious bodies of various creeds. Coverage referred to “moral law,” but application of this law to issues of foreign policy was clearly ascribed to religious interest groups.

In the *Washington Post* coverage of the conference, discussions of human rights were overwhelmingly in the political domain with emphasis on issues of security of person, freedom from wrongful interference, oppression, law and justice, ideas about nation and sovereignty and discussions of the anti-militarism and anti-isolationism movements. However, the social domain of human rights was also extensively explored with discussions of ideas about community, cooperation, society, common benefit, neighborliness, duty, service, progress and civilization. The domain of general morality was included through use of such value terms as atrocities, criminals, treachery, right and conscience as well as by discussions of the existence of canons of “right and wrong,” “international conduct” and “common standards of behavior.”⁴⁹³ The religious domain was included only through coverage of President Truman’s references to God and the “righteous path of peace.”⁴⁹⁴ Human rights appeared also in the economic domain through reference to the United Nations Economic and Social Council and to material well-being as a right.⁴⁹⁵

Most discussions of human rights in coverage of the conference in the *Los Angeles Times* appeared in the domains of general morality and politics. of all the newspapers examined, the *Los Angeles Times* coverage laid the greatest emphasis on notions of general morality, including ideas about decency, ideals, unselfishness, humanity, right, and “considered judgment.”⁴⁹⁶ Discussion of human rights within the political domain included discourses of peace, security, prevention of war, freedom from wrongful interference, immigration, and statelessness. Discourse within the legal domain encompassed issues related to punishment of Nazi war criminals and the establishment of an international bill of rights. Economic and social rights were covered only briefly in discussions of indemnification, relief, rehabilitation and resettlement.

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage focused attention on human rights in the political and general morality domains. Issues of peace, justice, domination, “arbitrary power,” security and freedom were the terrain of the political domain.⁴⁹⁷ The domain of general morality encompassed ideas about a “better world,” hope, progress, reason, innocence, duty, “suffering humanity,” “deepest hope and highest purpose of all mankind,”

⁴⁹¹ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit ‘Security’ Program’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁴⁹² April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit ‘Security’ Program’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁴⁹³ April 29, 1945, ‘Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community’, *Washington Post*, 1B.

⁴⁹⁴ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁹⁵ April 27, 1945, ‘Red Minister Blocks Election of Stettinius to Chairmanship’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁴⁹⁶ April 26, 1945, ‘The Conference is Opened’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

⁴⁹⁷ April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8.

“mutual understanding,” civilization, cooperation, moral law and “natural rights.”⁴⁹⁸ The domains of social and economic rights were included through discussion of education and cultural cooperation and establishment of an economic council. Again, the inclusion of human rights in the general discourse was implicitly ascribed to religious groups in coverage of various petitions presented to the delegates by “31 religious leaders of various denominations.”⁴⁹⁹

Symbols of Human Rights Discourse in the Print Media

In general, the *New York Times* coverage had little symbolic or metaphorical language. A limited number of metaphors and images was used to describe the conference and its purpose. One image was that of the world standing at a crossroads and needing to turn in the right direction — ‘Today we stand at the crossroads of history. We need God’s guidance to direct us along the path of peace.’⁵⁰⁰ A second metaphor was of competition. The old way of doing things was presented as competition for “primacy of power” and the new way as needing competition for “primacy of unselfishness.”⁵⁰¹ Other language equated human rights with security and equality, repeatedly using these terms in conjunction with each other. Articles in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* also described human rights in the language of equality. Writers presented moral law and natural rights as closely tied to the notion of equality. Equality was used as a special symbol of the way in which the new world and way of conducting international relations would operate. Equality was presented in terms of nations where “[n]o preferred status should be granted to any nation or group of nations, no special privileges should be requested. Sovereign equality... demands that each nation be free in its internal government... and that its judicial personality be recognized in its international relations.”⁵⁰² It was also presented in terms of individuals where all people possessed natural rights to which they were entitled “full enjoyment.”⁵⁰³

The final imagery in *New York Times* coverage was of the horror of war, with war portrayed as a “holocaust” and as “bestiality.”⁵⁰⁴ The *Los Angeles Times* coverage also depended on images of war to symbolize the need for human rights. Images of the suffering and tribulation of individuals during the war and the horrors of war itself were contrasted with ideas of civilization and improvement in the world. The suffering was presented in descriptive language, such as “tribulations heaped upon them” and suffering “overwhelming” the Jewish people and as being too much for individuals to bear.⁵⁰⁵ In the aftermath of the brutality, chaos and destruction of the war, the new organization was portrayed in terms of establishing machinery or a framework for peace. Thus, the emotional language describing the destruction of war was replaced with tidy images of machinery and construction. Truman referred to the conference as creating the “structure” and providing the “machinery” for the “essential

⁴⁹⁸ April 27, 1945, ‘Parley Thrown Into Deadlock: Molotov Blocks Stettinius as Chairman’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1 and April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁴⁹⁹ April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8.

⁵⁰⁰ April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, *New York Times*, p.10.

⁵⁰¹ April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, *New York Times*, p.10.

⁵⁰² April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁵⁰³ April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁵⁰⁴ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁵⁰⁵ April 30, 1945, ‘Parley Hearing Sought by Jews’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.9.

organization.”⁵⁰⁶ He also suggested that the task of the conference was to build a “permanent monument to those who gave their lives that this might come.”⁵⁰⁷ In a similar vein, the San Francisco mayor talked about an “obligation to succeed for the veterans of the two wars.”⁵⁰⁸ Stettinius talked about how the nations could not “afford anything less than the success of this endeavor,” while an editorial echoed this language, saying that the world could not sustain further exposure to war.⁵⁰⁹

In striking contrast to the language in the *New York Times*, the language in the *Washington Post* coverage of the conference was heavily symbolic and metaphoric. A wide range of metaphors and images described the war, the purpose of the conference and the ideals of human rights. Language related to crime and punishment was used to describe the need to deal with Hitler and his officials in the aftermath of the war. References were made to “criminals,” “perpetrators” and “war crimes.”⁵¹⁰ In addition, the metaphor of police was used to describe some options for a new world organization with the statement that “a community would rather be at the mercy of a posse of police than of individual policemen who were not in agreement about their roles. But the choice is of the Hobson variety... Most of the delegates want a society of nations, not an alliance of three policemen.”⁵¹¹

Language related to ideas of responsibility also figured heavily in *Washington Post* discussions about human rights, especially through such related ideas as sacrifice and paternalism. Paternalistic language emerged through discussions of the responsibilities of great states and war victors. The peace process was described also in terms of needing to make a great effort, to make sacrifices and as paying “too high a price” if the process failed.⁵¹² Other language associated with this notion of responsibility included symbols and metaphors of cooperation, community and unity — the so-called “higher community of interests and purpose.”⁵¹³ Cooperation was not only at the individual level but also at the world level — the “World Rule of Law” and the “world organization.”⁵¹⁴

The notion of progress permeated the language in the *Washington Post*. Progress was portrayed as coming through inclusion of ideals in politics as well as in the move from chaos and “brutality” to law and order.⁵¹⁵ Several dichotomies were established to illustrate the progress to be achieved through the conference. Not only were social order and civilization positioned opposite chaos and brutality; so were justice and law versus destruction, and civilization and justice versus injustice and aggression. The language of progress included references to “starting down the true road,” reaching the goal and “progress away from

⁵⁰⁶ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁵⁰⁷ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁵⁰⁸ April 26, 1945, ‘Truman Asks Delegates Forego Own Interests to Make War Impossible’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁵⁰⁹ April 26, 1945, ‘Truman Asks Delegates Forego Own Interests to Make War Impossible’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁵¹⁰ April 25, 1945, ‘U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt, If Necessary’, *Washington Post*, p.1 and April 27, 1945, ‘The Gallup Poll: U.S. Public Favors Punishing Minor Nazis for War Crimes’, *Washington Post*, p.12.

⁵¹¹ April 29, 1945, ‘Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community’, *Washington Post*, 1B.

⁵¹² April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4.

⁵¹³ April 27, 1945, ‘Red Minister Blocks Election of Stettinius to Chairmanship’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁵¹⁴ April 25, 1945, ‘“Big Four”* Accept Chinese Plan For World Rule of Law’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁵¹⁵ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

international rule by force alone.”⁵¹⁶ Other language referred to growth as a metaphor for progress, with discussion of the “seeds of peace” and of the conference as “creating the social and political climate congenial to their growth.”⁵¹⁷

Similar language in the *Los Angeles Times* represented progress. The steps taken at the conference were portrayed as a beginning — as the “first step on a long and difficult road.”⁵¹⁸ The metaphor of a road was linked with metaphors of progress and the historical metaphor of the American pioneers and the pioneering spirit. Progress was portrayed as “this new world of which such glorious potentialities in the advancement of science and the improvement of the material welfare of mankind are being heralded.”⁵¹⁹ Both Truman and Stettinius compared the task facing the conference to that of the pioneers exploring the West. Stettinius linked the metaphors of the pioneers and a road by saying, “We are pioneers on a new road.”⁵²⁰

Writers in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* connected language about progress with language of building. Progress was depicted as a goal in itself and as advancing toward goals. It was described as the “advancement of their peoples” and as moral advancement toward a “high purpose.”⁵²¹ It was also referred to in terms of a “march to an objective sought by all the peoples represented.”⁵²² The objectives of the conference were described again in terms of dichotomies between organization and chaos; tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance versus “order and justice” and “free men and free nations” ; and moral law and natural rights versus temporal law of “government... of men or of nations.”⁵²³

Metaphors of building in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* included an article in which images related to building or construction occurred continuously, with quotes from Truman referring to the “task of forging” the new organization” and the “labors at the conference”; quotes from Governor Earl Warren citing the need to “develop a sound pattern of world affairs” ; quotes from Mayor Lapham referring to “creating the framework of a world security organization... built not on the shifting sands of distrust but on the rock of mutual understanding”; and the writer’s own references to the construction of “delicate machinery” and welding of “polyglot tongues into a mighty voice.”⁵²⁴ In other places the conference was referred to as an instrument of peace, as fashioning peace and as erecting a structure for peace.⁵²⁵

⁵¹⁶ April 29, 1945, ‘4 World Court Issues Left for Parley to Face: Court Crucial - Dewey’, *Washington Post*, 9M.

⁵¹⁷ April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4.

⁵¹⁸ April 25, 1945, “‘Parley Must Not Fail,’ Is Spirit of Delegates’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁵¹⁹ April 25, 1945, ‘Hope of a War-Weary World’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

⁵²⁰ April 26, 1945, ‘Truman Asks Delegates Forego Own Interests to Make War Impossible’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁵²¹ April 27, 1945, ‘Parley Thrown Into Deadlock: Molotov Blocks Stettinius as Chairman’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁵²² April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8.

⁵²³ April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁵²⁴ April 26, 1945, ‘Parley Is Dedicated To Permanent Peace: President Truman, Opening Sessions, Stresses Challenging Opportunity’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁵²⁵ April 25, 1945, ‘Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

The difficult task before the conference also generated language in the *Washington Post* related to work, with references to the “job of planning” and “tasks” as well as the need for a “combination of hard work and faith.”⁵²⁶ Other work-related language included images of planning, drafting rooms, structures, weaving, the “creation of a system” and reference to conference delegates as “architects of a better world.”⁵²⁷ Hard work was linked with pragmatism and contrasted with proposals portrayed as “idealist, unpractical, even harebrained.”⁵²⁸ This notion of the need for faith was echoed in a number of religious metaphors. An editorial talked about the “idols” of international politics that were worshipped and protected above all else, as well as the need to “consecrate an alliance,” the “new holy alliance” and a description of the state as “God walking on earth.”⁵²⁹ The final set of metaphors in the *Washington Post* coverage of the conference used geographical language. References were made to “strategic frontiers,” “vast distance,” the “face of the earth” and “future tidal waves of militarism.”⁵³⁰

Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy in the Print Media

Ascribing agency in foreign policy was remarkably similar across the four newspapers examined. In all cases agency was assigned to the president of the United States and his administration, specifically to the U.S. State Department. The *Los Angeles Times* coverage also specifically mentioned Truman and F.D. Roosevelt “whose hopes and labors had done much to bring about the United Nations conference at this time and place.”⁵³¹ Again, in all cases, the leaders of other nations and their foreign ministers were assigned agency, but more power was granted to leaders of the Allied nations — the Big Powers. Interestingly, one difference was who these big powers were seen to be. Writers for the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* referred to the Big Three (United States, Britain and Russia) while those for the *Los Angeles Times* referred to the Big Four (United States, Britain, Russia and China — the sponsors of the conference).⁵³² The *Washington Post* coverage broke the powers into two groups: the Big Five (United States, Britain, Russia, France and China) and the inner-core Big Three (United States, Britain and Russia).⁵³³ The *New York Times* articles generally used the term “Allied governments” to refer to this group without specifying membership.⁵³⁴

Coverage in each of the newspapers assigned agency to conference delegates, although that in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* emphasized the contributions of American delegates over other delegates.⁵³⁵ Writers for the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* assigned agency to congress only through inclusion of individual senators on the American delegation. In contrast, the *Los Angeles Times* coverage not only assigned agency to members of

⁵²⁶ April 25, 1945, “‘Big Four’ Accept Chinese Plan For World Rule of Law”, *Washington Post*, p.1 and April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4.

⁵²⁷ April 26, 1945, ‘Speaking for Humanity’, *Washington Post*, p.10.

⁵²⁸ April 29, 1945, ‘Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community’, *Washington Post*, 1B.

⁵²⁹ April 25, 1945, ‘Great Community’, *Washington Post*, p.8.

⁵³⁰ April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4.

⁵³¹ April 26, 1945, ‘Truman Asks Delegates Forego Own Interests to Make War Impossible’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁵³² April 25, 1945, ‘Enduring Peace Objective Urged: Stettinius Makes Appeal on Eve of Conference’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1 and April 26, 1945, ‘Truman Asks Delegates Forego Own Interests to Make War Impossible’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁵³³ April 29, 1945, ‘Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community’, *Washington Post*, 1B.

⁵³⁴ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit ‘Security’ Program’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁵³⁵ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11 and April 25, 1945, “‘Big Four’ Accept Chinese Plan For World Rule of Law”, *Washington Post*, p.1.

Congress in the American delegation, but also to individual members of Congress, such as Senator Vandenberg of Michigan.⁵³⁶ Congress itself is assigned power through portrayal of the need of the president to present his views to its members before presenting the views to the conference in San Francisco.⁵³⁷

All of the newspapers portrayed the United Nations as having power in foreign policy, but only the *Washington Post* included state and local government and public opinion as having a role in the foreign policy process. State and local government were portrayed as having only a peripheral role, through comments by the mayor of San Francisco and the governors of California and New York. The role of public opinion was portrayed as giving the leaders a “powerful mandate” and also through statements about the American public demanding peace.⁵³⁸

Concerning the question about what parties were treated as having a role in the incorporation of human rights in foreign policy, all those named above were included — plus a broad range of other groups. The *New York Times* coverage assigned agency to interest groups and religious organizations, including the American Jewish Conference, the World Jewish Congress, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, B’nai Brith, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, “representative Catholic organizations,” “other official international organizations already dealing with this subject” and “forty-two consultants designated by national organizations at the invitation of the State Department.”⁵³⁹ Individuals and the general public were portrayed as having power through comments about prayers in “every church, chapel, school and home of the archdiocese” and “signatures of some 1,300 Americans of all races and creeds,” respectively.⁵⁴⁰ God was also ascribed a role in the peace process by a reference to His directing “us along the path of peace.”⁵⁴¹

The *Washington Post* coverage, most overtly of the four newspapers, assigned power to Congress in the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy. Congress had power both through being needed to approve the resolution to pursue war criminals and through promoting the need to pursue these criminals “after a group of Congress members went to Europe to inspect Nazi atrocity camps.”⁵⁴² Even though the newspaper coverage had emphasized the role of American delegates to the conference in helping to create foreign policy, agency was also assigned to other delegates, such as the Chinese delegates (who joined with the Americans in proposing an amendment dealing with justice, international law, and social and economic concerns) and delegates from smaller nations — such as the Netherlands whose delegates brought concerns about equality and rights to the conference

⁵³⁶ April 25, 1945, “‘Parley Must Not Fail,’ Is Spirit of Delegates’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2.

⁵³⁷ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.2 and April 26, 1945, ‘The Conference is Opened’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p.4.

⁵³⁸ April 26, 1945, ‘President Urges Nations to Build Strongly Against Any Challenges’, *Washington Post*, p.1 and April 25, 1945, “‘Big Four’ Accept Chinese Plan For World Rule of Law’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁵³⁹ April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Groups Ask Hearing at Parley: American Jewish Conference and World Congress Submit ‘Security’ Program’, *New York Times*, p.11 and April 30, 1945, ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁵⁴⁰ April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, *New York Times*, p.10 and ‘Jewish Group Asks World Rights Bill’, *New York Times*, p.11.

⁵⁴¹ April 30, 1945, ‘Mass for Parley Attended by 10,000’, *New York Times*, p.10.

⁵⁴² April 25, 1945, ‘U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt, If Necessary’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

table.⁵⁴³ References were also made to the contributions to policy discussions by the United Nations War Crimes Commission; state government through the efforts of people like New York Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, who addressed the 48th annual banquet of the American-Irish Historical Society on the subject of the conference and human rights; religious groups, such as the Federation of Churches; and public opinion and the “community of mankind,” whose conscience and yearning for peace were depicted as driving the conference.⁵⁴⁴

The *Los Angeles Times* coverage ascribed agency for the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy to all of the groups involved in general foreign policy-making as well as to “all mankind,” who gave delegates their mandate, and God — portrayed as inspiring the ideals driving the conference.⁵⁴⁵ Similarly the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage assigned agency to the groups discussed above, in addition to all the “peace-loving peoples” who “crave peace and international justice,” as well as to religious organizations, such as the Catholic Association for International Peace.⁵⁴⁶

Human Rights in Congress, 1945

In common with the congress of 1919, the *Congressional Record* of 1945 did not separate the subject of human rights from the general category of war issues. Thus, a time period was selected for inclusion in this study. For this case study the first session of congress for 1945 was examined — that is June and July 1945. Although this is not the exact period studied for the print media (which reported events in San Francisco as they occurred), congressional debate focused intensely on the events of the San Francisco conference with conference delegates reporting the details of the conference to congress. Thus, the subject matter remains the same for the print media and congressional records studied.

Congressional Definitions of Human Rights

Definitions of human rights in congressional records examined centered on a core of values comprising ideas about peace, justice, law, freedom, democracy, equality, self-determination, freedom of speech and individual rights. Economic, social and cultural rights comprised part of the discourse related to prevention of war and the fight against totalitarianism. This theme of anti-totalitarianism and anti-fascism was central in understanding definitions of human rights outside the UDHR. Other definitions outside those of the declaration could be divided into two value-related sub-themes. One encompassed ideas about progress, humanity, civilization and ideals. The other encompassed ideas related to the notion of right and wrong, morality in general, Christianity, cooperation and duty.

Peace and justice were presented in congressional discourse as essential for a “better, happier, and safer world” -- essentially the goal pursued by advocates of human rights.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴³ April 25, 1945, “‘Big Four’ Accept Chinese Plan For World Rule of Law’, *Washington Post*, p.1; April 29, 1945, ‘4 World Court Issues Left far Parley to Face: Court Crucial – Dewey’, *Washington Post*, 9M and April 29, 1945, ‘Oaks Veto Plan Gives Few Unfair Advantage In World Community’, *Washington Post*, 1B.

⁵⁴⁴ April 25, 1945, ‘U.S. Asked to Ignore Treaties in Criminal Hunt, If Necessary’, *Washington Post*, p.1.; April 30, 1945, ‘No Security in Isolation, Grew Declares’, *Washington Post*, p.4; April 25, 1945, ‘Great Community’, *Washington Post*, p.8 and April 27, 1945. ‘Red Minister Blocks Election of Stettinius to Chairmanship’, *Washington Post*, p.1.

⁵⁴⁵ April 26, 1945, ‘Text of Truman Address to Security Conference’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.2 and April 26, 1945, ‘The Conference is Opened’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 2, p. 4.

⁵⁴⁶ April 25, 1945, ‘Federation of the World’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.8 and April 29, 1945, ‘Justice Urged in World Affairs: Objective Is Stressed by Catholic Group’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.12.

⁵⁴⁷ *Congressional Record: 1945, 79th Congress: 1st Session, June 29- July 24*, p.6981.

Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey saw the goal of the conference as the “final banishment of brute force, and the enthronement of justice in all human relations.”⁵⁴⁸ Senator Burton Wheeler argued for a peace treaty that would “bring about justice and peace and decency throughout the world,” and Senator Joseph Hill announced the goal as being the creation of “a world where all peoples may live in peace, under law and justice.”⁵⁴⁹

The idea of a world operating under rules of law rather than anarchy is one of the important ways in which members of congress seem to have understood human rights. Senator Vandenberg referred to the rule of law as “substituting orderly justice for the jungle-creed that might makes right.”⁵⁵⁰ Representative Eaton talked about the concept of “fair dealing” rather than “brute force.”⁵⁵¹ Senator Homer Ferguson portrayed the rule of law as the main contribution that the United States could make to any peace, because he said, “[W]e survived because we built on the firm foundation of ‘equal justice under law’”; and this creed was needed as an “international as well as a national institution.”⁵⁵²

Understanding how “peace and decency” were defined was one of the tasks of the research here. One simple answer is that these ideas were closely tied to F.D. Roosevelt’s concept of the Four Freedoms — “freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of the press and freedom of religion.”⁵⁵³ One central notion was that security of person was essential to a happier and safer world. Although all wars tend to the horrific, World War Two was treated as notable due to the widespread horror and disgust engendered by Nazi concentration camps. This horror was expressed through phrases such as “human slavery and savagery,” “senseless, savage destruction of life and property,” and what Senator Vandenberg of Michigan called the “cruel science of mass murder.”⁵⁵⁴ He went on to say that, “if World War III ever unhappily arrives, it will open new laboratories of death too horrible to contemplate.”⁵⁵⁵ Representative Eaton succinctly outlined the purpose of guaranteeing security of person as being to fulfil the “passionate longings of men and women everywhere for a life free from tyranny and fear in which by their own efforts they can achieve for themselves and their posterity a worthwhile life.”⁵⁵⁶

A cluster of freedoms made up congressional definitions of human rights. Equality and self-determination for nations and their citizens were seen as an important part of freedom. There were calls for “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and for the “rights of self-government which peoples all over the world cherish and desire.”⁵⁵⁷ The notion of freedom was presented as a quintessentially American right Senator Ferguson of Michigan declared that the United States was “founded on the inalienable right of man to enjoy freedom exceeded nowhere in the world.”⁵⁵⁸ Representative Sol Bloom argued that “America’s chief contribution to the Charter is the inclusion of an international bill of rights, so that the individual, no matter of what race or creed shall be protected anywhere and

⁵⁴⁸ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7300.

⁵⁴⁹ *Congressional Record: 1945*, pp.7981, 7973.

⁵⁵⁰ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.6985.

⁵⁵¹ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7300.

⁵⁵² *Congressional Record 1945*, p.8001-8002.

⁵⁵³ Senator Wheeler, Montana, *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7982.

⁵⁵⁴ *Congressional Record: 1945*, pp.7980, 7156, 6982.

⁵⁵⁵ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.6982.

⁵⁵⁶ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7300.

⁵⁵⁷ Senators Hill and Barkley, *Congressional Record 1945*, pp.7972, 7970.

⁵⁵⁸ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.8002.

everywhere on earth.”⁵⁵⁹ Senator Wheeler expressed concern that the United Nations Charter did not make “one single clear specific provision for the protection of the individual human personality of which the society of nations is ultimately composed ... not one single reference even to the worth and dignity of the human person, much less any specific provisions for the protection of his inalienable rights.”⁵⁶⁰

Not only was there a concern for individual freedoms and a fear that such freedoms might not be guaranteed by the new international organization, but undefined freedoms also figured prominently in congressional discourse. The phrase “fundamental freedoms” was frequently reiterated, usually in conjunction with the phrase “human rights.” For example, Senator Hill cited the importance of “human rights and basic freedoms” and argued that the United Nations Charter was notable for its emphasis on these.⁵⁶¹ Senator Wheeler emphasized the “basic liberties and rights and dignity of human character” and wanted these highlighted in the United Nations Charter.⁵⁶² An ardent supporter of the fledgling United Nations, Senator Vandenberg argued that whatever form the peace treaties might take, the “protections for human rights and fundamental freedoms inherent in the San Francisco Charter will inevitable make a better, a wiser, and a safer job of it in its ultimate impacts upon humankind.”⁵⁶³

Two basic freedoms were identified as democracy and freedom of speech. Senator Alben Barkley expressed a hope that the result of the Allied victory in the war might be that “democracy might not only flourish wherever it now is, but that it may extend its boundaries throughout the world.”⁵⁶⁴ Senator Wheeler was concerned about the stifling effect of tyranny on democracy in Eastern Europe combined with the lack of freedom of speech. He challenged the people in the United States who admired Russia to go to Eastern Europe, and “there see what would happen to them if they dared to criticize in the slightest degree either the government or any of the officials of the government.”⁵⁶⁵ Wheeler was also concerned that the postwar anarchy in Europe would damage prospects for democracy. He asked, “Does anyone imagine that the chaos, famine, disease, immorality, suffering and the stinking desert of conflict that has been made of Europe and that is fast being spread over the Orient, is fertile ground in which the roots of democracy can flourish?”⁵⁶⁶

Social, economic and cultural rights were considered in two ways. One approach was to view provision of these rights as protection against war. The other was to view them as rights in themselves — inherently belonging to humans rather than as preventative measures against war. The former approach was exemplified by the declaration of Senator Hill that “Economic injustice, hunger, want, misery, exploitation, the denial of economic opportunity, make fertile the soil for the seeds of war.”⁵⁶⁷ A senator from Kansas, Barkley, outlined a similar perspective, saying, “We know from history that in the years gone by economic conditions have contributed largely to warfare, and to the unhappiness of men, women, and children because of their desire to expand and get out of life something which they could enjoy.”⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁵⁹ *Congressional Record* 1945, p.7298.

⁵⁶⁰ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7973.

⁵⁶¹ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7972.

⁵⁶² *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7973.

⁵⁶³ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.6983.

⁵⁶⁴ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7970.

⁵⁶⁵ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7991.

⁵⁶⁶ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7985.

⁵⁶⁷ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7972.

⁵⁶⁸ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7970.

The latter position presented the task of the United Nations as being in the very words of the charter to ““ achieve international cooperation in the solution of international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, language, religion or sex.”⁵⁶⁹ The middle ground was represented in the statement of Senator Ferguson:

We seek to substitute economic cooperation for economic welfare between nations in the hope of removing some of the basic causes of war; and with the further aim of promoting the welfare of all the peoples of the world... to promote... the educational, social, and cultural relations between peoples of the world in the effort to bring about better understand and genuine good neighborliness among nations.⁵⁷⁰

As mentioned above, three themes were evident in other definitions and ways of talking about human rights. One was the idea that totalitarianism and fascism were inherently anti-human right and anti-individual rights. Thus, to resist totalitarianism was to strike a blow for human rights. Senator Wheeler of Montana, particularly concerned about the effect of totalitarianism on human rights, said: “The threat of a rampant totalitarian tyranny everywhere raises its ugly head. The resurgence of a brutal and fanatical fascism lurks.”⁵⁷¹ Not only was totalitarianism linked with tyranny and violations of individual security; it was also seen as a threat to standards of living. Aid to Europe was thus portrayed by those in favor of it as a means of resisting totalitarianism, and more specifically, Soviet Communism.

A second set of definitions of human rights emerged under the umbrella of ideas related to progress, humanity, civilization and ideals. The San Francisco conference was portrayed as refusing to “accept a static world in which yesterday’s inequalities are frozen in a strait jacket,” and the United Nations Charter was a “new emancipation proclamation for the world.”⁵⁷² The notion of progress was explicitly part of the discourse, as evident in such declarations as “The United Nations Charter offers to the world an absolutely new political and social organism for insuring the steady progress of civilized mankind through security and peace... It has, in effect, tremendous potentialities to help make this world a better place to live in for all human beings.”⁵⁷³ The charter was even called the “new magna carta of peace and security for mankind.”⁵⁷⁴ In a similar vein, Senator Barkley referred to the “progress of international moral and spiritual values” and the “advancement and elevation of mankind.”⁵⁷⁵ Senator Hill used the metaphor of pioneers, saying that the conference led “mankind forward and upward over a new frontier and into a new era.”⁵⁷⁶

This new era was one in which an organization existed “for the purpose of protecting us against ourselves and against the hates and angers of mankind” and where there existed a “new world civilization.”⁵⁷⁷ The motivations for this progress in civilization were portrayed as “high and noble ideals,” the “legitimate hopes of men, women and children,” the “hopes

⁵⁶⁹ Senator Vandenberg, Michigan, *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.6982.

