# Private Men and Public Intellectuals: UK Historians and Changing Perceptions of Interwar Germany

**A Thesis submitted by**

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# Abstract

UK historians' work in the interwar era demonstrates their particular significance in shaping the UK's relationship with Germany. UK interwar historians served in roles that touched upon high politics, and in occupations that gave them unique access to the public space. The thesis explores why UK historians studied Germany, and with what impact on public perceptions. It also assesses how their engagement with Germany contributed to their reputations as public intellectuals. The thesis argues that UK interwar historians were an influential collection of individuals, whose writings on Germany helped consolidate a shifting public space. It examines UK historians' capacity to analyse, prescribe and advocate.

UK historians emerged in the interwar period as an identifiable body of public intellectuals. Several factors fostered the development of this collective. These factors were strongly influenced by analyses that reflected UK historians' understandings of interwar Germany, and included perceptions of Germanness, Germany's democracy, Germany's power and the Nazi Party. Ultimately, the thesis examines UK interwar historians' commitment to analysing Germany, albeit with diverse opinions. Historians' evolution as public intellectuals was key in this phenomenon.

# CERTIFICATION OF THESIS

I hereby certify that the ideas, analysis and conclusions reported in this submission are entirely my own except where acknowledged. This work is original and has not been previously submitted for any purpose.

Signature of Candidate: Date:

Signature of Supervisor: Date:

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION AND APPROACHES

On 15 April 1937, British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's private secretary took receipt of a memorial addressed to the Prime Minister, and which was authored by several prominent British historians of Germany.[1] One of the historians who co-authored the document, William Harbutt Dawson, also appended a personal note to the memorial, meant for Baldwin. In it, he outlined what he hoped his correspondence would achieve, and in so doing, outlined what he believed to be the position and role of British historians in interwar Britain:

> …It falls to me to send this memorial to you. It is due to a deep conviction that these questions hold the key not only to friendship with Germany but to the peace of Europe. I have known Germany intimately for over fifty years – from my student days in Berlin, when A. Chamberlain simultaneously matriculated there...have closely followed the colonial movement, and written in *The Times* without number. I know, therefore, how intensely, even passionately, the Germans feel on this subject, but I know, too, how strongly they trust English generosity. I believe they would respond wonderfully to a decision in the service of this memorial. I believe, too, that the more steps all the world over would be informed for such a gesture…I have tried to serve my country and the course of international peace for over half a century, and my quest is to help avoid our drift into another catastrophe like that of 1914-19.[2]

Dawson's memorial to Baldwin gave insight into the lack of consideration for the complexity of Germany's position in Europe. Dawson felt that misinformed views about Germany were rising in the United Kingdom, views which he had hoped to help dissuade by appealing to the Prime Minister. The extent of UK historians'

[1] A statement of facts as the basis of a petition.
[2] William Harbutt Dawson's Note to the Memorial to Baldwin, 15 April 1937, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Stanley Baldwin's Private Papers*, Baldwin 89, ff., F2.

public roles involving Germany was belied by Dawson's personal note and co-authorship of the memorial, which emphasised to Baldwin that their correspondence was not meant for publication.[3] However, Dawson's communication to Baldwin at a crucial period in Anglo-German relations shows that an appeal to a leading politician could be decisive and revealed historians' capacity to navigate between the public and private spaces that affected foreign policy. The wider interwar period demonstrates an ambitious assertion of public intellectuals' roles by UK historians in the interwar era. The note and accompanying memorial's inspiration was the conviction, adopted by Dawson and his colleagues, that a punitive peace had been imposed on Germany after World War I. They used this belief to give urgency and credence to their analyses and commentary about Germany, and thereby to enhance their roles as public intellectuals.

World War I provided the immediate context for British historians' perspectives on Germany, and offers a prism through which to comprehend their analyses. An analysis of British historians in the interwar era shows the influence that they, as a collection of individuals, wielded in the UK's relationship with Germany, and indicates their collective importance in bringing foreign affairs to the attention of the British public. In the period I analyse, some historians often self-identified as 'English' as opposed to 'British'. Hereafter, I use United Kingdom (UK) when referring to the state, and defer to the historians' own terminology within quotations. I argue that UK historians acted as an effective collection of individuals, whose interest in interwar Germany created the context for their work across different fields of knowledge, thereby accentuating their public role. They fulfilled this function while maintaining a variety of beliefs. In the process, UK historians sought to raise Britons' awareness of a collective sense of grievance held by Germans. In the interwar period, historians occupied roles that affected decisions of high politics, and served in capacities that gave them access to the public. The thesis considers UK historians and their ability to marshal analytical, prescriptive and advocacy skills. It investigates the role of UK historians in influencing public opinion and foreign policy on interwar Germany.

[3] *Ibid*.

The focus of the thesis is on UK historians and public intellectuals of interwar Germany in order to ascertain the extent to which their public commentary and histories contributed to the shaping of UK public opinion and to British foreign policy towards Germany. The thesis proposes that, although there was a diversity of opinion in their views, there was a synergy between their ability to influence public opinion and foreign policy directions. It argues that the study of UK historians of interwar Germany constitute a unique case study of public intellectuals who influenced private, public and political attitudes. Accordingly, the aim of my thesis is to outline and analyse the ways interwar UK historians addressed the geopolitical importance of interwar Germany. Though sometimes the historians examined other periods and countries aside from Germany's, it was the singularity of that country's assertiveness and power before World War I which contrasted with the vulnerability and weakness after it. Following World War I, Germany remained the object of UK historians' analyses because the outcome of that country's fate seemed uncertain to them and the state remained of geostrategic importance.

These historians' careers arose at a time when the study of history at tertiary level was fluid. The criteria for university history teachers' employment at this time were, according to Matti Klinge, '…traditional, undefined and flexible'.[4] Such historians did not have to be assessed and undertake research in order to facilitate a career in academia, though they often did. The intellectuals I selected for this thesis all published their work in a wide array of publications. The historians that have been selected include those scholars who published revisionist works that questioned Germany's responsibility in starting World War I and who emphasised the severity of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and who were variously engaged in government and university employment. They worked across different fields of knowledge, and the areas of their employment overlapped in a number of ways. Historians in the interwar UK were aided in their role by the benefits that flowed

[4] Matti Klinge, 'Teachers', in Walter Ruegg (ed.), *A History of the University in Europe: Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Centuries*, Vol. 3, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 139.

from their contributions to their country's political and social establishment. Chief among these were the concepts of capital and the notion of value.

The structure of the thesis examines how UK interwar historians worked across contexts as public intellectuals, and how this enabled their particular examinations of Germany. Chapter 1 begins with an outline of how UK historians gained the wherewithal to engage Germany publicly as intellectuals in the interwar era. It explains social and cultural capital as theoretical concepts that underpinned UK historians' capacity to work across different spaces. The chapter explores the nature of the interwar public space, and how its development influenced UK historians' analyses of Germany.

Chapter 2 seeks to determine the origins of UK historians' authoritative commentary and analyses on interwar Germany. UK historians' activities in various circles gave them the gravitas to work across different fields of knowledge, and to broaden notions about what their role in society really was. Working within these fields enhanced their authoritativeness as public intellectuals. UK interwar historians formed a collection of individuals, but their collective influence was given expression by public involvement in political parties, international movements, foreign-policy formation, the press and associations. Chapter 3 looks at how UK historians' capacity to depict themselves as authoritative analysts of Germany was aided by the socio-cultural context of interwar UK. The literature review shows how historians analysed the interwar period. It is situated as an examination of historians' roles in the public space, and places the period's various aspects in the context of what has been written about this subject. UK historians were strongly influenced by ideas about class, ethnicity and gender. As public intellectuals, these were formative parts of their identity, and how historians analysed Germany and German identity.

UK interwar historians investigated matters of high importance to Germans. Within Britain, they examined contested interpretations of Germannness, as outlined in Chapter 4. These included interpretations that revolved around how Britons could comprehend Germany. Historians invoked ideas about Anglo-Saxon identity,

militarism, and intellectualism as reference points through which to understand Germans. UK historians raised the significance of these aspects to create a context about Germans' collective sense of injustice, grievance and failure following World War I. Historians sought to bring awareness of these to Britons, and to elicit empathy for Germans' vulnerability and humiliation. Chapter 5 investigates UK historians' views about Germany's chances of achieving a viable democratic system, which had been complicated by the 1919 Versailles Treaty and its associated War Guilt Clause. Chapter 6 profiles how UK historians saw interwar Germany's ability to project its power beyond its borders as indicative of Germans' sense of renewed dynamism after World War I.

Historians were sensitive to Germans' sense of insecurity and were conscious of their German colleagues' aspirations for national achievement. These events set the context for the way historians scrutinised the Nazi Party, and are examined in Chapter 7. Historians contextualised the party's development through two parallel tracks, with one approach analysing the Nazi Party as just another German government that could be influenced, while the other examined the party and movement to represent a force that required balancing and opposition. The thesis differs from other studies in that I argue that UK interwar historians' acted as an uniquely influential collection of individuals, whose knowledge of Germany raised their profile as public intellectuals who could.

For UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany, the social rank they enjoyed afforded them an appreciation of the merits in which holding Germany high as an important subject of discussion be continued. The thesis uses elements of a prosopographical approach that presents biographical data of individuals who meet the thesis' definition of UK historians and public intellectuals. This is in order to outline their backgrounds, motives and to discern the degree of commonalities that existed among them.[5] Prosopography has been defined as 'collective life histories', 'collective biography', and *quantitative Personenforschung*.[6] Moreover,

[5] Anna Beerens, *Friends, Acquaintances, Pupils and Patrons: Japanese Intellectual Life in the Late Eighteenth Century: A Prosopographical Approach*, Amsterdam, Leiden University Press, 2006, p. 18.
[6] *Ibid*.

prosopography has often been determined to be 'the description of persons with regard to their functions and their relations to other persons'.[7] Indeed, the historian Lawrence Stone articulated an interpretation of prosopography in a magisterial article.[8] He wrote,

> Prosopography is the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives. The method employed is to establish a universe to be studied, and then to ask a set of uniform questions…The various types of information about the individuals in the universe are then juxtaposed and combined, and are examined for significant variables.[9]

Advances in the methodology of prosopography continued to increase in the interwar period, and crystallised with the publication of Lewis B. Namier's *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (1928).[10] One of the impetuses for the interest in prosopography was historians' desire to know 'about who rather than what'.[11] While the focus of prosopography appears to highlight the significance of 'the group', the goal of retaining 'the individuality of every person within the chosen collective' is aimed for.[12] Despite this, however, prosopography is exercised in order to analyse collectives, because the whole of the collective should be looked at and not just the individual parts who comprise it.[13] As it was infeasible to analyse all of the UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany outside the scope of the thesis' parameters, there is a concentration on historians and public intellectuals whose involvement as part of an effective collective of individuals is apparent. The prosopographical methodology applied in the study is not strictly comparative, as the employment of 'identical categories' would be unviable, given the differing

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[7] Peter Becker, 'Making Individuals: Some Remarks on the Creation of a Prosopographical Catalogue with KLEIO', in Jean-Philippe Genet and Günther Lottes (eds), *L'État moderne et les élites, XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles, apports et limites de la méthod prosopographique*, Paris, 1995, p. 51, pp. 51-61.
[8] Lawrence Stone, 'Prosopography', *Daedalus* 110, 1971, pp. 46-79.
[9] *Ibid*.
[10] Lewis Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, 2nd edn, London, Macmillan, [1928] 1957.
[11] Stone, p. 53.
[12] Beerens, *Friends, Acquaintances, Pupils and Patrons: Japanese Intellectual Life in the Late Eighteenth Century: A Prosopographical Approach*, p. 19.
[13] *Ibid*., p. 36.

contributions from a wide range of historians and public intellectuals.[14] Individuals whose work and biographies gave evidence of their contributions are included. In terms of the development of the historical discipline, there were few limitations put on the inclusion of individuals, as there was growth in the extent to which history bordered on, and sometimes merged into the neighbouring research areas of international relations and political science. The research and writing of history was considered foundational to the analysis of international relations in this era.

Anna Beerens has acknowledged that gatherings of people that are identifiable by several or more characteristics 'often evoke a sense of organisation, structure and conscious belonging'.[15] However, the sense of group awareness or consciousness 'may not have been intended by the individuals associated with the group' and a sense of association may be absent.[16] Some of the differences between historians and social scientists include historians' use of prosopographies for biographical information, while social scientists practice 'social network analysis'.[17] Prosopography and social network analysis are similar in some respects but are different methodologies.[18] Beerens contended that the methodology of prosopography is context-dependent and is contingent upon the specific nature of the task. She wrote,

> The term 'method' is used here in a fairly loose sense: one might say that there is no single prosopographical method, but that prosopography is a varying combination of methods borrowed from several disciplines. The structure of prosopographical studies can vary endlessly.[19]

## Social and Cultural Capital: Bourdieu

UK historians' possession of social and cultural capital enabled a capacity to project authority into political space throughout the interwar period. Their ability to do this

[14] *Ibid*., p. 21.
[15] *Ibid*., p. 29.
[16] *Ibid*.
[17] *Ibid*., p. 31.
[18] *Ibid*., p. 30.
[19] *Ibid*., p. 38.

was aided by the measure of authoritativeness that their work held, and derived from a public perception that their opinions were reputable. The noted sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, identified social groups as being attached to an agglomeration of social fields where different power centres converge. Bourdieu contended that these aspects were 'capital'.[20] Gaining access to these fields required UK historians to possess intellectual, social and cultural 'assets', which determined their inclusion into fields where their opinions about Germany would matter.[21] Among Bourdieu's contributions towards understanding capital was his categorisation of the term into four generic divisions, involving symbolic, economic, social and cultural capital. This was thereafter broadened into the classes of capital that included political capital, educational capital, as well as other field-specific definitions.[22] As a collection of individuals, historians' use of these types of capital would add credence to their analyses and commentary about interwar Germany.

UK historians' possession of various aspects of capital allowed them to augment their authority in the interwar era.[23] Social capital, and its close counterpart cultural capital, both largely derive from Bourdieu's works.[24] James Coleman and Robert D. Putnam have deepened the discussion provided by Bourdieu's research into social and cultural capital, by investigating whether the phenomenon finds

[20] Rajani Naidoo, 'Fields and Institutional Strategy: Bourdieu on the Relationship between Higher Education, Inequality and Society', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol. 25, No. 4, September 2004, p. 458.
[21] *Ibid*.
[22] Mike Savage, Alan Warde and Fiona Devine, 'Capitals, Assets, and Resources: Some Critical Issues', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2005, p. 40. See also: James Farr, 'Social Capital: A Conceptual History', *Political Theory*, Vol. 32, No. 1, February 2004, p. 25. Farr pointed out that nineteenth-century political scientists, such as Marx, Marshall and Bellamy, emphasised the 'social' of social capital, rather than twenty-first-century focuses on the 'capital' aspect of the term.
[23] The most notable of his books in this field are: Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, Peter Collier (trans.), Stanford, Stanford University Press, [1984] 1988; Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Richard Nice (trans.), London, Routledge, [1979] 1984; Pierre Bourdieu et al, *Academic Discourse: Linguistic Misunderstanding and Professorial Power*, Richard Teese (trans.), Cambridge, Polity Press, [1965] 1994; Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital', in J. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research in the Sociology of Education*, New York, 1985; and, Pierre Bourdieu, *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, J. D. Wacqaunt (trans.), Cambridge, Polity Press, [1989] 1996.
[24] Ben Fine, 'Social Capital versus Social History', *Social History*, Vol. 33, No. 4, November 2008, p. 451; Derek Robbins, 'The Origins, Early Development and Status of Bourdieu's Concept of Cultural Capital', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2005, p. 15: Robbins contends that Bourdieu came from an intellectual culture which evolved differently to the German legacy of *Kulturgeschichte* or *Geisteswissenschaft*.

greater expression in individuals or groups.[25] The UK historians gave expression to social and cultural capital as a collection of individuals who had interests in interwar Germany.

UK historians acquired social and cultural capital by their closeness to education and institutions of learning, such as public schools and universities. Networks forged during study and work facilitated historians' later employment. Their involvement also facilitated their ability to collaborate and network with colleagues from other professions. The public's recognition of historians as credible commentators was facilitated by the latter's proximity to higher education and ability to access zones where they could be influential. Bourdieu interpreted social capital to be the 'aggregate of the actual or potential resources that are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition…which provide each of its members with the backing of collectively owned capital'.[26] The acquisition of social capital enabled historians' professional advancement through their proximity with intellectuals and their entry into institutions that awarded credentials, such as degrees deemed worthy by society.[27]

Historians knowingly used aspects of a particularly relevant type of capital, cultural capital, to advance their credibility.[28] Historians' connections to schools and universities, and the increasing prominence of education's value aided this perception. Cultural capital, wrote Susan Dumais, was 'a power source' which

[25] *Ibid*.
[26] Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital', in J. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research in the Sociology of Education*, New York, 1985, p. 249; For seeing the distinction between North American and European interpretations of social capital, see: Ellen Wall, Gabriele Ferrazzi and Frans Schryer, 'Getting the Goods on Social Capital', *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 63, No. 2, June 1998, p. 304: 'In mainstream American sociology, the current, widely accepted definition of social capital is the mutual relations, interactions, and networks that emerge among human groups, as well as the level of trust (seen as the outcome of obligations and norms which adhere to the social structure) found within a particular group or community. In contrast, European sociologists tend to use the same term when examining how the mobilisation of connections associated with social networks reinforces the social hierarchy and differential power'
[27] Alejandro Portes, 'Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology', *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24, 1998, p. 4.
[28] Susan A. Dumais, 'Cultural Capital, Gender, and School Success: The Role of Habitus', *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 75, 2002, p. 46.

facilitated status, a feature it shared with symbolic, economic and social capital.[29] Historians would draw upon these currents of legitimacy, both real and perceived, in order to amplify the scope of their authority. Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital has particular resonance in the education system of interwar Britain, where it intersected with the class system.[30] This intersection helps to understand the broader social authority of public intellectuals whose success originated from time spent at educative locales, such as school or university.

UK interwar historians were endowed with cultural capital, and had the opportunity to be acknowledged publicly by virtue of their acquired expertise.[31] This is especially so if their knowledge of a field was vast and was regarded by the community as having social and cultural importance.[32] Dumais recounted how Bourdieu differentiated cultural capital along several criteria, with institutional cultural capital, involving 'educational credentials and the credentialing system' that can clearly be associated with UK interwar intellectuals.[33] UK interwar intellectuals' educational attainment transformed a generic cultural capital into its institutionalised variant with an educational and class-based dimension.[34] Embodied cultural capital, a form of cultural capital distinct from its institutionalised variant, enabled historians to exploit their 'dominance' in information about Germany by gaining direct access to 'prestigious groups' as well as by facilitating their involvement in 'exclusively bounded networks'.[35] This aided the development of 'social connections' with likeminded people who held comparable views.[36] Bourdieu's investigations of social capital's relatedness to cultural capital emphasised the importance of social connections, and these would have had particular relevance for UK interwar historians.[37] He explored the method by which intellectuals' capital incorporated

[29] *Ibid*.
[30] Rob Moore, 'Cultural Capital: Objective Probability and the Cultural Arbitrary', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol. 25, No. 4, September 2004, p. 445.
[31] *Ibid*.
[32] *Ibid*.
[33] *Ibid*.
[34] Dumais, 'Cultural Capital, Gender, and School Success: The Role of Habitus', p. 46.
[35] Omar Lizardo, 'How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 71, October, 2006, p. 780.
[36] Wendy Bottero, 'Relationality and Social Interaction', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2009, p. 407.
[37] *Ibid*.

'strategies of reproduction', based on the underpinning 'field of power'.[38] As van der Werfhorst contended:

> [i]n Bourdieu's work on cultural reproduction, cultural capital functions to reproduce social advantage…Once direct forms of transmission of (economic) capital became less easy, elites had to find other ways to transmit their advantage, which is achieved by means of cultural resources reproduced through the education system…the increasing relevance of education was not only driven by normative pressures against direct transmissions of advantage, but also by increasing demand for the kinds of skills closely related to cultural resources, such as social and language skills.[39]

UK historians were particularly adept at attaining and deploying institutionalised cultural capital.[40] UK interwar historians' networks emanated from their association with schools, colleges, universities and work, which maximised their connectivity with social and cultural capital. Historians were able to improve their standing by involving themselves in firm social circles that accentuate their visibility, obligation and fellowship, increasing their cultural capital in the process. Furthermore, this entry into 'prestigious groups' increases a participant's rewards in the system.[41] Sullivan theorised Bourdieu's idea of cultural capital to be intertwined with the norms and values of a society's elite, and particularly intellectuals' capacity to discern and employ the language of the 'educated'.[42] Cultural capital is constructed via embodied, internalised social structures, shown in the concept of habitus.[43]

UK historians in interwar Britain possessed a variety of forms of capital, drawing attention to the convertibility of one type of capital into another.[44] Bourdieu developed this idea in his work, *Distinction* (1984), in which he wrote that

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[38] *Ibid*.
[39] Herman G. van der Werfhorst, 'Cultural Capital: Strengths, Weaknesses and Two Advancements', *British Journal of Sociology of Education,* Vol. 31, No. 2, March 2010, p. 160.
[40] Portes, 'Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology', p. 4.
[41] Lizardo, 'How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks', p. 780.
[42] Alice Sullivan, 'Cultural Capital and Educational Attainment', *Sociology*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2001, p. 893.
[43] Mary Kosut, 'Professional Capital: Blue-Collar Reflections on Class, Culture and the Academy', *Cultural Studies-Critical Methodologies,* Vol. 6, No. 2, 2006, pp. 247-248.
[44] Kosut, 'Professional Capital: Blue-Collar Reflections on Class, Culture and the Academy', pp. 247-249; See also: Lizardo, 'How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks', p. 780.

someone's social standing was related to four entwined classes of capital, namely, cultural, social, economic and symbolic.[45] Bourdieu's insights revealed how he situated social capital within the framework of rituals and institutions, including, among other things, work, education, status and institutional networks. He noted that, while these associations are interconnected and served as a vehicle for the propagation of selected aspects of cultural and economic capital, they are often not noticeable by actors at the time.[46] UK historians, however, used Britons' interest in interwar Germany to defy this observation, though it remained accurate in how they primarily acquired social and cultural capital in the first place.

Bourdieu's research on capital focused on the nexus that existed between cultural capital and the educational system and which attracted historians who were 'academically talented'.[47] Accordingly, a symmetry existed between advanced education and social class, with historians who possessed cultural capital often pre-exposed to it as a consequence of their social background and influence.[48] Bourdieu's work on Parisian institutions of higher education, *Homo Academicus* (1984), and his opus on elite schools, *The State Nobility* (1989), laid out the flexible nature of defining some types of capital. In his books, he laid out a distinction between intellectual capital and academic capital, though this acknowledged that historians' success in various roles required them to master the conventions of their institutions'.[49] Moreover, the transferability of different types of capital that historians enjoyed gave an insight into how education was deemed valuable. Historians' cultural capital was transmitted by the means of the transformative power

[45] *Ibid*.
[46] Bottero, 'Relationality and Social Interaction', p. 407.
[47] Naidoo, 'Fields and Institutional Strategy: Bourdieu on the Relationship between Higher Education, Inequality and Society', p. 459.
[48] *Ibid*.
[49] Naidoo, 'Fields and Institutional Strategy: Bourdieu on the Relationship between Higher Education, Inequality and Society', p. 458: See also: Derek Robbins, 'The Transcultural Transferability of Bourdieu's Sociology of Education', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol. 25, No. 4, September 2004, pp. 418-419; Robbins asserts that: '*Homo Academicus* was not to be read in other cultures as a representation of the competing staff interests and institutional ideologies in Parisian institutions of higher education', but rather as an example for sociologists to follow while standing from 'the inside'.

of education. The cultural signifiers of those historians who internalised cultural capital existed in their mien, language and self-confident projection.[50]

It is undoubtedly the case that the attainment and use of social and cultural capital provided a form of influence to historians. UK interwar historians' personal and career success depended on the role and gradual expansion of universities, as well as a rising level of education to cater to an interwar mass society's demands of a reading public.[51] The British tradition of universities was often held to accentuate universities' role in developing 'character' rather than focusing on 'scholastic credentials'.[52] In this context, historians' academic capital refers to cultural capital that has been institutionalised via the transmission of a university education.[53] In *Homo Academicus*, academic capital was associated with the machinery of the university establishment, while intellectual capital was connected to scholarly achievement and reflection.[54] In *The State Nobility*, however, academic capital takes on an institutional dimension of cultural capital and was founded on such factors as 'prior educational achievement' and a propensity to exhibit academic attributes in verbal and written communication.[55] In *The State Nobility*, Bourdieu outlined the significance of accruing accredited, educative credentials for the acquisition of cultural capital.[56] In this respect in the UK, the weight that social capital had acquired as a desirable commodity for social networking, when viewed in the context

[50] Moore, 'Cultural Capital: Objective Probability and the Cultural Arbitrary', p. 451; See also: Karen Aschaffenburg and Ineke Maas, 'Cultural and Educational Careers: The Dynamics of Social Reproduction', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 62, No. 4, August 1997, p. 573. They suggest that 'social inequalities' are seen in the dissimilarities of cultural capital observed in peoples' 'educational credentials', which directs people into occupation opportunities available to their parents.
[51] Naidoo, 'Fields and Institutional Strategy: Bourdieu on the Relationship between Higher Education, Inequality and Society', p. 458.
[52] Simon Gunn, 'Translating Bourdieu: Cultural Capital and the English Middle Class in Historical Perspective', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2005, p. 58; See also: Sheilagh Ogilvie, 'Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital: Evidence from German Proto-Industry', *Economic History Review*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2004, p. 330; Ogilivie suggests that Social networks often deliver 'a social capital of shared norms, common information, mutual sanctions, and collective political action'.
[53] Naidoo, 'Fields and Institutional Strategy: Bourdieu on the Relationship between Higher Education, Inequality and Society', p. 458.
[54] *Ibid*.
[55] *Ibid*.
[56] Gunn, 'Translating Bourdieu: Cultural Capital and the English Middle Class in Historical Perspective', p. 58.

of historians' attendance at a school or university, transcended the importance of the institution's credentials.[57]

The promulgation of civic values by UK historians allowed them to contribute to political debates, entangling them in the public space. These phenomena were part of the larger framework of the UK's political culture, a feature which indicated how the state's constituent nations dealt with debate. It is evident that cultural and social capital was revealed by UK historians to engage in topics of significance within a multinational and multiethnic UK, and to ensure that a political environment rich in capital was also 'open, pluralistic, deliberative, tolerant and democratic'.[58]

UK interwar historians moved across contexts through their employment in both academia and government, enabling their access to various positions that were both traditional and innovative. Historians formed a group to the extent that they can be collectively characterised by a proximity to multiple fields of knowledge. While a group's traits, argued Michael Grenfell, often determine their educational success, the same was true for a collection of individuals.[59] Individuals' social capital translated into how influence was used at all levels of the education system. This was where teachers' influence, 'collegiality', 'bonding' and 'mutual trust' formed social capital that endured beyond the duration of their studies.[60] The social mores and norms were reflected in society's education system.[61] High educational achievement provided historians a pathway to the public space. UK historians' education from schools and universities provided them with formative skills that benefited them in the interwar era. It is not surprising that historians of Germany would command

[57] *Ibid*.
[58] Robert I. Rotberg, 'Social Capital and Political Culture in Africa, America, Australasia, and Europe', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1999, pp. 339-340; See also: Leonard N. Rosenband, 'Social Capital in the Early Industrial Revolution', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1999, p. 437; Lucian W. Pye, 'Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining Asia', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 29, No. 4, Spring 1999, p. 764; Susan Keen, 'Associations in Australian History: Their Contribution to Social Capital', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 29, No. 4, Spring 1999, p. 640.
[59] Grenfell, 'Applying Bourdieu's Field Theory: The Case of Social Capital and Education', p. 26.
[60] Michael Grenfell, 'Applying Bourdieu's Field Theory: The Case of Social Capital and Education', *Education, Knowledge and Economy*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2009, p. 26.
[61] *Ibid*.

respect when commenting on Germany, given Bourdieu regarded disciplines as having their own distinct intellectual capital that were each woven together within 'fields of power'.[62]

For the historians, who form the basis of this thesis, a fluid interdependence that drew on diverse social and political networks would prove central. The political culture of the interwar UK ensured that historians would not have to temporise in the face of government fiat and could undertake research that amplified their projection of political influence. The interrelationship between students and teachers in universities was vital in serving as a seedbed for the socialising process in the interwar era.[63] Coleman, in 1990, sought to explain how intellectuals benefited from trust that was embodied in relationships formed by social capital.[64] He argued that a precondition for maximising the efficiency and knowledge of human capital was that social capital provide an organic basis for social networks to flourish.[65] Historians' networks embodied social capital, and highlight the role that networks play in accentuating the civic virtues that underpin stable democracies.[66] Historians demonstrated that a polity could draw on social networks that operate outside a government's aegis, as well as highlight the significance of democracy's social resources.[67]

Crucially, UK historians worked across multiple contexts in the public space. UK historians sought to raise awareness of interwar Germany, and in the process excite public interest about the complexity of Germany's circumstances. The case of interwar Germany emphasises the centrality of the public space and its connectivity with the interests of UK historians. Historians' involvement increased the public

[62] Michael Burawoy, 'Public Sociologies; Contradictions, Dilemmas, and Possibilities', *Social Forces*, Vol. 82, No. 4, 2004, p. 1617.
[63] Tomas Englund, 'The General School System as a Universal or a Particular Institution and its Role in the Formation of Social Capital', *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2009, p. 30.
[64] *Ibid*.
[65] *Ibid*.
[66] Kenneth Newton, 'Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society and Political and Economic Performance', *Political Studies*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2006, p. 848.
[67] *Ibid*.

visibility of intellectuals in the public space. UK historians operated within the tradition of not maintaining connections with, and being subsidised by, the state. While there are many formulations of 'the public space' depending on the era, place and society, most emphasise it in contradistinction with the private space and argue that it emanates from the particular power arrangement in a society.[68]

UK historians' involvement in the public space transcended their influence as a part of civil society. Paul Ginsborg supported theorist Jürgen Habermas' interpretation of the public space as representing, 'first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed […] A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body'.[69] The public space, Ginsburg explained, is separate from civil society, even though they are associated and serve as a locale for citizens to engage in dialogue.[70] The distinction is emphasised when it is recalled that civil society is founded on activities and networks, while the public space operates as a vehicle for disseminating public opinion.[71] The concept is extrapolated further on the predication that 'liberal' societies' self-identify by declaring a private dimension to their activities. Indeed, Alan McKee acknowledges that the public space is connected with civil society and is not attached to government.[72]

A developing public space was crucial in determining the expression of interwar UK historians, though historians' public voice was not new. As UK interwar historians were public intellectuals who sought to propagate civic virtues within the public space, their actions were helped by pre-existing connections with social capital.[73] Historians formed collectives that were composed of individuals, which

[68] Neil Smith and Setha Low, 'Introduction: The Imperative of Public Space', in Setha Low and Neil Smith (eds), *The Politics of Public Space*, New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 4; See also: Alan McKee, *The Public Sphere: An Introduction*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 10.
[69] Cf. Paul Ginsborg, *The Politics of Everyday Life: Making Choices, Changing Lives*, Carlton, Melbourne University Press, 2005, p. 135.
[70] *Ibid*., pp. 135-136.
[71] *Ibid*.
[72] McKee, *The Public Sphere: An Introduction*, p. 9.
[73] Marcus Freitag, 'Bowling the State Back In: Political Institutions and the Creation of Social Capital', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2006, pp. 126-127.

nurtured political tolerance and political orientation.[74] The performance of these '…little democracies', influenced the 'political context' of the broader society.[75] Their success extended to the political and social institutions, including parliament and the rule of law, which constituted the foundations of the political order.[76] Jeffrey Cormier and Phillip Coutin, suggested that the promotion of democracy is a theme that is redolent throughout the literature on the public space, and pointed out that the growth of new types of civic associations in the nineteenth-century aided the transmission of democracy and imbued its ethics across the public space in many countries.[77]

## Using Bourdieu as a Framework

The thesis' use of Bourdieu incorporates his scholarship within the parameters of the work of UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany. As such, while the empirical and theoretical aspects of the thesis tend to be combined, it nonetheless seeks to emphasise the applicability of Bourdieu's work in a narrow, specific and historical context. Bourdieu's work was vital for accentuating the merits of UK historians and public intellectuals, and in explicating how the notions of social and cultural capital were related to their career development both within and outside of the UK's education system. When Roger Brubaker reviewed Bourdieu's book, *Choses dites* (1987), itself composed of Bourdieu's intellectual's discussions, lectures and interviews, he commented that Bourdieu's work has a uniqueness when it is positioned around subjects that are situationally and contextually applicable.[78] Brubaker wrote,

> [s]ince Bourdieu's texts are products – and instruments – of particular intellectual strategies and struggles, their emphases vary considerably from text to text, depending on the particular intellectual field in which a text is situated and the structure of that

[74] Cigler, Alan and Mark R. Joslyn. 'The Extensiveness of Group Membership and Social Capital: The Impact on Political Tolerance and Attitudes'. *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2002, p. 9.
[75] *Ibid*.
[76] *Ibid*.
[77] Cormier, Jeffrey and Phillipe Couton. 'Civil Society, Mobilisation, and Communal Violence: Quebec and Ireland, 1890-1920'. *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2004, p. 488.
[78] Roger Brubaker, 'Review of Choses dites', *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 18, no. 5, 1989, p. 783.

field at the time the text was written.[79]

The historical and specific context of the influence shown by UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany is discernible from a careful employment of Bourdieu's ideas. Bourdieu's work covered the complexities involved with determining how someone's social standing influences the decisions they take throughout life.[80] He took political positions that were publicly contentious. He examined, sociology, history, education, philosophy and anthropology, among many others. Bourdieu founded his own journal, before gradually starting a publishing company.[81] Bourdieu came from France, a polity where 'the ideal of the detached and critical intellectual who intervenes actively in the political life of the nation is particularly strong'.[82] Bourdieu was an untypical intellectual, in that he was deemed by some to be not as energetic as his colleagues. There was a difference between Bourdieu's 'public political activism' in the later part of his working life, and between the scholarship that typified the early work of his career.[83]

The personal trajectories of UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany through the UK's class system was of vital importance to identifying their level of influence. However, historians' proximity to fellow intellectuals and scholarly institutions also assisted their choice in available pathways. Bourdieu's work is useful when setting his contributions inside the specific social meaning of the interwar period's parameters.[84] Education was a vital aspect to understanding Bourdieu's research, and it has been identified that greater scope for future research lies in the areas of 'personal narrative' and 'emotion'.[85] Bourdieu regarded the schooling system to be the primary vehicle for the reproduction of a functioning

[79] *Ibid*.
[80] Deborah Reed-Danahay, *Locating Bourdieu*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 2.
[81] *Ibid*.
[82] David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1997, p. 219.
[83] David L. Swartz, 'From Critical Sociology to Public Intellectual: Pierre Bourdieu and Politics', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 32, 2003, p. 792.
[84] Reed-Danahay, *Locating Bourdieu*, p. 152.
[85] *Ibid*.

hierarchy in sophisticated countries.[86] Although Bourdieu's concepts were associated with the latter half of the twentieth century, they have currency within the interwar era as he held education to be important in the travails of democracy.[87] Bourdieu studied philosophy as a requirement for higher learning, and it was noted that intellectuals were often tutored in philosophy as their first subject. Anthropology was not yet regularised as an authentic subject, and the teaching of philosophy dominated the curricula.[88] The combination of history, geography and anthropology attained greater significance for intellectuals' education.[89]

Bourdieu derived much of his concepts from sociological readings of peoples' interactions, and the extent to which public intellectuals' functions and obligations reinforced one another were evident with the choices made by interwar UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany. Bourdieu explained habitus as a way to discern his own career chronology. He determined that comprehending habitus depends upon knowing social backgrounds.[90] Bourdieu was chided by some within France because his political activism was perceived to be too intense. It was noted that he felt deeply about 'the role and the responsibilities of the intellectual'.[91] Bourdieu later wrote that, '[n]othing is more false… than the maxim almost universally accepted in the social sciences according to which the researcher must put nothing of himself into his research'.[92] He urged public intellectuals to understand themselves and their histories collectively, rather than as agents who acted independently. Indeed, Bourdieu held the individual to be a 'social agent'.[93]

Bourdieu's sociological interpretations of peoples' relationships have received criticism. However, these critiques of Bourdieu paradoxically strengthen the argument of this study that interwar UK historians and public intellectuals of

[86] Loïc Wacquant, 'Symbolic Power in the Rule of the "State Nobility"', Loïc Wacquant and James Ingram (trans.), in Loïc Wacquant (ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005, p. 134.
[87] *Ibid*.
[88] Reed-Danahay, *Locating Bourdieu*, p. 81.
[89] *Ibid*.
[90] *Ibid*., p. 151.
[91] *Ibid*., p. 153.
[92] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Participant Objectivation, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, p. 287.
[93] Reed-Danahay, *Locating Bourdieu*, p. 159.

Germany were an effective collection of individuals. Aspects that undermine the interchangeability of Bourdieu's research into other fields include the different circumstances that may prevail, and that lay outside the scope of Bourdieu's work. Another feature of criticism of using Bourdieu involves the exactitude of his conclusions, given that the nature of his work could be interpreted to encourage precision about various subjects. His work has been interpreted to be weak in historical perspective, but also to be applicable in different activities or fields. However, although the context provided by an analysis of the interwar UK is specific and historical, Bourdieu's work can be interpreted to transcend time and locality, given that much of his scholarship sought to comment on systems, and to recommend solutions in order to understand them. His work can be interpreted as relevant while lying within the bounds of historical chronology. In other words, the creation of Bourdieu's works and their reception could convey a sense of them being contingent upon theoretical speculation.[94]

Bourdieu observed that academia, like other professions, is conflictual in areas and that there were disagreements over what constituted symbolic capital.[95] Cultural capital has been defined by other social theorists as exceeding the 'symbolic knowledge' which Bourdieu suggested, and that it incorporated the totality of cultural items.[96] However, the thesis' focus is not on the development of sociological interpretations or on social and cultural capital per se, but in how it was employed and to what effect. It examines the process of historians' work as public intellectuals. Some critiques of Bourdieu charged that his theory was unable to explain transformations in the social sphere.[97] This viewpoint has received various levels of prominence, with some alleging that Bourdieu displayed 'quietism' in terms of political activism and that his work reinforced a superior culture.[98] Some have asserted that his work underrates the capability of the working class, and that his

[94] Derek Robbins, *Bourdieu and Culture*, London, Sage, 1999, p. 109.
[95] Reed-Danahay, *Locating Bourdieu*, p. 1.
[96] Arjo Klamer, 'Cultural Goods are Good for More than their Economic Value', in Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton (eds), *Culture and Public Action: A Cross Disciplinary Dialogue on Development Policy*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 151; Bourdieu suggested that in 1986.
[97] Robbins, *Bourdieu and Culture*, p. 113.
[98] *Ibid*.

research reflects 'determinism'.[99] UK historians and public intellectuals' enrolment at particular educative institutions reflected the centrality that class enjoyed with education in their careers. The education system in the UK was an aspect of the class system, and rose out of the networks of power to express a willingness for equitable reform, as opposed to the interests that stood for maintaining existing power arrangements.

Bourdieu suggested that there was a risk that intellectuals' views were at risk of becoming commodified, a situation which he which he named 'Le Fast Talker'.[100] Many regard Bourdieu's political involvement and his 'scientific' research to be interchangeable, but that his research has been misinterpreted by academic rigidity.[101] Furthermore, Bourdieu saw journalism become entwined with the functioning of politics.[102] A large part of Bourdieu's research before the twenty-first century found fault with what he perceived as the independence of French writers, in that the proximity of journalism with intellectualism was growing so great as to be counterproductive.[103] However, Vera Mark blamed Bourdieu for 'scholasticism', which embodied some of the dilemmas in contemporary anthropology to which he himself had warned.[104]

Bourdieu noted how enthusiasm was influenced by the capital that intellectuals enjoyed, in that it was derived from social networks in which they were located and from the high esteem in which their erudition was held. Bourdieu's 'highly visible political engagements' throughout the course of his working life was noted by his contemporaries.[105] He posited that a large number of public intellectuals are 'fortuitously thrust into the limelight', and that they attained 'by virtue of…accident sufficient name recognition to become sought-after commentators on

[99] *Ibid*.
[100] Richard A. Posner, *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003 [2001], p. 5.
[101] Franck Poupeau and Thierry Discepolo, 'Scholarship with Commitment: On the Political Engagements with Pierre Bourdieu', Loïc Wacquant and James Ingram (trans.), in Loïc Wacquant (ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005, p. 84.
[102] Eric Darras, 'Media Consecration of the Political Order', in Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005, p. 157,
[103] Reed-Danahay, *Locating Bourdieu*, p. 154.
[104] *Ibid*., p. 84.
[105] Swartz, 'From Critical Sociology to Public Intellectual: Pierre Bourdieu and Politics', p. 792.

current events'.[106] Moreover, Bourdieu's characterisations of 'an intellectual life' included intellectuals' display of maturity, ostensibly even without them being mature.[107] He reflected that those members of society who concerned themselves with abstract questions were more prone to enjoy this trait.[108] The vestiges of primordial ideas about honour are evident in looking at the origins in the development of the professions.[109] A sign of Bourdieu's influence is the interest he showed in intelligence that was not accrued as a result of schooling. This approach emphasised how students socialised themselves in relation to their institution and each other.[110] Bourdieu alluded how intellectuals' voices were widely heard and wrote, '[r]egarding the loss of disinterested researchers, I would say that scientists are always interested'.[111]

Bourdieu maintained that in order to know the 'character of stratification' in an area, it was the examination of intellectuals which was critical for discerning where the political and social dynamics of a country lay.[112] At the time of the interwar period, it was acknowledged that there was a necessity for academics to position their analyses within the ambits of generally agreed upon findings.[113] This limited the likelihood of redundant methods interfering in the development of new approaches in understanding society.[114] The consolidation of the public space provided an opportunity for UK historians in the interwar era to adopt positions that could reinvigorate a role for public intellectuals.[115] The 'political context of the social environment' affected the calculus of the participants who operated within it.[116] Critiques by 'academic intellectuals' such as historians within the public space

[106] Posner, *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline*, p. 5.
[107] Elisa Tamarkin, *Anglophilia: Deference, Devotion and Antebellum America*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 248.
[108] *Ibid*.
[109] Thomas Bender, *Intellect and Public Life: Essays on the Social History of Academic Intellectuals in the United States*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. xv.
[110] Tamarkin, *Anglophilia: Deference, Devotion and Antebellum America*, p. 259.
[111] Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Conditions for the Progress of Reason', *Social Science Information*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1975, p. 22.
[112] Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, p. 219.
[113] Charles F. Gattone, *The Social Scientist as Public Intellectual: Critical Reflections in a Changing World*, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, p. 44.
[114] *Ibid*.
[115] Harold Mah, 'Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2000, p. 157.
[116] Barbara A. Misztal, 'Public Intellectuals and Think Tanks: A Free Market in Ideas', *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2012, p. 138.

raised the quality of debate and deepened the social and intellectual basis of democracy in the UK.[117]

## Methodology

My research question is, 'what were UK historians' roles in analysing Germany, and how did they analyse that country in the interwar period?' To answer this, I explore historians' influence on the public debate regarding Germany, and analyse how this facilitated their work as public intellectuals. I argue that UK historians and public intellectuals acted as an effective collection of individuals, whose interest in interwar Germany created the context for their work across different areas of work and public life. The methodology that I adopt is based on a thematic approach and explores UK historians' engagement with Germany in the interwar period. Examining the extent of historians' fluid roles in this era requires identifying areas where intellectuals' commentary identified the course of events. The thesis' approach incorporates primary and secondary sources to identify recurrent themes in the analysis of interwar Germany.

