

## **Representative Decision Making: Constituency Constraints on Collective Action**

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### Overview

This chapter focuses on the role of group and national identity in various types of collective actions. It features the decision to take action and asks about factors that influence that decision. Thus, our perspective is from the standpoint of the decision-maker who usually represents a collectivity (group, organization, nation). The interest is less about those decision-makers' *own* identities and attachments than about various *drivers and constraints* on their decisions to act.

People responsible for developing organizational and national policies often think in terms of futuristic scenarios. They ask about options in the form of “what ...if,” and turn alternative stories around in their mind. They play out some implications of alternative futures – with regard to such problems as the stability of regimes, the mobility of elites, negotiating tactics, and peacekeeping operations. This study takes advantage of this familiar kind of thinking about policy and action. We ask: What if a situation were like this? What would you do? We then continue the questioning in an attempt to tease out the reasons for the decision, in this case various collective actions. We add an analytical dimension to scenario decision making. By administering the scenarios to a large population of respondents, we can systematically vary several aspects of both situations and actions. By using a simple rating task, we can produce scales – like temperature scales – that distinguish more (“hotter”) from less (“cooler”) important elements in decision making. This is a new approach to the study of decision making in an international context.

### Background

We define collective action as a situation when a group member (in our case this group member is a decision-maker) acts as a representative of the group and where the action is directed to the group as a whole (Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam 1990; Wright and Tropp 2002). We construe decision makers as negotiating representatives. As in many negotiations, they must be responsive to their constituencies or principals (see Aquilar and Galluccio, 2008; Galluccio, 2007).

Referred to as a boundary role, this responsiveness must be balanced with the demands made by the opposing negotiators or national decision makers. Demands may take the form of threatened violence from a neighbouring nation, internal protests of administration policies, or pleas for humanitarian aid for nations in crisis. The decision taken in response to these demands is influenced by various features of national constituencies. This influence process has been modelled as an information processing problem, where decision makers weight the features in terms of their impact on decisions (Druckman, 1977). This study applies this negotiation model to several types of collective action decisions.

Our framework identifies five aspects of “constituencies” that may drive or constrain decisions to take action on behalf of the group or nation: These aspects are motivation, efficacy, type of identity, durability of identity, and spread of identity. The motivational and efficacy variables resemble those developed by Gurr and Davies (2002). The identity variables are based on a three-factor theory of national identity proposed by Druckman (2001).

The work done by Gurr and his colleagues on ethno-political conflicts inspired this project. However, there are important differences between the projects. Their research focuses on the action itself, coded as events (dependent variables). We are concerned with the decisions to take action. We do not focus specifically on ethnic groups, although the distinction between national and ethnic identities is often blurred. They explore the impacts of 19 variables on violent collective actions: These are organized into the categories of incentives for action, group identity, group capacity, and domestic and international opportunity factors. We consolidate these variables into three categories, motivation to act, efficacy in acting, and group identity.

Our motivational variable is similar to their international opportunities for collective action, but also includes the severity of the threat. Our efficacy variable is similar to their group organization and territorial concentration indicators but also includes readiness to take action. Our political system variable, a part of group identity, incorporates their repression, restrictions, and autocratic or mixed polities indicators. We define it specifically in terms of type of political system, as autocratic or democratic. The other two parts of identity are not included in their set but derive from theoretical work on national identity developed largely within the social-psychology literature. Even though Gurr and his colleagues have taken into consideration the ‘perceived’ nature of deprivation, their identity variables did not capture the underlying psychological processes that enhance the likelihood of collective action. Yet, these psychological processes, such as the strength of in-group identification, are essential to our understanding of identity. Our durability variable refers to the strength of citizen identity, distinguishing between strong and weak ties to the nation. The spread variable is defined in terms of the amount of citizen support for actions as indicated in public opinion polls (see Druckman, 2001).

