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Key factors impacting on response time of software vendors in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities

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Abstract

Software vulnerabilities are a major problem for organizations and society given how pervasive the use of computers and the Internet and networks has become. Computers, the Internet and networks in general are underpinned by operating system software and, increasingly, software applications are integrated with the Internet. In this increasingly complex environment hackers and attackers are more likely to take advantage of software vulnerabilities and exploit operating system software and application software. These software exploitations can result in huge losses to businesses which are highly reliant on computerized systems. Software vendors are responsible for securing these vulnerabilities through software patching. This study examines the effect of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of software vendor and type of software on the software vendors' response time in releasing software patches once software vendors have been informed of vulnerabilities in their software.

The main theoretical support for this study is software security disclosure theory and an economic model of software security investment. These theories provide a framework for understanding how open source versus proprietary software vendors respond with patches to software vulnerabilities depending on the level of criticality of the software vulnerability and the type of software.

Empirical data was collected from four related software vulnerability databases: SecurityFocus, Open Source Vulnerability Database, National Vulnerability Database and Secunia. These four software vulnerability databases contain archival data about software vulnerabilities which has been rigorously collected and screened. This research focuses on software vulnerabilities that have been recently reported in these software vulnerability databases from 2008 to 2010. To test the hypothesised relationships in the proposed research model, multiple regression analysis is used as the main statistical tool.

Analysis of the archival data confirms that software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability. Open source vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities 39% quicker than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software. Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released 8% slower than patches for application software vulnerabilities.

This study contributes to the existing knowledge and theory by investigating how the different levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities, the differences between open and proprietary source software vendors and the difference between operating system software and application software impact on the response time of software vendors in releasing patches once the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities. The findings of this study also establish that responsible disclosure is a more effective mechanism than full disclosure for determining the response time of software vendors. This study contributes to practice by providing an enhanced understanding of the software vulnerability landscape and the complex process of software vendors' patching behaviour.

Certificate of Dissertation

I certify that the ideas, designs, experimental work, results, analyses, software and conclusions set out in this dissertation are entirely my own effort, except where otherwise indicated and acknowledged.

I further certify that the work is original and has not been previously submitted for assessment in any other course or institution, except where specifically stated.

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Signature of Principal Supervisor	Date
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List of Abbreviations

NVD:	National Vulnerability Database
OSVDB:	Open Source Vulnerability Database
CERT:	Computer Emergency Response Team
OWASP:	Open Web Application Security Project
OVAL:	Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
CWE:	Common Weakness Exposure
CVE:	Common Vulnerability Exposure
CAPEC:	Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
SDLC:	Software Development Life Cycle
CASE:	Computer Aided Software Design
ERP:	Enterprise Resource Planning
S-SDLC:	Software Security Development Life Cycle
SOAP:	Simple Object Access Protocol
OSGi:	Open Services Gateway Initiative
WASC:	Web Application Security Consortium
XSS:	Cross Site Scripting
CSRF:	Cross-Site Request Forgery

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the dissertation topic, followed by a description of the specific project and the general research questions to be analysed in detail in later chapters. The chapter begins with an overview of software vulnerabilities, their impact on organisations, the general public and the economy in general; and the consequences for software vendors, IT managers and policy makers. The importance and motivation for releasing patches for software vulnerabilities in a timely and responsible manner is discussed and justified. This study attempts to identify to what extent the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches once the software vendors are informed of software vulnerabilities is influenced by the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of software and type of software vendor.

1.2 Background and Significance of the Study

Since the late 1980s, economies of the world have become increasingly reliant on computerised systems and, more recently, networks. Businesses and governments have increased their productivity substantially through the use of software applications, the Internet and networked operating systems (Min 2009; Thong, Yap & Raman 2012). However, significant information security risks threaten these systems and applications. Most of these types of information security incidents are caused by flaws in software and the poor security of computer networks which are constantly attacked by viruses, worms and hackers (Cavusoglu & Zhang 2006). It is estimated that there are as many as 20 flaws per thousand lines of software code (Cavusoglu et al. 2006; Dacey & Robert 2003; Gerace & Cavusoglu 2009). This is evident in the number of errors in design and implementation phases—which increase incrementally over the software development life cycle (Cavusoglu et al. 2006; Dacey et al. 2003). Similarly, the added problem of design complexity or program complexity increases the difficulty that a programmer encounters in ensuring that the design and coding of software systems has 'security' in mind. Such difficulties in the software development life cycle are likely to result in potential software vulnerabilities that can be susceptible to cyber attack (Frei, May, Fiedler & Plattner 2006).

The CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey 2010/2011 reported that the average loss per company from a software cyber attack was $ 234,000 between July 2008 to June 2009; and just under $ 100,000 between July 2009 to June 2010 (Richardson 2009, 2010). Losses from software cyber attacks in the UK were estimated to be $43.5 billion; and around $1 trillion globally in 2010 (Jackson & King 2011).

The Symantec MessageLabs Intelligence Report announced that targeted attacks have significantly increased year by year (Albin 2011; Fossi 2011; Fossi, Mack & Johnson 2010). In 2005, the average monthly attack rates were 0.5 percent higher in comparison to past years and increased dramatically to 25 percent higher in 2010. Typically 200-300 organizations worldwide are targeted each month and attacks number 77 per day (Fossi et al. 2010). Similarly, Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Centre's (CERT/CC) statistics reveal that the number of software vulnerabilities catalogued by CERT increased significantly over the years from 171 in 1995 to 6,058 in 2008 (Q1-Q3) (CERT 2009) and, overall, 44,074 software vulnerabilities were catalogued by CERT in that period of time.

Security industry and software vendors endeavour to proactively identify and patch new software vulnerabilities by analysing identified common vulnerability exposures (CVE) from past years. Despite these efforts, attackers are often able to exploit software vulnerabilities. A large number of software vulnerabilities have been identified and released publicly since the late 1990s (Arora, Telang & Xu 2008). In general, when software vendors are informed of software vulnerabilities, users expect software vendors to patch these vulnerabilities. However, this does not seem to always be the case because poor software quality and resulting excessive delay in the release of software patches has emerged as a prominent issue of concern (Arora, Krishnan, Telang & Yang 2010a). Software vulnerabilities reported to CERT/CC are fully disclosed after 45 days; software vulnerabilities reported to the Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) are fully disclosed after 30 days; and software vulnerabilities reported to the NTbugtraq are fully disclosed after 14 days after the initial reporting of a software vulnerability—in spite of the existence or accessibility of software patches or workarounds from affected software vendors (CERT 2008; Cooper 1999; OIS 2004). Software vendors are seriously concerned about security breaches and have attempted to strengthen their product quality to reduce software vulnerabilities. However, the ultimate solution to fix software vulnerabilities is to apply patches developed by software vendors in the earliest possible timeframe. Therefore, in order to better manage the potential risks associated with software vulnerabilities it becomes crucial to gain a better understanding of the relationship between software vulnerabilities and the key factors which influence the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches.

1.3 Research Problem

Software security is affected by a broad range of factors in a multifaceted environment of software engineering (Ardi, Byers & Shahmehri 2006). When a new software vulnerability is discovered, various parties such as software vendors, IT managers, policy makers and researchers actively participate to solve the problems encountered with each software vulnerability. This has been a continuous trend since the beginning of the use of computer systems in mainstream organisations. A number of studies classified software vulnerabilities to enable real-world benefits in proactively addressing software vulnerabilities, including automatic assessment of threat posed by software vulnerabilities and assessment of mitigation strategies and techniques (Bishop 1999; Howard, LeBlanc & Viega 2010; Landwehr, Bull, McDermott & Choi 1994; Seacord & Householder 2005; Tsipenyuk, Chess & McGraw 2005). However, software vulnerability assessment is dynamic and the threat environment is changing rapidly over time (Xueqi, Nannan & Hsiao 2008) and software vulnerabilities are increasing exponentially. Previous studies examined software security investment issues and software quality issues in an attempt to solve the problems associated with software vulnerabilities. However, specific solutions to prevent software vulnerabilities occurring remain under investigation (Arora et al. 2010a; Banerjee & Pandey 2009; Kannan & Telang 2005; Krishnan, Kriebel, Kekre & Mukhopadhyay 2000).

Many studies have identified that the only way to solve a software vulnerability is to inform the software vendor of the software vulnerability in order to encourage the software vendor to decrease the response time taken to release a software patch for a software vulnerability (Cencini, Yu & Chan 2005; Chambers & Thompson 2004). The response time that software vendors take to release a software patch in previous studies was estimated from the full disclosure date of a software vulnerability (Arora, Krishnan, Telang & Yang 2005b; Arora et al. 2010a; Telang & Wattal 2005). However, analysing the response time on the basis of the full disclosure date of software vulnerability does not provide an accurate estimation of the response time because software vendors are commonly informed of software vulnerabilities before the full disclosure of software vulnerability (Whitney 2009). Scant attention has been paid in previous research to analysing the response time of software vendors' patching behaviour on the basis of the vendor informed date.

To address the research problem and gaps identified in the existing literature, the following general research question is investigated:

To what extent does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of software vendor (Open source, Proprietary source vendor), type of software (Operating system software, Application software) influence the response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

1.4 Justification for the Research

This research is justified on the basis that it is unique in the depth that it intends to examine software vendors' response time in releasing a software patch in terms of level of criticality, type of software vendor and type of software once a software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability. Patch release date is the date on which software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities. Similarly, vendor informed date is the date when a researcher discloses the software vulnerability to the vendor (OSVDB 2011b). Software vendors' response time is the amount of time taken to release a software patch based on the date when the software vendor is informed of a software vulnerability (OSVDB 2011b). One of the key aspects of better and more secure software is minimizing the response time in releasing patches for the software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010).

Some of the key factors which have greater impact on the response time of software vendors in releasing a software patch are (1) level of criticality of software vulnerability, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software. The level of criticality of a software vulnerability is the degree of security risks which are brought to operating system software or application system software in terms of potential security property violations (Xueqi et al. 2008). The level of criticality is associated with the type of software vendor and type of software. Therefore type of software vendor and type of software also make a significant difference to the response time in releasing software patches for software vulnerabilities.

Gordon and Leob (2002) argue that the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches is an optimization decision where software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality are most optimal for software vendors in terms of effort to develop and release patches; whereas for low and high level of criticality vulnerabilities the effort of software vendor is less optimal to develop and release patches. Similarly, software security disclosure theory suggests that full disclosure of software vulnerabilities encourages software vendors to be more proactively and timely in responding to software vulnerabilities (Swire 2004, 2006). The response time of software vendors in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities is determined by the date of disclosure of software vulnerability. Therefore it is also important to understand the different types of software vulnerability disclosure in order to identify the actual response time. Arora et al. (2010a, p. 115) defined that 'Full disclosure of software vulnerability refers to the publication of vulnerability information (i.e. publicly disclosed) before a patch to address the software vulnerability has been issued by the software vendor'. The full disclosure date of software vulnerability is the date on which software vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed to end users or reported to the information security advisories or reported to the software vendors (Ozment 2007).

A gap has been identified in previous studies regarding software vendors' patching behaviour for software vulnerabilities. Previous studies which analysed software vendors' patching behaviour for disclosed software vulnerabilities were inconsistent in their key findings (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu & Zhang 2011; Mangalaraj & Raja 2005; Schryen 2009; Schryen & Rich 2010; Telang & Wattal 2007). This might be because the response time for disclosed software vulnerabilities was calculated from the full disclosure date of software vulnerability. Different information security advisories follow different timeframes to disclose software vulnerabilities (Cavusoglu & Raghunathan 2004 ; Cooper 1999; OIS 2004; SANS 2003). To address this inconsistency in determining the actual response time of software vendors in releasing software patches, this research calculates the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches on the basis of vendor informed date.

The findings from this analysis of the response time of software vendors in releasing patches based on the vendor informed date should provide a better understanding about how quickly software vendors release patches to current software vulnerabilities depending on a number of key factors. These key factors are (1) the level of criticality of the software vulnerability, (2) whether the software vendor for the software vulnerability is an open source software vendor or proprietary source software vendor and (3) whether the software vulnerability is an operating system software vulnerability or an application software vulnerability.

1.4.1 Contribution to Theory and Existing Knowledge

This study seeks to confirm

1. Whether and how the level of criticality of current software vulnerabilities influences the response time of the software vendor in releasing software patches;
2. Whether the operating system software patches are released more quickly than application software patches; and
3. Whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in response to software vulnerabilities is different between open source software vendors and proprietary source software vendors.

This research contributes to existing theory and knowledge by empirically testing the impact of three independent variables on the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities in the current threat environment faced by organizations. Software security disclosure theory and the economic model of software security investment provide the theoretical basis for this research. Software security disclosure theory is extended in this study to consider the impact of responsible disclosure of software vulnerability which provides a more accurate mechanism for determining the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches. The economic model of software security investment provides a means for explaining software vendors response time in releasing patches in terms of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities.

1.4.2 Contribution to Practice

This research contributes to practice by providing a better understanding of the complex process of disclosing and releasing patches for software vulnerabilities in the context of the level of criticality of the software vulnerability; open source versus proprietary source software vendor; and operating system software versus application once a software vendor has been informed of a software vulnerability. This study also assists practitioners to decide how to more effectively undertake preventive measures for software vulnerabilities based on the impact of the level of criticality, the software type and the type of software vendor on the process of releasing software patches. These findings should better inform the management of software patching in practice. Furthermore, the findings of this study show that the responsible disclosure of software vulnerabilities is an effective mechanism that Government and regulators can use for encouraging software vendors to be more proactive in releasing software patches for software vulnerabilities once informed of software vulnerabilities.

1.5 Methodology

This study grounded in a positivist paradigm and used a quantitative methodology to undertake an explanatory investigation of the relationship between vendor informed software vulnerabilities and the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches. The data collected to test hypothesised relationships in the proposed research model are drawn from four related and connected software vulnerability databases: SecurityFocus, Open Source Vulnerability Database, National Vulnerability Database and Secunia. These four software vulnerability databases contain archival data about software vulnerabilities which has been rigorously collected and screened. This research focuses on software vulnerabilities that have been recently reported from 2008 to 2010 in the Open Source Software Vulnerability database and other related databases listed previously in this section. The following three hypotheses are tested in this study.

H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

H2: Open source vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability in the proposed research model.

A multiple regression analysis is the main statistical tool used. Figure 1.1 represents a proposed research model for this study.



Figure 1.1 The Proposed Research Model for this Study

1.6 Structure of Dissertation

This dissertation is structured as follows:

Chapter 2—Literature Review: This chapter provides an in-depth review of the relevant literature in relation to software vulnerabilities and the patching behaviour of software vendors. Specific research questions and a set of hypotheses are developed and justified from the relevant literature. These form the basis of the theoretical and conceptual model which will be tested in this research. Chapter 2 concludes with a theoretical and conceptual model for investigating the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches once software vendors are informed of software vulnerabilities in terms of (1) the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software.

Chapter 3—Research Design and Methodology: This chapter describes and justifies the research methodology used to collect data and test the research model presented in Chapter 2 in the context and scope of the general research questions and set of hypotheses. The research design and appropriate research strategies employed for this study are described in detail. Further, the sources from where the archival data were obtained are discussed, followed by a discussion of the sample generation and measurement of variables. Finally, data analysis using descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis techniques are discussed.

Chapter 4—Data Analysis: This chapter presents and discusses the key findings from the analyses of archive data collected from four related and connected software vulnerability databases, namely, SecurityFocus, Open Source Vulnerability Database, National Vulnerability Database and Secunia Database, in order to provide answers to the three specific research questions and to test the three specific hypotheses developed for this research.

Chapter 5—Conclusion: This chapter summaries the key finding of this study in relation to the three research questions investigated and the three hypotheses tested in this study; and provides a number of conclusions about the research problem and general research question addressed in this study. The contributions of this study to theory and practice are discussed. Finally, the limitations of this study are acknowledged and suggestions for future research are offered.

1.7 Definition of Key Terms

Software Vulnerability

A software vulnerability is a hole or weakness in a software application which can be a design flaw or an implementation bug that allows an attacker to cause harm to stakeholders of a software application (OWASP 2011).

Full Disclosure of Software Vulnerability

This study adopts the definition by Arora et al. (2010a, p. 115): 'Full disclosure of a software vulnerability refers to the publication of vulnerability information (i.e. publicly disclosed) before a patch to address the vulnerability has been issued by the software vendor'.

Responsible Disclosure of Software Vulnerability

The following definition is used for the responsible disclosure of a software vulnerability in this study: responsible disclosure of software vulnerability means when a vulnerability is discovered, the researcher, information security advisories inform the software vendor and the researchers, information security advisories and vendors work together diligently and ethically to produce a timely patch to reduce the risk as much as possible for the individuals and organizations (Cavusoglu & Raghunathan 2005, 2007; Shepherd 2003; Williams, Pescatore & Proctor 2006).

Software Patching

The following definition of software patching is used in this study: software patching is blocking the attacking paths and providing protection against the exploitation of software vulnerabilities which are caused by software vulnerabilities (Chen, Boehm & Sheppard 2007; Frei et al. 2006).

Vendor Informed Date

In this study, the vendor informed date is defined as: the date when researcher disclosed the vulnerability to the vendor (OSVDB 2011b).

Full Disclosure Date

The following definition is used for the full disclosure date in this study: the date on which software vulnerabilities are publicly disclosed to their users or reported to the information security advisories or reported to the software vendors (Ozment 2007).

Response Time

The following definition is used for response time in this study: It is defined as the amount of time taken to release a software patch based on the date when the software vendor is informed of a software vulnerability. In this study, there are also some instances where software vendors have released software patches before the software vendor is informed about software vulnerabilities. In these situations, the response time is zero or a negative number of days (source: developed for this research).

The Level of Criticality of a Software Vulnerability

The following definition is used for the level of criticality of a software vulnerability in this study: It is the risk level assigned to each software vulnerability which describes the extent of damage that could be caused by a specific breach of confidentiality, integrity and availability for that software vulnerability (Liu et al. 2011).

Proprietary Source Software Vendor

This study adopts the definition by Ming-Wei and Ying-Dar (2001, p. 33) ‘Proprietary software vendors operate on a closed-source model: They develop their own software and release that software to the public with the intention of gaining market penetration and earning a profit’.

Open Source Software Vendor

The following definition is used for open source vendor in this study: Vendors who provide open source software with compilable source codes and these source codes can be modified or redistributed often free of cost (Payne 2002; Schryen et al. 2010)

Operating System Software

The following definition is used for operating system software in this study: It is a set of special programs that run on a computer system itself and run other programs as well. It also controls and coordinates the use of the hardware among the various system programs and application programs for various users (Bhatt 2007; Silberschatz, Galvin & Gagne 2009).

Application Software

The following definition is used for application software in this study: It is defined as a set of programs written in a specific programming language to solve a particular problem. It is independent of the machine on which it is operated and intended to support the operation of a particular task (Nithyashri 2010).

1.8 Delimitations of Scope and Key Assumptions

Software vulnerabilities are a major problem for organizations and society given the pervasive use of computers, the Internet and networks (Farahmand, Navathe, Enslow & Sharp 2003; Martin 2001). Although a number of software vulnerabilities are identified and recorded in many software security databases, this research analysed software vulnerability data obtained as a primary source from the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB). Some of the required information for each software vulnerability is incomplete in this database to test the research model developed for this study. Thus, additional information for each software vulnerability was obtained from SecurityFocus database, National Vulnerability Database (NVD), Secunia database and vendor websites. The software vulnerabilities analysed in this study was limited to current software vulnerabilities from 2008 to 2010 that have been recorded in the OSVDB database and which have a vendor informed.

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter lays the foundation for this dissertation. It provides a background on software vulnerabilities and the significance of better management of software patching of software vulnerabilities in practice. This study is justified because it makes a significant contribution to better understanding the complex process of patching of software vulnerabilities in the context of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities; open source versus proprietary source software vendors; and operating system software versus application once software vendors have been informed of software vulnerabilities. The method by which this research has been conducted is briefly described, the structure of the dissertation is outlined with an overview of each subsequent chapter, and a list of key definitions used in this dissertation is provided. Finally, the delimitations of scope and key assumptions of this study are provided.

The next chapter conducts an in-depth review of the relevant literature in the field of information security in relation to software quality, software security investment, software vulnerabilities and software vulnerability disclosure and patching.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an in-depth review of the published literature and research on information security and, in particular, software vulnerabilities with the purpose of developing a research model grounded in the existing literature. According to Kitchenham et al. (2009) a systematic review of literature is an aggregation of empirical evidence achieved by using a number of techniques in different contexts. Software security disclosure theory and economic model of software security investment provide the theoretical lens for the research model developed in this study. Thus, the main output of this chapter is a research model for investigating how, once informed of software vulnerabilities—and depending on the level of criticality of the software vulnerabilities and the type of software—open source versus proprietary software vendors respond with patches. A specific set of research questions and hypotheses are developed from the relevant literature as the basis for testing the hypothesised relationships in the proposed research model.

This chapter opens with an introduction to the parent disciplines applicable to this study and fundamental to information security. Throughout the discussion of the relevant literature there are references made to a number of previous research papers which address problems in the field of information security. This review systematically analyses major concepts underpinning the process of disclosure and patching software vulnerabilities. Figure 2.1 depicts how the review of relevant literature starts with the broad field of information security, software quality and software security investment as the parent literatures; and then moves to a narrow focus of software vulnerability disclosure and software patching. Subsequently, a conceptual framework is developed from the relevant literature to investigate the following research objectives:

1. whether the level of criticality of current software vulnerabilities influence the response time of the software vendor in releasing software patches;

2. whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in response to software vulnerabilities is different between open source software and proprietary source software; and

3. whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in response to software vulnerabilities is different between operating system software and application software.

Finally, the research questions and related hypotheses that test the relationships in the proposed research model are presented and justified in the context of the existing literature.


Information Security
Software Quality
Software Security Investment
Software Vulnerabilities
Classification of Software Vulnerability
Software Vulnerability Databases and Software Vulnerability Classification
Software Vulnerability Disclosure
Software Vulnerability Disclosure Policy
Software Vendors
Proprietary Source Software Vendor
Open Source Software Vendor
Debate on Open and Proprietary Source Software Vulnerabilities
Software Vulnerability Disclosure and Software Patching

Figure 2.1 Topics Reviewed in Software Vulnerability Disclosure and Software Patching

2.2 Information Security

It is somewhat ironic that one of the first uses of the computer was to break codes and ciphers used to protect information during World War II. The allied effort was greatly assisted by the use of the first computer to break the German Enigma code, which subsequently helped stop the German U-Boat Wolf-Packs from savaging allied shipping. Now, the security of all information stored and transmitted using computers or other electronic devices is subject to potential compromise (Alnatheer & Nelson 2009; Whitman & Mattord 2010, 2011).

Security is a broad concept which has its own language and focuses on the processes of attacks on information, and in preventing, detecting and recovering from attacks (Alnatheer et al. 2009; Whitman et al. 2011). Information security is defined as procedures and actions designed to prevent the unauthorised disclosure, transfer, modification or destruction—whether accidental or intentional—of information from a computer system (Alnatheer et al. 2009; Gordon et al. 2002). Information includes data, voice, video, images and fax (Schumacher & Ghosh 1997). Similarly, information security—also termed as computer security—refers to the security of computer programs, procedures and associated documentation and data pertaining to the operation of a computer system (Sulaiman & Kassim 2010).

One of the critical aspects of the information security problem is a software problem. According to Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003), information security is the preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information and information resources. The potential weakness in software that can be subsequently exploited in any of these information security components (confidentiality, integrity and availability) tends to be software vulnerabilities (Igure & Williams 2008). Software vulnerabilities enable external attacks and allow attackers to exploit their privileges to gain unauthorised access to information, systems and services. Therefore, software security is one of the critical elements in managing information security for any organization or individual (Grand 2005). Additionally, software also interfaces with other application software and operating systems and network components that allow the processing of transactions, sharing of information and delivery of other services. A breach in software security occurs when an attacker exploits a flaw in a software that causes the software to work in a manner for which it was not developed; and attackers exploit unexpected benefits of the interfaces with other information, applications systems and network components, resulting in undesirable consequences (Grand 2005).

2.2.1 Information Security Components

Information security can be categorised into three classic principles (Whitman et al. 2011)

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability



Figure 2.2 Three Classic Principles of Information Security

Figure 2.2 represents the information security triangle consisting of confidentiality, integrity and availability which have a significant effect on the security of information in software. In this study, these three classic principles of information security are used to rate the criticality of a software vulnerability.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality—also referred to as privacy or secrecy—refers to the protection of data so that it cannot be disclosed in an unauthorised fashion (Alnatheer et al. 2009; Escamilla 1998; Hassler 2001). In general, most IT users recognise the need to ensure that the information they transmit to a recipient should arrive without being read by a third party. Encryption is the most widely used technique or process to provide confidentiality to data and systems.

In terms of software security, a software vulnerability which provides root level access to unauthorised information is scored as a complete loss of confidentiality and has a severe adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Similarly, a software vulnerability which provides user level access to unauthorised information is scored as a partial loss of confidentiality and has a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals (Mell, Scarfone & Romanosky 2007; NVD 2011b; OSVDB 2011b; Whitman et al. 2011; Zevin 2004).

Integrity

In general, the data integrity component of information security aims at ensuring that data is not modified or altered by unauthorised system users (Escamilla 1998; Hassler 2001). It is possible there could be serious consequences should users of systems make business decisions based on flawed information. System integrity relates to the assurance of accuracy, completeness and performance according to defined specifications (Khadraoui & Herrmann 2007). Integrity is normally provided in a computing system through a number of approaches. Encryption can assist in providing data integrity by ensuring that data packets are not intercepted, modified and then re-transmitted to an unsuspecting recipient. Access control, which involves ensuring that only authorised users can gain access to data, is another mechanism that can be used to provide or ensure data integrity (Escamilla 1998; Hassler 2001; Khadraoui et al. 2007). Restricting access to a particular system makes it potentially harder for an outsider to access and then modify the data.