⁵⁷⁰ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.8001.

⁵⁷¹ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7973.

⁵⁷² Senator Vandenberg, Michigan, *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.6983.

⁵⁷³ Representative Bloom, *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7298.

⁵⁷⁴ Representative Bloom, *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7299.

⁵⁷⁵ *Congressional Record*: 1945, pp.7968-7969.

⁵⁷⁶ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7973.

⁵⁷⁷ Senator Bushfield and Representative Eaton, *Congressional Record*: 1945, pp.7156, 7300.

and aspirations of peoples,” the “hopes of humankind,” “precious values” and the “aspiration of all mankind.”⁵⁷⁸

The final set of definitions existed in the domain of morality and religion are related to ideas about values and responsibilities. Responsibilities identified included those of “trusteeship or guardianship of weak and backwards peoples,”⁵⁷⁹ as well as the need to “work together in amity.”⁵⁸⁰ The notion of working together included ideas of unity, cooperation, community, neighborliness and good will. Senator Hill neatly summed up the idea of cooperation and community through the medium of the United Nations as:

Without compulsion on any nation, here will be the opportunity for all the nations to work together as good neighbors, to elevate the worth and dignity of the individual, to raise standards of living and advance social progress, to help men to obtain the fruit of their toil and to enjoy a better deal, to carry education, enlightenment, and cultural development into all lands and to promote human welfare and human happiness.⁵⁸¹

These responsibilities were to be taken on either because of notions of right and morality — the “willingness to be guided by principles of right conduct in human association” and the “moral sense and trained intelligence of the whole people”— or because of religious conviction based on “Sacred Writ” and the “spiritual forces of this earth.”⁵⁸² Senator Hill argued that the single greatest contribution of the United Nations was: “Here on the stage of the world in broad daylight will be considered in free and open debate the affairs that concern the men and women of this earth. Here truth may turn its shining light into the dark places and challenge the hearts and consciences of men.”⁵⁸³ Thus, notions of progress were equated with morality and religious conviction and ultimately with human rights.

Congressional Linkage of Human Rights and Foreign Policy

Members of congress saw a number of connections between human rights and foreign policy. Some connections related to the idea that it was appropriate to consider morality in foreign policy and that some moral imperatives guided, or should guide, foreign policy. Other ideas were connected with the notion of world leadership and the responsibilities of reducing the anarchy and chaos of war. Finally, a number of issues were debated, such as whether the United States should become involved in world affairs; the role of cooperation and ideas of community; national self-interest versus international responsibilities and the role of idealism versus pragmatism in world politics.

The main role morality was seen to play in foreign policy was through the United States and others taking a moral stance in order to influence the behavior of other countries. Senator Vandenberg referred to this as invoking the “moral pressures of the organized conscience of the world” and said the result would be that the “aggressor of tomorrow who breaks this contract will stand in naked infamy before the embattled conscience of an outraged world.”⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁷⁸ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7968-8001.

⁵⁷⁹ Senator Barkley, Kansas, *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7970.

⁵⁸⁰ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7156.

⁵⁸¹ *Congressional Record 1945*, p.7972.

⁵⁸² *Congressional Record: 1945*, pp.8001, 7300, 6983.

⁵⁸³ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7972.

⁵⁸⁴ *Congressional Record: 1945*, pp.6983-6984.

Senator Wheeler made an even stronger plea for including moral values in foreign policy, saying:

if we as a nation are to revert to the pagan faith of tyrants that truth cannot and will not triumph in free conflict, the hope for moral leadership among the nations and the peoples of the earth will perish for long years to come ... the world of the future will degenerate into a vast intellectual, moral and spiritual concentration camp.⁵⁸⁵

Not only was morality seen as an appropriate consideration in foreign policy, but some members of congress argued that a moral imperative existed: American values and the sacrifice of American lives in the war demanded an attempt to improve the world. One member said the options were “either...final failure and self-imposed extinction; or ... a golden age of freedom, justice, peace and social well-being.”⁵⁸⁶ In a similar tone, the warning was issued that “failure to reduce international anarchy to law and order threatens the whole structure of law and order which mankind has painfully built up through the centuries.”⁵⁸⁷ Senator Vandenberg highlighted the moral imperative, saying, “[I]f the effort fails, we can at least face the consequences with clean hands.”⁵⁸⁸

This moral imperative was seen to derive in part from the special experiences of the United States, and the question was asked: “What other power on earth is going to sacrifice itself to guarantee the strengthening and perpetuation of our way of life if not America?”⁵⁸⁹ Members of congress clearly saw the United States as having values and experiences that could benefit the rest of the world. Senator Ferguson of Michigan asked rhetorically:

Examine the history of the whole world and tell me what other nation emerged victorious from two great wars asking nothing for itself except that which would bring peace, law, and order in the relations between nations. It is more than chance... that Bretton Woods, Hot Springs, Dumbarton Oaks, and San Francisco are American place names; and that from them come the outlines of a new era in world organization. So I say, without in any way minimizing the great contributions of other nations, that political innovation — the power of organization — is the genius of the American people.⁵⁹⁰

Backing the notion that the United States had much to offer the rest of the world were arguments that no single nation was “more interested in humanity on an international basis than the United States of America. We have rushed to the relief of the stricken everywhere”; “we are the richest, the most powerful and freest nation that not only now exists but that ever existed”; and “We built up on this continent the greatest country on the face of the globe, where there is greater prosperity, greater freedom, and greater liberty and more real religion than there ever was in any other country in the face of the globe.”⁵⁹¹ This last comment was made in connection with an argument that the United States should keep to itself and not

⁵⁸⁵ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7973.

⁵⁸⁶ Representative Eaton, New Jersey, *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7300.

⁵⁸⁷ Senator Ferguson, Michigan, *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.8001.

⁵⁸⁸ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.6982.

⁵⁸⁹ Senator Wheeler, *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.7985.

⁵⁹⁰ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.8002.

⁵⁹¹ Senator Ferguson, Michigan, *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.8002; Senator Barkley, Kansas, p.7970 and Senator Wheeler, p.7991.

meddle in international affairs, because such “meddling” could jeopardize all that the United States had achieved.

The debate between those who wanted the United States to take an active role in world affairs and those who took a more isolationist position was one of the dominant themes found in examining connections between human rights and foreign policy. The idea of the existence of human rights and the international standards thereof, presupposes involvement in world affairs -- making difficult the argument for human rights while opposing participation in a world community. Senator Vandenberg held to the position that participation in world affairs would not diminish American interests, saying, “[W]e sacrifice none of our essential American sovereignty and none of our essential American rights when, exercising intelligent self-interest, we join ourselves in this international enterprise to seek a peace and a security which are as essential to our welfare as the air we breathe.”⁵⁹² He went on to say that “America has everything to gain and nothing to lose... everything to lose and nothing to gain by declining this continued fraternity with the United Nations in behalf of the dearest dream of mankind.”⁵⁹³ In fact, he presented the alternative to participation as being “physical and moral chaos in many weary places of the world.”⁵⁹⁴ In marked contrast were the views of senators such as Wheeler, who argued that:

again having learned nothing from the past, America is being used to build up a new world struggle between two great imperialistic nations, a struggle for world trade, world markets, world resources, world power, and world domination, in which again we shall be called to pour out what is left of our once vast storehouses of treasure, raw materialists [sic] and of blood.⁵⁹⁵

Senator Hill made the strongest plea for world cooperation instead of American isolation. In fact he argued that the United States could not maintain an isolationist position because the “airplane and the radio, rapid transportation and instantaneous communication have made the world one common neighborhood. Whether we like it or not, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought, affects the future of america.”⁵⁹⁶ He went on to argue that as part of a community America could wage a battle against “intolerance, repression, exploitation, injustice, and economic want as the common perils of the future” — which could not be waged alone.⁵⁹⁷

A related debate in congress was over the role of what was perceived as idealism in political affairs. Many members of congress called notions of morality, community and human rights unduly idealistic in the hard realities of international relations. Senator Harlen Bushfield sweepingly described the idealists as the “dreamers who would remake the governments of earth into one world in which all the human characteristics of mankind are merged into a civilization of light and sweetness.” He continued on to say that “we must not be swept away from practical, hard-headed common sense.”⁵⁹⁸ In contrast, Senator Ferguson declared, “I think we can keep our heads in the clouds of idealism and also plant our feet squarely on the

⁵⁹² *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.6984.

⁵⁹³ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.6985.

⁵⁹⁴ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.6981.

⁵⁹⁵ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7986.

⁵⁹⁶ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7971.

⁵⁹⁷ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7971.

⁵⁹⁸ Senator Bushfield, Nebraska, *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7156.

ground of realism.”⁵⁹⁹ His reasoning was that the founding of the United States showed how idealism could be incorporated into the “practical world,” and, thus, a similar process could take place in foreign policy.

A further argument made by those in favor of international involvement and the incorporation of ideals into foreign policy was that, as a world leader, the United States had certain responsibilities. Vandenberg argued that, “If America is to assume the moral leadership of a better world in which we have fought our way to glorious eminence, we can scarcely be content to be among the last who care or dare to speak when this United Nations’ roll is called.”⁶⁰⁰ Representative Eaton suggested that the earliest possible ratification of the United Nations charter would “confirm the position of our great and free country in its acknowledged place of leadership in the supreme task of reconstructing a shattered civilization, and establishing permanent peace and security, throughout the world.”⁶⁰¹

One clear way in which human rights and foreign policy were connected in congressional discourse was the identification of the reduction of anarchy as a goal of foreign policy. Senator Ferguson argued that anarchy over time had been reduced by the “substitution of principles of right, equality, and justice for the unbridled passions of men.”⁶⁰² The reduction of anarchy was clearly linked with human rights and foreign policy by his argument that, through “appropriate ‘agencies and courts’ and ‘by the introduction of law, equity, and order commensurate with the dignity of man ..., freedom, peace and justice [can] be attained. Freedom must precede peace, for peace with slavery is not desirable and must never be permitted.’”⁶⁰³ Similar linkages were made by Senator Barkley’s argument, that if as much money had been spent on “education, hospitalization, improvement of our highways, and all the things that make for a higher standard of life and the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” as was spent on the war, the “cause of civilization” and the “standard of life” in the United States and around the world would have benefited.⁶⁰⁴

Congressional Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy

Discussions in congress of who had agency in the making of American foreign policy mainly took place in the realm of questions about specific assignment of power — that is, debates about who had authority to make decisions. The old debate between congress and the president over who had authority in foreign policy was brought to the forefront by discussions of potential ramifications of ratification of the United Nations charter on domestic decision-making. One specific fear was about who would have the power to declare war and send American troops to war. Related to this fear was the belief that American troops should be committed only to “protect American lives and property, and not the property or lives of some foreign nations or combination of nations.”⁶⁰⁵ Some senators argued that the constitution provided that only congress could declare war — while others said the president had the power to make executive agreements (such as treaties) though he “may have to go to congress for approval in order to obtain money to carry them out.”⁶⁰⁶ The middle ground in

⁵⁹⁹ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.8002.

⁶⁰⁰ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.6985.

⁶⁰¹ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7300.

⁶⁰² *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.8001.

⁶⁰³ *Congressional Record* 1945, p.8001.

⁶⁰⁴ *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7968.

⁶⁰⁵ Senator Wheeler, *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7994.

⁶⁰⁶ See Senator Bushfield, Nebraska, *Congressional Record*: 1945, p.7156 for arguments endorsing the power of congress and Senator Taft, p.7999 for endorsement of the president’s authority.

this debate was occupied by such senators as Vandenberg, who took a placatory stance, saying, “It seems to me that the important thing to underscore and to underline is that we all agree that this cannot be done by executive agreement if it eliminates the voice of Congress or the voice of the Senate from the equation.”⁶⁰⁷

The American Discourse of Human Rights in 1945

The San Francisco conference of 1945, the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are seen as the foundations of contemporary discussions about human rights. Yet it can be seen that the ways human rights were talked about in 1919 (the first case study) were remarkably similar to those of 1945. The four newspapers studied in 1919 talked about human rights in terms of security, peace and justice; equality; common interest and morality; democracy; trade, labor and economic development; national identity, internationalism and idealism; punishment and law; suffrage; the threat of Bolshevism; and progress and civilization. The same four newspapers in 1945 identified many of the same components, of human rights although these components were differently combined and emphasized. Human rights were defined in terms of security, freedom from wrongful interference and equality; justice, law and peace; freedoms in general; values, common interest and morality; economic and social rights; punishment and international standards; progress and civilization; and undefined rights.

The emphasis on common interest in 1919 became an emphasis on community, although it is clear that the ideas are basically the same — cooperation between nations based on mutual interests. The idea of security in 1919 emphasized prevention of war and the establishment of rules governing how nations could conduct war (and peaceful relations). In 1945, emphasis was laid to a greater extent on the right of all individuals to freedom from wrongful interference — security at an individual rather than a national level. The notion of punishment for violation of international standards remained constant. In 1919, the criminals were seen as the Kaiser and his associates and in 1945, perpetrators of crimes were the Nazis and their allies. In both cases, the print media argued that certain acts against individuals and groups of people were not acceptable, even in the course of conducting war.

Economic and social rights remained a small component of definitions of human rights. A much larger component in both case studies was definition of human rights in terms of progress and service to civilization. One of the most interesting differences between newspaper coverage of the Paris Peace conference and the San Francisco conference is that while human rights are talked about in terms of freedom in 1945, the concept of democracy is far more important in the ways newspapers in 1919 talked about human rights. In contrast, congressional definitions of human rights in both 1919 and 1945 emphasized democracy as essential to provision of freedom and rights.

The congressional discourse of human rights was remarkably similar in the two case studies. Congress consistently defined human rights in terms of political and civil rights: peace, justice, law, freedoms of speech and press, self-determination and democracy. Congress in 1919 portrayed provision of aid to European nations and efforts to guarantee basic human rights as part of the struggle against the influence of Bolshevism. Congress in 1945 discussed the role of provision of economic aid to Europe and supporting development of universal

⁶⁰⁷ *Congressional Record: 1945*, p.8000.

standards of political and civil rights as weapons in the fight against totalitarianism — specifically, communism.

The congresses of 1919 and 1945 both depicted human rights as intimately connected with the progress of society and civilization towards higher standards of morality. In both periods, the United States was presented in both print media sources and congressional discussions as having a special role to play -- that of moral leadership -- because of American historical experience (successful establishment of a democratic government undergirded by an idealistic constitution) and American influence in the world (as a result of involvement in two world wars). Congressional and media discourse also consistently exhibited a tension between the role of idealism and that of pragmatism in foreign policy. In both periods, idealism was tied to those individuals and organizations that supported United States involvement in a world community, and pragmatism was tied to those who supported a less interventionist foreign policy.

The next two case studies allow comparison of human rights discourse in periods when the United States was not at war, or dealing with the immediate aftermath of war. Chapter Five discusses human rights and foreign policy during the 1976 presidential campaign — specifically, in the debate between presidential candidates Gerald Ford and James Carter. Chapter Six discusses American responses to the massacre of Chinese students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 by the army of the People's Republic of China. In such different situations definitions of human rights, perceptions of the purpose of foreign policy, attribution of agency in foreign policy and general ways of talking about human rights could be reasonably expected to differ from these two early case studies. If this is not the case, the outlines of a twentieth-century American discourse of human rights can be seen emerging from these case studies.

Chapter Five

Human Rights in the 1976 Presidential Campaign: Case Study III

The story of human rights told by the print media in 1976 was complex and often contradictory. The contradictions came largely from the different stories of human rights being told by President Gerald Ford and presidential candidate James (Jimmy) Carter. Ford's narrative of human rights made freedom the central plot — articulated through notions of democracy, justice, peace and the freedoms of migration, speech and opinion. Carter's narrative encompassed all of these concepts but also drew in ideas about the entitlement of all human beings to social security and food — so-called second-generation rights. Ideas about morality and peoples' aspirations were also part of the narrative, whether couched in terms of political, social or economic rights. Anti-communism continued to be an important thread in the narrative of human rights, with Western democracy identified with the provision of human rights and communism tied to subjugation of peoples. Civil and political liberties were at the center of congressional narratives of human rights, with democracy as an essential component of the stories. However, women's rights (though largely articulated as civil and political rights) and a small measure of social and economic rights were also part of the story.

The print media in 1976 clearly saw the president and his administration as the prime narrators of foreign policy. Congress and public opinion were given smaller roles. Various divisions of the executive branch — such as the U.S. State Department and policy advisors — were seen as important narrators of foreign policy. In an election year, constituents and presidential candidates were portrayed as much more important narrators of foreign policy and human rights stories than would usually be the case. International agreements were also seen to play a role in the telling of human rights stories. Congress at this time saw itself as a much more important narrator of both foreign policy and human rights stories than in previous years, although congressional discourse showed an awareness of the balance between the voices of congress and the president in policymaking.

The Presidential Debate

On October 6, 1976, U.S. President Gerald Ford, the incumbent president and Republican candidate for re-election, met Governor James Carter of Georgia, the Democratic presidential candidate, in the Palace of Fine Arts theater in San Francisco for a debate on foreign policy and national defense issues. This was the second in a series of what were considered historic debates. A live audience and an estimated 100 million Americans watched the debate on television.⁶⁰⁸ Ford was in the difficult position of having to defend a foreign policy largely inherited from his predecessor, Richard Nixon. He had retained Nixon's Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and continued many Nixon administration policies.⁶⁰⁹ However, Ford also had the incumbent advantage and the associated foreign policy experience. Carter, though having consulted extensively with foreign policy experts, had the disadvantage of

⁶⁰⁸ According to Pauline Frederick of National Public Radio, moderator of the debate, in October 7, 1976, 'Partial Text of Ford-Carter Foreign Policy Debate', *Los Angeles Times*, p.26.

⁶⁰⁹ Alan Brinkley. (1993), *The Unfinished Nation: A Concise History of the American People*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), p.874.

inexperience in foreign policy, but he had the advantage of being a challenger unblemished by any foreign policy missteps.⁶¹⁰

Ford's campaign tried to use Carter's pre-debate consultations as evidence that Carter was not qualified to lead the country. Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Robert Dole of Kansas, speaking to the American Bankers Association, according to a *Los Angeles Times* article, argued that the "pre-debate consultations and briefings of Carter by well-identified foreign policy and defense experts were 'solely for the purpose of lending much needed credibility to his candidacy.'" ⁶¹¹ The article also suggested that Ford's strategy was to "show that he [Carter] is fuzzy, uncertain and undependable when it comes to dealing with other nations."⁶¹² In turn, Carter sought to show Ford as tarnished by association with Kissinger's "Realpolitik" and Nixon-era foreign policy and as given to secrecy. With reference to discussions over nuclear proliferation, Carter declared that "our President will not even come out of the White House to explain his proposal or be questioned on it."⁶¹³ Thus was the stage set for the 1976 debate on foreign policy in San Francisco.

As to the winner of the debate, as usual in such cases, opinion was sharply divided. In a selection of responses printed in the *Los Angeles Times*, Dole was reported as having declared the president the winner because "Gov. Carter really didn't come to debate. Instead of discussing foreign policy and defense, all he did was nitpick for 90 minutes."⁶¹⁴ Betty Ford concurred, saying that the debate was "like someone who knew how to dance and someone who was trying to learn how to dance"; and Republican Senate candidate S J . Hayakawa painted a picture of an ignorant Carter versus an experienced Ford, saying, "President Ford caught Carter with his facts down."⁶¹⁵ Senator John Tunney (D-Calif.) argued that "on substance Carter won. On debate points, it was a draw."⁶¹⁶ Opinion was unanimous however, that no matter how well Ford had performed, he had shot himself in the foot with his comment that 'There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and there never will be under a Ford administration... Each of these countries is independent, autonomous. It has its own territorial integrity. And the United States does not concede that those countries are under the dominance of the Soviet Union.'⁶¹⁷ After these words, Ford's administration was placed on the defensive for the remaining weeks of the campaign.

Human Rights in the Newspapers of 1976

The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times* and the *New Orleans Times - - Picayune* were studied for the week of October 4 to 10, 1976. On the Wednesday of that week, Ford and Carter debated in San Francisco. Thus, the news coverage was examined for pre-debate discussions of foreign policy and human rights, coverage of the debate itself and post-debate analysis.

⁶¹⁰ Carter was reported as having consulted extensively with James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense under Ford and W. Averell Harriman, a retired diplomat, October 4, 1976, 'Carter Discusses Foreign Affairs with Schlesinger', *Los Angeles Times*, p.6. In addition, on arrival in San Francisco, Carter met with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia University and Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis.), October 5, 1976, 'Carter in S.F., Vows to Debate Aggressively', *Los Angeles Times*, p.6.

⁶¹¹ October 5, 1976, 'Dole Uses Carter's Quotes to Allege He Is "Fuzzy"', *Los Angeles Times*, p.7.

⁶¹² October 3, 1976, 'Dole Uses Carter's Quotes to Allege He Is "Fuzzy"', *Los Angeles Times*, p.7.

⁶¹³ October 5, 1976, 'Carter in S.F., Vows to Debate Aggressively', *Los Angeles Times*, p.6.

⁶¹⁴ October 7, 1976, 'Partial Text of Ford-Carter Foreign Policy Debate', *Los Angeles Times*, p.26.

⁶¹⁵ October 7, 1976, 'Partial Text of Ford-Carter Foreign Policy Debate', *Los Angeles Times*, p.26.

⁶¹⁶ October 7, 1976, 'Partial Text of Ford-Carter Foreign Policy Debate', *Los Angeles Times*, p.26.

⁶¹⁷ October 7, 1976, 'Partial Text of Ford-Carter Foreign Policy Debate', *Los Angeles Times*, p.26.

Defining Human Rights in the Print Media

The print media in 1976 emphasized definition of human rights in terms of political freedoms. Other ways of defining human rights were found in the newspapers studied, but coverage of the debates in the print media was dominated by ideas encompassed by the notion of political freedom. Although, the *New York Times* coverage of the presidential campaign contained a range of definitions of human rights, the primary definition was that of freedom, which encompassed ideas about participation in government, justice, peace, and freedom of movement. Notions related to social security and the entitlement of human beings to food were also included, as were undefined or general rights. Definitions of human rights identified as outside those in the UDHR included ideas related to yearnings — people's hopes and desires — and morality.

The *Washington Post* coverage of the Ford-Carter debate differs significantly from that in the other newspapers. While coverage in the other newspapers couched the debate in terms of human rights and foreign policy, that in the *Washington Post* cast it almost entirely in terms of general foreign policy and specific issues, such as those of the Panama Canal, the Middle East peace settlement and the SALT Treaty.⁶¹⁸ The one article that included discussion of human rights defined them in very general terms and in terms of freedom of speech and opinion, freedom from wrongful interference and migration. Another article in the sample week covered congressional concerns with general human rights and provided a narrow definition of human rights as freedom from wrongful interference.

The *Los Angeles Times* coverage of the debate encompassed the widest range of definitions and ways of talking about human rights of all the newspapers studied. A long list of freedoms was identified as essential to human rights, including general freedom; political freedom; freedom to travel; emigrate and demonstrate; freedom of information and speech; freedom from discrimination and wrongful interference; and cultural, economic and individual freedoms. Human rights were also discussed in terms of economic aspirations, morality, and as anti-communism.

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage of the Ford-Carter debate contained the narrowest set of definitions of human rights found among all the newspapers in this study. Human rights were simply defined in terms of freedom versus domination — that is, as political rights -- or used as a term in isolation without further definition.

Political Freedom

Terms like oppression, hegemony and domination were central to discussions about freedom in the *New York Times* coverage. Both Carter and Ford repeatedly referred to "Soviet domination."⁶¹⁹ Ford also talked about the "repressive measures" taken by South Korean President Park to maintain control.⁶²⁰ The primary idea used in defining freedom as a human right was political freedom — both in terms of democracy through participation in government and in terms of freedom from military and other oppression. Carter seems to have been especially keen to point out in the debate that Eastern European countries had little political freedom in contrast to Ford's assertion that freedom existed in these countries. He

⁶¹⁸ October 8, 1976, 'Debate Failed to Clarify Future Policy', *Washington Post*, A10.

⁶¹⁹ October 8, 1976, 'Carter Assails Ford on "Serious Blunder"', *New York Times*, A18.

⁶²⁰ October 8, 1976, 'Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate', *New York Times*, A19.

did so by saying “that the Soviet Union still had combat tank divisions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and troops in East Germany” and by asking, “Did Mr. Ford not see those tanks when he visited Poland last year?”⁶²¹ The importance of freedom in any definition of human rights was emphasized in the coverage by extensive discussion of the difference of opinion between Carter and Ford about Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Carter was reported as “calling Mr. Ford’s allusion to freedom in Western Europe ‘a cruel hoax upon millions’ in the region [millions] ‘who have lived under Soviet domination for their entire lives’ ... Mr. Carter accused the President of an affront to the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany who have strived so long for some small measure of freedom.”⁶²² Other comments by Carter on the subject of freedom received extensive coverage, including his challenge: “If the people there are free, let them tear down the wall and we will observe the exodus from East Germany.”⁶²³

Articles in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* also emphasized the notion of domination. It was talked about in terms of “control” and “subjugation” versus “autonomy and freedom.”⁶²⁴ The role of the Soviet Union in the debated domination of Eastern Europe was extensively discussed, especially in connection with presenting Ford as “ignoring the human rights of millions of people under Communist rule.”⁶²⁵ References were also made to “dictatorships” and especially to Carter’s description of American “foreign policies that support foreign dictatorships and ignore human rights.”⁶²⁶ Prominence was given to the statement released by the Democratic National Committee’s Nationalities Unit that “slavery is the very opposite of freedom, not a verbal variation of it”⁶²⁷

Washington Post articles during this week presented both Carter and congress as considering the vital concern of human rights as freedom from wrongful interference and freedom of speech. Carter was reported as condemning “political persecution in Chile” and “repression in South Korea and other lands.”⁶²⁸ Representative Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) was reported as “distressed by reports of torture and other serious abuses in Argentina, some involving American citizens there.”⁶²⁹ Both Carter and Ford were reported as considering freedom of movement a human rights concern. Carter’s “calls for greater efforts to convince Russians to permit emigration of Soviet Jews” was reported, along with reports that Ford “asked Brezhnev privately to advance emigration of Soviet Jews.”⁶³⁰

Both Carter and Ford were portrayed by the *Los Angeles Times* as having presented concerns about political freedom around the world during the debate. In an attack mode, Carter argued that under “Kissinger, Ford and Nixon... we’ve espoused the purposes of dictators.”⁶³¹ Ford’s response was to highlight American — and particularly his administration’s — support for

⁶²¹ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁶²² October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁶²³ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁶²⁴ October 7, 1976, ‘Debate Heats Up over SALT Issue’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1 and October 8, 1976, ‘Reaction of World: “Blunder”’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁶²⁵ Jeffrey Blyth, *London Evening News*’ New York correspondent in October 8, 1976, ‘Reaction of World: “Blunder”’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁶²⁶ 19 October 7, 1976, ‘Debate Heats Up over SALT Issue’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1

⁶²⁷ October 9, 1976, ‘Carter Attacks: Ford Explains’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁶²⁸ October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates’ Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8.

⁶²⁹ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

⁶³⁰ October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates’ Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8.