This project focuses on a number of key historians. These were selected to include UK historians who trained in universities, worked in universities and engaged in research that led them to publish material on interwar Germany. They were variously employed by the government and contributed to government policy. The criteria used to select historians drew on the bases of historians' careerism, meaning institutional affiliation and publishing. The research involves the scrutiny of contemporary archival sources holding the personal papers, diaries, letters and manuscripts of historians. I have accessed primary source material from British archives and libraries, including the British Library, the British National Archives, the University of London's Senate House Library, London School of Economics' Archives, the German Historical Institute of London, Oxford University's Bodleian Library, Cambridge University Library's Manuscripts, Kings College (Cambridge) Archive Centre, the University of Manchester John Rylands Library's Special

[117] *Ibid*.

Collections, the University of Leeds' Brotherton Library and, Edinburgh University Library's Centre for Research Collections. Together, this encompasses the archival resources of 18 of the UK's most influential interwar historians of Germany.

The selected historians offer a comprehensive sample of those working in the field. There were 92 authors who published books on the subject of Germany and its relation to Europe in the interwar period. The thesis' parameters are exclusive to the works published between 1918 and 1940. Many of these same authors contributed to edited works that are also included in the percentage of books published. The 18 UK historians selected out of the 92 encompass 77 per cent of the number of works written by historians about Germany throughout the interwar period. Included in this proportion are historians' public lectures, newspaper pieces and journal articles. The selected historians had archival sources that were substantial and commensurate to their impact in the interwar period. A number of other historians had a smaller archival presence, or none at all, and have consequently not been included in the study.[118] 17 out of 18 UK interwar historians were affiliated with what would become Russell Group universities.

Historians and public intellectuals who had an archival presence up to series level, and who I was able to access include:

Charles Robert Ashbee
Ronald Edmund Balfour
Sir Charles Raymond Beazley
Sir Herbert Butterfield
Edward Hallett Carr
Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-Cecil
William Harbutt Dawson
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson
Arthur Elliott Felkin
Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher
Norman Henry Gibbs
George Peabody Gooch
Arthur James Grant
Richard Haldane
Sir James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley
Arthur Berriedale Keith
Richard Henry Tawney

Arnold Toynbee
George Macaulay Trevelyan
Arthur Keith
John Theodore Merz:
John Maynard Keynes
Edmund Dene Morel
Gilbert Murray:
Philip John Noel-Baker
Albert Frederick Pollard
Thomas Frederick Tout
Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart:
Charles Kingsley Webster
Henry Wickham Steed
Alfred Eckhard Zimmern

**Historians' Archival Presence**

Charles Robert Ashbee: 1 location
Ronald Edmund Balfour: 3 locations of related collections
Sir Charles Raymond Beazley: 5 locations of related collections
Sir Herbert Butterfield: 8 locations of related collections
Edward Hallett Carr: 4 locations of related collections
Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-Cecil: 11 locations of related collections
William Harbutt Dawson: 1 location
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson: 8 locations of related collections
Arthur Elliott Felkin: 1 location
Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher: 33 locations of related collections
Norman Henry Gibbs: 4 locations of related collections
George Peabody Gooch: 7 locations of related collections
Arthur James Grant: 5 locations of related collections
Richard Haldane: 11 locations of related collections
Sir James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley: 5 locations of related collections
Arthur Berriedale Keith: 2 locations of related collections
Richard Henry Tawney: 12 locations of related collections
Arnold Toynbee: 10 locations of related collections
George Macaulay Trevelyan: 25 locations of related collections
Arthur Keith: 11 locations of related collections
John Theodore Merz: 2 locations of related collections
John Maynard Keynes: 11 locations of related collections
Edmund Dene Morel: 9 locations of related collections
Gilbert Murray: 11 locations of related collections
Philip John Noel-Baker: 11 locations of related collections
Albert Frederick Pollard: 10 locations of related collections
Thomas Frederick Tout: 3 locations of related collections
Sir Robert Gilbert Vansittart: 11 locations of related collections
Charles Kingsley Webster: 11 locations of related collections
Henry Wickham Steed: 9 locations of related collections
Alfred Eckhard Zimmern: 10 locations of related collections

Historians and public intellectuals who had an archival presence up to series level, and who I was unable to fully access:

Earnest Barker: 16 locations of related collections
Geoffrey Barraclough: 4 locations of related collections
Raymond Beazley: 5 locations of related collections
John Buchan: 38 locations of related collections
Edward Hallett Carr: 4 locations of related collections
G. K. Chesterton: 12 locations of related collections
G. E. R. Gedye: 3 locations of related collections
William Foster: 3 locations of related collections
Frank Noel Keen: 3 locations of related collections
F. J. C. Hearnshaw: 1 location of related collections
F. S. Marvin: 2 locations of related collections
T. G. Masaryk: 2 locations of related collections
Judah Leon Maynes: 1 location of related collections
Edward Deane Morel: 14 locations of related collections
Lewis Bernstein Namier: 9 locations of related collections
Hugh Rathbone: 2 locations of related collections
Richard Henry Tawney: 16 locations of related collections
Alan John Percivale Taylor: 10 locations of related collections
Arnold Toynbee: 10 locations of related collections
George Macaulay Trevelyan: 25 locations of related collections
John Wheeler-Bennett: 3 locations of related collections

Not all of these archives contained materials pertaining to the interwar period or UK historians' work covering Germany. Each of these UK interwar historians, however, has an archival record that involves series cataloguing. These occasionally included materials relating to UK interwar historians and their work in the period.[119] Total of historians who had archives up to series level and who were not accessed: 21. UK interwar historians I did not include because of a lack of series or no archival presence: 28. The balance of remaining UK interwar historians have a low visibility in the project's tri-partite criteria for selecting historians, low or no archival presence and made minimal edited contributions. There were 21 historians, or 22.8%, however, whose archival presence extended to series level that was not accessed. Moreover, there were 28 historians, or 30.4%, who had limited or non-existent archival presence.

[119] This data was compiled with the assistance of the National Register of Archives of the National Archives (UK).

## UK HISTORIANS OF INTERWAR GERMANY

UK interwar historians were involved in persuading and advocating on topics that resonated beyond academia, and their efforts warrant a level of recognition beyond their individual careers. The extent to which UK historians and public intellectuals worked across different fields of expertise in the interwar era. For UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany who were both active and who wrote in the interwar period, the section argues that the significance of their public involvement can be demonstrated in four ways. UK historians' influence drew from activities that encompassed academia, politics, policy and the press. Historians' ability to operate across these contexts would prepare them to engage in public discussions about Germany. Their flexibility in moving between these areas increased the potential scope, effectiveness and resonance of their arguments. Moreover, historians' work reflected the high levels of social capital needed to cross these various spaces. Their activities found expression in academic networks, a rising number of non-governmental organisations and think tanks.

UK interwar historians' disagreements with the outcome of the Paris Peace Settlement saw their partial emergence as self-appointed judges of public opinion. The majority of senior academics throughout the interwar period were people who were held to be of 'public and political' importance.[120] As Bourdieu observed, intellectuals have competing goals to achieve. He noted that 'on the one hand, he [*sic*] must belong to an autonomous intellectual world; …on the other hand, he must invest the competence and authority he has acquired in the intellectual field in a political action'.[121] This political activity correlated closely with the interests of UK interwar historians, who were among the most dedicated and effective critics of the Paris Peace Settlement.[122] These men can be characterised as having sought 'to work

[120] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality of the League of Nations', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2011, p. 285.
[121] Cf Ellen Cushman, 'The Public Intellectual, Service Learning, and Activist Research', in Amitai Etzioni and Alyssa Bowditch (eds), *Public Intellectuals: An Endangered Species?,* Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, p. 102.
[122] *Ibid*.

collectively in defence of their specific interests and of having the means necessary for protecting their own autonomy'.[123]

Most eminent historians from the generation prior to the beginning of World War I were drawn to Whitehall to be employed in intelligence and propaganda work that would support British geo-strategy.[124] For instance, James Headlam-Morley, Arnold Toynbee and Lewis Namier advised military and naval intelligence officers the best ways to turn enemy periodicals, such as German newspapers, to British wartime propaganda use.[125] World War I further opened avenues for many UK historians to influence policy via their government employment into the interwar era.[126] During the war, the Propaganda Department at Wellington House involved prominent historians Lewis Namier, Toynbee, Headlam-Morley, R. Seton-Watson, Reginald and A. W. A. Leeper, while Alfred Zimmern was employed by the Ministry of Reconstruction.[127] Sir Frederick Maurice Powicke was born on 16 June 1879, and scrutinised Britain's medieval history. Powicke was schooled at Owens College, Victoria University of Manchester, where he was awarded his undergraduate degree, and at Balliol College, University of Oxford, where he received First Class Honours. Between 1908 and 1915, Powicke was a Fellow of Merton College, University of Oxford. Despite this accolade, in 1909 he received a post as Professor of Modern History at Queen's University, Belfast. He stayed at Belfast for a decade. Between 1919 and 1928, he held the post of Professor of Medieval History at the Victoria University of Manchester (which became the University of Manchester in 2004). In 1927, he was Ford's Lecturer in English History at Oxford. From 1928 Powicke became Regius Professor of Modern History at University the Oxford, and stayed in that position until 1947. From 1933 to 1937, he was President of the Royal Historical Society. Powicke died on 19 May 1963.

[123] *Ibid*.
[124] Michael Bentley, 'The Age of Prothero: British Historiography in the *Long Fin De Siecle*, 1870-1920', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Vol. 20, 2010, p. 192.
[125] Gary S. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992, p. 39.
[126] Erik Goldstein, 'The Round Table and the New Europe', *Round Table*, Vol. 346, No. 1, 1998, p. 3.
[127] *Ibid.*

Sir George Walter Prothero, KBE, similarly employed 'historical knowledge' for the British war effort, and cultivated the friendships he nurtured through an extensive correspondence with important personages in other countries.[128] This was particularly so with regard to his efforts in the United States of America.[129] Prothero's achievements made him a 'public figure' and he was charged by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office to direct its peace pamphlets operation. He succumbed to a flu pandemic in 1922, but had initially led the British delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference.[130] Prothero was born on 14 October 1848, in Wiltshire. He was schooled at Eton, King's College, University of Cambridge, and at the University of Bonn, Germany. He taught at Eton and at the universities of Nottingham and Leicester. From 1876, he taught history at King's College, University of Cambridge, where he attained a Fellowship. In 1894, he acquired the inaugural Professorship of Modern History at the University of Edinburgh. He edited the political journal *Quarterly Review*, as well as the *Cambridge Historical Series*. Between 1901 and 1905, Prothero presided over the Royal Historical Society.

Prothero taught at many universities, including Cambridge, Oxford and John Hopkins. After World War I, he occupied the post of Historical Advisor to the Foreign Office. He led the British delegation at the 1919 Paris Peace Settlement, and prepared briefing books on countries, territorial and economic questions on behalf of the Foreign Office. In 1920, Prothero was awarded Knight Commander of the British Empire, but died on 10 July 1922. Other historians who attended, like Harold Temperley, had a background in military intelligence, and used their qualifications to affect the formation and implementation of British policy.[131] Like his colleagues, Toynbee wrote books, essays, pamphlets, propaganda and undertook intelligence duties. On the war's end he, too, accompanied the 1919 British delegation to Paris.[132]

[128] Bentley, 'The Age of Prothero: British Historiography in the *Long Fin De Siecle*, 1870-1920', p. 192.
[129] *Ibid.*
[130] *Ibid.*
[131] John D. Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1992, p. 125-126.
[132] Gordon Martel, 'The Origins of World History: Arnold Toynbee before the First World War', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2004, p. 355.

The Foreign Office's March 1918 creation of the Political Intelligence Department (PID) saw these historians, including Zimmern, prepare for the post-war order, though the war's outcome was uncertain.[133] UK internationalist thinking was deeply affected by World War I, and this was revealed in the sentiments expressed in UK interwar historians' analyses.[134] UK historians sought to raise the concept of internationalism to a practical, implementable idea, rather than a moral afterthought.[135] The UK intellectuals who attended meetings at the Versailles Settlement were mostly liberal and young, and felt themselves able advocates for internationalism.[136] This impulse was often shared by other members of the French and American delegations, but all countries' delegations sought to advance their respective state interests.[137]

## Historians and Universities

UK historians' pre-World War I occupations created opportunities for them to be able to work across contexts, which allowed their influence to be widely disseminated. This was particularly so given the increased social reach of universities and political parties in the interwar UK. Universities not only accommodated these historians' employment but fostered their participation in other capacities as much of their work was undertaken outside the university.[138] Following World War I, universities demonstrated themselves to be durable and adaptable institutions that were central to UK historians.[139] In part, the public visibility of historians was facilitated by their association with universities' organisational frameworks, procedures and rules.[140] This was particularly the case in the UK, where historians'

[133] Goldstein, 'The Round Table and the New Europe', p. 3.
[134] Casper Sylvest, 'Beyond the State? Pluralism and Internationalism in Early Twentieth-Century Britain', *International Relations*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2007, p. 73.

[135] *Ibid.*

[136] Andrew Williams, 'Why don't the French do Think Tanks?: France Faces up to the Anglo-Saxon Superpowers, 1918-1921', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2008, p. 56.
[137] *Ibid.*
[138] Llewellyn Woodward, 'The Rise of the Professional Historian in England', in K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (eds), *Studies in International History*, London, Longmans, 1967, pp. 32-33.
[139] *Ibid.*
[140] Matti Klinge, 'Teachers', in Walter Ruegg (ed.), *A History of the University in Europe, Vol. 3, Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Centuries*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 156.

notions of affiliation with institutions facilitated intellectuals' public role, as Klinge contended,

> [t]he rise in the scientific level of the British universities at the turn of the century and the relative demise of the aristocratic elite after the First World War strengthened the role of the academic world. In Britain, the ideal of the free, non-university scientist and author continued longer than in other parts of Europe. In Britain and the colonies, the academic ideal was sustained more by former students of the well-known universities than by the universities and the teachers themselves.[141]

UK interwar historians had early doubts about many features of British politics and policy, particularly those arising from the Paris Peace Settlement.[142] Universities were one of a number of sources of specialist advice that the victorious allies turned to in the aftermath of World War I.[143] The United States' delegation, for example, enlisted the expertise of professional historians from its universities to act as advisors.[144] The interwar period saw universities remain important localities of influence.[145] Indeed, the interwar 'academic intellectualism' of Oxford and Cambridge was characterised by Klinge as a 'special form' of influence.[146]

Universities were important in spreading UK historians' messages, as expanding literacy restored these important locales for public discussion and debate to war-weary, cynical populations. Following World War I, many historians returned to academic as well as political paths, ensuring that their substantial historical knowledge was disseminated through their published works.[147] However, the dividing line between politics and academia was difficult to fathom in 'interwar

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[141] *Ibid.*
[142] Jonathan M. Nielson, *American Historians in War and Peace: Patriotism, Diplomacy and the Paris Peace Conference, 1918-1919*, Palo Alto, Academia Press, 2012, p. xviii.
[143] *Ibid.*
[144] *Ibid.*
[145] Klinge, 'Teachers', in Walter Ruegg (ed.), *A History of the University in Europe, Vol. 3, Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Centuries*, p. 151.
[146] *Ibid.*
[147] Goldstein, 'The Round Table and the New Europe', p. 4.

debates on international politics'.[148] Casper Sylvest's work, for example, has demonstrated the fluidity present in the newly created international fora that reflected this. The European peace movements in the interwar era contained networks of 'transnational activists' who shared a common purpose and political bearing.[149]

Many UK interwar historians believed in a new order. Though there were differences in approach, UK interwar historians were part of a grouping that was central to the formation of public opinion in the post-World War I period.[150] The experiences and relationships nurtured by historians in universities, colleges and institutes ensured that their ideas were reflected in their writings. Some, such as Sir Herbert Butterfield, had misgivings about the course of modern democracy and the weight it afforded to the force of public opinion.[151] Butterfield was born on 7 October, 1900, and was a philosopher of history as well as a political and diplomatic historian. Butterfield was schooled at the Trade and Grammar School in Keighley. In 1919, he entered Peterhouse College, University of Cambridge, as an historian, and was elected a Fellow in 1923. In 1924, he won the Prince Consort Prize for his analyses on European diplomatic history between 1806 and 1808. Butterfield won the Seeley Medal in this period. In 1926, he acquired a Master of Arts from Cambridge. He attained the positions of Regius Professor of Modern History and Vice-Chancellor at the University of Cambridge, and became Master of Peterhouse College. From 1938 until 1955, Butterfield edited the *Cambridge Historical Journal*. He became known primarily for his work, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (1931). Butterfield died in 1979.

Many historians sought to link universities with the achievement of a clear purpose and a central organising principle.[152] The intellectual Norman Angell's

[148] Casper Sylvest, 'Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004, p. 412.
[149] Ofer Ashkenazi, 'Reframing the Interwar Peace Movement: The Curious Case of Albert Einstein', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2011, p. 759.
[150] Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1976, pp. 138-140.
[151] Julia Stapleton, 'Modernism, the English Past, and Christianity: Herbert Butterfield and the Study of History', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2008, p. 555.
[152] Alan Chong, 'Lessons in International Communication: Carr, Angell and Lippmann on Human Nature, Public Opinion and Leadership', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2007, p. 631.

beliefs about 'public education' and leadership were similar to those of E. H. Carr, in that Carr suggested that 'learned folk' ensured that the doctrines of imperialism, nationalism and patriotism were diffused throughout society.[153] 'Elite opinion', remarked Robert Putnam, 'is most apt to run ahead of mass opinion in periods of rapid change and on topics that are new to the national agenda'.[154] Lionel Curtis is one example of this. An historian and a Beit Lecturer at Oxford University in 1912-1913, he suggested presciently that the most efficient way of promoting 'ideas' was to convince a country's elite of their validity.[155] From there, he believed that ideas would then trickle down to the 'respective constituencies'.[156] This principle was to 'educate the educators', a process that involved a vanguard of knowledgeable people to spread particular messages.[157]

Historians' experiences were reflected in their attempts to establish a connection between British interests and their own personal ambitions. UK interwar historians were public intellectuals who frequently advocated for a new order of democratic behaviour. Some historians endeavoured to enable an emerging global culture that would reflect and promote a reality of growing interdependence among countries. These activities, its proponents argued, would bring about a reality that was conducive to peace and harmony, and would have provided the basis for an international civil society.[158] Harold Temperley was representative of many historians in this regard.[159] He served as an intelligence officer on the Imperial General Staff during World War I and was part of the British delegation at the Versailles Conference.[160] In 1917, Temperley began to attend Prime Minister Lloyd George's Council of Intelligence, where he advised the Council on the implications

[153] *Ibid.*
[154] Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1976, pp. 138-140.
[155] Paul Williams, 'A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 1919-1939', *International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, p. 38.
[156] *Ibid.*
[157] *Ibid.*
[158] Stapleton, 'Modernism, the English Past, and Christianity: Herbert Butterfield and the Study of History', p. 555.
[159] Ian Hall, 'History, Christianity and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, p. 722.
[160] *Ibid.*

of policy decisions in light of his historical and analytical capacity.[161]

Temperley's expertise in diplomatic history of the nineteenth century was complemented by his earlier experiences. As an example of his wide interests, Temperley wrote a book that examined Foreign Secretary George Canning (1822-27), and was co-author of a successful work on nineteenth century and early twentieth-century European history.[162] He was reputed to be the leading diplomatic historian of the interwar era, and believed that the fluid interchange between academia and politics had no conflict of interest.[163] Temperley was born in Cambridge on 20 April 1879. He was a soldier and diplomat, as well as historian. He was the son of a mathematician who had had a Fellowship at Queen's College, University of Cambridge. Temperley was educated at a public school and then enrolled at King's College, University of Cambridge. Temperley was awarded a Bachelor's degree in 1901 and a Master of Arts degree in 1906.[164] He lectured at Leeds University, and came back to University of Cambridge where he received a Fellowship at Peterhouse College. Temperley's achievements were not as publicly acknowledged as those of his contemporaries.[165] It was written of Temperley, in an edited book several years after his passing, that '[i]t is well that he did not live to see September 1939, when those international hatreds which he hoped could be softened by the disinterested findings of scholars were again let loose in all their fury'.[166] Temperley died on 11 July 1939.

Benedict Sumner was born in 1893 in London. In August 1914, Sumner volunteered for the King's Royal Rifle Corps, and he fought in France until 1917. In July 1917, he joined the War Office Intelligence Department. In the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, he was part of the British delegation. Between 1920 and 1922, he worked with the International Labour Office. He was awarded a Fellowship at Balliol

[161] Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, p. 118.
[162] *Ibid.*
[163] *Ibid.*
[164] Margareta Faissler, 'Harold Temperley (1879-1939)', in Bernadotte E. Schmitt (ed.), *Some Historians of Modern Europe: Essays in Historiography*, Port Washington, Kennikat Press, [1942] 1966, p. 495.
[165] John D. Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1992, p. 126.
[166] Faissler, 'Harold Temperley (1879-1939)', p. 514.

College, University of Oxford. Between 1940 and 1945, he was Professor of History at the University of Edinburgh. Between 1944 until 1951, Sumner occupied the post of Warden of All Souls. Sumner died in 1951. Seton-Watson was born on 20 August 1879 in Perthshire. He devoted much of his work towards analyses about the ramifications of the Austrian-German (Dual Alliance) alliance of 1879. He attended New College at the same time as H. A. L. Fisher was history tutor. Seton-Watson was 'fortunate in not having to concern himself about earning his own living'.[167] Seton-Watson was witness to the phenomenon where 'the historian was merged in the publicist and politician'.[168] From 1938 until the end of World War II, Seton-Watson advocated to prevent Czechoslovakia from being partitioned by Germany. From 1945 until 1948, Seton-Watson was elected as President of the Royal Historical Society, and his two sons became academics in history at Oxford University.[169]

Following Germany's wartime capitulation, many UK interwar historians took advantage of new opportunities to hone their analytical frameworks.[170] This led historians' interests towards an emerging global culture that was connected to a growing interest in international history. Herbert Butterfield ventured that '…diplomatic history had a kind of heyday in England, and one of the important services of Temperley and [Charles] Webster, was the part they played in the training of future scholars' in this regard.[171] Charles Kingsley Webster was born on 25 April 1886. Webster was a diplomatic historian, soldier and diplomat. Webster attended Merchant Taylor's School in Crosby as well as King's College, University of Cambridge. Between 1914 and 1922, Webster had professorial roles in Modern History at the University of Liverpool. Between 1922 and 1932, he had a professorial chair in Modern History at the University of Wales, as well as a professorial role at Harvard University from 1928 to 1932. From 1932 to 1953, he was a professor at the London School of Economics. From 1950 to 1953, he was President of the British Academy. He attended the Versailles Peace Conference and assisted the British

[167] R. B. Betts, 'Robert William Seton-Watson, 1879-1951', *The Slavonic and Eastern European Review*, Vol. 30, No. 74, 1951, p. 252.
[168] *Ibid*., pp. 253-.254; Seton-Watson produced many during World War I works 'to inform public opinion and guide public action'. Some of these included *Roumania and the Great War* (1915), *The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic* (1915), and *German, Slav and Magyar* (1916)
[169] *Ibid*., p. 255.
[170] *Ibid.*, p. 125-126.
[171] *Ibid.* p. 177.

delegation, and acted as secretary to the Military Section of the delegation. From 1915 until 1917, Webster receive a commission into the Army Service Corps. Between 1917 and 1919, he was staffed to the General Staff Intelligence Section, and later in 1918, was seconded to the Foreign Office. He attended many international gatherings of historians and he promoted networking between them. Webster died 21 August 1961.

Europe after World War I experienced greater contributions from intellectuals in both government and from the emergence of non-government organisations than had previously been the case.[172] Temperley and his colleagues sought to take advantage of what they saw as a chance to refine the development of diplomatic history.[173] Temperley's influence extended to younger historians of diplomatic history, hoping that his protégés' success would secure the future of this research. Indeed, the interwar era saw Temperley and his colleagues consolidate diplomatic history into a leading field of historical analysis.[174]

Most UK historians involved with developing modern history and international relations saw no contradiction between its study and its wider social and political applicability.[175] UK interwar historians sought to take advantage of the opportunities that universities presented. Following the Peace Settlement, Foreign Office employees such as Alfred Zimmern, Carr and Philip Noel-Baker determined to pursue careers in modern history, a decision that led them to become professors in the emerging discipline of international relations. The term 'modern history' here refers to its use in the context of the interwar period.[176] Historians became focused on modern history and international relations because of these subjects' established place in politics and World War I. These developments were the fruit of Temperley,

[172] *Ibid.*, p. 125-126; The French had their *Comité d' études* under Ernest Lavisse, and the Americans had their Inquiry, which was formed by Colonel Edward House. The participants of these national delegations similarly formed collections of individuals.
[173] *Ibid.*
[174] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[175] Sylvest, 'Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations', p. 413.
[176] Williams, 'A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 1919-1939', p. 57.

Butterfield and their associates, having developed the study of diplomatic history and having informed the parameters of what was to become international history.[177] The 'scientific' aspects of this field of history were held to constitute the discipline of international relations.[178] Importantly, its 'advocates' promoted knowledge about international affairs, and of Germany's place in it.[179]

UK historians' experiences helps to reveal the variety of roles that UK historians adopted throughout their careers. They worked as public intellectuals who used varying degrees of prior experiences in peace and labour movements. Historians such as Temperley and his colleagues, including Edmund Dene Morel, an historian and founder of the Union for Democratic Control (UDC), advocated for the release of government documents relating to the war.[180] E. D. Morel was born in Paris on 10 July 1873. Morel was an historian, politician, journalist, and pacifist. Morel's father was a French bureaucrat and his mother was English. He was educated at Madras Hose School at Eastbourne and then at Bedford Modern School. Morel favoured many aspects about Germany, and advocated for a neutral British response if World War I eventuated. On war's emergence, Morel conceded that Britain's entry into the war was a foregone conclusion, and established Union of Democratic Control (UDC) with colleagues, Ramsay MacDonald, Charles Trevelyan, and Norman Angell. This group tasked itself with getting greater public scrutiny to bear on the conduct of foreign affairs. Morel castigated the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles and intoned that Germany would seek revenge when the country was stronger. Morel occupied the secretaryship until he died, on 12 November 1924.

One UDC member, Sir Daniel Stephenson established the Stevenson Chair of International History at the London School of Economics to campaign against Germany's war guilt.[181] Temperley wanted to influence government policy and have an impact on international events. Like his colleagues who were acknowledged

[177] Michael Riemens, 'International Academic Cooperation on International Relations in the Interwar Period: The International Studies Conference', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2011, p. 923.
[178] *Ibid.*
[179] Sylvest, 'Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations', p. 413.
[180] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Troublemakers: Dissent over Foreign Policy Makers, 1792-1939*, Middlesex, Penguin, [1957] 1985, p. 178.
[181] *Ibid.*

experts in their respective fields, he was an expert on the Balkans, and felt an affinity for the Slavs, having also served as a boundary commissioner for Albania. He had carried out roles of both political intelligence and military intelligence, conducting activities in the Balkan Peninsula as well as advising his country's delegation in Geneva.[182] Temperley's career reflected the various roles that UK historians occupied.

The focus on Germany informed much of the scholarship of these interwar historians, and provided a rallying point of agreement among them regarding the German problem.[183] The pressures from the economic upheavals of the late 1920s fell hard on universities and the academics who worked there. UK historians were aware of the hardships experienced by university staff, especially their German counterparts, which had energised Germans' activism and helped to intensify 'extreme' opinions in the expression of 'nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies'.[184] For example, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson was an historian, pacifist and Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. He castigated the CICI's (International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation or *Commission Internationale de la Coopération Intellectuelle*) 'scandalous' failure to mention Germany during a funding drive for struggling universities.[185]

Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson was born on 6 August 1862 in London, in a Christian Socialist family. Dickinson was educated in Chertsy, where he boarded, and in Godalming at Charterhouse School. He attended King's College, University of Cambridge, from where he attained a Fellowship in 1887. He had membership of the Cambridge Apostles, a name for the Cambridge Conversazione Society. Dickinson visited Germany and tried the study of medicine as well as literature. He lectured at Norwich, Leister and Newcastle under the aegis of the University Extension Scheme.

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[182] Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, p. 146.
[183] Daniel Laqua, 'Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Problem of Order', *Journal of Global History*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2011, p. 235.
[184] Notker Hammerstein 'Universities and War in the Twentieth-Century', in Walter Ruegg (ed.), *A History of the University in Europe*, Vol. 3, *Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Centuries*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 644-645.
[185] Laqua, 'Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Problem of Order', p. 235.

From 1886 until he retired in 1920, Dickinson taught political science. He taught at the London School of Economics for 15 years. With colleagues such as Lord Bryce, and others, he directed many of the ideas behind the League of Nations and was a visible participant in the founding of the League of Nations Union. He promoted his ideas with a large number of books and pamphlets. Dickinson believed that secret diplomacy had brought about the war. Dickinson's career represented an 'an academic life lived before the ossification of disciplinary boundaries', and his 'life has been described as a classicist, historian and political scientist.'[186] 'Everyone around me, all my best friends even, seem to have settled down to live as before, pleasantly, cynically, or whatever may be their attitude. I, almost alone, rise and go to bed with the constant obsession, is there to be a continuance of the old, to the new war, or a radical transformation'.[187] He died on 3 August 1932.

Dickerson's colleague, Gilbert Murray, supported his stance in *The Times*.[188] Gilbert Murray was born in 1866 and was an Australian-born British scholar, classicist and political activist. He attended the University of Oxford and graduated at the top of his class in 1887. He was an internationalist and supported the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League of Nations Union was formed after World War I, and Murray was one of the founding members. From 1923 to 1938, he was chairman of the League. He taught at the University of Oxford. He was Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford. In 1942, he became one of the founding members of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, or Oxfam, as well as one of its trustees. Murray died on 20 May 1957, in Oxford. Toynbee favoured an internationalist program to deal with various problems between the victorious powers and Germany, particularly from a 'universal cultural perspective'.[189] The new international order

[186] Jeanne Morefield, 'Never Satisfied Idealism of Dickinson', in Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (eds), *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 209.
[187] Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, *The Autobiography of G. Lowes Dickinson and other Unpublished Writings*, Dennis Proctor (ed.), London, Duckworth, 1973, p. 98.
[188] *Ibid*.
[189] Christian Hasse, 'In Search of a European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-55', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2007, p. 374.

was promoted by its advocates as an unprecedented, moral awakening that claimed to have made redundant the so-called 'old diplomacy'.[190]

## Historians, Political Parties and International Movements

There were close linkages between British political parties and intellectuals in the interwar years, and this forms the second means to characterise interwar UK historians.[191] UK historians' awareness of the relationship that existed between policy and politics assisted them in reaching audiences and readerships. Despite changes, few were able to attain secure employment as historians, and flexibility allowed the intellectuals the means to influence political debate.[192] Some historians, such as Philip John Noel-Baker and Zimmern, occupied academic posts that correlated with their involvement in political parties.[193] Noel-Baker was an historian, politician, pacifist and Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson. He was born on 8 November 1889 in London. Noel-Baker's father had been involved in pacifism, and had sought to repair the suspicion that had grown over the Anglo-German naval race. Noel-Baker attended the Quaker school at Ackworth, as well as the Bootham School in York. From 1908 to 1912, he went to Kings College, University of Cambridge, where he participated in undergraduate societies opposed to mobilisation and war.[194] Following four years at Cambridge, Noel-Baker's father sent him to Munich University, where he learned German and became acquainted with Germans. He studied international law there and had corresponded with fellow pacifist Norman Angell.[195]

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[190] Stapleton, 'Modernism, the English Past, and Christianity: Herbert Butterfield and the Study of History', p. 555.
[191] Sylvest, 'Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations', p. 413.
[192] Michael Bentley, *Modernising England's Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870-1970*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 39.
[193] *Ibid.*
[194] The Conclusion of a tape made by the Right Honourable Noel-Baker with Mr Liddle in London in 1974, in the last minutes of the tape he was asking him about the League of Nations and the Thirties, Leeds University Library: Special Collections, *Liddle Collection*, CO 067 Philip Noel-Baker Tape 2012, p. 1.
[195] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

In 1914, Noel-Baker attained the post of vice-principal of Ruskin College, University of Oxford, and in 1915 received a Fellowship at King's College, University of Cambridge. Following World War I, Noel-Baker aided Lord Robert Cecil in establishing the League of Nations. From 1924 until 1929, he was the first Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of International Relations at the University of London, and then taught at Yale University from 1933 until 1934. In 1929, Noel-Baker won the seat of Coventry for the Labour Party. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1959. Noel-Baker died on 8 October 1982. The administrative environment in which UK historians participated in politics had undergone a significant change with the Parliament Act of 1911, which ensured that Members of Parliament would be paid.[196] Britain's political system still maintained vestiges of Edwardian life after the Act's passage, however, with Douglas Newton claiming that the parliament resembled an oligarchy rather than a pluralistic and representative liberal democracy.[197]

The interrelationship between UK interwar historians and their political colleagues in the post-World War I era involved opportunities for both collections of these individuals to work across contexts. UK interwar historians were often democratically elected politicians, such as H. A. L. Fisher, G. P. Gooch, Noel-Baker among others.[198] Politicians who had undergone a 'serious academic study' of history did not predominate in the immediate aftermath of post-War War I British politics. Throughout this period, however, politicians who were eager to publish their memoirs regarding World War I were determined to position themselves publicly as historians.[199] There was some reluctance among politicians to involve academic and professional historians in the preparation of these memoirs, of which David Lloyd George's work was a popular example.[200] Keith Robbins observed that there was

[196] *Ibid*.
[197] Douglas Newton, *British Policy and the Weimar Republic, 1918-1919*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 84.
[198] Keith Robbins, *History, Religion and Identity in Modern Britain*, London, Hambleton Press, 1993, p. 22.
[199] *Ibid.*
[200] *Ibid.*

'little doubt' that Lloyd Georges' *War Memoirs* had a 'major impact on British political opinion' in the latter part of the interwar era.[201]

> [T]here is a certain artificiality, beyond a given point, in trying to determine what part 'being a historian' played in the advancement of any particular political career. Success in politics can be so arbitrary that while 'being a historian' may be very important to historians, it may be less important in his advancement than in his ability as a speaker, his congeniality as a colleague, or his sense of humour. Poor historians, more rounded in these respects, may succeed where others, more distinguished, fail, though lack of these qualities does not by itself guarantee eminence as a historian![202]

Keith Robbins' musings focused on a central point of this thesis, that a strict definition of historians as being professionalised, published and affiliated with an institution remained contested at the time. The fluidity of who was considered an historian, and able to deploy the authority that came with it, was axiomatic to the role itself.

UK interwar historians were sometimes elected representatives of high political office, such as Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher.[203] Fisher was an Oxford-based historian, but was also an interwar cabinet minister and a former president of the Board of Education.[204] Fisher, OM, FRS, was born on 23 March 1865 in London. Fisher worked as an historian, educator, and Liberal politician. He was educated at Winchester and New College, University of Oxford, where he graduated with a First Class degree and was awarded a Fellowship. In the coalition government of David Lloyd George, Fisher was President of the Board of Education. Fisher taught modern history at Oxford from 1925 to 1940, and was the Warden of New College. He represented the seat of Sheffield Hallam as a politician. He occupied positions on a number of political and cultural bodies. Fisher had affiliations with the London

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[201] *Ibid.*
[202] Keith Robbins, 'History and Politics: The Career of James Bryce', in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse (eds), *Historians in Politics*, London, Sage Publications, 1974, p. 114.
[203] Richard Carr, 'Conservative Veteran M.P.s and the "Lost Generation" Narrative after the First World War', *Historical Research*, Vol. 85, No. 228, 2012, p. 286.
[204] *Ibid.*

Library, the British Museum, and the National Trust. He was connected with the council at Winchester, the BBC, the Rhodes Trustees and the British Academy. Fisher died on 18 April 1940. Historians, such as Fisher, sought to influence the burgeoning debates about British youths of the UK's exposure to imperialism, militarism and patriotism.[205] As part of this movement, Fisher cautioned in his Stevenson series lecture in 1923 that patriotism was useful only when it was bereft of 'instinctive primitive emotion'.[206] Fisher was not alone and the interwar period witnessed increasing attempts to disseminate 'national virtues', such as patriotism and respect for veterans.[207]

A number of UK interwar historians had at some point been elected politicians who lamented deteriorations in Anglo-German relations. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Ramsay Macdonald, regarded George Peabody Gooch as 'by far and away our ablest historian' in 1924.[208] Preceding the World War I, Gooch had been a Liberal M.P. from 1906-1910.[209] Although the two men did not represent the same political platform, they had shared commonalities throughout their career. In addition to their political service in the House of Commons, both had opposed aspects of the UK's involvement in the Boer War and World War I. Some historians who were elected to the House of Commons were also noblemen who later transferred to the House of Lords.[210]

Gooch was born on 21 October 1873, in London. He was educated at Eton College, King's College, London, and at Trinity College, University of Cambridge. Gooch was not a lifelong university academic, and with his colleagues exemplified historians' liminal roles. He edited the journal *Contemporary Review*. From 1933 until 1936, Gooch presided over the National Peace Council and the English Göthe

[205] Mathew G. Stanard, 'Interwar Pro-Empire Propaganda and European Colonial Culture: Toward a Comparative Research Agenda', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 2009, p. 34.
[206] Julia Stapleton, 'Citizenship versus Patriotism in Twentieth-Century England', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2005, p. 165.
[207] *Ibid.*
[208] Cf. Anthony D'Agostino, 'The Revisionist Tradition in European Diplomatic History', *The Journal of the Historical Society*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2004, p. 264.
[209] *Ibid*.
[210] Frank Eyck, 'G. P. Gooch', in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse (eds), *Historians in Politics*, London, Sage Publications, 1974, p. 180.

Society. He was enthusiastic about the League of Nations and sympathetic towards Germany. From 1923 until 1926, Gooch was President of the Historical Association. Gooch travelled to interwar Germany and headed groups of British historians who lectured in Germany and sought to form bonds.[211] He was married to a German woman. Gooch died on 31 August 1968. Gooch, for instance, had believed that that there had been a lost opportunity for an Anglo-German entente during the Boer War.[212] Despite their differences, Macdonald and Gooch had both previously undertaken work in London's East End, and met under the auspices of a debating and dinner group that was composed of Socialists, Radicals and Liberals.[213]

UK historians appeared more amenable to the Treaty of Versailles's revision than their French and Italian colleagues, and reflected a tradition held by some Britons to refuse to be overly committed to European disputes. Like his colleagues, Gooch's presence among the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was premised on delivering advice to advance his country's position.[214] The conditions the French and the Italians sought to impose upon the defeated Germans impressed upon the UK historians the need for counterweights to prevent any single country from becoming too powerful.[215] Much of British foreign policy was premised on ensuring that no single country controlled Europe.[216] To this end, Gooch and his colleagues produced handbooks for the conference, although they were ultimately disappointed with the outcome of President Wilson's decisions.[217]

UK historians engaged in activities that incorporated different contexts, including roles that encouraged the growth of a new international architecture to accommodate Germany. Following World War I, the historian and classicist Murray,

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[211] Frank Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 329.
[212] D'Agostino, 'The Revisionist Tradition in European Diplomatic History', p. 264.
[213] Eyck, 'G. P. Gooch', in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse (eds), *Historians in Politics*, pp. 178-180.
[214] *Ibid*., p. 314.
[215] *Ibid*.
[216] Jason Tomes, *Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 281.
[217] *Ibid*., p. 314.

advocated for the establishment of a League of Nations.[218] The Phillimore Committee was officially established to consider the operation of the League in January 1918, and Murray was a member. He was successful in uniting the radical League of Nations Society along with the League of Free Nations Association into the League of Nations Union (LNU) in October 1918. Murray became chairman of its management committee in 1923, having sat on its board from its beginning.[219] In 1938, he became co-president with the cabinet minister, parliamentarian and historian, Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil Chelwood CH, PC, QC. Robert Cecil was born in London on 14 September 1864. He engaged in diplomacy, politics and law. Lord Robert Cecil was educated at his private residence, Eton, and University College, thus for the University of Oxford. From 30 May to 10 January 1919, Cecil occupied the office of Lord Privy Seal as well as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Cecil argued that the Treaty of Versailles should have been less harsh on Germany, and that Germany should be allowed to join the League of Nations. With his colleagues, he planned the activities of the League of Nations Union. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1937. Cecil died on 24 November 1937. Murray became deputy chairman of the International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC) at the Committee's founding in 1922. He became chairman in 1929 and remained so until 1939.[220]

UK historians' movement across contexts resulted in instances where roles were fluid, and tensions arose with other members of the political elite. Political parties and movements were engaged in the formation of assemblies in which interwar historians participated. British officials tended to express political, as opposed to legalistic, support for the Covenant of the League of Nations.[221] Historians' authority, and sensitivity to public opinion, helped to support politicians' attempts to secure a new age of peace.[222] The main drafters behind the League of

[218] Peter Wilson, 'Gilbert Murray and International Relations: Helenism, Liberalism, and International Intellectual Cooperation as a Path to Peace', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2011, p. 885.
[219] *Ibid*.
[220] *Ibid*.
[221] Stephen Wertheim, 'The League of Nations: A Retreat from International Law?', *Journal of Global History*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2012, p. 224.
[222] *Ibid*.