In terms of software security, a software vulnerability which provides root level access to modify information is scored as a complete loss of integrity and has a severe adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Similarly, a software vulnerability which provides user-level access to modify information is scored as partial loss of integrity and has a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals (Mell et al.

2007; NVD 2011b; OSVDB 2011b; Whitman et al. 2011; Zevin 2004).

Availability

The availability goal in information security aims to protect network services and data from unauthorised attempts to withhold information or computer resources (Escamilla 1998). Lack of access to information can be a critical concern. For instance, if patients' medical records become unavailable due to a network security problem the consequences could be fatal. Statements about the availability of network and data services cannot be made with the same level of confidence as those relating to confidentiality and integrity (Escamilla 1998). A hardware failure resulting in a network traffic congestion problem could deny users access to resources—either of which could be a result of equipment failure, poor network planning or some other reason than the result of a security incident per se. A number of controls may, however, be implemented to increase availability. Network design, access control and prioritising services and users can all promote enhanced resource availability.

In terms of software security, a software vulnerability which provides root level disruption of access to information or an information system is scored as a complete loss of availability and has a severe adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Similarly a software vulnerability which provides user-level disruption of access to information or an information system is scored as a partial loss of availability and has a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals (Mell et al. 2007; NVD 2011b; OSVDB 2011b; Whitman et al. 2011; Zevin 2004).

2.3 Software Quality

Computer software has become a driving force for all organizations and individuals (Pressman 2010). The capabilities of computer systems to safeguard the information and information resources are dependent on the performance of their software quality. Quality in the context of software involves a variety of quality attributes, for example, performance, security, reliability and so on. In this study, software quality is investigated in relation to all kinds of software security flaws. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defined quality as ‘the totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs’ (Palvia, Sharma & Conrath 2001). IEEE defined software quality as the degree to which software possesses a desired combination of quality attributes such as design, performance, security, reliability and so on (IEEE 2009). Agarwal, Tayal and Gupta (2009, p. 89) defined software quality as a ‘Conformance to explicitly stated functional and performance requirements, explicitly documented development standards, and implicit characteristics that are expected of all professionally developed software’. This study adopts a definition of software quality by Kan (2003) which defines software quality as clearly defined software requirements (i.e. either users, owners or both) to avoid all kinds of security holes during software development life cycle (SDLC) phase using regular measurements of quality attributes such as reliability, integrity, availability, efficiency, security, maintainability and size of source code to protect the information security. Kan (2003) also added that any deviations from those requirements are considered to be a software vulnerability.

Quality software protects users’ information from potential software vulnerability exploitations. Software experts often blame software vulnerabilities on poor software development practices, such as improper testing, failure to control common programming errors, and poor understanding of the interactions between different components of complex software (Schneier 2001). The quality of software can be improved through the utilisation of superior personnel, effective use of computer aided software engineering (CASE) tools and early investment in planning and design of software (Arora et al. 2010a; Kannan et al. 2005; Krishnan et al. 2000). Lieberman and Fry (2001) argued that debugging is necessary and should be used to improve the quality of software. Banerjee and Pandey (2009) contended that to improve the quality of software, proper attention (such as not only thinking through a developer’s perspective, but also through an attacker’s perspective) should be given during the entire SDLC process because many critical functions such as access control, privacy, security, reliability, backup plan are entirely dependent on software development. They proposed 21 security rules to be implemented and obeyed by all stakeholders of a software development life cycle to provide better security in software (see Figure 2.3). They found that practical implementation of these 21 security rules throughout the stages of a software development life cycle resulted in software that is more secure and reliable.



Figure 2.3 Rules of Software Security in SDLC

Source: (Banerjee et al. 2009)

Banker (2002) and Mercuri (2003) identified that software reliabilities are affected through administratively-controllable factors. They argued that to increase the reliability of software and to harden software, a number of measures need to be implemented including enforcing release control, the need for programmers to be better trained in designing and writing secure code, incorporating more security testing in the testing phase, and creating and enforcing complexity metric standards.

Although researchers and software security industries have conducted many studies on how to improve the quality of software to reduce the occurrence of vulnerabilities from a number of different perspectives, software vulnerabilities are still increasing exponentially. To improve the quality of software, it has become essential for an increased investment in the initial phase of the software development process. However, most organizations these days do not build software: they tend to purchase software packages and services and customise them to their needs. Hence, they are reliant on the organisations which develop software to build security into software as part of the process of improving software quality.

2.4 Software Security Investment

Software vulnerabilities are a fact of life for organizations of all sizes. Unfortunately, some level of defects has also become the expected norm for a software purchase, whether for a small business payroll system, a medium business inventory control system, or a large business enterprise resource planning (ERP) deployment (Chelf 2006). Researchers in the field of information security have mainly focused on the tools, techniques and policies that individuals and organizations can use to protect themselves from security breaches. However, information security is also strongly linked with software security (Telang et al. 2005). Costs related to software security have had an increasingly-significant impact on the U.S. economy (Arora, Forman, Nandkumar & Telang 2006b). The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) estimated that software defects cost the U.S. economy upwards of $60 billion a year. NIST also found that detecting these defects earlier and with more diagnostic accuracy could result in as much as $22 billion in annual savings (Anonymous 2003; Arora, Caulkins & Telang 2006a; Chelf 2006). The hard truth is that software vulnerabilities affect both open source and proprietary source software and are very costly to all users and producers of software (Mell, Bergeron & Henning 2005).

According to Kissel, Stine, Scholl, Rossman, Fahlsing and Gulick (2008), early integration of security in the SDLC enables software vendors to maximize return on investment in their security programs through early identification and mitigation of security vulnerabilities and mis-configurations, resulting in lower cost of security control implementation and vulnerability mitigation. Macro (n.d.) empirically analysed the software security development life cycle (S-SDLC). He found that 85% of software vulnerabilities are introduced in the coding phase of a software security development life. He argued that this occurs because of a lack of investment in software security. Microsoft identified that the cost of software security in USA for unbudgeted time to fix security problems is about 1000 man-hours; software security cost of training software developers in security is about $100 million; and NIST identified that in the USA the cost of inadequate software testing is about $3.3 billion (Morana 2008).

Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan (2004) designed a model focusing on ROSI (Return on Security Investment). They found that it is very difficult to calculate ROSI because of unexpected security breaches. They also found that risk analysis and cost effectiveness analysis tools work with high level of aggregate data (such as taxing, increasing possibility and scope of IT security breaches), which have limited value in an IT security setting. The difficulty of calculating ROSI is also proved by the 2010/2011 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey. The 2010/2011 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey revealed that 67.1% of respondents detected security breaches (Richardson 2010).

Gordon and Loeb (2002) proposed that software vulnerabilities are an index of information security investment and developed a model that determined that there is a relationship between level of severity of software vulnerability and the effectiveness of security investment—explained as follows. When the level of severity of software vulnerability is low, a significant investment in security is hard to justify because the reduction of expected loss is low. Conversely, with a medium level of severity of software vulnerability, the level of security investment reduces expected loss more effectively. When the severity of software vulnerability is at the highest level, reduction of expected loss becomes more difficult to justify because of the significant security investment required by the software vendor. Under these assumptions, the model showed that the optimal level for software security investment peaks at a medium level of severity for software vulnerabilities (Tanaka, Matsuura & Sudoh 2005). The nature of investments in software patching is a fixed cost which means the cost of fixing vulnerable software is almost independent of the number of software copies sold. Software vendors are taking advantage of this fixed cost nature and deliberately release a vulnerable software product, but patch the software later for the market (Arora et al. 2006a; Arora et al. 2008; Telang et al. 2007) as this optimises their investment in a particular software product. Furthermore, currently there is little in the way of government regulation and legislation which discourages this type of behaviour by software vendors (Kuechler 2007; Otter 2007; Saint-Germain 2005).

Although this study does not analyse the investment in software security, from the preceding discussion on software security investment it has been identified that software security investment is a key factor that influences the quality of software from an information security perspective and, potentially, how quickly software vendors response to software vulnerabilities to optimise their investment and effort based on the level of criticality of a software vulnerability. Similarly, the discussion also highlights that the reason so many software vulnerabilities exist is because of the lack of software security investment. In order to understand software vulnerabilities more fully, it is critical to understand the landscape of software vulnerabilities in detail.

2.5 Software Vulnerabilities

The following definitions of a software vulnerability have been identified from the literature. According to Schryen (2009, p. 155), 'When bugs on software can be directly used by attackers to gain access to a system or network, they are termed a software vulnerability'. Telang and Wattal (2007, p. 544) provide a more detailed definition of a software vulnerability, namely, 'a flaw in a software system that can cause it to work contrary to its documented design and could be exploited to cause the system to violate its documented security policy'.

This study adopts a broader and more current definition of a software vulnerability as a hole or a weakness in a software application which can be a design flaw or an implementation bug that allows an attacker to cause harm to stakeholders of a software application (OWASP 2011). To mitigate the risk of software vulnerabilities to organisations and individuals, it is important to classify software vulnerabilities appropriately so that they can be understood in depth. Different researchers and information security advisories have classified software vulnerabilities for different aspects of information security risk; therefore, a review of the classification of software vulnerabilities is discussed below.

2.5.1 Classification of Software Vulnerabilities

Tsipenyuk, Chess and McGraw (2005) presented eight kingdoms of software security vulnerabilities, and provided a mapping to 19 deadly sins of software security (Howard et al. (2005)) and to the top ten Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP (2005)) software vulnerabilities, as shown in table 2.1. A kingdom refers to a group of classes that share a common theme and a sin refers to software security defects. The main purpose of this classification is to reduce unnecessary levels of confusion among practitioners and software developers about common software coding errors that affect information security.

Table 2.1 Mapping 19 Sins and Top 10 OWASP Software Vulnerabilities into Eight Kingdoms of Software Vulnerabilities

Eight Kingdoms	**19 Sins**	**Top 10 Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Software Vulnerabilities**
1.Input validation and representation	(1) Buffer overflows (2) command injection (3) cross-site scripting, (4) format string problems (5) integer range errors (6) SQL injection	(1) Buffer overflows (2) cross-site scripting flaws (3) injection flaws (4) unvalidated input
2. API abuse	(7) Trusting network address information	
3.Security features	(8) Failing to protect network traffic (9) failing to store and protect data (10) failing to use cryptographically strong random numbers, (11) improper file access (12) improper use of SQL (13) use of weak password-based systems (14) unauthenticated key exchange	(5) Broken access control (6) insecure storage
4.Time and state	(15) Single race conditions (16) use of “magic” URLs and hidden forms	(7) Broken authentication and session management
5.Errors	(17) Failure to handle errors	(8) Improper error handling
6.Code quality	(18) Poor usability	(9) Denial of service
7.Encapsulation	(19) Information leakage	
8.Environment		(10) Insecure configuration management

Source: adopted from (Tsipenyuk et al. 2005)

Furthermore, Berghe, Riordan and Piessens (2005) proposed an approach for the creation of predictive taxonomies regarding likely software vulnerabilities, and presented an example based on Bugtraq software vulnerabilities data. Bugtraq is a high volume, full disclosure mailing list for the detailed discussion and announcement of computer security vulnerabilities (SecurityFocus 2010). Similarly, Weber, Karger and Paradkar (2005) presented a new software vulnerability taxonomy analysing incident reports in modern software and previously categorised software vulnerabilities together. The main purpose of creating a new taxonomy is to adequately represent software vulnerabilities in modern software. Table 2.2 shows a software vulnerability taxonomy. This taxonomy categorises software vulnerabilities in terms of intentional and inadvertent software vulnerabilities to represent both previously identified software vulnerabilities, as well as modern software vulnerabilities—an aspect lacking in prior research on the classification of software vulnerabilities.

Intentional refers to software flaws—which may be malicious or non-malicious—developed intentionally to harm the system. Similarly, inadvertent refers to software flaws generated accidently while, for example, coding, designing, implementing and testing software. Although, the security of software is threatened by both intentional and inadvertent software vulnerabilities, inadvertent or unintentional software vulnerabilities can be exploited once hackers are aware these software vulnerabilities exist. Jarzombek (2011) reported that the most exploitable software vulnerabilities (which are unintentional software vulnerabilities) are attributed to non-secure coding practices (i.e. not defined in software testing phase). He also added that hackers are opting to target these unintentional software vulnerabilities in operating system software and application software to circumvent security controls rather than attempt to break or defeat network or system security. Conversely, the internal crime department of the United States Secret Service (USSS) investigated internal data breaches within the organizations in 2010. It found that 90% of data breaches were intentional and 10% of data breaches were unintentional (Baker, Goudie, Hutton, Hylender, Niemantsverdriet, Novak, Ostertag, Porter, Rosen & Sartin 2010).

The intentional and unintentional software vulnerabilities taxonomy based on Weber et al. (2005) in Table 2.2 is mapped with OWASP top ten 2010 web-based software vulnerabilities.

Table 2.2 Intentional and Unintentional Software Vulnerability Taxonomy

Type of Software Vulnerability	**High level classification**	**Specific classification**	**OWASP Top Ten Software Vulnerability Items mapped**
Intentional	Malicious	Trap door	N/A
		Logic/Time Bomb	N/A
	Non-malicious	Convert Channel	N/A
		Inconsistent access paths	N/A
Inadvertent (Unintentional)	Validation Error	Addressing errors	N/A
		Poor parameter value check	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
		Incorrect check positioning	N/A
		Identification/authentication inadequate	Insecure Direct Object References, Broken Authentication and Session Management
	Abstraction Error	Object Reuse	N/A
		Exposed Internal Representation	N/A
	Asynchronous Flaws	Concurrency (including TOCTTOU)	N/A
		Aliasing	N/A
	Subcomponent misuse/failure	Resource Leak	N/A
		Responsibility Misunderstanding	Injection
	Functionality Error	Error handling failure	Cross-Site Scripting
		Other security flaw	Insecure Cryptographic Storage

Source adapted: (Weber et al. 2005)

The OWASP top ten 2010 web based software vulnerabilities are: (1) Injection, (2) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), (3) Broken Authentication and Session Management, (4) Insecure Direct Object References, (5) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), (6) Security Misconfiguration, (7) Insecure Cryptographic Storage, (8) Failure to Restrict URL Access, (9) Insufficient Transport Layer Protection and (10) Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards (OWASP 2010). In table 2.2, Cross-Site Scripting and Insecure Cryptographic Storage are partially mapped with the Weber et al. (2005) taxonomy where as Injection, Broken Authentication and Session Management, and Insecure Direct Object References are completely mapped in the Weber et al. (2005) taxonomy. The other OWASP Top Ten software vulnerabilities which are only partially mapped or not mapped in Weber et al. (2005) taxonomy are design or configuration errors and considered to be out of scope. Moreover none of the intentional software flaws in Weber et al. (2005) taxonomy are mapped with OWASP Top Ten software vulnerabilities. This study examined both intentional and unintentional software vulnerabilities but it should be acknowledged most software vulnerabilities are unintentional and are a result of poor design, coding, configuration and testing of software and related hardware.

Similarly, Engle, Whalen, Howard and Bishop (2006) described a tree-based classification approach to classify existing software vulnerabilities on the basis of software vulnerability characteristics. This classification approach allows software vulnerabilities to fall into multiple classes without ambiguity. Characteristics in this classification of software vulnerabilities indicate attributes of a vulnerable state. Although classification of software vulnerabilities on the basis of characteristics provides more in-depth understanding and meaning of the impact of software vulnerabilities, this classification approach provided no guidance on which characteristics to use or where to derive those characteristics from.

Moreover, Yu, Aravind and Supthaweesuk (2006) discussed security-related software vulnerabilities in SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) based web services and analysed the common pattern of attacks in the increased complexity and connectivity of the web services environment. However, no further software vulnerability classification was provided. The main purpose of analysing web related software vulnerabilities is to map common attack patterns for security verification requirements with regard to web service software systems. Similarly, the SANS Top 20 (2007) did not list single software vulnerabilities, but it classified software vulnerabilities into high level in terms of client-side software vulnerabilities and server-side software vulnerabilities and the risks they cause.

With the increasing problems in web based software and security, software vulnerabilities have been more broadly classified from late 2010. Parrend and Frénot (2008) created a classification of Java component vulnerabilities in the OSGi (Open Services Gateway Initiative) platform. Similarly, security experts at Microsoft corporation, Howard, LeBlanc and Viega (2010) provided the ‘24 deadly sins of software security’ as a comprehensive high level framework for classifying software vulnerabilities based on their practical knowledge and experiences (see table 2.3).

Table 2.3 The '24 Deadly Sins of Software Security'

Web Application Sins	1	SQL Injection
	2	Server side Cross-Site Scripting
	3	Web Client Related Vulnerabilities
Implementation Sins	4	Use of Magic URLs
	5	Buffer Overruns
	6	Format String Problems
	7	Integer Overflows
	8	C + + Catastrophes
	9	Catching All Exceptions
	10	Command Injection
	11	Failure to Handle Errors
	12	Information Leakage
	13	Race Conditions
	14	Poor Usability
	15	Not Updating Easily
Cryptographic Sins	16	Not Using Least Privileges
	17	Weak Password Systems
	18	Unauthenticated Key Exchange
	19	Random Numbers
Networking Sins	20	Wrong Algorithm
	21	Failure to Protect Network Traffic
	22	Trusting Name Resolution
Stored Data Sins	23	Improper Use of SSL/TLS
	24	Failure to Protect Stored Data

Source: (Howard et al. 2010)

In table 2.3, 24 deadly sins are classified under five domains of software security defects. In this classification, sins are also referred to as software security defects. Although this classification of software defects is the most current and comprehensive classification of software defects, not all of the classified software defects are relevant to this proposed study. Software defects related to web application sins, implementation sins and cryptography sins are relevant in terms of their impact (the level of criticality of a software vulnerability). However, networking sins and stored data sins are not relevant and beyond the scope of this research. Networking and stored data sins are not discussed in Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) and National Vulnerability Database (NVD) from where the level of the criticality of software vulnerabilities is obtained to test the proposed research hypotheses in this study.

Furthermore, The Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) classified 46 types of web based software vulnerabilities with the contribution of application developers, security professionals, software vendors and compliance auditors to ensure a consistent language for web applications related issues (WASC 2010). Similarly, the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is dedicated to improving the security of software applications worldwide and have categorised software vulnerabilities into 165 categories. The main purpose of the categorisation of software vulnerabilities is to make the software consumer more aware of the impact of software vulnerabilities. Thus, individuals and organisations can make informed decisions about software exploitation risks and take appropriate action to reduce the risks of software exploitation to an acceptable level (OWASP 2011). The CAPEC (2011), CWE (2011) and OVAL (2011) classified software vulnerabilities in terms of attacks, weakness and vulnerabilities respectively.

The review of software vulnerability classifications provided the background to how software vulnerabilities are classified in terms of their common characteristics and their nature of impact. On the basis of this review, this study empirically analysed software vulnerabilities classified in CWE (2011) in terms of their impact (the level of criticality of a software vulnerability) on the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches. Software vulnerability classification in CWE (2011) is discussed in more detail with regard to NVD database in the next section. Furthermore, to obtain the detailed information about the impact (i.e. the level of criticality of software vulnerability), software vendor type and software type, this study also used the classification of software vulnerabilities from the prominent software vulnerabilities databases SecurityFocus (2010), OSVDB (2011b), NVD (2011b), and Secunia (2011), which are discussed in detail in the next section.

2.6 Software Vulnerability Databases and Software Vulnerability Classification

Landwehr et al. (1994) observed that the history of software vulnerabilities has been mostly undocumented, however, knowing how systems have failed can help in designing a system which is less prone to being vulnerable. The software vulnerability database is a right step in that direction as it provides a historical record of software vulnerabilities that is a useful reference resource for organizations to proactively manage software vulnerabilities in their organisational context.

A software vulnerability database serves as a repository of software vulnerability information collected from different sources, is organized to allow useful queries to be performed on the data, and can provide valuable information to system designers in identifying areas of weaknesses in the design, requirements or implementation of software within an organisation (Venter & Eloff 2004). A software vulnerability database can also be used to maintain vendor patch information, vendor and response security advisories, and catalogue the patches applied in response to those security advisories (Mell & Tracy 2002). This information is also helpful for system administrators to protect the systems from information security breaches.

The most prominent software vulnerability databases are listed in alphabetical order in Table 2.4, with a column to indicate which software vulnerability databases are used in this research.

Table 2.4 Software Vulnerability Databases

Database name	**Unique identity**	**Databases used in this research**
IBM’s Internet Security System (ISS) (IBM ISS 2009)	ISS X-Force ID	
Microsoft Security Bulletin (Microsoft 2011)	Microsoft Bulletin ID	
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) (NVD 2011)	CVE ID	YES
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) (OSVDB 2011)	OSVDB ID	YES
Secunia (Secunia 2011)	Secunia Advisory ID	YES
SecurityTracker (SecurityGlobal 2011)	Security Tracker Alert ID	
SecurityFocus (SecurityFocus 2010)	Buqtraq ID	YES
US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database (US-CERT 2011)	Vulnerability Notes ID	
Vupen Security (Vupen Security 2011)	Vupen ID	

Source: adapted from (Langweg & Snekkenes 2004)

All these software vulnerability databases provide the following information for each software vulnerability recorded:

- A unique identity for each software vulnerability
- A detailed description of software vulnerability
- Full disclosure date of software vulnerability
- Vulnerable software’s name
- Vulnerable software vendor’s name
- Severity of software vulnerability
- Software vulnerability disclosing references
- References to the affected software vendors and their product
- References to related reports and to descriptions in other databases
- Software patch release information
- Protection links from particular software vulnerability.

This research is based on four major software vulnerability databases: Security Focus, OSVDB, NVD and Secunia. Although the unique identity for each software vulnerability is provided in these databases (i.e. SecurityFocus, OSVDB, NVD and Secunia) and is referenced in the OSVDB database, the details and classification of software vulnerabilities in each of these software vulnerability databases are described in their own way, which makes it difficult to map each software vulnerability into a single table.
Therefore, the main features of each software vulnerability database are discussed in turn. Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.8 and 2.10 represent the main features of SecurityFocus, OSVDB, NVD and Secunia software vulnerability databases respectively. The SecurityFocus database is a main source of software vulnerability data because it has been maintained since 1999 (see Table 2.5).

2.6.1 SecurityFocus

SecurityFocus is a vendor-neutral site that provides objective, timely and comprehensive security information to all members of the security community, from end users, security hobbyists and network administrators to security consultants, IT managers, CIOs and CSOs (Arora, Forman, Nandkumar & Telang 2010b; Arora et al. 2010a; Li & Rao 2007; SecurityFocus 2010). SecurityFocus hosts the Bugtraq mailing list which is a high volume, full disclosure mailing list for the detailed discussion and announcement of computer security vulnerabilities, including all vendor-informed and fully-disclosed software vulnerabilities.

BugTraq also serves as the cornerstone of the Internet-wide security community (SecurityFocus 2010).

- The SecurityFocus Vulnerability Database provides security professionals with up-to-date information on vulnerabilities for all platforms and services.
- SecurityFocus Mailing Lists allow members of the security community from around the world to discuss security issues. There are currently 31 mailing lists; most are moderated to keep posts on-topic and to eliminate spam.

Table 2.5 summarises main features of SecurityFocus database.

Table 2.5 Features of SecurityFocus Database

Unique Identity	**Information**	**Discussion**	**Exploit**	**Solution**	**References**
Bugtraq ID	Class, CVE, Remote, Local, published date, updated date, creditor's name and vulnerable software	Discussion regarding software vulnerability	Information about the exploits from the each software vulnerability	Information about the solution provided	Affected vendors and products and advance security notification

Source: (SecurityFocus 2010)

The following list provides a brief description of the main fields in the SecurityFocus database (SecurityFocus 2010):

- Bugtraq id represents a unique identification of each software vulnerability through the Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE_ID) identification for each software vulnerability
- Remote or local attack of software vulnerability
- Full disclosure date of software vulnerability
- Solution provided date for software vulnerability
- Information about the researcher who disclosed the vulnerability and affected software from that particular software vulnerability
- Discussion provides core information about the software vulnerability
- Exploit provides exploitation details for each software vulnerability
- Solution provides details of how software vulnerability is fixed and reference provides links and cross-references for the vulnerability.

Overall, the SecurityFocus database provides more qualitative information than quantitative information about software vulnerabilities.

2.6.2 Open Source Vulnerability Database

OSVDB is an independent and open source database created by and for the software security community (Frei et al. 2006; OSVDB 2011b; Yu et al. 2006). The goal of this database is to provide accurate, detailed, current and unbiased technical information on software security vulnerabilities. This database promotes greater, more open collaboration between companies and individuals, eliminates redundant work, and reduces expenses inherent with the development and maintenance of in-house software vulnerability databases (OSVDB 2011a). The database currently covers 72,658 vulnerabilities, spanning 34,257 products from 4,735 researchers, over 46 years (Frei et al. 2006; OSVDB 2011b; Yu et al. 2006). Table 2.6 summarises the main features of OSVDB database.

Table 2.6 Features of the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB)

Unique Identity	**Timeline**	**Description**	**Classification**	**Products**	**References**	**Credit**	**CVSSv2 score**
OSVDB ID	Discovery date, Full Disclosure date, Vendor informed date	Description provided by CVE	Location, Attack type, Impact, Exploit, Full Disclosure	Product name	Security advisories team and affected vendors	Name of person or security advisories team or software vendor	CVSSv2 Base Score

Source: (OSVDB 2011b)

The following list provides a brief description of main fields of the OSVDB database (OSVDB 2011b):

- The unique identity of a software vulnerability
- Timeline provides software vulnerability discovery date (i.e. the date when vulnerability was discovered)
- Full disclosure date (i.e. the date when software vulnerability was fully disclosed)
- Vendor informed date (i.e. the date when software vendor was informed about software vulnerability)
- Description provides core information about the software vulnerability
- Classification provides attribution about the software vulnerability which can be added
- Products provides a software vendor name, as well as the name of affected software
- Reference provides links and cross-references for the software vulnerability
- Credit provides information about the researcher who disclosed the vulnerability
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System ($CVSS_{v2}$) provides a base score for the software vulnerability.