Another important difference is that unlike their project -- and most studies of political and ethnic violence -- we do not limit the focus to violent actions. We focus on several types of collective actions. These include violent, non-violent, and humanitarian actions. We know little about the decisions for non-violent protests and probably less about why nations (or other groups such as NGOs) participate in humanitarian missions in other countries. It will be interesting to learn whether the same (or different) variables that influence decisions to act violently also influence decisions to act in non-violent ways. For instance, studies on democratic peace theory suggest that regime type constrains or prevents states from going into wars in both the monadic (Maoz and Abdolai 1989; Rummel 1995) and dyadic versions of this theory (Russett 1993). The theory provides a single factor explanation for decisions to go to war and limits the focus to one type of collective decision, violent actions.

At the heart of this project are questions about identity. These questions have been largely ignored in the literatures on causes of international conflict. Those studies focus mostly on the characteristics of the international system such as alliances and polarity, power capabilities of states, and geopolitics. (Singer et al. 1972, Bremer 1980; Bueno de Mesquita 1981, Maoz 1989, Waltz 1990)

On the other hand, identity is taken into account in the civil war/internal conflict literatures. These literatures deal with identity in two ways. First, some of the studies that consider grievance as a key factor take identity into consideration as part of the *motivation* for collective action (e.g., Gurr, 1993, 2000; Reynal-Querol 2002). According to this view, grievances about unjust treatment are shared by group members and reflected in their cultural identity, which serves as a motivator for collective action (Aquilar, Galluccio, 2008; Gurr 1993). Second, other studies take identity or grievance into consideration but downplay the importance of it in relation to such factors as structural and organizational efficacy or resource mobilization (Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Collier, Hoeffler, and Sambanis 2005; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978).

Further, regardless of the degree of importance they attribute to identity in explaining violent collective action, many of these studies focus attention only on broad categories such as ethnic group or religion. More importantly, while measuring identity, these studies primarily look at grievance-causing indicators as proxies to identity, such as economic inequality, denial of political rights, ethnic polarization, and ethnic dominance (e.g. Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis 2005). To our knowledge, no previous study has examined the strength of citizen identification with an identity group. An attempt is made in this study to unpack the identity variable by examining three components posited to influence decisions to act.

In sum, the emphasis of the most studies in the international and internal conflict literatures is on motivation and efficacy for taking violent actions. We know more about how actions spring from intentions and assets than **from the way citizens identify with their nation, particularly the durability and spread of those citizen**

**identities. This is due in part to the tractability of these variables: stated intentions and assets are easier to measure than is identity.**

The decision-making focus of this project is also mostly missing from the earlier research. The international relations studies discussed in the previous paragraphs deal with the acts or events of violent collective action rather than the factors that are taken into consideration by decision-makers before engaging in collective action. An exception is Lichbach's (1990, 1994) game theoretic model which highlights an individual's dilemma of choice about participating in violent collective action. He regarded collective action to be a matter of individual decision, in which rational actors choose not to rebel when it works against their own interests.

Several studies in the social-psychology literature on collective action focus attention on decision-making as well. These studies distinguish between individual action and collective action and elaborate on the underlying conditions for each (see Turner et al 1987; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Wright and Tropp 1999, 2002; Ellemers 2002). An individual seeks action to achieve personal outcomes when her identity is salient and when she perceives permeability between inter-group boundaries. On the other hand, a person seeks collective action for social change when social identities are salient and impermeability of inter-group boundaries is perceived. Thus, these studies suggest strength of in-group identification as an essential factor in predicting collective action regardless of the degree of perceived grievance, which is a motivational factor.

However, although the studies deal with decision-making regarding collective action, they primarily examine an individual's decision to participate in the action. They do not specifically take political decision-makers/negotiating representatives acting on behalf of nations into consideration. This study attempts to fill this gap in understanding conflict. Specifically we learn about:

- a. The decisions that precede and precipitate actions;
- b. the calculations of decision-makers in the role of group representative;
- c. the way that different kinds of conflict situations impact on decisions, and
- d. the way that the same set of contextual and identity variables influence different types of decisions to act -- violent, non-violent, and humanitarian actions and the mechanisms used to resolve disputes, i.e., international negotiation, mediation, etc.