Nation's Covenant were the Foreign Office's Zimmern, the LNU's Murray, Jan Smuts and Cecil.[223] The links between members of political parties and their role in movements such as the LNU became problematic as their interests diverged, however. For example, Arthur James Balfour, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary consented to become the League's Honorary President in 1918. Murray was Chairman of the League and Balfour's niece served on its Committee.[224] Murray had no power over the statements the League released. In 1923, Balfour was ambivalent about the League's purpose and advocated for the 'peace group' to be shut down. When the League was not discontinued, he resigned.[225] This was representative of a conflict between many historians and politicians, and its outcomes contributed to setting the context for British policy in the future.

UK historians sought to draw attention to the close relationship between culture and institutions. One example, Richard Henry Tawney, regarded himself as a Socialist and an advocate of democratic republicanism.[226] R. H. Tawney was born in Calcutta 30 November 1880. Tawney's father lectured at the university. Tawney attended Balliol College, University of Oxford, and graduated in 1903. He read and spoke German with ease. He was involved with the Workers' Education Association and taught workers in the North and Midlands of England, and he was the first to start the venture in 1908. He favoured war with Germany at the start of World War I, and served with the 22nd Manchester Battalion. Tawney was wounded and discharged, and thereafter became a member of the Labour Party. He sought to have secondary education changed to benefit less advantaged people. Tawney believed that a fair society had 'vacated the public sphere'.[227] Tawney died on 16 January 1962. Tawney wrote that culture, rather than institutions, would be preeminent for the new formation of a modern democratic state. 'Britain's tragedy', he suggested, was that it possessed democratic institutions as opposed to a democratic culture and that the

[223] *Ibid*.
[224] Tomes, *Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman*, p. 262.
[225] *Ibid*.
[226] David Marquand, 'The Strange Career of British Democracy: John Milton to Gordon Brown', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 79, No. 4, 2008, p. 471.
[227] Lawrence Goldman, 'Tawney's Century: R. H. Tawney and the Origins of Capitalism in Tudor and Stuart England', *The Oxford Historian*, No, 11, 2014, p. 14.

country had experienced an inadequate political evolution.[228] Tawney resented Britain's retention of 'the social habits and mentality of the oldest and toughest plutocracy in the world'.[229]

UK historians' involvement in various circles represented a blurring of roles, incorporating historians' skills with tasks that had public importance. The merits of historians' arguments were anchored in their perceived expertise, freeing them from the political considerations of elected parliamentarians. Many historians remained interested in the synergies between political advocacy and the activities of public intellectuals. Many liberal intellectuals joined groupings alongside 'established Socialist intellectuals'.[230] From the beginning of the post-war period until 1931 (when the second Labour government ended), over one hundred and fifty people, including MPs and guests were attendees at the Advisory Committee on International Questions (ACIQ) meetings.[231] This 'quasi-academic forum' was formed to discuss questions of the Labour Party's foreign policy. The regular members of the committee included its secretary, Leonard Woolf, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Philip Noel-Baker, Norman Angell, David Mitrany, C. P. Trevelyan, G. Young, W. Gilies, N. Buxton, C. D. Burns, and E. Bentham.[232] George Macaulay Trevelyan, OM, CBE, FRS, was born on 16 February 1876. Trevelyan studied history at Harrow School and Wixenford School. He was then educated Trinity College, University of Cambridge. Until 1903, Trevelyan taught at Cambridge. Following that period, he devoted himself to non-university history writing and participated in World War I on the Italian front. In 1925, Trevelyan became a Fellow of the British Academy, and was subsequently elected as a Fellow of the Royal Society. In 1927, Trevelyan occupied the post as Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Cambridge. In 1940, he became Master of Trinity College. He was the first President of the Youth Hostels Association in the United Kingdom. Trevelyan died on 21 July

[228] *Ibid*.
[229] *Ibid*.
[230] Sylvest, 'Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations', p. 413.
[231] *Ibid*.
[232] *Ibid*.

1962.

UK historians were engaged as public intellectuals who sought to erect a global architecture for international cooperation on conflict prevention. Gooch, G. Lowes Dickinson, Bertrand Russell and Morel were Liberal intellectuals who were part of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), a pressure group that was influenced by World War I and that also involved the politicians MacDonald, Philip Snowdon and Arthur Ponsonby.[233] Such public figures sought to foster fora that promoted dialogue and pacifism in the long term. These public intellectuals were suspicious of military establishments in any guise, but nonetheless recognised that military aggression required prevention and punishment. The interwar period saw cooperation between these public men. Headlam-Morley, Fisher, Lord Haldane and MacDonald, and the Prime Minister, showed support for Gooch and Temperley in their efforts to release British documents relating to World War I.[234] Richard Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane Lord Haldane. Lord Richard Burdon Haldane was born on 30 July 1856, in Edinburgh. His education included much time spent in Germany. Haldane was regarded as one of Britain's greatest War Ministers. He was ennobled in 1911, and occupied the post of Lord Chancellor from 1912, but he was judged by much opinion to have been too pro-German and subsequently relinquished his position. In 1912, Haldane visited Berlin in an attempt to see relations between both Britain and Germany improved. He was known as a Germanophile by many Britons. Haldane died on 19 August 1928. The need to release documents was put forth by Gooch in *International Affairs.*[235] In 1924 the Foreign Office commissioned Gooch and Temperley as co-editors with the volume. The result was the 1926 publishing of the *British Documents on the Origins on the War.*[236]

Many UK interwar historians sought to inculcate Anglo-German friendship, as well as seek to imbue a spirit of reconciliation.[237] The networks forged between historians and politicians crossed academic and political contexts, which in turn

[233] D'Agostino, 'The Revisionist Tradition in European Diplomatic History', p. 262.
[234] Hasse, 'In Search of a European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-55', p. 374.
[235] *Ibid*.
[236] *Ibid*.
[237] Frank Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 329.

facilitated a wider audience for their views. UK historians' visible engagement in political matters indicated their movement within contexts included both academia and politics. For example, the first German representative in the UK after World War I was the Chargé d′ Affaires and later ambassador to the UK until 1930, Dr Friedrich Sthamer, and Gooch met him at Morley's residence in London.[238] Their meeting's significance lies in the fact that Germany regarded the revision of the Treaty of Versailles (particularly War Guilt Clause 231) a priority. The Germans recognised that building relationships with prominent UK historians as soon as Anglo-German diplomatic representation was re-established was conducive to Germany's goal of the Treaty revision. Gooch gave speeches to the London School of Economics, the Historical Association, universities, colleges and the London School Teachers' Organisation.[239] He often visited Germany and Austria in the war's aftermath and delivered lectures on British foreign policy whose content both pre-dated and post-dated World War I.[240]

Commentary from UK historians showed the extent to which they promoted views that combined a domestic and international orientation, chiefly Britons' perceptions of Germany.[241] As an internationally known intellectual, Gooch favoured a practicable framework for European cooperation, and was open to Britain's involvement in such an undertaking. He was hostile to what he deemed to be the Conservative Party's policy towards Europe in the interwar era, commenting that, 'I detest the Conservatives' idea that England is not part of Europe but only part of the British Empire'.[242] Germany was a salient issue for UK public intellectuals in the period, and many followed the vicissitudes of Anglo-German relations into the Nazi years with interest.[243] Nonetheless, Gooch suggested that it was advisable to acquiesce to Nazi German encroachments on the territories of Central and Eastern Europe in 1937.[244] Gooch's prescriptions on matters such as this brought

[238] *Ibid*., 317.
[239] Felix E. Hirsch, 'George Peabody Gooch', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1954, p. 263.
[240] Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, p. 329.
[241] Robbins, *History, Religion and Identity in Modern Britain*, p. 23.
[242] Cf. Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, p. 407.
[243] Robbins, *History, Religion and Identity in Modern Britain*, p. 23.
[244] *Ibid*.

disagreement among his colleagues, such as Seton-Watson, who favoured a more confrontational approach.[245]

There was great fluidity in the roles and social networks of interwar UK historians, and this was reflected in their influence beyond academia. The various workplaces of the historians comprised multiple roles. The next section deals with their contributions of historical knowledge to the bureaucracy, since the authors wrote from a unique position of access to the Foreign Office and possessed familiarity with the subtleties of Foreign Office views.

## Historians and the Formation of Foreign Policy

Academics who did not hold formal government posts were nonetheless often part of the policy-making process.[246] Many intellectuals served in the British bureaucracy and foreign policy establishment, and helped to direct the details of the post-World War I world that had been promulgated by the Versailles Treaty.[247] As the cases of UK interwar historians' involvement with universities and political parties has shown, there was sometimes disagreement between intellectuals over the formation and implementation of policy. Yet, historians formed a collection of individuals through their involvement in the Foreign Office, and their government employment offers another meaningful way to engage with this dynamic collective. UK interwar historians' involvement in policy making is seen through the prism of their direct experiences, sometime employment in the Foreign Office, roles in establishing think tanks, and in lobbying for foreign policy outcomes. UK interwar historians' willingness to offer substantive critiques to their government's foreign policies varied according to their research backgrounds, personalities and visions of the future.

UK interwar historians brought a degree of cultural uniformity to their writings. Historians' intellectual development had incorporated views to complement

[245] *Ibid*.
[246] John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, London, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1984, p. 48.
[247] Goldstein, 'The Round Table and the New Europe', p. 1.

their arguments about policy. The impacts included historians' public school and university education, and lives spent in the UK following World War I. This context was influenced by their proximity to the Foreign Office and think tanks, a relationship in which their contributions could be viewed as a function of careful analyses and research. Yet, there were differences between these historians in how they expressed their disagreement with policies in bureaucratic settings. Headlam-Morley, for instance, was guarded when it came to critiquing elected representatives, and admonished his colleague Zimmern for his public attacks of aspects of Lloyd George's foreign policy.[248] Toynbee, Seton-Watson and Lewis Namier, among many others, were unified in dissociating themselves from aspects of the Treaty of Versailles's outcomes.[249]

Edward Hallett Carr CBE was a diplomat as well as an historian, but he also had a degree in Classics, a credential that stimulated his interest in philosophy and how he could apply it to the public space.[250] Carr CBE was born on 28 June 1892, in London to a middle-class family. Carr worked as an historian, diplomat, international relations theorist, and journalist. His family came from northern England, however, he was schooled in London at Merchant Taylors' School. His family admired much about Germany and this was said to have imbued Carr with affection for the country. This was held to have been common at the time for 'upper-middle class Victorians', who gravitated towards the Liberal and Labour parties.[251] He interpreted 'social power' to be manipulable by the state.[252]

In 1911, Carr attained the Craven Scholarship so that he could be educated at Trinity College, University of Cambridge. In 1916, Carr received a First Class Degree in Classics, after which he undertook diplomatic work. He was a member of the Foreign Office's Contraband Department, which coordinated aspects of the Allied blockade. At the Versailles Peace Settlement, he was incensed at French and

[248] Gordon Martel, 'The Prehistory of Appeasement: Headlam-Morley, the Peace Settlement and Revisionism', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1998, p. 251.
[249] *Ibid*.
[250] Seán Molly, 'Dialectics and Transformation: Exploring The International Theory of E. H. Carr', *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2003, p. 281.
[251] Jonathan Haslam, 'E. H. Carr's Search for Meaning', in Michael Cox (ed.), *E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal*, London, Palgrave, 2000, p. 27.
[252] Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations*, London, Verso, 1994, p. 11.

other allied policies towards post-World War I Germany. Carr left the Foreign Office in 1936 and continued his work as an historian. Between 1941 and 1946, Carr contributed to editing *The Times*. Carr died on 3 November 1982. Historians Zimmern and Murray were also influenced by their shared training as classicists, and regarded their contributions to policy as an attempt to reconstruct a peaceful order.[253]

Some sought solace in bringing about a fusion of their training with the new international situation. For example, during the interwar era, Toynbee was idealistic in his work as an historian and as a political analyst. Much of his scholarship sought to reconcile this approach with what he saw as the 'polycentric' nature of world order and civilisation.[254] His writings included his thoughts on the emergence of globalisation. However, his first writings reflected the world view of his teachers, an 'evolutionary idealism' that came under pressure after World War I.[255]

Government functionaries associated with foreign policy formed a small society. As Paul Williams argued, policy formation retained its elite veneer, being influenced by historians and bureaucrats trained in history, with minimal democratic accountability and control:

> [d]uring the early decades of the twentieth century, the making of British foreign policy, as well as a wider interest in international affairs, remained a relatively exclusive preoccupation. One estimate suggested that during this period 'high policy' in Britain was 'conducted by about fifty or perhaps one hundred individuals'.[256]

UK historians pursued two parallel tracks regarding foreign policy. The first sought to criticise British policy over Germany, while the second involved them in

[253] Laqua, 'Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Problem of Order', p. 229.
[254] Michael Lang, 'Globalisation and Global History in Toynbee', *Journal of World History*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2011, p. 749.
[255] *Ibid*.
[256] Williams, 'A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 1919-1939', p. 38.

the apparatus of the Foreign Office. Foreign Office work provided the historians with an outlet to explain the country's international interests, and to generate popular support. Historians' proximity around subjects of politics and history meant that they were well-acquainted with discourses of power, while their ability to move across public contexts empowered their commentary. UK historians' social networks, bureaucratic experience, and analytical skills were to prove crucial to their lobbying outside the formal structures of government.

The career of Sir James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley offers one example of this process. He regarded the Allied Reparation Policy as leading the German population to the brink of mass starvation and deemed that it was counterproductive to British interests.[257] In 1925, the Foreign Secretary and Cambridge graduate in Modern European History, Sir Austen Chamberlain, commissioned Headlam-Morley to review the peaks and troughs of British power throughout history. In reply, Headlam-Morley suggested the 'lessons' that could be applied to British foreign policy making in the post-World War I world.[258] Headlam-Morley was born in 1863. Morley was educated at Eton, King's College, University of Cambridge, and in Germany, where he studied with German historians Treitschke and Hans Delbrück. He was Professor of Greek and Ancient History at Queen's College, London between 1894 and 1900. In academia he studied history and the classics. Headlam-Morley served in the bureaucracy and consulted governments. In World War I, with his colleagues, he directed propaganda against Germany. Headlam-Morley contributed to having the Treaty of Versailles written after World War I. He acted as a guarantor for his colleague Arnold Toynbee's entry to Chatham Hose and collaborated with Harold Temperley and G. P. Gooch on diplomatic documents on the war's outbreak. Headlam-Morley died in 1929.

Other historians at the Foreign Office were also skilled at dealing with issues of public concern. Carr's book, *Britain: A Study of British Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War*, was in the final stages of preparation of

[257] Ephraim Maisel, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926, Brighton*, Sussex Academic Press, 1994, p. 108.
[258] *Ibid*., p. 165.

publication when war broke out in 1939. The Foreign Secretary, Viscount Halifax, wrote the text's foreword in which he lauded not only Carr's administrative capacities, but also his 'sound learning and political understanding' to enlist support for Britain.[259]

Members of the new 'think tank', Chatham House, had considerable historical expertise about Germany, and cultivated close links to the Foreign Office.[260] They also had close connections with the government. The historians Headlam-Morley and Lionel Curtis largely founded the influential Chatham House, with little preparation.[261] Chatham House, also known as the Royal Institute for International Affairs, became what was known as a 'traditional' think tank that developed and analysed ideas and policies.[262] Chatham House's founders were occupied with matters of transnational cooperation as well as with affecting British government policy. Although they could be described as 'liberal imperialists' who understood power politics, they comprehended the significance of the public space.[263]

Toynbee was Chatham House's first Director of Research, and interpreted World War I as being emblematic of Germany's rejection of a common European civilisation. Under the aegis of Chatham House, Temperley spent the years between 1920 and 1924 editing *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*.[264] In this manner, think tanks served as conduits for UK interwar historians' views. Another edited volume by Carr, entitled *Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, involved nine intellectuals who attended

[259] Cf. Brian Porter, 'Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the Spirit Ironic: A Comedy of Errors', *International Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, pp. 88-89.
[260] Hasse, 'In Search of a European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-55', p. 373.
[261] Arnold Toynbee, *Experiences*, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 77.
[262] Richard Cockett, *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983*, London, Fontana, 1995, p. 139.
[263] Williams, 'A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 1919-1939', p. 38.
[264] Hasse, 'In Search of a European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-55', p. 373.

Chatham House from November 1936.[265]

Chatham House's founders comprehended British society from an elite perspective, which deemed the 'public' to be those who possessed an informed interest in history and current events.[266] Historians answered this description but also advocated for a greater democratising of foreign policy making and sought to influence government as well as to enlist the greater involvement of public opinion.[267] These twin aims were achieved by the continuance discussions following the Versailles Peace Conference with colleagues and politicians and by having a journal, *International Affairs*, published in 1922. Chatham House and its German counterpart, *Institut für Auswärtige Politik,* carried out a major part of the interwar diplomacy between Germany and the Allies that was concerned with the War Guilt Clause, Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty.[268] This was the crux of the war guilt debate that dealt with responsibility for World War I.[269]

A plurality of competing interests continued to concentrate historians' minds.[270] The beliefs of 'action intellectuals', as Inderjeet Parmar termed it, in think tanks such as Chatham House were practical, despite the interwar era's idealism and longing for pacifism.[271] Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, Curtis and Toynbee were not hostile to the concept of a universal government, although they were acutely conscious of being from the UK, and of the reality of national interest and balance-of-power-politics. Their nationalism and their organisation's character was best captured in Parmar's characterisation of them as 'patriotic internationalists'.[272]

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[265] Porter, 'Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the Spirit Ironic: A Comedy of Errors', pp. 87-89.
[266] Williams, 'A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 1919-1939', p. 38.
[267] Porter, 'Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the Spirit Ironic: A Comedy of Errors', pp. 87-89.
[268] Hasse, 'In Search of a European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-55', p. 373.
[269] Williams, 'A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 1919-1939', p. 38.
[270] Inderjeet Parmar, 'Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council of Foreign Relations', *International Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, p. 66.
[271] *Ibid*.
[272] *Ibid*.

Zimmern was born on 26 January 1879, to Jewish parentage. His father was born in Germany. He was a classical historian, political scientist and educationalist. Zimmern attended Winchester College, New College, University of Oxford, and Berlin University. In 1903, he was Lecturer of Ancient History, New College, Oxford. Between 1904 and 1909, he taught and received a Fellowship at New College. Between 1912 and 1915, he was staff inspector at the Board of Education. Between 1918 and 1919, he joined the Political Intelligence Department at the Foreign Office. Zimmern's chief was Sir Ian Tyrrell, head of the Information Department at the Foreign Office. He fulfilled roles as Wilson Professor of International Politics, and between 1919 and 1921, he was the earliest Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales. Between 1922 and 1923, Zimmern lectured at Cornell University. Between 1930 and 1944, Zimmern was the first Montagu Burton Professor of International Relations at University of Oxford. In 1919, he co-established Chatham House and participated in the London Round Table Group. Along with his colleagues, he supported the establishment of the League of Nations Society (LNU). He had the post of Deputy Director of the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation in Paris in the mid-1920s. Zimmern died on 24 November 1957.

Arnold Toynbee was born on 14 April 1889 in London. Toynbee attended Winchester College and Balliol College, University of Oxford. Toynbee investigated classics and history. In 1912 he became a tutor and Fellow in Ancient History at Balliol College. Three years later, Toynbee worked for the Foreign Office in matters relating to intelligence. In World War I, he was engaged with Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. Like his colleagues, he was part of the British delegation at the Versailles Peace Settlement. Toynbee was then employed as a Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies at the University of London. Between 1924 and 1943, he contributed to the studies at Chatham House and Balliol College, University of Oxford, as there were close connections between the two. Chatham House conducted research for the Foreign Office and had close relations with members of the office. In 1925, Toynbee attained a research professorship in international history at the London School of Economics. While in Germany in 1936,

he interviewed Adolf Hitler. Toynbee died on 22 October 1975.

UK interwar historians' role in policy development rendered them acutely conscious of their responsibility to national interest. Their analytical efforts and social connections eased this process, with actions that contributed to developing the contexts for them to work across. Headlam-Morley's advice was often dismissed by the Foreign Office when French concerns had to be considered.[273] It was historians in the Foreign Office, such as Headlam-Morley, who despaired of the long-term ramifications of the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. Germany's inability or unwillingness to provide telegraph poles, coal and timber (as a form of reparations) in a timely manner prompted the Franco-Belgian intervention, moving Headlam-Morley to write that: '[i]t was now generally recognised that the reparation Clauses could not be defended. They can be indeed explained, condoned, excused, but an attempt to defend and justify them would almost certainly fail'.[274]

Historians' expertise was not always recognised or agreed with, and their ability to provide facts was often more valued than their analytical opinion. When Lewis Namier was working for the Foreign Office, he attempted to influence his superiors to adopt his view of post-1918 Germany. He argued that the UK's support for various Polish factions should have better considered some Poles' hostility towards remnants of the UK's white Russian allies. Namier was supported in his views by high officials such as the private secretary to Lloyd George, Philip Kerr, as well as Headlam-Morley, Sir William Tyrrel and Lord Eustace Percy.[275] His idealism was unsuccessful, however, as more senior policy makers regarded his suggestions on Poland to be 'biased and warped'.[276] Nonetheless, Namier felt that the international situation was unpredictable, and that the 'old ruling classes'' loss of influence had created a 'new and frightening' Europe.[277] Namier was born on 27 June 1888, in

[273] Dragan Bakić, '"Must Will Peace": The British Brokering of a "Central European" and "Balkan Locarno"', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2013, p. 27.
[274] Cf. Maisel, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926*, p. 109.
[275] Amy Ng, 'A Portrait of Sir Lewis Namier as a Young Socialist', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2005, pp. 633-636.
[276] *Ibid*., p. 636.
[277] *Ibid*.

Wola Okrzejska, Poland.

Namier's family came from Austrian Galicia, in a region that was close to the Russian border. Although Namier was of Jewish descent, his family had converted to Roman Catholicism and adopted aspects of Polish identity. Namier's surname was originally Bernstein, but he Anglicised it to Namier as his admiration of England coincided with a determination to pursue his career in the UK.[278] The name 'Namier' came from 'Nemirov', the name of the Bernstein's property, and Namier changed it to the English surname 'Napier'.[279] After making his acquaintance with Namier in 1909, Toynbee recounted that Namier 'saw international politics with Polish, rather than with Jewish, eyes', and that he wanted the Russian and German Empires to be toppled so that Poland could regain independence.[280]

When Poland reacquired self-determination after World War I, Namier rejected Polish nationalism and became a Zionist.[281] Toynbee noted that Namier's personality was endearing, but that it could be intense, and wrote that 'If you crossed Lewis on some issue which, for him, was of importance, he was capable of declaring total war on you, however old and close a friend of his you might be; and, in making war, he was always vehement, sometimes vindictive, and occasionally even venomous'.[282] Toynbee mentioned that Namier's advocacy of Zionism did not conflict with his 'love' for England and the broader UK, which inspired much of his research on the history of British politics.[283] Namier was ultimately awarded with a knighthood. The 'informal homage' which Namier was held in the UK was regarded

[278] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 66.
[279] *Ibid*.
[280] *Ibid*., p. 67; Toynbee noted the associations between Lewis Namier, Professor Hamish J. Paton and himself, all of whom were friends and attendees at Balliol College, Oxford University, and of the tasks their collaboration inspired. 'The time when Hamish saw the most of him was during the First World War, when they were working together, for the British Government, on a minute study of the ethnic composition of the population around the fringes of the area in which the Poles were indisputably in a decisive majority. (The outcome of their joint work was the Paton Line – known to the world as 'the Curzon Line'; research assistants, however eminently intellectually, are seldom given the credit for their work)'.
[281] *Ibid*., pp. 67-68.
[282] *Ibid*., p. 68.
[283] *Ibid*., p. 70-75.

as ‘immense’, though he never received a professorial chair at Oxford University, attained employment at a provincial, northern university.[284]

Namier regarded ‘proper work’ to be synonymous with much of the work his colleagues and himself engaged in.[285] He pursued political activities and sought to be ‘in the thick of events’. Norman Rose wrote that Namier ‘buttonholed Cabinet members, exerted pressure on political leaders, harassed Government officials, [and] canvassed support in the press’.[286] Rose suggested that Namier’s sense of Jewish consciousness was fluid. His activities in ‘non-academic matters’ frequently culminated in his eliciting the attention of ‘psychoanalysts’’ treatment of ‘emotional turmoil’.[287] Namier was involved with the Foreign Office in World War I and in its aftermath, and he maintained an antagonism towards Germans, whom he regarded as a ‘deadly menace to Europe and to civilisation’.[288] Namier died on 19 August 1960 in London.

In other instances, historians were able to influence the issue more successfully. For example, George Clark, senior clerk in the War Department of the Foreign Office, noted that in the case of the Yugoslavs, Dr Robert William Seton-Watson ‘enabled’ the Foreign Office to ‘derive information’ in order for them to make informed decisions.[289] Seton-Watson was born on 20 August 1879, in London to Scottish parents. Seton-Watson attended Winchester College and New College, University of Oxford. He attended New College at the same time as H. A. L. Fisher was history tutor. Seton-Watson was ‘fortunate in not having to concern himself about earning his own living’.[290] He studied modern history and graduated with a First-Class degree in 1901. Seton-Watson studied at Berlin University and published a number of academic pieces. In the middle of World War I, he established and

[284] *Ibid*., p. 73.
[285] Norman Rose, *Lewis Namier and Zionism*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 72.
[286] *Ibid*.
[287] Gemma Romain, *Connecting Histories: A Comparative Exploration of African-Caribbean and Jewish History and Memory in Modern Britain*, London, Kegan Paul, 2006, p. 193.
[288] Ian Hall, ‘Sir Lewis Namier’s International Thought’, in Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (eds), *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 236.
[289] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 630.
[290] Betts, ‘Robert William Seton-Watson, 1879-1951’, p. 252.

financed a journal which advocated for the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, called *The New Europe*.

Between 1917 and 1919, he engaged in propaganda, and worked at the Intelligence Bureau of the War Cabinet in the Enemy Propaganda Department. He was present at the Versailles Peace Conference, but was said to not be attached to the official delegation at that time. In 1915, Seton-Watson founded the School of Slavonic Studies at the University of London. He promoted the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Seton-Watson was witness to the phenomenon where 'the historian was merged in the publicist and politician'.[291] From 1938 until the end of World War II, Seton-Watson advocated to prevent Czechoslovakia from being partitioned by Germany. From 1945 until 1948, Seton-Watson was elected as President of the Royal Historical Society, and his two sons became academics in history at Oxford University.[292] Seton-Watson died on 25 July 1951.

UK historians' contributions to the policy outcomes from the policy-making process extended to the issue of colonies in the interwar era. These reflections made some historians the champions of those who sought to revise opinion about the cause of World War I. Historians' commentary about the Paris Peace Settlement's implications for Germany was that it was unsustainable and would eventually require revisions. Colonies elicited the attention of this thesis' historians because they were regarded as an expression of a country's demographic and geographic strength, and there were widespread perceptions that non-self-governing territories possessed vast riches.[293] The middle years of the twenties were relatively calm compared to other years of the interwar period, and showed some significant foreign policy achievements.[294] In 1925, for example, the British mandate of Tanganyika made provision for German settlers' return and made room for a legislature at the start of

[291] *Ibid*., pp. 253-.254; Seton-Watson produced many during World War I works 'to inform public opinion and guide public action'. Some of these included *Roumania and the Great War* (1915), *The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic* (1915), and *German, Slav and Magyar* (1916).
[292] *Ibid*., pp. 252-255.
[293] Stanard, 'Interwar Pro-Empire Propaganda and European Colonial Culture: Toward a Comparative Research Agenda', p. 40.
[294] Weisbrode, 'International Administration between the Wars: A Reappraisal', p. 39.

1926, amplifying the spirit of cooperation from the Treaty of Locarno.[295] UK public intellectuals noted the sensitivities that segments of German opinion held regarding the loss of Germany's pre-World War I colonies. The changing status of colonies can be seen in the writings about policy outcomes by UK interwar historians connected to the Foreign Office and think tanks. Subsequent interest in the interwar period has understandably been focused on the implications of appeasement, and whether the war might have been avoided.[296] Various intellectuals, such as Kerr, argued that Germany could be placated from seeking redress by returning her former colonies, particularly those in Africa, so as to restore her symbolic 'imperial' status.[297]

UK interwar historians' appraisal of foreign policy and history led them to various published outcomes. The reinterpretations about how World War I began contributed to Prime Minister MacDonald's 1924 decision to release the British Diplomatic Documents that predated the conflict. Gooch received the co-editorship along with Temperley, and both sought to be impartial while presenting British policy as unsullied.[298] The result was the publishing in 1926 of the *British Documents on the Origins on the War*. The editors' intention was simultaneously to offer tentative support for the Versailles Treaty's legality, and also to promote European 'reconciliation' amongst the former war's participants.[299]

## Historians, the Press and Association

UK historians sought to cultivate a reputation for impartiality, a perception held by their readership which set them apart as a collection of individuals. While they remained important in government, interwar historians sought to influence debate on the legacies of the Treaty of Versailles by providing reliable analyses to the press, often omitting to disclose their close relationship with government when so doing. UK interwar historians' relationship with the press highlighted their role as effective disseminators of ideas to various media outlets. For those historians whose Foreign

[295] *Ibid*.
[296] Harry Hodson, 'The Round Table: Until the Early 1930s', *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 352, 1999, p. 681.
[297] *Ibid*.
[298] D'Agostino, 'The Revisionist Tradition in European Diplomatic History', p. 264.
[299] Hasse, 'In Search of a European Settlement: Chatham House and British-German Relations, 1920-55', p. 374.

Office employment was concurrent with their journalistic work, their expertise found expression because of the 'special permission' they received from the Foreign Office to provide commentary.[300] These historians had aims that other commentators presumably shared, in that this collection of individuals induced ideas and opinions in others that reflected their own.[301] The flow of ideas from these historians reached public opinion, and they sought to persuade readers so as to achieve their point of view.[302] Historians' interactions with the press and associations can be organised into four main categories: their direct experiences with publishing that sought to promote various visions of international cooperation, their contributions to the press while employed as civil servants, their engagement with collectives that influenced their work and, finally, the re-emergence of propaganda.

UK interwar historians aimed to shape the national debate and promote peace by publishing their views in periodicals and by organising frameworks for international cooperation. Many of these historians held liberal characteristics along with their colleagues, such as a belief that intellectuals had a responsibility to enhance the practice of politics.[303] Gooch, among others, endeavoured to bring amity between the Britain and Germany after the war. Gooch attempted to do so in his co-editorship of *Contemporary Review*, and by writing for the press and lecturing.[304] Gooch made *Contemporary Review* the chief British journal on foreign developments, and sought to maximise its readership to promote his editorial vision.[305]

The relationship between international dialogue and the press was recognised by a number of historians, such as Gooch, Toynbee, Zimmern and others, identifying them as a like-minded collection of individuals. Its significance lay in the degree to which public intellectuals elevated the importance of diplomacy between countries,

[300] Goldstein, 'The Round Table and the New Europe', p. 4.
[301] *Ibid*., pp. 4-6.
[302] *Ibid*.
[303] Ian Hall, 'Challenge and Response: The Lasting Engagement of Arnold J. Toynbee and Martin Wight', *International Relations*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2003, p. 400.
[304] Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, p. 312.
[305] *Ibid*; *Contemporary Review* OCLC [circulation] Number: 1564974.

as well as its reportage.[306] Zimmern sought to promulgate international awareness of Germany's importance via his encouragement of summer schools, recreational activities and international student conferences held in Geneva. These events came about after Zimmern ceased working at Aberystwyth University and started employment with the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, based in Geneva.[307] His colleague at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Toynbee, supported this work. In 1930, Zimmern came back to Oxford, where he began his 'writings' in the popular press that, throughout the decade, acquired a tone of 'idealist propaganda' rather than 'serious' scholarship.[308] He argued that the press would show its significance in reporting either the success or the failure of policy and stimulate this debate.[309] Eventually, however, the post-World War I model of 'diplomacy by conference' became moribund, despite its previously widespread public support.[310]

UK historians' regular access to the press had a powerful influence on their ability to self-identify as a cohesive number of individuals. Interwar historians found journalistic forays a congenial way to exercise significant influence on the public, particularly when the subject was Germany.[311] As a collection of individuals, UK interwar historians recognised the potential transnational scope of targeting wide-spread, English-speaking audiences.[312] They believed that a favourable outcome in the interwar era would require UK historians to be fluent articulators in the press, a view which saw them emphasise the cultural affinities between Anglo-Saxon nations.[313]

[306] Paul Rich, 'Reinventing Peace: David Davies, Alfred Zimmern and Liberal Internationalism in Interwar Britain', *International Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, pp. 123-124.
[307] *Ibid*., p. 123.
[308] Cf. *Ibid*.
[309] Bernadotte E. Schmitt, 'The Relation of Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs Before and During the First World War', in A. O. Sarkissian (ed.), *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography*, London, Longmans Green, 1961, p. 330.
[310] *Ibid*.
[311] Tomes, *Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman*, p. 265.
[312] *Ibid*.
[313] *Ibid*.

Prominent newspapers' columns had regular contributions from historians in the interwar ear. Temperley, among others, maintained a visible presence in the press.[314] UK interwar historians' and public intellectuals' access to the press, as well as the Foreign Office and think tanks, was based on British assumptions about an individual's public involvement.[315] As well as Temperley and Headlam-Morley, their colleagues included Carr, who contributed articles for *The Times* from 1937.[316] This is exemplified in the press contributions of Headlam-Morley, whose output reflected the public nature of historians' work. Gordon Martel commented:

> Headlam-Morley's elevation to the position of 'Historical Advisor' to the Foreign Office enabled him to make what was an almost seamless transition from wartime propagandist to peacetime publicist. From 1920 until his retirement in 1928, he produced an enormous number of book reviews, essays and articles, amounting to some 250,000 words in total. Like the wartime propaganda, the vast majority of these were anonymous…It is not going too far to suggest that Headlam-Morley became the voice of *The Times* and the *Literary Supplement* on the subjects of war origins, war guilt and the peace treaties.[317]

UK historians' consolidated links with the press enabled them to pursue multiple goals.[318] These were facilitated by networks with colleagues who occupied places in the public space.[319] The increased growth of ideology in the interwar period influenced the role of the press and associations in providing UK interwar historians a platform to visibly display their opinions. They contributed towards the implementation of a new international architecture, which they hoped would integrate partner states in ever-increasing dependency. By 1936, Carr, Webster and

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[314] Robbins, *History, Religion and Identity in Modern Britain*, pp. 23-24.
[315] Martel, 'The Prehistory of Appeasement: Headlam-Morley, the Peace Settlement and Revisionism', pp. 243-244; See also: Robert Colls, 'The Lion and the Eunuch: National Identity and the British Genius', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 82, No. 4, 2011, p. 575.
[316] Porter, 'Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the Spirit Ironic: A Comedy of Errors', pp. 89-90.
[317] Martel, 'The Prehistory of Appeasement: Headlam-Morley, the Peace Settlement and Revisionism', pp. 243-244.
[318] Porter, 'Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the Spirit Ironic: A Comedy of Errors', p. 86; See also: Gary Love, "'What's the Big Idea?": Oswald Mosley, the British Union of Fascists and Generic Fascism', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2007, p. 458.
[319] D. C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1965, pp. 10-11.

Zimmern had published work on the League of Nations.[320] William Harbutt Dawson had begun his career in journalism and even wrote for the German newspaper, *Deutsche Rundschau*.[321] Dawson told his German readers in 1934 of his outrage at what he perceived as the UK press's unfair discrimination against Germany.[322] Temperley wrote to *The Times* amidst the crisis in Czechoslovakia in 1938.[323] He praised Czechoslovakia's leader, Edvard Beneš, as 'the wisest' politician in Europe, but ultimately supported the UK's accommodation with Germany on Czechoslovakia's borders.[324] Dawson was born on 27 July 1860. He was an historian, but had also worked as a journalist and British civil servant. He was educated at Humboldt University of Berlin, and the preponderance of his analyses concerned Germany and Germans. His two marriages were with German women. He died on 7 March 1948.

UK interwar historians largely shared the aims of the various peace movements, and sought to gain positive press exposure to attain converts for their program.[325] Zimmern shared the concerns of his fellow historians that the future of peace relied upon the success of international nongovernmental entities in settling international disputes.[326] World War I had convinced public intellectuals associated with the LNU that international affairs would command public interest.[327] Zimmern, like Murray and others, occupied positions within the League of Nations' movement and in academia, but was 'sceptical' of liberal internationalism's triumph.[328] Zimmern used the press to critique the agendas of the UDC and other groups as

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[320] *Ibid*.
[321] Stefan Berger, 'William Harbutt Dawson: The Career and Politics of an Historian of Germany', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 465, 2001, p. 102.
[322] *Ibid*.
[323] Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, p. 279; *The Times* article was: Harold Temperley, 'Czechoslovak Frontiers', *The Times*, 4 May 1938, p. 15, available from *The Times* digital archives, (accessed 11 January, 2015).
[324] *Ibid*.
[325] Helen McCarthy, 'The League of Nations, Public Ritual and National Identity in Britain, c. 1919-56', *History Workshop Journal*, Vol. 70, 2010, p. 112.
[326] Thomas Richard Davis, 'A "Great Experiment" of the League of Nations Era: International Nongovernmental Organisation, Global Governance, and Democracy Beyond the State', *Global Governance*, Vol. 18, 2012, p. 415.
[327] McCarthy, 'The League of Nations, Public Ritual and National Identity in Britain, c. 1919-56', p. 112.
[328] Casper Sylvest, 'Continuity and Change in British Liberal Internationalism, c. 1900-1930', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2005, p. 279.

unrealistic.[329] Through propaganda methods, however, the LNU sought to turn the people of the UK into 'enlightened patriots'.[330] These methods constituted public gatherings with speakers, writings forwarded to newspaper editors, pamphlets and educative materials.[331] Historians' work was published in a context where the 1935 'Peace Ballot' was extolled as a triumph for the League, given it polled nearly twelve million votes in the UK.[332] The occasion was recognised by historians as a publicity coup, and was perceived as an 'unofficial referendum on the future of British foreign policy'.[333] Only with the UK's accelerating rearmament from 1935 did significant numbers of historians begin to moderate their views.

UK interwar historians formed a fluid but cohesive collection of individuals, which can be understood in a variety of ways. Historians' increasing careerism, commitment to institutional affiliation and publishing laid down a marker for their occupational flexibility. Moreover, it facilitated their activities across four areas of public life: universities, political parties, policy making and the press. The roles fulfilled by UK public intellectuals ensured that historians' work remained a vital and high-prestige occupation, which was central to the life of the country in the interwar era. The next chapter examines the manner in which history and histories were written and disseminated in the interwar era, and the importance of class, ethnicity and gender in assessing the interwar historians' contributions about Germany

[329] *Ibid*.
[330] McCarthy, 'The League of Nations, Public Ritual and National Identity in Britain, c. 1919-56', p. 112.
[331] *Ibid*., pp. 112-114.
[332] *Ibid*., p. 112.
[333] *Ibid*.

# CHAPTER 2

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Histories of interwar Britain

UK historians' ability to depict themselves as authoritative spokesmen was influenced by the socio-cultural context of interwar Britain. The chapter argues that UK interwar historians' analyses were particularly shaped by class and Anglo-Saxonism, which were both formative aspects of their identity. Class influenced them by regulating their access to politics and the public space. UK historians benefited from the synergy between class and education, and used the relationship between the two to move across different contexts. Finally, the shifting perceptions of Anglo-Saxonism in the interwar era influenced UK historians' interpretations about whiteness, masculinity and culture. The work they created inspired cultural feedback that often elicited political reactions. Historians' cognisance of England's place in the UK, particularly its position as the metropole in a multiethnic and multinational empire set the context for their public involvement. The main interpretations of this field are summarised in the existing state of knowledge of these various approaches. The chapter discusses the framework in a thematic way, focusing on how these aspects interacted in the interwar UK.