Table 2.7 presents a high level of classification of software vulnerabilities by attack types for OSVDB software vulnerabilities. The table also provides a brief description of each attack type to classify the software vulnerability attack types in OSVDB database.

Table 2.7 Classification of Software Vulnerabilities in OSVDB by Attack Type

Attack Type	Description
1. Authentication Management	A vulnerability that attacks or bypasses an authentication mechanism. Exception: If an attack uses SQL injection to bypass auth or add an administrative account, the attack itself is not authentication based, unless that is the only thing that can be done with the attack.
2. Cryptographic	A vulnerability that attacks a cryptographic implementation (e.g., compromising an algorithm), relies on the presence of weak cryptography (e.g., password protection via XOR) or relies on the lack of cryptography (passwords stored in plaintext, information transmitted in clear text).
3. Denial of Service	A vulnerability that results in a loss of service, functionality or capability. This includes making a service unresponsive, consuming resources (e.g., CPU, memory) or forcing a reboot.
4. Information Disclosure	A vulnerability that results in the disclosure of information that may be sensitive (e.g., passwords, credit info) or useful in conducting additional more focused attacks (e.g., usernames, installation path).
5. Infrastructure	A vulnerability that attacks an infrastructure device, such as a large router, firewall or another device supporting BGP. This does not apply to SOHO routers. Input Manipulation- A vulnerability that is exploited by sending manipulated and unexpected data to a service or process. This includes all types of overflows, memory corruption, XSS, SQLi, RFI, traversals and more.
6. Misconfiguration	A vulnerability that exploits a misconfiguration in a system or software. Misconfigurations can be as shipped by a vendor (e.g., version 3.3 accidentally shipped with insecure options), or by administrators who would reasonably configure software incorrectly (e.g., common sense or product documentation would lead to it).
7. Race Condition	A vulnerability that can only be exploited during a specific 'window of attack'. Typically a race between two actions where the first makes a system vulnerable and the second removes the condition for exploit. This is frequently seen in temporary file handling, but may apply to a wide variety of attacks.
8. Other	A vulnerability that cannot be defined by any other Attack Type classification.
9. Attack Type Unknown	The attack type for this vulnerability is not known.

Source: adopted from (OSVDB 2011b)

Although OSVDB classifies software vulnerabilities into nine types of attack as shown in table 2.7, the mostly commonly-found attack types are Infrastructure, Authentication Management, Misconfiguration, Denial of Service and Information Disclosure. Furthermore, these nine types of attack classifications do not comprehensively classify all software vulnerabilities found in the OSVDB database into attack types. Therefore, this study used a more comprehensive classification of software vulnerabilities provided by the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), which is described in section 6.2.3 (see Table 2.9).

2.6.3 National Vulnerability Database

NVD is the U.S. Government's repository of standards-based vulnerability management data represented using the Security Content Automation

Protocol (SCAP). This data enables automation of vulnerability management, security measurement, and compliance (Arora et al. 2010b; Arora et al. 2010a; NVD 2011b).

Table 2.8 summarises the main features of NVD database including databases of security checklists, security related software flaws, misconfigurations, product names, and impact metrics (NVD 2011b).

Table 2.8 Features of National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

Unique Identity	**Overview**	**Impact**	**References**	**Technical Details**
CVE ID	General description about the software vulnerability	CVSS base score v2, access vector, access complexity, authentication and impact type	To advisories, solutions and tools	Vulnerability type

Source: (NVD 2011b)

The following list provides a brief description of the main fields of the NVD database (NVD 2011b):

- CVE ID represents a unique identification of a software vulnerability
- Overview provides general information about the software vulnerability
- Impact provides a CVSS severity and CVSS metrics where CVSS severity gives the level of the criticality of software vulnerability and CVSS metrics gives an access vector, access complexity, authentication and impact type
- References provide links and cross-references for the software vulnerability; and technical details provide the cause of software vulnerability with vulnerability type
- NVD provides technical details integrating with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE).

Furthermore, to classify software vulnerabilities into comprehensive and specific types, this study used a standard classification of software vulnerability types: the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classification which is cross mapped with National Vulnerability Database (NVD) through the Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE) entries (NVD 2011b) in OSVDB. However, the following software vulnerabilities ‘Other’, ‘Not in CWE’, ‘Insufficient Information’ and ‘Design Error’ are not mapped in NVD.

Table 2.9 lists and briefly describes a comprehensive classification of 23 specific types of software vulnerabilities developed by NVD and OSVDB and which is used to classify the software vulnerabilities analysed in this study.

Table 2.9 Comprehensive Classification of 23 Specific Types of Software Vulnerabilities

Name	CWE-ID	Description
1. Authentication Issues	CWE-287	Failure to properly authenticate users.
2. Credentials Management	CWE-255	Failure to properly create, store, transmit, or protect passwords and other credentials.
3. Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control	CWE-264	Failure to enforce permissions or other access restrictions for resources, or a privilege management problem.
4. Buffer Errors	CWE-119	Buffer overflows and other buffer boundary errors in which a program attempts to put more data in a buffer than the buffer can hold, or when a program attempts to put data in a memory area outside of the boundaries of the buffer.
5. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	CWE-352	Failure to verify that the sender of a web request actually intended to do so. CSRF attacks can be launched by sending a formatted request to a victim, then tricking the victim into loading the request (often automatically), which makes it appear that the request came from the victim. CSRF is often associated with XSS, but it is a distinct issue.
6. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	CWE-79	Failures of a site to validate, filter, or encode user input before returning it to another user's web client.
7. Cryptographic Issues	CWE-310	An insecure algorithm or the inappropriate use of one; an incorrect implementation of an algorithm that reduces security; the lack of encryption (plaintext); also, weak key or certificate management, key disclosure, random number generator problems.
8. Path Traversal	CWE-22	When user-supplied input can contain ".." or similar characters that are passed through to file access APIs, causing access to files outside of an intended subdirectory.
9. Code Injection	CWE-94	Causing a system to read an attacker-controlled file and execute arbitrary code within that file. Includes PHP remote file inclusion, uploading of files with executable extensions, insertion of code into executable files, and others.
10. Format String Vulnerability	CWE-134	The use of attacker-controlled input as the format string parameter in certain functions.
11. Configuration	CWE-16	A general configuration problem that is not associated with passwords or permissions.
12. Information Leak / Disclosure	CWE-200	Exposure of system information, sensitive or private information, fingerprinting, etc.
13. Input Validation	CWE-20	Failure to ensure that input contains well-formed, valid data that conforms to the application's specifications. Note: this overlaps other categories like XSS, Numeric Errors, and SQL Injection.
14. Numeric Errors	CWE-189	Integer overflow, signedness, truncation, underflow, and other errors that can occur when handling numbers.
15. OS Command Injections	CWE-78	Allowing user-controlled input to be injected into command lines that are created to invoke other programs, using system () or similar functions.
16. Race Conditions	CWE-362	The state of a resource can change between the time the resource is checked to when it is accessed.
17. Resource Management Errors	CWE-399	The software allows attackers to consume excess resources, such as memory exhaustion from memory leaks, CPU consumption from infinite loops, disk space consumption, etc.
18. SQL Injection	CWE-89	When user input can be embedded into SQL statements without proper filtering or quoting, leading to modification of query logic or execution of SQL commands.
19. Link Following	CWE-59	Failure to protect against the use of symbolic or hard links that can point to files that are not intended to be accessed by the application.
20. Other	No Mapping	NVD is only using a subset of CWE for mapping instead of the entire CWE, and the weakness type is not covered by that subset.
21. Not in CWE	No Mapping	The weakness type is not covered in the version of CWE that was used for mapping.
22. Insufficient Information	No Mapping	There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unknown or unspecified.
23. Design Error	No Mapping	A vulnerability is characterized as a 'Design error' if there exists no errors in the implementation or configuration of a system, but the initial design causes a vulnerability to exist.

Source: adopted from (NVD 2011a; OVAL 2011)

2.6.4 Secunia

Secunia is a comprehensive and trusted source of security information on the Internet. Secunia provides Secunia Security Factsheets that inform users about the state and evolution of software vulnerabilities with respect to the product specified in the factsheet (Borders, Weele, Lau & Prakash 2009; Nazario 2009; Secunia 2011). Whenever a new vulnerability is reported, Secunia releases a Secunia Advisory after verification of the information. A Secunia Advisory provides details of the software vulnerability including a description, a risk rating, impact, recommended mitigation, credits, and references (Borders et al. 2009; Nazario 2009; Secunia 2011).Table 2.10 summarises the main features of Secunia database.

Table 2.10 Features of Secunia Database

Unique Identity	**Description**	**Release Date**	**Last Update**	**Criticality Level**	**Impact Type**	**Location**	**Solution Status**	**Type of Software**	**Secunia CVSS Score**
Secunia Advisory ID	Description of software vulnerability	Full disclosure date	Solution date	Severity level	Name of software vulnerability	From where attack originates	Software vulnerability patching information	Operating system or Application software	Severity score

Source: (Secunia 2011)

The following list provides a brief summary of the main fields in the Secunia database (Secunia 2011):

- Secunia advisory id is a unique identity to represent a software vulnerability
- Description provides general information about a software vulnerability
- Release date is the date when a software vulnerability is fully disclosed
- Last update date is a solution date
- Criticality level represents the severity of software vulnerability
- Impact type represents a cause of software vulnerability
- Location represents the origin of attack
- Solution status represents whether software vendor patched a software vulnerability or not
- Type of software provides whether a software vulnerability originates from operating system software or application software

The four software vulnerability databases discussed previously provide detailed information for the useful classification of software vulnerabilities used in this study. However, in order to examine the response time of software vendors in releasing a software patch for the above classified software vulnerabilities in terms of their level of criticality, type of software vendor and type of software, software vulnerability disclosure can provide a much clearer picture of how the response time can be accurately determined.

2.7 Software Vulnerability Disclosure

The following definitions of a full disclosure of software vulnerability have been identified from the literature. Telang and Wattal (2005, p. 1) stated that 'Any public announcement about a software defect is termed as full disclosure of software vulnerability'. McKinney (2008, p. 76) states that ' A full disclosure of software vulnerability is a phenomenon of openness and transparency among security researchers, security vendors, product vendors and other stakeholders'. This study adopts the definition by Arora et al. (2010a, p. 115) that: 'A full disclosure of software vulnerability refers to the publication of vulnerability information before the software vendor has released a patch to address the vulnerability'.

2.7.1 Software Vulnerability Disclosure Debate

It is inevitable that software vulnerabilities are discovered in software products in spite of how much time and effort is spent in identifying and removing flaws during development of software preliminary maturity. Based on this inevitability, one can guess that a logical structured procedure could be pursued for disclosing software vulnerabilities. However, the current process for disclosing software vulnerabilities can range from a loosely organized effort to complete disorder (Bollinger 2004; SANS 2003).

This lack of structure has resulted in a heated debate within the information security community about the socially optimal method of disclosure of a software vulnerability. The full disclosure movement of the late 1990s argues that by providing as much open detail about software vulnerabilities as possible will help system administrators and software programmers to fully understand the technical details of software vulnerabilities in order to prevent and defend software vulnerabilities (Bollinger 2004; Cooper 1999). A software programmer can review the structure of the software vulnerability through the full technical details of a software vulnerability; and try to avoid similar software vulnerabilities in future software development. Similarly, users can take appropriate defensive security action such as implementing an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), shutting down a vulnerable service or using exploit code to scan the network for vulnerable applications (Bollinger 2004; SANS 2003).

Moreover, full disclosure supposedly puts pressure on software vendors to issue a high quality software patch for newly-discovered software vulnerabilities as soon as possible and improve the quality of software over time. If software vendors fail to release a software patch and a software vulnerability is subsequently fully disclosed, public media coverage will negatively impact on the reputation and revenue of software vendors. To reduce negative public media coverage, software vendors are more likely to develop less vulnerable software products (Arora, Telang & Xu 2004a; Bollinger 2004; SANS 2003).

Although the concept of full disclosure of software vulnerabilities has a number of advantages, it is lacking by not providing a grace period in which software vendors can address those software vulnerabilities. The major problem of full disclosure of software vulnerabilities is that software vendors are notified at the same time as the vulnerability is fully disclosed. Information security is affected by the time software vendors take in releasing software patches to fix the software vulnerability (Arora, Krishnan, Nandkumar, Telang & Yang 2004b; Bollinger 2004).Thus, the concept of delayed or responsible disclosure was introduced, where information about the identification of a software vulnerability is first informed to a software vendor and then disclosed fully when the software vendor releases a software patch (Arora & Telang 2005a; Farrow 2000; Meunier 2008).

A number of papers have discussed the pros and cons of non-disclosure, full disclosure and socially planned software vulnerability disclosure (Arora et al. 2004b; Arora et al. 2005b; Farrow 2000; Laakso, Takanen & Röning 2001; Rescorla 2003, 2005). A discussion on the various types of software vulnerability disclosures is beyond the scope of this research. However, the responsible disclosure of software vulnerabilities provides a vendor informed date which facilitates a more accurate response time by software vendors in releasing software patches to be calculated. This approach is used in this study to examine the effect of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities on the response time of software vendors in releasing a patch for software vulnerability. The response time is based on the responsible disclosure date or vendor informed date.

Full disclosure of software vulnerability has a serious effect on the software vendors' response time in releasing software patches, however, the concern is that different types of software vulnerability disclosures have a different impact on the software vendor response time in releasing software patches. To gain a better understanding of an actual response time, software vulnerability disclosure policy needs to be examined in more detail.

2.8 Software Vulnerability Disclosure Policy

Flaws in software make software products vulnerable and prone to violating software security policy (Arbaugh, Fithen & McHugh 2000). The examination of optimal policy for software vulnerability disclosure was demonstrated through the optimal timing of disclosure policy. It was shown that policy makers such as those in government and regulatory authorities in specific industries have the power to influence behaviour of software vendors and also minimise the magnitude of patch developing costs and loss to customers (Arora et al. 2008; Cavusoglu et al. 2007). It was also shown that any software vulnerability disclosure is not optimal. Software vendors always decide to release patches afterwards, rather than when informed of a software vulnerability, because this optimises their effort and investment in their software products (Arora et al. 2008). Does this mean that the type of software, type of software vendor and the level of criticality of software vulnerability also affect the decision of software vendors to develop and release timely patches?

Information security advisories have moved away from a policy of immediate disclosure to having a period of grace before full disclosure. A policy of immediate disclosure of software vulnerability in this study means the disclosure of software vulnerability when it is recognized as being a security threat. Information security advisories such as CERT/CC introduced their own software vulnerability disclosure policy to determine when to fully disclose software vulnerability. The software disclosure policy of CERT/CC provides a reasonable 45 days grace period for software vendors to release a software patch before full disclosure. Similarly, Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) provides a 30 day grace period for software vendors to release a software patch before full disclosure (Cavusoglu et al. 2004). In the same way, Russ Cooper's NTbugTraq policy provides a maximum of 14 days grace period to software vendors to release a software patch before full disclosure. Likewise, Rain Forest Puppy's 'RFPolicy' provides 5 working days for software vendors to respond after initially being informed about software vulnerabilities. Failure to respond in 5 days resulted in full disclosure of software vulnerabilities (Cooper 1999; OIS 2004; SANS 2003).

From the above discussion, a full disclosure of software vulnerability depends upon the policy of the individual information security advisory. There is no single standard policy for the full disclosure of software vulnerabilities. What this means for this research is that the full disclosure of a software vulnerability does not provide an accurate means for calculating the actual response time in releasing a software patch. Therefore, it is more appropriate to identify the vendor informed date and solution date in order to calculate the actual software vendors' response time in releasing software patches.

2.9 Software Vendors

Software is generally developed and distributed by two main types of software vendors: proprietary source software vendors and open source software vendors (Comino & Manenti 2003; Leoncini, Rentocchini & Vittucci Marzetti 2010).

2.9.1 Proprietary Source Software Vendor

According to Payne (2002, p. 63), 'Vendors who provide licensed software are often described as proprietary software vendors'. This study adopts the definition of proprietary source software vendors provided by Ming-Wei and Ying-Dar (2001, p. 33): ‘Proprietary source software vendors operate on a closed-source model: They develop their own software and release that software to the public with the intention of gaining market penetration and earning a profit’.

2.9.2 Open Source Software Vendors

The following definition is used for open source software vendors in this study: vendors who provide open source software with compilable source code and this source code can be modified or redistributed free of cost (Payne 2002; Schryen et al. 2010)

Both these two main types of software vendor are responsible for fixing software vulnerabilities through developing and releasing software patches for their vulnerable software products. However, the main focus of this study is to determine if there is a difference in the time taken in releasing software patches by open source software vendors versus proprietary source software vendors once software vulnerabilities have been informed to software vendors.

2.9.3 Debate on Open and Proprietary Source Software Vendors

There has been considerable debate about the software security of open source software vendors and proprietary source software vendors. Open source software vendors do not develop software in a controlled environment. Open source software is not always peer reviewed or validated for use. Users are free to examine and verify source code, however, the expert software programmer could embed back door Trojans to capture private and confidential information without the user ever knowing. This lack of a quality software development process results in open source software being viewed as having security issues (Hoepman & Jacobs 2007; Saltis 2009). Additionally, the reviewers of an open source software project may not continue on the software project for the duration of its development lifetime (i.e. reviewers might leave one software company and join another one). This lack of continuity and common direction leads to barriers to effective communication among reviewers and delays in resolving software vulnerabilities once the open source software vendors have been informed of the software vulnerability.

On the other hand, proponents of open source software stress the strength of having a large number of potential reviewers because source code of open source software is publicly distributed. The numbers of reviews of the source code of open source software maintains the maturity of software quality (Payne 2002). Similarly, Raymond (2001, p. 19) argued that 'Given enough eyeballs, bugs are shallow'. This strength of the open source software review process is assumed to enable easier identification of software vulnerabilities, and enable software vendors to be informed accordingly so they can more quickly release software patches once they have been notified of a software vulnerability.

Proprietary source software vendors develop software in a controlled environment with a concentrated team effort in a common direction; whereas open source software vendors do not always develop software in a controlled environment and have individual users worldwide developing the software. A lack of continuity and common direction prevents effective communication, thus, proprietary source software vendors appear more secure than open source software vendors (Saltis 2009). Additionally, the source code from proprietary source software vendors is viewed and edited in-depth by a dedicated software development team—eliminating the risk of back door Trojans and reducing the risk of occurrence of any software vulnerabilities. Although the source code of proprietary source software is viewed only by a dedicated software development team, Raymond (2001) argued that finding a software vulnerability in proprietary source software is not a difficult task. Expert software reviewers who are not in the dedicated software development team can find software vulnerabilities in proprietary source software without any trouble.

Nonetheless, the problem is the response time of the proprietary source software vendor in releasing a software patch. Once software vulnerability is found in proprietary source software and informed to the software vendor, only the dedicated software development team in a controlled environment can review the source code. The idea is that a large number of source code reviewers, rather than a small number of reviewers, can resolve the informed software vulnerability. Open source software often has an uncountable number of reviewers compared to proprietary source software, which has a limited number of reviewers.

Both open source software vendors and proprietary source software vendors are equally vulnerable in the perspective of software developers and specific type of software development (MacCormack, Rusnak, Baldwin & Research 2006). However, the main concern of this study is to determine which type of software vendor is quicker to respond in releasing a software patch once the software vendor is informed of the software vulnerability.

2.10 Software Vulnerability Disclosure and Software Patching

Nizovtsev and Thursby (2007) developed a model to motivate users to disclose software vulnerabilities through an open community forum under the circumstance of instant disclosure which is socially optimal. Likewise, Telang and Wattal (2007) analysed the full disclosure of software vulnerability through an event study and demonstrated that full disclosure is one of the best possible ways to lower the stock prices of software vendors. Full disclosure should encourage software vendors to be more proactive in releasing software patches. Li and Rao (2007) identified that there is no change in optimal time of full disclosure, even if private information security advisories (e.g. iDefense, TippingPoint, ISS Inc.) participate and put pressure on software vendors to release software patches. However, private information security advisories' services decrease a vendor's willingness to release a patch promptly. Arora et al. (2010a; 2008) proved that larger software vendors are more responsive to software vulnerabilities if software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed by CERT. However, the study by Arora et al. (2010a; 2008) did not tested the extent to which the level of criticality of a software vulnerability influences the response time of software vendors in releasing a patch once the software vendor is informed of the software vulnerability.

2.10.1 Open Source versus Proprietary Source

Schryen (2009) argued that there is no significant difference in vendors' patching behaviour on fully disclosed vulnerabilities between open and proprietary source software. However, Arora et al. (2010a) argued that open source vendors are quicker to release a patch than proprietary source vendors. Both these studies analysed software vendor patching behaviour of fully disclosed software vulnerability and both studies analysed 2003 and 2006 data from the same vulnerability database—which is quite dated in the current threat and attack environment. It is expected that software vendors' patching behaviour is clearer if the behaviour is analysed with the date the vendor was informed of software vulnerabilities, rather than the date the software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed.

2.10.2 The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability

Arora et al. (2010a) argued that vendors are more responsive to critical vulnerabilities. However, Schryen and Rich (2010) empirically showed that a vendor's patching behaviour does not significantly differ in terms of the criticality of software vulnerabilities in open and proprietary source software vendors. Both these studies analysed software vendor patching behaviour and the level of criticality of software vulnerability with the full disclosure date of software vulnerability. It is expected that software vendors' response to the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities is more accurately measured using the vendor informed date for software vulnerabilities rather than using full disclosure date for software vulnerabilities, because the full disclosure date varies with software vulnerability disclosure policy across different information security advisories—as discussed in section 2.8.

2.10.3 Operating System Software versus Application Software

Similarly, Christey and Martin (2007) categorised software types into operating system and non operating system (i.e. application software) to classify software vulnerabilities. Lowis and Accorsi (2009) classified software vulnerabilities into operating system and web application to better understand their cause and effect, as well as to improve vulnerability management tool support. Young and Conklin (2010) found that most organizations are using two to three operating systems and are concentrating on hardening those systems, which currently leaves the door open for hackers and attackers in relation to application software which is poorly managed in terms of patching, as organizations are often using dozens, if not hundreds, of different types of software applications—all with potential software vulnerabilities. It is much more difficult to manage the patching of software applications given the large number of software applications in relation to operating system software. Moreover, SANS institute analysed the patching behaviour of application software and system software by taking software vulnerabilities data from Microsoft, Adobe and Sun Microsystems and found software vendors are much slower in patching application software than patching operating system software (SANS 2009).

Similarly, TippingPoint security community also analysed detected operating system software and application software vulnerabilities to rectify the changing dynamics in the software vulnerability assessment field. It also found that software vendors are much slower in patching application software than patching operating system software (TippingPoint 2009). This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that most software applications interact with the Internet in some way these days (Rehman & Mustafa 2009; Telang et al. 2007). This indicates there is a relationship between software vulnerabilities and type of software. However, previous studies have not concentrated on analysing software vendor patching behaviour in terms of the type of software and the level of criticality of vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

2.11 Theoretical Support for this Study

Software security disclosure theory is an extension of the theory of full disclosure which was first raised in the context of lock smithing in the 19th century regarding whether weaknesses in lock systems should be kept secret in the lock smithing community or revealed to the public (Hobbs, Tomlinson, Fenby & Mallet 1868). Alfred Hobbs noted in 1853 that '*Rogues are very keen in their profession, and know already much more than we can teach them'* when questioned on the wisdom of publishing the weaknesses of existing locks. Similarly, software security disclosure theory argues that full disclosure of software vulnerabilities encourages software vendors to be more proactive and timely in responding to software vulnerabilities; and makes organisations and individuals more aware of the potential risks associated with vulnerabilities in the software they are using (Swire 2004, 2006).

Previous empirical studies on full disclosure of software vulnerability have also identified that when software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed, open source software vendors release patches more quickly than proprietary source software vendors (Arora et al. 2010a; Swire 2004, 2006; Xueqi et al. 2008); software vendors are more responsive to severe software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010a); and patches are released more quickly by software vendors for operating system software vulnerabilities than for application software (SANS 2009; TippingPoint 2009; Young et al. 2010).

Furthermore, the economic model of software security investment developed by Gordon and Loeb (2002) also suggests that the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches is an optimisation decision where software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality are the most optimal for software vendors to develop and release patches; whereas for low level and high level of criticality software vulnerabilities the effort of software vendors is less optimal to develop and release patches.

Therefore, this study has used the concept of software security disclosure theory developed by Swire (2004, 2006) and the economic model of software security investment developed by Gordon and Loeb (2002) as the theoretical lens for this study which assesses the extent of the (1) level of criticality of a software vulnerability, (2) type of software vendor, and (3) type of software impact on the response time of software vendors in releasing a patch once the software vulnerability has been informed to the software vendor.

2.12 Research Gaps

The review of the literature reveals the following gaps:

1. Previous studies identified that the level of the criticality of software vulnerabilities potentially impacts on the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches for disclosed software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). Schryen and Rich (2010) did not find any significant difference in software vendors' patching behaviour for severe software vulnerabilities. Although all the above studies analysed the relationship of vendors' patching behaviour and the level of criticality of software vulnerability with the full disclosure date of software

vulnerability, they did not analyse the relationship between the level of criticality of software vulnerability and software vendors' patch release behaviour with vendor informed date.