There are two ways of construing the relationship between identity and the contextual variables of motivation and efficacy. One approach addresses the issue of relative importance of these factors. Each factor is regarded as an independent variable: In other words, identity variables are regarded as being orthogonal to contextual variables. It captures the idea of weighting the importance of one type of factor against another: Do decision makers emphasize citizens' identity more or less than those citizens' motivation and readiness for action? Which aspect of identity or

context is most important? This approach is suited to the study of the way decisions are made and guides this phase of our research.

Another approach examines interactive effects: With regard to motivation, strong identities can intensify the motivation to act. On efficacy, strong identities enhance group cohesion, which, in turn, contributes to performance. This interactive approach is suited to the study of group action or performance, where the dependent variables are the actions themselves. It guides the next phase of our research on collective actions.

A framework for the project is shown in Figure 1. Both independent and interactive effects are depicted. The former asks about relative impacts of the five variables (shown in the smaller boxes) on each of the three types of collective action decisions. The latter asks about whether identity variables mediate the relationship between context and collective action. Mediating effects are depicted by the arrows between the larger boxes.

Figure 1 here

The study design is a static, comparative analysis. It is static because it assesses decisions at a point in time. It is comparative because it explores different situations and collective actions. The methodology is designed to tease out the influences and to evaluate their impact on judgments. And, it is intended to connect to the next phases of the project, where actual actions are taken in selected or sampled cases. It will be interesting to discover whether the key influences on decisions to act are also the primary indicators of the actions taken.

Relatively undeveloped theory on these problems, as we note above, encourages us to approach the topic in an exploratory fashion rather than as an evaluation of theoretically-derived hypotheses. The results will distinguish between more and less important influences on decisions. They contribute to the development of a theory of decision-making for collective action by offering a set of hypotheses induced from the findings. Although this is a descriptive project, it may also have value for practitioners by alerting them to the way decisions about collective actions are made by other countries or groups (rather than the way they should be made by our own country). We turn now to a discussion of the research design.

#### Research Design

For each type of collective action (violent, non-violent, humanitarian) four scenarios were written. They differ in terms of direction of the five variables. The variables either encouraged or discouraged taking action, or they were mixed with contextual (or identity) variables encouraging action and identity (or contextual) variables discouraging action. In one scenario, both the contextual (motivation, efficacy) and the identity (political system, durability, spread) variables were geared in the direction of taking action: For the violent scenario, these are severe threat, high readiness, an autocratic regime, widespread support, and durable nationalist identities. In another scenario, these variables were geared toward inaction: a moderate threat,

low efficacy, a democratic system, limited support, and fluid internationalist identities. An example is the war between the armed forces of Iraq and Iran lasting from September 1980 to August 1988 (efficacy). The autocratic regime of Iraq (political system) viewed the Pan-Islamism and revolutionary Shia Islamism of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran as a substantial threat (motivation). Saddam Hussein's regime used Arab nationalism (durability, spread) to rally population support for the September 22, 1980 attack on Iran. Hussein's pretext was an alleged assassination attempt on Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in southern Iraq.

In another scenario, these variables were geared toward inaction: for example, a moderate threat, low efficacy, a democratic system, limited support, and fluid internationalist identities. An example is the sinking of the docked Rainbow Warrior by the French in New Zealand in 1985. The New Zealand Greenpeace vessel, a boat used to peacefully protest the nuclear tests at the French Mururoa Atoll, was blown up by the "action" branch of the French foreign intelligence services. This was not seen as a substantial threat (motivation) by the democratic New Zealand government (political system), and New Zealand's relatively weak military forces did not go to war with France. Support for action was not widespread, nor were New Zealand's citizens deeply nationalistic. The French bombers were treated in accordance with international law and a trial was held.