⁶³¹ October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

“black majority rule in Rhodesia, South-West Africa and South Africa.”⁶³² On the subject of Eastern Europe, both Carter and Ford talked about political freedom in terms of Soviet domination of various countries, although Carter argued that Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were under Soviet domination while Ford would not concede this point during the debate. He insisted instead that the “United States never has and never will concede to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.”⁶³³

Ford’s comments during the debate on Eastern Europe became the focus of intense controversy with Ford attempting in following days to clarify his comments and Carter using every opportunity to use Ford’s perceived blunder as a campaign weapon against him. The *Los Angeles Times* devoted a great deal of coverage to the emerging controversy. Immediately following the debate, Brent Scowcroft, as head of the National Security Council, recast Ford’s statements, explaining, “[W]hat the President was trying to say” is that last year he visited Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland to ‘symbolize their independence and freedom (to) maneuver.’”⁶³⁴ Ford later further explained his comments as being that the “United States would never accede to Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and that it supported freedom in all the countries of the Soviet bloc.”⁶³⁵ Carter in turn focused attention on what he called the “Soviet’s bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolution ... Soviet tank divisions... in the heart of Poland” and Soviet domination in general.⁶³⁶

Politics of personality aside, what is important here is definition of human rights as political freedom and — the notion central to this - of the right of individual citizens to “free choice of government.”⁶³⁷ Also important is the clear positioning of freedom as the opposite of domination; “free nation” versus “slave nation”; choice versus imposition of power; and freedom of political debate versus repression and suppression.⁶³⁸ These definitions of human rights are clearly outlined in an editorial in the *Los Angeles Times*, which, in a satirical commentary on Ford’s politically incautious comments, suggested Ford should have said:

Of course the Soviet Union dominates Eastern Europe and the deprivation of sovereign rights and civil liberties as a result of that domination is a tragedy of the modern world...we are deeply embarrassed that the Soviet Union has only marginally implemented the Helsinki agreements of last year, and has ignored the agreements designed to make the lives of the East Europeans and Russians more free...⁶³⁹

Other Freedoms (Speech, Press, Migration, Cultural)

The Helsinki agreements brought out several ways of talking about human rights in the newspaper coverage. The *Los Angeles Times* coverage described the Helsinki conference as

⁶³² October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶³³ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: President Defends His Dominance Comment’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶³⁴ October 8, 1976, ‘Policy Unchanged for 20 Years: “Captive Nations” Revived as Issue’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶³⁵ October 9, 1976, ‘Ford Urgently Tries To Clarify Europe Remarks’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶³⁶ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: U.S. Was Disgraced, Democrat Contends’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶³⁷ October 10, 1976, ‘Ford May Have Added to East Europe’s Confusion’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶³⁸ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: U.S. Was Disgraced, Democrat Contends’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶³⁹ October 10, 1976, ‘But He Might Have Said *Los Angeles Times*, Section VI, p.4.

having “institutionalized the postwar balance of power between East and West in Europe in return for Soviet promises to ease restrictions on emigration, travel and the flow of information.”⁶⁴⁰ Carter drew attention during the debate to what he perceived as the Ford administration’s failures to implement the Helsinki agreements, specifically identifying the rights of “people to migrate, to join their families, to be free, to speak out”⁶⁴¹ However, the *New York Times* coverage also identified President Ford’s definition of resolution of conflict and peace as human rights as well as his attention to issues of freedom of movement -- specifically the issue of Soviet reluctance to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate.⁶⁴²

In addition to these freedoms, cultural, economic and individual freedoms were identified in *Los Angeles Times* coverage as important rights. Cultural and economic freedoms were discussed with reference to Soviet control of Eastern European countries’ cultural life and management of their economies -- that is, as important rights despite their absence in those countries.⁶⁴³ Individual freedoms were discussed in terms of political prisoners and the provision of civil liberties to individuals in other countries.⁶⁴⁴ Another definition of human rights mentioned in the debates that were included in *Los Angeles Times* coverage was that of discrimination against individuals on the basis of race: this emerged through discussion of Arab boycotts of Israeli companies and American companies with Israeli or Jewish ties.⁶⁴⁵

Social Security and Food

During the debate, Carter took the lead in discussions of human rights, clearly outlining his operating terms of “liberty,” “simple justice” and social issues, such as “caring for the poor” and “providing food, becoming the breadbasket of the world.”⁶⁴⁶ Carter emphasized welfare rights, the provision of food and social security through foreign policy instead of the United States being the “arms merchants” of the world.⁶⁴⁷ In contrast, Ford sought to identify peace as a right that his administration had been able to provide for American citizens and for other countries through its foreign policies.⁶⁴⁸ He also sought to counter Carter’s accusations with the statement that the “Ford Administration wants to eradicate hunger and disease in our undeveloped countries throughout the world.”⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴⁰ October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁴¹ October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁴² October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19

⁶⁴³ October 10, 1976, ‘Ford May Have Added to East Europe’s Confusion’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁴⁴ October 10, 1976, ‘Ford May Have Added to East Europe’s Confusion’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and October 10, 1976, ‘But He Might Have Said — *Los Angeles Times*, Section VI, p.4.

⁶⁴⁵ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: President Defends His Dominance Comment’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: U.S. Was Disgraced, Democrat Contends’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁴⁶ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18 and October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁴⁷ October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1

⁶⁴⁸ October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁴⁹ October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

Morality

Whatever definitions of human rights were used, both candidates and the newspaper coverage presented human rights in terms of morality. An important article in the *New York Times* headlined as “Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford- Carter Debate,” referred to some instances of foreign policy as examples of “morality-inaction.”⁶⁵⁰ Ford emphasized his definition of human rights as peace and morality by rhetorically asking, “What is more moral than peace, and the United States is at peace with the world?”⁶⁵¹ Carter spoke more plainly about “doing what’s right” and the need to consider how governments of different nations “treat their own people.”⁶⁵² Both candidates made liberal use of the terms “human rights” and “freedom” without providing specific definitions.

The *Los Angeles Times* coverage also defined human rights in terms of morality, principles and right — what Carter called “commitment to principles” and “doing what is right” while he painted United States foreign policy as negligent in these aspects.⁶⁵³ In reply, Ford argued that the “foreign policy of the United States meets the highest standard of morality” and that “success was the answer to Carter’s charge that U.S. foreign policy did not meet standards of morality.”⁶⁵⁴ Ford’s measure of success here was the provision of peace, as discussed above.

Economic Aspirations and Anti-Communism

Articles in the *Los Angeles Times* on the debate talked about rights in terms of economic aspirations of countries less developed than the United States.⁶⁵⁵ Coverage also talked about communism and the Soviet Union as the antithesis of freedom and human rights.⁶⁵⁶ In addition, Carter spoke of human rights in terms of human desires - what he called “aspirations of human beings” and “yearning for freedom.”⁶⁵⁷

Undefined Human Rights

General discussions of human rights without specific definition dominated the *Washington Post*’s coverage during this period. During the debate, Carter and Ford were both reported as discussing human rights, “human rights abuses” and “injustices.”⁶⁵⁸ In the coverage of congressional demands for reports on human rights conditions in other countries references were made to human rights “conditions,” “practices,” “records,” “situations,” “cases,” “assessments” and “provisions.”⁶⁵⁹ Negative human rights practices were referred to in terms of “questionable human rights practices,” “a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights,” a “country that violates human rights” and “violating human rights.”⁶⁶⁰ The clearest

⁶⁵⁰ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁵¹ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁵² October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁵³ October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁵⁴ October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁵⁵ October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁵⁶ October 10, 1976, ‘Ford May Have Added to East Europe’s Confusion’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and October 10, 1976, ‘But He Might Have Said ~’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section VI, p.4.

⁶⁵⁷ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁶⁵⁸ October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates* Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8.

⁶⁵⁹ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

⁶⁶⁰ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

definition of human rights was outlined in Representative Fraser's statement that the key concern was the "way a government treats its own people."⁶⁶¹

Linkages Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Print Media

Newspaper coverage of the debate identified numerous links between human rights and foreign policy — that is, human rights were accepted by the media as having a role to play in foreign policy decisions. The *New York Times* coverage of the debate and other human rights issues identified human rights concerns and idealism with political liberalism and interest in the practicalities of foreign policies as a concern of political conservatives. The *Washington Post* coverage of the debate also emphasized the differences between pragmatic and idealistic foreign policy goals. However, coverage also discussed the related issues of human rights concerns versus sovereignty — that is, intervention versus respect for national sovereignty; serious political issues versus frivolous concerns; and the role of morality in foreign policy.

In addition to discussions of idealism versus pragmatism in the *Los Angeles Times*, a wide range of ways of talking about human rights appeared, along with the greatest number of linkages between human rights and foreign policy found among the newspapers studied. This range included the issue of sovereignty and the role of morality in foreign policy. Also discussed were: the importance of humanitarianism and international freedoms; human rights as an international pressure point; and consideration of human rights issues as important in getting the ethnic vote in the election. This last issue received the greatest amount of coverage, although this aspect was entirely absent from the other newspapers studied.

Coverage of the presidential debate in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* echoed the other newspapers in some of the ways it linked human rights and foreign policy — portraying the conflict between pragmatism and idealism and discussing the validity of including human rights in foreign policy. However, three other linkages were identified during research: the idea that foreign policy should be based on the human rights record of a country; the notion that improvement of human rights can be linked to contact of non- Western countries with the West; and the idea that human rights and foreign policy are linked symbolically rather than through concrete policy actions.

As in previous case studies, concern with human rights was tied to an idealistic approach to policy-making while so-called "traditional" approaches to foreign policy (such as government-to-government diplomacy) were portrayed as the more pragmatic approach. These two stances were portrayed as exemplified by Carter and Ford during the debate. After identifying the "theme of human rights and morality in foreign policy," an article in the *New York Times* said of the two men:

Their two approaches embodied profoundly different philosophies of foreign policy and conflicting tendencies in American history ... Mr. Ford's was the practical, power-politics approach - treat other countries according to their importance to the United States and not on how they treat their own people. Mr. Carter's approach is based on the view that the United States must take a stand in the world for human rights to be a world leader and true to itself.⁶⁶²

⁶⁶¹ October 4, 1976, 'Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries', *Washington Post*, A2.

⁶⁶² October 8, 1976, 'Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate', *New York Times*, A19.

The article further referred to the difference between the positions of the two men as a “trade-off between security considerations and principle.”⁶⁶³ In discussing Ford’s perceived “blunder” on Eastern Europe, *New York Times* coverage portrayed Ford’s concerns as being the larger issue of United States-Soviet relations in the context of the Cold War where the administration was unwilling to “recognize Soviet hegemony over the so-called captive nations.”⁶⁶⁴ While decrying such a hard-nosed stance and illustrating Ford’s cynicism by reference to his refusal to receive Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn at the White House, Carter also sought during the debate to create a bridge that would allow for idealism and concrete achievements in foreign policy by linking world leadership with concern for human rights. However, in his statement that the United States was the “arms merchant of the world” rather than the “breadbasket,” he also linked concern for military strength with lack of concern for human rights.⁶⁶⁵

Although human rights concerns were identified with liberalism and security concerns with conservatism in articles in the *New York Times*, both ends of the political spectrum in congress were shown to incorporate human rights concerns in foreign policy. Persons identified as “Congressional liberals” were reported as wanting to cut back on “American associations with military dictatorships” and to “stop all military aid to nations that show a ‘pattern of gross violations of human rights.’”⁶⁶⁶ Congressional “conservatives” were portrayed as pressing for a law “withholding equal trading status from the Soviet Union until it permitted freer emigration of its citizens, particularly Jews.”⁶⁶⁷ These discussions illustrate the nineteen seventies as a period during which congress increasingly sought to use economic means to enforce foreign policy goals.

Articles in the *Washington Post* portrayed idealistic foreign policy as overt linkage of policy decisions to human rights issues while the pragmatic approach to policy was “quiet diplomacy.”⁶⁶⁸ Congress was shown as preferring open linkages — that a “nation’s human rights record should be an important factor in determining U.S. relations with that country.”⁶⁶⁹ This preference for openness was connected to the idea that human rights concerns over-ride sovereign concerns — what Representative Fraser called the belief that the “way a government treated its own people is a legitimate concern of the international community.”⁶⁷⁰ Carter was presented as taking the middle ground in this discussion; he condemned political persecution in several countries and suggested the “U.S. should refrain from intervention in domestic politics of other countries while using unspecified ‘economic and political persuasion’ against injustices.”⁶⁷¹ The stance of Ford and his administration was that “open U.S. action is less effective in human rights cases than quiet diplomacy.”⁶⁷² Ford

⁶⁶³ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁶⁴ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁶⁶⁵ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁶⁶ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁶⁷ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁶⁸ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2 and October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates’ Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8

⁶⁶⁹ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

⁶⁷⁰ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

⁶⁷¹ October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates’ Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8.

⁶⁷² October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

further called the Jackson Amendment, which denied trade benefits to the Soviet Union because of its restrictions on emigration, “self-defeating and mistaken.”⁶⁷³

One of the most important aspects of the linkage between foreign policy and human rights is that congressional moves and Carter’s political stance allowed open discussion of the idea that morality and idealism had a role in foreign policy. Even while Ford espoused quiet diplomacy, he implicitly acknowledged that human rights concerns, and therefore morality and idealism, had a part to play in foreign policy decisions. However, the stance in *Washington Post* coverage was clearly that these issues were not particularly pertinent to serious analysis of foreign policy. Citing issues as being addressed during the debate only in “simplistic, emotional and nationalistic terms,” an editorial said:

At the level of serious discussion - rather than of theatrical performances in search of votes - the debate conveyed a picture of important issues barely recognizable to those here and abroad who must deal with them ... Considering the nature of some things that were said, it may be just as well that crucial issues were ignored.⁶⁷⁴

The conflicting goals of idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy were highlighted in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage by identification of the Ford administration’s dilemma as being caught between “detente” and “support for Eastern European countries.”⁶⁷⁵ A further dilemma for the administration was the issue of sovereignty, given that the United States had signed the Helsinki agreement “codifying the postwar boundaries of Europe, pledging noninterference in internal affairs.”⁶⁷⁶ Exemplifying pragmatic politics was the so-called Sonnefeldt doctrine, by which the United States could acknowledge that the Soviet Union had a “special relationship” with Eastern Europe.⁶⁷⁷ An editorial suggesting what Ford should have said during the debate, said the appropriate pragmatic stance was that “[w]e have only reluctantly accepted the Soviet sphere of influence because the alternative risks nuclear war.”⁶⁷⁸ Another article described the tension between idealism and pragmatism as a balancing act between the “need to resist the idea of Soviet domination of half of Europe and the need to accept the fact of that domination.”⁶⁷⁹

Carter’s idealistic stance was presented as suggesting that “U.S. foreign policy did not meet standards of morality”⁶⁸⁰ and thus change was needed. Carter’s approach to foreign policy was also portrayed as suggesting that notions of humanitarianism and sympathy for others should be considered in policy-making along with the notion of freedom — that the United

⁶⁷³ October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates’ Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8.

⁶⁷⁴ October 8, 1976, ‘Debate Failed to Clarify Future Policy’, *Washington Post*, A10.

⁶⁷⁵ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: President Defends His Dominance Comment’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁷⁶ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: President Defends His Dominance Comment’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁷⁷ October 10, 1976, ‘Ford May Have Added to East Europe’s Confusion’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁷⁸ October 10, 1976, ‘But He Might Have Said — *Los Angeles Times*, Section VI, p.4.

⁶⁷⁹ October 8, 1976, ‘Policy Unchanged for 20 Years: “Captive Nations” Revived as Issue’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁸⁰ October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

States “must not ignore the hope of freedom among those who have known too little of it in recent years.”⁶⁸¹

The so-called harsh realities of international politics was discussed through the idea that human rights are important to American foreign policy but are also an international pressure point — that is, that insistence on human rights will strain international relations. Carter used the notion to accuse Ford and his administration of “knuckling under to the Russians and Arabs.”⁶⁸² An article about the history of the concept of “Captive Nations” supported this accusation by suggesting that “a succession of Presidents has proclaimed Captive Nations Week, mandated by congress, with an almost furtive air, annually and dutifully slipping the statement into the White House press room after business hours on Friday and otherwise trying to keep from straining U.S.-Soviet relations.”⁶⁸³

The tension between pragmatism and idealism in foreign policy surfaced only briefly in *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage of Ford’s statements about Middle East policy. Ford pledged to “strengthen existing policy against the Arab boycott of Israel without jeopardizing our vital interests in the Middle East”⁶⁸⁴ Similarly, only brief attention was paid to the notion that human rights should be a consideration in foreign policy. This idea was presented largely through the implication that Ford had blundered by “ignoring the human rights of millions of people under Communist rule” and the suggestion by a member of the public that Secretary of State Kissinger be “sent to negotiate greater freedom for the East Bloc countries.”⁶⁸⁵ Much more attention was given to the idea that foreign policy should be based on a nation’s human rights record — particularly mentioned were Portugal (where Carter “said the United States tolerated the dictatorship... much longer than other nations”), the Middle East and the Soviet Union.⁶⁸⁶

As discussed earlier, only the coverage in the *Los Angeles Times* suggested that incorporating human rights issues into discussion of foreign policy was a way to get ethnic votes — that this was simply a political gambit to gain votes. This suggestion was not subtle, as statements such as the following illustrate:

The long discussion about the Eastern European situation and the Middle East was clearly directed at two constituencies ~ the descendants of the Catholic immigrants from Eastern Europe, and the Jewish voters, crucial in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and a few other places.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸¹ Jimmy Carter in October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: U.S. Was Disgraced, Democrat Contends’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁸² October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: U.S. Was Disgraced. Democrat Contends’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁸³ October 8, 1976, ‘Policy Unchanged for 20 Years: “Captive Nations” Revived as Issue’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁸⁴ October 8, 1976, ‘Furor on Ford Remark Grows’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁶⁸⁵ Jeffrey Blyth, *London Evening News* ‘New York correspondent in October 8, 1976, ‘Reaction of World: “Blunder”’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1 and October 9, 1976, ‘Carter Attacks: Ford Explains’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁶⁸⁶ October 7, 1976, ‘Debate Heats Up over SALT Issue’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁶⁸⁷ October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

... with Carter scheduled to make stops this weekend in such great Catholic ethnic centers as Cleveland, South Bend (Ind.), Chicago and Milwaukee -- the democratic nominee can take crushing advantage of what Carter described as 'a very serious blunder' by Ford.⁶⁸⁸

Indicating he considered one of his comments in Wednesday's foreign policy debate potentially damaging. Ford moved with dispatch to deal with a problem that he feared could hurt him with ethnic voters... there were immediate signs that it could have significant repercussions, particularly in ethnic groups.⁶⁸⁹

More sceptical members of the debate audience noted that Carter, in his rejoinder, primarily addressed Poles, Czechs and Hungarians who, by virtue of American citizenship, may have no direct voice in East European politics but certainly have a vote in November... For the last 20 years in the United States, the 'captive nations' issue has been potent to East European ethnics, as that voting bloc is now called, though the potency has ebbed and flowed.⁶⁹⁰

Ford ... sought to calm ethnic groups across the United States by emphasizing his support of Polish 'hopes and aspirations' for freedom ... Ethnic Americans were bitter, and Carter, seeing a golden opportunity, stepped up his campaign rhetoric.⁶⁹¹

One further idea that received attention in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage of the debate was Ford's suggestion that Eastern European nations would benefit if they became "less dependent on the Soviet Union" and had "closer contact with the West, and of course, the United States of America."⁶⁹² Implicit is the suggestion that good human rights records are a prerogative of the West. Finally, by extensive coverage of Ford's explanations for his comments on Eastern Europe, the proposition was put to readers that linkages between human rights and foreign policy were more a matter of symbolism and word choice on the part of the Ford administration than real concerns for human rights. Coverage charged that this was apparent in such statements as that the United States "would not accept Soviet domination of Eastern Europe"; "never will concede' Russian control of the region" and "has never conceded and never will concede their dominance by the Soviet Union."⁶⁹³

Human Rights and American Identity in the Print Media

In the four newspapers examined, human rights tended to be only implicitly linked with American ideals and identity. Explicit linkages came through the identification of certain ideas and values as American, as well as through connecting human rights concerns with the interests of the immigrant and ethnic American communities. The *New York Times* coverage made both these explicit linkages. First the newspaper reported Carter's comments after the debate about American "pride in our ethnic heritage" and the "yearning for freedom among

⁶⁸⁸ October 8, 1976, 'Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: U.S. Was Disgraced, Democrat Contends', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁸⁹ October 8, 1976, 'Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: President Defends His Dominance Comment', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁹⁰ October 8, 1976, 'Policy Unchanged for 20 Years: "Captive Nations" Revived as Issue', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁹¹ October 9, 1976, 'Ford Urgently Tries To Clarify Europe Remarks', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁶⁹² October 8, 1976, 'Furor on Ford Remark Grows', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁶⁹³ October 8, 1976, 'Furor on Ford Remark Grows', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

Eastern Europeans and émigrés from that area to the United States.”⁶⁹⁴ Carter’s references during the debate to “our people” and the need for the United States to “be true to itself” associated American identity with human rights values.⁶⁹⁵ However, Carter was also presented as chiding the United States for weakness in failing to do “what’s right.”⁶⁹⁶ More explicit linkages were made through allusions to the “ideals of the American people” and “longstanding American principles of independence and anticolonialism.”⁶⁹⁷

The *Washington Post* coverage focused largely on coverage of the events rather than extensive commentary. Thus, linkages between human rights and American identity were sparse and implied. In an article on congressional moves to tie foreign aid to human rights records, the implication was that American values drove this move — that elected American representatives considered human rights an important issue.⁶⁹⁸ Similarly, a report on the presidential candidates’ foreign policy stances outlined one of Carter’s themes as being the need for “foreign policy to reflect ideals and morality of American people.”⁶⁹⁹ However, the article did not outline what these ideals were and how they could be reflected in foreign policy.

Linkages between human rights and American identity were most evident in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage of the debate and its aftermath. In addition to general references to American values, — “traditional American humanitarian values”; “America as bastion of the free world”; the “character of the American people” — these values were specifically outlined in a number of articles as “freedom, independence and self-determination for all people” and the “desire for liberty and freedom.”⁷⁰⁰ Implicit linkages were also revealed through use of value judgements, such as “disgraced our country” and “disappointed,” to report the response of Carter and the general public, specifically the immigrant communities, to Ford’s “blunder.”⁷⁰¹ This connection between Eastern Europeans, the American immigrant community and calls for freedom in Eastern Europe was explained less in terms of specific concern for human rights than by “deep emotional attachments” that often resulted in great trauma when America disappointed. The connection was also made in the suggestion that “when no help came from the West... Moscow was able to put down a reform communist regime [in Czechoslovakia] without any Western interference.”⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁴ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁶⁹⁵ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18 and October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁹⁶ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁹⁷ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁶⁹⁸ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2 and October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates’ Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8..

⁶⁹⁹ October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates’ Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8.

⁷⁰⁰ October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; Jimmy Carter in October 7, 1976, ‘Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says President Gave In to Russ’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: President Defends His Dominance Comment’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and October 9, 1976, ‘Ford Urgently Tries To Clarify Europe Remarks’. *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷⁰¹ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: U.S. Was Disgraced, Democrat Contends’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and October 10, 1976, ‘Ford May Have Added to East Europe’s Confusion’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷⁰² October 10, 1976, ‘Ford May Have Added to East Europe’s Confusion’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

The *New Orleans - Picayune (Times)* coverage similarly emphasized that the immigrant community's calls for freedom in Eastern Europe were motivated as much by feelings about Soviet power as by general humanitarian ideals.⁷⁰³ The coverage also highlighted Carter's accusation that Ford had disgraced America — "disgracing America," "disgraced our country" and "a disgrace to our country"— thus implicitly linking human rights concerns to American values without explicit discussion of such linkages.⁷⁰⁴

Domains of Human Rights in the Print Media

Discussions of human rights in the print media largely fell into the domains of politics, general morality and society. Only coverage in the *Los Angeles Times* placed discussions of human rights in the economic and cultural domain.

Discussion in the domain of general morality was in the context of societal norms of behavior and the desires of humankind for standards. These desires were expressed in *New York Times* coverage through such phrases as "human aspirations," "yearning for freedom" and "aspirations of human beings."⁷⁰⁵ Societal norms were articulated through value terms, such as "ridiculous" and "cruel hoax," to describe Ford's statements about human rights in Eastern Europe.⁷⁰⁶ A theme of morality and values was clear in the coverage of the debate through such terms as "morality-in-action," "moral concerns," right, principles and ideals.⁷⁰⁷ In *Washington Post* coverage, references to such notions as "ideals and morality" and "injustices" fit the domain of general morality.⁷⁰⁸ References to "humanitarian values," "sympathy" and "moral commitments" clearly placed discussions of human rights in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage in the domain of general morality.⁷⁰⁹ Cultural norms of morality appeared in use of such value phrases as "deeply embarrassed" and "tragedy of the modern world" to describe violations of human rights and nonresponse of Western nations to these violations.⁷¹⁰ Articles in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* that relied on ideas about hopes and aspirations and societal values, such as disgrace, shame and insensitivity, placed the discourse of human rights in the domain of general morality, social values and norms.

Discussions of human rights were placed by *New York Times* articles in the social domain by Carter's references to the need for social and economic justice for poor people and nations — the "breadbasket" analogy. The *Washington Post* also placed issues related to emigration in the social domain. Discussions of welfare and social security and the "economic aspirations" of "Third World Nations" were identified by *Los Angeles Times* coverage as in the domain of economics.⁷¹¹ Discussions of freedom to travel and choice of emigration were placed within the domain of society. Culture was only referenced through discussions of political control of culture in Eastern Europe, thus mixing the political and cultural domains.⁷¹²

⁷⁰³ October 8, 1976, 'Furor on Ford Remark Grows', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁷⁰⁴ October 8, 1976, 'Furor on Ford Remark Grows', *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁷⁰⁵ October 8, 1976, 'Carter Assails Ford on "Serious Blunder"', *New York Times*, A18.

⁷⁰⁶ October 8, 1976, 'Carter Assails Ford on "Serious Blunder"', *New York Times*, A18.

⁷⁰⁷ October 8, 1976, 'Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate', *New York Times*, A19.

⁷⁰⁸ October 6, 1976, 'Candidates' Stands on Foreign Policy', *Washington Post*, A8.

⁷⁰⁹ October 6, 1976, 'Debate Could Have Impact Around World', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷¹⁰ October 10, 1976, 'But He Might Have Said *Los Angeles Times*, Section VI, p.4.

⁷¹¹ October 6, 1976, 'Debate Could Have Impact Around World', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and October 7, 1976, 'Crossfire Keynotes Debate: Ford Holds Carter Would Weaken U.S.; Rival Says Resident Gave In to Russ', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷¹² October 10, 1976, 'Ford May Have Added to East Europe's Confusion', *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

The political domain was clearly demarcated in the *Washington Post* coverage through identification of human rights through the negative terms of torture, “serious abuses,” persecution and repression.⁷¹³ The *New York Times* coverage also discussed human rights in the domain of politics. Usually discussions of human rights in the political domain refer to civil and political liberties, such as freedom of speech, the right to choose government, etc. However, in this case, the focus was the mechanics of political discourse — specifically Carter’s use of human rights as a weapon in his campaign for the presidency. Coverage was given to Carter’s claims that Ford’s blunder was the “product of isolation in the White House” and that Ford was inaccessible and ignorant about the “attitudes of ethnic Americans.”⁷¹⁴ An article also suggested that Carter had to use the issue of human rights because of the “President’s low-profile candidacy and the consequent absence of issues on which Ford might be vulnerable to attack.”⁷¹⁵ Human rights were also placed in the political domain through the notion that they were a valid concern in the making of foreign policy. In *Los Angeles Times* coverage of the debate, discussions of human rights using terms such as freedom, domination, peace, independence and liberty — what were called “sovereign rights and civil liberties” — were identified in research as in the political domain.⁷¹⁶ In the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage, such notions as freedom, domination, independence, autonomy, subjugation and slavery fit the political domain.

Symbols of Human Rights Discourse in the Print Media

Symbols and metaphors related to notions of freedom and captivity were prevalent in the print media. Through use of symbols such as the Berlin Wall and Biblical references to the exodus of people from an alien land, political repression was represented in the *New York Times* coverage as physical captivity.⁷¹⁷ In contrast, support of values of political freedom were represented in heroic terms of taking a “stand in the world,” “conviction” and “cause.”⁷¹⁸ Articles in the *Washington Post* used the same metaphor of the Berlin Wall and additional metaphors of the Iron Curtain and communism — and the “Soviet sphere of influence”⁷¹⁹ -- to symbolically position free nations opposite “slave nation(s).”⁷²⁰ The Berlin Wall was again used in *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage as a symbol of domination and slavery.⁷²¹ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was also explicitly identified as a “symbol of freedom.”⁷²² These symbols and metaphors were used in discussions of human rights to place notions of political freedom in opposition to political captivity. Communist domination and slavery were positioned opposite ideas of autonomy and freedom.