Similarly, Gordon and Loeb's (2002) economic model of software security investment showed that software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality have the highest potential impact on the software vendors' patch release behaviour compared to low and high level of criticality of software vulnerability. Therefore, this study analyses the relationship between the level criticality of software vulnerabilities and the response time to release software patches once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerabilities.

2. Arora et al. (2010a) argued that open source software vendors are quicker to release software patches for software vulnerabilities than proprietary source software vendors. Schryen (2009) argued that there is no significant difference in software vendors' patching behaviour on fully disclosed software vulnerabilities between open and proprietary source software vendor. Both studies analysed the software vendors' patching behaviour using the full disclosure date of software vulnerabilities. This study analyses software vendor patching behaviour using the vendor informed date of software vulnerabilities because response time calculated to release software patches is more accurate when using the date of vendor informed software vulnerabilities than the date of full disclosure of software vulnerabilities.

3. Prior studies that concentrated on classifying software vulnerabilities into different types of software (Christey & Martin 2006; Lowis et al. 2009) found that organisations are more proactive in hardening operating system software, rather than application software (Young et al. 2010). SANS Institute analysed the patching behaviour of three software vendors: (1) Microsoft Corporation, (2) Adobe Systems Incorporated and (3) Sun Microsystems, in relation to application software versus operating system using software vulnerabilities data (SANS 2009). SANS found that these three software vendors released software patches more quickly for operating system software vulnerabilities than for application software. Similarly, TippingPoint security community also analysed detected operating system software and application software vulnerabilities to rectify the

changing dynamics in the software vulnerability assessment field. It also found that software vendors are much slower in patching application software than patching operating system software (TippingPoint 2009). Therefore, this study will address these issues and, based on software vulnerability data from 2008 to 2010, analyse the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches to determine if there is a difference in the response time between operating system software and application software.

2.13 Research Question and Sub Questions

The general research question should focus on the specifics of the enquiry at hand (Zikmund 1997; McPhail 2000). Therefore, the general research question for this study is as follows:

To what extent does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of software vendor (Open source, Proprietary source vendor), type of software (Operating system software, Application software) influence the response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

To answer the general research question for this study, the following three specific research questions are addressed.

RSQ1. How does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities influence the response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

RSQ2. Is there a difference between open and proprietary source software vendors in terms of their response time in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

RSQ3. Is there a difference between operating system software and application software in terms of response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

2.14 Conceptual Model

The theoretical basis of the conceptual model for this study is software security disclosure theory, which is an extension of the theory of full disclosure and the economic model of software security investment developed by Gordon and Loeb (2002) and (Hobbs et al. 1868; Swire 2004, 2006). The theory of software security disclosure provides an explanation for why the disclosure of a software vulnerability will encourage software vendors to be more proactively in responding and releasing a patch to a software vulnerability once they informed of its existence. Previous studies have argued that the patching behaviour of software vendors when a software vulnerability is disclosed are different for the type of software (operating system software versus application software) and the type of software vendor (proprietary software vendor versus open source software vendor). The economic model of software investment explains how the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches is an optimisation decision and suggests that software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality are the most optimal for software vendors to develop and release quickly (Gordon et al. 2002). Conversely for low and high level of criticality software vulnerabilities the economic model of software investment suggests that the effort of software vendors is less optimal and software vendors develop and release patches more slowly.

In this study, the conceptual model underpinned by on the theory of software security disclosure and the economic model of software security, is based on the relationships among four key variables identified from the previous relevant literature. The level of criticality of a software vulnerability, software vendor type and type of software are independent variables in this study. The level of criticality of software vulnerabilities is measured as a continuous variable on a scale of 0 to 10. The scale of 0 to 10 is categorised into 5 levels (very low, low, medium, high and very high). Software vendor type is a dummy variable (open source software vendor, proprietary source software vendor) and is measured as a binary variable. Similarly, type of software is a dummy variable (operating system software, application software) and is also measured as a binary variable. The response time is the dependent variable in this study and is a continuous variable measured by number of days taken to release a software patch based on when the software vendor is informed about a software vulnerability. The response time is determined on the basis of the vendor informed disclosure date. Type of vendor release a software patch based on the level of criticality of software vulnerability and type of software. Therefore, it is anticipated that these three independent variables are hypothesised to have a direct impact, although they are interrelated with each other, on the dependent variable, the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in this study. To test proposed relationships in this model, three hypotheses have been specifically formulated from the three research sub questions stated previously in section 2.13.

2.15 Hypotheses

The level of criticality of software vulnerability is the risk level assigned to each software vulnerability which describes the extent of damage that could be caused by a specific breach of confidentiality, integrity and availability for that software vulnerability (Liu et al. 2011). The levels of criticality is categorised into 5 levels (very low, low, medium, high and very high) in this study. Previous studies have argued that the higher the level of the criticality of software vulnerabilities, the higher potential impact on the software vendors' response time in releasing software patches for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). In contrast, Schryen and Rich (2010) did not find any significant difference in software vendors' patching behaviour for critical software vulnerabilities. Furthermore, Gordon and Loeb (2002) argued that the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches is an optimisation decision where medium level of criticality of software vulnerabilities are the most optimal for software vendors to develop and release patches promptly; whereas low level and high level of criticality software vulnerabilities are less optimal and software vendors to develop and release patches for software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality less quickly for. Based on these issues in the existing literature, the following hypothesis will be tested.

H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

Schryen (2009) argued that there is no significant difference in vendors' patching behaviour on fully disclosed vulnerabilities between open and proprietary source software. However, Arora et al. (2010a) argued that open source vendors are quicker to release a patch than proprietary source vendors. Both studies analysed 2003 and 2006 data from the same vulnerability database—which is dated in the current threat and attack environment. Both these studies also analysed software vendors' patching behaviour using the full disclosure date of software vulnerabilities. Similarly, Xueqi, Nannan and Hsiao (2008) argued that software vulnerabilities data and its relationship with the release of software patches will change over time due to the dynamic and rapidly-changing nature of software vulnerabilities. Therefore, this hypothesis will test whether the response time to release a software patch is different between open source vendors and proprietary source vendors based on the vendor informed date. Therefore, the following hypothesis will be tested.

H2: Open source vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

As mentioned previously in section 2.10.3, Young and Conklin (2010) argued that most organizations concentrate more on hardening operating systems rather than application software, as organizations use two or three operating systems as opposed to dozens, if not hundreds, of different types of software applications—all with potential software vulnerabilities. Moreover, SANS and TippingPoint (2009; 2009) found that software vendors release patches for operating system software vulnerabilities more quickly than for application software. Indeed most operating systems have built-in mechanisms for software updates. Based on these reasons, the following hypothesis developed from the existing literature will be tested.

H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

Figure 2.4 represents an integrated conceptual model with the three proposed hypothesised relationships which will be tested in this study to investigate and determine the level of impact of key factors, namely, (1) the level of criticality of software vulnerability, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software, on the software vendors' response time in releasing software patches


Type of Software Vendor
1. Open Source Software Vendors
2. Proprietary Source Software Vendors
H2
Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability
H1
Response Time
Type of Software
1. Operating System Software
2. Application Software
H3

Figure 2.4 Key Factors impacting on Response Time

2.16 Conclusion

This chapter firstly provided a context for understanding the background and parent literatures surrounding software vulnerabilities and software patches by reviewing the relevant literature. The immediate literature focused on the issues of software vulnerabilities: software vulnerability classification, software vulnerability disclosure, software vulnerability disclosure policy and software vendors' patching behaviour. Gaps in the literature are identified in the areas of software vulnerabilities and software vendors' response time in releasing software patches in terms of (1) the level of criticality, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software. There appears to be no study that focuses on the influences of key factors: (1) the level of criticality, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software, on the response time in releasing software patches once software vendors have been informed of software vulnerabilities. The main theoretical support for this study is software security disclosure theory and the economic model of software security investment. Based on the relevant literature, software security disclosure theory and an economic model of software security investment as the theoretical lens, a research model is developed which can contribute a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between key factors of software vulnerabilities and their impact on the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches once informed of software vulnerabilities. The relationships between the key factors of software vulnerabilities and response time are developed from the existing literature and are presented as research hypotheses.

The following chapter (Chapter 3) discusses and justifies the research design and methodology used to collect and analyse empirical data to test the research model developed in this chapter.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology used to collect and analyse empirical data to test the research hypotheses proposed in chapter two and developed from the general research question specified in chapter one. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and justify the methodology used to answer the main research questions of this study by testing the research model and research hypotheses presented in the literature review. This chapter provides justification for the choice of a positivist paradigm, research design and research strategy, and then discusses how the issues of validity and reliability are addressed in this study. This chapter is divided into four major sections. First, it discusses the research purpose and commonly-used strategies for collecting data to answer research problems. Second, it explores the issues of validity and reliability of this study. The data collection strategies adopted for this research, including data sources, sample generation and data measurement approaches are discussed next. Finally, the appropriate method of data analysis used in this research is outlined, justifying the choice of multiple regression analysis and the test of significance in the context of this study.

3.2 Research Paradigm

This study adopts the positivist research paradigm which means the object of this study is independent of researchers individual beliefs and biases. Knowledge is discovered and verified through direct observations or measurements of phenomena. Similarly, the facts are established by the testing of hypotheses developed from the existing theory through the measurement of observable social realities (Krauss 2005; Tuli 2011). Flowers (2009) argued that the positivism assumes the knowledge is valid only if theoretical models can be developed that are generalisable, can explain cause and effect of relationships, and predict outcomes. Similarly, positivism is based upon values of reason, truth and validity and there is a focus purely on facts, gathered through direct observation and experience and measured empirically using quantitative methods-surveys and experiments and statistical analysis (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). For this study, the positivist paradigm is adopted to test the impact of key factors on the software vendors' response time in releasing software patches through a series of hypothesised relationships using quantitative archival data.

3.3 Research Design

The research design provides an overall framework for the research process (Davis 2005; Zikmund 2010). It is designed to guide researchers in their quest to solve the research problem being studied (Davis 2005). The research design process involves a series of decisions which need to be answered systematically based upon the context of the research problem. These decisions need to be made carefully as there are a number of potential sources of error which may affect the results of the study (Davis 2005). For example, errors may occur during research planning, data collection, data analysis, or when reporting the results of the study. Thus, the purpose of a research design is to ensure that the researcher is aware of these potential sources of error and has planned sufficiently to control or limit errors in the research process, thereby producing accurate and useful information (Davis 2005). This research uses a quantitative method to undertake an explanatory investigation of the relationship between critical levels of software vulnerabilities, open source software vendors versus proprietary software vendors, operating system software versus application software and the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches. The main aspect of this research is designed within a positivist framework. This means that data are collected in a form that are quantitative, detached and objective (Leedy & Ormrod 2001). The research design for this study is illustrated in figure 3.1.


SecurityFocus
(Initial population)
Secunia
OSVDB
(Reduced population)
NVD
(Additional information)
Further reduced on the availability of complete field of information for data analysis
Review data
Impact of the level of criticality of software vulnerability on response time
Impact of type of software vendors on response time
Impact of type of software on response time
Data Presentation
Data Analysis/ Interpretations
Draw Conclusion

Figure 3.1 Research Design

3.3.1 Research Strategy

Research strategy refers to a plan specifying the methods and procedures for collecting and analysing the required information (Zikmund 2010). There are five types of research strategies, experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case study (Yin 2009). Accordingly, the research strategy should be aligned with the goals and characteristics of the study (Yin 2009).

Table 3.1 explains the relevant situations for different research strategies.

Table 3.1 Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies

Strategy	**Form of Research Question**	**Requires Control of Behavioural Events**	**Focuses on Contemporary Events**
Experiment	How, why	Yes	Yes
Survey	Who, what, where, how many, how much	No	Yes
Archival analysis	Who, what, where, how many, how much	No	Yes/No
History	How, why	No	No
Case study	How, why	No	Yes

Source: (Yin, 1994, p.6)

The purpose of this research is to confirm:

(1) whether the level of criticality of current software vulnerabilities influences the response time of the software vendor in releasing software patches;

(2) whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in response to software vulnerabilities is different between open source software vendor and proprietary source software vendor; and

(3) whether the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches in response to software vulnerabilities is different between operating system software and application software.

Archival data analysis strategy is considered to be appropriate for this research because data are obtained from software vulnerability databases.

The primary approach to the collection of data for this research was to collect quantitative data concerning software vulnerabilities. Quantitative data were in the form of archive data based on factual data which already has a pre-established degree of validity and reliability and goes through rigorous screening processes before being entered into these software vulnerability databases. By being in close proximity to the variables being studied, richer data and description can be obtained to improve the quality of the research results (Yin 2009).

3.3.2 Archival Analysis

Archival analysis refers to a form of the longitudinal observation method where the researcher examines the accumulated documents. This analysis presents an opportunity to access potentially rich data that helps to reveal current events, as well as historical events, and also provide a map of what decisions and actions can be taken, by whom, how many and where. A great strength of archival analysis lies in its ability to analyse historical data continually over time. However, a poorly-maintained database can cause problems. Internal archival and current documentation do not have this weakness and is useful as a source of summary data, although it can be difficult to come by if confidential in nature (Insights 2009; Jankowicz 2005; Yin 2009).

3.4 Data Collection

3.4.1 Data Sources

The data collected to test hypothesised relationships in the proposed research model are primarily drawn from the software vulnerability database: Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB), with SecurityFocus database providing the initial sample population for this study. SecurityFocus cross-references its software vulnerabilities with the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) through the Bugtraq ID. Moreover, OSVDB provides both definition of software vulnerabilities and a dictionary of software vulnerabilities (OSVDB 2011b). This dictionary for each software vulnerability provides a standard identifier number (i.e. osvdb id), a brief description and references to related software vulnerabilities reports and advisories. As the data sources of OSVDB are cross referenced with trusted organizations such as NVD, SecurityFocus, Secunia, Nessus, Snort, Microsoft Bulletin, Vupen and CERT, the software vulnerabilities input in OSVDB is assumed to be rigorous, screened and comprehensive. National Vulnerability Database and Secunia provided additional information needed to conduct data analysis. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) cross-references its software vulnerability data with OSVDB through the Common Vulnerabilities Exposures (CVE) catalogue and Secunia cross-references its software vulnerability data with OSVDB through Secunia Advisory ID.

This research analyses data fields such as primary software vendor, description of the software vulnerability, vendor informed date, full disclosure date of software vulnerability, and software patch release date obtained from OSVDB. The level of criticality of software vulnerabilities was obtained by using a Common Vulnerability Scoring System Version 2.0 (CVSS V2), access vector, access complexity, authentication, confidentiality, integrity, availability and impact type obtained from National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Similarly, the type of software (Application software or Operating system software) for each fully disclosed software vulnerabilities sample constructed for this study is obtained from Secunia, This research also analyses software vulnerabilities under a standard classification of software vulnerability types provided by Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) which are cross section mapped by National Vulnerability Database (NVD) with Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE) entries (NVD 2011b). The information contained in these databases is factual information on software vulnerabilities and table 3.2 shows the data fields from these databases, as well as calculated fields used in this research. OSVDB track a large number of security problems, but not all SecurityFocus vulnerabilities meet its criteria to be listed in the OSVDB.

To verify the archival data obtained as a sample population from the OSVDB database is accurate and complete, software vulnerability data was randomly selected from the sample population. The OSVDB id (primary key in the OSVDB database) was used to track and confirm the validity of the data fields in each OSVDB software vulnerability with the various original data sources. The original data sources for each OSVDB software vulnerability are cross referenced in the OSVDB database (such as CVE ID, NVD, Bugtraq ID, Secunia advisory ID etc) and can be systematically cross checked for accuracy (OSVDB 2011b).

Therefore, for the purpose of empirical analysis, this research has considered only the software vulnerabilities published in both OSVDB and SecurityFocus and which can be identified through Bugtraq ID field which is contained in SecurityFocus and OSVDB; CVE catalogue which is contained in NVD and linked with CVE field in OSVDB; and Secunia Advisory ID which is contained in Secunia and linked with Secunia Advisory ID in OSVDB. Additional information such as the classification of software vulnerabilities as open source or close source are obtained from software vendor websites for each vendor informed software vulnerability in this study.

Table 3.2 OSVDB Data Fields, NVD Data Fields, Secunia Data Fields plus Fields calculated for this Research

Data fields taken from Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB)				**Additional Information obtained from National Vulnerability Database (NVD)**	**Additional Information obtained from Vendors Websites**	**Additional Information obtained from Secunia**	**Calculated Fields for this Research**
Primary Vendor Product	**Description of Software Vulnerability**	**Software Vulnerability Vendor informed Date**	**Patch Release Date/Solution Available Date**	**Criticality Score (CVSS V2 Base Score)**	**Type of Software Vendor**	**Type of Software**	**Response time (in days)** (Patch Release Date – Software Vulnerability Vendor informed Date)
					Open Source Software Vendor (1) / Proprietary Source Software Vendor (0) (Dummy Variable)	**Operating System Software (1) / Application Software (0)** (Dummy Variable)	
IBM	AIX is prone to an overflow condition. Pioout command fails to properly sanitize unspecified user-supplied input resulting in a buffer overflow. With a specially crafted command-line argument, a local attacker can potentially cause arbitrary code execution.	29/11/2007	23/01/2008	7.2	1	1	55
Microsoft Corporation	Microsoft Windows contains a flaw that may allow an attacker to gain access to unauthorized privileges. The issue is triggered when the kernel-mode drivers in win32k.sys fail to properly validate pseudo-handle values in callback parameters during window creation, allowing a local authenticated attacker to gain full user privileges.	15/06/2010	10/08/2010	9.3	0	1	56
Apple computer Inc	Apple Safari WebKit contains a memory corruption flaw related to WebKit's handling of CSS counters. The issue is triggered when visiting a maliciously crafted website. This may allow a context-dependent attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML document.	1/06/2010	28/07/2010	9.3	0	0	57
Adobe Systems Incorporated	Adobe Flash Player before 9.0.277.0 and 10.x before 10.1.53.64, and Adobe AIR before 2.0.2.12610, allows attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors related to SWF files, decompression of embedded JPEG image data, and the DefineBits and other unspecified tags.	8/06/2010	10/06/2010	9.3	0	0	2

Source: (NVD 2007; OSVDB 2011a)

3.4.2 Sample Generation

From January 1st 2008 to December 30th 2010 the SecurityFocus database reported 21,527 software vulnerabilities. This population is reduced to 11,758 software vulnerabilities which are also reported in OSVDB database. As discussed in data sources section (3.4.1), not all the SecurityFocus software vulnerabilities meet the criteria to be listed in the OSVDB. The population of 11,758 software vulnerabilities reported in OSVDB is further reduced to 2,714 software vulnerabilities. This population is reduced on the basis of the availability of a patch solution date from the software vendors. Then the 2,714 software vulnerabilities obtained from OSVDB were further reduced to 667 software vulnerabilities that had the complete relevant information to test the proposed hypothesized relationships in this study. The 667 software vulnerabilities were filtered on the basis of having a vendor informed date in OSVDB. Moreover, the whole population of 667 software vulnerabilities with complete information required is taken as a sample size for this study (Anonymous 2010; Bartlett, Kotrlik & Higgins 2001; Cochran 1977; Krejcie & Morgan 1970).

Table 3.3 summarises the number of software vulnerabilities documented by OSVDB in each year from 2008 to 2010 and the sample generation for this study (OSVDB 2011a).

Table 3.3 Number of Software Vulnerabilities Documented in OSVDB from SecurityFocus

Number of software vulnerabilities documented in OSVDB from SecurityFocus			
Years	Number of Fully Disclosed Software Vulnerabilities	Fully Disclosed Software Vulnerabilities Solution Available	Population/Sample of Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities for this Study with Complete Information
2008	5,768	574	144
2009	3,690	1199	281
2010	2,300	941	242
Total Data (From 2008 to 2010)	11,758	2714	667

3.4.3 Measurement

In order to test the proposed hypothesis, the variables defined should be measurable. The following discussion describes each of the variables in the research model which were tested in this study.

- **Full Disclosure Date of Software Vulnerability** is the date on which software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed to their users; reported to information security advisories; or reported to software vendors.
- **Patch Release Date** is the date on which software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities.
- **Vendor informed Date** is the date when a researcher disclosed the vulnerability to the vendor. This is typically evident when a timeline is included.
- **Response Time** is the amount of time taken to release a software patch based on when the software vendor is informed of a software vulnerability. It is measured in terms of days (ratio scale) and is calculated as following:

  Response time = (Patch Release Date) – (Vendor informed Date)

- The **Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability** is measured as an interval scale from 0 to 10. The level of criticality of software vulnerabilities is identified from the breach of software security in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Confidentiality-related vulnerabilities are highly critical, whereas availability-related vulnerabilities are less critical. The criticality nature of software vulnerabilities is determined by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS is an open, mature and well-established definition of the fundamental characteristics of a software vulnerability (Frei et al. 2006; Jones 2007; Ransbotham 2010). Despite its shortcomings, it is objectively examined by many interested researchers and security advisories and uniformly applied to all software vulnerabilities. The CVSS scoring system used in this study is adopted from Mell, Scarfone and Romanosky (2007) (see tables 3.4 and 3.5).

- Two types of software vendors—open source and proprietary source software vendors—are examined and compared in this study. Vendor informed software vulnerabilities are categorised into one of these two types of software vendors (open source software vendor, proprietary source software vendor) based on the descriptions of software vulnerabilities in the OSVDB database. A binary variable is used to measure differences between these two types of software vendors in relation to their response time in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities.

- Vendor informed software vulnerabilities will also be classified into one of these two types of software (operating system software and application software) in this study. A binary variable will be used to measure the difference between these two types of software in relation to the response time of software vendors in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities.

Table 3.4 Criticality Measurement of Software Vulnerabilities

Rating method listing				
ID	**Description**	**Possible impact metrics cases**	**Qualitative level**	**Impact score**
1	Each of confidentiality, integrity, and availability properties has a 'complete' loss	[C:C/I:C/A:C]	High	(7.0-10.0)
2	One of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'partial' loss. The other two have a 'complete' loss	[C:P/I:C/A:C],[C:C/I:P/A:C], [C:C/I:C/A:P]	High	
3	One of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'none' loss. The other two have a 'complete' loss	[C:N/I:C/A:C],[C:C/I:N/A:C], [C:C/I:C/A:N]	High	
4	One of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'complete' loss. The other two have a partial loss	[C:P/I:P/A:P],[C:P/I:C/A:P], [C:P/I:P/A:C]	High	
5	One of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'complete' loss. One of them has a 'partial' loss and one has a 'none' loss	[C:C/I:P/A:N],[C:C/I:N/A:P], [C:P/I:C/A:N], [C:P/I:N/A:C],[C:N/I:C/A:P], [C:N/I:P/A:C]	Medium	(4.0-6.9)
6	One of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'complete' loss. The other two have a 'none' loss	[C:C/I:N/A:N],[C:N/I:C/A:N], [C:N/I:N/A:C]	Medium	
7	Each of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'partial' loss	[C:P/I:P/A:P]	Medium	
8	One of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'none' loss. The other two have a 'none' loss	[C:N/I:P/A:P],[C:P/I:N/A:P], [C:P/I:P/A:N]	Low	(0.0-3.9)
9	One of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'partial' loss. The other two have a 'none' loss	[C:P/I:N/A:N],[C:N/I:P/A:N], [C:N/I:N/A:P]	Low	
10	Each of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties has a 'none' loss	[C:N/I:N/A:N]	Low	

Source adapted from: (Liu et al. 2011; Mell et al. 2007; NVD 2007)

Table 3.5 Software Vulnerability Criticality Metrics

Metrics of scoring method		
Exploitable metric	**Metric value**	**Quantitative score**
Access vector (AV)	Local (L)/ Adjacent network (A)/ Network (N)	0.395/0.645/1.0
Access complexity (AC)	High (H)/ Medium (M)/ Low (L)	0.35/0.61/0.71
Authentication (Au)	None (N)/ Single (S)/ Multiple (M)	0.704/0.56/0.45

Source adapted from: (Liu et al. 2011; Mell et al. 2007; NVD 2007)

3.5 Data Analysis

This section provides the justification for the statistical methods used to analyse the empirical data in this study. To begin with, a discussion of the descriptive statistics is provided, including the test for normality of the relevant variables. This is followed by a discussion of the reliability and validity of data. Then the appropriateness of the statistical tests used for testing the research model is discussed. Finally, the level of significance used in testing the research hypotheses is reviewed.

3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and the Normality of the Raw Data

Descriptive statistics were used to summarise patterns in the responses (Vaus 2002). Descriptive statistics were also used to confirm the normality of the raw data. As a requirement for conducting any multivariate data analysis, the data needs to be representative of a normal distribution (Cooper & Emory 1995; Davis 2005; Hair, Black & Babin 2010; Zikmund 2010). The following section provides an overview of the descriptive statistics used to determine the shape of the distribution of the archive data.

The mean and standard deviation measures are used to determine the centre and the spread of the distribution of data. Cooper and Emory (1995) advised that visual representations (graphs), which are superior to numerical representations of the data, were used to discover the shape of the distribution of data. Moreover, the shape of the spread of data was measured by skewness and kurtosis. Skewness indicates whether there is a substantial departure from a normal distribution in the data (Moore 2009). That is, the data is collected to one side of mean, rather than symmetrically distributed about the mean. Kurtosis indicates the peakedness or flatness of a distribution (Cooper et al. 1995; Hair et al. 2010).

Tests for skewness and kurtosis were used to determine outliers within the data set. Outliers are extreme cases within the data that lie outside the normal range of the data set (Hair et al. 2010; Moore 2009; Zikmund 2010). Outliers were retained to ensure the generalisability of the study, except in cases where there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the outlier does not provide an accurate representation of the target population.