The cohort of UK historians who were familiar with Germany, and with German history, enjoyed a professional, intellectual identity which stimulated an awareness of how they came to comprehend and write about Germany. While the literature on relations between the UK and Germany is vast, the perspectives of UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany is placed within a context of the interwar period. A critical foundation of the thesis, however, uses frameworks that analyse Anglo-German relations from perspectives that transcend the periodisation of the interwar era. This schema incorporates the intellectual heritage of how UK historians and public intellectuals acted, and occasioned effects. Stefan Berger and Daren Lilleker contextualised a backwards and forwards continuum of influence between Britons and Germans, and articulated that it extended beyond the passing of

World War II.[1] This pattern was identifiable among multiple actors in both countries in the post-World War II period of Anglo-German relations.[2] Berger and Lilleker acknowledged that post-World War II German politicians gained inspiration for democracy by invoking the early twentieth century experience of the UK, in both war and peace, under a democratic system.[3]

UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany recognised that the 'German Question' occupied the centrality of issues that revolved around Cold War disagreements in the several decades following World War II.[4] R. Gerald Hughes and Rachel Owen maintained that the UK had a powerful influence in ensuring that the configuration of a future German polity be determined for the advancement of British interests.[5] W. R. Smyser observed of Germany that 'no nation's fury, no nation's fate, had a greater impact on the twentieth century'.[6] Similarly to the interwar period under investigation, the 1950s saw much opinion emanate from the UK on whether the British government should adopt a more flexible posture towards the GDR.[7] David Childs authored an article about the relationship between members of the British Labour Party and the GDR.[8] Childs observed that support for closer UK-GDR relations was stronger within elements of the British left and that they were early advocates of extending to the GDR a degree of legal acknowledgement.[9]

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[1] Stefan Berger and Darren Lilleker, 'The British Labour Party and the German Democratic Republic during the Era of Non-Recognition, 1949-1973', *Historical Journal*, Vol. 45, 2002, p. 436; The GDR was the German Democratic Republic, [*Deutsche Demokratische Republik*, (DDR)], or East Germany. It existed from 1949-1990. The FRG was the Federal Republic of Germany, [*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*], or West Germany. It existed from 1949-1990.
[2] *Ibid*.
[3] *Ibid*.
[4] W. R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany*, New York, St Martin's Griffin, 1990] 1999, p. xvii.
[5] R. Gerald Hughes and Rachel J. Owen, '"The Continuation of Politics by other Means": Britain, the Two Germanys and the Olympic Games, 1949-1972', *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2009, p. 444.
[6] Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany*, p. xvii.
[7] Arnd Bauerkämper, 'It Took Three to Tango: The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Relationship between Britain and the GDR, 1949 to 1990', in Stefan Berger and Norman LaPorte (eds), *The Other Germany: Perceptions and Influences in British-East German Relations, 1945-1990*, Augsburg, Wißner-Verlag, 2005, pp. 45-60.
[8] David Childs, 'British Labour and Ulbricht's State: The Fight for Recognition', in Adolf M. Birke and Günter Heydemann (eds), *Britain and East Germany since 1918*, Munich, 1992, pp. 95-97.
[9] *Ibid*.

For UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany, the nuances and complexities of people who desired better relations for the advancement of their respective country's interests were evident.[10] As Anthony Glees held, this was shown when representatives from the UK sought to promote the image of the post-World War II polity of the GDR to the British public.[11] Arnd Bauerkämper emphasised that the position of gradually recognising the GDR was supported by some members of the British Labour Party members, who hoped to facilitate measures that would increase contacts between the UK and the GDR.[12] They supported the eventual reunification of Germany, and sought to prevent tensions that could escalate into the recurrence of another major European war.[13] At first, however, the stance of not recognising the GDR was relatively uncontroversial in the UK.[14] GDR functionaries portrayed their own polity as 'antifascist' when compared to the FRG.[15] As Germans from the GDR, they sought to capitalise on the hostility towards anything that was deemed to be German by some in the UK, and they aimed to influence 'specific target groups' to promote the interests of the GDR away from the FRG.[16] UK historians identified class structure and class mobility as powerful aspects that informed their own sense of social standing, the importance of which energised how they came to know Germany.

## Class

The significance of interwar UK historians' understanding of class was shown in the synergies realised in the networks between class and politics. As Berger showed in how vocal some UK perspectives were in a later period of Anglo-German relations, and is a vital basis for this thesis, class was a powerful factor.[17] The political culture

[10] Anthony Glees, *The Stasi Files: East Germany's Secret Operations against Britain*, London, Free Press, 2003, pp. 70-72.
[11] *Ibid*.
[12] Bauerkämper, 'It Took Three to Tango: The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Relationship between Britain and the GDR, 1949 to 1990', pp. 45-60.
[13] *Ibid*.
[14] Hughes and Rachel J. Owen, '"The Continuation of Politics by other Means": Britain, the Two Germanys and the Olympic Games, 1949-1972', p. 451.
[15] Stefan Berger and Norman LaPorte, 'In Search of Antifascism: The British Left's Response to the German Democratic Republic during the Cold War', *German History*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2008, p. 536.
[16] *Ibid*.
[17] Stefan Berger, '*Ostpolitik* before *Ostpoliti*k: The British Labour Party and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 1955-64', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2006, p. 414; Berger also showed how historians' preoccupation with ages of transition had an influence on their work: Stefan

from which UK historians emerged was complicated by the post-war riots and recession of 1919-1921, the 1926 General Strike, and the mass unemployment of the 1929 Great Depression.[18] The Labour Party won government for the first time under Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in January 1924, and the intellectuals associated with the party sought to expose its party members to arguments about Germany's place in international relations.[19] Such considerations were also characterised by the social legacy of World War I, and the substantial influence of the World War I 'trench generation'.[20] While interwar UK intellectuals recorded World War I enlistees' severe treatment in various publications, their consideration indicated an obvious class-based bias in comparison to their commissioned counterparts.[21]

The manner in which histories were written and disseminated in the interwar period show the prevalence of class as a significant category. The merging of class and politics brought together a synthesis that involved UK historians. John Field drew attention to the strong motivation of those university students who operated unemployment camps in the interwar period and their later pursuit of other avenues of 'social service'.[22] The Great Depression of 1929 also influenced how Britons viewed Germany, and Philip Noel-Baker argued that the ruination of Germany's middle class by the Franco-Belgian Ruhr occupation had a powerful impact on British ideas of class.[23]

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Berger, 'Municipalism, Regionalism, Nationalism: Hybrid Identity Formations and the Making of Modern Europe', *National Identities*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2006, p. 442.

[18] Stephen Heathorn and David Greenspoon, 'Organising Youth for Partisan Politics in Britain, 1918-c.1932', *Historian*, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2006, p. 118.

[19] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Rethinking a Socialist Foreign Policy: The British Labour Party and International Relations Experts, 1981 to 1931', *International Labour and Working-Class History*, Vol. 75, No. 1, 2009, 2009, p. 32.

[20] Julia Stapleton, 'Political Thought and National Identity in Britain, 1850-1950', in Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore and Brian Young (eds), *History, Religion, and Culture: British Intellectual History, 1750-1950*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 262-263.

[21] Douglas Carl Peifer, 'The Past in the Present: Passion, Politics, and the Historical Profession in the German and British Pardon Campaigns', *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 71, No. 4, 2007, pp. 1114-1127.

[22] John Field, 'Service Learning in Britain between the Wars: University Students and Unemployed Camps', *History of Education*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2012, p. 197.

[23] Lord Strang, *Britain in World Affairs: A Survey of the Fluctuations in British Power and Influence from Henry VIII to Elizabeth II*, London, Faber and Faber, 1961, p. 299.

The historians of this thesis witnessed political machinations that informed their views on the roles of property, class, and the public space. The UK's economy had been dominated by sectors of shipping, steel, coal and textiles, and most of the unemployed came from these heavy industries when economic downturn arrived.[24] The problem became so pronounced that British governments enacted twenty-eight unemployment insurance bills, from 1919 to 1934.[25] This was a change in direction for public policy, however, given that the state had previously only given its functionaries pensions rather than the general public.[26] Denis Lineham stated that there were wide variations in the spread of economic upheaval in the interwar era, remarking that although there was mass unemployment, southern England (where most of the thesis' historians were based) enjoyed something of a boom for long periods.[27] Daniel Garsk suggested that the interwar era was prominent for experiencing the end of cooperation between the interests of property and labour, notably apparent, he suggested, within the Liberal Party.[28] The Liberal Party's fortunes waned in the period, alongside the simultaneous rise of class antagonisms and the Labour Party.[29] Garsk indicated that this 'interwar division of British politics along class lines' was explainable because of the weakening of trade unions in the 1920s.[30] Such changes had a powerful impact on historians' social networks and political assumptions about future international developments.

Class informed UK historians' discussions at the highest levels of international diplomacy in the period, and their interest in nascent international institutions is core to the thesis. The interplay between capitalism, socialism and social democracy was at the heart of international debates among intellectuals on the activist Left.[31] Lucian Ashworth maintained that radical and reformist socialists

[24] Pamela M. Graves, 'A Blessing or a Curse? Working-Class Attitudes to State Welfare Programmes in Britain, 1919-1939', *Labour History Review*, Vol. 74, No. 2, 2009, p. 172.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] Edward Higgs, 'Fingerprints and Citizenship: The British State and the Identification of Pensioners in the Interwar Period', *History Workshop Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 69, 2010, p. 55.
[27] Denis Linehan, 'Regional Survey and the Economic Geographies of Britain, 1930-1939', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2003, p. 97.
[28] W. Daniel Garst, 'From Sectoral Linkages to Class Conflict: Trade and Coalition Formation in Britain Prior to and after World War I', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 7, 1999, p. 801.
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid*., p. 802.
[31] Ashworth, 'Rethinking a Socialist Foreign Policy: The British Labour Party and International Relations Experts, 1981 to 1931', p. 45.

shared similar goals regarding pacifist liberal internationalism,[32] but that working out the machinery for the League of Nations' operation was a priority for the reformers. As Ashworth contrasted, 'the League may not have been socialist, but its existence could be part of the development of a socialist world'.[33]

Historians sought to give greater recognition to class as an effective way to understand the challenges of the period, and as a reference point for analysing the UK as a whole.[34] Class-based rhetoric gradually acquired a central position in interwar Britain.[35] Simon Gunn postulated that class gradually departed from its previous association with particular localities in the period from 1918. He noted that, while 'workers…might be identified somewhat vaguely with the north', the label 'middle class' was increasingly synonymous with that of the nation.[36] He suggested that the term 'middle class' had appropriated an authority that was national in reach and had transcended 'local and specific' contexts.[37] Such authority facilitated historians' public authority.

One aspect of the historians' ability to access public space through their personal and professional networks was the growing reach of serious newspapers that catered to all views of society.[38] As Adrian Bingham wrote, 'the circulation of daily newspapers doubled in the 20 years after 1918, and 'by 1939 some two-thirds of the population read one'.[39] In drawing attention to the rise of the 'upper-class gentleman' journalist who reflected wider social change of reading publics, Sarah Newman noted that newspaper proprietors recognised the 'highly valuable asset' of a 'man on the inside' who would not appear out of place amongst the gatherings of powerful

[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] David Cannadine, *The Rise and Fall of Class in Britain*, New York, Cannadine, 1999, p. 140-141.
[35] Simon Gunn, 'Class, Identity and the Urban: The Middle Classes in England, c. 1790-1950', *Urban History*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2004, p. 44.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] Adrian Bingham, 'An Organ of Uplift?', *Journalism Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2013, p. 651.
[39] *Ibid.*

men.[40]

Historians drew attention to people's circumstances, and experiences of class as an expression of identity.[41] Following World War I, many intellectuals invoked the concept of 'Englishness' to attempt to eviscerate the emergence of alien ideological fanaticism from both sides of the political spectrum.[42] Arthur Bryant, G. M. Trevelyan and H. A. L. Fisher sought to increase the public's consciousness of the UK's history as a part of this process. Trevelyan, for example, recognised trade unions as part of the history of what he termed 'Englishry', despite his omission of socialist thought from its understanding.[43] E. D. Morel viewed 'the worker as the prime agent of twentieth-century politics', and backed working-class movements that campaigned for influence.[44] These class-based concepts were articulated within the rubric of the UK's changing identity.

As individuals, they frequently aimed to persuade the public to adopt their points of view regarding class. Eric Hobsbawm observed that what came to be known as middle-class attitudes had the potential to change behaviour.[45] These 'practices' included attitudes about education and were transmitted between social groups, such as instances of historians' promotions of national histories.[46] He proposed that the importance of 'invented traditions' resided in their political and social resonance across aspects of identity, education and employment.[47] Ross McKibbin contended that the interwar period was unique for the heightened intensity of feeling among classes in the UK.[48]

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[40] Sarah Newman, 'Gentleman, Journalist, Gentleman, Journalist: Gossip Columnists and the Professionalisation of Journalism in Interwar Britain', *Journalism Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2013, p. 705.
[41] Stefan Schwarzkopf, 'Discovering the Consumer: Market Research, Product Innovation, and the Creation of Brand Loyalty in Britain and the United States in the Interwar Years', *Journal of Macro-marketing*, Vol. 29, No. 8, 2008, p. 17.
[42] Stapleton, 'Political Thought and National Identity in Britain, 1850-1950', pp. 262-263.
[43] *Ibid*., 266.
[44] Jonathan E. Robins, 'Slave Cocoa and Red Rubber: E. D. Morel and the Problem of Ethical Consumption', *Contemporary Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2012, p. 606.
[45] Eric Hobsbawm, 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914', in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 306-307.
[46] *Ibid.*
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] Ross McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures: England, 1918-1951*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 54.

Historians took opportunities to maximise the synergies between class and education to expand their roles. The majority of UK historians came from the same social stratum and had mannerisms and outlooks that were in keeping with their education.[49] Those UK historians who identified as English had a vast influence within the state's historiography, due to their near omnipresence as teachers and tutors.[50] The universities of Oxford and Cambridge, as well as the University of London, were the locations where many of the conservative historians would remain throughout their careers.[51] Academics at the London School of Economics (LSE) had often received instruction at Oxford and Cambridge, and were of 'very comfortable backgrounds'.[52] Reba Soffer noted that 'even the historians at the LSE' had commonalties with aspects of the ancient universities, and described them as 'an exclusive and almost incestuous community'.[53] The public recognition afforded to historians further facilitated this. E. H. Carr, whose newspaper was the *Manchester Guardian*, attained a permanent academic posting at his alma mater of Trinity College, Cambridge University, because, 'typically, [they] knew next to nothing of his work but took him in because they knew him to be famous'.[54]

Class in the interwar UK existed alongside an educational framework that favoured those with the networks and capital to pursue high intellectual achievement. This system rewarded the academic elite whose influence was underpinned by their intellect and the continuance of the educational system.[55] Gail Savage argued that the English Board of Education was staffed by men who were themselves beneficiaries of the system. She suggested that the 'small, meritocratic elite' was a reflection of

[49] Reba N. Soffer, *History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: The Great War to Thatcher and Reagan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 226.
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 226-230.
[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] Jonathan Haslam, 'E. H. Carr's Search for Meaning, 1892--1982', in Michael Cox (ed.), *E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000, pp. 27-32.
[55] Julia Stapleton, 'Political Thought, Elites, and the State in Modern Britain', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1999, p. 254.

the type of government that had traditionally ruled the UK.[56] The 'framing concepts' that intellectuals received from universities, she reasoned, were vital for facilitating their career progression, weaving their 'professional identity' with that of 'social identity'.[57] In other words, it was an occupational identity. UK university students in this period, moreover, encompassed 'well under 2% of all young Britons'.[58] The middle and upper class represented the vast majority of those involved in giving and receiving education in the university system.[59] There were variations in context, however, and familial circumstances of UK historians ranged from penury to affluence.[60]

Despite their privilege, 'academics' and political functionaries contributed to breaking down perceptions of class barriers between different regions.[61] UK interwar historians and public intellectuals were community figures, who were instrumental in convincing public authorities to grant schoolchildren free access to historically significant places of the UK.[62] Their actions were premised on history's 'central place' within a compulsory schooling system.[63] In this manner, the prevailing social order infused what was positioned as the 'democratic culture of history'.[64]

Marxist historical scholarship represented the UK's history as a revolutionary continuum that would lead to Marxism.[65] Intellectuals of the Left-leaning Teacher Labour League sought to apply pressure to the Labour party at its 26th yearly

[56] Gail L. Savage, 'Social Class and Social Policy: The Civil Service and Secondary Education in England during the Interwar Period', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1983, pp. 276-277.
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] Field, 'Service Learning in Britain between the Wars: University Students and Unemployed Camps', p. 195.
[59] *Ibid.*
[60] Soffer, *History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: The Great War to Thatcher and Reagan*, p. 38.
[61] Jeremy Burchardt, 'State and Society in the English Countryside: The Rural Community Movement, 1918-39', *Rural History*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2012, pp. 86-87.
[62] Billie Melman, *The Culture of History: English Uses of the Past, 1800-1953*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 150.
[63] *Ibid*.
[64] *Ibid*., pp. 150-151.
[65] Edwin A. Roberts, 'From the History of Science to the Science of History: Scientists and Historians in the Shaping of British Marxist Theory', Science and Society, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2005, p. 546-546.

conference in 1926.[66] They advocated for an appreciable inclusion of working-class history in history books, and demanded the adoption of policies that deemphasised establishment-centred histories.[67] In the middle of the 1930s, Marxist intellectuals' attempted to influence their compatriots to forswear 'the official English history taught by official English historians'.[68] At the time, government officials identified the introduction of 'communist ideas' into the education system as tantamount to sabotage.[69] Despite this, however, the intellectuals of the Communist Party of Great Britain often sought to resist the authority of the Soviet Union.[70]

UK interwar historians recognised the salience of educational access in discussions about class, as well as the role of geographic locales in the intersection of class and education. In the 1920s, the north-west areas of England were reliant on young and part-time workers engaged in textile production.[71] Historians showed regret that local business interests and 'some working-class opinion' had misgivings about the worth of educational access.[72] The professional classes were mainly centred on London, and the business leaders of southern England, embodied most of the British 'elite'.[73] In 1928 at Manchester, Fisher, who was then the president of the Board of Education, drew attention to how issues around class would have to be solved if education was to be improved. Fisher argued for policy changes that accommodated the growing sophistication of 'society', and deplored how the 'rich learn and the poor earn'.[74]

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[66] Jim English, 'Empire Day in Britain, 1904-1958', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2006, p. 268.
[67] *Ibid*.
[68] Cf. Roberts, 'From the History of Science to the Science of History: Scientists and Historians in the Shaping of British Marxist Theory', 544.
[69] Steve Parsons, 'British "McCarthyism" and the Intellectuals', in Jim Fyrth (ed.), *Labour's Promised Land?: Culture and Society in Labour Britain, 1945-51*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1995, p. 231.
[70] Stapleton, 'Political Thought and National Identity in Britain, 1850-1950', p. 267.
[71] Harry Judge, 'H. A. L. Fisher: Scholar and Minister', *Oxford Review of Education*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2006, p. 11.
[72] *Ibid*.
[73] W. D. Rubinstein, 'Britain's Elites in the Interwar Period, 1918-39', in Alan Kidd and David Nicholls (eds), *The Making of the British Middle Class?: Studies of Regional and Cultural Diversity since the Eighteenth Century*, Phoenix Mill, Sutton, 1998, p. 188.
[74] Cf. Genevieve Abravanel, 'English by Example: F. R. Leavis and the Americanisation of Modern England', *Modernism/Modernity*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, p. 694.

The intersection of class and education highlighted the prominence of masculinity in the UK.[75] Typologies of masculinity ranged from definitions of men as 'sensitive and caring' to being strong, 'competitive' men who shunned emotional disclosure.[76] As a collection of men, historians' work was both 'gendered and embodied'.[77] The 'monastic origins' of academia meant that a masculine culture was perceived to permeate through their work.[78] Their 'gendered' influence reflected the society that surrounded them.[79] Particular attributes of masculinity were associated with successful intellectual pursuits and were bound up with the competitive impulse to acquire intellectual command.[80] UK intellectuals' public visibility in the interwar era drew on their possession of these hegemonic masculine traits.

A number of the men in this thesis embodied a form of hegemonic masculinity, requiring its acknowledgment from their peers to be effective.[81] Public schools and universities had evolved from the nineteenth century and mandated an 'education in manliness as the preparation for a governing elite'.[82] World War I destroyed many men's pre-war certitudes of masculinity, although Fascists saw involvement in the war as having enriched its participants' masculinity.[83] Masculine standards were pliable and beheld changeable qualities.[84] Veterans, such as Harold Temperley, were associated with duty, and intellectuals' attributes included the perception that they were 'calculating', 'unemotional', and 'rational'.[85]

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[75] Peter Hopkins and Greg Noble, 'Masculinities in Place: Situated Identities, Relations and Intersectionality', *Social and Cultural Geography*, Vol. 10, No. 8, 2009, p. 814.
[76] Merran Toerien and Kevin Durrheim, 'Power through Knowledge: Ignorance and the "Real Man"', *Feminism and Psychology*, Vol. 11, No, 1, 2001, p. 36.
[77] David Mills and Mette Louise Berg, 'Gender, Disembodiment and Vocation: Exploring the Unmentionables of British Academic Life', *Critique of Anthropology*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2010, p. 332.
[78] *Ibid*., p. 337.
[79] Penny Griffin, Jane L. Parpart and Marysia Zalewski, 'Men, Masculinity, and Responsibility', *Men and Masculinities*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2013, p. 5.
[80] T. P. Lasane et al, 'Hypermasculinity and Academic Goal-Setting: An Exploratory Study', *Psychological Reports*, Vol. 85, No. 2, 1999, p. 489.
[81] Bob Connell, 'Hegemonic Masculinity', in Stevi Jackson and Sue Scott (eds), *Gender: A Sociological Reader*, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 61.
[82] George Mosse, *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 134-135.
[83] *Ibid*., p. 158.
[84] Kimberley Hutchings, 'Making Sense of Masculinity and War', *Men and Masculinities*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, pp. 391-392.
[85] *Ibid*.

A number of interwar Britons held the conviction that World War I had advantaged women.[86] Within the Board of Education and in schools, women gained greater influence and were believed by their male counterparts to hold a hostile attitude toward masculine traits. Boys' militarised activities at school were perceived to have been sidelined, for example.[87] This resulted in the National Association of Schoolmasters (NAS), a teachers' group with many veterans as members, opposing the initiatives of the National Union of Women Teachers (NAWT).[88] The NAS's values included 'imperial masculinity', and were expressed in the Men Teachers for Boys campaign, a public space initiative which sought to shield schoolboys from 'effeminising influences'.[89] The male teachers sought to guard against interrupting boys' development and to emphasise men's value in inculcating boys with a masculine identity.[90]

The association between universities and scholarliness provided a place for men to embrace the importance of friendship and male bonding.[91] Some middle-class men abandoned the 'stuffy formalities of pre-war homo-sociality'.[92] For example, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, who helped conceive the League of Nations, adored being around 'young men' in the then single-sex King's College of Cambridge University.[93] Dickinson felt that, 'the best tradition of King's [is] that of friendship and intimacy between undergraduates and dons'.[94] However, types of masculinity were averse to 'academic' success and some intellectuals pursued influence outside the academy.[95] Unmanly youths were often perceived to be of 'a particular type', and were cast by some as a 'cultural enemy' that was made up of dandified male

[86] Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 193.
[87] *Ibid*.
[88] Dolly Smith Wilson, 'Fighting the "Damnable Triumph" of Feminism: Battles Between Teachers' Unions in Interwar Britain', *Gender and Education*, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2007, p. 671.
[89] *Ibid*.
[90] *Ibid*., pp. 670-673.
[91] Helen McCarthy, 'Service Clubs, Citizenship and Equality: Gender Relations and Middle-Class Associations in Britain between the Wars', *Historical Research*, Vol. 81, No. 213, 2008, p. 532.
[92] *Ibid*.
[93] Jason Harding, 'Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson and the King's College Mandarins', *The Cambridge Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2012, p. 28.
[94] Cf. *Ibid*.
[95] Dean Lusher, 'Masculinity, Educational Achievement and Social Status: A Social Network Analysis', *Gender and Education*, Vol. 23, No. 6, 2011, p. 656.

graduates from comfortable backgrounds.[96] The masculine environment of the London medical schools in the interwar years emphasised 'performance' and 'competition', for instance.[97] St Mary's Hospital educated 'St Mary's men', just as other hospitals sent forth credentialed, energetic men.[98]

## The Growth of Anglo-Saxonism in the Interwar UK

Interwar historians' analyses of Germany were influenced not only by class, but also by shifting expressions of Anglo-Saxonism. The strength of English identity in the UK, and its connection to a white north European identity, empowered the historians to argue for a more just treatment of Germany in the interwar era. As an assemblage of cultural and ethnic assumptions, UK historians used a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage to promote friendship between the peoples of the UK and Germany.

To a considerable degree, historians contributed to notions of ethnicity that underpinned interwar identity in the UK.[99] Intellectuals were broadly involved in the policy-making processes that sought to strengthen national identity.[100] The early interwar era saw intellectuals with backgrounds in history, anthropology, genetics, biology and the social sciences produce writings that focused on ethnicity.[101] The ethnic context of the British Empire provided much of the context for debates relating to Germany. Racial diffusionists advanced a notion that supported the UK's moral responsibility to develop its colonies by virtue of their more advanced 'progress'.[102] They represented the UK's dominance over non-self-governing lands as the latest instalment in a parade of military adventures where a 'lighter skinned monotheistic "martial race"' gained ascendancy 'over darker skinned polytheists'.[103]

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[96] Adrian Bingham, *Gender, Modernity, and the Popular Press in Inter-War Britain*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2004, p. 230.
[97] Carol Dyhouse, 'Women Students and the London Medical Schools, 1914-39: The Anatomy of a Masculine Culture', *Gender and History*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1998, p. 126.
[98] *Ibid*., pp. 125-126.
[99] Tony Kushner, *We Europeans? Mass-Observation, "Race" and British Identity in the Twentieth Century*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004, p. 32.
[100] Ulf Brunnbauer, 'Emigration Policies and Nation-building in Interwar Yugoslavia', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2012, p. 606.
[101] Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the Question of Racial Equality*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2008, p. 313.
[102] Daniel Mark Stephen, '"The White Man's Grave": British West Africa and the British Empire Exhibition of 1924-1925', *The Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2009, p. 109.
[103] *Ibid*.

Social Darwinists, however, maintained that ethnicities were fated to fight until one emerged as a clear victor.[104]

Notwithstanding imperial rivalries, historians sought to remind the English population of the UK of their ancestral Anglo-Saxon links (although they often assumed that this emphasis on the English included the other constituent nations of the UK by default). Historians' writings about Anglo-Saxon qualities were conducted with reference to contemporary notions of whiteness and the historians at the centre of this thesis were active participants in public discussions about ethnicity in the UK. They did this by referencing the vitality of an Anglo-Saxon tradition, and by using Germany's historical experience to support opinions about that country's resilience.[105]

The competing interpretations of Anglo-Saxonism in the interwar UK provide a segue to understand the role of ethnicity and the salience of whiteness in the period. Those people in the UK who articulated a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage most clearly included UK historians of English heritage, who felt an ethnic affinity with Germans.[106] Connections with Germany had an ethnic foundation and were imagined to relate to the contact with Teutonic antecedents at Kent.[107] German ancestry was reputed to have provided the origins for England's development, with the two peoples held to share the same kindred blood and Anglo-Saxon destiny.[108]

The significance of an Anglo-Saxon and Germanic component to England's identity was redolent throughout historians' work. They did this by emphasising the Germanic roots of England's commitment to the principles and values of liberty. However, this view was complicated by some English views about the source of their nationality. 'The construction of Englishness at any one time and place has been

[104] *Ibid*.
[105] William Harbutt Dawson, 'Introduction', in Heinrich Schnee (ed.), *German Colonisation: Past and Future: The Truth about the German Colonies*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1926, pp. 26-31.
[106] Steven W. Siak, '"The Blood that is in Our Veins comes from German Ancestors": British Historians and the Coming of the First World War', *Albion*, Vol. 30. No. 2, 1998, pp. 228-230.
[107] *Ibid*.
[108] *Ibid*.

intimately connected to hatreds and antipathies towards those on the continent, or rather specific nations', suggested Tony Kushner.[109] Germany occupied a dual role as a source of Britain's ethnic fraternity as well as of a rival nation, having superseded France.[110]

After World War I, analogies were made between the Roman and the British Empires, partly in order to compare the strengths and weaknesses of the two multi-ethnic empires.[111] As the UK operated as a nerve centre for a trans-oceanic empire, some intellectuals expressed esteem for the ethnicities of British India, along with self-criticism for the common civilisation of the West.[112] Perceptions of ethnic decay and moral turpitude within the UK concentrated the minds of interwar public intellectuals.[113] Public intellectuals F. L. Lukas, Evelyn Baring and James Bryce commented on the contrasts between how the Roman and British empires framed ethnicity.[114] Post-war public school text books authored were orientated less towards ideas around Anglo-Saxon heritage and ethnicity, and large parts that accentuated its significance were excised as the country's connections were radically reimagined.[115]

In the interwar period, whiteness was an extension of ideas about Anglo-Saxonism, though Britishness and Englishness were terms that some English people frequently used interchangeably.[116] The UK's possession of a multi-ethnic empire, however, meant that definitions of the term would complicate a singular reading of

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[109] Kushner, *We Europeans? Mass-Observation, "Race" and British Identity in the Twentieth Century*, p. 32.
[110] *Ibid*.
[111] Krishan Kumar, 'Greece and Rome in the British Empire: Contrasting Role Models', *The Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2012, p. 99.
[112] Paula Hastings, 'Fellow British Subjects or Colonial "Others"? Race, Empire, and Ambivalence in Canadian Representations of India in the Early Twentieth Century', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2008, pp. 16-17.
[113] Elizabeth R. Valentine, 'Spooks and Spoofs: Relations between Psychical Research and Academic Psychology in Britain in the Interwar Period', *History of the Human Sciences*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2012, p. 82.
[114] Kumar, 'Greece and Rome in the British Empire: Contrasting Role Models', p. 99.
[115] Paula Hastings, 'Fellow British Subjects or Colonial "Others"? Race, Empire, and Ambivalence in Canadian Representations of India in the Early Twentieth Century', *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2008, pp. 16-17.
[116] Lucy Bland, 'British Eugenics and "Race Crossing": A Study of an Interwar Investigation', *New Formations*, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2007, p. 68.

Anglo-Saxonism.[117] Whiteness theory captures how certain groups gain access to privilege in society.[118] The concept of whiteness has been described as a 'slippery phenomenon', emphasising its situational and contextual nature.[119]

Within the UK, professionals experienced a distrust of foreigners after World War I, that often emanated from ethnic and faith-based prejudices.[120] Immigrants without proper documentation in the UK were deported with regularity as the country enforced its immigration laws.[121] For instance, some well-known UK intellectuals expressed 'cultural' hostility towards the Jewish population.[122] Part of the estrangement was encapsulated in Judaism's perceived menace to the UK's Christian heritage. Catholic authors, such as G. K. Chesterton, T. S. Eliot and Hillaire Belloc, opined that Jewish culture was inimical to social cohesion in the UK.[123]

Historians recognised that the growth of Anglo-Saxonism took place in a context where the other constituent parts of the UK maintained less attention to Anglo-German relations than did England. Attitudes towards the Irish fluctuated across time, but historians' knowledge of the UK's history reminded them of the complexity and nuances of the state's multi-ethnic and multi-national composition. It has been argued that the interwar era, which coincided with the Anglo-Irish War, saw ill-will towards the Irish heighten.[124] The Irish did not exhibit 'racial otherness', yet it has been suggested that UK authorities employed language that positioned the Irish as a 'non-white', 'uncivilised' people.[125] The 'racialization' of Ireland's inhabitants,

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[117] Pomfret, *op. cit*., p. 330.
[118] Tylor Stovall, 'National Identity and Shifting Imperial Frontiers: Whiteness and the Exclusion of Colonial Labor After World War I', *Representations*, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2003, p. 53.
[119] *Ibid*., p. 62.
[120] Martin Cloonan and Matt Brennan, 'Alien Invasions: The British Musicians' Union and Foreign Musicians', *Popular Music*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2013, pp. 279-284.
[121] Christiane Reinecke, 'Governing Aliens in Times of Upheaval: Immigration Control and Modern State Practice in Early Twentieth-Century Britain, Compared with Prussia', *International Review of Social History*, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2009, p. 58.
[122] Thomas Linehan, 'Comparing Antisemitism, Islamophobia, and Asylophobia: The British Case', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012, p. 372; See also: Benjamin J. Lammers, 'The Birth of the East Ender: Neighbourhood and Local Identity in Interwar East London', *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2005, p. 336.
[123] *Ibid*.
[124] Peatling, 'The Whiteness of Ireland Under and After the Union', p. 128.
[125] *Ibid*., pp. 115-116.

and its emigrants, saw the words 'Irish' as synonymous with 'Catholic and/or nationalist Irish'.[126] The Irish peoples' whiteness was juxtaposed with their marginal status within the UK's ethnic taxonomy.[127]

In the publications of the 1920s, the descendants of English colonists in Ireland were believed to possess the ethnic 'characteristics of Englishmen', maintained in the face of the 'alien' Irish ethnicity.[128] Furthermore, UK control of Ireland over many centuries was noted as evidence that the English were superior to the Irish, giving supporters the opportunity to invoke social Darwinian thought.[129] Another theme adopted by the English in the post-World War I era was that the Irish people's alleged primordial state as 'living fossils' meant that English efforts had been in vain.[130] In 1934, a Scottish bishop positioned the Irish as ethnically Mediterranean, in contrast to 'Nordic Britons'.[131] The geographic proximity which the English and the Irish enjoyed with each other was held to be 'more acute and dangerous than in any other part of Europe inasmuch as the two races in Britain confronted each other directly without, as elsewhere, being separated by Alpines'.[132] What amounted to 'popular hibernophobia' was salient in the period, having been dormant from the beginning of the twentieth century.[133]

Throughout much of the interwar period the adjective 'whitest' was judged an accolade, as the eighth Duke of Northumberland, Alan Ian Percy, was called by his colleagues.[134] Intellectuals such as Lionel Curtis was representative of those who believed in the English tradition in the British Isles and who believed increased affinity between the world's Anglo-Saxons was a worthy goal.[135] The Duke of

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[126] Louise Ryan, 'Aliens, Migrants and Maids: Public Discourses on Irish Immigration to Britain in 1937', *Immigrants and Minorities*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2001, p. 39.
[127] *Ibid*., 117.
[128] R. M. Douglas, 'Anglo-Saxons and Attacotti: the Racialisation of Irishness in Britain between the World Wars', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2002, p. 44.
[129] *Ibid*.
[130] *Ibid*.
[131] *Ibid*., p. 49.
[132] *Ibid*., pp. 49-51.
[133] *Ibid*., p. 53.
[134] Cf. Markku Ruotsila, 'The Antisemitism of the Eighth Duke of Northumberland's the *Patriot*, 1922-1930', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2004, p. 71.
[135] Daniel Gorman, 'Lionel Curtis, Imperial Citizenship, and the Quest for Unity', *The Historian*, Vol. 66, No. 1, 2004, p. 69.

Northumberland further developed Curtis' views to position the English ethnicity as the highest ideal.[136] Such ideas permeated society, in that the St George's Society expressed disapproval over the 1920 selection of an Irish candidate to fulfil the role of Lieutenant-Governorship of Queensland.[137] This body of thought was represented in how the Scottish, the Irish and Roma were classed as idle and unreliable and the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean ethnicities were castigated for their lack of redeeming qualities.[138]

Nazi Germany's assertive behaviour towards its neighbours from the mid-1930s influenced UK historians to veer away from using the word 'race' as a tool of characterisation, partly to differentiate themselves from the Nazis' particular understanding of the term, which significantly changed the context in which the term could be used.[139] These developments were coexistent with this thesis' UK interwar historians' writings as public intellectuals. The interwar years also saw increased xenophobia between European peoples in general, including anti-Semitism.[140]

Despite a tendency to categorise Germans into various typologies, the shared sense of an imagined common Anglo-Saxon heritage was one of the elements that aided the UK's sense of affinity with Scandinavian countries.[141] The writer, P. Morton Shand, spoke of 'our own Viking blood, the only blood in us that matters'.[142] Moreover, the geographer and anthropologist, H. J. Fleure, was a humanist who acknowledged that 'fair hair, light eyes, long head and face, tall stature and boney build' indicated the presence of a 'Nordic race-type'.[143] However, he wrote that Germans were often solidly built and 'broad-headed', thereby employing current

[136] Ruotsila, 'The Antisemitism of the Eighth Duke of Northumberland's the *Patriot*, 1922-1930', pp. 71 -73.
[137] Bueltmann and MacRaild, 'Globalising St George: English Associations in the Anglo-World to the 1930s', p. 103.
[138] Ruotsila, p. 103.
[139] Snait B. Gissis, 'When is "Race" a Race? 1946-2003', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2008, p. 438.
[140] *Ibid*.
[141] William Whyte, 'The Englishness of English Architecture: Modernism and the Making of a National International Style, 1927-1957', *The Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2009, p. 451.
[142] Cf. *Ibid*.
[143] Cf. Kushner, *We Europeans? Mass-Observation, "Race" and British Identity in the Twentieth Century*, p. 43.

standards of ethnicity to counter the Nazis.[144]

UK public intellectuals de-emphasised the ethnic aspects of a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage over time, as the Nazi Party rose to prominence in Germany. These ideas were expressed in Julian Huxley and A. C Haddon's 1935 book, *We Europeans*, which challenged biological interpretations of ethnicity for political ends, and was meant as a counterargument to Nazi German writings.[145] The anatomist, palaeontologist and anthropologist, Sir Arthur Keith, argued that ethnicities coexisted in a world of struggle in which the erection of boundaries between populations was normal.[146] Arthur Keith, Sir Arthur Keith, FRS, was born on 5 February 1866. He was Scottish and studied anthropology and anatomy. He became President of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Keith died on 7 January 1955. Each country's population were, in this view, 'actually evolving races'.[147] 'Racial' signifiers, such as skin tone, facial and cranial features, and fingernails were prominent in the writings of interwar British racial thinkers.[148] A number of 'radical' biologists in the 1930s, however, queried why 'racial classifications' were based on humans' phenotypes, or physical form, and not on their genetic makeup.[149] London School of Economics' Professor Lancelot Hogben proposed that genes were apportioned 'geographically', rather than fit with identikit populations.[150] The use of 'race' was minimised in anthropological and biological practice.[151] This was sometimes the result of observation of ethnically-informed policies within the colonies. For instance, Hogben's work in South Africa during the 1920s made him hostile to the application of ethnically-based scholarship.[152]

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[144] Cf. *Ibid*.
[145] Warwick Anderson, *The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in Australia*, Carton South, Melbourne University Press, 2002, p. 162.
[146] *Ibid*.
[147] Gavin Schaffer, 'Assets or "Aliens"? Race Science and the Analysis of Jewish Intelligence in Interwar Britain', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2008, p. 195.
[148] Tony Kushner, '"Without Intending any of the Most Undesirable Features of a Colour Bar": Race Science, Europeanness and the British Armed Forces during the Twentieth Century', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 46, No. 3/4, 2012, p. 369.
[149] Anderson, *The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in Australia*, p. 162.
[150] *Ibid*.
[151] Schaffer, 'Assets or "Aliens"? Race Science and the Analysis of Jewish Intelligence in Interwar Britain', *Patterns of Prejudice*, p. 196.
[152] *Ibid*.

Anglo-Saxonism influenced interwar historians' understandings about the shifting notions of masculinity. UK maleness historically operated on assumptions that gender was predicated on tough and durable qualities.[153] World War I provided a dominant context for masculinities in the interwar UK, given its immense impact on the social and cultural factors that underpinned gender.[154] The building of empire was believed to necessitate the involvement of men whose qualities correlated with imperial requirements. They were, it was hoped, 'self-reliant', 'resourceful', and 'practical'.[155] The men who perceived these aspirations amplified aspects of their identity that aligned with the UK's vision of Imperial Britain.[156] 'Manliness', as believed by youths of the pre-1914 middle class, was associated with martial experiences.[157] 'Jingoism' provided one outlet for men's energy in a social context where the distinctions between classes were less than those that separated the sexes.[158]

Masculinity was not simply conceptualised as a list of characteristics that defined a man, but a set of aspirational ideals to strive for. UK historians' masculinities were created within the UK and the 'transnational arena' of the British Empire.[159] From an Anglo-Saxonist outlook, UK males' possession of masculine ideals enhanced the UK's ability to pursue its civilising mission.[160]

UK historians saw Anglo-Saxonism as a celebration of the traditions of the English people, a phenomenon which found inspiration from their exploration of their imagined descent from manly, Germanic tribes.[161] Their support for Anglo-

[153] Alexandra Shepard, 'From Anxious Patriarchs to Refined Gentlemen? Manhood in Britain, circa 1500-1700', *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2005, p. 281.
[154] Tony Coles, 'Negotiating the Field of Masculinity: The Production and Reproduction of Multiple Dominant Masculinities, *Men and Masculinities*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2009, p. 30.
[155] John Tosh, *Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Essays on Gender, Family and Empire*, Harlow, Pearson Longman, 2005, p. 193.
[156] *Ibid*.
[157] Michael Roper, 'Between Manliness and Masculinity: The "War Generation" and the Psychology of Fear in Britain, 1914-1950', *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2005, p. 344.
[158] John Tosh, 'Masculinities in an Industrialising Society: Britain, 1800-1914', *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2005, p. 342.
[159] R. W. Connel, 'Globalisation, Imperialism, and Masculinities', in Michael Kimmel et al (eds), *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities*, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2005, p. 75.
[160] Deana Heath, *Purifying Empire: Obscenity and the Politics of Moral Regulation in Britain, India and Australia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 72-74.
[161] Connel, 'Globalisation, Imperialism, and Masculinities', p. 75.

Saxon heritage related closely to a construct of hegemonic masculinity.[162] This was commensurate with the social and cultural context of the interwar UK, and their ability to access the public space in a form that was authoritative. [163] Intellectualised men's bodies were a mechanism of cultural capital, as shown in their physicality.[164] Bourdieu expanded on these ideas in his 2001 book, *Masculine Domination*, in which he argued.[165] Historians enjoyed a level of social dominance which was commensurate with their status as male public intellectuals.