In discussions of linkages between human rights and foreign policy in the *New York Times* coverage, metaphors of negotiation were used for different approaches to foreign policy. On one side were the “practical, power-politics approach” and “security considerations,” while

⁷¹³ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

⁷¹⁴ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁷¹⁵ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁷¹⁶ October 10, 1976, ‘But He Might Have Said —’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section VI, p.4.

⁷¹⁷ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter Assails Ford on “Serious Blunder”’, *New York Times*, A18.

⁷¹⁸ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁷¹⁹ October 10, 1976, ‘But He Might Have Said —’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section VI, p.4.

⁷²⁰ October 8, 1976, ‘Carter and Ford Do Battle Over Eastern Europe Issue: U.S. Was Disgraced, Democrat Contends’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷²¹ October 8, 1976, ‘Furor on Ford Remark Grows’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁷²² October 7, 1976, Debate Heats Up over SALT Issue*, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

on the other side were taking a “stand in the world” and “principle.”⁷²³ Similarly, human rights were associated in the *Los Angeles Times* with the values of liberalism through discussions of the “relatively liberal U.S. economic policy toward poor nations” and descriptions of Carter’s proposed policies as “generally liberal.”⁷²⁴

A wide range of other symbols and metaphors also appeared in *Los Angeles Times* representations of human rights. Human rights were also associated with a number of values and emotions, including character, sensitivity and hope. Failure to support human rights aspirations was associated with disgrace and embarrassment. Additional metaphors in *New York Times* coverage described the debate over human rights in terms of weapons and battle, with Ford described as “under fire on the human-rights issues” and “on the defensive” and Carter “on the attack.”⁷²⁵ Congress was also described as wielding the “legislative club on human rights” with “their target détente with the Soviet Union.”⁷²⁶

The primary symbol of human rights in the *Washington Post* coverage came through the notion of violation of personal security. In an article on congressional calls for reports on international human rights, reference was made to “gross violation,” “violates,” “violating” and “violations.”⁷²⁷ Human rights were also represented in terms of progress and advancement of society if attention were given to positive values and issues of injustice.⁷²⁸

Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy in the Print Media

When general foreign policy issues were discussed in the *New York Times*, agency was assigned to the President and his administration, congress -- and to the American people through the influence of public opinion. Public opinion was represented as playing an important role in the incorporation of human rights concerns into foreign policy. Presidential candidates, such as Carter, placed human rights on the foreign policy agenda — as did congress through requiring certain standards of human rights to be met before allocation of foreign aid.

The *Washington Post* coverage similarly assigned agency in foreign policy to both congress and the executive branch. However, the president and his administration were clearly assigned a greater proportion of power in the making of foreign policy than in general foreign policy. The U.S. State Department was portrayed as playing a role through such activities as the preparation of reports on human rights and other policy issues.⁷²⁹ Personal contacts between leaders, such as the meeting between Ford and Brezhnev, were portrayed as significant. The newspaper reported on the Ford administration’s belief that quiet diplomacy between leaders was more important in foreign policy than loud protests, but coverage also acknowledged the role of presidential candidates such as Carter, in placing human rights on the foreign policy agenda. Congress was assigned agency in the incorporation of human

⁷²³ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁷²⁴ October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷²⁵ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁷²⁶ October 8, 1976, ‘Human-Rights and Morality Issue Runs Through Ford-Carter Debate’, *New York Times*, A19.

⁷²⁷ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

⁷²⁸ October 6, 1976, ‘Candidates’ Stands on Foreign Policy’, *Washington Post*, A8.

⁷²⁹ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

rights concerns into foreign policy because of actions to “cut foreign aid to countries violating human rights.”⁷³⁰

The *Los Angeles Times* assigned agency in foreign policy to the same groups as found in the other newspapers (the executive branch and congress). However, agency was also assigned to experts, such as consultants in national security.⁷³¹ Members of congress also had agency separately from congress through acting as advisors to the president and presidential candidates. Agency was also assigned to presidential candidates more explicitly than was found in the other newspapers. An analysis of the debate suggested that:

In the months since Carter emerged as the front running Democratic candidate. Ford and Kissinger have moved to pre-empt some of the earlier Carter positions — especially on U.S. relations with its allies, U.S. policy toward Africa and the Third World, and U.S. policy on the spread of the nuclear weapons.⁷³²

Concerning the question about the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy, it was found the coverage in the newspaper assigned agency to all the groups previously named, plus constituents — especially “ethnic voters,” including immigrants from Eastern Europe and “Catholic ethnic voters, to whom the issue appeals and from whom he [Ford] needs support”⁷³³ International agreements had also a small measure of influence in that the United States was portrayed as being bound by such agreements as the Helsinki accord.⁷³⁴

When foreign policy is considered on its own, the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage of the debate assigned agency to the executive branch and to congress. Carter’s concern that the general public was left out of the policy-making process was also extensively covered, as was Carter’s desire to “restore the involvement of Congress in foreign policy making.”⁷³⁵ The president and his administration, congress and the general public — especially ethnic voters, such as “Polish, Czech and German-Americans” -- were all assigned agency in the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy.⁷³⁶ Agency was also ascribed to presidential candidates — specifically Carter — and to the Democratic National Committee through its nationalities unit.⁷³⁷

Human Rights in Congress, 1976

The *Congressional Record* of 1976 classified discussions of human rights under the subject headings of human rights, civil rights and United Nations. Thus, any reference to human rights in congressional debate of 1976 was included in this study.

Congressional Definitions of Human Rights

Congressional discussions of human rights during this period centered on definitions of human rights in terms of civil and political liberties. Human rights were defined as a number of freedoms, including those of assembly, protest, opposition to government and undefined

⁷³⁰ October 4, 1976, ‘Hill Seeks Reports on Human Rights in 19 Countries’, *Washington Post*, A2.

⁷³¹ October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷³² October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷³³ October 6, 1976, ‘Debate Could Have Impact Around World’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷³⁴ October 10, 1976, ‘But He Might Have Said *Los Angeles Times*, Section VI, p.4.

⁷³⁵ October 7, 1976, ‘Debate Heats Up over SALT Issue’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1.

⁷³⁶ October 9, 1976, ‘Ford Urgently Tries To Clarify Europe Remarks’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁷³⁷ October 9, 1976, ‘Carter Attacks: Ford Explains’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, p.1

general freedoms. These undefined freedoms were interesting because, without specifying exactly what was meant, freedoms were still placed in such categories as civil and individual rights. Security of person was a specific human rights concern identified, specifically in the context of genocide and discussions of the genocide convention. Democracy was a central notion in defining human rights, as were ideas of equality, women's rights and social and economic rights.

Freedom was a central notion in much of congressional dialogue about human rights, whether explicitly or implicitly, such as through discussions of repression. Senator John B. Conlon of Arizona made one of the clearest statements regarding freedom when he declared that the:

Declaration of Independence tells us that freedom is an inalienable right of man, yet very few of the 5 or 6 billion men and women who have inhabited the earth have enjoyed it ... History seems to be the record of the long struggle between people to gain freedom and the state, dominated by the stronger element to rule over them.⁷³⁸

Less defined concepts of freedom and human rights included references to "human rights violations," the "cause of human rights," the "principle of human rights," "basic human rights for all people of every nation," and "human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."⁷³⁹ Rights and freedoms were defined in terms of "restrictions of civil liberties" and as limitation of "individual rights and responsibilities."⁷⁴⁰ Discussions of freedom of assembly, protest and opposition to government were focused on the events in Chile following the military junta taking power. Senator Edward Kennedy expressed deep concern about "arrests and expulsions" after Chileans spoke with United States congressmen who visited the country. He identified human rights violations as coming from the fact that the "very act of talking to a U.S. Congressman was cause for arbitrary arrest, mistreatment, and expulsion."⁷⁴¹ Senator James Abourezk used a similar definition of human rights when he argued against "crime against individuals who do no more than speak their conscience and argue peacefully for change."⁷⁴²

As mentioned earlier, security of person and genocide in particular, was a major concern for congress at this time and thus a primary definition of human rights. Senator William Proxmire called the "right to survival" the "most fundamental human right" and argued that the Genocide Convention was the only way to guarantee this "right to survival to all national, racial, religious, and ethnic groups."⁷⁴³ Proxmire further called the Genocide Convention America's "Commitment to Human Rights," thus clearly linking the two concepts.⁷⁴⁴ Genocide was defined as the "destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group."⁷⁴⁵ Other issues of security of person were related again to events in Chile, with Senator Kennedy presenting a list of rights violated by the junta, including "arbitrary arrest, arbitrary firing from jobs, exile within the country, and torture during interrogation."⁷⁴⁶

⁷³⁸ *Congressional Record: 1976*, Volume 122, 94th Congress, February 26 - September 27, pp.15004-15005.

⁷³⁹ *Congressional Record: 1976*, pp.11513, 32476, 34809, 32477.

⁷⁴⁰ *Congressional Record: 1976*, pp.4850, 5355.

⁷⁴¹ *Congressional Record: 1976*, p.11513.

⁷⁴² *Congressional Record: 1976*, pp.32476-32477.

⁷⁴³ *Congressional Record: 1976*, p.34809.

⁷⁴⁴ *Congressional Record: 1976*, p.34809.

⁷⁴⁵ *Congressional Record: 1976*, p.28756.

⁷⁴⁶ *Congressional Record: 1976*, p.11515.

The right to security of person was connected in congressional discourse to the notion of democracy as a right. Senator Abourezk made this connection explicit through his argument that “acts of violence are the ultimate attack against democracy and against legitimate democratic expression.”⁷⁴⁷ Senator Kennedy tied military power, banning of political parties and terror to a decline of democracy and therefore human rights in Chile.⁷⁴⁸

The idea of equality as an essential right ran through all of the above discussions of human rights. Senator Proxmire asserted that the ideas central to American history and its foundation were those “self-evident truths that all men are created equal, and are endowed with certain inalienable rights.”⁷⁴⁹ Equal rights for women was raised as another notion central to human rights by Ambassador Barbara White, United States Representative to the United Nations.⁷⁵⁰ In contrast, Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota expressed concern about bringing the attention of congress to rights other than those expressed in standard discussions of human rights by listing rights proposed under a new bill of rights put forward by Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., then executive director of the National Urban League. These included the “right to education, the right to economic security, the right to health, the right to family stability, the right to representation, and the right to safe communities.”⁷⁵¹

Human rights were defined in three other ways outside definitions in the UDHR. These definitions included the idea of human rights as a mark of civilization, as illustrated by references to the “civilized world” and condemnation of Nazi atrocities by “every civilized nation.”⁷⁵² Human rights were also discussed in terms of morality and capitalism. Senator John Conlon of Arizona presented a history lesson to the Senate on the development of moral values, the connection of these to Christianity and the interconnection of human rights, civilization, Christianity and capitalism. Starting his lecture from the pre-Biblical era, Conlon described how lawlessness ruled human interactions where the “strong... worked their will upon the weak” and slavery became rampant.⁷⁵³ He argued that “it is difficult to see how even a start toward civilization could be made until ethical and moral concepts were born in the minds of men.”⁷⁵⁴ This start was provided in his narrative by worship of God by Abraham and the establishment of the Ten Commandments by God. He suggested that “when men are governed by the spiritual ideals which we have come to call the moral law of God, there is self-discipline and self-restraint on the part of the strong, permitting the weak to enjoy freedom.”⁷⁵⁵ Having announced the principle that freedom can only exist with moral ideals, Conlon went on to outline his belief that human rights, Christianity and capitalism are intertwined and require each other for survival:

freedom in the marketplace...results in the maximum satisfaction of human needs and wants... Any tampering with it, any form of government control... results in less human satisfaction... It [abundant production in the West] was made possible by the

⁷⁴⁷ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.32477.

⁷⁴⁸ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.11515.

⁷⁴⁹ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.34809.

⁷⁵⁰ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.12417.

⁷⁵¹ “Toward New Human Rights”, a symposium at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, in *Congressional Record* 1976, p.32210.

⁷⁵² Senators Javits and Proxmire, *Congressional Record* 1976, pp.S3S6, 34809.

⁷⁵³ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.15004.

⁷⁵⁴ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.15004.

⁷⁵⁵ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.15005.

free market philosophy operated by men who were loyal to the moral law of God ... if we now become disloyal to that law and cease to follow the discipline flowing from it, the free market philosophy will break down and society will return to authoritarianism.⁷⁵⁶

His argument continued weaving together all these notions, suggesting that a decline in moral values had already led to the “decline of the market economy and the rise of statism, or the master and slave relationship we call communism, fascism, or a government managed economy.”⁷⁵⁷

Congressional Linkage of Human Rights and Foreign Policy

Human rights and foreign policy were explicitly linked in congressional dialogue during 1976 in a number of ways. Some of these linkages are in the domain of values, as shown by references to American traditions and values, conscience, moral duty and the notion that moral considerations should play a role in foreign policy. Other connections between the two appear in discussions of the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs -- where the need for world leadership, involvement in a world community and obligation to international treaties is contrasted with ideas of sovereignty and reluctance to become enmeshed in the affairs of other nations.

An American tradition of humanitarianism was particularly invoked in reference to discussions over ratification of the Genocide Convention. Senators of all political persuasions alluded to this tradition. Senator Kennedy cited a “long tradition of humanitarian concern...(for) the tragic excesses of war and civilian destruction.”⁷⁵⁸ Senator Jacob Javits expressed bewilderment as to why Americans would not want to support a “statement so in keeping with our national traditions and ideals... it is a very simple, strong declaration of principle to which I believe every American can assent.”⁷⁵⁹ Senator Proxmire talked about ‘Two hundred years’ commitment to the principles of human rights,” America’s long history of “uncompromising leadership in support of basic human rights for all people of all nations” and the “ideals of our Founding Fathers.”⁷⁶⁰ And Senator Abourezk argued that the convention was “in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States.”⁷⁶¹

Throughout these discussions an implication remained clear that conscience, moral duty and moral considerations were seen to have a role to play in foreign policy decisions — what Senator Kennedy called the responsibility to reduce “this burden of strife which continues to strike at man’s conscience” and to create what Representative Philip Crane described as “a world in which all men and women enjoyed the same rights that Americans have secured for themselves.”⁷⁶² A second clear implication here is that the United States was able to ensure human rights for its own citizens whereas other countries needed American guidance and support to achieve the same standards. American participation was presented as enabling the United States to “again assume the leadership role which it once maintained in the area of

⁷⁵⁶ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.15005.

⁷⁵⁷ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.15005.

⁷⁵⁸ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.4577.

⁷⁵⁹ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.5356.

⁷⁶⁰ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.34809.

⁷⁶¹ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.32477.

⁷⁶² *Congressional Record*: 1976, pp.4577, 4850.

human rights.”⁷⁶³ American leadership was suggested as important in order to “induce other nations to follow our lead and demonstrate their contempt for acts of genocide.”⁷⁶⁴

The appropriate role for the United States in the world was a major topic of discussion by congress because an answer to this question would also answer the question of the role to be played by human rights concerns in foreign policy. Senator Proxmire said the United States must ratify the Genocide Convention in order to become part of the “world community.”⁷⁶⁵ He also agreed with the U.S. Defense Department statement that ratification of the treaty was a “positive step in the national interest of our country.”⁷⁶⁶ Others argued that participation in international treaties would have a negative impact on domestic law and that other nations would use treaties, such as the Genocide Convention, to take action against the United States and individual American citizens in such cases as Vietnam prisoners of war and “our treatment of black Americans.”⁷⁶⁷ Senator Javits argued that these fears were unfounded and that “there is a note of fear behind most arguments — as if genocide were rampant in the United States and this Nation could not afford to have its actions examined by the international community.”⁷⁶⁸

Once congress had decided that human rights did have a role to play in foreign policy, attention turned to discussions of how this role could function. One of the most common ways to incorporate human rights concerns into foreign policy was through the use of economic and military sanctions to punish violations. Senators Kennedy and Abourezk particularly sought to link American military and economic aid with the human rights records of nations, such as Chile. Kennedy argued that “to continue to ship arms to the junta is to accord U.S. aid and support to the repressive practices of the military junta that now rules Chile.”⁷⁶⁹ Abourezk, addressing the Senate on behalf of Senators Patrick Leahy, Jacob Javits, George McGovern, Floyd Haskell, John Tunney and Gary Hart, called strongly for prohibition of “assistance of any land which is provided, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of Chile, by any department, agency or instrumentality of the United States Government”⁷⁷⁰

Congressional Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy

Congressional attribution of agency in foreign policy clearly reflected the complex relationship between the executive and congressional branches of government Congress allowed itself a great measure of agency in foreign policy — both by allusion to congressional power in general and by reference to specific powers of the House and Senate. Senator Proxmire’s passionate argument for ratification of the Genocide Convention outlined the need for world leadership, which had been “hindered too long by the inaction of the U.S. Senate.”⁷⁷¹ Similarly, discussions about linking international economic and other aid with a nation’s human rights record was largely attributed to the work of members of the Senate and

⁷⁶³ Senator Proxmire, *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.28756.

⁷⁶⁴ Senator Proxmire, *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.28756.

⁷⁶⁵ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.6688.

⁷⁶⁶ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.5429.

⁷⁶⁷ Senator Javits, *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.5356.

⁷⁶⁸ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.5356.

⁷⁶⁹ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.11515.

⁷⁷⁰ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.32477.

⁷⁷¹ *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.28756.

House. Specific members, such as Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser, received credit for “emphasizing the need to include human rights concerns in our foreign policy formations.”⁷⁷²

However, acknowledgment was made of the advisory role of congress in formulating resolutions that the president could, but was not required to, take into account in policy-making. The strong language of the resolution on terminating aid to Chile unless an improvement was seen in the human rights of the country was modified by the statement that the “United States *should* have no hesitancy in curtailing the amount of economic assistance we provide to that country” (italics added).⁷⁷³ Senator Kennedy also expressed frustration that senate statements on the issue “expressed four times in the past 2 years” were yet to become a law that the administration could not ignore.⁷⁷⁴ Similarly the role of the president is shown to be curtailed by the requirement for congressional approval. This is exemplified by the statement that, “27 years after President Truman transmitted the Genocide Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, it remains before us as pending business.”⁷⁷⁵

Thus, congressional discourse seems during this time to show an awareness of the boundaries and constraints of the system of checks and balances. The result of these checks and balances is constant negotiation of power in foreign policy between the executive and congressional branches.

The American Discourse of Human Rights in 1976

The print media in 1976 presented human rights in a narrower range of ways than did the newspapers in 1919 and 1945. Although a range of rights was discussed in the newspapers* coverage of the presidential debate, these rights could largely be classified as political rights, as those related to freedom (participation in government, individuals’ freedom from wrongful interference and from discrimination, freedom of movement, press and speech) and to notions of morality. In addition, Carter particularly drew attention to the rights of social security and food. Both presidential candidates talked about human rights as economic aspirations and discussed the provision of human rights as weapons in the right against communism. Definition of human rights in terms of progress and civilization was not pan of print media discussions at this time. However, these ideas remained prominent in congressional discussions of human rights, which also emphasized democracy as a specific way to provide political freedoms and civil liberties. Social and economic rights were specifically identified as being outside the normal range of human rights (in an argument suggesting that they should not be so).

In the print media a discourse is emerging that defines human rights primarily in terms of political freedom. This discourse derives its inspiration and guidance from moral ideals — especially the notion of universal standards of right and wrong. Human rights are depicted not only as “things-in-themselves,” but also as a way of battling first Bolshevism, then communism. Print media in 1919 and 1945 portrayed the provision of second generation rights, such as rights to social security and food, as part of the fight against subversive ideas. However, in 1976, coverage of presidential candidate Carter’s arguments by newspapers presented the idea that second-generation rights were as universal as first-generation political

⁷⁷² Senator Kennedy, *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.11513.

⁷⁷³ Senator Abourezk, *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.32476.

⁷⁷⁴ *Congressional Record*: 1976, Volume 122, p.11513.

⁷⁷⁵ Senator Proxmire, *Congressional Record*: 1976, p.34809.

and civil rights. In doing so, media discourse differed from congressional discourse that portrayed second-generation rights as subordinate to first-generation rights.

The discourse of congress that is emerging from the first three case studies is one that defines human rights as political and civil rights — ideally provided through establishment of democratic governments -- and in which provision of human rights is a mark of civilization and modernity. Human rights in congressional discourse are portrayed as the natural progression of history to a point of recognition of universal right -- an example of Stuart Hall's argument regarding the naturalization of ideology.

By 1976 it seemed largely accepted in newspaper coverage of foreign policy that human rights were appropriate considerations in foreign policy. Analysis of congressional discussions suggested that the role of human rights in foreign policy was still a matter for debate. It was found that ideas about values drove arguments for the inclusion of human rights in foreign policy. In common with the first two case studies, it was found that congress saw a tension existing between idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy and debated how best to negotiate the divergent requirements of idealism (defined as emphasis on the pre-eminence of human rights concerns) and pragmatism (defined as the pre-eminence of national interest). These tensions were also articulated in media coverage of foreign policy issues. However, American history, a tradition of humanitarianism, and American values were portrayed by the print media as driving United States concern for human rights. Congress added moral duty and the need for United States leadership in the world to this list, but for some members of congress, the fear remained that involvement in world affairs (especially participation in international human rights treaties) would damage national interest and ultimately lead to loss of sovereignty.

In 1989, fourteen years after the debate between presidential candidates Ford and Carter, President George Bush and congress faced the challenge of devising and articulating an appropriate response to the Chinese government's attack on students in Tiananmen Square. Analysis of print media coverage and congressional debate, as well as Bush's public responses to this event, will reveal developments in the American discourse of human rights and consistencies in this discourse studied across nearly one century of United States integration of human rights into foreign policy.

Chapter Six

The United States and China - Tiananmen, 1989: Case Study IV

“Pandas don’t shoot their young.”

State Department China Specialist, *New York Times*, June 10, 1989

The human rights stories of 1989 centered on the notion of civil liberty and definition of human rights in terms of security of person — understandable in that press coverage and congressional commentary were in response to brutal violations of civil rights in China. The central components of these stories were freedom of person -- speech, expression and association — and freedom of society ~ press and democracy. In common with many of the earlier human rights stories, the narrative linked human rights with modernity, progress, capitalism and civilization and linked violations of human rights with communism. Morality was seldom an explicit component of the narrative and instead was replaced by the concept of international standards of behavior -- both personal and national — such as restraint, responsibility and respect. Emotions, such as shame, outrage and disappointment, also played an important part in the narrative. Congressional stories of human rights also were those of civil rights and liberties provided through democracy and economic liberalization, but denied through communism. Congressional stories of human rights were presented in the format of a morality tale that depicted indignation at a disorder that violated norms of civilization and progress — and of American values.

In 1989 the president was seen by the press and by himself as a central narrator of foreign policy and human rights stories. The voice of congress was important but was overshadowed by that of the president and his administration. The print media drew narratives from a wide range of sources within the executive branch, but primarily from the U.S. Secretary of State and the U.S. State Department. Even former members of the executive branch, such as Henry Kissinger, were seen as narrators of foreign policy and of the role of human rights in foreign policy. By placing pressure on congress and the executive branch to act against China, the general public were assigned roles in narrating human rights stories. Across the cases studied, the voice of the public was strongest and seen to be the most influential in policy-making, in 1989. While congressional discourse portrayed congress as having an important role in the narratives of foreign policy and human rights, a significant proportion of the members actively argued for congress to assign greater agency to the executive branch and portrayed the prime narrator of foreign policy as being the president. The reason given for this was to allow the United States to present a single foreign policy and human rights story to China. Many members of congress expressed support of this movement to create and present a single narrative to the general public and to a world audience.

Tiananmen Square, June 4, 1989

The events of June 4, 1989, called the Tiananmen Square Massacre by some and the Tiananmen Incident by others, and often referred to simply as Tiananmen, is one of those historic moments that reverberated around the world, more so than many events because it was a human rights spectacle carried live on television into living rooms around the world. Therefore, it is hard to separate facts from emotion in any description of it. The events at Tiananmen are to many in the world community as the assassination of President Kennedy is

to the American psyche — a shocking interruption to everyday life. At the end of a decade of increasing openness in China and amid hope around the world that the Cold War era was finally over, the Chinese military attack on protesters in the square was a harsh reminder of the past. Perhaps because of the power of television images of individual protesters facing the military, bloody victims rushed to hospitals on handcarts and the famous lone man facing a tank, the world response was immediate. Not only did governments respond with condemnation and sanctions, but citizens around the world turned out to protest the actions of the Chinese government.

Exactly what did happen on that day has been debated by politicians, academics and members of the media. The debates have ranged from whom the exact perpetrators of the violence were to the number of deaths and even the reasons for the protests. Many Western media organizations had reporters in Beijing at the time or shortly thereafter, and a vast volume of reportage was generated — dramatic on-the-spot accounts based on observations and the flying rumors of a disaster zone. China historian Rafe de Crespigny concludes that:

Much of what was said and written at the time has since been questioned, and the Chinese government has done its utmost to confuse matters with stories of innocent, peace-loving soldiers attacked by a few vicious hooligans, but most of the outside world has accepted that the leadership of the People's Republic ordered its troops to open fire and crush an unarmed, albeit embarrassing, group of youthful protesters.⁷⁷⁶

Research for this dissertation did not seek to examine the events in Tiananmen Square but the responses to those events — and specifically American responses to the reports of brutal killings of protesters in Beijing by the Chinese military.

A further debate concerns the actual goals and intentions of the protests. As will be seen below in a discussion of discourse in U.S. newspapers and congress, the basic American assumption was that the protests were for democracy. This was implicit in the many references to “prodemocracy demonstrators.” China scholars at the time tried to explain that the protests in the main called for reform of the current system rather than democracy *per se*. However, many China scholars were presented by politicians and media as apologists for the Communist regime — something that few showed any sign of being. Historian W. J.F. Jenner argues that the problem is that:

The perpetrators of the Peking massacre of 1989 are so obviously tyrants of a most repulsive kind that we tend to assume that those they crushed were not only on the side of the angels but also serious about representative government. The problem about such assumptions is that the rhetoric of democracy in protest groups within China in 1989, and outside China among political exiles since the slaughter is rarely matched by democratic behaviour.⁷⁷⁷

Some confusion was generated for many Western observers by the fact that the protesters raised a replica Statue of Liberty as a symbol. However, de Crespigny argues that even with this:

⁷⁷⁶ Rafe de Crespigny, (1992), *China This Century*, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press), p.338.

⁷⁷⁷ W.J.F. Jenner, (1992), *The Tyranny of History: The Roots of China's Crisis*, (London: Penguin Books), p.190.

it is questionable.. if the people who rallied around such a symbol had any clear idea what it was that they were seeking to emulate or introduce. Though they raised substantial questions, the symbols of democracy were really no more than a general expression of political protest, they were not accompanied by any coherent programme for national reform, and their supporters ... had no means to develop such a programme.⁷⁷⁸

He goes on to conclude that the “affair at Tiananmen was simply a demonstration that went too far, and that the vast majority of those involved, despite good intentions, were primarily concerned with personal self-expression.”⁷⁷⁹ This is not to deny the tragedy of the events but merely to set the context within which American responses were formed. That is, the events in Tiananmen Square on June 4 and the following days were seen as the brutal crushing of popular protests for democracy by a totalitarian government. It is in this context that the discourses of human rights detailed below took place.

Human Rights in the Newspapers of 1989

The *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times* and the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* were studied from June 3 to 10, 1989. During this period the news of events in China was breaking in the United States. This week was selected for analysis because it encompassed most of the actual events in Tiananmen Square and the immediate aftermath. Large sections of major newspaper front pages and international news sections were devoted to China and to domestic and international responses to the events. Articles were selected on the basis of their primary focus on the United States response to the events rather than events. In general, the selected articles were analytical and editorial rather than descriptive. Due to the nature of the events in China, human rights were discussed in very concrete terms and usually in reference to civil and political rights rather than as abstract and general rights.

Defining Human Rights in the Print Media

Human rights were defined in the *New York Times* coverage almost entirely in terms of freedoms — of speech, expression, association and press — and of the right to security of person. These definitions encompassed discussions of democracy and unspecified civil and political rights. Other ways of talking about human rights outside the definitions in the UDHR included rights in the contexts of crime and the need for restraint and honesty on the part of a government. Human rights were also discussed in terms of modernity, capitalism and progress and contrasted with communism.