3.5.2 Reliability and Validity of Data

The archival data used in this study is factual data which already has a pre-established degree of validity and reliability (MacCallum 1998; McBurney 2001). The SecurityFocus database, OSVDB database and NVD database are the main archival data sources for this study. The provenance of these software vulnerability databases can be checked as this archival data is published on the Internet and open to scrutiny by organisations and the general public. All information relating to software vulnerabilities goes through a rigorous screening process before being entered into these databases. These software vulnerability data have been proven to be reliable and valid in a number of previous empirical studies published in information systems research journals such as *Information Systems Research, Information Systems Frontiers, Management Science,* and *Information Economics and Policy* (Arora et al. 2006a; Arora et al. 2010b; Arora et al. 2010a; Li et al. 2007).

3.5.3 Hypothesis Testing

In conducting hypothesis testing there are three important decisions that need to be made: (1) the type of statistical test that will be used; (2) the appropriateness of that statistical test; and (3) the level of significance which is considered to be appropriate (Cooper et al. 1995). For this study, multiple regression analysis (MRA) was considered the most appropriate for testing the associations between type of software vendor, type of software and the level of the criticality of software vulnerability (independent variables) and the response time (dependent variable). The acceptable level of significance for rejecting the null hypothesis was determined by convention to be five percent. The following sections discuss and justify the use of multiple regression analysis and tests of significance within the context of this study.

Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA)

Regression is a statistical technique used to measure the linear association between a dependent and independent variables (Davis 2005; Moore 2009; Zikmund 2010).

In this study, vendor informed software vulnerabilities are used as the unit of analysis and multiple regression extends the concept of regression to allow the simultaneous investigation of a set of independent variables (type of software vendor, type of software and the level of criticality of software vulnerability) upon a single dependent variable (response time).

There are certain assumptions of MRA that need to be met to improve the accuracy of the results, namely: normal distribution of data, and multi-collinearity (Osbourne & Waters 2002), as explained below:

- Normal distribution of the level of criticality software vulnerabilities and response time of software vendors in releasing patches will be verified by producing the descriptive statistics. Normal Q-Q plot, box plot and histogram can also be used to verify these variables and are representative of a normal distribution. If normal distribution does not exist, data transformation can be undertaken to modify the data because normality is a condition of MRA (Osbourne et al. 2002).

- Correlations between the independent variables will be analysed to determine whether there are any multi-collinearity problems. This will determine if there is a strong correlation between two or more predictors in the regression model. According to Nugroho and Sampurno (2010), if collinearity level is above 0.7 or, according to Field (2009), if VIF is more than 2, it is very likely that a predictor of the outcome will be regarded as insignificant and rejected from the model.

The following regression model is assumed as the model for this study:



Type of Software Vendor
1. Open Source Software Vendors
2. Proprietary Source Software Vendors
Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability
Type of Software
1. Operating System Software
2. Application Software
b1
b3
b2
Response Time

Figure 3.2 Multiple Regression Model for this Study

A dependent variable is the response time. The independent variables are type of software vendor (Open source vendor, Proprietary source vendor); the type of software (Operating system software, Application software); and level of criticality of software vulnerability. Additionally, $b_{1,}$ b_2 and b_3 are the slope (Beta coefficient) for type of software vendor, the type of software and level of criticality of software vulnerability respectively.

The significance of each variable with response time in patching software vulnerability is tested using the t-test with the null hypothesis (H_0) and alternative hypotheses (H_{a1}, H_{a2}, H_{a3}) as follows:

H_0: $b_0 = 0$

H_{a1}: $b_1 \neq 0$

H_{a2}: $b_2 \neq 0$

H_{a3}: $b_3 \neq 0$

H_0 is rejected if t-calculated is less than –tn, α/2 or more than tn, α/2. Here, tn, α/2 is the tabulated value of t-statistics with n-degrees of freedom and α-level of significance of a two-tailed distribution. Alternatively, if the calculated t-statistics lies within the range of the tabulated value, then H_0 is accepted.

Tests of significance

After determining the acceptance and rejection of null hypothesis, it is necessary to test the fitted regression for reality and linearity. This is done by the analysis of variance with the determination of the squared correlation coefficient (r^2), which is the ratio of the sum of squares accounted for by regression (Q_R) to that accounted for by total (Q_T) as follows (Kumar 2010):

$$r^2 = Q_R / Q_T$$

Where $Q_R = [\Sigma Y(X-X_{AV})]2 / \Sigma(X-X_{AV})2$

$Q_T = \Sigma Y^2 - (\Sigma Y)^2/n$

Here,

X= independent variable; Y= dependent variable

n= sample size; X_{AV} = average of X

According to Chaulagain (2006, p. 33) there are two kinds of significance—practical and statistical. If the regression is not practically significant, it is of little use to test its statistical significance. If, however, it is practically significant, then a test of the hypothesis must be made in order to test for statistical significance. Practical significance is measured by the squared correlation coefficient, r2. A larger correlation coefficient indicates a better fit of the regression equation. If $r^2 < 0.25$, then the regression is very doubtful for practical use and a further test for statistical significance is meaningless (ibid). But, if $r^2 > 0.25$, then the regression should be tested further for statistical significance. Statistical significance is tested by estimating the error in the regression equation (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams 2010):

$y = b_0 + b_1, b_2, b_3\ x + e$

Where,
e = error in estimating the regression equation.

The level of significance used to test the null hypothesis indicates the probability at which the results will be accepted or rejected based upon chance. The commonly-accepted level of significance for rejecting the null hypothesis is five percent (Davis 2005; Zikmund 2010). This study follows conventional hypotheses. However, bearing this mind, it is important to consider the statistical significance.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter described the main research methodology used in the study. The overall research design adopted quantitative research methods using archival data. A brief justification was provided for the appropriateness of archival data analysis in this study, followed by a detailed description of the process of data collection from the four predominant databases. The total sample population of vendor informed software vulnerabilities was generated from 2008 to 2010 archival data. Data analysis included descriptive analysis and multiple regression analysis. Descriptive analysis tests the normality, linearity and homoscedasticity; and multiple regression analysis tests the relationship between dependent and independent variables established as hypotheses for this proposed study. The following chapter provides detailed results of the data analysis.

Chapter 4: Data Analysis

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and discuss the results of descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis. This chapter is organized in the following way: First, it discusses the results of descriptive statistics in relation to the characteristics of each of the variables used in this study. Second, it discusses the results of testing the proposed research model using multiple regression analysis. Finally, this chapter discusses the hypothesised relationships in the proposed research model in relation to the existing literature and concludes by summarising the main findings from the descriptive and multivariate statistical data analysis.

4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables in the Proposed Research

This section presents and discusses the results of the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviations, and correlations) for the explanatory variables used in the proposed research model for this study. As discussed in chapter 3, the total population/sample size for this study is 667 software vulnerabilities. On the basis of this population/sample size, each of the variables is discussed in turn in relation to the results of descriptive statistical analyses.

4.2.1 Type of Software Vendor

Type of software vendor is an independent variable and measured as a binary variable. Open source software vendors are coded as 1, with proprietary software vendors coded as the reference category of 0.

Table 4.1 presents the distribution for proprietary source software vendors and open source software vendors across the total population of 667 software vulnerabilities. Table 4.1 shows that 418 (62.7%) software vulnerabilities in the total sample population are in proprietary source vendor software and 249 (37.3%) software vulnerabilities are in open source vendor software.

Table 4.1 Distribution of Software Vulnerabilities by Type of Software Vendor

Type of Software Vendor	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percentage
Proprietary Source Software Vendor	418	62.7	62.7
Open Source Software Vendor	249	37.3	100.0
Total	667	100.0	

Top 12 Software Vendors and Informed Software Vulnerabilities (from 2008 to 2010)

Figure 4.1 presents the top 12 software vendors in the total sample population of software vulnerabilities for this study and their proportion of informed software vulnerabilities from 2008 to 2010.



Figure 4.1 Top 12 Software Vendors by Number of Software Vulnerabilities in this Study (from 2008 to 2010)

(Source: developed for this research)

The top 12 software vendors were selected on the basis that the numbers of software vulnerabilities informed to the software vendors were 10 or above in the sample population used for this research. The reason for choosing 12 software vendors is that more than half (341) informed software vulnerabilities from the total sample population of 667 are reported for these software vendors. Microsoft Corporation has the highest number of informed software vulnerabilities, numbering 60; followed by

Adobe Systems Incorporated and Apple Computer Inc with 49 each respectively. Cisco System Inc has the lowest number (10) of informed software vulnerabilities in these top 12 software vendors. Among these top 12 software vendors, 10 software vendors are proprietary source and 2 are open source. This indicates that most of these software vendors with the highest number of informed software vulnerabilities are proprietary source software vendors in the total sample population for this study.

Types of Software Vulnerabilities and Their Proportion

Figure 4.2 presents a pie chart of 21 different types of software vulnerabilities identified in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities from 2008 to 2010 for this study.



Figure 4.2 Types of Software Vulnerabilities by Percentage Terms in this Study

(Source: developed for this research)

Figure 4.2 shows that buffer error is the most common software vulnerability (30%) in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, followed by cross site scripting (XSS) (17%), numeric errors and resource management errors (7%), SQL injection, path traversal, input validation, code injection (6%), insufficient information and permission, privileges and access control (4%), authentication issues (2%), and CSRF, other design errors and OS command injection (1%). The following software vulnerabilities configuration, credentials management, cryptographic issues, format string vulnerability and link following had a less than (1%) occurrence in the total sample population of 667 for this study.

Type of Software Vulnerability across Software Vendor Type

Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the 21 most commonly identified types of software vulnerabilities across proprietary source software vendors and open source software vendors.

Table 4.2 Types of Software Vulnerability across Software Vendor Type

Types of Software Vulnerability * Software Vendor Type			
Types of Software Vulnerability	**Software Vendor Type**		Total
	Proprietary Source Software Vendor	Open Source Software Vendor	
Authentication Issues	6 (1.4%)	5 (2.0%)	11 (1.6%)
Buffer Errors	160 (38.3%)	37 (14.9%)	197 (29.5%)
Code Injection	36 (8.6%)	5 (2.0%)	41 (6.1%)
Configuration	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.4%)	1 (0.1%)
Credentials Management	2 (0.5%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.3%)
Cryptographic Issues	2 (0.5%)	1 (0.4%)	3 (0.4%)
CSRF	8 (1.9%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (1.2%)
Design Errors	3 (0.7%)	1 (0.4%)	4 (0.6%)
Format String Vulnerability	2 (0.5%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.3%)
Information Leak/Disclosure	8 (1.9%)	1 (0.4%)	9 (1.3%)
Input Validation	29 (6.9%)	11 (4.4%)	40 (6.0%)
Insufficient Information	9 (2.2%)	15 (6.0%)	24 (3.6%)
Link Following	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.4%)	1 (0.1%)
Numeric Errors	30 (7.2%)	19 (7.6%)	49 (7.3%)
OS Command Injections	4 (1.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (0.6%)
Other	4 (1.0%)	4 (1.6%)	8 (1.2%)
Path Traversal	12 (2.9%)	25 (10.0%)	37 (5.5%)
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control	18 (4.3%)	8 (3.2%)	26 (3.9%)
Resource Management Errors	35 (8.4%)	10 (4.0%)	45 (6.7%)
SQL Injection	8 (1.9%)	31 (12.4%)	39 (5.8%)
XSS	42 (10.0%)	74 (29.7%)	116 (17.4%)
Total	418	249	667

Buffer errors, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), code injection, input validation, numeric errors, resource management errors and SQL injection are the most common software vulnerabilities in both types of software vendors.

Although distribution of software vulnerabilities in open source software vendors and proprietary source software vendors is not equal, from table 4.2 it can be established that proprietary source software vendors have a higher occurrence of software vulnerability buffer errors (38.28 %) compared to open source software vendors (14.86 %). Similarly, proprietary source software vendors have a higher occurrence of the following software vulnerabilities: code injection (8.61 %), resource management errors (8.37 %) and input validation (6.94 %), compared to open source software vendors of code injection (2.01 %), resource management errors (4.02 %), and input validation (4.42 %). In contrast, open source software vendors have a higher occurrence of Cross Site Scripting (XSS) (29.72 %) compared to proprietary source software vendors (10.05 %).

Likewise, open source software vendors have a higher occurrence of the following software vulnerabilities: SQL injection (12.45 %), path traversal (10.04 %) and insufficient information (6.02 %), compared to proprietary source software vendors with SQL injection (1.91 %), path traversal (2.87 %) and insufficient information (2.15 %). The software vulnerability numeric errors are almost equally distributed in both types of software vendors with (7.63 %) occurrence in open source software vendors and (7.18 %) occurrence in proprietary source software vendors.

4.2.2 Type of Software

Type of software is an independent variable in the proposed research model for this study and is measured as a binary scale. Operating system software is represented as 1 and application software is represented as the reference category 0. Table 4.3 presents the distribution for operating system software and application software across the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities.

Table 4.3 Distribution of Software Vulnerabilities across Type of Software

Type Of Software	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percentage
Application Software	611	91.6	91.6
Operating System Software	56	8.4	100.0
Total	667	100.0	

Table 4.3 shows that 56 (8.4%) software vulnerabilities are classified as operating system software and 611 (91.6%) software vulnerabilities are classified as application software.

Types of Software Vulnerability across Software Type

Operating system software and application software are affected by different types of software vulnerabilities (Telang et al. 2007). Table 4.4 shows how both operating system software and application software are affected proportionately by the 21 most common types of software vulnerabilities in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities in this study (NVD 2011a; OVAL 2011).

Table 4.4 Types of Software Vulnerability across Software Type

Types of Software Vulnerability * Software Type			
Types of Software Vulnerability	**Software Type**		
	Application Software	Operating System Software	Total
Authentication Issues	11 (1.8%)	0 (0.00%)	11 (1.6%)
Buffer Errors	178 (29.1%)	19 (33.9%)	197 (29.5%)
Code Injection	31 (5.1%)	10 (17.9%)	41 (6.1%)
Configuration	1 (0.2%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.1%)
Credentials Management	2 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.3%)
Cryptographic Issues	3 (0.5%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (0.4%)
CSRF	5 (0.8%)	3 (5.4%)	8 (1.2%)
Design Errors	4 (0.7%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (0.6%)
Format String Vulnerability	2 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (0.3%)
Information Leak/Disclosure	9 (1.5%)	0 (0.0%)	9 (1.3%)
Input Validation	39 (6.4%)	1 (1.8%)	40 (6.0%)
Insufficient Information	21 (3.4%)	3 (5.4%)	24 (3.6%)
Link Following	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.8%)	1 (0.1%)
Numeric Errors	42 (6.9%)	7 (12.5%)	49 (7.3%)
OS Command Injections	3 (0.5%)	1 (1.8%)	4 (0.6%)
Other	7 (1.1%)	1 (1.8%)	8 (1.2%)
Path Traversal	37 (6.1%)	0 (0.0%)	37 (5.5%)
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control	22 (3.6%)	4 (7.1%)	26 (3.9%)
Resource Management Errors	39 (6.4%)	6 (10.7%)	45 (6.7%)
SQL Injection	39 (6.4%)	0 (0.0%)	39 (5.8%)
XSS	116 (19.0%)	0 (0.0%)	116 (17.4%)
Total	611 (100%)	56 (100%)	667 (100%)

Buffer errors, code injection, CSRF and input validation are the most common software vulnerabilities in these two different software types.

Table 4.4 shows that the distribution of these different software vulnerabilities is not equal across application software and operating system software. From the table it can be identified that cross site scripting, SQL injection and path traversal have the highest occurrence in application software by (19%), (6.4%) and (6.1%) respectively, with no occurrence in operating system software in the total sample population for this study. Similarly, application software has a higher occurrence of the software vulnerability input validation (6.4 %) compared to occurrence of input validation (1.8%) in operating system software.

In contrast, it can be identified that operating system software has the highest occurrence of the following software vulnerabilities: buffer errors (33.9%), code injection (17.9%), numeric errors (12.5%), resource management errors (10.7%) and CSRF (5.4%) compared to application software with the occurrence of buffer errors

(29.1%), code injection (5.1%), numeric errors (6.9%), resource management errors (6.4%) and CSRF (0.8%).

4.2.3 The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability

The level of criticality of software vulnerabilities is an independent variable and measured as an interval scale from 0 to 10. Table 4.5 presents the distribution of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities across the sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities.

Table 4.5 Distribution of Software Vulnerabilities related to the Level of Criticality Categories

Categorization Of Level Of Criticality	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percentage
Very Low (0-2)	0	0	0
Low (2.1- 4)	14	2.1	2.1
Medium (4.1 – 6)	195	29.2	31.3
High (6.1 – 8)	139	20.8	52.1
Very High (8.1- 10)	319	47.8	100
Total	667	100.0	

As shown in table 4.5, the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities is categorised into five classes: very low (0-2), low (2.1 to 4), medium (4.1 to 6), high (6.1 to 8) and very high (8.1 to 10). In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities there are no software vulnerabilities which are considered to have a very low level of criticality. However, in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities 68% are of a high or a very high level of criticality, 29% are a medium level of criticality and 2% are a low level of criticality.

Table 4.6 summarizes the results of the descriptive statistics for the level of criticality of software vulnerability.

Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics of the Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability

Descriptive Statistics		
Categorization of Level of Criticality		
N	Valid	667
	Missing	0
Mean		4.1439
Median		4.0000
Std. Deviation		.91384
Skewness		-.454
Kurtosis		-1.273

Table 4.6 shows that for the variable level of criticality the Mean is 4.14, Median is 4.00 and the Standard Deviation is 0.91384 in the total sample population of 667 of

software vulnerabilities. This indicates that this variable is considered to be normally distributed because mean and median are almost the same. The standard deviation is less than 1 which means the variable, the level of criticality of software vulnerability, is closely spread. Similarly, skewness and kurtosis present the shape of the distribution for the variable, the level of criticality of software vulnerability. If the value of skewness and kurtosis are zero, the observed distribution is exactly normal. From table 4.6, it can be observed that the value of skewness -0.45 and the value of kurtosis -1.27 are close to 0, which represents a normal distribution. However, the negative value of skewness indicated that the distribution for the variable, the level of criticality of software vulnerability, is negatively skewed and the negative value of kurtosis indicated that the distribution for the variable, the level of criticality of software vulnerability, is flatter.

Figure 4.3 box plot graph and figure 4.4 Normal Q-Q plot graph indicate that the variable, the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, is representative of a normal distribution. Figure 4.3 shows that the distribution of the variable, the level of criticality, is normal because the horizontal line in the box known as median line is in the middle of the box. Similarly, figure 4.4 shows that the distribution of the variable, the level of criticality, is normal because the data points are on or around the straight line.



Figure 4.3 Box Plot for the Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability



Figure 4.4 Normal Q-Q Plots for the Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability

Level of Criticality across Software Vendor Type

Table 4.7 shows distribution of the different levels of criticality for software vulnerabilities across the type of software vendor.

Table 4.7 Level of Criticality across Software Vendor Type

Level of Criticality * Software Vendor Type			
Level of Criticality	Software Vendor Type		
	Proprietary Source Software Vendor	Open Source Software Vendor	Total
Low	6 (1.4%)	8 (3.2%)	14 (2.1%)
Medium	75 (17.9%)	120 (48.2%)	195 (29.2%)
High	75 (17.9%)	64 (25.7%)	139 (20.8%)
Very High	262 (62.7%)	57 (22.9%)	319 (47.8%)
Total	418 (100%)	249 (100%)	667 (100%)

Table 4.7 shows that in the total sample population, a very high level of criticality for software vulnerabilities has greater representation for proprietary source software vendors (62.7%) compared to open source software vendors (22.9%). In contrast, high, medium and low level of criticality of software vulnerabilities have higher representation for open source software vendors (25.7%, 48.2% and 3.2% respectively) compared to proprietary source software vendors (with 17.9%, 17.9% and 1.4 respectively).

Table 4.8 shows the variations of the mean values of the level of criticality across software vendor type.

Table 4.8 Variations of Means for Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerabilities across Software Vendor Type

Descriptives								
Level of Criticality					95% Confidence Interval for Mean			
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
Proprietary Source Software vendor	418	4.4187	.83067	.04063	4.3388	4.4985	2.00	5.00
Open Source Software Vendor	249	3.6827	.86121	.05458	3.5752	3.7902	2.00	5.00
Total	667	4.1439	.91384	.03538	4.0745	4.2134	2.00	5.00

As shown in table 4.8, the mean value of level of criticality of software vulnerability for open source software vendors is 3.6827; and for proprietary source software vendors is 4.4187. These mean values indicate that software vulnerabilities for open source software vendors are less critical overall than software vulnerabilities for proprietary source software vendors in the total sample population for this study.

Table 4.9 shows the results of a one-way ANOVA analysis of the level of criticality of software vulnerability across type of software vendor.

Table 4.9 ANOVA Analysis of Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability across Type of Software Vendor

ANOVA					
Level of Criticality					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	84.513	1	84.513	119.153	.000
Within Groups	471.670	665	.709		
Total	556.183	666			

Table 4.9 shows that there is a statistically significant difference between open source software vendor and proprietary source software vendor as determined by one-way ANOVA (F (1,665) = 119.153, p = 0.000 in terms of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities.

Level of Criticality across Type of Software

Table 4.10 shows the distribution of different levels of criticality for software vulnerabilities across the type of software.

Table 4.10 Level of Criticality across Type of Software

Level of Criticality * Software Type			
Level of Criticality	**Software Type**		Total
	Application Software Count/Percentage	Operating System Software Count/Percentage	
Low	13 (2.1%)	1 (1.8%)	14 (2.1%)
Medium	192 (31.4%)	3 (5.4%)	195 (29.2%)
High	123 (20.1%)	16 (28.6%)	139 (20.8%)
Very High	283 (46.3%)	36 (64.3%)	319 (47.8%)
Total	611 (100%)	56 (100%)	667 (100%)

Table 4.10 shows that high to very high levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities in the total sample population are more representative in operating system software (64.3% and 28.6% respectively) compared to application software (46.3% and 20.1% respectively). In contrast, low level of criticality of software vulnerabilities in application software (2.1%) compares similarly to operating system software (1.8%).

Table 4.11 shows the variations of the mean value of the level of criticality across type of software.

Table 4.11 Variations of Level of Criticality across Type of Software

Descriptives								
Level of Criticality	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Application Software	611	4.1064	.92336	.03736	4.0330	4.1797	2.00	5.00
Operating System Software	56	4.5536	.68542	.09159	4.3700	4.7371	2.00	5.00
Total	667	4.1439	.91384	.03538	4.0745	4.2134	2.00	5.00

As shown in table 4.11, the mean value of level of criticality of software vulnerability for operating system software is 4.5536; and for application software is 4.1064. These mean values indicate that the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities in operating system software is slightly higher than the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities in application software in the total sample population for this study.

Table 4.12 shows the results of a one-way ANOVA analysis of the level of criticality of software vulnerability across type of software.

Table 4.12 ANOVA Analysis of Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerabilities across Type of Software

ANOVA					
Level of Criticality					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	10.259	1	10.259	12.496	.000
Within Groups	545.924	665	.821		
Total	556.183	666			

Table 4.12 shows that there is a statistically significant difference between operating system software and application software as determined by one-way ANOVA (F (1,665) = 12.496, p = 0.000 with the level of criticality of software vulnerability.

Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time

Table 4.13 shows the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities across response time to release patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

Table 4.13 Level of Criticality across Response Time

Level of Criticality * Response Time								
Level of Criticality	**Categorization of Response Time**							Total
	-1500 to 0 Count / Percentage	1 to 100 Count / Percentage	101 to 200 Count / Percentage	201 to 300 Count / Percentage	301 to 400 Count / Percentage	401 to 500 Count / Percentage	501 to 2500 Count / Percentage	
Low	2 (14.3%)	8 (57.1%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (21.4%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (7.1%)	0 (0.0%)	14 (100.0%)
Medium	17 (8.7%)	147 (75.4%)	18 (9.2%)	7 (3.6%)	1 (0.5%)	3 (1.5%)	2 (1.0%)	195 (100.0%)
High	10 (7.2%)	88 (63.3%)	19 (13.7%)	13 (9.4%)	3 (2.2%)	4 (2.9%)	2 (1.4%)	139 (100.0%)
Very High	9 (2.8%)	134 (42.0%)	101 (31.7%)	30 (9.4%)	14 (4.4%)	7 (2.2%)	24 (7.5%)	319 (100.0%)
Total	38 (5.7%)	377 (56.5%)	138 (20.7%)	53 (7.9%)	18 (2.7%)	15 (2.2%)	28 (4.2%)	667 (100.0%)

Table 4.13 indicates that of 14 software vulnerabilities with a low level of criticality in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 8 (57.1%) had a software patch released between (1 to 100 days), while 3 (21%) had a software patch released between (201 to 300 days) and 1 (7%) had a software patch released between (401 to 500 days). However, 2 (14.3%) low level criticality software vulnerabilities had software patches released before the vendor informed date, hence, the response time in days is zero or a negative number of days.

There are 195 medium level criticality software vulnerabilities in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities for this study. The majority—147 (75.4%)—of medium level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (1 to 100 days). Eighteen (9.2%) medium level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (101 to 200 days), 7 (3.6%) medium level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (201 to 300 days) and 3 (1.5%) medium level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (401 to 500 days). However, 17 (8.7%) medium level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released before the vendor informed date.

Similarly, there are 139 high level criticality software vulnerabilities in the total sample population of 667 vendor informed software vulnerabilities for this study. The majority of high level criticality software vulnerabilities—88 (63.3%)—had a software patch released between (1 to 100 days); 19 (13.7%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released in (101 to 200 days); 13 (9.4%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (201 to 300 days); 3 (2.2%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (301 to 400 days); 4 (2.9%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (401 to 500 days); and 2 (1.4%) very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (501 to 2500 days). However, only 10 (8.7%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released before the vendor informed date.