Similarly, examples can be given for the non-violent and humanitarian scenarios. Contrasting examples show the difference between situations that encourage either non-violent action or inaction. Following the 2002 Israeli Operation Defensive Shield, an enraged Syrian public was encouraged by the autocratic regime (political system) to boycott American goods (motivation). Widespread public support (spread) from a nationalist citizenry (durability) provided additional impetus to effectively organize the demonstrations (efficacy).

Despite a robust trading relationship between Canada and the US (democratic political systems), issues arise on occasion. Recent disputes over softwood lumber and the beef trade have provided an impetus for protest. However, low threat (motivation) combined with limited support (spread) from an international public (fluid identity) has discouraged action. Limited experience with non-violent demonstrations further discouraged the Canadian public to rally around these issues.

Peacekeeping serves as a context for humanitarian missions. With regard to action, Canadian peacekeeping provides an example. Widespread popular support for Canada's participation in UN missions combines with internationalist and multilateral policies (motivation and durability) to provide strong incentives for active involvement. A well-trained peacekeeping force makes Canada a valued partner in most peacekeeping missions. By contrast, Iran proves an example of inaction. This autocratic government (political system) has been reluctant to participate in UN missions. Limited popular support (spread) combines with nationalist and unilateral policies (motivation and durability) to provide strong disincentives for participation.

A poorly trained military further discourages involvement, both from the vantage point of Iranian regimes and the UN (efficacy).

The other two scenarios were mixed such that the contextual variables were geared toward action (or inaction) while the identity variables were geared toward inaction (action). However, the meaning of “geared toward action or inaction” depends on the type of collective action considered. For example, autocratic regimes with nationalist populations are geared toward taking violent action. Democratic regimes with internationalist populations are geared toward committing to humanitarian missions. These different meanings were taken into account in the construction of the scenarios.

The key variables are underlined in each scenario as shown in the Appendix example of decisions to take humanitarian actions, where the variables were geared toward taking those actions. The research design captures the framework shown above in Figure 1: It permits comparisons among the four configurations of the variables and the three types of actions. It is referred to as a 4 (types of scenarios) by 3 (types of collective actions) design. The comparisons are made among scaled weights for each of the five variables by scenario and by type of collective action. Questions asked are: Do the weights change for the different types of situations for each collective action? Do the weights change for the different types of collective action? For example, is motivation more or less important than efficacy in situations where both are geared to taking action? Is spread more or less important than durability as an influence on decisions to promote humanitarian missions?

#### Data Collection and Analysis

Data were collected from large classes at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia, and from two Universities in Turkey, Bilkent in Ankara and Sabanci in Istanbul. A total of 64 scenarios were distributed at each University, divided into roughly 16 per condition (scenario) for each of the three types of collective actions. There were a total of 179 respondents, assigned randomly to the violent (65), non-violent (54), and humanitarian (60) scenarios.

A random-numbers table was used to order the questionnaires before dissemination in the classes. This satisfies the requirement of random assignment to condition. For most role players the task took between 15 and 20 minutes to complete. There were no apparent problems with understanding the situations or the rating task.

After reading about the situation, role-players were asked to make a decision. For the violent scenario: “Based on the information you received above, will you mobilize your army for action against your neighbor or only put them on readiness alert?” For the non-violent scenario: “Based on the information you received above, will you organize your citizens and NGOs around the country to demonstrate against your neighbor or will you wait for further indications of their intentions before encouraging mass demonstrations of protest from your citizens?” For the humanitarian mission scenario: “Based on the information you received above, will

you send your military and civilian peacekeepers to Asghania or not take any action at all? The role-players were then asked to complete a pair-comparison exercise. This consisted of comparing each variable with each of the other variables, resulting in 10 judgments of ‘more or less importance in influencing your decision.’ Judgments were made in the following format:

a more or less important factor in your decision than:

	Your economy/historical record	Your peacekeeper’s readiness	The spread of citizen support	The strength of citizens’ identity within your nation
Is your political system	More/less	More/less	More/less	More/less
Is your economy /historical record		More/less	More/less	More/less
Is your peacekeepers’ readiness			More/less	More/less
Is the spread of support				More/less

Role-players were told to make decisions by circling “more” or “less” for each comparison without leaving any blank. The method of pair comparisons produces values on a psychological scale. The procedure gives the number and proportion of times each element is judged as being more important than each of the other elements. This produces a proportions matrix, which is then converted into areas of the normal curve. The result is an interval scale.