In the *Washington Post* coverage of the events in China, a definition of human rights within the realms of civil and political rights stood out. These rights were encompassed within the territory of freedom — such as the right to security of person and freedom from wrongful interference, rights of demonstration, rights to political representation and democracy, assembly and freedoms of speech and press. General freedoms and individual rights also fall within this territory. A wide range of other ways of defining human rights was also found in the coverage. Ideas related to the presence of international standards made up one group of definitions — such as notions of crime, disorder, restraint and responsibility. Human rights were also treated in terms of reform, anti-communism and as hope and aspirations.

⁷⁷⁸ de Crespigny, (1992), *China This Century*, pp.342-43.

⁷⁷⁹ de Crespigny, (1992), *China This Century*, p.343.

Human rights in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage of the events in Tiananmen Square were talked about entirely in terms of freedom — general freedoms, freedom of the press, assembly, security of person — and democracy and individual rights. In line with the newspaper coverage focus on democracy, other ways of talking about human rights positioned democracy as equaling peace, order, reform, progress and modernity and placed these opposite communism and disorder. Value definitions of human rights included ideas about hope, respect, restraint and the concept of shame for violating human rights.

Coverage in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* defined human rights very much as in the other newspapers examined. The idea of freedom dominated the way coverage talked about human rights -- freedom of assembly, individual rights, right to security of person and democracy. Other ways of defining rights included the legitimization of democracy and the positioning of stability, reform and progress opposite totalitarianism and disorder. Human rights were also talked about in negative terms of outrage and disappointment.

Security of Person

The right to security of person was identified as a primary human right by articles in the *New York Times* through representations of military actions in the Square as inappropriate, unjustified and deserving of international opprobrium. The central components of the violation of this right identified in the coverage were the use of force against protesters, the use of the military against a nation's own citizens and the fact that the protesters were peaceful and unarmed. The first component was illustrated through use of terms such as "brutality"; "tanks used to attack pro-democracy demonstrators"; "bloodshed"; "slaughterers"; the "crackdown" and the "killings in Beijing"; "Overwhelming firepower and ruthlessness... stem savagery"; the "weekend of bloodshed"; a "violent and bloody attack on the demonstrators"; and "savage crackdown... bloody repression."⁷⁸⁰ The use of the Chinese military against Chinese citizens was presented as an especially blatant violation of the right to security of person. Marlin Fitzwater, White House spokesman, presented the situation as being that the "Government has murdered many, many of its own citizens."⁷⁸¹ Other articles referred to the "army assault on the central square"; the notion that "Chinese should not kill Chinese"; a "murderous army assault on the demonstrating students" and what Secretary of State James Baker described as the "army of the people... used to suppress the people."⁷⁸²

The right to security of person and protection from wrongful interference was similarly one of the crucial rights identified in the *Washington Post* coverage of events in China. This right was also illustrated through the use of such negative words and phrases as "excessive force,"

⁷⁸⁰ June 4, 1989, 'President Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups', *New York Times*, p.21; June 5, 1989, 'The West Condemns the Crackdown', *New York Times*, A12; June 5, 1989, 'Administration Ponders Steps on China', *New York Times*, A12; June 5, 1989, 'Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood', *New York Times*, A16; June 6, 1989, 'President Spurns Other Sanctions: Doesn't Want "a Total Break in Relations," He Declares', *New York Times*, A1; June 6, 1989, 'Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush's News Session', *New York Times*, A15 and June 9, 1989, 'Bush Bars Normal Ties Now: Beijing is Warned - President Says Relations Depend on Its Stance Toward Students', *New York Times*, A1.

⁷⁸¹ June 10, 1989, 'A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing', *New York Times*, p.5.

⁷⁸² June 10, 1989, 'Moynihan Jeered at China Protest: Booed by Crowd After March in Chinatown Mourning Slain Beijing Students', *New York Times*, p.6; June 6, 1989, 'Forceful Not Frantic, About China', *New York Times*, A30 and June 4, 1989, 'Resident Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups', *New York Times*, p.21

“brutality,” “escalating violence,” “violent crackdown,” “the violence,” “wanton slaughter,” “loss of life,” “bloodshed,” “death, violence, killing,” “the crackdown and the slaughter,” “further repression and brutality,” the “massacre... in which hundreds of demonstrators were killed” and “murder.”⁷⁸³

Similar to coverage in the *New York Times*, that in the *Washington Post* presented the violation of the right to security of person by one’s own government and military as a particularly egregious violation of human rights. In one article this aspect is highlighted through multiple references to “use of ‘excessive force’ by Chinese authorities”; “a country that is shooting its own people”; the “government’s ... use of force against the demonstrators” and the “violent crackdown by Chinese authorities.”⁷⁸⁴ Each article read about the events in China that week similarly repeatedly linked the notion of security of person with the responsibilities of the government and military. In an editorial headlined “Massacre in China,” this aspect of violation of rights by a government is shown to be of particular concern in the way human rights are identified and talked about. This is illustrated by the description of a “cynical and panicked Chinese leadership” responding “in a classic struggle of people against brute power*” and the conclusion that the events were “a massacre by a failed party reduced to ruling by force alone.”⁷⁸⁵ Another article reported President Bush’s concern with the “sensitive issue of whether the military should be used as an instrument of political repression.”⁷⁸⁶

Definitions of human rights as security of person dominated discussions in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage. The most frequent term for the events in China and the denial of these rights was repression — repression of “political and economic reforms”; “Violent repression of freedoms”; the headline “Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression” over a description of a “brutal and repressive regime” ; “brutal repression” and Beijing’s “repression against the students.”⁷⁸⁷ Making it clear that human rights defined as security of person and freedom had been denied — indeed taken away — from Chinese citizens, an editorial concluded that:

In the end, the old men who cling to power in China could think of no better way to deal with six weeks of popular clamor for change than by ordering the army to turn its machine guns and tanks against the protesters... A divided regime answered them first with patronizing equivocation, then with threats, finally with brutal repression ... For now, obviously the hardliners have carried the day, invoking vicious, relentless and shameful force in an effort to reassert unquestioned control.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸³ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A 1; June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10; June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A24; June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Suspends Military Sales to China: President Rejects Calls From Congress for More Severe Action’, *Washington Post*, A 1; June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China, *Washington Post*, A22; June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: Resident Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A 1; June 10, 1989, ‘White House Condemns China “Murder”: Administration’s Criticism Intensifies but Is Not Directed at Deng’, *Washington Post*, A14.

⁷⁸⁴ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A 1.

⁷⁸⁵ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10.

⁷⁸⁶ June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China, *Washington Post*, A22.

⁷⁸⁷ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section n, p.6 and June 10, 1989, ‘U.S. Calls Reprisals Against Dissident Leaders Repugnant’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁷⁸⁸ June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section n , p.6.

Similar to coverage in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, the emphasis here was on the fact that the government and army had moved against their own citizens — and especially against students. This “turning its guns against the people” was portrayed as the ultimate repression — called the reaffirmation of “Mao Tse-tung’s dictum that power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”⁷⁸⁹

Given the circumstances of the events in China, rights to security of person and the association of this with freedom of assembly were also central to definitions of human rights in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*. Lack of security of person was illustrated by “Chinese troops storming the square in Beijing” and the “bloody suppression of prodemocracy demonstrators.”⁷⁹⁰ Emphasis was again on the role of the military in references to the army’s moves to “clear Tiananmen Square” and the statement that “Chinese troops swept through Beijing.”⁷⁹¹ As in other newspapers, the protests were identified as for democracy — “students... agitating for democracy.”⁷⁹² Individual rights were also included in definitions of rights, as shown by the statement of a professor at Louisiana State University that ‘I have the right to urge our government to do something.’⁷⁹³ Greater emphasis than in the other newspapers was on local reactions to events in China through commentary from a number of locally based Chinese academics.

Freedom (Speech, Association, Press)

The notion of the freedoms of speech and assembly as a right were closely associated in *New York Times* coverage of this event with the right to security of person because all these rights were seen to be violated when the protests were crushed in Tiananmen Square. Dominating discussions of rights were the images of “unarmed, idealistic Chinese students,” “peaceful student demonstrators,” “innocent civilians” and “popular and peaceful demonstrations” — that is, citizens gathering to express opinions.⁷⁹⁴ More explicit identification of human rights as including speech and assembly came in such statements as George Bush’s declaration that the “demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were advocating basic human rights, including the freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association.”⁷⁹⁵ Bush’s statement regarding the “validity of the students’ aspirations” further implicitly identified speech and assembly as human rights.⁷⁹⁶

Freedom of the press was identified as a basic human right in the *New York Times* coverage of events. In addition to Bush’s comments, freedom of the press was dealt with in the specific case of Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts to China. These broadcasts were portrayed as

⁷⁸⁹ June 10, 1989, ‘Not by Guns Alone’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section H, p.8.

⁷⁹⁰ June 4, 1989, ‘N.O. Chinese plead for Bush to step in’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A4 and June 5, 1989, ‘Stronger U.S. stand demanded’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁷⁹¹ June 6, 1989, ‘Army units dash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1 and June 9, 1989, ‘Bush calls on China to end bloodshed’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁷⁹² June 9, 1989, ‘Bush calls on China to end bloodshed’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁷⁹³ June 4, 1989, ‘N.O. Chinese plead for Bush to step in’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A4.

⁷⁹⁴ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16; June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’, *New York Times*, p.5 and June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office – Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁷⁹⁵ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office – Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁷⁹⁶ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bars Normal Ties Now: Beijing is Warned - President Says Relations Depend on Its Stance Toward Students’, *New York Times*, A1.

important in transmitting accurate information to the Chinese military — what Richard Carson, VOA director called making “available to the Chinese military information about what is going on in China.”⁷⁹⁷ They were also presented as important because VOA Chinese-language broadcasts had been jammed, and the “Chinese media have been very dishonest about the student demonstrations and the role of the military.”⁷⁹⁸ Thus, freedom of the press was not only identified as a right; American media sources were portrayed as involved in securing that right for the Chinese people.

Implicit in descriptions of government brutality is definition of freedoms of speech and assembly as rights that were violated through failure to provide protection from wrongful interference. It is often difficult in news coverage to pull apart the different components of any definition of human rights. In this case, the rights to security of person, freedom from wrongful interference and freedoms of speech and assembly are intertwined in the ways the *Washington Post* reported on and editorialized about human rights. The notions of individual rights and freedom of the press — both rights specifically identified by President Bush in his public responses to the events in China -- are likewise interwoven throughout the discourse.⁷⁹⁹ In addition, phrases such as the “struggle for freedom,” identify freedom as a right without breaking it into its component parts.⁸⁰⁰

General notions of freedom —that is, undefined uses of the term or uses of it without application to specific freedoms — appeared widely in the *Los Angeles Times*. These uses included such phrases as the “struggle for freedom,” “repression of freedoms” and “calls for a freer society.”⁸⁰¹ More specific discussions of freedom referred to freedom of assembly and security of person as well as press freedom, although the former received more emphasis than the latter. Freedom of the press was mentioned only briefly, in a description of “calls for a freer press.”⁸⁰² Likewise, individual rights received brief attention, mainly from reporting President Bush’s assertion that the rights of individuals must be recognized and his statement that “I view the life of every single student as important.”⁸⁰³

Democracy

In addition to describing protesters as unarmed and peaceful, the majority of news coverage and commentary in the *New York Times* referred to the demonstrators as “pro- democracy.” Thus democracy was clearly linked to other rights described as basic or essential. The demonstrations were described as “a peaceful statement in favor of democracy” and referred to as the “Chinese democracy movement.”⁸⁰⁴ President Bush linked “freedom, democracy,

⁷⁹⁷ June 9, 1989, ‘Voice of America Beams TV Signals to China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁷⁹⁸ Richard Carson, June 9, 1989, ‘Voice of America Beams TV Signals to China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁷⁹⁹ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A 1.

⁸⁰⁰ June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A24

⁸⁰¹ June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality*, *Los Angeles Times*, Section n , p.6.

⁸⁰² June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section n, p.6.

⁸⁰³ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Rejects China Curbs, Urges Respect for Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁰⁴ June 4, 1989, ‘President Assails Shootings in China- Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups*, *New York Times*, p.21 and June 5, 1989, ‘The West Condemns the Crackdown’, *New York Times*, A12.

respect, nonviolence” as essential rights and as ways for a government to treat its own people.⁸⁰⁵

Democracy was seldom itself defined in *Washington Post* coverage, but the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square were inextricably tied to a perceived desire for democracy on the part of the Chinese and this was treated as a fundamental right of people. The words “demonstrators” and “prodemocracy” appeared together many times, and other references included such phrases as a “hunger for democracy,” “students and workers asking for democracy” and the “Victims and their demands for democracy.”⁸⁰⁶ In no case was democracy identified as a human right, but the linkage was implicit that a desire for democracy was an universal value and that it was a right being denied to the citizens of China.

Los Angeles Times articles referred to the “pro-democracy protesters,” “prodemocracy forces in China,” “pro-democracy demonstrators,” “pro-democracy movement,” the “student-led movement for democracy” and the “student democracy movement.”⁸⁰⁷ President Bush in particular emphasized democracy as the goal of the protests with his calls to work for “restraint and for human rights and for democracy” and his assertion that the “forces of democracy are going to overcome these unfortunate events in Tian An Men Square.”⁸⁰⁸ The editorial concluded that “[i]n China, now as before, there is no real political alternative to the party.”⁸⁰⁹

Undefined Political and Civil Rights

Unspecified civil and political rights were also part of the definitions of human rights used in the *New York Times* coverage of events in China. A spokesperson from Freedom House talked about “Violations of political rights and civil liberties” without elaboration.⁸¹⁰ Senator Jesse Helms cited China’s “historic repression of human rights.”⁸¹¹ Both Helms and Representative Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma described Chinese citizens’ yearnings for what Edwards called the “same freedoms we in the West take for granted.”⁸¹²

Standards of Behavior

The notion of violation of human rights as a crime against people and society was important in *New York Times* coverage of events in China. Identifying violation of rights as a crime implies that certain standards have been established that must be met by a society. Thus, what

⁸⁰⁵ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁸⁰⁶ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10 and June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China’, *Washington Post*, A22

⁸⁰⁷ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; June 4, 1989, ‘Crowd in L.A. Urges End to Beijing Bloodshed’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12; June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1; June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Rejects China Curbs, Urges Respect for Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and June 10, 1989, ‘Thousands Rally to Cries of “Shame”’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁸⁰⁸ June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1

⁸⁰⁹ June 10, 1989, ‘Not by Guns Alone’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section H, p.8.

⁸¹⁰ June 4, 1989, ‘President Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups’, *New York Times*, p.21.

⁸¹¹ June 4, 1989, ‘President Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups’, *New York Times*, p.21.

⁸¹² June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12.

is identified as having constituted criminal behavior is important in studying notions of human rights. As discussed above, one of the criminal behaviors identified in this newspaper was government use of violence against its own people. Under the headline “Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood,” editorial comments clearly laid this crime at the feet of Deng Xiaoping.⁸¹³ The same editorial also referred to the crimes of the Soviet Union and Nicaragua in violating human rights.

One of the standards portrayed as transgressed by the Chinese government in *New York Times* coverage was restraint. President Bush repeatedly urged a policy of restraint and “mutual restraint, nonviolence and dialogue” on the part of the government.⁸¹⁴ At other times, Bush talked about the driver of a tank as having exercised restraint; having seen “some exercising restraint” on the part of the protesters; calling for the government and protesters to “continue to show the restraint that many of you have shown”; arguing that “the army did show restraint... and they showed restraint for a long time; and calling for people to “continue to work for restraint and for human rights and for democracy.”⁸¹⁵ Bush’s emphasis on restraint was echoed in other *New York Times* coverage, including an article listing military units sympathetic to the students who refused to shoot at students and to units that obeyed orders.⁸¹⁶ Affiliated with the idea of restraint was the notion that a government should be honest with its citizens, including not attempting to cover up violations of human rights.⁸¹⁷

The existence of international standards of behavior was an important concept to some of the other ways in which human rights were defined in the *Washington Post* coverage. Standards were outlined explicitly in the reporting of President Bush’s statements about “norms of behavior that are accepted internationally in terms of armed people don’t shoot down unarmed students.”⁸¹⁸ An editorial also referred to the “reasonable standard” of nonviolence and restraint that the government failed to meet.⁸¹⁹ Implicit acknowledgment of standards came through the use of value-laden terms, such as “outrage” and “unacceptable,” to describe the events in China.⁸²⁰ Identification of the acts of the Chinese government as crimes also implicitly defined human rights as international standards or norms of behavior, as did discussions of disorder, responsibility and restraint — all terms from the domain of morality and therefore value-laden. Violations of human rights were linked with disorder — the “abyss of terror, spreading unrest or even incipient civil war,” or what was identified as “ugly and anachronistic” compared with “nonviolence and restraint.”⁸²¹ Human rights were additionally

⁸¹³ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Denies His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16; June 10, 1989.

⁸¹⁴ June 6, 1989, ‘President Spurns Other Sanctions: Doesn’t Want “a Total Break in Relations,” He Declares’, *New York Times*, A 1

⁸¹⁵ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁸¹⁶ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bars Normal lie s Now: Beijing is Warned - President Says Relations Depend on Its Stance Toward Students’, *New York Times*, A 1.

⁸¹⁷ June 9, 1989, ‘Voice of America Beams TV Signals to China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁸¹⁸ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A 1.

⁸¹⁹ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10.

⁸²⁰ June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A24.

⁸²¹ June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China’, *Washington Post*, A22 and June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’. *Washington Post*, A10.

associated with the notion of responsibility by discussions of “responsible elements” and the editorial statement that “a road back to responsibility remains open.”⁸²²

Definitions of human rights in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage also appeared in value terms, using the concepts of shame, respect restraint and the idea of hope — ideas related to the existence of standards of behavior. Editorial and news articles presented the argument that the government in China ought to feel ashamed of its actions because of its use of “vicious, relentless and shameful force” in what was called a “morally odious action.”⁸²³ Other terms, such as “outrageous” and “appalled,” emphasized the notion of shame.⁸²⁴ The idea of shame was contrasted with the notion of respect — in phrases such as calls to “respect the rights of the student protesters,” “respecting the urge for democracy” and “respect for the rights of those who disagree.”⁸²⁵ Shame was also contrasted with the ideas of restraint — especially as emphasized in the public statements of President Bush — and of upholding the “hopes and aspirations” of citizens.⁸²⁶

Violations of human rights were also discussed by the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* in terms of emotions — outrage (suggesting an agreed-upon standard of behavior), events “followed in horror by people around the world” and reports of President Bush’s disappointment in “the course of events since he visited China in February.”⁸²⁷

Reform and Anti-Communism

New York Times coverage linked support of human rights values with democracy and linked violations of human rights with Communism. Tied to this was the argument that human rights, and especially democracy, were inherently linked with the values of modernity, capitalism and progress. One editorial made this connection clearly, saying, “Economic opening brought increased contact with the outside world and nurtured yearnings for democratic reform as well... Mr. Deng has defiled his reputation and 10 years of leading the way to an educated, modernized China.”⁸²⁸ This same editorial argued that democracy was the “necessary political corollary of his [Deng’s] economic plans.”⁸²⁹ President Bush made a similar argument, saying that “as people have commercial incentive, whether it’s in China or in other totalitarian systems, the move toward democracy becomes more inexorable.”⁸³⁰

This linkage of human rights with progress and modernity was pervasive. Representative Stephen Solarz described Deng as the “butcher of Beijing” in contrast to his previously expressed opinion of him as a leader “who might have gone down in history as a

⁸²² June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China, *Washington Post*, A22.

⁸²³ June 4, 1989, ‘Crowd in L.A. Urges End to Beijing Bloodshed’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12 and June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section 0, p.6.

⁸²⁴ June 10, 1989, ‘Thousands Rally to Cries of “Shame”’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁸²⁵ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Rejects China Curbs, Urges Respect for Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸²⁶ Mayor Richard M. Daley of Chicago in June 10, 1989, ‘Thousands Rally to Cries of “Shame”’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁸²⁷ June 5, 1989, ‘Stronger U.S. stand demanded’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1; June 6, 1989, ‘Army units clash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1 and June 9, 1989, ‘Bush calls on China to end bloodshed’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1

⁸²⁸ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16; June 10, 1989.

⁸²⁹ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16; June 10, 1989.

⁸³⁰ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

modernizer.”⁸³¹ Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney lamented that Deng had presided over the attacks on students, saying that Deng had “been the advocate of reform; the man who really was aggressively pursuing the modernization of China.”⁸³² An unidentified analyst argued that “there will be change. The demands made on the system and its leaders cannot be met with an authoritarian regime. China will have to be put back together in a new way.”⁸³³ Another article reported on banners carried by student protesters in New York that read “China [,] do not kill your future,” implying derailment of progress toward modernization.⁸³⁴

The *Washington Post* coverage of events in China also identified human rights with reform and the nation’s move away from communism. George Bush talked about returning to the “path of political and economic reform and conditions of stability,” and this was echoed in an editorial describing pre-Tiananmen China as “edging from a generally successful, party-directed economic reform into a careful and also party-directed experiment with mild political reform.”⁸³⁵ Senator Jesse Helms emphasized that the attacks were ordered by the “communist Government of China,” and Trade Representative Carla Hills voiced her opinion that “people have... tremendous doubts about their earlier stated opinions with respect to China’s forward momentum, its liberalization.”⁸³⁶ James Baker also talked about China’s “tragic step backward.”⁸³⁷ Human rights were also tied to the ideals and hopes of people aspiring to more freedom.⁸³⁸

Alongside citing democracy as central to the definition of human rights, the *Los Angeles Times* coverage closely tied a number of other definitions of human rights to the notion of democracy. Democracy was equated with peace, order, reform, progress and modernity and positioned opposite communism and disorder. The terms democracy and human rights were often used as two sides of the same coin.⁸³⁹ In contrast, communism was portrayed as the opposite of the values and ideals of democracy. Senator Jesse Helms made the clearest distinction between the two sides, saying that there existed “division in this world, communism and freedom” and continuing, “You cannot deal with rattlesnakes, and you cannot deal with Communist governments.”⁸⁴⁰

One example of the way democracy was tied to the notions mentioned above was the already mentioned identification of the protests with pursuit of democracy -- although one editorial conceded that it was “something of an overstatement to describe the Beijing protests as ‘pro-

⁸³¹ June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’, *New York Times*, p.5.

⁸³² June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’, *New York Times*, p.5

⁸³³ June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’, *New York Times*, p.5

⁸³⁴ June 10, 1989, ‘Moynihan Jeered at China Protest: Booed by Crowd After March in Chinatown Mourning Slain Beijing Students’, *New York Times*, p.6.

⁸³⁵ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A1 and June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10.

⁸³⁶ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A1 and June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Suspends Military Sales to China: President Rejects Calls From Congress for More Severe Action’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁸³⁷ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁸³⁸ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁸³⁹ See the comments of Congressman Solan in June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁴⁰ June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

democracy.’ But unmistakably they were pro-freedom.”⁸⁴¹ Coverage also identified popular calls for reform.⁸⁴² Commentary in the newspaper further identified the purposes of the protests as being “only modest legal and political reform s... triggered by frustration and anger over economic and political conditions”; there were “calls for a freer press, for curbs on rampant official corruption and nepotism, for the regime to pay more attention to what the students and the masses want.”⁸⁴³ Thus, reform was implicitly tied to democracy in commentary on the events. More explicit linkages were made in an editorial that argued that “economic growth and modernization” were needed and that “economic subsistence is no longer accepted as enough, neither is a political and intellectual life limited by totalitarian proscriptions.”⁸⁴⁴ The opposite of growth and modernization was portrayed as “crippling state controls” of a “hard-line Communist government”⁸⁴⁵

Violations of human rights were laid squarely at the feet of an “aging circle of communist imperialists,” by writers for the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*.⁸⁴⁶ Democracy was positioned opposite totalitarianism — called “terror-enforced ideology” and “tyranny” versus democracy, power-sharing, “sensitivity to the public” and other reforms.⁸⁴⁷ Similarly, stability, restraint and reform were positioned opposite a “chaotic situation.”⁸⁴⁸

Linkages Between Human Rights and Foreign Policy in the Print Media

All of the newspapers studied connected human rights to foreign policy in a number of ways. In all of the coverage, a tension was portrayed as existing between idealism and pragmatism in the incorporation of human rights into foreign policy. Discussions of this tension asked the question of where the line can be drawn between the idealism of human rights morality and the pragmatism of everyday international relations. However, a broad consensus existed in print media coverage of the events in Tiananmen Square that human rights concerns were a valid part of foreign policy; that governments (particularly the United States government) have a responsibility to respond to other countries’ violations of human rights — the world community needs to pay attention, and respond, to events taking place in other countries; that the United States relationship with other countries is, or needs to be, based on each nations’ adherence to standards of human rights; and that human rights are preeminent in international relations — and override concerns about sovereignty.

New York Times coverage contained these notions under the overarching concept of responsibility. Firstly, the idea was presented that governments and their leaders have responsibilities to each other and to a world community to pay attention, and respond, to events taking place in other countries. This responsibility was manifested through condemning what were perceived as inappropriate actions on the part of another government. Basing policy decisions on the human rights record of a country was portrayed as another way this responsibility could be manifested — whether through traditional diplomatic actions or economic and military sanctions. This idea existed in The idea of sovereignty undermines

⁸⁴¹ June 10, 1989, ‘Not by Guns Alone’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section H, p.8.

⁸⁴² June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1

⁸⁴³ June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section II, p.6.

⁸⁴⁴ June 10, 1989, ‘Not by Guns Alone’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section n, p.8.

⁸⁴⁵ June 10, 1989, ‘Not by Guns Alone’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section n, p.8 and June 10, 1989, ‘Thousands Rally to Cries of “Shame”’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁸⁴⁶ June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times Picayune*, B10.

⁸⁴⁷ June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

⁸⁴⁸ June 6, 1989, ‘Army units clash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

this idea of international responsibility while that of the existence of international standards underlines it.

Although the *Washington Post* coverage also stressed the tension between idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy, it focused much more on justification of the role of human rights in foreign policy. Three separate but related ideas were identified in the news coverage and editorial comments. One was that foreign policy should be made on the basis of the human rights record of a nation. Related to this was the idea that the United States' relationship with a country should be dependent on that country's human rights record. Also associated with these ideas was the notion that human rights should take precedence over discussion of other issues in international situations.

The *Los Angeles Times* coverage of events in China emphasized three sets of linkages between human rights and foreign policy. The first was the same as found in other newspapers — tension between idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy. The second concerned the idea of international standards and individual nation's responsibility to live up to and support those standards. The final set of ideas related to the notions that the relationship between the United States and China was based on adherence to certain standards of human rights and that American foreign policy should respond to violations of these rights.

Attention in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage focused on the propositions that the Sino-American relationship was dependent on human rights standards; that foreign policy decisions should be made in response to human rights conditions in other countries and that tensions existed between idealism and pragmatism in the implementation of the previous two propositions. However, attention also focused on two further ideas — that human rights concerns override sovereignty and, linked with this, that a world community exists, the members of which have the responsibility to intervene in situations where human rights are being violated.