Society in the UK in the early twentieth century challenged interpretations of gender roles.[166] The UK's self-perception was linked to the idea that the British Empire fulfilled a civilizational calling, and that it was a force for Good.[167] Associated with this undertaking was belief that 'manliness' was integral to conducting the enterprise.[168] The gendered framework of masculinity set itself apart from femininity by observing the 'superiority of reason'.[169] This set part of the context of UK men's self-perception and male identity formation in the interwar era. This often centred on the dichotomy that separated the public and private space. The empowerment of women in various areas was presented as men's loss of their natural roles, with a role-reversal logic that suggested men were 'emasculated and feminised'.[170] Moreover, male colleagues of these women were described as 'effeminate, intellectual, highbrow and concerned with how other men dressed'.[171]

Anglo-Saxonism's influence on manliness in the UK in the early twentieth century gradually moved to represent 'militarist', secular, and physical values.[172] As

[162] Richard Howson, *Challenging Hegemonic Masculinity*, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 3.
[163] William Harbutt Dawson, *The German Workman: A Study in National Efficiency*, London, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906, pp. viii-xii.
[164] Simon Gunn, 'Translating Bourdieu: Cultural Capital and the English Middle Class in Historical Perspective', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 2005, p. 60.
[165] *Ibid*.
[166] Tosh, 'Masculinities in an Industrialising Society: Britain, 1800-1914', p. 330.
[167] Sharon Crozier-De Rosa, 'Marie Corelli's British New Woman: A Threat to Empire?', *The History of the Family*, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 416.
[168] *Ibid*.
[169] Anastasios Gaitanidis, 'Benign Masculinity and Critical Reason', *Psychotherapy and Politics International*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2012, p. 221.
[170] *Ibid*.
[171] *Ibid*.
[172] Martin Crotty, *Making the Australian Male: Middle-Class Masculinity, 1870-1920*, Carlton South, Melbourne University Press, 2001, pp. 11-12.

mentioned in the relationship between class and education, these values were found in the public schools and universities.[173] World War I exposed a taxonomy of masculinities, as servicemen interacted with comrades from various occupations and with different social status.[174] Men's ability to be 'natural, masculine' and willing to take life was held to demonstrate their 'normativity'.[175] Those men who did not conform were categorised as 'psychologically abnormal', displaying 'childish and infantile' conduct that was unbecoming of 'manhood'.[176] Despite the slaughter of the war, however, there was a belief among many 'young men' that combat was still heroic and purifying.[177] The promotion of the English 'gentleman', for example, as well as that of the British Empire in publications, extended throughout the interwar period.[178] The definitions of masculinity had shifted for many UK men, however. According to Martin Frances,

> [t]he newly re-domesticated male, who preferred dominos and home improvement to outwitting rebellious tribesmen on the North-West Frontier, became a paradigm, not merely of normative masculinity, but of interwar national identity.[179]

UK historians recognised that these factors would influence the cultural assumptions that Anglo-Saxonism relied upon. The shifts that Anglo-Saxonism underwent in UK society at the end of the interwar era changed how manliness was interpreted.[180] As the UK lurched towards war with Germany, aspects of imperial manliness were widely thought of as anachronistic. There was doubt over 'values' that had continued to be promoted in the aftermath of World War I.[181]

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[173] Heath, *Purifying Empire: Obscenity and the Politics of Moral Regulation in Britain, India and Australia*, p. 70.
[174] Bourke, *Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War,* p. 251.
[175] Joanna Bourke, 'Effeminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma: The Sufferings of "Shell-Shocked" Men in Great Britain and Ireland, 1914-39', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2000, p. 59.
[176] *Ibid*.
[177] Michael Roper, 'Between Manliness and Masculinity: The "War Generation" and the Psychology of Fear in Britain, 1914-1950', *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2005, p. 344.
[178] John Beynon, *Masculinities and Culture*, Philadelphia, Open University Press, 2002, p. 50.
[179] Martin Frances, 'A Flight from Commitment? Domesticity, Adventure and the Masculine Imaginary in Britain after the Second World War', *Gender and History*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, p. 165.
[180] Allen Warren, 'Popular Manliness: Baden-Powell, Scouting, and the Development of Manly Character', in J. A. Mangan and James Walvin (eds), *Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987, pp. 213-214.
[181] *Ibid*.

## The Role of the UK Public Intellectual

Historians expressed differing views as public intellectuals and there was not a uniformity of opinion on all issues. The term 'public intellectual', in the context of the interwar UK, refers to historians who participated in the public debate about Germany, and who addressed matters that related to Anglo-German relations. The distinction between historians who occasionally worked in academia and as public intellectuals were their activities in the public space. As Bourdieu observed, one part of intellectuals' function was participation in 'public activities', particularly aspects that were of 'a political nature'.[182]

Intellectuals who aimed to fulfil roles of dispassionate public duty was reflected in intellectuals' interest in politics. The interwar era continued a pattern where an 'ill-defined state of academic boundaries' had pre-existed, and this influenced how historians, among others, analysed politics.[183] As Julia Stapleton has argued, the rise of intellectuals as '"public" thinkers' was associated with the commonalities of mission that bound their work together.[184] Public intellectuals' membership of the historical profession saw them become part of a 'social subgroup' which had its own precepts to sustain themselves.[185] Herbert Butterfield spent much of his time invested in ensuring that specificity in the study of history resulted in a public good.[186] UK historians' social and cultural capital was connected with their involvement in the public space. As Collini surmised,

> [i]nsofar as individuals occupy the role of the intellectual, they are by definition playing a 'public role', since it is precisely the movement between their initial specialised or creative activity on the one hand and addressing the wider audience on the other that

[182] Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, Peter Collier (trans.), Stanford, Stanford University Press, [1984] 1988, p. 99.
[183] Julia Stapleton, *Political Intellectuals and Public Identities in Britain since 1850*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2001, p. 20.
[184] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[185] Jeremy D. Popkin, *History, Historians and Autobiography*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 54.
[186] Julia Stapleton, 'Modernism, the English Past, and Christianity: Herbert Butterfield and the Study of History, The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2008, pp. 552-553.

constitutes the activity of the intellectual.[187]

Bourdieu's conceptualisation of social capital referred to the benefits that individuals or groups acquired when they possessed resources that others deemed valuable.[188] Historians' social status paralleled the social norms of their class, correlating with the status of their work.[189] One measure of historians' familiarity with Germany was shown in the formal positions they attained. The Foreign Secretary from 1924 to 1929, was Sir Austen Chamberlain.[190] He was trained in modern European history at Cambridge. Chamberlain is known both for reasserting the Foreign Office's independence from prime ministerial control and for the Treaty of Locarno. The 1925 Treaty of Locarno guaranteed the post-1919 frontiers of Belgium, France and Germany and was held by contemporaries to be a major event of high consequence in the 1920s. Moreover, it seemed to mark the end of diplomatic unrest that had simmered since the 1919 Versailles Settlement.[191]

The relative uniformity of UK historians' backgrounds can be juxtaposed with their differences of opinion, but there was often consensus. Bourdieu identified the nexus that exists between the concepts of fields and habitus, and argued that it could be understood as the work of public intellectuals.[192] Accordingly, historians possessed social authority in their prescribed area of interest in Germany.[193] Bourdieu maintained that a system of an individual acquiring specific characteristics, including, among other things, 'traits, behaviours, properties, titles, academic qualifications', and any feature of the 'social world' provided them with capital.[194] They adopted multiple roles and identities in academia, the public service and

[187] Stefan Collini, '"Every Fruit-juice Drinker, Nudist, Sandal-wearer…": Intellectuals as Other People', in Helen Small (ed.), *The Public Intellectual*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2002, p. 209.
[188] *Ibid*.
[189] Peter Scott, *The Making of the Modern British Home: The Suburban Semi and Family Life between the Wars*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 11.
[190] Austen Chamberlain was brother to future British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.
[191] Patrick Finney, 'Raising Frankenstein: Great Britain, "Balkanism" and the Search for a Balkanlocarno in the 1920s', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2003, pp. 335-336.; 317-342.
[192] Ian Hardy and Bob Lingard, 'Teacher Professional Development as an Effect of Policy and Practice: A Boudieuian Analysis', *Journal of Education Policy*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 2008, p. 64.
[193] Lizardo, 'How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks', p. 780.
[194] *Ibid*.

journalism. To some extent their work overlapped. As private actors, however, their work was undertaken outside formal channels. UK interwar historians' work was accompanied by a proximity to the academy, politics, the public service, and journalism. These historians availed themselves of the opportunities available to intellectuals to articulate issues of public concern and interest.[195]

Class was a powerful frame of reference for people after World War I.[196] Intellectuals whose work was class-inspired incorporated such diverse figures as Oswald Mosley and R. H. Tawney. Their involvement, moreover, was as much intellectual as active.[197] Indeed, the class-based elements that involved education in this period directly informed the consciousness of those who self-identified with a particular class. Post-1919 British interwar intellectuals rarely used the terms 'idealist' and 'realist', preferring the labels 'socialist', 'liberal' and 'conservative' as either intellectual signifiers or as pejoratives.[198] People's social status paralleled the social norms of their class, correlating with work, 'standards of dress, restrained speech and behaviour'.[199] These were applicable to both foreign and domestic policy. Socialism was associated with a liberal paradigm that sought to transcend pre-World War I diplomacy, liberalism with the growth and expansion of internationalism and free trade, while conservatism was associated, often by its opponents, with the power politics of the state system that produced the war in the first place.[200]

There was much support for Fascism in countries where the likelihood of Communist upheaval was high.[201] In 1934, the UK's population of roughly fifty million people included fifty thousand British Union of Fascists members.[202] Within

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[195] Leon H. Mayhew, *The New Public: Professional Communication and the Means of Social Influence*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 140.
[196] Todd, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
[197] Stapleton, 'Political Thought and National Identity in Britain, 1850-1950', pp. 262-263.
[198] Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Where are the Idealists in Interwar International Relations?', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2006, p. 297.
[199] Scott, *The Making of the Modern British Home: The Suburban Semi and Family Life between the Wars*, p. 11.
[200] *Ibid.*
[201] Richard Thurlow, 'The Failure of British Fascism, 1932-40', in Andrew Thorpe (ed.), The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain, Exeter, University of Exeter, 1988, p. 74. Pp. 67-84.
[202] Lena Berggren, 'Swedish Fascism: Why Bother?', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2002, p. 412.

the UK, however, there appeared to be minimal chances of Communist revolution. The outcomes of the Triple Alliance in 1921, as well as of the General Strike in 1926, revealed the government's success in controlling 'neo-syndicalist' forces.[203] Harold Temperley, for example, supported the Conservative government's policy against the 1926 General Strike.[204]

Within both the UK and Germany, people who were employed by the state experienced harsh conditions following the war, and largely remained so throughout the interwar period.[205] In Germany, the chief German historians had a social status that paralleled that of senior German politicians. The title of Herr Professor and Frau Professor was synonymous with belonging to a group with affluence and high social standing. Accomplished German academics were able to able to exceed forty thousand marks annually.[206] They numbered amongst the esteemed personages in Germany.[207] Following World War I, there was a fluidity of roles that affected writers in the public space, including historians, public intellectuals, and journalists. Arbitrary cuts in the salaries of those employed on state salaries in German universities led to a 'quasi-proletarianisation of university teachers and their families'.[208]

## The Role of the UK Historian

This fluidity of the public space had a significant influence on UK interwar historians' public roles. The networks provided by universities, exemplified by the latter's ability to cultivate social and cultural capital, ensured that historians' collegial bonds were a factor in their employment by the government and elsewhere. Some history teachers modernised the teaching in their colleges in an attempt to enable their students' greater access to the civil service.[209] Such changes and

[203] Thurlow, 'The Failure of British Fascism, 1932-40', in Andrew Thorpe (ed.), *The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain*, p. 74.
[204] John D. Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1992, pp. 226-227.
[205] Klinge, 'Teachers', in Walter Ruegg (ed.), A History of the University in Europe, Vol. III, Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Centuries, p. 143.
[206] Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 22.
[207] *Ibid*., p. 23.
[208] Klinge, 'Teachers', p. 143.
[209] George Haines, *Essays on German Influence upon English Education and Science, 1850-1919*, Hamden, Archon, 1969, p. 89.

attendant transformations in public perceptions, existed in parallel to ongoing elitism. This latter was reflected in the remarks of Lord Chesterfield, when he elaborated that: 'an intimate knowledge of history, my dear boy, is absolutely necessary for the legislator, the orator and the statesman, who thence deduce their morals and examples, speaking and judging of the present, and by it the past, prognosticating the future'.[210] Such comments reveal the change in perceptions about the public role of historians that occurred during the interwar period.

British universities had a powerful influence on the contexts that UK historians would work across in the interwar period. The universities' curriculum had largely been focused on mathematics and the classics before the 1850s, with history added as part of the set framework.[211] By the middle of the nineteenth century, history had become increasingly defined as an academic subject, transforming the capital associated with the discipline. As the process accelerated, history teachers' roles gradually became those of university-based, professional staff.[212] This process transformed historians' role, but was not to define them publicly.[213]

Familiarity with networks provided historians with social opportunities, and helped them to influence the centres of power in the interwar period. It was part of the acculturating process at the elite universities that they sought to inculcate students with 'gentlemanliness'.[214] Peter Novick wrote that British universities traditionally concentrated on imbuing their students with gentlemanliness, rather than scholarliness.[215] Academic prestige was associated with elite and aristocratic characteristics. The British upper class's education was historically transmitted

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[210] Valerie E. Chancellor, *History for their Masters: Opinion in the English History Textbook, 1800-1914*, Somerset, Adams and Dart, 1970, p. 18.

[211] Christophe Charle, 'Patterns', in Walter Ruegg (ed.), *A History of the University in Europe: Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Centuries*, Vol. 3 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 61-62.
[212] R. D. Anderson, *Universities and Elites in Britain since 1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 8.
[213] Robert Harrison, Aled Jones and Peter Lambert, 'The Institutionalisation and Organisation of History', in Peter Lambert and Phillip Schofield (eds), *Making History: An Introduction to the History and Practices of a Discipline*, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 16.
[214] A. H. Halsey and M. A, Trow, *The British Academics*, London, Faber and Faber, 1971, p. 206.
[215] Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession*, p. 22.

through the prestigious universities of Oxford and Cambridge, as well as other ancient universities in the UK.[216] The career connections of such students led to the pinnacles of power in politics, the judiciary, the clergy, and industry.[217] Through these trajectories, students were introduced to the political class, were influenced by politicians and officials, and were furnished with a conduit for students to become involved in politics.[218] The Oxford Union, for example, promoted the exchange of political and academic discourse among members and visitors (a feature it shared with other examples of growing associations in society such as rotary clubs and trade unions). The students' interaction with representatives of government through university clubs abetted the transfusion of parliamentary mores, a process started in 1888 and made more regular as guests of the Union were invited from London.[219] The commonalities that many UK intellectuals shared before World War I included this similar educational culture and shared cultural beliefs from a social elite.[220]

Historians were among those leading the call for reforming the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service's recruitment.[221] European countries had standardised the process by which candidates entered the public services during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[222] Prior to this, patronage was still used, often with deleterious effects.[223] In the UK, the Committee of 1860 and the Playfair Commission submitted that successful candidates to the civil service have a university education and sit for an examination.[224] Despite these changes, however, the Royal Commission on the Civil Service in 1914, the Liberal Foreign Affairs Committee and radical members in the Commons, maintained that access to the

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[216] Halsey and Trow, *The British Academics*, p. 206.
[217] *Ibid*.
[218] Harrison, 'The Institutionalisation and Organisation of History', pp. 381-382.
[219] *Ibid*.
[220] Stuart Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918*, Edinburgh, John Donald, 1988, p. 3; See also: R. H. Thomas, 'German and English Intellectuals – Contrasts and Comparisons', in E. J. Feuchtwanger (ed.), *Upheaval and Continuity: A Century of German History*, London, Oswald Wolff, 1973, p. 88; Harold J. Laski, 'The British Cabinet: A Study of its Personnel, 1801-1924', *Fabian Tract*, No. 223, London, February 1930, p. 4.
[221] Ephraim Maisel, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926*, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 1994, p. 12.
[222] Brian Chapman, *The Profession of Government: The Public Service in Europe*, London, Unwin University Books, [1959] 1966, p. 74.
[223] Gerald E. Caiden, *Career Service: An Introduction to the History of Personnel Administration in the Commonwealth Public Service of Australia*, Carlton, Melbourne University Press, 1965, p. 50.
[224] G. A. Campbell, *The Civil Service in Britain*, London, Gerald Duckworth, 1965, pp. 40-41.

Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service remained too educationally and socially exclusive.[225]

World War I caused UK historians to be directly employed by their government to articulate a national narrative that emphasised themes of the popular will, sacrifice, social values and Manichean interpretations of the war. UK historians often contributed to public debates on issues that involved the use of military and naval force.[226] The value of learning from history was seen in the British government's attempts to bureaucratise history to facilitate its application to policy.[227] In September 1906, following the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars, Lord Esher recommended that a Historical Section be founded as a subcommittee to the Committee of Imperial Defence.[228] Richard Bosworth's writings documented the 'intriguing tendency' of governments' employment of historians during wartime.[229] The nature of UK historians' role and their wartime employment included the use of their abilities to coordinate and interpret intelligence.[230] Bosworth explained that this drafting of historians' tradecraft by governmental bureaucracies showed that, at the time, the discipline of history was seen as the 'pinnacle of the humanities'.[231] Historians throughout World War I knew the value of historians' role, who used it to seek explanations about the conflict, as well as to prevent its recurrence once hostilities ceased.

World War I's outbreak provided an opportunity for UK historians to amplify the UK's traditional self-perceptions of liberty and English notions of British exceptionalism, in contradistinction to Imperial Germany's perceived Prussian *junker* militarism. Three weeks after the beginning of World War I, historians at Oxford University's History School published their first interpretation of Britain's

[225] Ephraim Maisel, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926*, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 1994, p. 12.
[226] Philip Towle, *Going to War: British Debates from Wilberforce to Blair*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillans, 2009, p. 80.
[227] Andrew Green, *Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories, 1915-1948*, London, Frank Cass, 2003, p. 5.
[228] *Ibid*.
[229] R. J. B. Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History writing and the Second World War, 1945*-1990, London, Routledge, 1993, p. 10.
[230] *Ibid*.
[231] *Ibid*.

confrontation with Germany, entitled *Why We Are At War: Great Britain's Case*.[232] The publication was an 'Oxford pamphlet', but was actually a book in its own right that exceeded 250 pages in length.[233] Its contributors included some of the famous, contemporary Oxford historians, such as F. Morgan, H. W. C. Davis, Arthur Hassall, Ernest Baker, L. G. Wickham Legg, and C. R. L. Fletcher.[234] It underwent many iterations as the war progressed and laid down a marker for similar publications, such as *Britain's Case Against Germany* (1914), *Why We Are Fighting Germany: A Village Lecture* (1914), *Our Duty and Our Interest in the War* (1914), *Britain's Reasons for Going to War* (1915), and, *Belgium and Greece* (1915).[235] Similarly, the works of historians such as Gilbert Murray, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1915* (1915), and *The United States and The War* (1916), also influenced the public debate on the war.[236] Such historians sought to downplay any association with propaganda in their work and claimed that their contributions brought the objective detachment of historians' scholarship to the public debate.[237] The historians claimed that, 'we are not politicians, and we belong to different schools of political thought'.[238] 'We have', they continued, '…endeavoured to treat the subject historically'.[239] There was, however, a correlation between the war aims of the British Empire and that of the historians' published works.

UK historians' war work included their employment by the War Propaganda Bureau.[240] This task saw historians devote considerable efforts to present the British case for the war, in part to agitate elite opinion in the United States of America against the policy of neutrality.[241] Phillip Taylor declared that historians occupied a unique position to oversee this aspect of the war.[242] He argued:

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[232] Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918*, p. 60.
[233] *Ibid*., pp. 60-63.
[234] *Ibid*., p. 60.
[235] *Ibid*.
[236] Gilbert Murray, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1915*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915; Gilbert Murray, *The United States and the War*, London, W. Speaight and Sons, 1916.
[237] Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918*, p. 60.
[238] Cf Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany: British Academics, 1914-1918*, p. 60.
[239] *Ibid*.
[240] Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 35.
[241] *Ibid*., pp. 35-36.
[242] *Ibid*.

> [t]o all outward purposes, it merely appeared that Britain's intelligentsia had mobilised itself out of spontaneous patriotism with no motive other than a desire to explain the issues of the war as they saw it from their individual and personal perspectives. This approach was linked to a further operational ground rule of British propaganda, namely that it should always be based primarily upon so-called neutral facts or objective information. Now, of course, there is no such thing since all facts are selective. Unpalatable facts could anyway always be omitted through censorship procedures. And who better to serve as advisors to ensure such principles were carried out than historians?[243]

UK interwar historians' movement within and across various contexts, whether in university or government service, led them to positions where they could maximise their social and cultural capital. The war's effects ensured UK historians' status and social mobility within the corridors of power, and reflected the importance that social and cultural capital had for their profession. The consolidation of the British public space was a development that aided this process. UK historians' work transcended the brief of informing populations and included their work for the government. Throughout World War I, for example, UK historians worked to educate many government and private committees in order to abet the direction of their country's war aims.[244] These tasks included historians' analyses of Germany's food supplies, thus highlighting Germany's vulnerability to a naval blockade.[245] In the latter years of the war, historians were used to ensure that Britain was well positioned to manoeuvre in the post-war world, against erstwhile allies as well as former enemies.[246] In April 1918, for instance, a Political Intelligence Department (PID) was established within the Foreign Office. It was tasked to give the

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[243] *Ibid*., p. 37.
[244] Janet L. MacDonald, 'Sir William Ashley (1860-1927)' in Bernadotte E. Schmitt (ed.), *Some Historians of Modern Europe: Essays in Historiography*, Port Washington, Kennikat Press, [1942] 1966, p. 39.
[245] *Ibid*; See also: H. W. Koch, 'Introduction' in H. W. Koch (ed.), *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, [1972] 1984, p. 19; Koch claimed that coal was the sole strategic, resource-extractive commodity which Germany had in plenty; See also: Lizzie Collingham, *The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food*, London, Allen Lane, 2011, p. 90; the theme of the UK's food insecurity in the interwar years is succinctly explored in this work
[246] Keith Hamilton, 'The Pursuit of "Enlightened Patriotism": The British Foreign Office and Historical Researchers During the Great War and Its Aftermath', in Keith Wilson (ed.), *Forging the Collective Memory: Government and International Historians Through Two World Wars*, Oxford, Berghan Books, 1996, p. 199.

government analysis on current events, share the administrative burden that bedevilled other departments, and increase the effectiveness of diplomacy.[247] Furthermore, the many roles that UK historians adopted throughout the war included their eponymous role of producing historical scholarship.[248] The official historiography produced during World War I included, among other works, the Peace Pamphlets, the publications of the new think tank, Chatham House, and the large histories dealing with the war's effects.[249]

As an assemblage of individuals, UK interwar historians remained a highly influential collective. Historians were prominent among their country's delegation at the 1919 Versailles Conference, for example.[250] In the immediate aftermath of World War I, historians were ably positioned at the intersection of public and government spaces. Wider changes in the years 1918-1921 did much to lay down a marker for the social climate of the interwar UK.[251] However, the scale of deaths during World War I meant that much of the population regarded anyone associated with military and strategic writing as being connected to the mentality that led to the war in the first place.[252] The historians at the 1919 Versailles Conference included, among others, such intellectuals as E. H. Carr, Sir J. W. Headlam-Morley, Benedict H. Sumner, C. K. Webster, Sir George Prothero, Sir Maurice Powicke, Arnold Toynbee, Harold Temperley, Lord Robert Cecil, G. P. Gooch and Sir Lewis Namier.[253] Under the leadership of establishment figure and historian, Lionel Curtis, many UK historians began work at the newly established Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House.[254] This institution provided historians with a platform to analyse international developments by revealing the historical context of current events.[255]

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[247] *Ibid*.
[248] Richard J. Evans, 'The Creighton Century: British Historians and Europe, 1907-2007', *Historical Research*, Vol. 82, No. 216, 2009, p. 325.
[249] *Ibid*.
[250] D. C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*, Westport, Greenwood, 1965, p. 48.
[251] Jon Lawrence, 'Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalisation in Post-First World War Britain', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 75, No. 3, 2003, p. 560.
[252] Towle, *Going to War: British Debates from Wilberforce to Blair*, p. 86.
[253] Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*, p. 48; R. B. Mowat was another esteemed UK historian who served on Field Marshal Smuts' staff at Versailles.
[254] *Ibid*.
[255] *Ibid*.

## Cultural History

The critical foundations of the thesis as laid out in Chapter 1 emphasised the social aspects of how the historians worked, and to what extent their social and cultural capital composed acts that could meet the definition of interwar public intellectuals' work. The social context was vital, but only to the degree that it provided historians with the opportunity to continue to try to affect political influence by using the mantle of their cultural authority. Historians engaged with the key theoretical works that informed how they acted and influenced how they produced commentary. Cultural history within the UK favoured an independent methodological approach and empirical observation, while cultural historical trends in Germany were based around theoretical and holistic aspects.[256]

Differences between the UK and Germany provided a setting for which UK historians, both consciously and unconsciously, used cultural aspects of their training to contextualise political questions. Mathew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*, published in 1869, was wary of the promotion of 'philistine culture', the expansion of which contributed to the rise of electoral politics and reading publics. Class divides previously kept political influence to the upper classes, though changes within the working class and a middle class affected this system.[257] Among many, World War I weakened opinions that held the concepts of Englishness and Britishness to be synonymous.[258] After World War I, the UK regarded their war involvement in mostly benign ways, as opposed to the same position among the Germans being discouraged.[259]

The social milieu and the cultural environment of historians often affected the nature of the issues that historians would seek to provoke political responses to. The

[256] Peter Burke, 'The Web and the Seams: Historiography in an Age of Specialisation and Globalisation', in Benedict Stuchtey and Peter Wende (eds), *British and German Historiography, 1750-1950: Traditions, Perceptions, and Transfers*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 402.
[257] Graeme Turner, *British Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, New York, Routledge, 1990, p. 42.
[258] Barbara Korte, 'Wars and "British" Identities – From Norman Conquerors to Bosnian Warriors: An Overview of Cultural Representations', in Barbara Korte and Ralf Schneider (eds), *War and the Cultural Construction of Identities in Britain*, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2002, p. 12.
[259] *Ibid*., p. 11.

meeting of multiple, related circumstances saw historians' comprehension of the public space as a reflection of actuality.[260] For instance, the ways in which culture was viewed was changed by shifts in public communication.[261] The milieu that composed the interwar public space saw that 'rival national cultural histories' of the UK facilitated the contestation of what culture meant, and which public intellectuals sought to interpret.[262] 'Public culture' existed as an 'exceedingly complex' arrangement between writers and their readership, as well as between orators and their listeners.[263] Cultural historians expanded their research to include the cultural framework that underpinned in-group characteristics. These frameworks composed class, occupation, gender, ethnicity, and ancestry.[264] A number of aspects continued to influence how intellectuals addressed the public and what filled the content of their oratory.[265] As historians and public intellectuals, 'they were men of affairs', and they offered 'commentary on national or international issues to the press'.[266] Thus they could be influenced by censure from colleagues as well as from the public at large.[267] For example, Harold Temperley had testy relations with the academic Arminius Vambéry, who Temperley referred as a 'Great Charlatan'.[268]

It was widely recognised that culture and politics were interdependent, and that those who engaged in political activities would have to understand the synergy

[260] Thomas Bender, *Intellect and Public Life: Essays on the Social History of Academic Intellectuals in the United States*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1993, p. 4.
[261] Avner Ben-Zaken, 'Cultural History: Difficulties and Possibilities', *Cultural History*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2013, p. 1.
[262] Alex Benchimol, *Intellectual Politics and Cultural Politics in the Romantic Period: Scottish Whigs, English Radicals and the Making of the British Public Sphere*, Ashgate, Farham, 2013, p. 209.
[263] Bender, *Intellect and Public Life: Essays on the Social History of Academic Intellectuals in the United States*, p. 4.
[264] Robert Harrison, 'The "New Social History" in America', in Peter Lambert and Philip Schofield (eds), *Making History: An Introduction to the History and Practices of a Discipline*, Abington, Routledge, 2004, p. 116.
[265] Daniel Lee Kleinman, 'The Commercialisation of Academic Culture and the Future of the University', in Hans Radder (ed.), *The Commodification of Academic Research: Science and the Modern University*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010, p. 27.
[266] Stuart Macintyre, 'Australia and the Empire', in Brian W. Winks (ed.), *Historiography*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 171.
[267] Lee Kleinman, 'The Commercialisation of Academic Culture and the Future of the University', p. 27.
[268] Keith Hamilton, 'Service Rendered: Arminius Vanbéry and British Diplomacy', in John Fisher and Anthony Best (eds), *On the Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800-1945*, Farnham, Ashgate, 2011, p. 110.

that existed between the two to be politically successful.[269] Historians were among the 'political and administrative decision-makers', and as such were regarded as part of the 'professional elite'.[270] Culture had different ways in which it could be used, and it had a different type of 'power' that worked in ways similar to capital.[271] The interwar era saw much interest in how dynamics around the portrayal of culture could negatively affect standards of morality for the reading and listening public.[272] The power of popular culture ensured that there would be complexities involved in how and whether changes could be made in political matters. They recognised the power of political convictions among people, but that cultural, social or monetary aspects could influence political responses.[273]

The ways in which culture was viewed by UK historians and public intellectuals of Germany was changed by the shifts in public communication.[274] Cultural influences ranked large in the ways historians and public intellectuals elicited political knowledge. Social and economic history had formerly predominated over subjects that interested cultural historians.[275] As Michael Schudson has postulated, 'the question of the autonomy of different cultural fields is both theoretically and empirically important'.[276] Asa Briggs commented on how the earlier chapters of his five-volume *History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom* omitted how 'local, regional and national orientations' were underpinned by 'cultural factors'.[277] In 1938, the Talks Department of the BBC endeavoured to provide evening shows about the British Empire. The BBC altered its intention to air the show in its original format, following a recommendation from the UK's Colonial

[269] Jeffrey Hill, *Popular Politics and Popular Culture in the Age of the Masses: Studies in Lancashire and the North West of England, 1880s to 1930s*, Oxford, Peter Lang, 2014, p. 7.
[270] Macintyre, 'Australia and the Empire', p. 171.
[271] David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1997, p. 127.
[272] Turner, *British Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, p. 43.
[273] Jeffrey Hill, *Popular Politics and Popular Culture in the Age of the Masses: Studies in Lancashire and the North West of England, 1880s to 1930s*, Oxford, Peter Lang, 2014, p. 7.
[274] Avner Ben-Zaken, 'Cultural History: Difficulties and Possibilities', *Cultural History*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2013, p. 1.
[275] Peter Burke, 'Strengths and Weaknesses of Cultural History', *Cultural History*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, p. 1, pp. 1-13.
[276] Michael Schudson, 'Autonomy from What?', in Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005, p. 214, pp. 214-223.
[277] Thomas Hajkowski, *The BBC and National Identity in Britain, 1923-53*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2010, p. 9.

Office that its release would offend German sensitivities. This was because calls from Germany to have their colonial possessions in Africa returned were becoming vocal. To emolliate the concerns of the Colonial Office and German opinion, the BBC broadcast only one talk that dealt with the release of the mandated territories back under Germany's influence.[278] However, the BBC positioned itself to broadcast an enlarged number of Empire talks in the later part of 1939. The work was to be composed of 13 talks about colonial issues, and included the efforts of historians, such as Philip Noel-Baker and Professor of Modern History at Southampton University, Vincent Harlow.[279] The show's preparation was discontinued due to the beginning of World War II.[280]

UK historians' representation of Germany, and their engagement with Germans in the interwar era, elevated the cultural and political commentary in their work. Bourdieu asserted that nationalism, when combined with culture, becomes an 'artifact of power'.[281] He regarded this combination to weaken peoples' attachment to social values that have 'universal' applicability.[282] 'Symbolic' capital was promoted through the social capital of historians' social and professional circles.[283] The interchangeability of historians' use of various types of capital reinforced their legitimacy to comment on diverse issues.[284] The centrality of these issues stimulated historians' production of cultural authority, the display of which attracted political attention.

> Taken as a whole, Bourdieu's trajectory recounts the genesis of a specifically political mode of intervention in which social science and civic activism, far from being opposed, can be construed as the two faces of the same coin of analysis and critique of social reality aimed at contributing to its transformation…This manner of intervening into public debate implies the construction of a

[278] *Ibid*., p. 43.
[279] *Ibid.*
[280] *Ibid.*
[281] Deborah Reed-Danahay, *Locating Bourdieu*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 155.
[282] *Ibid.*
[283] Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu, 'Introduction: Field Theory as a Work in Progress', in Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu (eds), *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005, p. 4.
[284] *Ibid.*

different point of view on politics.[285]

In a similar vein, after World War I, UK interwar historians' work included the expression of their opinions in ways that made their views more reflective of the dynamic changes the world had lately experienced. Likewise, Bourdieu aimed to transcend what appeared to be the constants of intellectuals' involvement in political action. He did this by seeing the extent to which public intellectuals' activities could be constrained.[286] Bourdieu asserted that 'culture is what remains when you've forgotten everything'.[287] He explained that a person who has a connection with culture affords them with characteristics that would facilitate 'a cultural exchange'.[288] The changes in UK historians' work as university-based, professional staff expedited the forming of social bonds and networks. Indeed, historians' cultural and social capital complemented these developments and laid the groundwork for their continual role in the public space, providing UK interwar historians with a means to maximise their influence. The events of the war meant that there was a need for UK historians and public intellectuals to analyse Anglo-German relations.

[285] Franck Poupeau and Thierry Discepolo, 'Scholarship with Commitment: On the Political Engagements with Pierre Bourdieu', Loïc Wacquant and James Ingram (trans.), in Loïc Wacquant (ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005, p. 65.
[286] *Ibid*., p. 80.
[287] Elisa Tamarkin, *Anglophilia: Deference, Devotion and Antebellum America*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 258.
[288] *Ibid*.

# CHAPTER 3: VIEWS OF *DEUTSCHTUM*

UK historians of this thesis asked the question that German intellectuals themselves sought to answer in the interwar era, namely '*Was ist deutsch*?' [What is German?].[1] German and UK scholars alike conveyed an image of Germans that reflected the 'magnificent successes' that pre-World War I Germany had attained.[2] The chapter argues that UK interwar historians were influenced by competing perspectives of Germanness (or *Deutschtum*), which they then used as a tool to inform their analyses. The chapter examines how the men's work to shape interwar policy was affected by cultural concepts of Germany. UK historians' involvement as public intellectuals drew on notions of Germanness to help revive and return an Anglo-Saxon sentience to British policy.

UK interwar historians' relationships with Germany were founded on shared values and ethnic ties. The public intellectuals examined in this thesis believed that the bonds that could foster Anglo-German cooperation were widely shared in each country. The chapter identifies three prisms through which Germanness was examined. The first section investigates how UK interwar historians considered Germans' thinking about contested interpretations of Germanness. In this way, UK historians were able to demonstrate the nuance in their expertise about Germany in a manner that could influence public opinion. The second section examines how UK historians contemplated Germans' certainty of their country's ascendancy, attested to by the high quality of German technology and poetic culture. UK historians recognised that Germany had the potential to be both a valued partner, with its ancestral and ethnic affiliation with the UK, as well as a competitor. The third section explores the risks of Germany's vulnerability to humiliation in the aftermath of World War I. The historians justified this as a means to restrain the ambitions of a vengeful France through the observance of international norms. The chapter asks to what extent Germanness influenced UK interwar historians' work about the country, and whether their understanding of Germanness influenced events. The various interpretations of Germanness gave a reference point for historians and suggested

[1] Cf. Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology*, Berkeley, University of California Press, [1961] 1974, p. 88.
[2] *Ibid*.

that Germans' behaviour was understandable in the context of self-assertion, aggression and post-war insecurity.

## Contested Interpretations of Germany: Paradox of Germanness

A strong sense of shared heritage between the English parts of the UK and Germany motivated individuals to support Anglo-German cooperation in both countries in the interwar era. The historians analysed by this thesis saw themselves as advocates aiming to affect UK attitudes about Germany, and were aided in this in their successful portrayal of themselves as credible scholars of Germanness. Interwar historians' analyses can be characterised as focusing on four key areas of Germanness. Anglo-Saxon heritage and identity gave historians a common bond through which to understand associations between Germany and the UK. Confessional affinities harmonised the bonds between UK historians and informed their sense of the benefits of colonialism. Germany, or Prussia, was characterised as being motivated by aggressive aspirations for territorial enlargement.[3] German intellectualism was perceived by UK devotees to reflect Germans' widespread cultural achievements. As proponents of change, historians used these core areas to inform and shift public debate.

## Anglo-Saxon Identity

During the interwar period, definitions of Germanness became a tool for UK historians to debate how contemporary Germany should be portrayed.[4] UK interwar historians believed that Anglo-German relations could be reawakened and rebuilt in a spirit of cooperation that drew on a shared heritage and identity. Interpretations of Germaness drew on understandings about Germanic blood and culture, and argued that this historical legacy had contributed to England's development at the centre of the UK and its empire.[5] UK historians were aware that German historians had

[3] G. P. Gooch, 'Forward', in G. P. Gooch et al (eds), *The German Mind and Outlook*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1945, p. vii-viii.
[4] Anthony Richter, '"Blood and Soil": What It Means to Be German', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1998, p. 91; See also: Janet Carsten, 'Introduction: Blood Will Out', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 19, 2013, pp. 1-23; De Zepetnek and Steven Totosy, 'Early German-Canadian Ethnic Minority Writing', *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1995, pp. 1-25.
[5] *Ibid*.

posited 'English' ancestry as being associated within a paradigm of 'Teutonic and eventually, Aryan history', although they acknowledged their German colleagues' recognition that the English had acquired characteristics that were unique within a multinational and multiethnic UK.[6]

German concepts of *Heimat* and *Volk* held that Germanness prevailed wherever Germans were located, and shaped UK historians' ideas about boundaries of the public space.[7] Historians achieved this by acknowledging the resilience of German folklore, and admired the high value that Germans placed on being devoted to their homeland. The term *Heimat* is analogous with concepts of ethnicity and location, such as 'blood' and 'soil'.[8] In 1924, the philosopher, Rudolf Steiner, noted that 'blood is a very special fluid'. He suggested that the blood was where the 'human ego' was formed.[9] The idea of *Volk* represented the association of Germans, and had mystical overtones that encompassed a meaning greater than 'people'.[10] Awareness of a Germanic identity arose in tandem with interest in 'Teutonism', meaning the influences of German civilisation.[11] These two elements of blood and culture were held as conduits for *Deutschtum*. These concepts originated with the philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried von Herder, who had encouraged Germans to have pride in their origins, language, and ethnicity as a people (*Volk*). German citizenship was enacted under these parameters in 1913, and remained as such throughout the interwar period.[12]

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[6] Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 351.
[7] Willeke Sandler, 'Deutsch Heimat in Afrika: Colonial Revisionism and the Construction of Germanness through Photography', *Journal of Women's History*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2013, p. 54.
[8] David Morley and Kevin Robins, 'No Place Like *Heimat*: Images of Home(land) in European Culture', in Erica Carter, James Donald and Judith Squires (eds), *Space and Place: Theories of Identity and Location*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1993, p. 17.
[9] Rudolf Steiner, *Spiritual Foundations for the Renewal of Agriculture: A Course of Lectures held at Koberwitz, Silesia, June 7 to June 16, 1924*, Catherine E. Creeger and Malcolm Gardner (trans.), Kimberton, Bio-Dynamic Farming and Gardening Association, [1924] 1993, p. 47.
[10] George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964, p. 4.
[11] Richter, '"Blood and Soil": What It Means to Be German', p. 91.
[12] *Ibid*.

Devotees of Anglo-Saxon mythology searched for evidence of its reality in a 'historically constructed German Fatherland'.[13] As 'Teutophilia' increased in the interwar period in both the UK and Germany, its ethnic dimension was opposed by academics such as Professor T. A. Rompelman. Rompelman had examined Old Germanic languages and was averse to the notion that German ethnicity equated to a singular 'Germanic' ethnic group.[14] Nevertheless, Raymond Beazley, one of this thesis' historians, opined that Germans 'are closely related to the Anglo-Saxon stock'.[15] He elaborated that Germans, 'represent, when all exaggeration is put aside, the finest, most virile and valuable stocks on the Continent'.[16] Sir Charles Raymond Beazley was born in 1868. From 1909 until 1933, Beazley was a History Professor at the University of Birmingham. He was schooled at St Paul's School, King's College London and Balliol College, University of Oxford. He attained Fellowship at Merton College, Oxford but then received a chair at Birmingham University. One writer wrote that Beazley was 'associated with a pro-German tendency within the British political and intellectual establishment in the interwar years'.[17] Beazley often submitted pieces to the *Anglo-German Review*, a journal created in 1936.[18] He was a member of the Anglo-German friendship body, the Link, and held a position on its National Council.[19] Beazley died in 1955.