Based on Thurstone’s law of comparative judgment, the procedure is suited especially for *similar* elements such as colors judged for pleasantness, samples of handwriting judged for excellence, or vegetables judged for taste. We take some license for this task. Here we are asking respondents to judge *different* elements for importance. To the extent that the comparisons can be made, we have confidence that the resulting scales are meaningful. We have reason to believe that the five variables can be ordered and, thus, compared in pair-wise fashion. An advantage of the procedure is that it allows for direct comparisons of situations and actions, which is the goal of this project. (See Guilford, 1954, for technical details of the method.)



## Results

The resulting weights for each of the four scenarios by type of collective action are presented in this section. For each scenario, the five factors are ordered in terms of the size of the weights. The higher the weight, the more important the factor is judged in that scenario. The scaled weights are shown in Tables 1-3. Spacings between factors are rough indications of distance between the weights.

The weights for the violent action scenarios are shown in Table 1. They are summarized as follows:

- (1) Threat -- the motivational variable -- is the strongest factor in the first scenario (high threat/readiness, high nationalism). It remains strong as well for each of the other scenarios.
- (2) One identity variable, spread, is judged as being very strong in scenarios 2, 3, and 4.
- (3) The political system variable is moderately strong in the fourth scenario.
- (4) The efficacy factor is only moderately strong in each of the scenarios.
- (5) Durability is weak in all four scenarios.

Table 1 here

These results suggest that, for decisions about taking violent collective action, spread of support is as important as the threat and more important than efficacy. Strength of identity (durability) is a relatively unimportant consideration in these sorts of decisions, irrespective of whether it is high (primary identity) or low (one of several identities). It seems that the severity of the threat and spread of support are the primary drivers or sources for these decisions. We turn now to the results for the non-violent action scenarios.

The scaled weights for non-violent actions are shown in Table 2. The key findings are summarized as follows:

- (1) Durability of identity is most important in the two scenarios where identity variables are geared toward encouraging non-violent protests.
- (2) The severity of the threat is most important in the two scenarios where the context variables are geared toward taking non-violent actions.
- (3) The other three variables, readiness, spread, and political system, are inconsistent from one scenario to another.

Table 2 here

This is the only type of collective action where durability of identity is a strong influence on decisions. When the constituent population consists mostly of patriots, decisions are based primarily on this information. As in the other types of collective actions, threat is important, but only in the scenarios where the threat is serious. Spread is less important in these scenarios than it is for the other types of actions. However the effects of spread, like readiness and political system, are inconsistent. We turn now to the results from the humanitarian action scenarios.

The weights for the humanitarian action scenarios are shown in Table 3. The key findings are as follows:

- (1) The motivational variable (economy) is consistently strong.
- (2) Spread is also consistently strong, and is very strong (a trumping effect) in scenario 4.
- (3) Readiness is inconsistent, it flip flops from being strong in scenarios 1 and 2 (geared either toward or away from taking action ) to be generally weak in the mixed scenarios 3 and 4.
- (4) Durability and political system are relatively weak in each of the scenarios.
- (5) The largest split between the variables occurs in scenario 1 but an interesting split occurs also in scenario 4, where spread sits alone at the top.

Table 3 here

These results are more remarkable for their similarities than for their differences to those obtained with the violent-action scenarios. In both, the motivational variable is consistently strong, whether defined as a threat (violent scenario) or in terms of the economy (humanitarian scenario). Spread is consistently strong for both types of actions, with the strongest effects in the mixed scenarios 3 and 4. Readiness is similarly inconsistent for both types of collective action, but is stronger in scenarios 1 and 2 than in 3 and 4.