Before discussing these ideas (which are all closely related to each other and in many cases difficult to separate), the tension between idealism and pragmatism in foreign policy needs attention. The tension emerged from establishment of the situation in China as requiring response — but a cautious rather than “precipitous” response.⁸⁴⁹ Differences existed in the *New York Times* coverage between perceptions of the goal of different American actions in response to the events in Tiananmen Square. President Bush and his administration saw the goal as being to “encourage” the Chinese government to exercise restraint in dealing with the students and “rebuking any use of force,” while congress saw the role of sanctions as being to “punish Beijing.”⁸⁵⁰ While there appeared to be consensus that international standards did exist and that morality had a role to play in foreign policy decisions, differences existed as to how to incorporate idealism into foreign policy and whether this served the best interests of the United States. An editorial outlined the role of morality in foreign policy, declaring that “America's conscience cries out... It would unconscionably contort America's principles to

⁸⁴⁹ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁸⁵⁰ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush's News Session’, *New York Times*, A1S and June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12.

continue business as usual with an unstable leadership which has so discredited and disabled itself.” The editorial added a description of American feelings as “revulsion.”⁸⁵¹

Among those who opposed excessive reliance on moral outrage in foreign policy was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — the master of Realpolitik — whom the *New York Times* reported as having “warned that the President and Secretary of State ‘cannot afford emotional outbursts’ in the present situation. The United States must be very careful about entering a diplomatic ‘antagonism’ with China that could give the Soviet Union a ‘free ride’ in influence in Asia.”⁸⁵² An editorial gave similar advice, but for slightly different reasons, warning that “conditions in China are too fluid to support impulsive policy lurches. The most prudent course is to suspend official cooperation until the political situation sorts out.”⁸⁵³ However, the editorial also warned against inaction because the United States might become associated, “in the eyes of the next generation of Chinese leaders, with Mr. Deng’s crimes.”⁸⁵⁴ President Bush clearly wanted to avoid making decisions based on emotions that did not take into account the United States’ long term interests — which many commentators saw as staying engaged with China. He argued forcefully that:

I want to see us stay involved and continue to work for restraint and for human rights and for democracy. And then down the road, we have enormous commonality of interest with China, but it will not be the same under a brutal and repressive regime... So I would argue with those who want to do something more flamboyant, because I happen to feel that this relationship is vital to the United States of America...⁸⁵⁵

Congress in most cases wanted a tough U.S. stance toward China — a stance tougher than Bush was willing to take. An article described the “pressure which was mounting in congress from both liberals and conservatives for a firm American reaction on behalf of the student ‘pro-democracy’ movement” and “Congressional calls for more severe penalties.”⁸⁵⁶ A *New York Times* editorial supported Bush, arguing the “best way to honor the martyred students, and their survivors, is not to turn America’s back self-righteously on China’s convulsions.”⁸⁵⁷ The conclusion was that Bush and his administration seemingly believed that the correct balance between idealism and pragmatism had been reached, since, “If those favoring change succeed, they will remember the Bush Administration for having materially and verbally demonstrated support. But until then, a crack in the door has been left to the existing leadership to signal if they moderate their behavior, some measure of good relations can be maintained.”⁸⁵⁸

⁸⁵¹ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16.

⁸⁵² June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁸⁵³ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16.

⁸⁵⁴ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16.

⁸⁵⁵ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁸⁵⁶ June 6, 1989, ‘President Spurns Other Sanctions: Doesn’t Want “a Total Break in Relations,” He Declares’, *New York Times*, A1.

⁸⁵⁷ June 6, 1989, ‘Forceful Not Frantic, About China’, *New York Times*, A30.

⁸⁵⁸ June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’, *New York Times*, p.5.

The situation in China was presented in *Washington Post* news coverage as one that required choices between different responses — what one article called the “difficult choice the U.S. government faces.”⁸⁵⁹ This same article described these choices: “While it supports pro-democracy efforts, the government through a succession of administrations has worked to promote improved Sino-American relations that Bush ... would not want to see fall apart on his watch.”⁸⁶⁰ Editorial commentary noted that “Americans find themselves hard put to define a policy that expresses the new outrage as well as the factor of national interest built up laboriously over the years.”⁸⁶¹ The idea of productivity is useful for understanding the pragmatic viewpoint — that it seemed foolish to waste what was called the “major American investment in political and strategic cooperation with China.”⁸⁶² Both President Bush and Republican Senator Warren Rudman (N.H.) termed what they deemed as excessive reaction “counterproductive.”⁸⁶³

The position of the idealists as represented in the *Los Angeles Times* was that the United States should take immediate “stem action” and that “sanctions against China were necessary if only for their symbolic action.”⁸⁶⁴ The position of the pragmatists (such as Henry Kissinger) was that a relationship with China was needed to balance the influence of the Soviet Union in Asia. A further concern of the pragmatists was that even so-called “punitive sanctions... held out little hope that such action would force a halt to the crackdown.”⁸⁶⁵ President Bush’s concern about maintaining a link with China was represented as his “seeking to walk a narrow line between his support of the demonstrating students and his desire to maintain relations with the government of the world’s most populous nation.”⁸⁶⁶ Both the idealist position (held generally within congress) and the pragmatist position (held by Bush and several so-called China experts) were extensively represented in the *Los Angeles Times’* news and editorial coverage.⁸⁶⁷

As in the other newspapers in this study, the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage made clear that, while human rights concerns were seen as playing a valid role in foreign policy, tension did exist in the implementation of morally-based policy. The position of so-called foreign policy pragmatists was represented through such terms as “cautious,” “diplomatic,” “careful,” “calm,” “stable”; on the other hand, calls by the idealists for a stronger United States response were called “emotional,” “abrupt” and “precipitous.”⁸⁶⁸ The editorial stance was that “cautious sympathy” was the best approach since “a less threatened tyranny is a less dangerous tyranny, at least as far as military threats go.”⁸⁶⁹ The editorial stance also endorsed Bush’s approach of America looking to “its own interest as well as that of a champion of democracy.”⁸⁷⁰

⁸⁵⁹ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A 1.

⁸⁶⁰ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A 1.

⁸⁶¹ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10.

⁸⁶² June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China’, *Washington Post*, A22.

⁸⁶³ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10 and June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁸⁶⁴ June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁶⁵ June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁶⁶ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Rejects China Curbs, Urges Respect for Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁶⁷ See for example June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁶⁸ June 5, 1989, ‘Stronger U.S. stand demanded’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A 1 and June 6, 1989, ‘Army units clash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁸⁶⁹ June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

⁸⁷⁰ June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

In all these discussions of balancing idealism and pragmatism, what was not in question was that notions of human rights had a role to play in the making of foreign policy. Whatever the response being considered, it was clear in news coverage that a response to the events in China was needed — whether condemnation, sanctions or other actions. Editorial commentary in the *Washington Post* outlined this perspective, saying:

it is clear the American policy requires more than appeals for Chinese nonviolence and restraint. China has repudiated the hope invested in that reasonable standard and has established a new requirement for American policy to reflect the reality of a massacre by a failed party reduced to ruling by force alone.⁸⁷¹

Los Angeles Times coverage relied heavily upon the notion of the presence of international standards and indeed the idea that the attacks on students constituted the crossing of a clear moral line. An editorial used such terms as “appalled” and “morally odious” to depict this crossing and suggested that violation of such international standards would be associated with great costs to China, including its internal stability, “international standing” and “prospects for future development.”⁸⁷² Use of these value terms and others, such as “repugnant” implicitly assumes the presence of moral standards and the need for such standards to play a role in foreign policy.⁸⁷³ That such standards were seen as universal is illustrated through allocation of responsibility to respond to the violations not only to the United States but to the United Nations and concerned individuals around the world.

International organizations, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, have played a role in establishing the principle that nations have responsibilities towards each other. In the case of the events in China, the *New York Times* reported appeals from Freedom House for the United States to “condemn China” for its actions.⁸⁷⁴ Demonstrations around the world also called for world leaders to “take a strong stand against the violence.”⁸⁷⁵ The *New York Times* coverage made clear that it was appropriate (and expected) for international leaders to make statements regarding the violence. Quoted were statements by Western heads of government, the Pope and Asian leaders; there were also comments on the fact that the “Soviet Union did not comment” and that “China’s Asian neighbors were slower to react.”⁸⁷⁶ The coverage also emphasized personal contacts between heads of government including attempts by President Bush to contact Chinese leaders -- his statement that he called “on the Chinese leadership publicly as I have in private channels” as well as his failure to “get anyone to answer his calls” — and exchanges between Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain to “discuss the Western response.”⁸⁷⁷ Members of the president’s administration also made clear that in the United States it was considered appropriate to pay

⁸⁷¹ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10.

⁸⁷² June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section II, p.6.

⁸⁷³ June 10, 1989, ‘U.S. Calls Reprisals Against Dissident Leaders Repugnant’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12

⁸⁷⁴ June 4, 1989, ‘President Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups’, *New York Times*, p.21

⁸⁷⁵ June 5, 1989, ‘The West Condemns the Crackdown’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁸⁷⁶ June 5, 1989, ‘The West Condemns the Crackdown’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁸⁷⁷ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush's News Session’, *New York Times*, A15; June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bars Normal Ties Now: Beijing is Warned -President Says Relations Depend on Its Stance Toward Students’, *New York Times*, A1 and June 6, 1989, ‘President Spurns Other Sanctions: Doesn’t Want “a Total Break in Relations,” He Declares’, *New York Times*, A1.

attention to events in other countries. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the administration “certainly watch[s] these developments with grave concern.”⁸⁷⁸

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage paid more attention to the notions of world community and responsibility in international relations than found in the other newspapers. The main component of this notion was the argument that “in today’s world such things [human rights violations] can be neither concealed nor disguised.”⁸⁷⁹ Given this, the perspective was presented that members of this world community had a responsibility to respond to violations of human rights that over-rode the concerns of sovereignty. Although all members of the world community were held to be responsible, the president of the United States was held to higher expectations. For example, members of the New Orleans community were “asking President Bush to step in and ‘stop the massacre’”; pleading for Bush’s intervention; urging Bush to “immediately exert moral leadership” and condemning him for “being too soft” in his actions.⁸⁸⁰

In addition to connecting human rights and foreign policy through the idea that nations have responsibilities towards each other, news coverage presented the perspective that the two can be tied together through basing policy decisions on the human rights record of another country. Almost every article in the *New York Times* about the events in China and the United States’ response to them seemed based on the assumption that diplomatic actions and sanctions of various kinds were an appropriate response to human rights violations. However, a fine line was identified as existing between the valid imposition of sanctions and such actions as commenting on internal affairs, which - in the words of an unnamed American official - “would be seen as interfering in the internal affairs of China, and that would probably not be appropriate for us to do.”⁸⁸¹

A whole range of foreign policy actions was identified by various individuals and agencies as appropriate responses, including recalling the American ambassador, suspension of American aid to China, halting arms sales, extending the visas of Chinese students studying in the United States, acting against China in such international organizations as the United Nations and various other symbolic gestures.⁸⁸² President Bush clearly linked violations of human rights and American policy decisions, saying that he was ordering particular actions, being “mindful of... complexities and yet of the necessity to strongly and clearly express our condemnation of the events of recent days.”⁸⁸³ He went on to say, “We can’t have totally normal relations unless there is a recognition of the validity of the students’ aspirations.”⁸⁸⁴

A response was required by the United States to events in China because of the proposition that the relationship between the two countries was based on certain human rights standards. This proposition was illustrated in the *Washington Post* coverage by President Bush’s early

⁸⁷⁸ June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’, *New York Times*, p.5.

⁸⁷⁹ June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

⁸⁸⁰ June 4, 1989, ‘N.O. Chinese plead for Bush to step in’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A4.

⁸⁸¹ June 4, 1989, ‘President Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups’, *New York Times*, p.21.

⁸⁸² June 5, 1989, ‘The West Condemns the Crackdown’, *New York Times*, A12 and June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁸⁸³ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁸⁸⁴ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bars Normal ties Now: Beijing is Warned • President Says Relations Depend on Its Stance Toward Students’, *New York Times*, A1.

statement of hope that “China will rapidly return to the path of political and economic reform and conditions of stability so that this relationship, so important to both our peoples, can continue its growth.”⁸⁸⁵ Similarly illustrative was Representative Solarz’s widely reported comment that the “United States will not continue to conduct business as usual with a government that engages in the wanton slaughter of its own people.”⁸⁸⁶ Other members of congress said that relations with China had been “dealt a bloody blow” and that events “cannot help but affect relations between the U.S. and China.”⁸⁸⁷ Bush later made stronger comments, suggesting that “We can’t have totally normal relations unless there’s a recognition... of the validity of the student’s aspirations” — what was called in the *Washington Post* coverage a sign that “violence may doom a budding commercial and diplomatic Sino-American relationship.”⁸⁸⁸

Linked to the presence of international moral standards is the proposition that the relationship between the United States and China is dependent on China adhering to these standards. Close attention was paid in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage both to congressional statements and those of Bush about linking reform and liberalization in China to continued good Sino-American relations.⁸⁸⁹ The simple assumption that continued violation of human rights in China would prompt further United States moves against China made clear that a continued relationship depended on adherence to certain standards.⁸⁹⁰ Not only was the relationship portrayed as dependent on adherence to human rights standards by China, but the United States was portrayed as willing to enforce such adherence — or to punish disregard of these standards. This notion was illustrated by the argument that the “blatant and bloody nature of the Chinese action represented a human rights violation too horrific to be addressed with the kind of special treatment that has become typical of U.S. foreign policy toward China” and that different policies were in the works, including sanctions and verbal condemnations.⁸⁹¹ Senator Edwards argued that “diplomatic messages of disapproval are a pretty puny reaction to the murdering of innocent civilians... the Defense Department, the State department and the Commerce Department ought to act immediately, in unison, to put some substance into the U.S. condemnations.”⁸⁹² Senator Helms made this linkage clear by his announcement that congress would pass legislation “that would cut off all trade, investment and financial dealings between the United States and China unless the Chinese government halts its use of violence to quell the protests.”⁸⁹³ Further illustration of this linkage was the statement that “U.S. actions will be affected by how far Beijing pushes its repression against the students who led China’s movement for democracy.”⁸⁹⁴ The position of congress as represented by Republican Senator William Cohen was that the United States was not attempting to tell

⁸⁸⁵ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁸⁸⁶ June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A24.

⁸⁸⁷ June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A24.

⁸⁸⁸ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁸⁸⁹ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁹⁰ June 7, 1989, ‘Senate Unanimously Urges Additional Steps Against China Regime’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.11

⁸⁹¹ June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁹² June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁹³ June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁸⁹⁴ June 10, 1989, ‘U.S. Calls Reprisals Against Dissident Leaders Repugnant’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

China what to do but was simply expressing the “views of the American people clearly, unequivocally, unambiguously.”⁸⁹⁵

In presenting the proposition that the Sino-American relationship depended on human rights standards. *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage relied on the same sources in other newspapers examined -- the statements of President Bush, administration officials and members of congress that the violent actions of the Chinese government would result in a more strained relationship with the United States.⁸⁹⁶ This proposition was closely tied to the idea that foreign policy decisions should be made in response to violations of these standards. This linkage was clearly illustrated by such statements as “President Bush suspended U.S. arms sales to China on Monday to protest the military’s bloody weekend crackdown, declaring Chinese leaders must learn ‘it’s not going to be business as usual.’”⁸⁹⁷ An editorial comment added an endorsement of Bush’s actions, saying, “[T]he Chinese brutality requires an immediate, specific response, and President Bush hit on an appropriate preliminary one.”⁸⁹⁸

The final notion related to the role of human rights in foreign policy was the suggestion that violations of human rights were matters of primary concern and should take precedence in international relations. In this case, the proposition was specifically related to the suggestion that the events in Tiananmen Square on June 4 should affect China’s bid to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) -- that violation of human rights could be linked to a lack of modernization and liberalization that might preclude membership in international organizations.⁸⁹⁹

Human Rights and American Identity in the Print Media

Coverage in all four of the newspapers rested on the implicit assumption that concern for human rights was linked in a special way to United States identity. Simply describing the relationship between China and the United States as dependent on adherence to human rights standards made this connection. The imposition of sanctions as a result of perceived Chinese violations of standards suggested certain assumptions in American ideas of human rights — firstly, that human rights are important and, secondly, that the United States has a responsibility to share and/or enforce those ideas. Outside of these basic assumptions, several other connections were made in the individual newspapers.

The *New York Times* coverage linked notions of human rights with specifically American ideals and what one article called “America’s conscience.”⁹⁰⁰ An editorial suggested that “America has no business equipping forces like those who carried out the butchery in Tiananmen.”⁹⁰¹ Coverage also linked concern about the specific case of Tiananmen with

⁸⁹⁵ June 7, 1989, ‘Senate Unanimously Urges Additional Steps Against China Regime’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.11.

⁸⁹⁶ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush “deplores” violence, asks Chinese to walk path of peace’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A28; June 5, 1989, ‘Stronger U.S. stand demanded’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1; June 6, 1989, ‘Army units clash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1 and June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

⁸⁹⁷ June 6, 1989, ‘Army units clash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁸⁹⁸ June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

⁸⁹⁹ See Carla Hills’ comments in June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Suspends Military Sales to China: President Rejects Calls From Congress for More Severe Action’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁹⁰⁰ June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁹⁰¹ June 6, 1989, ‘Forceful Not Frantic, About China’, *New York Times*, A30.

ethnic identity and values — noting the thousands of American Chinese protesting on the streets of American cities, “many of them with relatives in China.”⁹⁰² However, the protests in various American cities were linked to Chinese identity -- rather than American identity — with descriptions, such as “the crowd, composed mainly of people of Chinese origin,” Chinese banners with Chinese “ideographs,” and interviews with Chinese students.⁹⁰³

The argument was also presented that the protests in China were a result of Chinese contact with the United States — that the spread of American values of democracy and freedom had led to the desire for greater freedom in China. President Bush stated succinctly at a news conference that the “budding of democracy which we have seen in recent weeks owes much to the relationship we have developed since 1972.”⁹⁰⁴ Bush overtly linked human rights with American values and identity, saying:

The demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were advocating basic human rights... These are goals we support around the world. These are freedoms that are enshrined in both the U.S. Constitution and the Chinese Constitution. Throughout the world we stand with those who seek greater freedom and democracy. This is the strongly felt view of my Administration, of our Congress, and most important, of the American people... this relationship is vital to the United States of America, and so is our adherence to democracy and our encouragement for those who are willing to hold high the banner of democracy.⁹⁰⁵

Articles in the *Washington Post* also linked events in China with American influence. It did so by focusing attention on two aspects of American influence — commercial contact with China that, in the words of Secretary of State Baker, “for the most part, have led toward openness,” and historical example, represented through the student protesters’ use of the symbol of the Statue of Liberty.⁹⁰⁶ Human rights were additionally connected with American ideals through editorial use of value-terms, such as “revulsion” and “disgust,” to describe American responses to the events in China.⁹⁰⁷ Americans in general, and American lawmakers “at both ends of the political spectrum,” were portrayed as deeply concerned by human rights violations.⁹⁰⁸

The *Los Angeles Times* coverage both implicitly and explicitly linked human rights and American values, in addition to the connections found in other newspapers. Explicit linkages included President Bush’s statement that “We are strongly committed to democracy around the world... It is the underpinning of our being as a nation.”⁹⁰⁹ A similarly explicit linkage appeared in a later article that said Deng Xiaoping had engaged in “violent repression of

⁹⁰² June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12

⁹⁰³ June 10, 1989, ‘Moynihan Jeered at China Protest: Booed by Crowd After March in Chinatown Mourning Slain Beijing Students’, *New York Times*, p.6.

⁹⁰⁴ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁹⁰⁵ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁹⁰⁶ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A1 and June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A22.

⁹⁰⁷ June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China’, *Washington Post*, A22.

⁹⁰⁸ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁹⁰⁹ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

freedoms that lie at the core of American values.”⁹¹⁰ Other linkages implicitly connected American values and human rights by indicating widespread support for actions against the Chinese government, such as the reference to a Senate resolution condemning China that “passed by a rare 100-0 vote” and a description of shopkeepers coming out of their stores in Los Angeles to applaud a human rights demonstration.⁹¹¹ The Statue of Liberty was again used as a symbolic reference to American values in a description of New York Mayor Ed Koch calling for United Nations action against China “with the Statue of Liberty in the background.”⁹¹² Other descriptions of the events in China used such terms as “repugnant,” “murdered” and “disturbing,” which indicated assumptions about American values. Outside the assumption that American values dictated the relationship with China, no explicit connections between human rights and American identity were found in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage. In fact, reference was made to the fact that the events in China had horrified people around the world, not just in the United States.⁹¹³ However, an editorial did identify the United States as a “champion of democracy,” thus linking American identity with one aspect of human rights.⁹¹⁴

Domains of Human Rights in the Print Media

As might be expected in news coverage of a specific case of brutal violation of human rights, the domains of discourse were largely political and moral, although several of the newspapers also talked about human rights in the economic domain. The *New York Times* coverage largely talked about human rights in terms of civil and political rights -- of assembly, security of person, democracy and press, among others. Human rights in the political domain were discussed in the *Washington Post* coverage solely in terms of democracy, security of person, and various freedoms -- such as press and individual rights. Heavy emphasis was laid in the *Los Angeles Times* coverage on ideas related to political rights, such as assembly, democracy, security of person and descriptions of the violence and repression in Tiananmen Square. Human rights were discussed in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage simply in terms of political and civil freedoms, political legitimacy and repression of freedoms.

The domain of morality was apparent in the *New York Times* coverage also through links of American concerns for the Chinese people with the notion of conscience, principles and values as well as in such value terms as “revulsion,” “outrage and anger,” “repugnant,” and identifications of Deng Xiaoping as the “Butcher of Beijing” and Prime Minister Li Peng as a “murderer.”⁹¹⁵ Morality also was clear in such phrases as “the right thing to do” and “it is not right.”⁹¹⁶ The domain of general morality in the *Washington Post* coverage appeared in value terms, such as “deplorable,” “excessive,” “revulsion” and “repugnant,” and in

⁹¹⁰ June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁹¹¹ June 7, 1989, ‘Senate Unanimously Urges Additional Steps Against China Regime’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.11 and June 10, 1989, ‘Thousands Rally to Cries of “Shame”’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁹¹² June 4, 1989, ‘Crowd in L.A. Urges End to Beijing Bloodshed’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁹¹³ June 6, 1989, ‘Army units clash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁹¹⁴ June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

⁹¹⁵ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16; June 6, 1989, ‘Forceful Not Frantic, About China’, *New York Times*, A30; June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’, *New York Times*, p.5 and June 5, 1989, ‘The West Condemns the Crackdown’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁹¹⁶ June 9, 1989, ‘Voice of America Beams TV Signals to China’, *New York Times*, A12 and June 10, 1989, ‘Moynihan Jeered at China Protest: Booed by Crowd After March in Chinatown Mourning Slain Beijing Students’, *New York Times*, p.6.

assumptions of the existence of international standards and norms of behavior.⁹¹⁷ The moral domain appeared in descriptions of the events in the *Los Angeles Times* as “morally odious” and “shameful,” as well as through description of American responses as “appalled,” and finding the events “repugnant” and “disturbing.”⁹¹⁸ In the *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage, discussions of American “moral leadership” and the United States standing for “something” occurred in a discourse of morality.⁹¹⁹ Description of American outrage and shock at the “morally unthinkable” acts of the Chinese government similarly places discussions of human rights in the domain of morality.⁹²⁰

Human rights also were discussed in *New York Times* coverage in ways fitting the economic domain by linkage of development and modernity with political freedom and democracy and explication of the perceived link between capitalism, freedom and democracy.⁹²¹ Economics were mentioned in the *Washington Post* coverage only in terms of economic reform being linked to political reform.⁹²² The economic domain was incorporated into discussions of human rights by writers in the *Los Angeles Times* through linking economic and social progress and modernization with the provision of political rights.⁹²³

Symbols of Human Rights Discourse in the Print Media

All of the newspapers studied set up opposing symbols to represent differences between the provision of human rights and their denial. In the specific case of China, ideas associated with change and progress were prevalent in discussion of human rights in the print media. In the *New York Times* coverage, progress was represented as a linear process from a closed totalitarian society towards an open democratic society. Democracy was talked about in terms of the “process of democratization” and the “move to democracy,” which is portrayed as “inexorable.”⁹²⁴ In a similar vein, democracy was also represented as a “genie” that could not be put back into the bottle.⁹²⁵ The ideals of the democratic society were portrayed as “non-violence, restraint and dialogue.”⁹²⁶ Resistance was identified as a virtue connected with change and progress in the sense that exposure to ideas of freedom was represented as bringing the ability to continue pushing for change and resisting repression.⁹²⁷ Human rights

⁹¹⁷ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A1; June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China’, *Washington Post*, A22; June 10, 1989, ‘White House Condemns China “Murder”: Administration’s Criticism Intensifies but Is Not Directed at Deng’, *Washington Post*, A14 and June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁹¹⁸ June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section H, p.6; June 10, 1989, ‘U.S. Calls Reprisals Against Dissident Leaders Repugnant’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁹¹⁹ June 4, 1989, ‘N.O. Chinese plead for Bush to step in’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A4 and June 9, 1989, ‘Bush calls on China to end bloodshed’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁹²⁰ June 5, 1989, ‘Stronger U.S. stand demanded’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1 and June 4, 1989, ‘N.O. Chinese plead for Bush to step in’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A4.

⁹²¹ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16 and June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁹²² June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10.

⁹²³ June 10, 1989, ‘Not by Guns Alone’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section n, p.8.

⁹²⁴ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office • Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁹²⁵ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁹²⁶ June 4, 1989, ‘President Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups’, *New York Times*, p.21.

⁹²⁷ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16.

were associated with change, progress, struggle, resistance and non-violence. Denial of human rights was represented through metaphors of Hitler, Nazism and fascism, repression and violence, crimes, dirt and destruction, and the unraveling of society through adherence to communism.

In a similar manner, opposing symbols in the *Washington Post* coverage conveyed ideas about human rights. For example, reform and order were positioned opposite disorder; good relationships versus bad relationships; democracy versus totalitarianism and symbolic versus concrete statements. Reform was closely tied to order and “normality” as well as the idea of enlightenment.⁹²⁸ In contrast disorder was represented as “great uncertainty, tension and distraction,” “ugly and chaotic” and as “ugly and anachronistic.”⁹²⁹ The relationships between the United States and China was presented in dichotomous terms as either constructive and positive or as tenuous and a “matter of ‘great concern.’”⁹³⁰ Similarly, democracy — the “new passion” and “hunger” — was presented in opposition to the “mysteries of totalitarian rule.”⁹³¹ Democracy and the concern for individual rights was also countered by depiction of the “suppression,” “bloody confrontation” and related synonyms for brutality and repression — “violence,” “massacre,” “crackdown,” “murder” and “killing.”⁹³² A further dichotomy between symbolic statements and clear declarations included on one side, “rhetorical protest” and a “symbol of American disgust,” and on the other, “direct signals,” “openly said” and “deploring... but making plain.”⁹³³

Although the *Los Angeles Times* carried more reports on American responses to the events in China than did the other newspapers, a narrower range of symbols was found in discussions of human rights. As in the coverage of the other newspapers, several ideas were positioned as binary opposites. Progress and order were positioned opposite chaos and disorder. Progress was linked with development, reforms, change and openness.⁹³⁴ Depiction of the protection of citizens and settled conditions were associated with the “restoration of order.”⁹³⁵ In contrast, chaos and disorder were linked with the bloodshed and turmoil of the crackdown and with upheaval.⁹³⁶ Brutality and violence — “blatant and bloody” crimes and “government-ordered brutality” — were further positioned against the “core of American values.”⁹³⁷ Democracy was positioned opposite the notions of a police state, totalitarian government, “wave of repression,” “secrecy, distortions and lies,” power struggles between hardliners and “crippling state controls.”⁹³⁸

⁹²⁸ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10 and June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize ‘‘Aspirations’’ of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁹²⁹ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10 and June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁹³⁰ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Decries Chinese Decision to Use Force’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁹³¹ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10.

⁹³² June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Suspends Military Sales to China: President Rejects Calls From Congress for More Severe Action’, *Washington Post*, A1 and June 10, 1989, ‘White House Condemns China “Murder”: Administration’s Criticism Intensifies but Is Not Directed at Deng’, *Washington Post*, A14.

⁹³³ June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China’, *Washington Post*, A22.

⁹³⁴ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁹³⁵ June 7, 1989, ‘Senate Unanimously Urges Additional Steps Against China Regime’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.11 and June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Rejects China Curbs, Urges Respect for Rights’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁹³⁶ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and June 10, 1989, ‘U.S. Calls Reprisals Against Dissident Leaders Repugnant’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁹³⁷ June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁹³⁸ June 10, 1989, ‘Not by Guns Alone’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section II, p.8.