## Confessional Perceptions

UK historians were familiar with the multi-confessional patchwork of interwar Germany, and drew on a shared, dominant Protestant culture.[20] Germany and the UK were mostly Protestant, although both countries had substantial Roman Catholic

[13] Richard Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism and Ambivalence, 1860-1914*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 318.
[14] Marnix Beyen, 'A Tribal Trinity: The Rise and Fall of the Franks, the Frisians and the Saxons in the Historical Consciousness of the Netherlands since 1850', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2000, p. 517.
[15] Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, London, Constable, 1980, p. 278.
[16] *Ibid*.
[17] *Ibid*., p. 239.
[18] *Ibid*.
[19] *Ibid*., p. 309.
[20] Georg G. Iggers, 'The Intellectual Preparation for the Great War, 1890-1914: The Historians' Response', in John A. Moses and Christopher Pugsley (eds), *The German Empire and Britain's Pacific Dominions, 1871-1919: Essays on the Role of Australia and New Zealand in World Politics in the Age of Imperialism*, Claremont, Regina Books, 2000, p. 24.

minorities.[21] Historians studied how religious and regional identities had informed German self-conceptions about the 'soul of true Germanness'.[22] They were conscious of different regions' religious particularities, and of the regional rivalries that were accentuated by the turbulent events of the Weimar Republic.[23] As George Gooch assured his readers in 1926, 'the clerical and conservative Bavarian regards the North [of Germany] as the home of Jews, atheism, and revolution'.[24] Gooch had been raised in an Anglican household but sought to be objective in his analyses regarding confessional identity.[25] However, his personal prejudices occasionally revealed themselves, such as his occasional use of the word 'totalitarian' in his descriptions of the Catholic Church.[26] William Harbutt Dawson was Anglican and hostile to Catholicism, but supported German Catholics' complaints against Polish authorities.[27] Dawson backed German Catholics' petition to Pope Pius XI that sought to change the Free City of Danzig into a diocese under the Vatican's authority, a move predictably opposed by Polish authorities.[28]

Various UK historians believed that Germans' enthusiasm for religion strengthened the country's desire to possess colonies. Part of the lost order of Imperial Germany that particularly concerned UK historians was the loss of its colonies. This was because the vitality of the British Empire was central to how the English thought of their mandate in the world. UK historians saw the loss of Germany's colonial territories as a setback for Christian proselytising and missionary work throughout the world. Beazley and Dawson championed 'Germany's needs and wishes … [and] generous spirit', when seeking to promote Germany's colonial

[21] Scully, *British Images of Germany*, p. 318.
[22] Rebecca Ayako Bennette, *Fighting for the Soul of Germany: The Catholic Struggle for Inclusion after Unification*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 90.
[23] *Ibid*; See also: G. P. Gooch, *Germany*, London, Ernest Benn, 1926, pp. 344-346.
[24] G. P. Gooch, *Germany*, London, Ernest Benn, 1926, p. 346.
[25] Frank Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 2.
[26] Cf. *Ibid*., p. 30; This was while Gooch was lauding the contributions of his mentor, the Liberal Catholic, Lord Acton.
[27] William Harbutt Dawson, *Germany Under the Treaty*, New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1933, p. 151; See also: Stefan Berger, 'William Harbutt Dawson: The Career and Politics of an Historian of Germany', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 465, 2001, p. 108.
[28] *Ibid*.

record in their 1937 memorial to Baldwin.[29] They claimed that Germans' religious inspiration underpinned their colonial ventures:

> [n]o parliament in Europe showed deeper concern for the humane treatment of native populations than the German Reichstag, from the beginning of the colonial era. Long before the war German colonial administration was admitted, on unimpeachable testimony, to be at once conscientious, enlightened and beneficial. Men like Cecil Rhodes, Sir Harry Johnston, Theodore Roosevelt, Lord Milner and Sir Charles Eliot have born witness to this.[30]

UK historians were aware of views that ranked countries' importance in accordance to whether or not they possessed colonies, and connected faith and vigour with the civilisation they were held to represent. Historians' emphasis on Germany's 'singular success' in elevating civilisation would gradually lead to changes in British policy towards appeasing Germany in the later interwar years.[31]

## Militarism

Historians' attentions shifted onto considerations that reflected the changed realities of the post-war period. These realities focused on perceptions of French militarism amid Germany's temporary weaknesses. Germany's real and alleged wartime behaviour hung over discussions of what constituted Germanness, but historians recognised militarism as an important means to interpret Germanness. Historians understood the importance of the military victories that had led to the emergence of the *Kaiserreich* in 1871. The historical imaginings of Prussia drew on the military victories that the state attained in the late nineteenth-century Wars of Unification, following Prussia's successful campaigns against Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1871.[32] The decisiveness of Prussia's victory over France in the late nineteenth century was ingrained in interwar UK historians'

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[29] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Prime Minister Baldwin, 15 April 1937, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Stanley Baldwin's Private Papers*, Baldwin 124: 89-90, ff., F2. 91-96.
[30] *Ibid*.
[31] William Harbutt Dawson, *A History of Germany*, London, Ernest Benn, 1928, p. 80.
[32] Georg G. Iggers, *The German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical thought from Herder to the Present*, Middletown, Wesleyan University Press, 1968, p. 120.

analyses.[33] Preceding World War I, the journalist and politician, C. P. Scott, named Prussia, rather than Germany, as a problem, and that 'there was a real danger that Prussia (it was Prussia really, not Germany, which was in question)' was likely to reshape the heart of the European state system by force.[34] Charles Prestwich Scott was born on 26 October 1846. He engaged in politics, publishing and journalism. From 1872 until 1929, Scott edited the *Manchester Guardian* and owned that publication until his death. Scott attended Hove House and Clapham Grammar School. He was educated at Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford. Scott died on 1 January 1932. Admiration for Germans' military capabilities continued to drive post-war desires to deepen Anglo-German relations.

Historians contrasted both German militarism's utility and threat to British interests. The contradiction draws attention to historians' different opinions about the connection between militarism and Germanness. Connotations of Germanness were entwined with Prussian militarism and an authoritarianism that continued in the Weimar Republic.[35] On 5 November, 1918, H. A. L. Fisher delivered an address in Edinburgh that discussed Anglo-German relations as a microcosm of ideas that would affect the post-World War I era.[36] He stated that, '[t]he opposition between English ways and Prussian, which was so present to the minds of [Otto von] Bismarck and [Heinrich von] Treitschke, seemed to be one of the great facts which would dominate the future of Europe'.[37] Fisher's categorisation of Germany as belonging to either a 'Weimarised' outlook, or a 'Prussianised' one, would typify

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[33] Jonathan Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 286.
[34] C. P. Scott, *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928*, Trevor Wilson (ed.), London, Collins, 1970, p. 48.
[35] Tein-Lung Lie, *The Chameleon State: Global Culture and Policy Shifts in Britain and Germany, 1914-1933*, New York, Berghahn Books, 1999, p. 7.
[36] Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, *Political Prophesies: An Address to the Edinburgh Philosophical Society*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1919, p. 27; See also: DK 5.45: George Walter Prothero's reading list for his students of German history from 1815-1885, contained, 'Sime, *Germany* (Freeman's Series); Malleson, *Life of Metternich* (Statesmen Series); Seeley, *Life of Stein*, Vol. 3; Treistchke, *Deutsche Geschichte* (to 1848); Biedermann, *Dressig Jahre Deutscher Geschichte* (1840-1870); Sybel, *die Begruendung des Deutschen Reichs*, (1848-1870); Lowe, *Life of Bismarck*; Busch, *Our Chancellor*; Morris, *Life of Moltke*; Dicey, *The Schleswig-Holstein War*; Hozier, *The Seven Weeks' War*; Malet, *Overthrow of the German Confederation*; Maleson, *Foundation of the German Empire, 1848-1871*; Leger, *History of Austria-Hungary* (to 1859), translated; Arnold-Foster, *Life of Deak*; Kossuth, *Autobiography*; Memoir of, by E. O. S. (Bohn's Series), and included *Freeman's Historical Geography of Europe* (to 1877)'.
[37] *Ibid*.

UK historians' impressions of Germanness for much of the interwar period.[38] Its significance lay in historians' awareness that the UK and Germany had a complex relationship, the management of which would require prudence and caution on both sides if they were to avert becoming dangerous rivals.

The idiom 'Potsdam and Weimar' characterised Germany's reputation for both militarism and culture, and was a motto that concentrated historians' minds.[39] Pamphlets authored by UK historians in World War I presented Germany in stark terms of Prussian and un-Prussian characterisations of the country.[40] 'The real Germany' that Alfred Zimmern wrote of was 'closely akin to ourselves', and constituted western and southern Germany.[41] He and his colleagues wrote of '[t]his Germany, the Germany of the Rhine country, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Cologne, Nüremburg, is the Germany which so many Englishmen know and admire'.[42] 'The second and more powerful of the two Germanies' was Prussia, which detractors like Zimmern deemed as 'an aggressive military monarchy'.[43]

Notwithstanding the juxtaposition of several views of Germanness and its Prussian components, analyses that covered pre-World War I Anglo-German perceptions observed that 'for every anti-German/anti-British quote from the period' there were 'pro-British/pro-German equivalents, often from the same people'.[44] These quotes showed that the complexities of UK and German interactions were multi-layered and overrode simple binaries. Dawson reflected the nuances of the signifiers of Germanness and the significance of Prussia's perceived singularity when he wrote that,

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[38] S. D. Stirk, *The Prussian Spirit: A Survey of German Literature and Politics, 1914-1940*, London, Faber and Faber, 1941, p. 17.
[39] G. P. Gooch, 'Forward', in G. P. Gooch et al (eds), *The German Mind and Outlook*, p. vii-viii.
[40] Alfred Zimmern, 'Germany' in R. W. Seton-Watson, J. Dover Wilson, Alfred Zimmern and Arthur Greenwood, (eds), *The War and Democracy*, London, Macmillan, 1915, p. 90.
[41] *Ibid*.
[42] *Ibid*.
[43] *Ibid*., pp. 95-98.
[44] Thomas Weber, *Our Friend "The Enemy": Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I*, Stanford, Stanford University, Press, 2008, pp. 48-49; See also: Thérèse Remus, *Germanophobia, Europhobia, Xenophobia – About Stereotypes in Anglo-German Relations*, Norderstedt, Grin Verlag, 2013, p. 1.

> [n]o one would dream of speaking of Bavarian, or Saxon, or Würtemberg [*sic*] militarism. The words would not fit. The growth is a Prussian growth…militarism as it has been forced upon Germany by Prussia, a State established by force and maintained by force…[45]

George Walter Prothero had lamented indignantly on the low standing that the UK was held in Germany in drafts that he contributed to *Fortnightly Review* in June 1912. He had blamed Germany's Secretary of State of the Foreign Office and later German ambassador to the UK, Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, for the state of relations. [46] He had commented that 'certain British writers' had the appearance of being influenced by Berlin.[47] He claimed that UK intellectuals were 'inspired' by friendship overtures from Bieberstein.[48] Prothero, too, referred to Germany as Prussia, but explained Anglo-German relations through the prism of their historic cooperation to contain France. Thus, Prothero wrote,

> [i]f we look back into the past we find that England has done the very greatest services to Prussia. She saved the Prussia of Frederick the Great not only from defeat but from annihilation as a State during the Seven Years' War. Half a century later she supported Prussia in her heroic struggle against Napoleon I… As England saved Prussia twice at the most critical moments of her history, it was only natural that patriotic Prussians looked towards Great Britain with feelings of gratitude and of admiration. An Englishman was then as much a *persona grata* in Prussia as he is now in Italy and in Greece.[49]

Prothero's comments show the long relationship of Anglo-German cooperation against France that served British self-interest. Anglo-French

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[45] William Harbutt Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?* London, Longmans Green, 1915, pp. 113-114.
[46] June 1912, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, DK. 5/61.
[47] *Ibid*.
[48] *Ibid*.
[49] *Ibid*.

cooperation at Germany's expense concerned this thesis' historians. Dawson noted that before World War I, the 'excellent' German ambassador, Count Wolf Metternich, had been anguished by the fact that 'France was everything to our Foreign Office, his own country nothing'.[50] Although in this instance British foreign policy's inflexibility matched Dawson's own view, it reflected an opinion among his colleagues that the advancement of stronger German ties would be beneficial to British interests. In the interwar years, UK historians would come to recognise Germany's important place in the European economy, and that that country's impoverishment deprived the UK of a valued trading partner.

UK historians sought to act as honest brokers in Franco-German relations following World War I, although they sought to serve British interests. Analysis of the writings of historians showed that they regarded themselves as detached observers, who sought to distance themselves from the cynicism that characterised Old Europe. On 18 January 1923, the British ambassador to Germany, Lord Edgar Vincent D'Abernon, noted a conversation with Dr von Rosenberg that was cited in a Berlin telegram to the British Foreign Secretary Lord George Nathaniel Curzon.[51] Lord D'Abernon wrote that Rosenberg informed him that throughout the Ruhr '[t]o a considerable extent, both Germany and France are carrying on a quarrel at England's expense'.[52] On 10 August 1922, Robert Sanders observed that the UK appeared to be taking the German perspective regarding Germany's repayments to France. He mentioned that 'it looks as if Germany may collapse. I see no hope of getting France to change her attitude in the West'.[53] On 29 January 1923, D'Abernon related his bafflement in a private dispatch, stating that 'regarding the idea of evacuation of Cologne by English troops – public opinion here [Germany] is distinctly against it. Curiously enough opposition is particularly strong in German military circles. Why, I cannot say'.[54] Revealingly, D'Abernon implied that British policy towards Germany

[50] William Harbutt Dawson, *The Future of Empire and the Price of World Peace*, London, Williams and Norgate, 1930, pp. 222-223.
[51] A Letter to Dr Rosenberg on the Situation in Germany, 18 January 1923, The National Archives (UK), *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B, p. 4.
[52] *Ibid*.
[53] Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol. II. University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of Robert Arthur Sanders, 1910-1935*, Dep. D. 753, p. 67.
[54] *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 164.

was inspired by a principled position of not taking too committed a role in Franco-German disputes, but under the aegis of British self-interest. He noted that 'we have resisted with considerable success the attempts at the disintegration of Germany through separation of the Rhineland, and we have prevented the occupation of the Ruhr'.[55] Lord Edgar Vincent, 1st Viscount D'Abernon, GCB, GCMG, PC, FRS was born on 19 August 1857. D'Abernon occupied himself with diplomacy, writing history, and politics. He attended Eton College before joining the diplomatic service. D'Abernon served five years in the Coldstream Guards and then went into the diplomatic service. From 1920 to 1925 D'Abernon was the British Ambassador to Germany. Lord Vansittart called D'Abernon the 'pioneer of appeasement'[56] D'Abernon died on 1 November 1941.

In November 1920, Harold Temperley wrote to John Maynard Keynes, who attended the Versailles Conference as a delegate of the British Treasury and whose book, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919), echoed what historians more broadly thought. John Maynard Keynes was born on 5 June 1883, at his parents' home in Cambridge. Keynes was educated at Eton and then King's College, University of Cambridge. Following Keynes' acquisition of an undergraduate degree, he joined the Home Civil Service and spent two years at the India Office. In January 1915, Keynes was employed by the Treasury to give recommendations to Sir George Paish, who was tasked with giving David Lloyd George advice.

By January 1919, on account of the Allied blockade, food had ceased to enter Germany for the fourth month in-a-row. This was contrary to the provisions of the Armistice. Keynes observed that the Germans were required to provide gold as a form of payment for food. The French opposed this measure, as they wanted Germany's gold to complement reparations to them. British troops were reportedly demoralised by malnourished and infirm children. In December 1919, Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* was published. In 1929 he was made a Fellow of the British Academy. He is remembered for his contributions to economics. Keynes died on 21 April 1946. Temperley mentioned the ill-starred results of

[55] *Ibid*., p. 3.
[56] Lord Vansittart, *The Mist Procession*, London, Hutchinson, 1958, p. 276.

perceived militarism, and wrote that

> [t]he Germans seemed to have played their cards very badly all through…Subsequently their various demands in their observations were in as many cases entirely conflicting... For instance, not only are there the cases which you have pointed out but such things as upper Silesia must remain with Germany because otherwise she cannot discharge Reparation, but the Saar valley must not go away from her or Eupen or Malmedy because the question of reparations comes in in any case. Again, they demanded a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine and insisted on the freedom of the seas...[57]

Perceptions of the Prussian connections to Germany's military establishment resonated with UK interwar historians as they empathised with Germans' plight.

## Intellectualism

Historians' work embraced the nuances of the Anglo-German relationship so that Germany occupied competing roles as both a 'model' and a 'monster' for the UK.[58] Supposed German qualities of intellectualism had different consequences when the outcomes involved militarism, but historians oriented discussions towards its significance as part of a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage. Many in the UK had a romantic image of Germany as the land of *Dichter und Denker* (poets and thinkers).[59] Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson believed that Germany represented the civilisation of thinkers and music composers. In 1920, he visited Berlin to familiarise himself with the concept of Germanness, and related its significance on his thinking to his colleagues.[60]

Others ought to propagate this view to those in authority. On 14 April 1937, in Raymond Beazley and William Harbutt Dawson's petition to British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin on improving Anglo-German relations, Germany was

[57] A Letter from Harold Temperley, November 1920, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of John Maynard Keynes*, GBR/0272/PP/JMK, JMK CO/11/209.
[58] Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism and Ambivalence, 1860-1914*, p. 318.
[59] *Ibid*; [poets and thinkers].
[60] E. M. Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, London, Edward Arnold, 1934, p. 186.

presented as their country's 'Teutonic neighbour'.[61] The implication of neighbourliness suggested that a warm familiarity existed between the UK and Germany, and that two men's self-identities involved Anglo-Saxonism being the pinnacle of civilisation. In addressing the prime minister, Dawson and Beazley represented themselves as 'experts' on Germanness.[62] They advised the prime minister that 'no existing nation except our own has distinguished itself so greatly as the German in the spheres of exploration, scientific and particularly pathological research, and pioneer settlement'.[63] Their petition to Baldwin represented a climax of their involvement as UK advocates of Germanness. 'No English writer knows more of German ways than Mr. Dawson', noted *The Spectator* during World War I.[64] Raymond Beazley informed the *Anglo-German Review*, a publication in the late 1930s, that the UK were 'specially called upon to have friendly relations with Germany'.[65]

Interwar UK historians believed that Germany was a beacon of intellectual culture.[66] Gilbert Murray termed the 'beelike industry' of German intellectualism as a process that UK intellectuals recognised and identified with.[67] Herbert Butterfield suggested that UK historians, such as Gooch, were the only foreigners equipped to understand German history as Germans understood it.[68] Butterfield posited this because Gooch was influenced by Sir John Acton, the well-read Liberal historian who studied with the German Church historian, Johann Joseph Ignaz von Döllinger, in Munich for six years. This experience contributed to Acton's promotion of liberty through his protégés.[69] It was 'under German influence' that Acton became acquainted with what he perceived were superior aspects of German

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[61] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Prime Minister Baldwin, 15 April, 1937, *Baldwin 91-96,* p. 6.
[62] *Ibid*.
[63] *Ibid*.
[64] Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?* p. 7.
[65] Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, p. 278.
[66] G. P. Gooch, *Our Heritage of Freedom,* London, Individualist, 1942, p. 11,
[67] Cf. Hugh Lloyd Jones, 'Introduction', in U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *History of Classical Scholarship,* Alan Harris (trans.), Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, [1921] 1982, p. xiv.
[68] Some Trends in Scholarship 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield 400, BUTT/400, p. 7.
[69] Herbert Butterfield, 'Acton: His Training, Methods and Intellectual System', in A. O. Sarkissian (ed.), *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography: In Honour of G. P. Gooch*, London, Longmans, 1961, p. 186.

historiography.[70] Acton sought to bring German methods of scholarship into the UK.[71] UK historians sensed the connection in the achievements at the centre of Germanness, and hoped they provided an emulative example for UK historians 'to catch up with German scholarship'.[72] Germanness' intellectual aspects played a part in UK historians' commentary about what it was that formed Germans' characteristics.

Germany's intellectual culture shaped UK interwar historians' approaches to Anglo-German relations. UK historians, such as R. W. Seton-Watson, believed that German nationalist historians had managed to influence many Germans by their work.[73] Seton-Watson sought to show that the German historian, Heinrich von Treitschke, influenced how Germanness was defined throughout much of the pre-interwar era. He observed in a statement, that

> [Treitschke's] influence upon the popular consciousness and upon the journalistic world can hardly be exaggerated. The fact that in our own country his name was hardly known before the war, save to a handful of historical writers, and seemingly never quoted save by the omniscient Lord Acton… serves to emphasise our neglect of German history and political thought. Treitschke certainly did more than any other man to poison the wells of historical science in Germany and to give currency to the seductive motto, 'my country, right or wrong'.[74]

Seton-Watson and his colleagues were aware that the histories that Treitschke and his colleagues produced were premised on Prussian historians' adage that 'strong

[70] Roland Hill, *Lord Acton*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 25.
[71] Butterfield, 'Acton: His Training, Methods and Intellectual System', p. 181.
[72] Some Trends in Scholarship 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, BUTT/400 p. 10.
[73] R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe*, London, School of Slavonic Studies in the University of London, 1922, p.25; The motto, 'Strong men make the age' (*die starken Männer machen die Zeit*), was coined by Heinrich von Treitschke, and was supported by colleagues such as Heinrich von Sybel.
[74] *Ibid*., p.26.

men make the age'.[75] This view resonated with UK historians, who generally agreed with Butterfield's assertion that 'the men at the summit were always interesting'.[76]

After World War I, UK historians, such as Fisher, lauded Germany's achievements and stressed the UK's recognition of its unique development and progression. His commentary pointed out the hollowness of some Germans' claims that the UK neglected Germany's prior successes. He claimed that,

> [w]hereas in Germany dislike of England was fostered by every academic art for a generation, there was no corresponding effort on our side. There were anti-German newspapers and anti-German magazines, but the great influences in education, if not actively favourable to Germany, were certainly not antagonistic. In music, in philosophy, in philological and historical research, as well as in the domain of physical science, we were eager to acknowledge our great and enduring debt to German industry.[77]

Fisher's address was one of a number that revealed UK interwar historians' awareness of contemporary Anglo-German interactions. Many Britons took holidays there.[78] In addition, high-ranking Germans in the interwar period possessed deep knowledge of the UK and maintained contact with people in London.[79] This reveals that Germany was more than a subject for UK interwar historians' analyses, but was also a location that held meaning for their intellectual development.

The eccentric Dickinson had German 'cultural sympathies', and was largely opposed to the French.[80] He was not alone, however, and many UK intellectuals saw German intellectual endeavours as superior to those of the French.[81] According to

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[75] Cf. *Ibid*; [*die starken Männer machen die Zeit*]
[76] Some Trends in Scholarship 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, BUTT/400 p. 10.
[77] Notes, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of H. A. L. Fisher* , MS. 167; These contributed to: H. A. L. Fisher, 'The Institute of Historical Research and the Anglo-American Historical Conference', *History*, Vol. 6, No. 23, October 1921, p. 154.
[78] Scully, *British Images of Germany:* p. 318.
[79] Richard Milton, *Best of Enemies: Britain and Germany: 100 Years of Truth and Lies*, Cambridge, Icon Books, 2007, p. 171.
[80] Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, p. 186.
[81] Stefan Collini, *English Pasts: Essays in History and Culture*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 126.

Fisher, many UK officials concurred that Germany need not be a strategic adversary given its cultural similarity to the UK, and regarded the recent conflict with Germany as 'painful'.[82] This was because the historians had acquired 'vast stores of learning' when they had studied there and had formed many friendships.[83]

In contrast, George Prothero posited that Germany's relationship with the UK was based on Anglo-German rivalry.[84] This rivalry was shaped by what some UK historians perceived as the institutionalisation of Anglophobia in Germany, a view that contrasted with British images of Germany as a non-threatening, passive land of intellectualism. British perceptions of Germans' animus were entwined with their knowledge of the German government's effort to push German public opinion against the UK. Prothero's model of Germanness revolved around perceptions of challenges to British interests. He noted a pre-World War I trip by the Germanophile UK official, Lord Richard Haldane, which shaped Prothero's thoughts. He stated,

> [i]n February, 1912, Lord Haldane went to Berlin in the hope of improving Anglo-German relations. He was well-received and treated with every courtesy, but immediately after his arrival violent attacks upon Great Britain appeared in the Press throughout Germany… a pamphlet entitled *England's Weltherrschaft und die Deutsche Luxusflotte* appeared soon after Lord Haldane's departure…it is thoroughly representative of a large number of anti-British pamphlets which have recently been published. The anonymous writer is so well informed on political, military, and naval matters that he was probably inspired by Government… The pamphlet depicts with diabolical skill and in the plausible manner the British nation as the enemy of the human race which deserves to be held up to execration and contempt. The unnamed author was described as a well-known admiral by the German Press, which praised the pamphlet highly...[85]

[82] H. A. L. Fisher, 'Viscount Bryce of Dechmont, O. M', *The British Academy*, London, Oxford University Press, 1922, pp. 7-8.
[83] *Ibid*.
[84] Notes for *The Fortnightly Review*, 1912, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, GB 237 Coll-454, DK. 5/61.
[85] *Ibid*; See also, Gerhard Ritter, *The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present*, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1965: on page 122, Ritter claimed that preceding World War I, the English had what he termed a 'grotesque…blind hatred of foreigners (originally directed against Russians and Boers, [but] not against Germans)'.

While impressed by German intellectualism, UK interwar historians were distrustful that its application to the scientific and industrial areas could fuel militarism. This was especially so when German activities touched on UK sensitivities that involved naval capacity, as reflected by Prothero's comment.

## Recognition of the Peculiarities of Germans' Political Culture

UK historians' own political system influenced their estimations of Germany's political culture, which was a key area by which they characterised Germanness.[86] Gooch observed that Germans' reverence for the state was evidenced by German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's praise for the German civil service, as well as in historian Treitschke's assurance that 'the State is power'.[87] UK historians were aware that German intellectuals had invoked what they believed to be the shortcomings of 'English liberty' in their own attempts to outline 'the German idea of Freedom'.[88] The implications of this were identified by Pollard, where he mentioned the 'complicated' dilemma of the 'German view that crime ceases to be a crime when it is committed by a state'.[89] UK public intellectuals were aware that their German counterparts did not mistrust the State in the same way that Britons often did, and advocated a return to old, non-capitalist virtues. In this sense, to Germans, the West represented the foreignness of UK, French and American cultures.[90]

H. A. L. Fisher had similarly written that support for democratic principles was weak in Germany, and wrote that 'the modern German is all for Caesarism, for a big state, a big army, a big navy, and for a long course of progressive national

[86] Seton-Watson, *The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe*, p. 22.
[87] Gooch, *Our Heritage of Freedom*, p. 11,
[88] Fritz K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933*, London, Wesleyan University Press, 1990, pp. 186-187.
[89] Miscellaneous, 1912-1933: Correspondence, including with Longmanss Green about possible book on English (or British?) history, lecture notes on modern Germany, letters from readers of Pollard's books, 20 January 1916, University of London: Senate House Library, *Pollard Papers (MS860)*, MS 860/19/4 Pollard.
[90] Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933*, pp. 186-187.

expansion under the dazzling guidance of the Hohenzollern house'.[91] The historian, John Theodore Merz, was trained in Germany, had a German father and was born in Manchester. John Thedore Merz was born in 1840. Merz was a German-British historian, chemist and industrialist. Merz was born in Manchester and was educated at Göttingen, Heidelberg and Bonn universities in Germany. Merz died on 21 March 1921. He commented that

> [t]he German nation may pride itself on possessing…the most powerful and best equipped army…With greater pride it may boast of having trained in the course of centuries the largest and most efficient intellectual army, ready at any moment to take up and carry to a successful issue great scientific undertakings demanding the intense thought and labour of a few secluded students or the combined efforts of a large number of ready workers. The army is scattered through the length and breadth of the land.[92]

UK historians contributed to an awareness of Germany's significant role as a sophisticated provider of goods to civilisation. They opposed beliefs that held Germans as 'scientific and intellectual giants but moral dwarfs' in writings that advocated greater Anglo-German cooperation.[93] On 30 December, 1924, Dickinson wrote to his colleague, A. J. Grant that he was:

> [s]tudying all the time an active form of that chronic disease called international politics for which I fear our civilisation will shortly perish…I continue to be intrigued by Goethe and to think him a man of vision in spite of the disquieting fact that there is very little of him that I can read. Only a German, perhaps, could manage to be at once a pedant and a genius, an official and a poet, a novelist and a preacher, etc., etc. He achieved anyhow, the greatest of triumphs, which is continuing to live to the last moment...[94]

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[91] H. A. L. Fisher, *The Value of Small States*, London, Oxford University Press, 1914, p. 3.
[92] John Theodore Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. I, London, [1904] 1965, pp. 160-161.
[93] David Edgerton, *Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 271.
[94] 1920s-June, 1931 Letter 4, 30 December 1924, London School of Economics Archives: British Library of Political and Economic Science, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson Papers*, GLD 5/11/5 GLD/AJG V.

Motifs of Germanness that emphasised modernity were juxtaposed by British admiration for Germany's cultural and intellectual tradition. UK historians and public intellectuals vocally raised awareness of Germany's progress in science, and their esteem increased when its application in industrial output was considered.[95] There were differences between how the UK and Germany viewed the 'national importance' of technology, however.[96] Despite the temporary drop in reputation for efficiency due to their country's World War I defeat, German ocean liners, zeppelins and aircraft captivated global interest in the interwar era.[97] In the Weimar Republic, nationalistic impulses rose in tandem with achievements in research and innovation.[98] Germans characterised technology as the means to free themselves from impediments that were perceived to have thwarted their national community's destiny. In public discourse, Germans regarded the importance of technology in tones that were more belligerent than those adopted by the UK.[99]

## Vulnerability and Humiliation

UK historians recognised that the victorious French regarded themselves in an aggrieved manner after World War I. This recognition caused historians to move away from the opinions they had expressed during the war. German humiliation about reparations and war guilt informed UK historians' open-minded approach for dealing with matters of Germanness. The way UK historians regarded the plurality of opinion on Germany's treatment suggested that they were ahead of their time and prefigured the direction of British public opinion and policy.

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[95] Scully, *British Images of Germany*, p. 318.
[96] Bernhard Rieger, *Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany, 1890-1945*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 226; See also: A. Burgen, 'The United Kingdom and the Reconstruction of German Science: The Rebirth of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft', *Technology in Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2001, p. 319.
[97] *Ibid*.
[98] *Ibid*.
[99] Rieger, *Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany, 1890-1945*, p. 226.

Many UK historians' analyses predated later shifts in public opinion. Temperley and Gooch critiqued aspects of former British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey's actions harshly, particularly regarding his 'military conversations with France'. In assessing their critique, Herbert Butterfield maintained that it was erroneous to see the increased relevance 'of contemporary history as merely a marginal affair'.[100] Historians, such as Butterfield and his colleagues, were representative of public intellectuals who aimed to draw attention to Germans' vulnerability so as to calibrate British policy more effectively.

Germans' defeat in World War I destroyed the certainties of national identity created by Bismarck, according to Zimmern, Germany was 'stupefied and bewildered' by defeat.[101] UK historians and Germans alike portrayed the country as 'the victim of a complete breakdown'.[102] As UK historians analysed in this thesis were largely from privileged backgrounds, the sense of class-based solidarity was palpable as they familiarised themselves with the German elites' circumstances.[103] Sanders encountered the English-born Princess Evelyn Blücher at Oxford on 19 June 1921, and discussed the elites' sense of disempowerment.[104] She said that following the war the Kaiser enjoyed no freedom of action, and that 'the announcement of his abdication was actually made before his signature was obtained'.[105] Their shared class backgrounds and the sense of cataclysmic crisis transcended the barriers of international politics.

UK interwar historians recognised the ignominy felt by Germans, but sought to highlight it within a paradigm that could serve British interests. They noted in diaries, in particular, how the appropriation of Germans' wealth at a time of hunger was influencing Germany's willingness to cooperate with other states. On Sunday 1 August 1920, Sanders wrote of the UK's anxiety regarding the prospect of Germany

[100] Some Trends in Scholarship 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, BUTT/400 p. 29.
[101] Alfred E. Zimmern, *Europe in Convalescence*, London, Mills and Boon, 1922, p. 173-174.
[102] *Ibid*.
[103] Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, 19 June 1921, Vol. I., Dep. D. 752, p. 131.
[104] [The full name of memoirist and diarist, Princess Blücher, was Evelyn Fürstin Blücher von Wahlstatt. She was born in Brighton, Sussex, and died in that county in 1960].
[105] *Ibid*., Vol. II.

forming a treaty with the Soviet Union. He wrote, '[i]f Germany likes to tear up the treaty and join hands with the Bolsheviks the situation will be very serious indeed. The French are most anxious to occupy the Ruhr district which would hobble? [*sic*] Germany economically'.[106] Notwithstanding these concerns, UK historians continued to be driven by the UK's trade requirements.[107] On 29 January 1919, a letter passed between the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In it, UK officials (who had received training as historians and who worked under the aegis of the Foreign Office), sought to recoup UK losses incurred by their merchant fleets. The letter reveals the balance between humanitarian motives and the acquisition of valuable enemy assets. It noted,

> [i]n advancing these suggestions, Mr Prothero has had in mind not merely the question of an immediate increase in the available supplies of food, but also the importance, pending a decision upon the policy advocated in the Board's correspondence above referred to, of keeping a hold upon the German fishing vessels and preventing the possibility of their being otherwise disposed of. I (Henry G. Maurice, Assistant Secretary in Charge of the Fisheries Division) may say that Mr Prothero would be gratified by the receipt of any information which Mr Balfour is able to furnish on this subject, in order that the Board may be fully apprised of the position of affairs.[108]

Historians were particularly aware of reparations in their reflections on Germans' defeat and vulnerability. They were swept up in the manner in which they were required to deal simultaneously with Germans' defeat, their protection from French desires for revenge, and the protection of British interests. This revealed itself in Prothero's lecture notes on the relevance of historical relations between France and Prussia to the present situation, when he noted that 'between the two governments, as between the two countries, that most dangerous of international conditions, mutual distrust and the fear of surprises, subsisted more and more'.[109] On

[106] *Ibid*., Vol. I.
[107] *Ibid*.,
[108] Compensation for UK Fishing Vessels Lost through Enemy Action, 29 January 1919, The National Archives (UK), *Foreign and Correspondence Records*, FO 608/76/22.
[109] Undated Lecture Notes, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, GB 237 Coll-454, DK. 45/62.

Sunday 22 July 1923, Sanders remarked in his diary on the position which the British cabinet adopted towards France and Germany. He wrote with concern that 'much time has been spent in Cabinet Consideration of the notes to Germany and the Allies. The result on the whole has been to make things very civil to France. Curzon seems to assume the French would be delighted with them, but doubts German acquiescence'.[110] Temperley and his colleagues were similarly concerned, and felt that the consequences of ambiguous wording in the treaty documents that could have created 'a loophole'.[111] He regarded the eagerness to paralyse Germany to be counterproductive, and went on to write to Keynes that

> [o]ne of the great dangers of all Treaties – and I am sure we shall find it in a very short time in the Treaty of Rapallo – is that small phrases of this kind are inserted and subsequently become of considerable importance. Mr [William Morris] Hughes's arguments as reproduced seem to me to show that he is either completely dishonest or a fool; I wish I could think the latter. But I am inclined to agree with the comment of a reviewer of [Bernard] Baruch's book in *The Times* that Mr Hughes did more harm than anybody else at the Conference, and quite apart from this part of the negotiation was I think largely responsible for the Japanese success. I heartily wish that we had had one of the Japanese delegation and they had had Mr Hughes. I do not know if you have seen the debates in the Australian Parliament? They are not calculated to raise one's estimate of the intelligence of that body. The Chief line seems to be that Mr Hughes was a traitor for letting Germany down easily.[112]

UK historians' interpretations of Armistice and Treaty documents significantly conflicted with French versions in the years that followed World War I. On 27 November 1920, Keynes wrote to Temperley that the French had complicated the UK's response and got their delegation into 'great trouble' due to their 'altering the wording of one of the Armistice documents after it had been signed'.[113] Keynes

[110] Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, 22 July, 1923, Vol. II., Dep. D. 753, p. 66.
[111] A Temperley Reply to Keynes, 24 November 1920, King's College Archive Centre, JMK CO/11/227.
[112] *Ibid*., A Temperley Letter to Keynes, 16 November 1920, JMK CO/11/227 King's College Archive Centre; The book they referred to was Bernard M. Baruch's *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty*, London, Harper and Brothers, 1920.
[113] 'A Keynes Letter to Temperley', 27 November 1920, King's College Archive Centre; JMK CO/11/232.

noted that it was 'significant' that the French Finance Minister, Louis-Lucien Klotz, 'made use of the text which had been tampered with' to bolster his position before the Reparation Commission.[114] Keynes continued that 'can there be any doubt that the text as signed by the Germans contained the word '*renonciation*', and that at some time later this was altered in the French official version to '*revendication*'; whereas the official English version is a translation of the original and authentic text'.[115] On 29 November 1920, Temperley wrote back and informed Keynes that his 'letter' was 'highly interesting and even sensational'.[116] Temperley, Keynes, and their colleagues' correspondence regarding Germany's treatment suggests that the historians were ahead of their time and prefigured the course of public opinion about the Treaty's shortcomings.

Important issues that fed UK historians' revisionism in the early 1920s included reparations, policy differences with France, and Weimar's hyperinflation. These issues inspired protective impulses in UK historians, who believed Germans were vulnerable to the excesses of vindictive French policies. These French policies were counterproductive to British interests.[117] The German government led the way in its use of documents from archives to prove that they were not solely responsible for the war, an action that was later replicated by the other combatant nations.[118] The rise in revisionism gradually spread into the Allied countries.[119] The occupation of western areas of Germany was a contentious feature of relations between the Great Powers, since it taxed Germany's economy and fed hostile nationalism among all countries involved. Foreign troops' presence on German territory promoted a re-articulation of German patriotism, and increased Germans' hostility to the Weimar

[114] *Ibid*.
[115] *Ibid*., See also: 24 November 1920, JMK CO/11/226, King's College Archive Centre: There appeared to be two interpretations of '*renunciation*', although he thought 'concessions' was the English equivalent, with '*Verzichtung*' in German, and '*renonciation*' in French.
[116] *Ibid*.
[117] Stefan Goebel, 'Re-Membered and Re-Mobilised: The "Sleeping Dead" in Interwar Germany and Britain', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2004, p. 493.
[118] Stefan Berger, 'The Role of National Archives in Constructing National Master Narratives in Europe', *Archival Science*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2013, p. 16.
[119] *Ibid*., pp. 16-17.

Republic.[120]

UK historians who experienced this phase of interwar Germans' humiliation were active in their recommendations. However, they were often bystanders to events in which Germans sought to deal with the growing hyperinflation. In November 1922, D'Abernon wrote a memorandum to Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon on the position of German finance and currency. He blamed the hyperinflation on the 'insane action' of the German *Reichsbank's* 'unlimited printing of notes', which he compared to 'a runaway horse with an incompetent and nervous rider'.[121] He suggested that the crisis was resolvable by 'a little courage on the part of the rider' to reintroduce confidence.[122] D'Abernon maintained that Germans' despair was partly to blame, as they undermined their own currency quicker than the amount of money in the economy. He wrote that throughout recorded history, 'no dog has ever run after its own tail with the speed of their *Reichsbank*'.[123] By 10 November 1922, he foresaw that Germany's 'most powerful weapon' for obfuscation of reparations payments had been the destruction of the mark by means of hyperinflation.[124]

UK historians' critiques of the reparations clauses and the French actions undermined perceptions of the inviolability of the Treaty of Versailles. They questioned the justice of the reparations amount, setting them ahead of their time. Scepticism about the Treaty of Versailles contributed to the British government's policy of appeasement towards Germany in later years. It bewildered Keynes that Lloyd George 'never in a public speech' indicated that he was aware of the pre-Armistice aspects of 'Germany's capacity to pay'.[125] On 3 August 1923, Sanders wrote that the French and Belgian responses regarding the Ruhr were 'all as unsatisfactory as can be', and that there was a likelihood that Curzon could put the

[120] Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990, p. 120; See also: Goebel, 'Re-Membered and Re-Mobilised: The "Sleeping Dead" in Interwar Germany and Britain', p. 493.
[121] Dated November 1922, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B.
[122] *Ibid*.
[123] *Ibid*., p. 20.
[124] *Ibid*., p. 34.
[125] 'Keynes Letter to Temperley on Germany's Capacity to Pay', 13 May 1932, King's College Archive Centre, JMK CO/11/256.

issue of their Allies' intransigence to the League of Nations.[126] Fisher believed that the Ruhr occupation was illegal, and that France's threats to occupy Germany were 'a general threat to renew the war'.[127]

Fisher and his colleagues saw that UK interests were not served by seeing Germany embarrassed, or seeing its national foundations undermined. Fisher observed that their Allies were also competitors, as UK merchantmen around Cologne 'found themselves encircled by a Franco-Belgian Customs ring and their business were brought to a standstill'.[128] He saw that Germany's campaign of passive resistance was discontinued on 26 September 1923, amid successful negotiations to ensure freedom of transit and provision of taxes.[129] UK historians were also aware of French initiatives to detach parts of Germany to form an independent buffer-state between their countries. Fisher remarked with satisfaction that this move was unsuccessful when he wrote,

> [P]oincaré claims that the net profit for 1924 will be 3 milliard [*sic*] francs and the question arises as to whether the cost of the Ruhr occupation should enjoy priority of all allied claims or be counted a purely French charge. The legality of the occupation being [*sic*] denied by the British Law Officers on April 11th 1923. Further, during the whole period of occupation French encouragement was given to a movement, which seems now to have failed, in favour of setting up a Rhineland State.[130]

UK historians' views of Germanness gravitated from empathic feelings for Germans, which was an instinct inspired by historical imaginings, towards a synthesis where Anglo-German relations could be redirected towards ever-greater cooperation. As Lord D'Abernon indicated, Germany regarded the UK as 'being

[126] Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, 3 August 1923, Vol. II. Dep. D. 753, P. 67.
[127] Liberal Research Department's German Reparations, 11 August 1923, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of H. A. L. Fisher*, MS. Fisher 172, p. 4.
[128] The Occupation of the Ruhr, Liberal Research Department: A Compendium of Dates and Information Chronologically Itemised with the Significance of the Day, Date, September 1923, MS. Fisher 173.
[129] *Ibid*.
[130] *Ibid*., p. 2.

nearer to them and closely interested in European affairs'.[131] The affinity was expressed by Lloyd George, whose government was 'looked upon as Germany's first, or even only, line of defence against French aggression'.[132] D'Abernon noted that it was only due to the UK that German delegates were able to have their concerns presented at international meetings.[133] These empathetic sentiments reflected the cooperation that enabled UK historians and diplomats to see their German partners accommodated.