#### Discussion

The purpose of this study is to discover patterns in decision making for collective action. The patterns emerged from judgments made by a large number of respondents, each of whom played a role of policy maker in one of 12 constructed situations (four configurations for each of three types of collective actions).

The pattern highlights three of the five variables, motivation, spread of support, and durability of identity. Motivation and spread are the primary drivers of decisions for both violent and humanitarian actions. These variables have dominant effects across the four scenarios, whether they are geared toward action (severe threat, widespread support) or inaction (modest threat, limited support). These findings suggest a general, *two-factor theory of action*. Further experimentation by the authors showed that these variables are the key influences on action decisions taken in external conflicts. Both the violent and humanitarian action scenarios involved external problems. This suggests that decision makers may be responding primarily to the external feature of these problems, rather than to their source.

Durability plays an important role in decisions to take non-violent actions. This variable is dominant when it is geared in the direction of taking action (primary identity for a patriotic population) but not when it is geared toward inaction (one of several identities, a population of internationalists). Similarly, motivation, defined as severity of the threat, is a strong influence on decisions only when the threat is severe. These findings suggest a contingency theory of action: Durability and motivation are drivers *under some circumstances*. Further experimentation by the authors showed

that durability and threat were the primary drivers on decisions to act in internal conflicts. Thus, the key distinction for actions may be between external (violent and humanitarian scenarios) and internal (non-violent scenario) conflict.

The condition of severe threat makes identity variables less important or not important at all. This finding is corroborated by findings from studies on crisis decision-making. These studies show that in crisis situations (i.e. severe threat to one's existence) there is a contraction in the decision-making unit (Hermann 1972; Lebow 1981). This implies that during such times decision-makers largely ignore their constituencies' preferences. This may be the reason why identity variables were trumped by motivation in our scenarios. Future research should explore this link in real life settings. Another important implication of this finding is that severe threat may increase or interact with the strength of group identification and thus lead to stronger support for violent collective action.

These findings suggest the following set of hypotheses.

1. Motivation in the form of threat will drive decisions about taking violent actions against the source of threat.
2. Motivation in the form of economic development and experience will influence the decision to participate in humanitarian missions.
3. Spread in the form of population support for action will drive decisions to about taking violent actions against the source of the threat.
4. Spread in the form of population support for humanitarian missions will influence the decision to undertake those missions.
5. Durability in the form of primary identity will influence decisions to organize for non-violent protests.
6. Motivation in the form of severity of threat will drive decisions to organize for non-violent protests.
7. Type of political systems (as democratic or authoritarian) will be a less-important influence on decisions to take violent, non-violent, and humanitarian collective actions.

The seventh hypothesis is worth elaborating further, especially in light of the arguments advanced on democratic peace theory. Contradicting the arguments from this theory, we found that political system/regime type was not ranked as a primary constraint on decision-making. Although we did not conduct interviews, we can suggest possible reasons for this finding. One explanation is that only in dyadic relations, democracies constrain decisions for violent collective action (Russett 1993). Since we did not describe the political system of the target of decision in our study, this may be the case. Alternatively, our findings may be supporting those studies that challenge the democratic peace theory based on the argument that the theory overlooked instances of coercive actions short of formal war. Hermann and Kegley (1995) suggest that there are numerous incidents of democratic states intervening with military force against other democracies. Since our scenarios deal with the decision

for taking violent action rather than the act itself, this may be plausible. In any case, our finding encourages further inquiry on this matter. The inquiry will contribute to the scholarly debate regarding the factors that prevent democratic states from going to war with each other.

A final hypothesis is as follows:

8. Readiness for action will be a less-important influence on decisions to take violent, non-violent, or humanitarian actions.