Furthermore, there are 319 very high level criticality software vulnerabilities in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities for this study: 134 (42.0%) very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (1 to 100 days); 101 (31.7%) very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (101 to 200 days); 30 (9.4%) very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (201 to 300 days); 14 (4.4%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (301 to 400 days); 7 (2.2%) high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (401 to 500 days); and 24 (7.5%) very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released between (501 to 2500 days). However, only 9 (2.8%) very high level criticality software vulnerabilities had a software patch released before the vendor informed date.

Types of Software Vulnerability across Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability

Table 4.14 shows the distribution of types of software vulnerabilities across different levels of criticality.

Table 4.14 Types of Software Vulnerability across Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability

Types of Software Vulnerability * Level of Criticality					
Types of Software Vulnerability	Level of Criticality				Total
	Low	Medium	High	Very High	
Authentication Issues	0 (0%)	4 (2.1%)	4 (2.9%)	3 (0.9%)	11 (1.6%)
Buffer Errors	0 (0%)	4 (2.1%)	20 (14.4%)	173 (54.2%)	197 (29.5%)
Code Injection	0 (0%)	2 (1.0%)	4 (2.9%)	35 (11.0%)	41 (6.1%)
Configuration	0 (0%)	1 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.1%)
Credentials Management	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	2 (1.4%)	0 (0%)	2 (0.3%)
Cryptographic Issues	0 (0%)	2 (1.0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	3 (0.4%)
CSRF	0 (0%)	1 (0.5%)	6 (4.3%)	1 (0.3%)	8 (1.2%)
Design Errors	0 (0%)	3 (1.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	4 (0.6%)
Format String Vulnerability	0 (0%)	1 (0.5%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	2 (0.3%)
Information Leak/Disclosure	1 (7.1%)	6 (3.1%)	2 (1.4%)	0 (0%)	9 (1.3%)
Input Validation	1 (7.1%)	15 (7.7%)	8 (5.8%)	16 (5.0%)	40 (6.0%)
Insufficient Information	1 (7.1%)	5 (2.6%)	8 (5.8%)	10 (3.1%)	24 (3.6%)
Link Following	1 (7.1%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.1%)
Numeric Errors	0 (7.1%)	3 (1.5%)	11 (7.9%)	35 (11.0%)	49 (7.3%)
OS Command Injections	0 (7.1%)	0 (0%)	1 (0.9%)	3 (0.9%)	4 (0.6%)
Other	2 (14.3%)	4 (2.1%)	2 (1.4%)	0 (0%)	8 (1.2%)
Path Traversal	1 (7.1%)	12 (6.2%)	21 (15.1%)	3 (0.9%)	37 (5.5%)
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control	0 (0%)	8 (4.1%)	15 (10.8%)	3 (0.9%)	26 (3.9%)
Resource Management Errors	1 (7.1%)	4 (2.1%)	6 (4.3%)	34 (10.7%)	45 (6.7%)
SQL Injection	0 (0%)	11 (5.6%)	28 (20.1%)	0 (0%)	39 (5.8%)
XSS	6 (42.9%)	109 (55.9%)	1 (0.7%)	0 (0%)	116 (17.4%)
Total	14 (2.1%)	195 (29.2%)	139 (20.8%)	319 (47.8%)	667 (100%)

Buffer errors are the most representative critical software vulnerability in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities for this study. One hundred and seventy-three buffer error software vulnerabilities are of a very high level of criticality, 20 are of a high level of criticality and 4 are of a medium level of criticality.

Similarly, SQL injection is the second most representative software vulnerability. Of the 116 SQL injection software vulnerabilities, none are of a very high level of criticality, 1 has a high level of criticality, 109 have a medium level of criticality and 6 have a low level of criticality. Likewise, numeric errors are the third most representative software vulnerability. Of 49 numeric errors software vulnerabilities, 35 numeric errors are of a very high level of criticality, 11 are of a high level of criticality and 3 are of a medium level of criticality.

Similarly, resource management errors are the fourth most representative software vulnerability. Of the 45 resource management error software vulnerabilities, 34 are of a very high level of criticality, 6 are of a high level of criticality, 4 are of a medium level of criticality and 1 is a low level of criticality. Code injection is the fifth most representative software vulnerability. Of 41 code injection software vulnerabilities 35 are of a very high level of criticality, 4 are of a high level of criticality and 2 are of a medium level of criticality.

Similarly, input validation is the sixth most representative software vulnerability. Of 40 input validation software vulnerabilities, 16 are of a very high level of criticality, 8 are of a high level of criticality, 15 are of a medium level of criticality and 1 is of low level of criticality.

4.2.4 Response Time

The response time is the dependent variable in the proposed research model in this study. As defined in chapter 1, response time *is the amount of time taken to release a software patch based on when the software vendor is informed of a software vulnerability*.

This variable is measured in days as a ratio scale. Table 4.15 shows the distribution of response time for the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities.

Table 4.15 Distribution of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time

Response Time			
Response days	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
-1500 to 0	38	5.7	5.7
1 to 100	377	56.5	62.2
101 to 200	138	20.7	82.9
201 to 300	53	7.9	90.9
301 to 400	18	2.7	93.6
401 to 500	15	2.2	95.8
501 to 2500	28	4.2	100.0
Total	667	100.0	

In table 4.15 the response time has been categorised into seven different categories (-1500 to 0, 1 to 100, 101 to 200, 201 to 300, 301 to 400, 401 to 500, 501 to 2500). In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities for this study, software vendors had released software patches for 56.5 % software vulnerabilities between 1 to 100 days; and released software patches for 20.7% software vulnerabilities between 101 to 200 days. Table 4.15 also shows that software vendors released software patches for 90% software vulnerabilities between 1 to 500 days. However, there are few instances of the release of software patches for software vulnerabilities that take less than 1 day (software patch released before the vendor is informed of the software vulnerability) and more than 500 days.

Table 4.16 summarizes the results of descriptive statistics for the variable response time in days.

Table 4.16 Descriptive Statistics for the Response Time

Descriptive Statistics			
Response Time		**Statistic**	**Std. Error**
Mean		110.55	7.410
95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	96.00	
	Upper Bound	125.10	
5% Trimmed Mean		90.28	
Median		48.00	
Std. Deviation		191.364	
Skewness		2.967	.095
Kurtosis		28.814	.189

Table 4.16 shows that for the response time, the mean is 110.55 days, median is 48.00 days and the standard deviation is 191.364 days. Similarly, skewness and kurtosis are 2.967 and 28.814 respectively, which present the shape of the distribution of the variable response time. From table 4.16 it can be observed that there is a large difference between mean and median; there is also a variation between mean and standard deviation. Likewise, skewness and kurtosis are not close to zero. This indicates that the distribution of the variable response time is not representative of a normal distribution (Field 2009; Hair et al. 2010).

Similarly, figure 4.5 normal Q-Q plot and figure 4.6 box plot show that the distribution of the variable response time is not representative of a normal distribution. From the normal Q-Q plot, it can be observed that the data points are highly deviated from the normal line. Likewise, from the box plot it can be observed that there are many outliers in the data set for the variable response time, which are illustrated with a circle and an asterisk (*) sign; and, also, median line is not in the middle of the box in the box plot graph. This also confirms that the variable response time is not representative of normal distribution.



Figure 4.5 Normal Q-Q Plot of the Response Time



Figure 4.6 Box Plot of the Response Time

From the above descriptive statistics, normal Q-Q plot and box plot graphs for the response time indicate that the variable is peaked with severe kurtosis and a number of outliers, therefore, a natural log transformation is an appropriate technique to make the variable response time more representative of normal distribution (McCluskey & Lalkhen 2007).

Assumptions for conducting data transformation (Hair et al. 2010) in this study are as follows:

- to correct violations of the statistical assumptions underlying the multivariate techniques (Multiple regression analysis) which are normality, linearity and homoscedasticity; and
- to improve the relationship (correlation) between variables.

Table 4.17 summarizes the descriptive statistics after the transformation of the variable response time. Table 4.17 shows that the statistical value of the mean is very close to the median, and the standard deviation (.719) is within 3 times the upper and lower bound of mean value. Similarly, skewness and kurtosis are very close to zero. This indicates that the transformed variable response time is now much more representative of a normal distribution.

Table 4.17 Results of Descriptive Statistics for the Variable Response Time after Log Transformation

Descriptive Statistics			
Log(Response Time)		**Statistic**	**Std. Error**
Mean		1.64	.028
95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	1.58	
	Upper Bound	1.69	
5% Trimmed Mean		1.66	
Median		1.73	
Std. Deviation		.719	
Skewness		-.498	.096
Kurtosis		-.416	.191

Figure 4.7 shows a histogram of the variable response time after a natural log transformation.



Figure 4.7 Frequency Distribution of Log (Response Time)

In figure 4.7, the mean 1.64 and standard deviation 0.719 on the top right corner shows that the data points (i.e. the variable response time) are distributed very close to mean. This suggests that the data in the variable response time is much more representative of normal distribution.

Figure 4.8 shows the box plot of the variable response time after a natural log transformation.



Figure 4.8 Box plot of Log (Response Time)

In Figure 4.8, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles are symmetrically arranged in the box plot. Similarly, the straight line inside the box plot indicates that the median is very close to mean. This also shows that after a natural log transformation, the variable response time is much more representative of a normal distribution.

Figure 4.9 shows a normal Q-Q plot of the variable response time after a natural log transformation.



Figure 4.9 Normal Q-Q Plot of Log (Response Time)

In figure 4.9, the transformation of the variable response time now is close to the normal straight line which indicates the transformed variable is much closer to a normal distribution.

Response Time across Software Vendor Type

Table 4.18 shows the distribution of different categories of response time across software vendor type.

Table 4.18 Response Time across Software Vendor Type

Response Time * Software Vendor Type			
Response Time	Software Vendor Type		Total
	Proprietary Source Software vendor	Open Source Software Vendor	
-1500 to 0	12 (2.9%)	26 (10.4%)	38 (5.7%)
1 to 100	183 (43.8%)	194 (77.9%)	377 (56.5%)
101 to 200	116 (27.8%)	22 (8.8%)	138 (20.7%)
201 to 300	50 (12.0%)	3 (1.2%)	53 (7.9%)
301 to 400	17 (4.1%)	1 (0.4%)	18 (2.7%)
401 to 500	13 (3.1%)	2 (0.8%)	15 (2.2%)
501 to 2500	27 (6.5%)	1 (0.4%)	28 (4.2%)
Total	418 (100%)	249 (100%)	667 (100%)

Table 4.18 shows that 56% of vendor informed software vulnerabilities software patches were released between (1 to 100 days) in the total sample population of 677 vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

Open source software vendors have a response time of between (1 to 100 days) to release a software patch for 77.9% of open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Open source software vendors have a response time of between (101 and 200 days) to release a software patch for 8.8% of open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Software vulnerabilities which have software patches released above 200 days account for only 7 open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Software vulnerabilities which have negative response times for releasing software patches account for 10.4% of open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

In contrast, proprietary source software vendors have a response time of between (1 to 100 days) to release software patches for 43.8% of proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Proprietary source software vendors have a response time of between (101 to 200 days) to release a software patch for 27.8% of proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Proprietary source software vendors have a response time of between (201 to 300 days) to release a software patch for 12% of proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Software vulnerabilities which have software patches released above 300 days account for only 57 (13.7%) of proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Software vulnerabilities which have negative response times for releasing software patches account for 2.9% of proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

Overall, open source software vendors have released software patches for 86.7% of open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities between (1 to 200 days); compared to proprietary source software vendors who released software patches for 71.6% of proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities between (1 and 200 days). This finding lends support for the notion that software patches for open source software are released quicker than for proprietary source software.

Response Time across Software Type

Table 4.19 shows the distribution of different categories of response time to release software patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities across software type.

Table 4.19 Response Time across Software Type

Response Time * Software Type			
Response Time	**Software Type**		Total
	Application Software	Operating system software	
-1500 to 0	36 (5.9%)	2 (3.6%)	38 (5.7%)
1 to 100	353 (57.8%)	24 (42.9%)	377 (56.5%)
101 to 200	127 (20.8%)	11 (19.6%)	138 (20.7%)
201 to 300	43 (7.0%)	10 (17.9%)	53 (7.9%)
301 to 400	14 (2.3%)	4 (7.1%)	18 (2.7%)
401 to 500	13 (2.1%)	2 (3.6%)	15 (2.2%)
501 to 2500	25 (4.1%)	3 (5.4%)	28 (4.2%)
Total	611 (100%)	56 (100%)	667 (100%)

Table 4.19 shows that while the overall percentages are similar for each category of response time, the comparative percentages of vendor informed software vulnerabilities for application software and operating system software are different.

For 57.8% of application software vulnerabilities, software patches are released in 1 to 100 days, 20.8% in 101 to 200 days and 2% in above 500 days; whereas 5.9% of software patches for application software vulnerabilities have negative response times as the software patch is released before the vendor informed date (0 to -500 days).

In contrast, 42.9% of operating system related software vulnerabilities software patches have been released in 1 to 100 days, 19.6% in 101 to 200 days, 17.9% in 201 to 300 days, 7.1% in 301 to 400 days, 3.69% in 401 to 500 days, and 5.4% in above 500 days. For software patches for operating system software vulnerabilities 3.6% have negative response times as the software patch is released before the vendor informed date (0 to -500 days).

Overall, for 78.6% of application software vulnerabilities, software patches are released in 1 to 200 days compared to 62.5% for operating system software vulnerabilities for which software patches are released in 1 to 200 days. This would suggest that software patches for application software vulnerabilities are overall released slightly quicker than software patches for operating system software vulnerabilities.

Types of Software Vulnerability across Response Time

Table 4.20 shows the distribution of the different types of software vulnerabilities across the different categories of response time.

Table 4.20 Types of Software Vulnerability across Response Time

Types of Software Vulnerability * Response Time								
	Response Time							
Types of Software Vulnerability	-1500 to 0	1 to 100	101 to 200	201 to 300	301 to 400	401 to 500	501 to 2500	Total
Authentication Issues	1(9.1%)	6 (54.5%)	1 (9.1%)	1 (9.1%)	2 (18.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	11 (100.0%)
Buffer Errors	4 (2.0%)	87 (44.2%)	57 (28.9%)	20 (10.2%)	7 (3.6%)	2 (1.0%)	20 (10.2%)	197 (100.0%)
Code Injection	2 (4.9%)	11 (26.8%)	18 (43.9%)	5 (12.2%)	4 (9.8%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.4%)	41 (100.0%)
Configuration	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (100.0%)
Credentials Management	0(0.0%)	2 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (100.0%)
Cryptographic Issues	0 (0.0%)	2 (66.7%)	1 (33.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (100.0%)
CSRF	0 (0.0%)	6 (75.0%)	1 (12.5%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (12.5%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (100.0%)
Design Errors	1 (25.0%)	2 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (25.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (100.0%)
Format String Vulnerability	0 (0.0%)	2 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (100.0%)
Information Leak/Disclosure	1 (11.1%)	5 (55.6%)	1 (11.1%)	2 (22.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	9 (100.0%)
Input Validation	6 (15.0%)	23 (57.5%)	2 (5.0%)	4 (10.0%)	1 (2.5%)	3 (7.5%)	1 (2.5%)	40 (100.0%)
Insufficient Information	1 (4.2%)	9 (37.5%)	8 (33.3%)	3 (12.5%)	1 (4.2%)	1 (4.2%)	1 (4.2%)	24 (100.0%)
Link Following	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (100.0%)
Numeric Errors	3 (6.1%)	26 (53.1%)	12 (24.5%)	2 (4.1%)	1 (2.0%)	3 (6.1%)	2 (4.1%)	49 (100.0%)
OS Command Injections	0 (0.0%)	4 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	4 (100.0%)
Other	2 (25.0%)	4 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (25.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (100.0%)
Path Traversal	2 (5.4%)	30 (81.1%)	2 (5.4%)	1 (2.7%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.7%)	1 (2.7%)	37 (100.0%)
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control	1 (3.8%)	19 (73.1%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (7.7%)	1 (3.8%)	3 (11.5%)	0 (0.0%)	26 (100.0%)
Resource Management Errors	2 (4.4%)	17 (37.8%)	19 (13.8%)	5 (42.2%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.2%)	1 (2.2%)	45 (100.0%)
SQL Injection	5 (12.8%)	34 (87.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	39 (100.0%)
XSS	7 (6.0%)	86 (74.1%)	16 (11.6%)	5 (4.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.9%)	1 (0.9%)	116 (100.0%)
Total	38 (5.7%)	377 (56.5%)	138 (20.7%)	53 (7.9%)	18 (2.7%)	15 (2.2%)	28 (4.2%)	667 (100%)

From the total sample population of 667 (100%) software vulnerabilities, table 4.20 shows that the most commonly released software patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities are buffer errors 197 (29.5%), followed by cross site scripting (XSS) 116 (17.4%), numeric errors 49 (7.3%), resource management errors 45 (6.7%) and code injection 41 (6.1%) across the different response time categories.

Only 4 (2.0%) of buffer errors software vulnerabilities are patched before vendor informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 87 (44.2%) of buffer errors software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 57 (28.9%) in (101 to 200 days), 20 (10.2%) in (201 to 300 days), 7 (3.6%) in (301 to 400 days), 2 (1.0%) in (401 to 500 days) and 20 (10.2 %) in (above 501 days).

Similarly, only 7 (6.0%) of cross site scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities are patched before vendor informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 86 (74.1%) of cross site scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 16 (11.6%) in (101 to 200 days), 5 (4.3%) in (201 to 300 days), none in (301 to 400 days), 1 (0.9%) in (401 to 500 days) and 1 (0.9 %) in above 501 days.

Only 3 (6.1%) of numeric software vulnerabilities are patched before vendor informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 26 (53.1%) of numeric software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 12 (24.5%) in (101 to 200 days), 2 (4.1%) in (201 to 300 days), 1 (2.0%) in (301 to 400 days), 3 (6.1%) in (401 to 500 days) and 2 (4.1%) in above 501 days.

Only 2 (4.4%) of resource management software vulnerabilities are patched before vendor informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 17 (37.8%) of resource management software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 19 (13.8%) in (101 to 200 days), 5 (42.2%) in (201 to 300 days), none in (301 to 400 days), 1 (2.2%) in (401 to 500 days) and 1 (2.2 %) in above 501 days.

Only 2 (4.9%) of code injection software vulnerabilities are patched before vendor informed date and hence have a negative response time; whereas 11 (26.8%) of code injection software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 18 (43.9%) in (101 to 200 days), 5 (12.2%) in (201 to 300 days), 4 (9.8%) in (301 to 400 days), none in (401 to 500 days) and 1 (2.4 %) in above 501 days.

Types of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time for Open Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities

Table 4.21 shows the distribution of different types of software vulnerabilities across the different categories of response time for open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

Table 4.21 Types of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time for Open Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities

Types of Software Vulnerability * Response Time for Open Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities

Types of Software Vulnerability	**Response Time for Open Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities**							
	-1500 to 0	1 to 100	101 to 200	201 to 300	301 to 400	401 to 500	501 to 2500	Total
Authentication Issues	0 (.0%)	4 (80.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (20.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	5 (100.0%)
Buffer Errors	3 (8.1%)	28 (75.7%)	6 (16.2%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	37 (100.0%)
Code Injection	0 (.0%)	3 (60.0%)	2 (40.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	5 (100.0%)
Configuration	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)
Cryptographic Issues	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)
Design Errors	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)
Information Leak/Disclosure	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)
Input Validation	0 (.0%)	11(100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	11 (100.0%)
Insufficient Information	0 (.0%)	6 (40.0%)	5 (33.3%)	3 (20.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (6.7%)	15 (100.0%)
Link Following	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (100.0%)
Numeric Errors	3 (15.8%)	12 (63.2%)	3 (15.8%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (5.3%)	0 (.0%)	19 (100.0%)
Other	1 (25.0%)	3 (75.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	4 (100.0%)
Path Traversal	0 (.0%)	24 (96.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (4.0%)	0 (.0%)	25 (100.0%)
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control	1 (12.5%)	7 (87.5%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	8 (100.0%)
Resource Management Errors	0 (.0%)	9 (90.0%)	1 (10.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	10 (100.0%)
SQL Injection	0 (.0%)	31(100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	31 (100.0%)
XSS	2 (2.7%)	67 (90.5%)	5 (6.8%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	74 (100.0%)
Total	10 (4.0%)	210(84.3%)	22 (8.8%)	3 (1.2%)	1 (.4%)	2 (.8%)	1 (.4%)	249(100.0%)

In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 249 software vulnerabilities are in the open source software vendor category in this study. Table 4.21 shows the distribution of response times of open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities. The most common open source vendor informed software vulnerabilities in the following order are Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 74; followed by buffer errors 37; SQL injection 31; path traversal 25; and numeric errors 19.

For the 74 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities, 97% of software patches are released in 1 to 200 days. For 37 buffer errors software vulnerabilities, 92% of software patches are released in 1 to 200 days. For 31 SQL injection software vulnerabilities, 100% of software patches are released in 1 to 100 days. For 25 path traversal software vulnerabilities, 96% of software patches are released in 1 to 100 days. For 19 numeric errors software vulnerabilities, 79% of software patches are released in 1 to 200 days.

Overall, for 249 software vulnerabilities in the open source software vendor category, 84% of software patches are released in 1 to 100 days.

Types of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time for Proprietary Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities

Table 4.22 shows the distribution of different types of software vulnerabilities across the different categories of response time for proprietary source vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

Table 4.22 Types of Software Vulnerabilities across Response Time for Proprietary Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities

Types of Software Vulnerability * Response Time for Proprietary Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities								
Types of Software Vulnerability	**Response Time for Proprietary Source Vendor informed Software Vulnerabilities**							
	-1500 to 0	1 to 100	101 to 200	201 to 300	301 to 400	401 to 500	501 to 2500	Total
Authentication Issues	0 (.0%)	3 (50.0%)	1 (16.7%)	1 (16.7%)	1 (16.7%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	6 (100.0%)
Buffer Errors	0 (.0%)	60 (37.5%)	51 (31.9%)	20(12.5%)	7 (4.4%)	2 (1.3%)	20(12.5%)	160(100.0%)
Code Injection	1 (2.8%)	9 (25.0%)	16 (44.4%)	5 (13.9%)	4 (11.1%)	0 (.0%)	1 (2.8%)	36 (100.0%)
Credentials Management	0 (.0%)	2 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	2 (100.0%)
Cryptographic Issues	0 (.0%)	1 (50.0%)	1 (50.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	2 (100.0%)
CSRF	0 (.0%)	6 (75.0%)	1 (12.5%)	0 (.0%)	1 (12.5%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	8 (100.0%)
Design Errors	0 (.0%)	2 (66.7%)	0 (.0%)	1 (33.3%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	3 (100.0%)
Format String Vulnerability	0 (.0%)	2 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	2 (100.0%)
Information Leak/Disclosure	0 (.0%)	5 (62.5%)	1 (12.5%)	2 (25.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	8 (100.0%)
Input Validation	3 (10.3%)	15 (51.7%)	2 (6.9%)	4 (13.8%)	1 (3.4%)	3 (10.3%)	1 (3.4%)	29 (100.0%)
Insufficient Information	0 (.0%)	4 (44.4%)	3 (33.3%)	0 (.0%)	1 (11.1%)	1 (11.1%)	0 (.0%)	9 (100.0%)
Numeric Errors	0 (.0%)	14 (46.7%)	9 (30.0%)	2 (6.7%)	1 (3.3%)	2 (6.7%)	2 (6.7%)	30 (100.0%)
OS Command Injections	0 (.0%)	4 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	4 (100.0%)
Other	1 (25.0%)	1 (25.0%)	0 (.0%)	2 (50.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	4 (100.0%)
Path Traversal	0 (.0%)	8 (66.7%)	2 (16.7%)	1 (8.3%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	1 (8.3%)	12 (100.0%)
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control	0 (.0%)	12 (66.7%)	0 (.0%)	2 (11.1%)	1 (5.6%)	3 (16.7%)	0 (.0%)	18 (100.0%)
Resource Management Errors	1 (2.9%)	9 (25.7%)	18 (51.4%)	5 (14.3%)	0 (.0%)	1 (2.9%)	1 (2.9%)	35 (100.0%)
SQL Injection	0 (.0%)	8 (100.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	0 (.0%)	8 (100.0%)
XSS	1 (2.4%)	23 (54.8%)	11 (26.2%)	5 (11.9%)	0 (.0%)	1 (2.4%)	1 (2.4%)	42 (100.0%)
Total	7 (1.7%)	188(45.0%)	116(27.8%)	50(12.0%)	17 (4.1%)	13 (3.1%)	27 (6.5%)	418(100.0%)

In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 418 software vulnerabilities are in the proprietary source software vendor category in this study. Table 4.22 shows the distribution of response times of proprietary source software vendors for vendor informed software vulnerabilities. The most common proprietary source software vulnerabilities in the following order are buffer errors 160; followed by Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 42; code injection 36; resource management errors 35; and input validation 29.

For the 160 buffer errors software vulnerabilities, the breakup of response times in releasing software patches shows that 86% of software patches are released in 1 to 400 days. For 42 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities, 93% of software patches are released in 1 to 300 days. For 36 code injection software vulnerabilities, 94% of software patches are released in 1 to 400 days. For 35 resource management software vulnerabilities, 91% of software patches are released in 1 to 300 days. For 29 input validation software vulnerabilities, 72% of software patches are released in 1 to 300 days.

Overall, for the 418 software vulnerabilities in proprietary source software vendor category, 84% of software patches are released in 1 to 300 days.

Level of Criticality across Response Time

Table 4.23 shows the mean value for the response time across the different levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities. Table 4.23 shows that software vendors have the longest response time in releasing a software patch for software vulnerabilities with a very high level of criticality, and have the shortest response time for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality. Software vendors have also taken a longer response time to release a software patch for low level of criticality software vulnerabilities compared to medium level and high level of criticality software vulnerabilities.