UK historians helped cause a diminution in their country's support for the Treaty of Versailles and its reparations burden on Germany in the early 1920s to the 1930s. UK historians played a leading role in revising views of the justice of the Treaty's implementation. Over the years, much public opinion would come to consider that Versailles had been too severe and supported its revision.[134]

UK historians' search for the sources of Germanness noted at the beginning of this chapter underlined the complexity of interwar interpretations of Germanness. The UK interwar historians identified in this chapter worked in close collaboration with their colleagues in government and identified the sensitivities of Germans in the aftermath of World War I. As public intellectuals, UK interwar historians contemplated contested interpretations of Germanness. By doing this, UK historians were able to have their historical knowledge of Germany conceptualised into an accessible way that shifted public opinion. Among historians, there was unanimity that Germany had a unique and rich cultural, scientific and historical tradition. These achievements concentrated UK historians' minds to see Germany as a competitor, as well as a close partner with ancestral and ethnic connections with the UK. They also acknowledged the bitter troughs of Germans' post-war vulnerability. UK historians regarded this within a paradigm that emphasised the solidarity and cohesion of a distinctive form of Anglo-German relations. UK historians viewed this posture as a

[131] Dated 1922, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 197.
[132] *Ibid*.
[133] *Ibid*.
[134] Malcolm Saunders, 'Australian Citizens and the Perception of the Prussian Menace: The Case of a Country Town Editor', in John A. Moses and Christopher Pugsley (eds), *The German Empire and Britain's Pacific Dominions, 1871-1919: Essays on the role of Australia and New Zealand in World Politics in the Age of Imperialism*, Claremont, Regina Books, 2000, p. 252.

counterweight to an aggrieved France. The historians became enthusiasts for morality and international norms to protect Germany from French initiatives.

The UK historians examined in this chapter evaluated aspects of Germanness in order to draw attention to Germany's significance. The historians' roles were increased by the breadth and depth of their knowledge of Germanness. They argued that Britons should care about Germany, despite their wartime conflict. The weight of these perceptions focussed attention on the development of German democracy, and it was here that UK historians sought to influence views about the machinery of government.

# CHAPTER 4: GERMAN DEMOCRACY

UK interwar historians analysed Germany's nascent democracy in the context of their understanding of British democracy. For UK historians, interwar German democracy was often viewed somewhat simplistically as a contest between forces of expression and repression. Historians' familiarity with the long-term historical patterns helped them to identify the transitional processes in Germany's democracy and the particular democratic crises of the Weimar Republic. Interwar German democracy evolved within the new democratic framework. Moreover, their commentary helped to shape Britons' discussion of the new Germany.

UK interwar historians' views were part of a thorough debate in wider society, and the chapter argues that they contributed to Britons' understanding of Germany by raising awareness of the challenges faced by republican democracy. The chapter examines how UK interwar historians sought to interpret the evolutions of German democracy, and how this was reflected in cooperation between the two countries. UK historians' experience with interwar Germany's political cultures was juxtaposed with Germans' own involvement with democratic practice.

The chapter analyses two key ways in which UK historians contributed to developments in interwar German democracy. The first explores the interrelationship between UK historians' teachings, educational campaigns, and the founding of German democracy. The second investigates UK historians' interpretations of the interwar order that had been facilitated by the Treaty of Versailles. The chapter asks to what extent UK historians' contributions to German democracy predominated over other forms of engagement with Germany, and whether their impact was identifiable.

## Founding a Democracy: Democratisation

Historians used their familiarity with concepts of democratisation to increase awareness of Germans' active engagement in their democracy. They did so in their writings to the press, petitions, and letter-writing. UK historians' educational campaigns and teachings on constitutions complemented contemporary

understandings of the founding of the Weimar democracy, and reminded their readers that the influence of elected politicians had been weak in Imperial Germany. UK historians were aware that the character of the historical German monarchies had been dissimilar to the 'democratic monarchy' that had developed in the UK.[1] Given this, some UK historians held that German democracy had originated on the battlefields of World War I, as such, and was uniquely represented by the Weimar Constitution.[2]

Historians observed the degree to which many Germans were not supportive of the constitution of Weimar Germany. The Professor of Modern History at the University of Berlin, Professor Hans Delbrück, was considered to be a 'concise and moderate' source of information about Germany.[3] They acknowledged, in a Political Information Department report to the Foreign Office, that Delbrück had 'not rated very highly' the work done on the Constitution and the results of the National Assembly at Weimar.[4] Delbrück wrote that, '[t]he new Republic, whatever the form of the Constitution, is by no means popular, let alone suggestive of enthusiasm to the great majority of Germans'.[5] This raised particular problems, given the perceived lack of depth to their democratic experience.

UK historians drew on the characterisations of German democracy that aligned with Delbrück's own. In A. F. Pollard's marginalia to his lectures notes on 27 January, he mentioned the 'monarchical basis of Modern Germany' as a means to understand contemporary democracy in that country.[6] To invoke his grasp of German democracy, Pollard highlighted in disjointed sentences what he perceived as the indigenous and organic growth of German democracy. He scribbled, '[n]ature did not

[1] Walter H. Kaufmann, *Monarchism in the Weimar Republic*, New York, Octagon Books, 1973, p. 11.
[2] G. P. Gooch, 'German Views of the State', in G. P. Gooch et al (eds), *The German Mind and Outlook*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1945, p. 35.
[3] Professor Delbrück on the Situation in Germany, August 1918, The National Archives (UK), FO 371/4382, PID 563, p. 2; The archival document indicated that Professor Delbrück was referring solely to the situation in August 1918 but he mentioned the situation many months later, as well.
[4] *Ibid*.
[5] *Ibid*.
[6] Lecture Notes, Miscellaneous, 1912-1933: Correspondence, including with Longmans Green about possible book on English (or British?) history, lecture notes on modern Germany, letters from readers of Pollard's books, University of London: Senate House Library, 20 January 1916, *Pollard Papers*, MS 860/19/4 Pollard.

foresee Prussia. Not a natural frontier to any state. Work of Monarchy [*sic*]. People couldn't make it themselves'.[7] Albert Frederick Pollard was born on 16 December 1869. Pollard gained a scholarship to Jesus College, University of Oxford. Between 1915 and 1915, Pollard was President of the Historical Association. From 1903, he was Professor of Constitutional History at the University of London. Pollard had the inspiration to establish an Historical Association for England and Wales. He also founded the Institute for Historical Research at the University of London. He served on the Government Committee on the League of Nations. In 1920, Pollard was elected to the British Academy. Pollard died in 1948. As discussed in Chapter 1, history underpinned the study of international relations in contemporary universities. Many works, such as those by Pollard, were standard works throughout the British Empire. Thus, on 1 February 1921, the Canadian scholar, A. W. Kennedy wrote to Pollard from Toronto, calling his book 'a boon and a blessing'.[8] Kennedy maintained that he was 'using [Frederic William] Maitland's memoranda of Parliaments for seven years past at the History School here', but noted Pollard's work as incisive.[9] By engaging with topics of Germany and democratisation, Pollard provided one framework on which to understand Germany's polity.

Pollard's work on contemporary Germany was firmly based on historical reflection, which would foreground the value of history. During World War I, he had asked himself, '[w]hat would Bismarck have done in this war?' His response conveyed a belief in the vitality of the German nation. He felt that [Bismarck] 'would never have made this war at all', but that there had been uncharacteristic 'atrophy' in the German people.[10] In so doing, Pollard refined his belief that Germany's state system could only be sustained in the presence of 'great men' such as Bismarck.

Pollard's prestige meant that he conveyed the importance of history to the development of German democracy and diplomacy. On Saturday, 8 January 1927, he

[7] *Ibid*.
[8] *Ibid*.
[9] *Ibid*.
[10] *Ibid*., On 2 March (1917?) in a lectures entitled, 'The Progress of the War and the Prophets of the Sword'.

addressed an historical conference at Eastbourne and emphasised 'history as key to the world problems'.[11] In this address, he stressed the relationship between history and values, and especially its role in 'Humanising Education'.[12] The crux of this civilising aspect was how the '[m]eans of historical study…were the one factor that might in the future humanise education, particularly the education of democracy'.[13] Sir Charles Batho, the Lord Mayor of London at the time, spoke at the address, and said that the 'utmost value' of knowledge was history, and that 'real educational and social progress' required recognition of the subject's centrality in education.[14] 'History was the key to the solution of many of our world problems', Batho maintained, and the UK's avoidance of unnecessary 'social experiments' required their compatriots and fellow Europeans to be reminded of democracy's value by their country's historians.[15]

UK interwar historians sought change through actions that accentuated democratic awareness.[16] Historians' social network augmented their influence on analysing aspects of democracy in Germany. H. A. L. Fisher's diary on Wednesday, 20 March 1918, noted having met with representatives of the press and upper classes of the UK, such as the Asquith, Gulland, Firth, and Balfour families. Later that day, he attended a symposium that included [Seebohm] Rowntree, Acland, Lord Gladstone, Barron, [R. H.] Tawney, [Sir Alfred] Zimmern, Sir E. Pollock, [and politician W. C.] Bridgeman. Fisher mentioned that 'question centres

[11] Coming-of-Age Conference to celebrate the twenty-first anniversary of the Historical Association; Historical Association, 1906-1932: Miscellaneous documents relating to the setting up and running of the Historical association. Some Historical Association leaflets, eg., "Books on the teaching of history in schools" and "A summary of historical examinations affecting schools", 8 January 1927, University of London: Senate House Library, *Pollard* Papers, MS 860/17/1.
[12] *Ibid*; Pollard founded the Historical Association in his house.
[13] *Ibid*.
[14] *Ibid*., Address by Professor A. F. Pollard, Historical Association Coming-of-Age Conference at Eastbourne; See also: H. A. L. Fisher, 'Education in England and America', *Report of the Meeting of the Education Guild of Great Britain and Ireland*, 6t January 1925, p. 5, p. 10, pp. 1-15. Fisher remarked that at the Conference of Educational Associations, held at University College, London, that 'numerous schools in England and Scotland' were 'almost entirely staffed from the Honours schools of the universities'.
[15] *Ibid*.
[16] Undated Notes, Some Trends in Scholarship 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield 400, BUTT/400, p. 10.

round…constitutional education'.[17] He was lauded for his ability to weave constitutional elements into his understandings of democracy in works about European history. On 24 June 1938, for instance, Fisher received a letter from lawyer Avrace Willis who visited Oxford, and who praised Fisher's 'colossal work' on democracy and political economy.[18] Willis attested that the importance of Fisher's work communicated across boundaries, and was of relevance to the legal community, academia and business. He wrote,

> [I] felt that I must write to you to say how much I have enjoyed your history of Europe...It has had to be read to me as I have for many years been totally blind, a fact which has never hindered the interest I have always had in political questions.[19]

UK historians, such as Fisher sought to highlight administrative history in discussions about threats to German democracy. Fisher argued that each country's histories meant democracy must be adapted to reflect circumstances.[20] On 5 March 1918, Fisher was received at Buckingham Palace by King George V.[21] After World War I, Fisher advocated for greater university funding, and sought to have Germany's experience with university funding examined for its applicability to the UK.[22] Fisher's had argued for an exploration of links between democratic constitutions, as important sets of principles that could direct countries' development.[23]

UK historians' public engagements sought to elevate understanding about the interrelationship between British values and German democracy. Harold Temperley

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[17] Fisher's Diary, 20 March 1918, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of H. A. L. Fisher*, MS. Fisher 11, p. 56.
[18] Letter from Avrace E. Willis Barrister at Law, credentialed 1889, to H. A. L. Fisher. 24 June 1938, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of H. A. L. Fisher*, MS. Fisher 77; The book of Fisher's was *A History of Europe*, London, Edward Arnold, 1936.
[19] *Ibid*.
[20] Herbert. A. L. Fisher, *Political Unions: The Creighton Lecture delivered in the University of London*, 8 November 1911, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1911, p. 30.
[21] Audience with the King, 5 March 1918, MS. Fisher 11, p. 49. Tuesday; See also: Hector Bolitho, *A Century of British Monarchy*, London, Longmans Green, 1951, p. 157.
[22] H. A. L. Fisher, *Our Universities: The Centenary Oration, Thursday, June 30 1927*, London, University of London Press, 1927, p. 20.
[23] H. A. L. Fisher, 'The Present Position of the League of Nations', [Unpublished Notes], 1923, p. 9.

attempted to coordinate his colleagues' conference to ensure that their commentary was received by the relevant people in appropriate contexts. Temperley argued that UK historians' expertise on democratisation should be reflected in the endeavours of their organisations. He also wrote that he was responsible for being an 'historical experts maker', given he promoted perceptions about UK historians.[24] On 31 May 1926, Temperley communicated to Thomas Frederick Tout the necessity that UK historians' 'principles' about being 'British' should be declared before they all attended an upcoming Anglo-American Conference.[25] Within several months Temperley was back in Germany, conducting research and advocating for an increase in Anglo-German cooperation.[26] Temperley suggested that the input of UK historians' presentation should be conveyed the same way as happened in international fora, such as at the 'Assembly or Conference as at the League'.[27]

Historians' capability to analyse the development of a consensual political culture contributed to an awareness of Germans' experiences of democracy. The historians were attentive to the peculiarities of German history, and sensitive to the speed of changes occurring in Germany following the Treaty of Versailles.[28] Within the UK, the belief that Germany had been treated severely by the Treaty increased as the interwar years wore on.[29] UK historians were responsive to views that emphasised the need to understand the relationship between German democracy and British interests.

## Founding a Democracy: Democratising History

UK historians' teachings positioned Germany as a country that should be of deep importance to the UK, notwithstanding their knowledge of the challenges to Germany's nascent democracy. UK historians, such as Herbert Butterfield, identified

[24] A Letter from Harold Temperley to Thomas Frederick Tout, 31 April 1924, The University of Manchester: The John Rylands Library Archive Centre, *Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout*, Harold Temperley TFT/1/1165/175; 1 of 15 letters by Temperley to Tout. TFT/1/1165/175.
[25] *Ibid*., 31 May, 1926.
[26] A Letter from Harold Temperley from Hotel Nizza Wiestbaden, Germany to Thomas Frederick Tout, 25 September 1926, TFT/1/1165/175.
[27] A Letter from Harold Temperley to Thomas Frederick Tout, 31 April 1924, TFT/1/1165/175.
[28] *Ibid*.
[29] Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, London, Constable, 1980, p. 110.

patterns in Germany's political development when he analysed interwar German democracy. Butterfield referenced the 'Prussian school' of history that was used for the benefit of the state, and which dominated the preceding decades in Germany.[30] This concept, known as 'statism' in German historians' research, or *Etatismus*, endured until the end of World War II.[31] Pollard, among his colleagues, was a member of the 'historical investigation' that sought to locate the 'prevailing political ideas' in the portrayal of the pre-war era.[32] Germany was the first country to publish their diplomatic documents, catalysing interest in Germany among UK historians.[33] The aftermath of Germany's military collapse in World War I demanded that UK historians contextualise the new era in the light of the recent past.[34]

UK historians taught history in the hope of benefiting both British interests and Anglo-German relations more broadly. Despite historians' deep knowledge, men such as Pollard asserted that 'no subject [as history] was often so badly taught'.[35] His colleague, George Walter Prothero, wrote a one-page pamphlet about history's uses for enlarging the public space with questions of post-war Germany and democracy.[36]

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[30] Some Trends in Scholarship, 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History; notes of 'A Centenary Address', Read on 6 December 1968, BUTT/400, p. 5.
[31] John Moses, *The Politics of Illusion: The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography*, London, George Prior, 1975, p. xiii.
[32] League of Nations: The Committee on the League of Nations, Final Report, 3 July 1918. Article I, Clause. 3, 1918; Copies of Documents Relating to the Foreign Office Committee on the Setting up of the League of Nations: Correspondence, minutes, draft convention, draft historical report and comments', University of London: Senate House Library, *Pollard Papers*, MS 860/16/1 Pollard.
[33] Some Trends in Scholarship, 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History; Notes of 'A Centenary Address', Read on 6 December 1968, BUTT/400 p. 12.
[34] *Ibid*.
[35] The Report of the Proceedings at the Meeting to Consider the formation of a Historical Association held at University College, London, on 19 May 1906, Mr W. M. Childs (Principle of University College, Reading) said that it was primarily to bring together those engaged in teaching history for the communication of ideas and experience. Pollard MS 860/17/1, p. 1.
[36] Reading List for German History, undated, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, GB 237 Coll-454, DK. 5.45: 'Why should History be taught, and how should History be taught? 1) It is necessary, in this age of competition, for the advocates of History to show that it is an essential part of a liberal education. The study of History confers both intellectual and moral training. Intellectual training: memory, observation, imagination, reason: the relation of History to other sciences, the difference between scientific and unscientific history, and the reasoning processes followed by the former; the doctrine of continuity in History. Moral training: love of truth, imaginative sympathy, impartiality, sense of responsibility, enlightened patriotism, caution and hopefulness. Such qualities are the best equipment for a statesman and a citizen: History is past politics, politics present history. 2) The teaching of History: necessity of interesting young students, therefore begin with simple narrative; chronology to follow, but sequence and connection rather than dates; use of literature, art, contemporary records, to show the infinite relations of historical events, and to adorn the solid basis of fact. Doubtful points: is ancient or modern, national or foreign history the better educational subject? Special advantage of the study of constitutional history. Outlines or periods? Conclusion: the aim of examiners and teachers

Pollard and his colleagues proposed that the Historical Association have different aims from *English Historical Review* or the Royal Historical Society, so that their Association could promote historical instruction in the UK's schools.[37] The Historical Association argued that children 'for their own future as citizens…should not leave school without some interest in, and some knowledge of, the machinery of government'.[38]

The historian Charles Robert Ashbee had written approvingly of the 'mechanical order' of democracy in the years before World War I.[39] Ashbee had claimed that '[t]he danger now is mechanism, in…the unintelligent use of power'.[40] Charles Robert Ashbee was born on 17 May 1863, and was a designer as well as a businessman. As well as an historian he innovated the Arts and Crafts movement. He was inspired by John Ruskin and the Socialism of William Morris, examining the beliefs of romantic socialism. He was schooled at Wellington College and read history at King's College, University of Cambridge, from 1883 to 1886. In 1918, he attained the position of civic advisor under the auspices of the British Mandate of Palestine. He supervised construction and laid rules that guarded architectural sites. Ashbee chaired the Pro-Jerusalem Society and counted Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson as his friend. Ashbee died on 23 May 1942.

On 1 May 1921, the scholar Geo Veitch, who was not German, wrote a 'delighted' letter to Pollard in which he informed him of his joy that Pollard's plans for a school of research were being realised so that it might inform contemporary debate on politics.[41] This was the Institute of Historical Research based at the University of London, which Pollard would use to train historical researchers.[42] Such

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should be to make the student think; lectures to be supplemented by problems; the subject to be taught for its own sake'

[37] Establishment of Historical Association, 19 May 1906, MS 860/17/1 Pollard.

[38] *Ibid*; HA Memorandum on the 'scope and aims of history teaching in central schools, senior classes of elementary schools'.

[39] Survey of English Speaking Universities, 1912, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of Charles Robert Ashbee*, GBR/0272/PP/CRA pp. 6-7.

[40] *Ibid*.

[41] A Letter from Geo S. Veitch to A. F. Pollard, 1 May 1921, MS 860/19/4 Pollard.

[42] Fisher, 'Our Universities: The Centenary Oration, Thursday, June 30 1927', pp. 16-17.

places of research trained colleagues about the contemporary international system. Moreover, the broader culture of the UK's elite universities also facilitated expression and a pluralism of voices on Germany. These research institutes propagated a set of intersecting values about German democracy. In them, highly educated Germans directly informed the works of UK historians about the challenges of making Germans enthusiastic republicans.

Historians' familiarity with Germany facilitated ongoing interest. On 13 May 1932, Temperley confessed to John Maynard Keynes that he was 'not much of a publicist' and asked if Keynes could review a recent chapter in his co-written work with A. J. Grant, *Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*.[43] Temperley noted that '[t]his book will certainly be read by some thousands of young people, it is as well to get the ideas as weighty as they can be in popular treatment'.[44] Temperley did not suggest that there was any possibility that his works may have been prescriptive as well as analytical. Yet, many were fearful as to the course of German democracy, and of the possibility of revolution within that country.

## Founding a Democracy: German revolution

Horror at the barbaric loss of life was palpable for those UK interwar historians who sought to engage with the post-World War I world.[45] Butterfield noted with regret that some of Temperley's accomplished students had become casualties in World War I.[46] For example, Temperley had attempted to have a 'brilliant' student of his elected as 'a second Historical Fellow', but he had been killed in World War I.[47] Ashbee claimed that '[t]he conflict between the gentleman and the barbarian' converged during the interwar period.[48] Historians' views about war legacy were informed by discussions in Germany. Their German colleague, Delbrück, thought that Germany's soldiery was an accurate representation of Germans' sentiments

[43] A Letter from Harold Temperley to John Maynard Keynes, 13 May 1932, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of John Maynard Keynes*, JMK CO/11/246.
[44] *Ibid*.
[45] Butterfield writes of L. G. Robinson of the London School of Economics, BUTT/400 p. 26.
[46] Autobiographical Writings in Butterfield's Hand, BUTT/7.
[47] *Ibid*.
[48] Survey of English Speaking Universities, 1912, *Charles Robert Ashbee Papers*, CRA pp. 6-7.

following World War I. He noted that Friedrich Ebert (Weimar Germany's first president) had expressed democracy to them as a hollow concept with the result that many of his countrymen struggled to embrace it. Delbrück surmised,

> [w]hen the first German troops returned to Berlin and Ebert greeted them with the words: 'You must be glad to find the Fatherland politically free' his words struck me as a blow, and millions of Germans felt as I did, and still more millions have since come to feel this, to know in their own persons what this 'freedom' means.[49]

UK interwar historians' interaction with the revolutionary periods of German democracy existed in a context of political and economic uncertainty within the UK and Europe. On 7 February 1918, Fisher interviewed colleagues such as James W. Headlam-Morley about teaching history, but scribbled that the 'Irish situation' at the time was 'very serious' and 'desperate'.[50] Ronald Edmund Balfour's miscellanea included Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson's musings and notes, which were full of rancour on the European state system. He posited that communism was a 'live institutional covenant' and was a 'big venture' that sounded the future.[51] He noted that '[t]heir European civilisation is bound to perish...Communism appears our only hope' and 'ally'.[52] Ronald Edmund Balfour was born in 1904 and was schooled at Eton, as well as at King's College, University of Cambridge. He matriculated from here in 1922, and thereupon became a Fellow of the College upon his election in to that body in 1928. He became a Lecturer in History in 1930. In World War II, Balfour was a commissioned officer and a member of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, and, on account of his historians' training, was charged to see that historical artefacts and buildings were salvaged in Germany, France and Belgium. On 7 March 1945, Major Balfour was killed by a shell while saving a statue from a destroyed church. On 28 December 1925, Dickinson wrote to A. J. Grant about the 'enormous changes'

[49] Professor Delbrück on the Situation in Germany, August 1918, FO 371/4382, PID 563, p. 2.
[50] Fisher interviews Colleagues, 7 February 1918, MS. Fisher 11, pp. 35-67.
[51] Miscellanea, Undated, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of Ronald Edmond Balfour*, GBR/0272/PP/REB/, REB/1/2/12.
[52] *Ibid*.

that he thought were needed for the reordering of the world. He noted ominously that 'no one can say whether a great destruction will come before they do'.[53]

A Home Office Report described some areas under the jurisdiction of the Weimar Republic, which were troubled by the persistence of revolutionary outbreaks. The report noted,

> [t]he government appears to have abandoned their earlier hope of fomenting Bolshevism in the Allied countries, and to be genuinely alarmed at the spread of communism in Germany. It has even made overtures to our service in the occupied territory to make common cause against the Spartacists, whom it represents as planning to send agents into France with the labourers for the devastated areas. In the area occupied by the British Army the Socialist Party appears to be gaining ground; the revolutionary ideas of returning soldiers are even affecting the peasantry, and the Church is said to be losing its influence over the people.[54]

Germany loomed large in the interpretations of UK historians as its stability was held to be as a centre of gravity for surrounding countries. On 3 January 1918, Fisher made a speech to a 'dull audience of about 500' people from the C.U. [Credit Union] of Teachers at the YMCA in Totttenham Court Road, after which Fisher conversed with his colleague George Trevelyan. Trevelyan had just returned from Italy and was worried about the fragility of the Italian army, due to the attenuated state of their morale and inadequate income.[55] Arthur Elliott Felkin's papers suggested that his colleagues had trouble discerning the nature of civil war and revolution in the southern European countries that surrounded Germany.[56] Arthur Elliott Felkin was born on 31 December 1892. In 1911, Felkin was admitted to King's College, University of Cambridge. After graduating, he worked as an

[53] A Letter from Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Arthur James Grant, 28 December 1925, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, GLD 5/11/5 GLD/AJG V, 1920s-June 1931 Letter 6.
[54] Political Correspondence: Directorate of Intelligence, Home Office, Report no. 10; A Monthly Review of the Progress of Revolutionary Movements Abroad, 14 August 1919, The National Archives (UK), *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 371/4382, p. 5.
[55] Fisher and Trevelyan, 3 January 1918, MS. Fisher 11, 10: 30 a.m. Wednesday, p. 15.
[56] A Letter from Arthur Elliott Felkin, Undated, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *Arthur Elliott Felkin Papers*, AEF/4/9/1 papers.

interpreter in prison camps such as Frongoch Prisoner of War Camp near Bala, Wales, and Blandford, Dorset. Felkin did this until he was employed as a personal assistant to Lord Salter, who was General Secretary of the Reparation Commission in Paris and later head of the Economics Section of the League of Nations Secretariat. Felkin was a member of the Finance Section of the Commission, and was a member of the Secretariat of the League of Nations in the Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service. His work included diplomacy. Felkin died in 1968.

The renown of UK interwar historians, such as Fisher, helped disseminate their work about German democracy to wide audiences. On 25 April 1939, H. W. Spalding wrote to Fisher from Columbia University to inform him that the University President [Nicholas Murray Butler], who was also a diplomat, peace activist and historian, had addressed the student body and lauded the value of history in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. Spalding related to Fisher how Butler finished his lecture by stating to the students that Fisher's 'incomparable' works numbered among the 'most important of all books'.[57] Butler particularly mentioned the last chapter in one of them, entitled 'New Dictatorships and Old Democracies', which he ranked as equivalent to the *Decline and Fall*.[58]

The comments of UK interwar historians, such as Goldsworthy Lowes-Dickinson, revealed their belief that Germany's problems sprung from the Treaty of Versailles. On 3 September 1927, Dickinson wrote to Grant from Geneva and commented that the interwar period's 'perpetual, futile, murderous nationalisms' made him feel more at home in the eighteenth century, rather than the nineteenth century.[59] Dickinson and Grant both shared an admiration for Orson Wells' socialist views of international cooperation, as well as Manichean views of history. He wrote to Grant that the League of Nations at the time was in 'a depressed condition' because of 'British snubbing'.[60]

[57] MS. Fisher 77.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Arthur James Grant, 3 September 1927, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson Papers*, 1920s-June 1931 Letter 8.
[60] *Ibid.*

## Interpreting a Democracy: Versailles and War Guilt

The Treaty of Versailles accentuated the complexities of UK historians' positions on German democracy. To UK historians, the Versailles Treaty came to explain why aspects of Weimar's experience of parliamentarianism failed to create a lasting commitment to democracy.[61] There was a sense that the UK saw its duty to be the promotion of peace and international cooperation. UK historians' commentary about the Treaty hinged on the 'deepest wish' of like-minded people to construct 'a world safe for peace and democracy'.[62] The men's perspectives of German democracy, while maintaining a diversity of opinion, were significantly influenced by the interwar era, and the financial and economic hardship the Treaty of Versailles caused Germans.[63] This was reinforced by the effects of the upheaval of the Treaty of Versailles on Germans' own self-perceptions.[64]

At the Versailles Conference in Paris, historians regarded the War Guilt Clause of Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty to have 'distressed' Germans, who maintained that any judgment on the issue should only be examined by 'neutral historians'.[65] In discussing the original text, the Germans had insisted that 'professional historians' be tasked with any analysis.[66] Instead, the Allied-imposed War Guilt Clause incensed the German representatives of the Peace Conference. The result was that large numbers of Germans regarded democracy as illegitimate and imposed, and rendered the country's political culture vulnerable to political extremism and militarism.[67] The British Foreign Office functionary and historian of Germany, A. W. G. Randall, acknowledged historians' close involvement in the attribution of war guilt, when he reported an exchange that he had with a Dr Field. A.

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[61] Roy Pascal, 'Nationalism and the German Intellectuals', in G. P. Gooch et al (eds), *The German Mind and Outlook*, London, Chapman Hall, 1945, p. 189.
[62] Lucie A. Zimmern, 'To the Editor: Great Britain in Geneva', *The Newsletter: The National Labour Fortnightly*, Vol. 6, No. 7, 22 December 1934, p. 112; In 1931, Anthony Eden was Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1934, he officiated in the role of Lord Privy Seal and was Prime Minister Baldwin's Minister for the League of Nations.
[63] Pascal, 'Nationalism and the German Intellectuals', p. 189.
[64] Arthur Rosenberg, *The Birth of the German Republic*, Ian F. D. Morrow (trans.), London, Humphrey Milford, 1931, p. 1.
[65] BUTT/400 p. 25.
[66] *Ibid*.
[67] Henry Ashby Turner, Jr, 'Hitler's Impact on History' in David Wetzel (ed.), *From the Berlin Museum to the Berlin Wall: Essays on the Cultural and Political History of Modern Germany*, Westport, Praeger, 1996, p. 124.

W. G. Randall was a Far Eastern Department Officer with the Foreign Office. Randall wrote,

> [D]r Field informed me that he knew Dr Grelling, the author of '*J'Accuse*', quite intimately and wished to say that Dr Grelling was willing to be called as a witness or to give his advice on the question of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war, which he had studied more closely perhaps than any other living man.[68]

UK interwar historians supported revisionism in the period. The notion that Germany was not completely at fault for the conflict gained greater recognition following World War I. By the latter stages of the interwar period, a majority of Britons believed that no one country or alliance system could be held responsible.[69] Among the historians and government functionaries, however, there was a variety of opinion. For instance, the South African soldier and politician, Jan Christiaan Smuts, disliked aspects of the Treaty. Harold Temperley claimed that US President Woodrow Wilson was only persuaded to adopt tenets of the Treaty by his legal team.[70] Temperley asserted that Smuts persuaded Wilson on matters that pertained to Smuts' memorandum. He wrote that the principles underpinning the Great Powers' action at Versailles were often at odds, and said:

> Wilson's chief interest was always territorial or political and Lloyd George and Clemenceau were always thinking of reparation [*sic*] the President may have got rather muddled up. Do you know or did you ever hear of an utterance of his in which he spoke of the Allies being entitled to "full reparation"? I do not know what 'full reparation' means but here again is an expression of a general

[68] Notes of Conversations with Dr. H. H. Field, August 29 1919, The National Archives (UK), *War Department*, PID 562, FO 371/4382, A. W. G. Randall, p. 4.
[69] Malcolm Saunders, 'Australian Citizens and the Perception of the Prussian Menace: The Case of a Country Town Editor', in John A. Moses and Christopher Pugsley (eds), *The German Empire and Britain's Pacific Dominions, 1871-1919: Essays on the Role of Australia and New Zealand in World Politics in the Age of Imperialism*, Claremont, Regina Books, 2000, p. 251.
[70] A Letter from Harold Temperley to John Maynard Keynes, 24 November 1920, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of John Maynard Keynes*, JMK CO/11/225; The French version was: '*sous reserve de toute renunciation et reclamation ulterieure de la part des Allies et des Etats-Unis, Reparation des dommages*'

> character which opens the door to a good deal of misunderstanding.[71]

UK historians engaged with the minutiae of the Treaty, were sensitive to the public's perceptions of it, and to its effects on the brittle quality of German democracy. On Wednesday 10 March 1920 from London, Prothero wrote in his diary about Canadian-born American historian, James T. Shotwell, and his views of John Maynard Keynes. He suggested that Wilson was intelligent, but felt that he was unfamiliar with Europe, and that his advisors often contradicted themselves in the advice they offered him. For example, the boundaries of the Saar region were proposed as permanent by Wilson's advisors. The French wanted the entire region annexed. He sadly concluded that 'Wilson made grave mistakes' in his discussions with the French, who had demanded 'complete annexation'. [72] Shotwell thought instead that alternatives in policy were required.[73] Other historians agreed with shortcomings of the Conference, and how its effects impacted countries on Germany's periphery. Temperley noted the importance of having 'Austrian and Bulgarian Reparation and Economic clauses' examined in order to get a sense of the proportionality of the blame apportioned to Germany.[74]

UK historians observed that many Germans distrusted the motives of parties that supported the Treaty of Versailles, and recognised that this also underpinned Germans' views about their foreign counterparts. Keynes recalled that all parties at the Peace Conference delegated the armistice conditions to representatives from their militaries without their Treasury counterparts.[75] The visibility of military

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[71] A Letter from Harold Temperley to John Maynard Keynes, 12 November 1920, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of John Maynard Keynes*, JMK CO/11/208.
[72] Prothero Diary on Wednesday, 10 March 1920, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, GWP/1/14, Prothero wrote in his journal on page 3 the journal goes up to 19 June 1922, after which GWP died on 10 July, 1922.
[73] *Ibid*.
[74] A Letter from Harold Temperley to John Maynard Keynes, 24 November 1920, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of John Maynard Keynes*, 24 November 1920, JMK CO/11/225; The French version was: '*sous reserve de toute renunciation et reclamation ulterieure de la part des Allies et des Etats-Unis, Reparation des dommages*'
[75] 'An Earlier Reply from Keynes to Temperley', 14 November 1920, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of John Maynard Keynes*, JMK CO/11/220.

representatives impressed upon UK historians' minds how World War I continued to affect Anglo-German relations. They were conscious of their German colleagues' views, such as those of Delbrück, whose opinions were given in translated extracts of the political magazine, *Preußische Jahrbücher* (which he also edited). Delbrück mentioned that, '[o]ur conscience may smite us, but we will not humiliate ourselves before people who, because they have conquered us, want to make the world believe that they are our moral superiors'.[76]

Historians examined how the Treaty impacted Germany's role in international peace. For example, they produced handbooks for the Peace Conference and Historical Surveys which sought to analyse the prospects of international harmony. Pollard noted that treaties were, after all, 'frail bonds'.[77] He wrote that a 'world state or Roman Empire' provided an untenable basis for Germany's involvement.[78] He suggested the formation of an International Peace Council to promote partnership between peoples. Pollard nevertheless felt that 'after so much mutual destruction' the time had arrived for more international governance.[79] Historians promoted the realisation of democratic institutions by supporting these processes amid popular sentiment. In a letter to the editor in 1934, one reader believed similarly that Anthony Eden's work with the League of Nations would be 'fully realised by our public opinion'.[80]

UK historians hoped their work would assist in deepening democracy in Germany, and the interwar period saw them largely preoccupied with the provision of analyses for their colleagues. On 3 June 1919, from the Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, British Delegation Paris, Lord Charles Hardinge, extended his appreciation for historical analyses that informed British policy makers' work on

[76] Professor Delbrück on the Situation in Germany, August 1918, FO 371/4382, PID 563, p. 6.
[77] MS 860/16/1 Pollard Preparatory notes regarding The League of Nations Committee Memorandum,
[78] *Ibid*.
[79] *Ibid*.
[80] Lucie A. Zimmern, 'To the Editor: Great Britain in Geneva', *The Newsletter: The National Labour Fortnightly*, Vol. 6, No. 7, 22 December 1934, p. 112; In 1931, Anthony Eden was Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1934, he officiated in the role of Lord Privy Seal and was Prime Minister Baldwin's Minister for the League of Nations.

Germany, complimenting the historian in question and his colleagues for the professionalism of their work.[81] He wrote,

> [o]n behalf of Mr. Balfour and myself I wish to thank you most sincerely for the valuable assistance you have been good enough to give the Historical Section in the compilation of the series of Handbooks for the Peace Conference. These books, which are the product of much learning, literary skill, and hard work ungrudgingly given, have not only earned glowing testimony throughout all ranks of the British Delegation, to which they have been of very great benefit, but will undoubtedly prove of lasting utility and interest. With many thanks for your share in their success, believe me. Yours sincerely, Hardinge of Penshurst.[82]

These books and the contributions of their authors in the aftermath of World War I helped British policy makers understand the background to German democracy in an accessible format.

UK historians were very cognisant of the emergence of Bolshevism and the risk of its spread, during their discussions about German democracy. The historian and British ambassador to Germany from 1920 to 1925, Lord D'Abernon, wrote that Germans' sentiments towards the Treaty compelled them to turn away from the UK. Germany and the Soviet Union were both dissatisfied powers. Given this, he claimed that '[i]n so far as policy is governed by individual ministers, and not by public opinion, the danger of Germany turning to the East is today somewhat less than it was under the [Chancellor from 1921 to 1922, Joseph] Wirth regime'.[83] Some historians familiarised themselves with new political realities by travelling to the Central and Eastern European nations created by the Treaty of Versailles. There were

[81] Lord Hardinge of Penshurst to Professor Keith, from the British Delegation, Paris, 3 June 1919, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, Gen. 145/2/174.
[82] *Ibid*.
[83] Report from Ambassador D'Abernon, 27 November 1922, The National Archives (UK), *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 67.

exceptions, however, and Pollard informed Tout that he was not motivated to travel internationally, and that he did not plan to attend an event held in Warsaw.[84]

## Interpreting a Democracy: Parliamentary Systems

Notwithstanding their general support for revisions to the Treaty of Versailles, UK historians also noted the many defects in Germany's parliamentary democracy. UK historians regarded the durability of parliaments and democratic procedures as vital for determining Germany's relationship with the UK. UK interwar historians, such as Pollard, perceived democracy and parliamentarianism as an array of institutions and values that complemented each other. Historians drew attention to how democratic norms were arranged and sought to apply them to Germany. They helped raise awareness about parliamentary government and favoured outcomes that could promote a democratic culture. George Gooch, for example, understood that the Weimar Constitution was approved largely because Imperial Germany's downfall had not left an alternative. Like many of his colleagues, he admired the contributions of German politicians such as Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau, and Chancellors Gustav Stresemann and Heinrich Brüning, but recognised that the support for the parliamentary Republic was weak.[85] This sentiment was shown in Delbrück's mention that Germans were 'vexed at the many stupidities' of how members of Weimar's National Assembly were pre-occupied with 'patents of nobility, titles and orders'.[86] Delbrück mocked the Assembly's pretentions to have established a framework of guiding rules from which Germany could have prospered, and noted with exasperation, '[f]resh ideas, originality, there is none'.[87] UK interwar historians argued against the spread of sentiments that suggested that democracy was alien to Germany.

[84] A Letter from Thomas Frederick Tout to A. F. Pollard, 23 September 1929, From St Mary's Grove, Barnes Common, The University of Manchester: The John Rylands Library Archive Centre, *Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout*, TFT/1/949/1-12.
[85] G. P. Gooch, *Dictatorship in Theory and Practice*, London, Watts and Co., 1935, p. 22-23; Pascal, 'Nationalism and the German Intellectuals', p. 190.
[86] Professor Delbrück on the Situation in Germany, August 1918, FO 371/4382, PID 563, p. 2.
[87] *Ibid*.