With regard to the importance of identity variables, spread of support appears to be the key driver (along with motivation) of decisions. Durability comes into play but only in a contingent way for non-violent actions. We would conclude that the role played by some identity variables is as significant as that played by some context variables, and is a more important influence on decisions than readiness to act. However, there remains much to be learned about these variables.

The findings can also be interpreted in terms of levers for action. Policy-makers can energize their own populations by manufacturing severe threats and rallying citizen support. They can provoke other nations by posing a severe threat to those with strongly patriotic populations. The Iraq wars are examples. But, they can also encourage support from other nations for their own plight by appealing to developed countries with a history of, and widespread support for, aid. The Tsunami crisis is an example.

The issue of relevance is addressed in terms of a familiar process of thinking about policy and action. The idea of “what ... if” futuristic thinking was introduced at the beginning of this chapter. An attempt was made in this study to reproduce this form of thinking in the context of scenarios. Relevance – or verisimilitude -- to real-world decision-making is enhanced to the extent that we have captured this process. This can be known only by comparing results reported in this chapter with data collected from foreign policy makers. Similar results would support relevance. However, it would be interesting to know whether our linear model captures the way they process the scenario information. Questions about how the information was used in arriving at action decisions would be helpful. It would also be interesting to know what other types of information about populations influence their decisions: Is our distinction between context and identity relevant? Are these the key contextual and identity variables? Answers to these questions would contribute to revisions in our framework and to the content of the scenarios.

The relevance question also turns on our conception of decision makers as negotiating representatives. In this role they are responsive to the preferences of constituents. Preferences are expressed in the form of motivation to act, durability, and spread of identity. The motivation and spread variables were shown to influence decisions in the violent and humanitarian action scenarios; durability influenced non-violent action decisions. The other variables – efficacy and type of political system – had less impact. These results suggest that the role-players were influenced more by constituents’ preferences to act or restrain from acting than by

organizational and systemic factors. They highlight the representational role features of decision-making, and, thus, the relevance of negotiation models. Whether these models also depicts decisions made by the actual policy-makers remains to be investigated.

More practically, the findings have implications for the interface between constituents (or stakeholders) and their representatives. One implication is for the monitoring function in negotiation. Information about motivation and identities helps to formulate negotiation strategies. They also insure that decisions (or concessions) made will resonate with the represented populations. Another implication is for mobilization. Popular collective action decisions facilitate the task of mobilizing citizens to take action, whether military, non-violent, or humanitarian. However, these types of actions may present different mobilization challenges. More generally, the study's results address the connection between decisions made by negotiators and leaders and the collective actions that follow.

A number of next steps are suggested by the findings. One question to be asked concerns the sequencing of decisions: In what order is the information about these variables processed on the way to making decisions? This can be assessed with a decision task where respondents are asked to report on how they use the information in making decisions. Another question concerns interactive or correlated effects: Does a severe (non-severe) threat serve to mobilize (discourage) support for an action?, Is widespread (limited) support easier to mobilize with nationalistic (internationalist) populations? This can be discovered with a factorial design that allows for all combinations of the key variables.

The scenario results alert us to focus on the motivational and spread variables. Cases can be selected in each of four combinations of these variables: high on motivation, high on spread; low motivation, low spread, and the two mixed combinations. These variables can also be explored with a large sampling of cases. Emphasizing the generality of findings, a broad sampling of cases can also be used for modelling.

The generality issue can be addressed with other types of populations. . It would be advantageous to recruit policy makers and/or experts to respond to the same scenarios. The policy makers are those with experience in foreign policy departments of governments. The experts are academics specializing in problems of international collective action. An advantage of our approach to data collection is that judgments can be made in a short amount of time. A problem is that we will not have the captive population of respondents provided by university classes. To an extent, this problem can be overcome by administering all the scenarios and actions to each expert. The data would be analysed as repeated measures, providing us with similar comparisons to those made with the large student population. Of interest is the question of whether the motivational and spread variables are also judged by them to be the key drivers of action decisions.