Table 4.23 Level of Criticality across Response Time

Level of Criticality across Response Time								
Level of Criticality	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Low	14	97.31	135.840	36.305	18.88	175.74	0	413
Medium	195	55.42	195.267	13.983	27.84	83.00	-1050	2225
High	139	83.54	138.459	11.744	60.32	106.76	-716	577
Very High	319	156.60	200.107	11.204	134.56	178.64	-697	1173
Total	667	110.55	191.364	7.410	96.00	125.10	-1050	2225

Table 4.23, shows that software vendors' response time in releasing software patches for low level of criticality software vulnerabilities is slower than medium and high

level of criticality of software vulnerabilities. Similarly, software vendors' response time in releasing software patches for medium level of criticality software vulnerabilities is the quickest and software vendors' response time in releasing software patches for very high level of criticality software vulnerabilities is the slowest.

4.3 Testing Underlying Regression Assumptions

In order to ensure the assumptions of multiple regression analysis have been met, it is necessary to check whether the conditions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity are met.

Figure 4.10 shows the relationship between the regression standard residuals and the regression standardised predicted values.



Figure 4.10 Scatter Plot of Regression Standardized Predicted Value

Figure 4.10 shows that there is no clear relationship between the regression standard residuals and the regression standardised predicted values, which means the scatter plot of residuals against predicted values is consistent with the assumption of linearity.

Similarly, figure 4.11 shows the normal P-P plot of regression standardised residuals and figure 4.12 shows the histogram of regression standardised residual.



Figure 4. 11 Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardised Residual



Figure 4. 12 Histogram of Regression Standardised Residual

Similarly, figure 4.11 (Normal plot of regression standardised residuals) and figure 4.12 (Histogram of regression standardised residual) for the dependent variable (Response time) also indicate a relatively normal distribution because the most observed residual points lie on the normal distribution line and regression standard residuals appears to follow a bell-shaped curve respectively.

Table 4.24 shows the normality test for the proposed regression model.

Table 4.24 Normality Test for the Proposed Model

Model Summary[b]

					Change Statistics					
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change	Durbin-Watson
1	.552[a]	.304	.301	.601	.304	94.253	3	646	.000	1.362

a. Predictors: (Constant), Type of Software, Type of Software Vendor, Level of Criticality
b. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)

To meet the assumptions of the normality of the regression model, the residuals terms should be uncorrelated or independent for any two observations. This assumption is tested using a Durbin-Watson test. Table 4.24 shows the value of the Durbin-Watson test for the regression model. The closer the value of the Durbin-

Watson test is to 2, the better the multiple regression models meets the assumptions of independent errors; and for this proposed regression model the value is 1.362—which meets the assumption of linearity.

Table 4.25 and table 4.26 below show the residual statistics for any extreme cases which may be an outlier, < ±2 and <±3 respectively, in the multiple regression analysis in the proposed model.

Table 4.25 Test for any Extreme Cases which may be an Outlier < ±2

Casewise Diagnostics[b]					
Case Number	Std. Residual	Log (Response Time)	Predicted Value	Residual	Status
43	2.207	3	1.26	1.325	
59	-3.061	0	1.84	-1.839	
60	-3.061	0	1.84	-1.839	
105	-2.123	0	1.58	-1.275	
109	-2.166	1	2.26	-1.301	
130	-2.352	0	1.41	-1.412	
134	-2.472	0	1.96	-1.485	
135	-2.472	0	1.96	-1.485	
136	-3.007	0	1.81	-1.806	
154	-3.061	0	1.84	-1.839	
159	2.115	3	1.47	1.270	
161	2.483	2	.98	1.491	
211	2.229	3	1.26	1.339	
215	-2.513	0	1.99	-1.509	
216	-2.513	0	1.99	-1.509	
284	-3.307	0	1.99	-1.987	
305	2.062	2	1.00	1.239	
425	-2.106	0	1.26	-1.265	
465	2.949	3	1.58	1.771	
492	-2.106	0	1.26	-1.265	
544	-2.560	0	1.84	-1.538	
547	-2.806	0	1.99	-1.685	
567	2.271	2	1.06	1.364	
591	-2.259	0	1.62	-1.357	
667	-2.218	0	1.63	-1.332	
a. Missing Case b. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time					

Table 4.26 Test for any Extreme Cases which may be an Outlier <±3

Casewise Diagnostics[a]				
Case Number	Std. Residual	Log (Response Time)	Predicted Value	Residual
59	-3.061	0	1.84	-1.839
60	-3.061	0	1.84	-1.839
136	-3.007	0	1.81	-1.806
154	-3.061	0	1.84	-1.839
284	-3.307	0	1.99	-1.987
a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)				

Residual statistics in the multiple regression analysis should also be examined for any extreme cases. In a normal sample, it is expected that 95% of cases will have standardized residuals within ±2 (Field 2009). With a sample of 667 software vulnerabilities, it is reasonable to expect about 5% (33 cases) to have standardised residuals outside these limits. From the case-wise diagnostics (table 4.25) produced by SPSS, there are 25 (3.75%) cases that are outside the limits. Therefore, the research sample is within the expected normal range, with very few outlier cases. In addition to that, if 99% of cases should have standardised residuals within ±3, it is expected that only 1% of cases should be outside of these limits. From table 4.26, it is clear that 5 (0.75 %) cases lie outside the limits. This gives no real cause for concern of any possible outliers that may influence regression parameters because none of the cases have a standardised residual greater than 3.5. Therefore, the above sample appears to confirm what is expected for a reasonably accurate model. Subsequently, the value of R^2 =0.301 and the level of significant of 0.000 in table 4.24 indicates that the multiple regression model is highly significant and reasonably accurate as well.

4.4 Multiple Regression Result Analysis

Figure 4.13 shows the multiple regression model that was formulated to test the proposed hypotheses listed in chapter 2, section 2.15.


Type of Software Vendor
3. Open Source Software Vendors
4. Proprietary Source Software Vendors
Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability
Type of Software
1. Operating System Software
2. Application Software
H2 +
H1 +
H3 +
Response Time

Figure 4.13 Multiple Regression Model for this Proposed Study

In figure 4.13, dependent variable is the response time of a software vendor in releasing a software patch for a software vulnerability. The independent variables are:

(1) Level of criticality of software vulnerability;
(2) Software vendor type (Open source software vendor, Proprietary source software vendor); and
(3) The type of software (Operating system software, Application software).

Table 4.27 provides a summary of the results of multiple regression analysis. This table shows that all three independent variables (the level of criticality, type of software and type of software vendor) together explain 30 percent of the variance (R^2) in the dependent variable (response time). The value of adjusted R^2 is 0.301, F (3,646) value is 94.253 and the level of significance $P<0.000$.

Table 4.27 Summary of Proposed Model Test

Model Summary[b]									
					Change Statistics				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.552[a]	.304	.301	.601	.304	94.253	3	646	.000
a. Predictors: (Constant), Level of Criticality, Type of Software, Type of Software Vendor b. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)									

Table 4.28 provides the approximate parameters of the multiple regression model tested. As shown in table 4.27, the overall goodness of fit of the multiple regression model was assessed using the F-value and was found to be statistically significant at $p<0.05$ (F (3,646) = 94.253, $p<0.05$, $R^2 = 0.304$, $R^2_{adj} = 0.301$) (Rokkan & Buvik 2003). The goodness of fit of the multiple regression model is very important because with multiple regression analysis it is mandatory that all the predictors (constant and independent variables) be taken into account simultaneously to establish the statistical significance of the overall model (Brown & Churchill 2009).

Table 4.28 Coefficients Test of Independent Variables in the Proposed Research Model

Coefficients[a]										
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
Model	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
Constant (b_0)	1.223	.097		12.653	.000					
Type of Software Vendor (**S_{vt}**)	-.574	.052	-.387(***)	-10.946	.000	-.487	-.396	-.359	.862	1.159
Type of Software (**Ts**)	.211	.086	.082(**)	2.467	.014	.140	.097	.081	.983	1.017
Level of Criticality (**Csv)**	.082	.011	.256(***)	7.191	.000	.410	.272	.236	.852	1.174
a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)										

$R^2 = 0.304$ $R^2_{adj}=0.301$ F (3,646) = 94.253

Predictors: (Constant), Type of Software, Type of Software Vendor, Level of Criticality

Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)

** = Significant at p<0.05 (two tailed), *** Significant at p<0.01 (one tailed)

Table 4.28 also shows the tolerance value and variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent variable used to check for multi-collinearity among the three independent variables. According to O'Brien (2007), a value of tolerance less than 0.20 and a value of VIF 10 or above indicates a multi-collinearity problem. However, in this regression analysis, the value of tolerance for each independent variable is greater than 0.20 and the value of VIF for each independent variable is smaller than 10. This indicates that there are no multi-collinearity problems in this multiple regression analysis.

The multiple regression model was tested using F-statistic and found to be significant in this study (see table 4.27). The value of R^2_{adj}=0.301 which is interpreted as 30% of the variance in the response time in days can be explained with the multiple regression model and the rest of the other variables have an additional impact on the response time. Similarly, the value of R^2 = 0.304 which is referred to as a coefficient of multiple determination can also be interpreted as follows (Brown et al. 2009, p. 604): it means that 30% of the variation in the dependent variable, the response time, is associated with variation in independent variables (type of software vendor, type of software and the level of the criticality of software vulnerability). Though table

4.28 shows that the type of software adds very little to improving the fitness of the multiple regression line, it can be inferred that there is an association between the type of software and the response time in releasing software patches.

Analysis of the relationship between the three independent variables and the dependent variable from table 4.28 shows:

- A strong positive relationship between the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities; and the response time indicates that software vendors increase their response time to release software patches with the increase in the level of criticality of a software vulnerability at the 0.01 significance level (one–tailed).

  However, for a single positive result it is not possible to show whether the longer response time for both high and low level of criticality of software vulnerability and shorter response time for medium level of criticality of software vulnerability is supported as stated in H1. Therefore, the level of criticality has split into three levels—low, medium and high—and a multiple regression model (MRA) was run for each level to determine the actual relationship between each level of software vulnerability and the software vendor response time (see Appendix A).

  The MRA test for each level of criticality shows that high level and low level of criticality of software vulnerability have a positive relationship with the response time. This indicates the longer response time to release software patches for high level and low level of criticality of software vulnerability at the 0.01 significance level (one–tailed) for high level; and at the 0.754 insignificance level for low level. The result shows insignificance for low level of criticality because the number of vendor informed software vulnerabilities with low level of criticality is only 14 in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities (see Table 4.5 sub section 4.2.3). Similarly, the distribution of low level of criticality to the type of software is: 1 for operating system software and 13 for application software (see Table 4.10 sub section 4.2.3). Further, the distribution of low level of criticality to the type of software vendor is: 6 for proprietary source software vendor and 8 for open source software vendor (see Table 4.7 sub section 4.2.3).

Conversely, medium level of criticality of software vulnerability has a negative relationship with the response time at the 0.01 significance level (one–tailed). This indicates a shorter response time to release software patches for medium level of criticality of software vulnerability (see Appendix A).

- A strong negative relationship between type of software vendor and the response time indicates that proprietary source software vendors take a longer response time to release a software patch than open source software vendors at the 0.01significance level (one–tailed).
- A positive relationship between type of software and the response time indicates that releasing patches for application software vulnerabilities is quicker than releasing patches for operating system software at the 0.05 significance level (two–tailed).

The resulting multiple regression model developed from this research is shown in figure 4.14:


Type of Software Vendor
1. Open Source Software Vendors
2. Proprietary Source Software Vendors
Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability
Type of Software
1. Operating System Software
2. Application Software
b1= - 0.39
b3= 0.26
b2= 0.08
Response Time

Figure 4.14 The Resulting Multiple Regression Model

To summarize the multiple regression model shown in figure 4.14, the individual beta coefficients corresponding to the predictor variables (independent variables) in the regression model can be interpreted as the average change in the appropriate predictor variable while holding the other predictor variables constant or unchanged. The following interpretations of the individual beta coefficient in relation to the hypothesis are summarized as follows:

The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability

H_1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

$b_3 = 0.256$ indicates that, on average, an increase of 0.256 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the level of criticality of a vendor informed software vulnerability if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant). This indicates that software vendors increase their response time to release software patches with the increase in the level of criticality of a software vulnerability.

As per test of H1, MRA was run individually for low, medium and high levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities and identified beta coefficient for low level ($b_l = 0.12$), medium level ($b_m = -0.18$) and high level ($b_h = 0.22$) of criticality of software vulnerabilities (see Appendix A for full results of these three MRA).

Where b_l is beta coefficient for low level of criticality of software vulnerability, b_m is beta coefficient for medium level of criticality of software vulnerability and b_h is beta coefficient for high level of criticality of software vulnerability.

The beta coefficient for low level of criticality ($b_l = 0.12$) indicates that, on average, an increase of 0.12 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the level of criticality toward the lowest level of criticality of vendor informed software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

The beta coefficient for medium level of criticality (b_m = -0.18) indicates that, on average, a decrease of 0.18 in the response time can be expected with a unit decrease in the level of criticality toward the medium level of criticality of vendor informed software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

The beta coefficient for high level of criticality (b_h = 0.22) indicates that, on average, an increase of 0.22 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the level of criticality toward the highest level of criticality of vendor informed software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

Table 4.23 (sub section 4.2.4) shows the variation of response time mean values across the levels of criticality. Table 4.23 shows that the response time is longer for software vulnerabilities with very high, high and low level of criticality; and shorter for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality.

Open Source versus Proprietary Source Software Vendor

H_2: Open source software vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to the software vendor.

b_1 = -0.387 indicates that open source software vendors are 39% quicker in releasing software patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities than proprietary source software vendors if type of software and the level of criticality of software vulnerability are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

Table 4.29 shows the average response time to release a software patch for proprietary source software vendors versus open source software vendors.

Table 4.29 Response Time across Software Vendor Type

Group Statistics					
	Software Vendor Type	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Response Time	Proprietary Source Software Vendor	418	155.95	216.860	10.607
	Open Source Software vendor	249	34.33	99.799	6.325

The mean value presented in table 4.29 shows that, overall, open source software vendors have a shorter response time in releasing a software patch compared to proprietary source software vendors.

Operating System Software versus Application Software

H_3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to software vendors.

b_2 = 0.082 indicates that patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released 8% slower than patches of application software if type of software vendor and the level of criticality of software vulnerability are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

Table 4.30 shows the average response time to release a software patch for application software versus operating system software.

Table 4.30 Response Time across Software Type

Group Statistics					
	Software Type	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Response Time	Application Software	611	105.64	193.421	7.825
	Operating System Software	56	164.10	159.120	21.263

The mean value presented in table 4.30 shows that the response time to release patches for operating system software vulnerabilities is longer than the response time to release software patches for application software vulnerabilities for vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

From table 4.30 it can be noted that the number of operating system software vulnerabilities is 56 compared to 611 application software vulnerabilities in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities. The number of operating system software vulnerabilities is less than 10% of the total sample population. Therefore, results of the hypothesis test $\mathbf{H_3}$ in this study should be treated with caution as the results may be unreliable.

4.4.1 Discussion of Results of Hypothesis Tests

The beta coefficient, the level of significance and other descriptive statistics discussed in this chapter determine the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses investigated in this study. Table 4.31 shows the summary of the hypotheses tested in the proposed research model.

Table 4.31 Summary of Hypotheses Tests and Results

Hypotheses	**Results**
H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability	Supported
H2: Open source software vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to software vendor	Supported
H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to software vendor	Not Supported

The Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability

Hypothesis H1 states:

H1: *Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability: (Supported)*

The beta coefficient ($b_3 = 0.256$) indicates that, on average, an increase of 0.256 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the level of criticality of a vendor informed software vulnerability if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

The beta coefficient for low level of criticality ($b_l = 0.12$) indicates that, on average, an increase of 0.12 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the level of criticality toward the lowest level of criticality of a vendor informed software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

The beta coefficient for medium level of criticality (b_m = -0.18) indicates that, on average, a decrease of 0.18 in the response time can be expected with a unit decrease in the level of criticality toward the medium level of criticality of a vendor informed software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

The beta coefficient for high level of criticality (b_h = 0.22) indicates that, on average, an increase of 0.22 in the response time can be expected with a unit increase in the level of criticality toward the highest level of criticality of a vendor informed software vulnerabilities if type of software vendor and type of software are kept unchanged (i.e. constant).

Table 4.13 (sub section 4.2.3) shows that 75% of medium level criticality software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 100 days), 77% of high level criticality software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 200 days), 73% of very high level criticality software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 200 days) and 78% of low criticality software vulnerabilities have software patches released in (1 to 300 days). The results show that software vendors take a shorter response time to release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality than for software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerabilities.

Similarly, Table 4.23 (sub section 4.2.4) shows that the medium level of criticality of software vulnerabilities have the shortest response time. From medium to very high level of criticality of software vulnerability, software vendors are increasing the response time with the increase in the level of criticality of software vulnerability. Similarly, for medium level to low level of criticality of software vulnerability, software vendors are increasing the response time with the decrease in the level of criticality of software vulnerability. This also suggests that software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

Similarly, as shown in table 4.13 (sub section 4.2.3) and table 4.23 (sub section 4.2.4), software vendors are taking a shorter response time to release software patches for the software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality compared with low and high level of criticality software vulnerabilities. This finding can be explained by the existing literature because, in reality, low level of criticality software vulnerabilities are not considered a high priority, while it may be more difficult to develop and release a patch for very high criticality software vulnerabilities (Gordon et al. 2002; Tanaka et al. 2005). Gordon's economic model of software security investment suggests that the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches is an optimisation decision where medium level of criticality of software vulnerabilities are the most optimal for software vendors to develop and release patches; whereas low level and high level of criticality software vulnerabilities are less optimal to develop and release patches for software vulnerabilities (Gordon et al. 2002). Furthermore, currently there is little in the way of government regulation and legislation which discourages this type of behaviour by software vendors (Kuechler 2007; Otter 2007; Saint-Germain 2005)

The proposed hypothesis H1 in this study worked in the opposite way to what was predicted in the previous literature which identified that software vendors more quickly release software patches for highly critical software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). In these studies the response time for releasing software patches was calculated from the full disclosure date of software vulnerabilities and software vulnerabilities are fully disclosed after the grace period provided to the software vendor to release software patches (Arora et al. 2005a; Farrow 2000; Meunier 2008). However, in this study the response time to release a software patch is calculated from the vendor informed date.

Similarly, previous studies identified that software vendors usually know of a software vulnerability before its full disclosure and they are provided a grace period to release a patch for software vulnerability before full disclosure (Cavusoglu et al. 2004 ; Cooper 1999; OIS 2004; SANS 2003). Once a full disclosure of software vulnerability occurs, most responsible software vendors release a software patch on or before the day of full disclosure. This indicates that there is little or no influence of full disclosure of software vulnerabilities on the response time to release a software patch. However, vendor informed dates for software vulnerabilities can provide a more accurate response time of software vendors in releasing a software patch to a software vulnerability. This can then be used to determine whether the software vendor is actually influenced to release a software patch to a software vulnerability by the level of criticality of that software vulnerability.

Open Source Software Vendor versus Proprietary Source Software Vendor

Hypothesis H2 states:
H2: *Open source software vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to software vendor: (Supported)*

The beta coefficient (b_1 = -0.387) for the variable software vendor type which is a binary variable indicates that open source software vendors release software patches 39% quicker than proprietary source software vendors for vendor informed software vulnerabilities. Similarly, the mean value of response time to release software patches by software vendor type in table 4.29 (section 4.4) provides further evidence for findings regarding H2 which indicate that open source software vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source software vendors once software vulnerabilities has been informed to software vendors.

Similarly, table 4.21 (sub section 4.2.4) shows that open source software vendor response time to release software patches for 84% software vulnerabilities is between (1 to 100 days). In contrast, table 4.22 (sub section 4.2.4) shows that proprietary source software vendor response time to release software patches for 84% of software vulnerabilities is between (1 to 300 days). This shows that open source software vendors’ response time to release software patches for open source software vulnerabilities is quicker than proprietary source software vendors’ response time to release software patches for proprietary source software vulnerabilities.

Further, table 4.7 (sub section 4.2.3) shows that 48% of software vulnerabilities with medium level criticality were found in open source software vendors; whereas 18% of software vulnerabilities with medium level criticality were found in proprietary source software vendors. Similarly, 48% of software vulnerabilities with high and very high level criticality were found in open source software vendors; whereas 81% of software vulnerabilities with high and very high level criticality were found in proprietary source software vendors. From the discussion of H1 it has been shown that software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability. This also explains why open source software vendors are quicker in releasing a software patch compared to proprietary source software vendors once a software vulnerability has been informed to the software vendor.

Schryen (2009) did not find any significant difference in vendors' patching behaviour between open source software vendors and proprietary source software vendors for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities. However, Arora et al. (2010a) found that open source software vendors release software patches quicker than proprietary source software vendors for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities. Based on the previous literature, this research supports the findings of Arora et al. (2010a) that open source software vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities quicker than proprietary source software vendors release patches for proprietary source software vulnerabilities.

Therefore, hypothesis H2 developed in this study that open source vendors release software patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source software vendors release software patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to software vendor is supported.

Operating System Software versus Application Software

Hypothesis H3 states:

***H_3:** Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to software vendors: (Not supported)*

The beta coefficient ($b_2 = 0.082$) for the variable type of software which is a binary variable indicates that software patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released 8% slower than patches for application software once software vulnerability has been informed to software vendors. Similarly, the mean value of response time for application and operating system software in table 4.30 section 4.4 shows that software vendor release patches for operating system are slower than application software once software vulnerabilities has been informed to software vendors.

Similarly, table 4.4 (sub section 4.2.2) shows that buffer errors, SQL injection and cross site scripting (XSS) are the mostly commonly found software vulnerabilities in application software; and table 4.20 shows that software vendors' response time to release software patches for most buffer errors, SQL injection and cross site scripting (XSS) software vulnerabilities in application software is between (1 to 100 days). In contrast table 4.4 (sub section 4.2.2) shows that buffer errors, code injection, resource management errors and numeric errors are the most common software vulnerability in operating system software; and table 4.20 (sub section 4.2.4) shows that software vendors' response time to release software patches for most buffer errors, code injection, resource management errors and numeric errors software vulnerabilities in operating software is between (1 to 300 days). This also provides further explanation for why software vendors' response time to release software patches for application software is quicker than response time to release software patches for operating system software.

Moreover, table 4.10 (sub section 4.2.3) shows that 90% of operating system software has a high level of criticality and 5% of operating system software has a medium level of criticality compared to 66% of application software with a high level of criticality, and 31% of application software with a medium level of criticality. As the result of H1 shows, software vendors take a longer response time in releasing a software patch for a highly critical software vulnerability compared to medium critical software vulnerability. It can be concluded that this is one of the main reasons why operating system software is patched more slowly than application software. This result is also supported by Gordon's economic model of software security investment which contends software vendors release patches for operating system software vulnerabilities much slower because the optimisation of investment in software security is higher for software with a high level of criticality (Gordon et al. 2002).

Previous empirical research by SANS and TippingPoint (2009; 2009) found that software vendors patch operating system software vulnerabilities more quickly than application software vulnerabilities. However, these empirical studies analysed the patching behaviour of a limited number of software vendors with their software vulnerabilities.

This research has analysed the patching behaviour of 160 software vendors with 667 software vulnerabilities and found that software vendors patch operating system software vulnerabilities slower than application software vulnerabilities. This result might be unreliable to generalize as a whole because in the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 611 software vulnerabilities are application software vulnerabilities and 56 software vulnerabilities are operating system software vulnerabilities. Therefore, this hypothesis needs further investigation in future research where operating system software vulnerabilities are more representative in the sample population.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented and discussed the results of the quantitative analysis generated from the statistical tests. The results and findings in relation to the statistical tests were discussed. The statistical tests included descriptive statistics, multi-collinearity, one way ANOVA and multiple regression analysis.

The descriptive statistics revealed that the three key factors (1) type of software, (2) type of software vendor and (3) the level of criticality of software vulnerability have a significant impact on the response time in releasing software patches.

The ANOVA analysis showed that there is a significant difference between the open source software vendor and proprietary source software vendor with the level of criticality of a software vulnerability. Similarly, there is also a significant difference between the operating system software and application software with the level of criticality of a software vulnerability.

Further, the mean difference of the response time in releasing a software patch revealed that (1) there is a difference between open source and proprietary source software vendors in releasing a software patch; and (2) there is a difference between operating system software and application software vendors in releasing a software patch.

The multiple regression model was used to test the research hypotheses formulated from the conceptual and theoretical model developed in chapter 2 (literature review). The hypothesis testing showed that the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities and the type of software have a positive relationship with the response time; and type of software vendor has a strong negative relationship with the response time. Although, the hypothesis testing showed that the level of criticality has a positive relationship, a single positive result it is not possible to show whether the longer response time for both high and low level of criticality of software vulnerability and shorter response time for medium level of criticality of software vulnerability is supported as stated in H1. Therefore, the level of criticality has been split into three levels—low, medium and high. The MRA test for each level of criticality shows that high level and low level of criticality of software vulnerability have a positive relationship with the response time. Conversely, medium level of criticality of software vulnerability has a negative relationship with the response time.