Coverage in the *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, as in the other newspapers studied, positioned various symbols and ideas associated with human rights opposite symbols associated with the violation of human rights. Non-violence was positioned opposite violence; order opposite disorder; democracy opposite imperialism and invalid government versus valid government. The “path of peace,” “non-violent tactics” and “nonviolent means” were symbolically placed opposite depiction of violence as “bloody suppression,” “murdering” and a “bloody blow.”⁹³⁹ Order was associated with political and economic reform and stability and progress — as well as being compared with the disorder of repression and violence.⁹⁴⁰ Democracy was represented by “popular and peaceful demonstrations,” “peaceful national uprising” and “popularly supported pragmatism” versus the imperialism, dictatorship and “tenor-enforced ideology” of Chinese hardliners.⁹⁴¹ Linked with this was the image of a valid government — defined as democratically elected — versus a government rendered invalid by “violence against its people.”⁹⁴²

In other ways of talking about human rights the *New York Times* coverage represented denial of human rights through ideas and images related to historical examples of repression, including references to Hitler, Nazi swastikas and descriptions of students carrying posters portraying Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders in “fascist garb.”⁹⁴³ The metaphors of shackles was used to depict the communist government of China, and its violent repression was represented by images of blood, bloodstains, butchery, tyranny, executioners and massacres compared to “that nice fuzzy China of panda bears.”⁹⁴⁴ Chinese society was described as unraveling as a result of such blatant violations of human rights.⁹⁴⁵ Violent repression was also presented in classical terms of folly and tragedy as well as in modern legal terms as crimes.⁹⁴⁶ Metaphors of dirt and destruction were also associated with violations of human rights, including depiction of Deng as having “defiled his reputation,” “poisoning his legacy” and as having become “discredited and disabled.”⁹⁴⁷

Other symbols linked with human rights in the *Washington Post* coverage were the Statue of Liberty, crime — identified as “wanton slaughter” — and the related need to punish the

⁹³⁹ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush “deplores” violence, asks Chinese to walk path of peace’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A28 and June 5, 1989, ‘Stronger U.S. stand demanded’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1

⁹⁴⁰ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush “deplores” violence, asks Chinese to walk path of peace’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A28.

⁹⁴¹ June 6, 1989, ‘Army units clash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1 and June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

⁹⁴² June 9, 1989, ‘Bush calls on China to end bloodshed’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁹⁴³ June 5, 1989, ‘The West Condemns the Crackdown’. *New York Times*, A12.

⁹⁴⁴ June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China*’. *New York Times*, A12; June 8, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16; June 10, 1989, ‘Moynihan Jeered at China Protest: Booed by Crowd After March in Chinatown Mourning Slain Beijing Students’, *New York Times*, p.6 and June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’. *New York Times*, p.5.

⁹⁴⁵ June 6, 1989, ‘President Spurns Other Sanctions: Doesn’t Want “a Total Break in Relations,” He Declares’, *New York Times*, A1.

⁹⁴⁶ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16.

⁹⁴⁷ June 5, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16.

perpetrators of crimes.⁹⁴⁸ Topographic metaphors depicted violation of human rights as the “abyss of terror” and adherence to human rights standards as the “road back to responsibility.”⁹⁴⁹ Across all of the *Washington Post* coverage a wide range of emotional language described American responses to violations of human rights, including anger, outrage, “deeply deplored,” unacceptable, American “sympathy and support” for the Chinese, revulsion, disgust and disappointment.⁹⁵⁰

The *Washington Post* coverage included a final extended metaphor used by Senator Jesse Helms. Helms described the Communist government as “rattlesnakes,” saying, “There is no such thing as a moderate Communist government. They are all rattlesnakes and they will turn around and bite you when the occasion arises.”⁹⁵¹ In contrast respect for human rights was represented through the notion of restraint and respect.⁹⁵²

Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy in the Print Media

During the time period of study, the *New York Times* coverage assigned agency to a wider range of individuals and organizations than that in all the newspapers. This is so whether one considers participation in foreign policy or responsibility for incorporation of human rights concerns into foreign policy. The greatest amount of agency in any aspect of foreign policy was attributed to the president and his administration, particularly the Secretary of State and the State Department. The president clearly concurred with this. He responded during his news conference on the American response to events in China to questions about congressional pressure for increased criticism and tougher sanctions by saying, “I’ve told you what I am going to do. I’m the President I set the foreign policy objectives and actions taken by the Executive Branch.”⁹⁵³ Former administration officials, such as Henry Kissinger and former members of the National Security Council, were also assigned agency both in general foreign policy and in the incorporation of human rights concerns, as were other experts outside the administration, such as academics.⁹⁵⁴ Other parties with agency in the making of foreign policy included congress in general, and specific congresspeople, heads of government of other nations, diplomatic representatives, and the United Nations (specifically recommendations by the Human Rights Commission and Security Council). The American people were also given a measure of agency through having supported the development of a relationship with China over a period of years.⁹⁵⁵

⁹⁴⁸ June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A24.

⁹⁴⁹ June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China, *Washington Post*, A22.

⁹⁵⁰ June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A24; June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Suspends Military Sales to China: President Rejects Calls From Congress for More Severe Action’, *Washington Post*, A 1; June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China, *Washington Post*, A22 and June 9, 1989, ‘Bush Bids China to Recognize “Aspirations” of Protesters: President Says He Seeks to Preserve Relations’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁹⁵¹ June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁹⁵² June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and June 6, 1989, ‘Harvest of Brutality’, *Los Angeles Times*, Section II, p.6.

⁹⁵³ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

⁹⁵⁴ June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12 and June 10, 1989, ‘A Rocky Period Lies Ahead for Washington and Beijing’, *New York Times*, p.5.

⁹⁵⁵ June 6, 1989, ‘Crackdown in Beijing: And Response From the Oval Office - Excerpts From Bush’s News Session’, *New York Times*, A15.

When considering questions of responsibility for incorporation of human rights into foreign policy, it was found that coverage assigned congress a greater role than in general foreign policy, including for individual congresspeople and for committees, such as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.⁹⁵⁶ Congress was portrayed as influencing administration decisions in such comments as, “In the face of widespread Congressional outrage... the Bush Administration is considering...” and the suggestion that “[t]he Administration will have to act quickly, though, if it is to stay ahead of a galloping Congressional movement for immediate action. Democratic and Republican leaders in congress joined forces today to demand that President Bush take steps to punish Beijing.”⁹⁵⁷ Other articles referred to the “pressure which was mounting in Congress” and the need for Bush to seek “middle ground between Congressional calls for more severe penalties and his own instincts.”⁹⁵⁸ The role of individual members of congress, such as Senator Moynihan and Representative Stephen Solarz — who suggested that “unless the White House acts, Congress will do it for him” — was also highlighted.⁹⁵⁹

The American people were also assigned a role in pushing for the inclusion of human rights concerns into foreign policy. The role of protesters was reported, with their calls for American action against China -- what was called demands by “citizens and political leaders” for “tough sanctions against China.”⁹⁶⁰ Another article suggested that, “with the American public’s having watched live on television the dramatic rise of the prodemocracy movement and its tragic ending, the Administration will probably have to do more than ‘deplore the violence’ as President Bush has done.”⁹⁶¹ Individual actions, such as making telephone calls to members of congress, were also identified as having the potential to play a part in policy decisions.⁹⁶² Other groups assigned agency were the media; coverage of events in China was portrayed as influencing policy decisions, human rights groups, such as Freedom House, and city and local government officials, such as mayors and local assembly-persons calling for policy changes.⁹⁶³

The *Washington Post* coverage assigned agency to a much narrower group of individuals and institutions. In the making of foreign policy, the president and his administration and congress had agency. References were also made to general American policy, such as “Americans find themselves hard put to define a policy,” and references to “American policy.”⁹⁶⁴ Members of the administration with special influence in foreign policy were Secretary of State James Baker, the State Department in general, the president’s National

⁹⁵⁶ June 4, 1989, ‘President Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups’, *New York Times*, p.21.

⁹⁵⁷ June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁹⁵⁸ June 6, 1989, ‘President Spurns Other Sanctions: Doesn’t Want “a Total Break in Relations,” He Declares’, *New York Times*, A1.

⁹⁵⁹ June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁹⁶⁰ June 6, 1989, ‘Forceful Not Frantic, About China’, *New York Times*, A30.

⁹⁶¹ June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12.

⁹⁶² June 10, 1989, ‘Moynihan Jeered at China Protest: Booed by Crowd After March in Chinatown Mourning Slain Beijing Students’, *New York Times*, p.6.

⁹⁶³ June 5, 1989, ‘Administration Ponders Steps on China’, *New York Times*, A12; June 8, 1989, ‘Two Old Men, Many Young Lives: Deng Xiaoping Defiles His Legacy With Blood’, *New York Times*, A16; June 9, 1989, ‘Voice of America Beams TV Signals to China’, *New York Times*, A12; June 4, 1989, ‘President Assails Shootings in China: Baker Silent on Requests for Economic Curbs by Helms and Rights Groups’, *New York Times*, p.21 and June 10, 1989, ‘Moynihan Jeered at China Protest; Booed by Crowd After March in Chinatown Mourning Slain Beijing Students’, *New York Times*, p.6.

⁹⁶⁴ June 5, 1989, ‘Massacre in China’, *Washington Post*, A10.

Security Advisor and White House officials. The role of congress was portrayed as allowing Bush to take the lead in foreign policy — but as being ready to “take action if the president doesn’t move immediately.”⁹⁶⁵ One article indicated that the president had only acted so as not to seem overly influenced by congressional opinions: “[A]ll of Bush’s advisers agreed that the administration should have a more definitive reaction than the statement issued when the violence first erupted on Saturday ‘so we wouldn’t seem to be dragged along by the Hill.’”⁹⁶⁶ The same parties were portrayed as having agency in getting human rights into foreign policy — with the addition of the general American public whose “strong protest,” “disgust” and “revulsion” were seen to drive congressional and presidential policy initiatives.⁹⁶⁷

The *Los Angeles Times* coverage assigned agency in the making of foreign policy to the president and his administration, congress, “experts” on international relations and specific countries and to the United Nations. Agency in the administration came across clearly through such comments as the “[administration had been considering possible additional measures against the Chinese government.”⁹⁶⁸ Specific branches of the administration mentioned as playing a role in policy decisions were the State Department and its associated embassy in China, national security advisors, and the Departments of Defense and Commerce.⁹⁶⁹ Congress was portrayed as pushing the President to act in an “unusual alliance; liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans” ; and individual senators were portrayed as particularly active in policy suggestions.⁹⁷⁰ Experts from academia and former administrations (such as Kissinger) were portrayed as having roles, as was the United Nations. The United Nations was suggested as having agency because of its role as the target of protesters demanding actions — that is, that members of the public assigned agency to the United Nations by their actions in protesting outside it.⁹⁷¹

The same actors as above were assigned agency in the incorporation of human rights in foreign policy — with the addition of members of the public and members of city and local government. The role of demonstrators in demanding sanctions was extensively covered as were the statements of members of city and local government such as city mayors.⁹⁷² Individual actions were also portrayed as having the potential to influence policy decisions in the case of President Bush’s reactions to “accounts of a Chinese man who halted a column of 10 tanks and 10 armored personnel carriers Monday near Tian An Men Square.”⁹⁷³ Again, tension was seen to exist between the president’s perception of appropriate action and congressional suggestions. One article discussed the fact that administration officials felt pressured by members of congress and “refused to discuss individual options.”⁹⁷⁴ Another suggested that the Senate, through its Foreign Relations Committee, and other policy

⁹⁶⁵ June 5, 1989, ‘Lawmakers Ask Strong U.S. Action: Punish Authorities, White House Told’, *Washington Post*, A24.

⁹⁶⁶ June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Suspends Military Sales to China: President Rejects Calls From Congress for More Severe Action’, *Washington Post*, A1.

⁹⁶⁷ June 6, 1989, ‘Signals to China’, *Washington Post*, A22.

⁹⁶⁸ June 10, 1989, ‘U.S. Calls Reprisals Against Dissident Leaders Repugnant’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁹⁶⁹ June 4, 1989, ‘Bush Deplores Troop Assault on China Crowd’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1 and June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁹⁷⁰ June 5, 1989, ‘Congress Steps Up Pressure for China Sanctions’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁹⁷¹ June 10, 1989, ‘Thousands Rally to Cries of “Shame”’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁹⁷² June 4, 1989, ‘Crowd in L.A. Urges End to Beijing Bloodshed’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

⁹⁷³ June 6, 1989, ‘Bush Halts Arms Sales Over China Repression’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.1.

⁹⁷⁴ June 10, 1989, ‘U.S. Calls Reprisals Against Dissident Leaders Repugnant’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.12.

committees was more interested than the House in incorporating issues of human rights into policy.⁹⁷⁵

The *New Orleans Times - Picayune* coverage assigned agency in foreign policy very similarly to coverage in the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* — that is, largely to the president and his administration and to congress. The president was portrayed as in control of foreign policy, either directly or by implication through such statements as the “sanctions he announced”; ‘lie hopes to ‘preserve the relationship’”; “firm in his support for the students” and “he was disappointed in the course of events.”⁹⁷⁶ Within the administration, agency was assigned to the U.S. State Department, national security advisors and the departments of defense and commerce. Congress’ role both in pushing the president to make specific policy changes and in endorsing the president’s actions were reported with reference to the coalition of liberal and conservative members of congress joining “forces ... to demand that President Bush end military aid to the Chinese government” and to congress “backing the President’s moves.”⁹⁷⁷

Regarding the question of the inclusion of human rights concerns into foreign policy, it was found that the coverage assigned agency to the president, congress and to a cross-section of the general public. The local community in New Orleans was presented as involved in attempts to “apply effective pressure on the government in Peking”; Chinese students were portrayed as trying to “flood telephone lines into the Chinese embassy in Washington and the Chinese Consulate in Houston with protest calls,” and the Chinese people themselves were portrayed as influential through the “power of sheer numbers.”⁹⁷⁸ Reference was also made to the right of United States citizens to demand action from their government.⁹⁷⁹

Human Rights in Congress, 1989

Although subject categories in the *Congressional Record* of 1989 clearly separated discussions of human rights from discussions of other rights, this dissertation looked only at congressional responses to the Tiananmen Massacre. Thus, the period of study is June 1989.

Congressional Definitions of Human Rights

Congressional discourse defined human rights almost entirely in terms of civil rights. In fact, at times this linkage was made explicit through comparison of the student movement in Beijing to the American civil rights movement.⁹⁸⁰ The greatest amount of attention was paid to definitions of human rights within the context of security of person and the right to freedom from repression. Other freedoms included in discussions of rights were press, speech, assembly, emigration and general unspecified freedoms. Human rights were extensively discussed in terms of democracy and again in unspecified terms — that is, as references to human rights without further explication. The right to self-determination and entitlement of citizens to legal protection were also identified as human rights.

⁹⁷⁵ June 7, 1989, ‘Senate Unanimously Urges Additional Steps Against China Regime’, *Los Angeles Times*, p.11.

⁹⁷⁶ June 9, 1989, ‘Bush calls on China to end bloodshed’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁹⁷⁷ June 5, 1989, ‘Stronger U.S. stand demanded’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1 and June 6, 1989, ‘Army units clash; civil war feared: Bush cuts off weapons sales’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A1.

⁹⁷⁸ June 4, 1989, ‘N.O. Chinese plead for Bush to step in’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A4 and June 6, 1989, ‘Massacre in Beijing’, *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, B10.

⁹⁷⁹ June 4, 1989, ‘N.O. Chinese plead for Bush to step in’. *New Orleans Times - Picayune*, A4.

⁹⁸⁰ Senators Simon and Pell, *Congressional Record: 1989*, Volume 135, 101st Congress: 1st Session, June 1-27, p.10876 and p.11506.

Human rights were also talked about using a wide range of other definitions, including those within the realm of morality (civilization, progress, reform, disorder, judgment, American values and explicitly moral terms of right, morality, moral indignation, crime and God). The hopes and yearnings of individuals were discussed in terms of rights. Freedom was identified as the right to bear arms and as linked with economic liberalization. Denial of human rights was discussed in terms of a list of -isms, including Communism, totalitarianism, Nazism, Stalinism and Orwellianism.

In summary, of all the case studies, the events in China provoked the greatest amount of congressional discussion of human rights. Almost every member of congress took the opportunity to make a one-minute statement about the events in Tiananmen Square and the appropriate United States response. Some members were able to make longer speeches or to incorporate outside material into the *Congressional Record*. The end result was over three thousand pages of text. It is difficult to thoroughly examine such a mass of material, and analysis must necessarily be illustrative rather than exhaustive.

As mentioned above, the bulk of discourse concentrated on definitions of human rights as security of person and the right to freedom from repression. Underlying all the responses was the assumption that “[i]t is unacceptable behavior within the community of nations to viciously attack and slaughter hundreds of nonviolent civilian demonstrators.”⁹⁸¹ The central ideas were the violence perpetrated on the protesters and the innocent nature of the protests. Tied to this was the definition of freedom of assembly as a right that was being denied. Many members of congress drew attention to the fact that it was the Chinese government perpetrating these acts. Examples of this are such statements as: “Government, of, by, and for the people is not a government that turns against itself” and what Senator George Mitchell called “organized murder — terror by a government against its own people seeking to intimidate them to permit that government to remain in power.”⁹⁸² Representative William Lipinski expressed deep concern that the actions were taken by “citizens of the same country, members of the same ethnic group, individuals of the same historical and cultural background.”⁹⁸³ Almost every commentary articulated the non-violent nature of the protests — “peaceful unarmed youth”; “unarmed nonviolent demonstrators”; “young peaceful student demonstrators”; “innocent and unarmed citizens”⁹⁸⁴ — and most often identified the goals of the protests as democracy and freedom. Other suggested goals of the protesters were resisting tyranny, “modest demands ... for a voice in their own future” and attempts to “join the free world’s privileges.”⁹⁸⁵

The concept of democracy was central in defining human rights in this discourse. In addition to frequent references to pro-democracy demonstrations and the causes of freedom and democracy, democracy was explicitly identified as an “inalienable human right” and as “that which we in America accept as given: The rights of democracy.”⁹⁸⁶ Some members of congress used a more multifaceted definition than simple references to democracy and freedom. Representative Donald Lukens of Ohio specifically talked about “pluralistic

⁹⁸¹ Representative Bilbray, *Congressional Record*: 1989, p.10786.

⁹⁸² Representative Leach and Senator Mitchell, *Congressional Record*: 1989, pp.10787,12943.

⁹⁸³ *Congressional Record*: 1989, p.11811.

⁹⁸⁴ *Congressional Record*: 1989, pp.11811.11213, 12850, 12858.

⁹⁸⁵ Senators Pell, Mitchell, Representative Schroeder, *Congressional Record*: 1989, pp.13057, 10872, 12735.

⁹⁸⁶ Representatives de Lugo and Faleamavaega, *Congressional Record*: 1989, pp.12850,11215.

democracy” and “political choice.”⁹⁸⁷ Senator Mitchell called for “a just and democratic society with a free and open political system that would protect the essential human rights of all the Chinese people.”⁹⁸⁸

House Resolution 182, proposed by Stephen Solarz and drafted by Richard Gephardt, clearly outlined the definition of human rights under which the House was operating. It begins, “Whereas a wide cross-section of Chinese society recognized their own inalienable rights and attempted to exercise their right to free speech by conducting demonstrations for democratic change which adhered to the highest goals of peace and nonviolence.”⁹⁸⁹ The right to free speech was thus inextricably tied to democracy and to human rights in general. One association made in congressional discourse was that the violence against the demonstrators began “when they began to freely assemble and to freely speak” and to “air their grievances in public.”⁹⁹⁰ With this association, these rights were presented as threats to authoritarianism. Other members of congress tied together a number of freedoms in defining human rights — “freedoms of speech, association, press, and human dignity” and “freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and of demonstrations.”⁹⁹¹

A great deal of congressional discourse was much less specific about freedom; the term was used as a general notion or catch phrase. Many references were made to the demonstrations for freedom in China and the “flame,” “cause” and “human desire for” freedom there exhibited.⁹⁹² Representative Donald Ritter contrasted “peace and freedom, human life and human dignity” with the “butchers of Beijing.”⁹⁹³ Representative Patricia Schroeder talked about freedom as the “free world’s privileges.”⁹⁹⁴ Such ways of talking about freedom seemed to use the phrase as shorthand for human rights. Other members of congress were more verbose but still did not explicitly define the constituent components of freedom. Senator Daniel Coats of Indiana identified freedom as a challenge to authoritarianism by saying that:

they fear, most of all, when men burdened by oppression stand upright and shout their defiance. They fear, above all, the chanted refrains of freedom ... It is freedom that occupies the imagination of passionate reformers. It is liberty that shapes the visions of the disaffected ... For freedom has an inevitability of its own — an inevitability rooted, not in the myth of an unseen dialectic, but in the highest hopes of common man.⁹⁹⁵

Freedom was not the only term used in a reductionist manner. Human rights themselves were often used as a phrase without additional definition. References were made to “basic human rights,” “recent human rights violations in China,” a “new respect for human rights” and “fundamental human rights violations,” amongst others.⁹⁹⁶

⁹⁸⁷ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12856.

⁹⁸⁸ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10872.

⁹⁸⁹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12851.

⁹⁹⁰ Representative McEwen and Senator Breaux, *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11214,11857.

⁹⁹¹ Representative Faleomavaega and Senator Heinz, *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11215,13478.

⁹⁹² *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.12855, 12857, 10872.

⁹⁹³ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.11582.

⁹⁹⁴ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12735.

⁹⁹⁵ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10875.

⁹⁹⁶ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.10787, 12849, 12852, 12944.

One of the few specific freedoms identified, other than those discussed above, was the freedom to emigrate. Senator Daniel Moynihan identified a central mark of a free country as a “nation’s willingness to permit emigration.”⁹⁹⁷ This freedom was discussed in relation to both China and to the Soviet Union. Another specific right identified in congressional discourse was an individual’s entitlement to legal protection. Senator Henry Heinz expressed great concern that the Chinese constitution provided for due process but the right was not being granted to citizens, while Representative Lukens talked about the suspension of the Chinese legal system “whenever they feel any threat at all to their dictatorial regime.”⁹⁹⁸ Senator Dennis DeConcini declared that the “government of the People’s Republic of China has violently discarded all respect for human rights, human dignity, and due process.”⁹⁹⁹ Several members also identified self-determination as a right, though the phrase was used clearly in the individualistic rather than the nationalistic sense, with comments such as those of Dick Gephardt referring to “self-determination and personal dignity.”¹⁰⁰⁰ Representative Lipinski, however, spoke specifically about the Tibetan push for self-determination.¹⁰⁰¹

Ideas related to morality dominated other definitions of human rights. In addition to explicitly moral definitions, ideas about civilization and progress were tied to moral judgments about the events in China. The notion of civilization was employed most often in identifying events in China as actions that civilized nations could not tolerate. The term used most often to describe the actions of the Chinese government was barbarism — and variations such as “barbaric behavior,” “barbaric and reactionary,” “stark barbarism” and “depths of barbarism.”¹⁰⁰² Barbarism was tied to “brutal, calculated slaughter” — what one member called a “descent to mindless brutality” — and repression in general.¹⁰⁰³ Civilization was positioned as the opposite of this brutality. Senator Robert Byrd argued that the actions of the Chinese government “runs afoul of the core of values and the principles of civilized governance,” while Representative Gerald Solomon described the “civilized world” as having “recoiled in horror” ; and Senator John Kerry described the actions as tearing at the “civilized world’s conscience.”¹⁰⁰⁴ Representative Lipinski went even further, saying that the Chinese government demonstrated that “they have no right to be considered civilized citizens of a world rapidly approaching the 21st century.”¹⁰⁰⁵

This last comment is important because it ties together ideas of civilization and progress in defining human rights. Congressional discourse clearly identified progress and modernity with its definition of the provision of human rights through democracy. In this context democracy was talked about as the “doorway to a better, more fulfilling life” and the “journey to civilization requires the fight for democracy.”¹⁰⁰⁶ Modernity was talked about in terms of “modern standards of decency, conscience, and personal liberty” and as an “open society where people could freely air their thoughts and ideas.”¹⁰⁰⁷ Several members referred to a “loss of progress,” a “great leap backward” and what Senator Robert Dole called the need to

⁹⁹⁷ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.13125.

⁹⁹⁸ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.13478, 12856.

⁹⁹⁹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.13436.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12852.

¹⁰⁰¹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.11812.

¹⁰⁰² *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11812, 12852, 13288, 11215.

¹⁰⁰³ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11215, 11506.

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.13288, 12858, 13290.

¹⁰⁰⁵ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.11811.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Representative Fosbard, *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11213, 11215.

¹⁰⁰⁷ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11812, 11554.

“resume their path toward reform and progress.”¹⁰⁰⁸ Civilization and progress were contrasted with disorder ~ what some called “repression and chaos” and “political turmoil bordering on chaos.”¹⁰⁰⁹

Explicitly value-laden ideas were also used in defining human rights. Representative Charles Bennett called for the Chinese government to exercise better “judgment,” implying that clearer thinking and moral values were associated with human rights.¹⁰¹⁰ Clear associations were made through identification of the demonstrators’ cause as being that of “righteousness”; references to the “moral authority” of a “just cause”; identification of events in China as a “moral issue of worldwide consequence and proportion” and indictment of the “moral bankruptcy of a government that can sustain itself in power only by killing its own people.”¹⁰¹¹

Moral outrage appeared in discussions of Tiananmen and human rights. Phrases expressing moral outrage included “unacceptable behavior”, “atrocities”; “shocked and appalled”; “ghastly tragedy”; “outrage and revulsion”; “the civilized world is repulsed”; “helpless outrage”; “deplorable”; and “shocking and dastardly behavior,” amongst others.¹⁰¹² Moral outrage was tied to two other moral concepts — crime and the notion that rights were universal gifts of God. The actions of the Chinese government were thus referred to as “heinous crimes” against people “demonstrating peacefully for their God-given rights.”¹⁰¹³ Human rights were also linked to American values, with Senator Mitchell calling the protests in China “a ringing endorsement of American democracy and the concept of self-determination for which we have stood for two centuries.”¹⁰¹⁴

The idea of universality was also tied to definition of human rights in terms of human yearnings and hopes. The universal nature of these was explicitly addressed by comments such as Representative Steven Gunderson’s declaration that:

the events in China of the last month have told each and every one of us that there is truly no such thing as the American dream. Rather there is a universal dream in the hearts and minds of people all over the world who simply yearn for the chance to be free and the right to chart their own destiny.¹⁰¹⁵

Senator David Boren similarly talked about the tragedy of the deaths in China for people “seeking what human beings all around the world seek most, spiritual value of democracy, and freedom to develop their potential to the fullest.”¹⁰¹⁶

A far less universal definition of human rights was that of Representative Ronald Marlenee who argued strongly for the inclusion of the right to bear arms as a fundamental human right. He suggested that:

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11554, 10873.

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.12852, 10873.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10786.

¹⁰¹¹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11215, 12858, 12943, 10872.

¹⁰¹² *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.10786, 12853, 12854-55, 12855, 10873, 10874, 12943, 13288.

¹⁰¹³ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11812, 12856.

¹⁰¹⁴ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12944.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10787.

¹⁰¹⁶ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10874.

If the Chinese had the right to keep and bear arms, they would be free today. The administration and gun-control advocates propose that we turn over — to a government agency — the authority to decide what firearms are legitimate for ‘sporting purposes’ ... The Chinese did that a long time ago. And they died in Beijing Sunday, June 8 [sic].¹⁰¹⁷

Congressional discourse also tied together freedom, human rights and economic liberalization. Economic reform was portrayed as essentially linked with political reform — what Senator Christopher (Kit) Bond called the “undeniable fact that economic reforms ... are impossible without equal and coordinated political and social reforms.”¹⁰¹⁸ Other senators talked about the fact that China’s government desired “Western economic modernization” but was “not willing to pay the price of the accompanying political democracy”; they noted “how universal is the human desire for freedom and economic opportunity and how totally communism has failed to provide either.”¹⁰¹⁹

This indictment of communism was a common thread through congressional responses to the Chinese government’s actions on June 4. Communism was inextricably tied to definition of human rights in the negative — that is, it equated denial of human rights. Members of congress tended to use the terms communism, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, Nazism, Stalinism and Orwellian metaphors interchangeably. References were made to “Gestapo-type films,” “elements of Nazism,” a “Stalin-type hotline” to denounce protesters and “Orwellian actions.”¹⁰²⁰ Representative John Porter talked about the “bankruptcy of totalitarian communism,” while others cited the “Communist dictatorship” and the “tyranny of a totalitarian Communist government.”¹⁰²¹ Most importantly, violations of human rights were explicitly talked about in terms of communism. Representative Gephardt presented his perspective that:

I think we knew instinctively that Communists do things differently from other cultures and other peoples. They hold human life more cheaply. What has happened in Tiananmen Square confirms that and bears that out... So I think history is constantly the reference point for proving sadly and tragically that communism views human beings as units of production and consumption and considers them expendable, rather than as human beings with human dignity and human rights.¹⁰²²

Senator Helms concurred with this perspective, arguing that he was not surprised by the events in China because “After all, this is what communism is all about.” He then called the Chinese government “an organization of gangsters masquerading as a government.”¹⁰²³ Senator Coates declared that “socialism has failed amid mountains of the innocent dead,” while Senator Moynihan similarly argued that the “totalitarian idea is dead,” but the “totalitarian practice is alive and well, stripped of its ideological pretension, and wielded, now as always, to defined the power of an elite.”¹⁰²⁴ These statements did not simply

¹⁰¹⁷ *Congressional Record: 1989, pp.11751-52.*

¹⁰¹⁸ *Congressional Record* 1989, p.10875.