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## Appendix

### THE SITUATION

You are a national decision-maker from Canasia, which has a democratically elected government where citizens are encouraged but not required to show loyalty to the State. You are faced with the following situation and must make a decision.

A far away country, Asghania, is a failed state and relies on the support of the international community, including your country, to provide security and to distribute humanitarian aid to its impoverished people, whose survival is threatened by the local warlords in the country. Your country is a well-developed nation, which historically has been a contributor to international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Your military and civilian support are well-trained in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Public opinion polls show that there is widespread support among your citizens for sending your peacekeepers on a humanitarian mission to Asghania and most of your citizens regard their national identity as one of their several group identities. The majority of your citizens regard themselves as internationalists.

You must now decide whether you want to send your peacekeepers on a costly humanitarian mission to Asghania which aims at providing security and humanitarian assistance to the people there. Based on the information you received above, will you send your military and civilian peacekeepers to Asghania or not take any action at all? (circle one)

You will notice that there are five underlined elements in this situation. These must be taken into account in making your decision: *your nation's political system, the economic situation and the historical record of your country, the training and readiness of your peacekeepers, the spread of support throughout your population for your actions, and the strength of your citizens' identity within the nation*. We ask you to compare these features of the situation in terms of their relative importance in influencing your decision. This is done with the following procedure.

The matrix below lists each of the elements along the side and at the top. You will compare each element with each of the other elements as a pair-wise comparison. For example, if you think that your nation's political system is a more important influence on your decision than the economic situation and historical record of the country, circle *more*; if the peacekeeper's readiness is less important than the spread of support, circle *less*. Please make a decision of more or less influence on your decision for each of the ten comparisons. Remember you are being asked to compare the row factor with each factor in the four columns.

Tables



Table 1. Violent action scenarios\*

All variables geared toward action (n = 16)

Threat	2
Readiness/efficacy	1.63
Spread	1.17
Durability	1.11
Political system	.70

All variables geared toward inaction (n = 17)

Threat	1
Spread	.95
Readiness/efficacy	.62
Political system	.54
Durability	.34

Context geared toward action, identity toward inaction (n = 16)

Spread	1
Threat	.98
Readiness/efficacy	.58
Political system	.17
Durability	0

Context geared toward inaction, identity toward action (n = 16)

Spread	1
Threat	.92
Political system	.69
Readiness/efficacy	.69
Durability	.47

\* All the scales are inverted in order to present the variables in a descending order of importance from higher to lower weights. Each calculated weight is subtracted from 1 or 2.

Table 2. Non-Violent action scenarios\*

All variables geared toward action (n = 13).

Durability	1
Threat	.84
Spread	.51
System	.33
Readiness	.29

All variables geared toward inaction (n = 12):

Spread	1
Readiness	.78
Durability	.60
Threat	.42
System	.05

Context geared toward action, identity toward inaction (n = 16):

Threat	1
Spread	.88
System	.87
Readiness	.54
Durability	.22

Context geared toward inaction, identity toward action (n = 13):

Durability	1
Readiness	.84
System	.80
Threat	.54
Spread	.46

\*Each calculated weight is subtracted from 1 in order to present a descending order of importance, from higher to lower weights.

Table 3. Humanitarian action scenarios\*

All factors geared toward action (n = 15):

Readiness/efficacy	2*
Economy	1.8
Spread	1.73
System	.91
Durability	.62

All factors geared toward inaction (n = 15):

Economy	2
Readiness/efficacy	1.93
Spread	1.87
Durability	1.73
System	1.63

Context geared toward action, identity geared toward inaction (n = 15):

Economy	2
Spread	1.92
System	1.68
Durability	1.65
Readiness/efficacy	1.50

Context geared toward inaction, identity geared toward action (n=15):

Spread	2
Economy	1.70
System	1.58
Readiness/efficacy	1.55
Durability	1.44

\*Each calculated weight is subtracted from 2 in order to present a descending order of importance, from higher to lower weights.

Figure 1. Framework of Influences on Collective Action Decisions (see attached pdf file)