The next chapter is the concluding chapter of this study and provides an overall summary of this study including the research problem, hypotheses test results, a discussion on the theoretical and practical contributions of the findings of this research, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

5.1 Introduction

This chapter reports on the main conclusions of this empirical research regarding the patching behaviour of software vendors for informed software vulnerabilities in terms of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, the type of software vendor and the type of software. This chapter begins with a summary of the research problem, the general research question, the three specific research questions addressed in this research, the three research hypotheses that were tested and the research methodology used in this study. The key findings and conclusions regarding the results of the descriptive data analysis, one way ANOVAs and research hypotheses tests using multiple regression analysis are then summarized. The key contributions of this study to theory and practice are then discussed; and the limitations of this study are acknowledged. Finally, this chapter provides some suggestions for future research regarding the key factors impacting on the response time of software vendors in releasing patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities.

5.2 Summary of this Study

This section provides a summary of the research problem and general research question investigated in this study, the research hypotheses tested, and the research method used in this study. The key findings of descriptive data analyses and hypotheses testing are then summarized.

5.2.1 Research Problem

Previous studies analysed the influence of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities on software vendors' patching behaviour on the basis of the full disclosure date (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). Arora et al. (2010a) also argued that open source software vendors are quicker than proprietary source software vendors in releasing software patches for software vulnerabilities on the basis of full disclosure date. Conversely, Schryen

(2009) argued that there is no significant difference between open source software vendors and proprietary source software vendors in releasing software patches for software vulnerabilities on the basis of full disclosure date. Furthermore, previous studies argued that software vendors release software patches for operating system software vulnerabilities quicker than application software vulnerabilities on the basis of the full disclosure date (SANS 2009; TippingPoint 2009). All the above studies based their analysis of software vendors' patching behaviour on the full disclosure date of software vulnerability and paid little attention to analysing software vendors' patching behaviour on the basis of vendor informed date. To address the identified gaps in the literature, this study investigated the following general research question:

To what extent does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of software vendor (Open source, Proprietary source vendor), and type of software (Operating system software, Application software) influence the response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

To answer the general research question for this research, the following three specific research questions are addressed:

RSQ1. How does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities influence the response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

RSQ2. Is there a difference between open and proprietary source software vendors in terms of their response time in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

RSQ3. Is there a difference between operating system software and application software in terms of response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities?

5.2.2 Research Hypotheses

The three hypotheses were formulated from the three research questions above after being justified and grounded in the existing relevant literature on software vulnerabilities and software vendors' behavior in releasing software patches. The three hypotheses are as follows:

H1: Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

H2: Open source vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

H3: Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released more quickly than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability.

These three hypotheses together test the effect of *the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of software vendor* and *type of software* on the response time of software vendors in releasing patches once the vendor is informed of the software vulnerabilities.

A research model showing the results of hypotheses testing using multiple regression analysis is presented in figure 5.1.


Type of Software Vendor
5. Open Source Software Vendors
6. Proprietary Source Software Vendors
39% quicker
H2 (***)
$b_1 = -0.39$
$R^2 = 0.304$
Response Time
Level of Criticality of Software Vulnerability
H1 (***)
$b_3 = 0.256$
$H1_l$ (*NS) ($b_l = 0.121$)
$H1_m$ (***) ($b_m = -0.181$)
$H1_h$ (***) ($b_h = 0.222$)
Type of Software
8% slower
1. Operating System Software
2. Application Software
H3 (**)
$b_2 = 0.08$

** = Significant at $p<0.05$ (two tailed), *** Significant at $p<0.01$ (one tailed)

Figure 5.1 Research Model and Results of Hypotheses Tests using MRA
Source: Developed for this research

In order to test hypothesis H1, the sample population for this study was split on three levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities (Low, Medium, High) in order to determine if software vendors released patches for medium level software vulnerabilities quicker than for low and high level software vulnerabilities once informed of the software vulnerability. Table 5.1 shows the beta coefficients, as well as corresponding significance level, for each level of criticality from each of the three MRAs conducted to test H1 hypothesis (full details of the three MRAs conducted for H1 hypothesis are available in Appendix A).

Table 5.1 Three Levels of Criticality Beta Coefficients and Level of Significance for Three MRA ran for Hypothesis H1

Level of Criticality	Beta Coefficients	Significance Level
Low Level of Criticality ($H1_l$)	$b_l = 0.121$(*)(NS)	0.754
Medium Level of Criticality ($H1_m$)	$b_m = -0.181$ (***)	0.004
High Level of Criticality ($H1_h$)	$b_h = 0.222$ (***)	0.000

* (NS) Insignificant, *** Significant at $p<0.01$ (one tailed)

Source: Developed for this research

Table 5.2 provides a summary of the hypotheses which were supported or not supported in this study. A discussion of each hypothesis is presented in the next section.

Table 5.2 Supported and Unsupported Hypotheses of This Study

Hypotheses	**Relationship investigated**	**Supported?**
H1	• High level and low level of criticality of software vulnerability have a positive relationship with the response time • Medium level of criticality of software vulnerability has a negative relationship with the response time	**Yes**
H2	A strong negative relationship between type of software vendor and the response time	**Yes**
H3	A positive relationship between type of software and the response time	**No**

Source: Developed for this Research

5.2.2 Summary of Results of Research Hypothesis Testing

H_1: The beta coefficient (b_3 = 0.256) (figure 5.1) indicates the overall impact of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities on response time of software vendors in releasing patches for vendor informed software vulnerabilities. However, this result did not distinguish between the response time for software vulnerabilities with high or low level of criticality and the response time for medium level of criticality of software vulnerability as stated in H1.

Therefore, in order to test the hypothesis H1 appropriately, the sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities was split into three levels of criticality (low, medium and high). A MRA was run for a subset of the sample population for each level of criticality to determine the actual relationship between each of the three levels of criticality of software vulnerabilities and the software vendors' response time (see Appendix A). Table 5.1 shows the beta coefficients for each level of criticality of software vulnerabilities after running each individual MRA. The beta coefficient (b_l = 0.12) for software vulnerabilities with a low level of criticality indicates that an increase towards the lowest level of criticality increases the response time. However, this relationship is statistically insignificant. Moreover, the beta coefficient (b_h = 0.22) for high level of criticality indicates that an increase towards the highest level of criticality increases the response time. In contrast, the beta coefficient (b_m = -0.18) for medium level of criticality indicates that a decrease towards the medium level of criticality decreases the response time.

Therefore, one of the key findings of this study is that the results of three MRAs for H1 hypothesis test provides support for the argument that software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality: (Supported)

H_2: Open source software vendors are 39% quicker than proprietary source software vendors in releasing software patches when informed of software vulnerabilities.

Another key finding of this study is that the results of the H2 hypothesis test provided support for the argument that open source vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability: (Supported).

H_3: The results of H3 hypothesis test did not provide support for the argument that software patches for operating system software are released quicker than those for application software (Not supported). Conversely, the results suggest that software patches for operating system software are released 8% slower than for application software when the software vendor is informed of a software vulnerability, which is contrary to predictions in the existing literature (Not supported).

5.2.3 Research Methodology

This is explanatory research which uses a quantitative approach to test the research model to examine the relationship between the independent variables: level of criticality of software vulnerability; type of software vendor; and type of software, as well as the dependent response time of software vendors' in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities once informed of the software vulnerability. The sample population of 667 vendor informed software vulnerabilities was archival data obtained from four related software vulnerability databases SecurityFocus, Open Source Vulnerability Database, National Vulnerability Database and Secunia. These four software vulnerability databases contain archival data about software vulnerabilities which has been rigorously collected and screened.

The software vulnerability data obtained from these four databases over the time period 2008 to 2010 did not provide all the required information to test the proposed hypotheses. Therefore, a sub set of those software vulnerabilities which have all the required information was selected as the sample population for this study. The total sample population of vendor informed software vulnerabilities was analysed using descriptive statistics, one way ANOVAs and multiple regression analysis. The results from the data analysis together with the existing literature were used to explain the main findings of this study.

5.2.4 Conclusions about Descriptive Data Findings

This study analyzed software vulnerabilities data with a vendor informed date in contrast to previous studies which analysed software vulnerabilities data with a full disclosure date (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). The descriptive data findings regarding the total sample population of 667 vendor informed software vulnerabilities for this study are summarised below.

Descriptive Data Analysis Findings about Type of Software Vendor and Software Vulnerabilities

- The majority of software vulnerabilities are found in the software of proprietary source software vendors in this study. In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 418 (62.7%) software vulnerabilities are in proprietary source vendor software and 249 (37.3%) software vulnerabilities are in open source vendor software (refer to table 4.1 subsection 4.2.1).
- *Buffer errors* (160, 38%) is the most common software vulnerability category for the software of proprietary source software vendors in this study (refer to table 4.2 subsection 4.2.1).
- *Cross site scripting* (XSS) (74, 30%) is the most common software vulnerability category in the software of open source software vendors in this study (refer to table 4.2 subsection 4.2.1).

Descriptive Data Analysis Findings about Type of Software and Software Vulnerabilities

- Most software vulnerabilities in this study are found in application software. In the total sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities, 56 (8.4%) software vulnerabilities are classified as operating system software, compared to 611 (91.6%) software vulnerabilities classified as application software (refer to table 4.3 subsection 4.2.2).
- *Buffer errors* (178, 29%), *cross site scripting* (XSS) (116, 19%) and *SQL injection* (39, 6%) are the most commonly found categories of software vulnerabilities in application software (611) in this study (refer to table 4.4 subsection 4.2.2).
- *Buffer errors* (19, 34%), *code injection* (10, 18%), *numeric errors* (7, 13%) and *resource management errors* (6, 11%) are the most commonly found categories of software vulnerabilities in operating system software (56) in this study (refer to table 4.4 subsection 4.2.2).

Descriptive Data Analysis Findings about Level of Criticality and Software Vulnerabilities

- Almost half of the software vulnerabilities (319, 48%) are of a very high level of criticality in this study (refer to table 4.5 subsection 4.2.3).
- The majority of the software vulnerabilities (262, 63%) in the software of proprietary source software vendors are of a very high level of criticality in this study (refer to table 4.7 subsection 4.2.3).
- Almost half of the software vulnerabilities (120, 48%) in the software of open source software vendors are of a medium level of criticality in this study (refer to table 4.7 subsection 4.2.3).
- Software vulnerabilities in the software of open source software vendors are overall less critical than software vulnerabilities in the software of proprietary source software vendors in this study. The average level of criticality of software vulnerability for open source software vendors is 3.68, whereas the average level of criticality of software vulnerability for proprietary source software vendors is 4.42 (refer to table 4.8 subsection 4.2.3).

- In terms of the level of impact, the following categories of software vulnerabilities: *buffer errors, numeric errors, resource management errors* and *code injection* mostly have a very high level of criticality, while *cross site scripting* (XSS) and *SQL injection* mostly have a medium level criticality in this study (refer to table 4.14 subsection 4.2.3).
- There were 192 (31%) software vulnerabilities in application software with a medium level of criticality, 406 (66%) with high levels (i.e. high and very high) of criticality and 13 (2.1%) with a low level of criticality in this study (refer to table 4.10 subsection 4.2.3).
- There were 3 (5%) software vulnerabilities in operating system software with a medium level of criticality, 52 (93%) with high levels (i.e. high and very high) of criticality and 1 (1.8%) with a low level of criticality in this study (refer to table 4.10 subsection 4.2.3).
- Overall operating system software vulnerabilities are more critical than application software vulnerabilities in this study. The average level of criticality of software vulnerabilities for operating system software is 4.55, whereas the average level of criticality of software vulnerabilities for application software is 4.1 (refer to table 4.11 subsection 4.2.3).

Descriptive Data Findings about Response Time and Software Vulnerabilities

- Software vendors release patches for the majority of software vulnerabilities (377, 57%) between 1 to 100 days in this study (refer to table 4.15 subsection 4.2.4).
- For the majority of software vulnerabilities in open source software (194, 78%), the software vendor response in releasing a software patch was between 1 to 100 days (refer to table 4.18 subsection 4.2.4).
- For the majority of software vulnerabilities in proprietary source software (349, 84%), the software vendor response in releasing a software patch was between 1 to 300 days (refer to table 4.18 subsection 4.2.4).
- Open source software vendors are quicker in releasing a software patch compared to proprietary source software vendors once informed of a software vulnerability. The average response time of open source software vendors to release a software patch for a software vulnerability is 34 days, whereas the

average response time of proprietary source software vendors to release a software patch for a software vulnerability is 156 days (refer to table 4.29 subsection 4.4).

- Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability. The average response time in releasing a software patch for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality is 55 days, whereas the average response time in releasing a software patch for software vulnerabilities with low, high and very high levels of criticality are 97 days, 84 days and 157 days respectively (refer to table 4.23 subsection 4.2.4).
- Software patches for application software vulnerabilities overall are released quicker compared to operating system software vulnerabilities once software vulnerabilities have been informed to the software vendor. The average response time to release a software patch for application software vulnerabilities is 105 days, whereas the average response time to release a software patch for operating system software vulnerabilities is 164 days (refer to table 4.30 subsection 4.4).
- The percentage of software patches released between 1 to 200 days for application software vulnerabilities (480, 78%) is greater when compared to operating system software (35, 62%) (refer to table 4.19 subsection 4.2.4).

From the summary of the above descriptive statistics, it is concluded that open source software vendors are quicker than proprietary source software vendors in releasing software patches when informed of software vulnerabilities. Similarly, software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality. In contrast, software patches for operating system software are released more slowly than application software when the software vendor is informed of a software vulnerability.

The descriptive data findings with regard to the type of software might be unreliable and should be treated with caution because the distribution of software vulnerabilities across the two types of software is unequal (i.e. the proportion of operating system software vulnerabilities is less than 10% of the total sample population of 667).

5.2.5 Conclusions Concerning Results of Research Hypotheses Tests

The result of the research hypotheses tests shows that all the independent variables, namely, (1) the level of criticality of software vulnerability, (2) type of software vendor, and (3) type of software have a significant effect on the dependent variable, *response time*.

Hypothesis H1: The key finding from the results of the three MRAs performed to test hypothesis H1 show that software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability. This finding provides further support for Gordon and Loeb's (2002) economic model of software security investment that argued the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches is an optimisation decision. Software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality are the most optimal for software vendors to develop and release patches. In contrast, for software vulnerabilities with low level and high level of criticality it is less optimal to develop and release patches (Gordon et al. 2002). Moreover, this finding contradicts the findings of Arora et al. (2010a) and Schryen and Rich (2010). Arora et al. (2010a) argued that software vendors are more responsive and patch highly critical software vulnerabilities quicker than less critical software vulnerabilities. Conversely, Schryen and Rich (2010) did not find any significant difference in software vendors' patching behaviour for highly critical software vulnerabilities compared to less critical software vulnerabilities.

Hypothesis H2: The key finding from the results of Hypothesis H2 test show that open source software vendors release software patches more quickly than proprietary source software vendors once informed of the software vulnerability. This finding provides further support for Arora et al.'s (2010a) study which found that open source vendors are quicker to release a patch than proprietary source vendors. This finding contradicts the finding of Schryen's (2009) study that found there is no significant difference in vendor patching behaviour for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities between open source software and proprietary source software.

Hypothesis H3: The key finding from the results of Hypothesis H3 test show that software vendors' response to release patches for application software vulnerabilities is quicker than operating system software vulnerabilities in this study. This finding contradicts the findings of SANS (2009) and TippingPoint (2009). Both these studies argued software vendors' response to release patches for operating system software vulnerabilities is quicker than for application software vulnerabilities. However, this finding in relation to H3 might be unreliable since the distribution of software vulnerabilities between two types of software is unequal (i.e. the proportion of operating system software vulnerabilities is less than 10% of the sample population).

5.3 Contribution of this Study

This study has made several contributions to theory and practice as follows.

5.3.1 Contribution to Theory

This research contributed to theory and existing knowledge by:

- Identifying that software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality influence the response time of software vendors in releasing patches quicker than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the software vendor is informed of the software vulnerabilities (Gordon et al. 2002; Swire 2004, 2006). Most of the previous studies which investigated the impact of the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities on the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches identified that the higher the level of criticality of a software vulnerability the more responsive software vendors are in releasing software patches for disclosed software vulnerabilities (Arora et al. 2010a; Liu et al. 2011; Mangalaraj et al. 2005; Telang et al. 2007). Furthermore, this study identified that analysing the impact of level of criticality of software vulnerabilities on the software vendor's response time in releasing software patches based on the date of full disclosure date is not accurate measure of the response time as most software patches are released before the full disclosure date. Therefore the findings of this study also show that the vendor informed date for a software vulnerability disclosure is a much more accurate measure of the response time than the full disclosure date of software vulnerabilities.

- This study confirmed that open source software vendors are quicker than proprietary source software vendors in terms of their response time in releasing patches once the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities. In previous studies, Arora et al. (2010a) argued that open source software vendors are quicker to release software patches for software vulnerabilities than for proprietary source software vendors. Conversely Schryen (2009) argued that there is no significant difference in software vendors patching behaviour for fully disclosed software vulnerabilities between open and proprietary source software vendor. Both studies analysed the software vendors patching behaviour on fully disclosed software vulnerabilities. The findings in this study show that the response time for open source software vendors in releasing software patches is quicker compared to proprietary source software vendor on the basis of responsible disclosure date of software vulnerability (Hobbs et al. 1868; Swire 2004, 2006).
- This study do not confirm that the response time of software vendors in releasing patches for operating system software is quicker than application software once the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities. Previous studies found that software vendors released software patches more quickly for operating system software vulnerabilities than for application software (SANS 2009; TippingPoint 2009). The findings in this study show that the vendors' response time in releasing software patches for application software vulnerabilities is quicker compared to operating system software vulnerabilities on the basis of responsible disclosure of software vulnerability (Hobbs et al. 1868; Swire 2004, 2006). However this finding may not be reliable because operating system software was not sufficiently represented in the sample population.
- This study established empirical support for responsible disclosure (vendor informed date) as a more accurate mechanism for determining the response

time of software vendors in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities. Previous studies have used the full (public) disclosure date as a mechanism for determining how quickly software vendors respond in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities. However the full disclosure date is not an accurate measure of the response time of software vendors as most software vendors release patches on or before the full disclosure date as software vendors are given a grace period by security advisories to develop and release a software patch (Arora et al. 2010a).

Thereby, the results of this study indicate that software vendors are more responsive in releasing patches to software vulnerabilities with medium level of criticality than software vulnerabilities with a high and low level of criticality. Open source software vendors take a shorter response time than proprietary source software vendors to release a software patch for a vendor informed software vulnerability. Application software patches are released more quickly than operating system software patches once the vendor is informed of a software vulnerability.

Furthermore, from the empirical investigation of vendor informed software vulnerabilities, this study also contributes to existing knowledge and theory by establishing that full disclosures of software vulnerability have little or no effect on the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches because most software vendors release software patches on or before the date of full disclosure of a software vulnerability. Therefore, this study confirms that responsible disclosure of software vulnerabilities is a more effective mechanism for encouraging software vendors to release software patches, rather than inconsistent full disclosure of software vulnerabilities from different information security advisories.

5.3.2 Contribution to Practice

The findings of this study can be used by both practitioners and policy makers (i.e. information security advisories) to better understand the software vulnerability landscape and the complex process of software vendors' patching behaviour in response to software vulnerabilities. The findings of this study should also assist practitioners in deciding how to more effectively undertake preventive measures for different categories of software vulnerabilities based on the level of criticality, the software type and the type of software vendor. The findings of this study suggest that responsible disclosure of software vulnerabilities (vendor informed date) is a more effective mechanism that government and industry regulatory bodies can use in encouraging software vendors to release software patches.

5.4 Limitation of this Study

As with all research, this research has some limitations. One limitation of this study is that only 667 software vulnerabilities provided the complete information required to test the research hypothesis, although the total population of software vulnerability reported from 2008 to 2010 in the OSVDB database was 11,758. Some of the categories of software vulnerabilities have a low representation in the sample population of 667 software vulnerabilities used in this study. For instance, of the 667 software vulnerabilities, there were only 14 with a low level of criticality and, of these, only one was a operating system software vulnerability with the other 13 being application software vulnerabilities. Therefore, any interpretation of the impact of software vulnerabilities with low level of criticality on the response time of software vendors in releasing a patch once informed of a software vulnerability should be treated with caution. Similarly, the number of software vulnerabilities in operating system software was less than 10 percent (56) in the sample population of 667. Therefore, the finding that patches for software vulnerabilities in application software are released quicker than for software vulnerabilities in operating system software also needs to be treated with caution.

5.5 Suggestions for Future Research

In this study, the research model confirms that independent variables explain 30% of the variation in the dependent variable, *response time*. This finding suggests that there are other key factors that could impact on the response time of software vendors in releasing software patches. The research model in this study determined the impact of (1) level of criticality of software vulnerability, (2) type of software vendor and (3) type of software on the response time of a software vendor in releasing a software patch once informed of a software vulnerability. This study found that software vendors are slower in releasing software patches for high level of criticality of software vulnerabilities compared to medium level of criticality of software vulnerabilities. To address this gap, future research should identify the motivational factors that encourage software vendors to release software patches once they are informed about software vulnerabilities with high levels of criticality. The losses incurred from the exploitation of software vulnerabilities with a high level of criticality are not tolerable to individuals or organizations. Another important area identified as worthy of further research is the role of government and industry in regulating and legislating the responsibility and liability of software vendors in relation to software vulnerabilities in their software products. Such legislation should encourage software vendors to be more proactive in developing and releasing patches for software vulnerabilities with higher levels of criticality. In addition, it has also been identified that the representation of operating system software vulnerabilities in this study was very low (i.e. less than 10% of total sample population). To be more confident in the findings achieved from this study, future research should replicate this study with a more equal representation of both operating system software and application software.

5.6 Summary

This chapter provided a summary of the key findings of this study, followed by the main contributions of the key findings to theory and practice, acknowledgment of the limitations of the study, and directions for future research.

This study developed a research model which is underpinned by software security disclosure theory (Swire 2004, 2006) and Gordon and Loeb's (2002) economic model of software security investment to investigate the following general research question: 'To what extent does the level of criticality of software vulnerabilities, type of software vendor (Open source, Proprietary source vendor), and type of software (Operating system software, Application software) influence the response time of software vendors in releasing patches when the software vendor is informed of software vulnerabilities'. This general research question is broken down into three specific research questions (see subsection 5.2.1). To answer these three research questions, three hypotheses (see subsection 5.2.1) were formulated for this study.

The following major conclusions were drawn from the result of three research hypotheses tests:

- Software vendors release patches for software vulnerabilities with a medium level of criticality in a shorter response time than software vulnerabilities with low and high levels of criticality once the vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability
- Open source software vendors release patches for open source software vulnerabilities more quickly than proprietary source vendors release patches for proprietary software vulnerabilities once the software vendor has been informed of the software vulnerability
- Patches for operating system software vulnerabilities are released slower than patches for application software vulnerabilities once the software vulnerability has been informed to the software vendor.

This study contributes to theory by investigating the impact of key factors: (1) the level of criticality of software, (2) type of software vendor (open source software vendor, proprietary source software vendor, and (3) type of software (operating system software, application software) on software vendors' response time in releasing a software patch once informed of a software vulnerability. Similarly, the study contributes to existing theory by establishing an experimental support for responsible disclosure (vendor inform date) as a more precise mechanism for determining the response time of software vendors in releasing patches for software vulnerabilities.

This study further contributes to practice by helping both practitioners and policy makers enhance their decision-making when undertaking preventive measures for different categories of software vulnerabilities based on the level of criticality of software vulnerability, the software type and the software vendor type. Similarly, government and industry regulatory bodies can adopt a responsible disclosure of software vulnerability (vendor inform date) which is recognised as a more effective disclosure of software vulnerability to encourage software vendors to release software patches.

As with all research, this study has some limitations. The sample population was restricted to 667 software vulnerabilities that had complete information to test the research hypothesis, although 11,758 software vulnerabilities were reported from 2008 to 2010 in the OSVDB database. A larger sample population which is more representative of operating system software vulnerabilities would provide further confirmation of the key findings of this research. The research model in this study confirmed the significance of three independent variables which explain 30 percent of the variance in the dependent variable response time of software vendors in releasing software patches. Future research could also extend the research model by identifying and including other key factors to explain more of the variance in the dependent variable *response time*. Similarly, determining the role of government and industry in regulating and legislating the responsibility and liability of software vendors in relation to software vulnerabilities in their software products is worthy of future research.

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Appendix A - The MRA Test for Three Levels (Low, Medium and High) of Criticality of Software Vulnerabilities

The MRA Test for Three Levels (Low, Medium and High) of Criticality of Software Vulnerabilities

Coefficient Test for Low Level of Criticality

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.240	1.393		.890	.408					
	Low Level of Criticality	.179	.544	.121(*)(NS)	.328	.754	.124	.133	.104	.734	1.363
	Type of Software Vendor	-.928	.473	-.645	-1.963	.097	-.576	-.625	-.620	.926	1.080
	Type of Software	.441	.892	.188	.495	.638	.075	.198	.156	.694	1.441

a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)

* (NS) Insignificant

Coefficient Test for Medium Level of Criticality

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	2.919	.437		6.674	.000					
	Medium Level of Criticality	-.273	.095	-.181 (***)	-2.885	.004	-.221	-.205	-.180	.992	1.008
	Type of Software Vendor	-.673	.092	-.458	-7.282	.000	-.464	-.468	-.455	.986	1.014
	Type of Software	.874	.441	.124	1.982	.049	.088	.143	.124	.994	1.007

a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)

*** Significant at $p<0.01$ (one tailed)

Coefficient Test for High Level of Criticality

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Correlations			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Zero-order	Partial	Part	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.800	.228		3.509	.000					
	High Level of Criticality	.127	.025	.222 (***)	5.046	.000	.298	.233	.215	.941	1.063
	Type of Software Vendor	-.478	.065	-.321	-7.309	.000	-.378	-.328	-.311	.940	1.064
	Type of Software	.182	.087	.089	2.094	.037	.096	.099	.089	.999	1.001

a. Dependent Variable: Log (Response Time)

*** Significant at $p<0.01$ (one tailed)