¹⁰¹⁹ *Congressional Record: 1989, pp.12219, 12943-44.*

¹⁰²⁰ *Congressional Record: 1989, pp.12855, 12856, 13436.*

¹⁰²¹ *Congressional Record: 1989, pp.11582, 11811, 10872.*

¹⁰²² *Congressional Record: 1989, p.12853.*

¹⁰²³ *Congressional Record: 1989, p.13318.*

¹⁰²⁴ *Congressional Record: 1989, pp.10875, 13125.*

condemn the communist government of China; they went further and used communism as a synonym for violation of human rights.

Congressional Linkage of Human Rights and Foreign Policy

The congressional discussion of human rights contained several linkages between human rights and foreign policy. Firstly, the relationship between China and the United States was portrayed as dependent on China's adherence to certain human rights standards. Foreign policy in general was subsequently portrayed as being made in response to human rights violations. Linked with this was the proposition that the United States government had a responsibility to respond to violations of human rights, even if this raised issues of sovereignty. This responsibility was presented in terms of moral obligation, as sharing American values and experiences, as investment for the future and as an obligation concomitant with world leadership. Finally, linkages between human rights and foreign policy were discussed in terms of the tension between idealistic and pragmatic approaches to policy-making.

The Sino-American relationship's dependence on human rights standards was articulated in terms of American inability to maintain normal relations in the face of Chinese government-sponsored violence against demonstrators. This inability was expressed most often through phrases indicating that the relationship would not be "business as usual" — that the United States' "respect for human rights outweighs business as usual" or that "The American government cannot conduct normal relations with a regime that believes itself free to act that way."¹⁰²⁵ The idea of normal relations was discussed largely in diplomatic terms — of feeling "no obligation to maintaining diplomatic ties with any brutally suppressive regime" — and in terms of continuing to extend Most Favored Nation status to China. Senator Alan Cranston expressed this argument as "China cannot be a favored nation while at the same time shooting down its citizens."¹⁰²⁶ Senator Byrd clearly expressed congressional sentiment on this matter saying:

America cannot possibly be in the position of rewarding, appearing to reward, or to in any way countenance such acts... For America to allow business as usual in the face of these despicable acts runs afoul of the core of values and the principles of civilized governance... There should be no confusion about where America stands in the face of the barbaric acts of the Chinese Government.¹⁰²⁷

Similarly Representative Barney Frank argued passionately that the Chinese government:

must not delude themselves into thinking that they can engage in that kind of brutality, turn their backs on the principles of freedom, and continue nonetheless to enjoy the land of warming relations between societies and governments that we have had ... The Chinese Government has the ability to pull back ... If they value good relations with us, they should do that.¹⁰²⁸

Making policy decisions on the basis of human rights violations was seen as appropriate by members of congress. Senator Cranston argued, "It is not enough just to regret actions taken

¹⁰²⁵ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.12857,10873.

¹⁰²⁶ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11812,13126.

¹⁰²⁷ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.13288.

¹⁰²⁸ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10787.

by the Chinese Government. We must take actions of our own.”¹⁰²⁹ Senator Moynihan was even more explicit in linking policy decisions and human rights, saying that the appropriate response to totalitarianism was to “notice, remember and react And each time democracy triumphs... we must be ready to reward.”¹⁰³⁰ Other members of congress talked about the need to “go beyond rhetoric” or paying “Lip service to freedom” to instead send strong signals and to use policy to force change.¹⁰³¹

Policies to force change were talked about in terms of both negative and positive actions. The positive came through such acts as granting MFN status, which Senator Moynihan explicitly identified as a tool for spreading human rights, saying that it was used to “buttress America’s defense of human rights around the world.”¹⁰³² Other forms of positive reinforcement came through granting commercial contracts, such as boosting American satellites with Long March rockets as “an important American gesture of support for the trend towards modernization and democratization.”¹⁰³³ The imposition of sanctions, removal of MFN status and denial of foreign aid were seen as ways to “make it clear... to the Chinese authorities that their conduct is not acceptable” and to “support those Chinese who believe in peace and freedom, human life and human dignity.”¹⁰³⁴

Linked to the notion that policy decisions should be made with consideration of human rights issues was the argument that governments, and specifically the United States government, have the responsibility to respond to human rights violations — even if such responses raised issues of sovereignty. Representative James Leach expressed his perspective that “[i]t is always awkward to comment on the affairs of other states, but there comes a time in the affairs of states when it is fitting and proper for outsiders to speak.”¹⁰³⁵ Senator Mitchell expressed similar sentiments when he concluded, “The United States cannot and should not attempt to dictate the course of internal events in China. But we can and should state clearly and unequivocally our strong support for those who are placing their lives and futures on the line in support of democracy in China.”¹⁰³⁶ This obligation was placed in a historical context by Representative James Bilbray, who expressed his concern: “What has happened to the Chinese students is an abomination and reminiscent of what happened in Nazi Germany, where the American Government stood by and said, ‘That is an internal matter of the German Government; we cannot do anything.’”¹⁰³⁷

The idea that certain issues overrode the concerns of sovereignty was tied to ideas of world community. The world was presented as a community where human rights violations could no longer take place in private. This notion was presented through descriptions of people as the “villagers of the globe... looking out the front window via television and seeing what is really happening” and through descriptions of the world watching “as the Chinese Government tries to intimidate its own people.”¹⁰³⁸ The reason given for people’s interest and concern was the interdependence of the world community — the idea that a “threat to human

¹⁰²⁹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.13126.

¹⁰³⁰ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.13125-26.

¹⁰³¹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.12857, 11810, 10874, 12218.

¹⁰³² *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.13125.

¹⁰³³ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12737.

¹⁰³⁴ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.11582.

¹⁰³⁵ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10787.

¹⁰³⁶ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10872.

¹⁰³⁷ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10786.

¹⁰³⁸ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11280,11375.

rights anywhere is a threat to human rights everywhere” — and that “human rights are not an internal matter but are the basis for relationships among people.”¹⁰³⁹

This responsibility to act was most often discussed in terms of moral obligation. The idea of obligation was expressed through frequent use of such phrases as “must” (“we must stand up for them and with them”) and “must not” (“this Congress must not be silent.”)¹⁰⁴⁰ Others articulated this moral obligation even more explicitly with such declarations as “Our moral imperative demands that we be unequivocal” and “We have the right, and an obligation, to speak out.”¹⁰⁴¹ Sentiment was clear in congress that this moral obligation arose from American historical experience and values -- what Senator Mitchell called the result of the world looking to the United States as the “arsenal of democracy, the beacon of freedom, the voice of self-government and self-determination.”¹⁰⁴²

This idea that Americans had a responsibility to share their own experiences and values came through clearly. Many members of congress said that the demonstrators in China had drawn inspiration from American history and described the students as “trying to emulate what we accomplished over 200 years ago”; the students were taking ‘Thomas Jefferson and other American heroes as their inspiration for this struggle.”¹⁰⁴³ Representative William Broomfield argued that “the students look to the United States as a model for human rights,” and others spoke about students having learned about freedom while studying in the United States and taking that knowledge back to China with them.¹⁰⁴⁴ Still other members of congress said the United States had a special responsibility because of her historical experience; Representative Benjamin Gilman said, “As the longest standing democracy in the world, the United States has the obligation to provide a leading example to all nations in supporting basic liberties for all citizens of the world”; and Representative David Skaggs argued, “They drew their inspiration in no small part from the ideals and even the symbols, the goddess of democracy, of this country. We can do no less than to stand with them now.”¹⁰⁴⁵ In addition to having responsibilities, Americans were also presented as having a special understanding of the concerns of the Chinese students because of their own history. Americans needed to take a stand to be true to their own nature because “[e]ach shot that takes a life, when met by silence or indifference or a sense of impotence, also takes with it a piece of who we are and what we are supposed to stand for as a nation.”¹⁰⁴⁶

Another connection made between foreign policy and human rights was that concern for human rights as expressed through policy decisions was an investment for the future — that is, something that would benefit the United States. This investment was presented in two different lights. One was the assumption that the student protesters were eventually going to take power in China and would remember American support.¹⁰⁴⁷ The other was that the future path of China was dependent on United States actions in the present Senator Simon argued that “our long term interest lies in a free democratic China” and gave the reason that actions at that moment would strengthen the role of so-called moderates in the Chinese

¹⁰³⁹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.12855-56.

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.12854,12853.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.12857, 10873.

¹⁰⁴² *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12943.

¹⁰⁴³ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.10787,12838.

¹⁰⁴⁴ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11333, 10786, 10787.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12834.

¹⁰⁴⁶ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.13290-91.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10787.

government.¹⁰⁴⁸ Senator Mitchell argued more forcefully that a stand must be taken to ensure future relations because the “Chinese Government is an institution that will exist beyond the men now organizing and directing this mass terror... this Chinese Government cannot permanently endure, given its brutal acts against its own people... we must make clear how America feels and where America stands on this issue.”¹⁰⁴⁹

A further sense of obligation to incorporate human rights concerns into foreign policy was presented as coming from the perceived role of the United States’ world leadership. Over and over the United States was presented as having a responsibility to act as “leader of the free world” and as “leader of the world’s democracies, as the symbol of freedom throughout the world”; as needing to “lead the Western response” and as being watched by a whole world “looking for leadership.”¹⁰⁵⁰

It was not until June 14, six days after news of the attacks on students reached the United States, that congressional discourse turned from pure rhetoric to practical considerations of the implications of certain foreign policy stances and decisions. At this point, the debate arose between the idealists, who were presented as wanting sanctions against China at any cost, and the pragmatists, who tended to want to preserve ties with China. The idealist position was represented by the arguments that the United States’ response was “overly timid and cautious”; that “economic considerations cannot outweigh our commitment to human freedom”; that there are some values that take precedence over commerce, and that there is a point beyond which we will not stomach business as usual”; that the events in China “must be met with public rage... by an unrelenting and unmistakable willingness to change immediately and significantly the status quo of our relationship” and that the “protection of human rights is something that must never be sacrificed for the sake of political or economic expediency.”¹⁰⁵¹ Senator Heinz criticized a decade of American relations with China, saying, “We have used the desire to normalize relations with China for geopolitical reasons as an excuse to sweep under the rug any impulse to criticize China’s human rights violations.”¹⁰⁵²

The pragmatist position was that the relationship with China needed to be maintained in order for the United States to have any influence over China. Representative Broomfield argued, “We still have a bit of leverage with the Chinese leadership. We can throw that influence away to register our righteous indignation at China’s policies, or we can use that leverage to help move China away from repression.”¹⁰⁵³ The pragmatist position in general supported President Bush — particularly pragmatists like Senator Dole who argued that the president has “sent a clear, measured message, and I am convinced it is exactly the right message, true to our ideals and consistent with our interests.”¹⁰⁵⁴ Senator Boren also praised the president for having “left the door open” to China and argued that maintenance of the relationship would ultimately be to the best benefit of the United States and those in China “working for change and reform.”¹⁰⁵⁵ There appeared to be little middle ground in this highly partisan division over policy. The only form of middle ground was that occupied by members like

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10876.

¹⁰⁴⁹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12943.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11213, 12944, 10876, 12857.

¹⁰⁵¹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11812, 12857, 13288, 13290, 13436.

¹⁰⁵² *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.13478.

¹⁰⁵³ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.13497.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10873.

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10874.

Representative Sangmeister, who described the United States as being in a dilemma -- but one where solution had to be to condemn the actions of China. His conclusion was that:

There is no way we can, or would want to, back down on our commitment to human rights. However, what do we do with a regime that occupies a strategic position and has been a real offset to the Soviet Union... I frankly do not see how we can turn our backs on these students even though we ride a setback to both our strategic and commercial interests.¹⁰⁵⁶

Congressional Attribution of Agency in Foreign Policy

Unanimity being rare in congress, there existed little agreement as to which parties had the greatest proportion of power in the making of foreign policy. Agreement was possible that both congress and the executive branch of government had agency, but individuals differed on division power between the two. In assigning power to the president and his administration, two different approaches were taken. In the first approach, calls for the president to take action against the Chinese government implicitly gave agency to the administration — for example, such statements as Representative Joseph Brennan’s “call on President Bush and Secretary of State Baker to immediately remove most-favored-nation trade status from China” and Senator Byrd’s gentle expression of hope that “when we, the Senate, returns [sic], the administration will have acted.”¹⁰⁵⁷ In the second approach, the administration was explicitly given agency and congress was criticized for seeking input into the foreign policy process — which was seen to lessen the impact of the United States speaking with “one voice.”

This notion of “one voice” was central to the second approach. This was elaborated through such comments as the “United States must speak with one voice at this critical juncture in world history”; “we have a Nation that speaks with one voice. The voice in this case is the President of the United States”; and “Only when we speak with a single voice in a situation like this can the United States have maximum impact.”¹⁰⁵⁸ Senator John Danforth extended this notion in outlining his and Senator Boren’s attempts to establish a bipartisan foreign policy, describing the:

seeming irresistible impulse for the Congress of the United States to want to weigh in on every foreign policy issue with microscopic detail. We have pointed out that when that happens, the country does not speak with one voice. It tends to be a message of confusion, a cacophony of confusion to the rest of the world ... We should support the President at this time ... we are of one mind in the United States, so let us act as though we are of one mind. Let us support the President of the United States in addressing this major issue of foreign policy.¹⁰⁵⁹

The most important point in Senator Danforth’s statement is his belief that all Americans held the same view on the events in China — basically his disallowance of alternate interpretations and policy responses. Senator Mitchell came out even more strongly in favor of President Bush, declaring, “Only the President of the United States speaks for all

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Congressional Record*: 1989, p.11810.

¹⁰⁵⁷ *Congressional Record*: 1989, pp.12845, 13288.

¹⁰⁵⁸ *Congressional Record*: 1989, pp.11213, 12857, 10873.

¹⁰⁵⁹ *Congressional Record*: 1989, p.10874.

Americans. Only the President of the United States is the leader of the free world ... It is the President of the United States and he alone who can give voice to American ideals.”¹⁰⁶⁰

Other members of congress assigned a greater measure of agency to themselves than to the president. This view of power was largely implicit through exclusive focus on congressional policy decisions and actions. Thus, members discussed such actions as refusal to renew MFN status — and specifically the Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking human rights and foreign aid -- refusal of World Bank loans, and denial of participation in the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.¹⁰⁶¹ Representatives Meldon Levine and Barbara Boxer spoke out clearly about taking actions “in terms of a resolution and in terms of a foreign aid bill” and asking “for the killings to stop.”¹⁰⁶² Similarly, Senator Mitchell described sending “a strong signal to the Government of China that the U.S. Senate condemns the actions they have taken.”¹⁰⁶³

A third approach to assigning agency in foreign policy was that both congress and the administration played a part Representative George Sangmeister made reference to the “President, Congress, or both acting in concert,” while others talked about “we in the Congress, along with the administration”; some referred to “speaking in unison, Democrats and Republicans, the administration and the Congress” and to the fact that “the Bush Administration and Congress will consider additional steps.”¹⁰⁶⁴ Representative Broomfield outlined the balance between the role of congress and that of the president as being that:

There is a need for continued consultation between Congress and the executive branch... It is important that the Bush administration have the option to respond quickly to changes should the situation deteriorate, and that the Congress stay continuously informed on administration actions ... I hope that we can fashion a comprehensive amendment which would maintain the bipartisan spirit while giving Congress the opportunity to provide policy direction on this important question.¹⁰⁶⁵

Thus, Broomfield aptly summed up the tension between the branches of government -- the need for flexible responses to foreign policy crises on the part of the president and the need for congress to remain informed and to provide advice and input into the foreign policy process.

The American Discourse of Human Rights in 1989

Print media discussion of human rights in 1989 focused on definition of human rights as political and civil rights — especially freedom, democracy and security of person. In doing so, the discourse of human rights in 1989 looks very similar to that in 1976. Greater emphasis was placed by media coverage in 1989 than was the case in 1979 on the provision of human rights through the establishment of democratic government. Analysis of congressional statements also found an emphasis on democracy — similar to congressional emphasis in 1976. Over the period of study, congress consistently portrayed human rights as best provided through democracy, and it seems that the print media discourse gradually moved

¹⁰⁶⁰ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12944.

¹⁰⁶¹ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11282, 13125, 12276, 12733.

¹⁰⁶² *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.12733,12854.

¹⁰⁶³ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.10872.

¹⁰⁶⁴ *Congressional Record: 1989*, pp.11810, 11811, 12858, 13477.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Congressional Record: 1989*, p.12852.

closer to such congressional definitions of human rights. Inasmuch as print media and congressional discussions were responding to the brutal events in China, social and economic rights were a limited part of the discourse. Any discussion of these aspects of human rights was tied to provision of political rights — that economic liberalization would lead to political liberalization. This linkage allowed discussion of second-generation (social, cultural and economic) rights only in terms of first-generation (civil and political) rights and reinforced the argument that human rights are best provided through Western capitalist democracy.

Other than the addition of democracy to definitions of human rights, the discourse of human rights in the print media remained remarkably consistent from earlier case studies — an international standard of behavior guiding political and civil rights provided through democracy and denied through communism. Present in earlier print media discussions of human rights, but absent in those of 1976, notions of progress were re-introduced in ways of talking about human rights in 1989. Definition of human rights in terms of civilization became discussion of human rights in terms of modernity and capitalism. However recast, these ideas remained the same: that a “modern” nation (defined as a capitalist democracy) acknowledged that international standards governed the way a government could treat its people and that it conducted its internal affairs in accordance with these standards. The congressional discourse of human rights was similar, with progress equated with civilization and additional linkage of progress to more overt statements of moral values — and identification of these values as American.

As argued earlier, by 1976, both in print media coverage of human rights issues and in congressional discussions of these issues, it was largely accepted that human rights were a valid part of foreign policy and that the United States had a responsibility — as a member of a world community and as a world leader ~ to support efforts to provide human rights to citizens of other countries and to consider human rights in forming relationships with other countries. Although these notions were prevalent in discourses of human rights, questions remained how best these could be incorporated — questions about the implications to national interests. American history and values were portrayed by all the sources studied as necessitating inclusion of human rights in foreign policy, but their inclusion was to be on the basis of negotiation between the competing interests of sovereignty and participation in world affairs.

Having identified some aspects of a twentieth-century American discourse of human rights in the preceding chapters, the implications of this discourse for the larger questions guiding this dissertation must be addressed. These questions include how ideas come to be seen as “common sense”; the role of news media in the construction of national identity and discourse — how the media articulate and circulate ideas in society and implications of an American discourse of human rights for international discussions of human rights. The final chapter speculates on the implications of the findings of this research for addressing these questions, the contributions of this research to media, political and historical studies and potential future directions for research.

Chapter Seven

Twentieth-Century American Stories of Human Rights

Analysis of print media and political discussion of the Paris Peace Talks in January 1919, the San Francisco conference of 1945, the Ford-Carter foreign policy debate of October 1976 and U.S. responses to the Tiananmen massacre of 1989 found a consistent American discourse of human rights across almost a century. In its simplest form, this discourse equated human rights with the political and civil rights provided through a democratic political system and denied by other forms of government — specifically by communist systems. Human rights were couched in terms of civilization, progress, modernity and capitalism under the umbrella of universal standards of behavior -- standards that derived from moral values linked to American history and experiences.

This discourse then is one of morality, constructed largely — as moral discourses often are — in terms of dichotomies. Good was contrasted with bad, right with wrong, principles with immorality, justice with injustice, civilization with anarchy, order with disorder, modernity with antiquity, freedom with imprisonment and democracy with communism. The language of the discourse emphasized the dichotomies through the language of battle, construction (“building a new world”), progress (growth, change, travel along a road, pioneers striking out into the wilderness), curing illness and negotiation between the competing concerns of sovereignty and national interest.

This last contrast was apparent not only in the language of the discourse, but appeared also as a major theme of any discussion of the role of human rights in foreign policy. As discussed more fully below, the United States was seen as having a responsibility to share its experience of freedom with the world, but that responsibility was tempered always with a fear that participation in a world community would lead to undesirable results — such as loss of sovereign power and entanglement in complex, unsolvable political situations.

American historical experience was a primary reason for the inclusion of human rights in foreign policy. This linkage of human rights and foreign policy occurred as early as 1919 in both media and political discourse. A nation based on moral principles was seen to have been successfully created — one perceived to be free of the taint of the secret power-politics of Europe. President Wilson in a speech to congress in 1917 referred to the “old way” of doing politics as “little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools.”¹⁰⁶⁶ In contrast, the U.S. constitution was portrayed as guaranteeing freedom and individual human rights. The United States was thus portrayed as having a responsibility to share the values and experience that had been gained from many years of democratic government.

Findings suggest that the ideas that comprise the American discourse of human rights and that motivated the inclusion of human rights concerns in foreign policy derive from earlier discourses -- such as that of Manifest Destiny. The threads identified in the construction of an

¹⁰⁶⁶ President Wilson’s War Message, April 2, 1917, *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 55, Part I, p.102 in Ruhl J. Bartlett (Ed.), (1960), *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), p.457.

ideology of universal rights are interwoven with religious concepts and a clear perception of the role played by God in bringing the American people to this point in history. Thus, it can be said that linkages between human rights and foreign policy were evident during the peace discussions after World War One. This is significant because it is a much earlier linkage than many historians suggest. However, these linkages can also be seen to have arisen out of the traditional discourse of Manifest Destiny — with Woodrow Wilson’s annotation of a Frederick Jackson Turner paper on internationalism in his Paris conference files as interesting supporting evidence of these ties. Thus the question remains, when did the linkage between human rights and foreign policy become common in the media and in political discourse? Further research would have to trace the development of the concept of Manifest Destiny and its role in foreign policy through media reports of the Spanish-American and Mexican wars and congressional debate of the time to ascertain whether human rights and policy decisions were explicitly linked.

Ideas and Ideology

Having identified an American discourse of human rights in twentieth century news media and politics, one can examine the implications of this discourse for the larger questions driving this research. In many ways these larger questions are unanswerable at this point. However, informed speculation can be made about such questions as how ideas become “common sense” in society; the role of the news media in constructing national discourse; the role of the media in the foreign policy process; implications of U.S. discourse for international discussions of human rights and the potential contribution of this research to media, political and historical studies.

Telling Stories About Human Rights

Analyzing the way in which human rights were talked about in various print media sources and by congress and presidents, this research rests on the assumption that stories are important in understanding ideas and ideology. Political scientists Sanford Schram and Philip Neisser argue that “stories, wherever told, whether unconsciously articulated through the invocation of prevailing discourse or consciously fashioned by participating in the rumor mill, are critical constitutive forces in politics and public policymaking.”¹⁰⁶⁷ Schramm and Neisser go on to say that stories:

construct political space itself, letting us know where it begins and where it ends, who populates it and who does not, which of their concerns are to be included and which are to be excluded. Stories... create a narrative coherence that not only defines but helps to realize political spaces, and they necessarily do so in politically biased ways. Stories map space and keep time in ways that impose coherence on identities, interests, and institutionalized groupings.¹⁰⁶⁸

Storytelling as a mapping of space that imposes coherence on ideas is illustrated by this research. Continual retelling of a particular story of human rights over the course of nearly a century inscribes that story as the story of human rights at least in a part of the world. Another way to say this is to use Stuart Hall’s notion of the naturalistic illusion and Fairclough’s argument about the naturalization of ideology to talk about how the “common

¹⁰⁶⁷ Sanford F. Schramm and Philip T. Neisser (Eds.), (1997), *Tales of the State: Narrative in Contemporary U.S. Politics and Public Policy*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield), p.5.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Schramm and Neisser, (1997), *Tales of the State*, p.5.

sense” story of human rights outlined in previous chapters came into existence.¹⁰⁶⁹ By telling and retelling a particular story of human rights, the fact that it is a story, and, as such, a particular ideological representation, becomes lost and the story simply becomes the way to talk about human rights.

The Storytellers of Foreign Policy

In telling the twentieth-century American story of human rights, the print media play an important role. It is difficult to ascertain whether human rights were linked first in the press or in public policy. However, it is clear that over the course of nearly a century, the discourse of human rights in the print media and in congressional debate became largely indistinguishable, and indeed, interacted to tell a coherent story of human rights. In this story, the media were not seen as actors in their own right, but the role of the media cannot be ignored as storytellers and as disseminators of notions of human rights. The media are also important in identifying the characters in the story — what Schramm and Neisser describe above as “who populates it ” Thus, it is difficult to identify whether media merely play supporting roles in foreign policy rather than roles of direct advocacy.

It is clear that congress and the president have power in foreign policy and that both are important narrators of foreign policy. Across the period of study, perceptions of the role of congress and the president in foreign policy fluctuated (even in congress) between attribution of power to congress and to the president and his administration. Each president attributed the greatest role in foreign policy to himself. In contrast, analysis of congressional discussions showed significant debate over congress’ own role in policymaking. Not until 1976 did congress take a larger role by formulating an independent path to the inclusion of human rights in foreign policy. The 1976 and 1989 case studies showed strong congresses seeking to influence presidential decision-making in foreign policy. The earlier case studies revealed debate in congress over the appropriate role of congress in policymaking but not the same level of congressional independence. What remained consistent was the debate over constitutional and customary allocation of power between the branches of government The role of the media is less clear. Although the media do not have formal power in foreign policy, it can be argued that as narrators, storytellers and disseminators of information, the media are an important part of foreign policy in the United States.

Implications and Future Directions

Three further questions were suggested in the process of identifying a twentieth-century American discourse of human rights. These questions related to the ideology of human rights: why particular stories of human rights were told; the results of certain stories being told and not others, and whose interests were served by these constructions of human rights. Possible answers to these questions emerge through consideration of the role of hegemony in the creation of an ideology of human rights.

American political discourse emphasizes civil and political rights over other rights, such as social, cultural and economic rights. Such an emphasis illustrates the Gramscian idea of negotiation as part of the process of hegemony. That is, civil and political rights are rights that Western capitalist democracies can provide without undermining their own bases of

¹⁰⁶⁹ Stuart Hall, (1996), ‘Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates’ in James Curran, David Moriey and Valerie Walkerdine (Eds.), *Cultural Studies and Communications*. (London: Arnold), pp.24-25 and Norman Fairclough, (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, (London and New York: Longman), pp.41-42.

power. Social, economic and cultural rights (often referred to as second- and third- generation rights) undermine, or have the potential to undermine, and destabilize some of the fundamental tenets of Western capitalism ~ such as the notion of the free market and government non-interference outside the political domain. Conversely, human rights defined as civil and political rights undermine authoritarian bases of power. Thus, by acceptance of certain definitions of human rights, dominant groups in society can be seen to address human rights concerns of individuals and human rights organizations, while defusing potential challenges to their authority and dominance. The role of the media can be seen as transmitting the concerns of individuals and groups to those in power and circulating a refashioned definition of human rights in society. This refashioned definition becomes “common sense”; that is, it is naturalized as an universal truth.

This dissertation discusses an American discourse of human rights in the twentieth century. To fully explore the theoretical proposition discussed above requires a comparative study of authoritarian and social democratic societies. If the theoretical direction indicated in this work proves useful, the discourses of human rights in these different kinds of political systems should differ from those of the United States. The discourse of human rights in social democracies should contain a balance of political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights, while the discourse in authoritarian systems should emphasize second-generation social and economic rights. The implication of this for international discussions of human rights is to provide different ways of approaching debates over human rights. Awareness of differing historical stories of human rights developed to meet different political and social requirements opens an universalizing discourse of rights to multiple voices.

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