UK interwar historians were aware that many Germans saw their polity as unresponsive to Germans' needs. Historians recognised that forms of government other than democracy were accepted by many people, because they were seen as 'the way of the future'.[88] UK historians used the British parliament as an example to provide insights into Germany's parliamentary system.[89] For example, following the 1848 revolutions, many German states established parliaments 'on the English model' that included dynastic heads of state.[90] The perceived failure of these parliaments to evolve meant that historians such as Pollard perceived the UK to be a unique example of democratic expression. Such historians argued that power in the UK lay with the consent of parliament and public opinion, although they also acknowledged that its historical origins lay partly in Germany.[91] Contemporary Germany was recognised to be experiencing new and difficult situations though. Pollard viewed 'equality [to be] as dangerous and as dubious a term as independence'.[92] He argued that the growth of mass societies would cause novel social pressures for parliaments such as Weimar Germany's.[93]

Historians were actively involved in the education of Foreign Office personnel, and used the opportunity to discuss their view on the evolution of German democracy. Fisher, for example, was '[a] learned and eminent historian, the true foundation for statecraft'.[94] The education of the Foreign Office was a task deemed to be of central importance to the historians' peers.[95] However, despite the scope of their work across various contexts, their influence remained bounded. The British Foreign Secretary at the time, Austen Chamberlain, had trained in Modern German History at Cambridge, but was seen as 'hopeless' at the Foreign Office, according to

[88] Pamela Fisher and Roy Fisher, 'Tomorrow We Live: Fascist Visions of Education in 1930s Britain', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2009, p. 73.
[89] Committee on the League of Nations Historical Memorandum, Sir Julian Corbett's Redraft of Article 14, University of London: Senate House Library, *Pollard Papers*, MS 860/16/1.
[90] 'The Pamphlets "Our Next War"', First published February 1898, University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, DK. 5/61.
[91] R. W. Seton-Watson, *Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, The Macmillan Company, 1937, p. 650.
[92] A. F. Pollard, 'The Dominions and Foreign Affairs', *Woman's Leader*, [Further publication details were not extant].
[93] 'The Origin and Future of Parliament', by Ernest Barker, *Edinburgh Review*, July 1920, Review of The Evolution of Parliament, p. 69.
[94] 'The Rt. Hon. Herbert Fisher', *Friends Quarterley Examiner*, London, Leominster, 1940, p. 1.
[95] A. F. Pollard, 'The Dominions and Foreign Affairs', *Woman's Leader*. [Further publication details were not extant].

the opinions of some members of historian Robert Arthur Sanders' Conservative party.[96]

Robert Arthur Sanders, 1st Baron Brayford of Stoke Trister, PC, JP, was an historian and politician. Sanders was born on 20 June 1867, in London. He was schooled at Harrow and at Balliol College, University of Oxford. Sanders was a Conservative Member of Parliament for Bridgewater, Somerset from 1910 until 1923. He also served from 1911 to 1917, as a Lieutenant-Colonel with the Royal North Devon Yeomanry. He served at Gallipoli, Egypt and Palestine. He was appointed a deputy lieutenant of Somerset in 1912. Sanders died on 24 February 1940. Nonetheless, historians' influence in the Foreign Office enabled them to promote the institutionalisation of democratic processes in Germany as a key component in that country's post-war stabilisation. They did this by being able to work across contexts in ways that could maximise public intellectuals' roles. Arthur Keith, moreover, believed that historians were 'entitled to advise' on matters that concerned the content of their work, including interpretation and implementation.[97]

## Interpreting a Democracy: The Public Space

UK historians' proximity to political power was aided by organs of democratic cooperation and the press.[98] Historians were aided in their efforts by 'Teutonic theory', which held that historians forged political developments and helped determine the outcome of events.[99] Historians were part of a circle that contributed to the preparation of important occasions. Fisher recounted how Lloyd George made a 'long, interesting, rather lifeless' address to the parliament on Europe and Germany's circumstances. Nevertheless, Fisher recognised the prime minister's address as 'a big statement'.[100] On 12 January 1921, Fisher wrote how he had introduced Temperley to Lloyd George and noted how 'curious' it was to see his colleague's

[96] Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Monday, 13 July 1924, Vol II. University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of Robert Arthur Sanders, 1910-1935*, Dep. D. 753, p. 84.
[97] Professor Keith of Sloan Street to Lord Crewe, 8 May 1919, University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, Gen. 145/2/179.
[98] M. R. D. Foot, *British Foreign Policy since 1898*, London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1956, p. 72.
[99] R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe*, London, School of Slavonic Studies in the University of London, 1922, p. 20.
[100] MS. Fisher 11, 2:30 p.m. Thursday, 20 December 1918, p. 14.

participation.[101] Fisher alluded to the influence prominent historians such as himself exercised, and claimed that he put Temperley 'where he now stands', among politically significant cliques.[102] Seton-Watson noted more modestly that while '[i]t is true that no historian has played more than a secondary part in public affairs', many worked in very influential government roles.[103] Temperley, according to Butterfield, 'liked to tell stories about his connections with the great, and in the twenties he still belonged to that group of historians who were bewitched because they were on the fringe of that magic circle of people who govern us'.[104]

Despite their limitations, historians were influential at the Versailles Peace Conference because they publicly identified the challenges faced by German democracy. Temperley, for example, predicted that 'new sentiments' would arise as a consequence of their work.[105] The web of contacts that historians used to contextualise current events deepened as the interwar period progressed. In 1922, Temperley wrote to the Lord President of the Council, the Conservative Party's Arthur Balfour, about how he had consulted the sources of a French colleague on matters about the Peace Conference.[106] Temperley framed the discussion so that his analyses were presented for the public interest. On a matter that related to Central and Eastern Europe, he was unable to comprehend how a particular journalist 'could know so much', implying that historians should have priority to access information about Germany when it became available.[107] Nevertheless, Temperley had previously suggested in 1922 that there must have been collusion with their own Foreign Office personnel and newspapers, and noted that 'a plenipotentiary' from the Versailles Conference could have been behind what he termed as 'puzzling' problems that represented the dilemmas of understanding the boundaries of the public space.[108]

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[101] Temperley: Notes, mostly on the life and career of H. W. V. Temperley, consisting in part of copies and extracts from his correspondence and diaries, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield BUTT/8.
[102] *Ibid*.
[103] Seton-Watson, *The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe*, p. 20.
[104] Autobiographical Writings in Butterfield's Hand, BUTT/7, p. 55.
[105] Some Trends in Scholarship, 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History; notes of 'A Centenary Address', Read on 6 December, 1968, BUTT/400 p. 25
[106] BUTT/8.
[107] *Ibid*.
[108] Notes on Dalmatia, Slovenia, Albania, Temperley wrote to Balfour, 30 June 1922, BUTT/8.

UK historians recognised that the public space was strongly present in their analysis of Germany's democratic framework. Historians such as Pollard drafted the *Historical Report* for the League of Nations, and collaborated with the half-German and German-educated diplomat, Sir Eyre Crowe, who was noted as an expert on Germany. Articles 27 and 28 of Pollard's *Historical Report* declared that a strong public space must contain elements of the democratic process. He hoped that the 'will of the people' would offer a more stable future.[109] This marked the beginning of an interwar context for decisions about how to deal with challenges to democracy. A consolidated public space would thereby facilitate new ideas and support democracy.[110] Such sentiments were expressed in a number of Pollard's works, such as, *The Evolution of Parliament*.[111]

UK historians solidified the public space in order to shape public opinion about the often attenuated state of German democracy. They did this by employing their social and cultural capital in a way that showed their understanding of Germany to be not completely bound by the conventions or rules of historical study, as it was then understood. Fisher and his colleagues sought to have "British public diplomacy" applied to Germany in the interwar era. He wrote that '[t]he democracies of Europe' required smart 'propaganda' that should aim to expedite 'international harmony'.[112] It was in this vein that historians received support for their actions from the British monarchy. In this instance, they argued that historians should promote the British culture and system of government as being of benefit to Germans and British interests.[113] In other words, they were tasked with 'showing the world what they owed Britain', as King George V declared it.[114]

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[109] The Committee on the League of Nations Submission to the Committee of an alternative version of a conclusion to our historical report by Eyre A. Crowe of the Foreign Office, June 18 1918, Pollard MS 860/16/1.
[110] *Ibid*; Pollard The Committee on the League of Nations Submission to the Committee of an alternative version of a conclusion to our historical report by Eyre A. Crowe of the Foreign Office, June 18, 1918.
[111] Evening Post, New York, 14 May 1921; Albert Beebe White of the University of Minnesota cited: 'the main feature being an imperial second chamber, based on a principle suggested by the United States Senate, to replace the House of Lords and all other second chambers throughout the Empire'.

[112] H. A. L. Fisher, *The Present Position of the League of Nations*, [Unpublished Notes] 1923, p. 9.
[113] Peter Aspden, *Selling Democracy? The Past and Future of Western Cultural Relations and Public Diplomacy*, London, British Council, 2004, p. 12.
[114] Cf. *Ibid*.

UK interwar historians' efforts to shape the growth of the public space took on unique forms of engagement, as demonstrated by the renown of their Peace Handbooks. On 14 October 1919, Prothero wrote to the Historical Section of the Foreign Office about how the Foreign Office had decided to publish historians' Peace Handbooks. He acknowledged that although they were created by the Historical Section for 'confidential' purposes, and the 'service of the State', many people had requested that they be made publicly available.[115] Prothero insisted that 'as these will be Government publications, the names of the authors will not be given'.[116] These briefing books were made for British negotiators at Versailles and dealt with many of the questions raised at the Peace Conference.[117] With a 'kind willingness', historians agreed that their colleagues and other 'experts' from the Foreign Office could have their books re-examined so that current events were able to be incorporated.[118] They represented a type of engagement which directly enlarged the UK public's awareness of the state of German democracy.

UK historians' work as public intellectuals ensured that their activities would shape public attitudes about German democracy. Fisher highlighted the development of institutes that promoted better understanding of the world and of the UK's foreign policy with regards to Germany. The UK historian-staffed Institute of International Affairs was one of the outcomes from the Versailles Peace Conference that Fisher alluded to as an instrument for investigating German democracy in the public space. He wrote:

> [t]he Institute of International Affairs is a product of the Peace Conference. It has been founded to promote the dispassionate study of contemporary politics…in democracies...Many good modern historians have been trained in journalism, but the best

[115] Prothero to Professor Keith, 14 October 1919, From the Foreign Office, Historical Section, 1, Lake Buildings, St. James's Park, S. W. 1. University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero* Keith, Gen. 145/2/165a.

[116] *Ibid*.

[117] Keith to Prothero, From 122 Polwarth Terrace, 26 September 1919, Gen. 145/2/168.
[118] Prothero to Keith, 19 September 1919, Gen. 145/2/171a.

preparation… [is knowledge of] the art and science of politics.[119]

Historians' public involvement with issues relating to German democracy was one of the factors that changed them into public faces of intellectualness. This aligns with Pierre Bourdieu's reasoning that public intellectuals' importance can be measured by how they are perceived by others.[120] In the light of such recognition, the Sub-Dean of University College, London G. Schwarzenberger wrote to Butterfield about the contributions of his colleague, Temperley. He was particularly interested about the latter's investigations to publish historical journals in German, English and French. Temperley defended the integrity of his institute's 'research work', as well as its validity in being applied to public debate and the strengthening of the public space.[121]

UK historians elevated interwar German democracy's importance so as to inform the UK's public discussion about Germany. They proved themselves both savvy and adept articulators of the significance of German democracy in the public space. They articulated German democracy by informing Britons about Germany, and by informing Germans about British democracy. Their analyses of German democracy explored various elements of interwar German society, including the Versailles Treaty, parliamentary systems, and the public space. UK historians viewed democracy in Germany as a means of Germans' political and cultural expression, realised through democratic institutions. Their ability to connect German democratic issues with the UK's was central to their influence. Crucially, it was historians' work across different contexts while writing and giving lectures that augmented the effects of their analyses of German democracy. The relationship between the founding of German democracy and UK historians' work reinforced their commitment to a robust democracy and public debate in Germany. Yet, their commentary about German democracy existed in the context of Germany's dissatisfaction with its post-World War I borders. It was Germany's borders that concentrated UK interwar historians'

[119] Notes that contributed to H. A. L. Fisher's article: 'The Institute of Historical Research and the Anglo-American Historical Conference', *History*, Vol. 6, No. 23, October 1921, p. 146, MS. 167.
[120] Junpeng Li, 'Intellectuals' Political Orientations: Toward an Analytical Sociology', *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 6, No. 12, 2010, p. 5.
[121] Butterfield and Temperley, BUTT/8, 3 May 1949.

minds, and where consensus on the significance of Germany's power was reached.

# CHAPTER 5: GERMAN POWER BEYOND AND ALONG ITS BORDERS

UK interwar historians' analyses of Germany's power were formulated amidst that country's transformation into a new polity with new borders. Historians' commentary about interwar Germany's influence outside its frontiers made reference to the threats they perceived Germany to represent, as well as their judgement of Germany's vulnerabilities. Their analyses of interwar Germany's extraterritorial power reinforced their capacities as public intellectuals.

UK historians recognised that the outcome of World War I left contested interpretations of where Germany's borders should be, and their attitudes about this evolved in tandem with those of many Germans. The chapter argues that UK historians raised awareness of the importance of Germany's borders to British interests. The chapter examines how some UK historians invoked Anglo-Saxon kinship in their interpretations of Germany's power beyond its borders, and in suggesting new directions for Anglo-German relations. They did this by publicly commenting about the changes to Germany's borders, and the effects of Germany's loss of colonies to long-term British interests. In doing so, they evoked Germany's historical conflict with neighbouring states, and Germans' experiences with people movement. Taken together, the different aspects were included in UK historians' recognition of the importance of German power beyond its borders to British interests.

The chapter includes interpretations that examine UK historians' perspectives about interwar German influence through three pillars. The first explores the linkage between UK historians and issues that included renegotiating the changes of Germany's borders. One element of this involved historians' involvement with the League of Nations, as they used the League as a means to draw attention to Germany's borders. It argues that UK historians drew on their knowledge about Germany's borders to project their influence in the public space. The second considers how UK historians sought to use bodies such as the League of Nations to help foster an eventual return of Germany's seized colonies. It argues that UK

historians saw a stronger Germany as desirable for British interests, and that Germany's usefulness as a counterweight to other powers required the eventual return of its colonies. The third shows that UK historians realised that the reshaping of Germany's borders around interwar interpretations of sovereignty and people movement had unnecessarily complicated Anglo-German relations. Historians' analyses implied that the resumption of harmonious relations between the UK and Germany could incentivise Germany to restrain and redirect its power for the betterment of Anglo-German relations.

## Renegotiating Germany's Borders and the League of Nations

UK interwar historians drew on their knowledge of Germany's borders to argue for a re-examination of that country's frontiers. They sought to project their influence in the public space by using the League of Nations' treatment of Germany's borders to raise awareness of British interests in the dispute. Historians used Germany's borders to elicit sympathy for that country on the basis of a shared Anglo-Saxon heritage. Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson regarded the management of Germany's power to be an important issue for the League of Nations. He felt that once hostilities had ended, the UK should have ensured that there were no recriminations since the Germans were entitled to Britons' help as Anglo-Saxon brethren.[1]

Historians sought to renegotiate Germany's borders, and used the League of Nations in order to show their willingness to work with the League as a feature of the post-World War I order. On 14 April 1937, one day before British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's private secretary took receipt of the memorial from UK historians William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley that began Chapter 1, they had written a six-page letter to Baldwin suggesting why the UK should have used its influence in the League of Nations to have Germany's colonies re-adjudicated. Firstly, they acknowledged that foreign policy solutions should not be subordinated to the caprices of politics. They then 'strongly' invoked their authority as historians of Germany to facilitate 'the early and sympathetic treatment of the German colonial

[1] E. M. Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, London, Edward Arnold, 1934, p. 186.

question by our government'.[2] By mentioning the League's moral authority, Dawson and Beazley sought to question whether Germany's power reflected its post-World War I borders. UK historians' appeal to their prime minister reflected their confidence in revisiting the justice of Germany's borders at the highest level.

World War I's aftermath provided an opportunity for some historians to rethink the durability of Germany's interwar borders, and to ponder the veracity of a common Anglo-Saxon heritage.[3] Historians were aware that World War I's ferocity had destroyed for many the claim (explored in Chapter 4) that British freedoms were Teutonically inspired.[4] Historians used the post-war period to seek to be detached observers of German power in the interwar world. They sought to show that their ability to address the justice and morality of an issue objectively was unimpeded by any framework they worked under. In Herbert Butterfield's words, UK historians ought to have the 'essential truth' revealed in order to firm Britons' understanding of the public space, although his aim was to inform the public about Germany.[5] George Gooch and Harold Temperley co-edited *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, a work that was only finished in 1938. They saw themselves as 'independent historians', and accepted the task because of an 'invitation' from the prime minister.[6] Despite critiques from some government officials, Gooch and Temperley published '[g]limpses of the kind of material that was relevant to policy-making'.[7] UK historians' positions in government meant that they were at the centre of debates about the intersection of borders and power in Europe after World War I.[8]

[2] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Stanley Baldwin's Private Papers*, Baldwin 91-96.
[3] Some Trends in Scholarship, 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History; notes of 'A Centenary Address', Read on 6 December, 1968, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield, BUTT/400 p. 25.
[4] Hugh Kearney, 'The Importance of Being British', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 71, No. 1, p. 21.
[5] Some Trends in Scholarship, 1868-1968, in the Field of Modern History; notes of 'A Centenary Address', Read on 6 December, 1968, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield, BUTT/400 p. 25.
[6] *Ibid*.
[7] *Ibid*.
[8] Kearney, 'The Importance of Being British', p. 21.

Many UK historians had been active in regions that had historically been prone to German influence. Temperley had served with the British army at Gallipoli, but was then seconded to the War Office to produce intelligence reports for the Balkans region. On 3 July 1919, he wrote that he was the 'chief interpreter with [the then-Foreign Secretary, Arthur] Balfour'.[9] Temperley had served in the Balkan Peninsula, and had conducted much work for the British government while his protégé and colleague, Butterfield, studied at undergraduate level at university.[10] Historians' activities were practical as well as intellectual. A typical aspect of Temperley's work can be seen in his approach to the allocation of land in the aftermath of World War I. Of Balkan population centres he wrote, '[t]he Peekommije and the Baranya with the 7 villages I gave to Serbia were settled – extension was reformed in the Barnat'.[11] He later gave 'permission to occupy' the town of Prenoninya.[12] UK historians' participation in redrawing borders reflected the wide scope of their influence.

UK historians' roles often included their work as civil servants rather than being primarily identified as historians. Historians' willingness to serve on various government bodies showed that they were central to the founding of international institutions on matters relating to Germany. As Chapter 5 alluded, the then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, historian, and one of the architects of the League of Nations, Robert Cecil, wrote to A. F. Pollard in December 1917, asking if Pollard was willing to serve on a 'small committee of an entirely private nature'.[13] Pollard's attendance on the committee of historians and Foreign Office functionaries was viewed as being of the 'greatest assistance'. They were tasked with investigating 'from a juridical and historic point of view into various schemes for establishing, by

[9] Temperley: Notes, mostly on the life and career of H. W. V. Temperley, consisting in part of copies and extracts from his correspondence and diaries, 3 July 1919, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield BUTT/8.
[10] Autobiographical Writings in Butterfield's Hand, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield, BUTT/7.
[11] Temperley: Notes, mostly on the life and career of H. W. V. Temperley, consisting in part of copies and extracts from his correspondence and diaries, 23 July 1919, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield BUTT/8.
[12] *Ibid*.
[13] League of Nations, December 1917, University of London: Senate House Library, *Pollard Papers*, MS 860/16/1 Pollard.

means of a League of Nations or other device, some alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes and report on their practicality'.[14]

Many UK historians wanted the League of Nations to succeed and this was a conviction shared by supporters of Anglo-German cooperation, who saw it as a means to reawaken an Anglo-Saxon consciousness. The Committee on the League of Nations had UK historians adopt roles that incorporated advocacy and analysis. On the fourth meeting of the committee, held on 20 February 1918 at the Foreign Office, Pollard and Sir Julian Corbett suggested that uncertainty would be attached to any scheme if there was no mechanism to protect stronger powers from weaker powers. However, the rest of the Committee opposed these suggestions as unworkable. Pollard and another member, Dr John Holland Rose, subsequently examined 'the historical side of the questions' of the work that they were engaged in.[15]

John Holland Rose was born in Bedford in 1855. Rose, 'like most of his colleagues, received little formal historical training in schools and universities'.[16] Rose studied at Bedford Modern School, and then at Christ's College, University of Cambridge, and examined diplomatic history and international relations, especially of the Napoleonic era. In World War I, Rose supported Britain's war effort by contributing a number of patriotic articles for publication. He contrasted Germany's aims in the early twentieth century with the ambitions of Britain's former continental adversaries in previous centuries.[17] Rose died in 1942. UK historians sought to show the nascent League of Nations' as an opportunity to awake humanity in order to achieve the goal of international harmony. UK historian Alfred Zimmern, for

[14] *Ibid*; See also: The minutes of the 1st meeting of the Committee, held at the Foreign Office, on 30 January 1918, included Sir Walter Phillimore (Chairman), Sir Julian Corbett, Professor Holland Rose, Sir Eyre Crowe, Sir William Tyrrell, Mr Hurst, Mr Kennedy as secretary, Pollard was ill. The first subject of discussion was Colonel Sir Hankey's Memorandum for the War Cabinet of 12 January 1918, on the League of Nations.
[15] *Ibid*; Pollard Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee of the League of Nations; On 27 February, in the minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Committee, Pollard postulated that they could categorise the existence of two sets of powers, in the great and the not-so-great. He thought that this would have the issue of 'voting power' resolved. Pollard observed that a second section of the Draft that began with Article 3, could have been included in another treaty.
[16] E. Wilson Lyon, 'John Holland Rose', in Bernadotte E. Schmitt (ed.), *Some Historians of Modern Europe: Essays in Historiography*, Port Washington, Kennikat Press, [1942] 1966, p. 367.
[17] *Ibid*., pp. 384-389.

example, submitted an article that was entitled, 'The League of Nations Peace', in which he intoned that '[a]ll men, and we in particular, of the League of Nations Society, must prepare our imaginations and our minds to rise to the height of the opportunity offered'.[18]

On 20 March 1918, Pollard, Corbett and Rose resolved to provide an historical memorandum for the committee at its next meeting in Sir Eyre Crowe's office at the Foreign Office.[19] A judge met with Pollard at the Foreign Office on 27 June 1918, and they traded opinions on the League of Nations' capacity to enforce peace. He had previously sent Pollard some documents that had laid out the League's policies, and which had been adopted at their recent convention on 17 May 1918. He also transmitted an early draft of a treaty for the League of Nations, which had been supported by the League's executive committee on 11 April 1918.[20] Pollard oversaw the credentials of countries' delegates to the League of Nations, including those of France.[21] Dickinson supported the notion of a League of Nations that was a European polity, but believed that its implementation was unlikely.[22] The 'Draft Historical Report' was made by Pollard, Rose and Corbett. The Chairman of the committee, however, observed that their report was not concerned with 'modern schemes of a League of Nations'.[23]

Historians drew on their knowledge relating to the boundaries of Germany's power when they sought to project influence in the public space. George Walter Prothero wrote from Edinburgh University to a newspaper on 30 September 1918,

[18] Pamphlet for the League of Nations Society, No. 12, December 1918, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Zimmern Papers,* MS. Zimmern 171.
[19] Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Committee of the League of Nations, MS 860/16/1; The time and date of the meeting was 11:30 a.m. on 24 April.
[20] Pollard Judge correspondence: Judge William H. Wadhams of the Court of Central Sessions in New York, sent Professor Pollard of the Foreign Office, Downing Street, the enclosed papers, 27 June 1918', MS 860/16/1.
[21] Pollard Correspondence from A. R. Kennedy, July 13 1918', MS 860/16/1.
[22] G. L. Dickinson, *The Choice Before Us*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1918, p. 172.
[23] Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the Committee held at the League of Nations The Committee of the League of Nations, 10th Committee Meeting, 10 May 1918', MS 860/16/1 Pollard; 'It was decided whether the report should not be supplemented by that part of the Chairman's paper (Part 4) which deals with modern schemes'.

and characterised the League of Nations as reflecting the realities of German power given its impending exhaustion.

> [s]ir, The importance of the peace terms proposed by the President of the United States may justify some comment on the questions discussed in your leader of this date. In the first place it would seem that the President's speech on September 27 does definitely contemplate the inclusion of Germany in the League of Nations: his whole argument for the formation of such a League by the Treaty of Peace rests on the necessity of including Germany, and he demand the establishment of effective means to carry out the Peace Settlement because he contemplates that Germany will be a member of the League; if this was not his view, his objection to the formation of the League before the Treaty of Peace would be without meaning. In the second place the President's terms do affect in one important aspect of the Paris Resolutions. They do not, I agree, touch upon the relations ...of parts of one nationality, and therefore are not inconsistent with either the French policy of preserving to the metro-pole the trade of her colonies nor with preference between the different parts of the British Dominions. Nor, of course, do they demand the adoption by any nation of merely revenue tariff. On the other hand it is impossible to deny that they do not permit of any differential treatment by one member of the League of Nations of another member. They demand that Germany should abandon her economic plans for the east, but they are equally inconsistent with any scheme for preference among members of the present Western alliance. Nor is this policy in any way surprising.[24]

Some historians contributed to the later renegotiation of Germany's borders by analysing the experiences of Germany's neighbours. Robert Sanders saw that the early interwar period had increased the vulnerability of smaller nations. This was an irksome observation, as the UK had nominally entered World War I against Germany to defend the integrity of Belgium.[25] Dickinson wrote that the 'future of mankind'

[24] 30 September 1918, a newspaper, most likely *The Times*, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, Gen. 145/2/197.
[25] Sunday, 16 September 1923, Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II. Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Monday, 13 July 1924, Vol II., University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of Robert Arthur Sanders, 1910-1935*, Dep. D. 753.

and the League of Nations were synonymous.[26] 'Smaller states', he assured his readers, wanted the League of Nations supported.[27] Sanders, however, referenced the cases of Greece and Italy in 1923.[28] Other UK historians, such as H. A. L. Fisher also saw the 1923 Corfu border dispute incident between Italy and Greece as more ominous than reported French predations on Germany.[29] Sanders sardonically wrote that France was 'much impressed' by the uncertainty that the League of Nations symbolised.[30] Meanwhile his colleague, Fisher, wrote of the seriousness of the situation between Italy and Greece by analogising it with the Ruhr occupation. He noted that

> [t]he Italian bombardment of Corfu, which compared with the French occupation of the Ruhr, was a trivial and transitory event, administered a shock to the friends of the League all over the world, because it was a clear violation of the most important undertaking which one member of the League assumes towards another under the Covenant.[31]

UK historians sought to synthesise the unresolved questions of Germany's power beyond its borders with the emerging rules and procedures of new international institutions.[32] On 13 January 1921, Pollard and Fisher both examined topics that revealed the extent to which German power remained and counselled on the risks that this entailed. Pollard contributed to the Royal Institute of International Affairs meeting at which Fisher read the paper, 'The Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva'.[33] Temperley wrote that he was a member of the Committee of the British Representative in Paris in 1921, and that at Geneva he was the British

[26] G. Lowes Dickinson, 'Italy and the League', *The Nation and The Athenaeum*, 15 September 1923, p. 739, London School of Economics Archives: British Library of Political and Economic Science, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson Papers*.
[27] *Ibid*.
[28] Sunday, 16 September 1923, Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II. Dep. D. 753.
[29] H. A. L. Fisher, The Present Position of the League of Nations, [Unpublished Notes], 1923, p. 8, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of H. A. L. Fisher*, MS. Fisher.
[30] Sunday, 16 September 1923, Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II. Dep. D. 753.
[31] H. A. L. Fisher, *The Present Position of the League of Nations*, [Unpublished Notes] 1923, p. 8.
[32] Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, p. 186.
[33] Pollard Notes, 13 January 1921, University of London: Senate House Library, *Pollard Papers*, MS 860/44/1.

advisor until 7 October.[34] Nonetheless, historians such as Dickinson observed that the plight of Germany was frequently ignored at Geneva.[35]

## League of Nations and Colonies

UK historians argued that the seizure of Germany's colonies undermined previous British claims that World War I had been fought to return morality to international relations, and they asserted that British interests would be served by returning the colonies to Germany. For most historians who were interested in positive Anglo-German relations, both countries' pursuit of colonies served to highlight their peoples' commonalities of purpose. UK interwar historians particularly sought to discuss the issue's relevance to British interests, referring to Germans' dissatisfaction with the Allied seizure of their colonies. Dawson and Beazley's message to Prime Minister Baldwin mentioned that Germany's colonial experience from 1883 until 1918 was 'far from inglorious', and had even served as a model for other countries.[36] For historians seeking to promote British interests, Germany was a potential partner rather than a competitor.

UK historians in the interwar era held the UK and Germany's relationship about colonies as a barometer of the strength of Anglo-German relations more broadly. The importance of these lands' resources did not escape Zimmern, who noticed how his colleagues had emphasised the growth of the UK's possessions since the end of World War I. Britons drew pride in the fact that the interwar British Empire was bigger and richer than the United States of America.[37]

[34] Temperley: Notes, mostly on the life and career of H. W. V. Temperley, consisting in part of copies and extracts from his correspondence and diaries, MS Butterfield BUTT/8
[35] Forster, *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, p. 186.
[36] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[37] VII. Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories: Imperial Conference, 1926. Summary of Proceedings, Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, November, 1926. London, H. M. Stationary Office, 1926, p. 31, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Zimmern Papers*, MS. Zimmern 171.

Colonies that formerly belonged to Germany served to galvanise historians' public commentary. Their arguments privileged economics, security and morality, and further increased their public roles in debate. They also recognised Germany's resilience, as the economic impact of Germany's colonial losses took place alongside a 'national effort' to develop the country's industry and technology.[38] It was noted by contemporary commentators that a prosperous Germany meant a richer UK. Public intellectuals acknowledged that 'leading industrialists in the Republic' had observed that German power beyond its borders had world-wide benefits, 'not only for Great Britain and Germany, but for the world'.[39]

Prothero regarded German power beyond its borders as primarily connected to Germans' wish to have their colonies returned. From Edinburgh University on 9 November 1918, he elaborated on this perceived slight in a letter to the Editor of *The Times*.[40] In this case, Prothero was consumed with defending the complaints of the Australian Prime Minister, William Morris Hughes, over the latter's criticisms of how 'principles of the terms of peace' were resolved without the Dominion governments' involvement.[41] He thought that it was important for the Australian prime minister to understand the British ministers' decisions at Versailles. Prothero believed that consultations with the Australian prime minister would have revealed to him how the confiscation of Germany's colonies related to the broader debate over concerns of German power beyond its borders. He wrote:

> [t]he interest of Australia in the war is as great as that of any of the minor powers, and every consideration of expediency and prudence demanded that Mr Hughes should have been asked to accompany the British Ministers to Versailles, where he could have learned in communication with the representatives of the allied powers the cogent reasons which rendered it desirable to abandon the natural demand for an indemnity for the costs of the war, and which justified the failure to state expressly that the allies interpret

[38] Hugh Quigley and R. T. Clark, *Republican Germany: A Political and Economic Study*, London, Methuen, 1928, pp. 300-301.
[39] *Ibid*.
[40] Prothero's letter to the editor of *The Times*, 9 November 1918, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, Gen. 145/2/191.
[41] *Ibid*.

> [President] Mr Wilson's terms as rendering impossible the return to Germany of her Colonies.[42]

Historians' views sought to accentuate the positive aspects of Germany's international influence, and worked to highlight that country's global position. Dawson and Beazley's note to the British prime minister in the later 1930s reflected the significance that UK historians at Versailles played on the seizure of Germany's colonies. They emphasised to Baldwin that the UK's 'best public opinion' and 'best statesmanship' was achieved when the UK supported Germany's colonial aggrandisement.[43] They referenced previous British public figures' approval of German power beyond its borders by mentioning the earlier opinions of historians such as Charles Wentworth Dilke, as well as those of politicians William Gladstone, Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Salisbury, Lord Rosebury, and Sir Edward Grey. Dawson and Beazley claimed that Germany's aims never conflicted with British interests, and that Germany's development necessitated that country's provision with colonies. Moreover, they pointed to a significant colonial pact that the UK and Germany had worked on until June 1914.[44]

UK historians' capacities as public intellectuals related to their ability to analyse Germany's power beyond its borders. The finer points of the politics about colonies emanated from the Versailles Conference, and on this basis, Dawson and Beazley appealed to their prime minister on grounds of morality and justice. They wrote that:

> [d]espite initial mistakes, such as often marked the colonial beginnings of other nations, Germany on the whole steadily and remarkably developed peace, order, and prosperity in her overseas possessions. Not only so, but, (though practically without constitutional influence on imperial policy) no parliament in Europe showed deeper concern for the humane treatment of native populations than the German Reichstag, from the beginning of the colonial era. Long before the war German colonial administration

[42] *Ibid*.
[43] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[44] *Ibid*.

> was admitted, on unimpeachable testimony, to be at once conscientious, enlightened and beneficial. Men like Cecil Rhodes, Sir Harry Johnston, Theodore Roosevelt, Lord Milner and Sir Charles Eliot have born witness to this.[45]

Given this past record of diplomatic bonhomie, UK historians strove to be eloquent advocates for change during the interwar era. Historians' views on Germany's treatment evolved over time, but remained accepting of colonies' continued value. Temperley wrote to his colleague, Thomas Frederick Tout, how a 'German sequence' shaped how they studied history.[46] Thomas Frederick Tout was born on 28 September 1855, in London. He attended St Olave's Grammar School, and then Balliol College, University of Oxford. In 1874 Tout received a Brackenbury history scholarship to study at Oxford, where he eventually became a fellow of Pembroke College. Tout began his academic responsibilities at St David's University College, Lampeter, in 1881. From 1925 until 1929, he was President of the Royal Historical Society. From 1910 until 1912, Tout was president of the Historical Association. In 1890, Tout was appointed Professor of Modern History at Owens College, which became the University of Manchester in 1903. In 1902, he became Professor of Medieval and Modern History. In 1920, He became Professor of History and Director of Advanced Studies, but retired in 1925. Tout also introduced original research into the undergraduate programme. This produced a Final Year thesis established on primary works. He was active in many different spheres of public life. Tout had once wrote to Pollard that 'historians should organise along with the rest'.[47] Tout died on 23 October 1929.

It was in this way of looking at things that Prothero wrote to Professor Arthur Berriedale Keith and asked if he could have his decision regarding colonial handbooks reconsidered. These books had 'essential' 'historical information' about

[45] Baldwin 91-96.
[46] A Letter from Harold Temperley to Thomas Frederick Tout, 31 April 1924, The University of Manchester: The John Rylands Library Archive Centre, *Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout*, Harold Temperley, TFT/1/1165/175.
[47] Cf. Donald Read, 'A Parade of Past Presidents: 1906-82', *The Historian: 1906-2000: One Hundred Years of the Historical Association*, Vol. 91, 2006, p. 12.

colonies in Africa, and Keith wanted them withdrawn.[48] He argued that Keith's decision would have meant a lacuna of knowledge that 'historians and politicians' needed to know.[49] Arthur Berridale Keith was born on 5 April 1879 in Aberdeen. Among other things, Keith's work involved Scottish constitutional law. He attained the posts of Regius Professor of Sanskrit and Lecturer in Constitutional History in the University of Edinburgh. In 1952, historian Norman Henry Gibbs published a revised version of *Keith's British Cabinet System*, and increased many of the contributions towards the history of the British War Cabinet. Keith died on 6 October 1944. Prothero noted that these matters particularly concerned those states 'now composing the League of Nations and also Germany'.[50]

Norman Henry Gibbs, a historian and soldier, was born on 17 April 1910 in London, and followed a similar career path. Gibbs was educated at Magdalen College, University of Oxford. Following Gibbs' graduation, he pursued research work and from 1934 to 1936 attained a position as an assistant lecturer at University College, London. Gibbs attained a MA and DPhil. In 1936, he taught modern history at Merton College, University of Oxford. In 1939, Gibbs joined the 1st King's Dragoon Guards, following the beginning of World War II. Gibbs developed an affection for military history. In 1943, Gibbs was seconded to the Cabinet Office, a rare development that tasked him with helping start work on an official history of the war. Thus, he was a member of the Historical Section, War Cabinet Office. In War Cabinet Committee minutes, dated 16 October 1939, Gibbs noted the 'discussion [on] whether information concerning War Cabinet Committees should be given to Parliament.[51] From 1953 until 1977, Gibbs was Chichele Professor of the History of War at University of Oxford. Gibbs died on 20 April 1990.

[48] Prothero wrote on Historical Section of the Foreign Office paper but scrawled with the address of Dial Cottage, Rye, Sumx ? 22 September 1919, The University of Edinburgh: Centre for Research Collections (CRC), *Lectures and Notes of Professor George Walter Prothero*, Gen. 145/2/167a.
[49] *Ibid*.
[50] *Ibid*.
[51] War Cabinet Minutes, 16 October 1939, London School of Economics Archives: British Library of Political and Economic Science, *Norman Henry Gibbs Papers*, GB 097 GIBBS.

UK observers of Germany saw that Germans' desire for the restoration of their old colonies was reenergised in the early 1930s.[52] This phenomenon existed alongside a feeling among many Germans that they were destined to expand beyond their current borders in an easterly or southerly direction.[53] These developments confirmed suspicions of men such as Sir Robert Vansittart. Vansittart was a Foreign Office official whose later Germanophobia at the end of the interwar era led to the creation of the word 'Vansittartism', meaning views that demonstrated 'an extreme and obsessive anti-Germanism'.[54] However, Vansittart noted in 1934 how the issue of colonies had divided opinions within Germany, and had divided opinion about whether the country could best attain its goals with or against the UK. Notwithstanding such debates, he asserted that all Germans wanted colonies to be reacquired.[55] Lord Robert Gilbert Vansittart, GCB, GCMG, PC, MVO, received several British orders of chivalry. Sir Robert Vansittart was born on 25 June 1881. He attended at Eton and joined the Foreign Office in 1902. He fulfilled many diplomatic roles in his career. In 1920, he attended the Versailles Peace Settlement and became a Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. He was known for his harsh views towards the Germans. Vansittart died on 14 February 1957.

UK historians argued that it would not be antithetical to British interests if Germany reacquired greater power. Their suggestion implied the return of Germany's colonies. Historians regarded colonies as a channel through which to explore German power beyond its borders, and it provided critical elements for their public empowerment. They sought to project an image of British political culture that was cosmopolitan and outward looking, and they also wanted pragmatism for Anglo-German relations. UK interwar historians conducted themselves as public intellectuals who analysed the implications of Germany's increased capacity to project power beyond its borders. It was on the matter of the UK's policy to Germany's lost colonies that Dawson and Beazley again appealed for change. They

[52] Wolfe W. Schmokel, *Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919-1945*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964, p. 90.
[53] *Ibid*.
[54] Norman Rose, *Vansittart: Study of a Diplomat*, London, Heinemann, 1978, p. 246.
[55] Schmokel, *Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919-1945*, p. 90; Memorandum to the Foreign Secretary on 5 April, 1934.

wrote that,

> [i]t ought to be possible to find a safe and a satisfactory [*sic*] via media. Without presuming to make definite proposals we would suggest that the largest renunciations still practicable would involve but a slight sacrifice by Great Britain and France, which even without the confiscated German colonies possessed territories (the British Dominions not counted) so much vaster and richer than their Teutonic neighbour. We would mention further that no existing nation except our own has distinguished itself so greatly as the German in the spheres of exploration, scientific and particularly pathological research, and pioneer settlement.[56]

UK historians such as Dawson and Beazley used the issue of Germany's confiscated colonies as a tool to persuade senior public figures that a re-evaluation of Germany's international role was needed. Historians' awareness of Germany's long-term developments in foreign policy motivated these historians to focus on colonial matters specifically. For instance, Dawson wrote the Introduction to a book authored by Dr Heinrich Schnee, the former Governor of German East Africa, in which Dawson emphasised his disagreement with British policy by writing '[i]t is not comforting to be told that it is permissible to ignore territorial treaties which stand in the way of national interest.[57]

UK historians believed that their country's national interests would be better served by building a stronger basis for Anglo-German relations to develop, and not by viewing British interests narrowly. Historians sought norms-building institutions to embed international peace and German democracy. They continued to believe that the League of Nations represented a potential framework in which British interests, German friendship, and multilateral cooperation could develop. UK interwar historians' fame as orators demanded their involvement at public speaking engagements. Lecturers in diplomatic history, such as A. J. Grant, were seen as

[56] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[57] William Harbutt Dawson, 'Introduction', in Heinrich Schnee (ed.), *German Colonisation: Past and Future: The Truth about the German Colonies*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1926, p. 23.

'missionaries', who could disseminate history that aimed to inculcate peacemaking with Germany.[58] Historians such as Grant participated in ways that approximated community outreach. Grant did this at universities, colleges, schools, public lectures, and to branches of the League of Nations, the Historical Association, and to philosophical and literary societies.[59]

Arthur James Grant was born on 21 June 1862, and schooled at Boston Grammar School and at King's College, University of Cambridge. In 1884, Grant graduated with a BA in Classics. Grant worked as a University Extension Lecturer. From Grant's papers, it was written that '[t]hese early lecturers were, in a real sense, missionaries, knowing that upon their shoulders lay the responsibility of imparting both knowledge and wisdom to those who were clearly now going to play a much more active part than they had ever played before in the affairs of mankind'.[60] In 1897, Grant was Professor of History at Yorkshire College, which became the University of Leeds in 1904. The historian and educationalist, Sir Michael Sadler reportedly said that, '[h]e is one of the best speakers in Britain'.[61] Grant was reputed to be a gifted orator, and addressed the Historical Association, various schools, colleges, League of Nations branches, philosophical and literary societies, Men's Fellowships and Women's Institutes. Between 1897 and 1927, Grant was Professor of History at the University of Leeds. Between 1930 and 1932, he taught at the University of Egypt, Cairo as a Professor of Modern History. Grant died on 24 May 1948.

UK interwar historians were influential voices, who managed to analyse Germany's international power through peacemaking institutions while remaining conscious of British interests. Historians amplified their voices in two main ways. The first was in framing how peaceful coexistence with Germany was discussed in

[58] Arthur James Grant, Professor of History, University of Leeds, 1897-1927; a Biographical Essay by John R. H. Moorman (Bishop of Ripon), Leeds University Library: Special Collections, *Arthur James Grant Papers*, MS 451, 47 ff in 1 envelope, p. 15.
[59] *Ibid*.
[60] 'Arthur James Grant, Professor of History, University of Leeds, 1897-1927; a Biographical Essay by John R. H. Moorman (Bishop of Ripon', Leeds University Library: Special Collections, *Arthur James Grant Papers*, MS 451, 47 ff in 1 envelope, p. 15.
[61] *Ibid*.

public space. The second was their preoccupation with bodies such as the League of Nations. In these ways, the historians shaped the UK's perceptions of German power along and beyond its borders, and set an important role for themselves in the process.

UK historians were political activists who believed their analyses of Anglo-German relations were vital to increase support for the two countries' positive relationship. Historians viewed the League of Nations and coloniality as central means through which to analyse German power beyond its borders. Further to this, historians assessed sovereignty, conflict and migration as further elements of German power outside its borders. Historians strove to be public intellectuals, who analysed the justice of Germany's interwar borders. UK historians' analyses consolidated the public space in the process. Thus, the historians of this thesis pursued two parallel tracks. The first sought Germany's power to be enveloped within structures that could increase British interests, while the second resulted in the firming of the UK's public space.

## The Reshaping of Germany's Borders

Historians sought to occupy a niche for themselves as a collection of individuals who understood Germany, and where their identity was distinguishable by their arguments as both historians and public intellectuals. Some of the historians of this thesis observed that a strong Germany would be useful for British interests, and sought to enable this through their interpretations of interwar Germany's power. They expressed these views as intellectuals, who recognised the effects of post-war events on Germany's sovereignty. After World War I, new polities had been established on the grounds of national self-determination, but this had resulted in large numbers of Germans who now lived outside the state identified as their own.[62] These former 'Reich Germans' conceived nationalism within paradigms of ethnic identity, rather than 'state borders' that did not align with their experience of reality.[63] Underlying it all was UK historians' perceptions that Anglo-German

[62] Cf. Annemarie H. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2010, p. 122.
[63] Cf. Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland*, Cambridge, Cambridge, University Press, 2012, pp. 26-27; German nationals within the borders of the Reich were designated as

relations had been unnecessarily complicated by the reshaping of Germany's borders.

UK historians' views about Germany's reshaped borders were expressed in their commentary about Germany's relationship with the countries that neighboured it, many of which had been newly created in the interwar era. Historians offered a wellspring of contributions about aspects of reshaped borders on lands that abutted Germany. These focused on concepts that conferred legitimacy to polities, and included sovereignty, independence, jurisdiction, and nation-states' rights to absolute authority in its territories. Some historians viewed Germany as a potential threat as well as a partner. Fisher, for example, prepared the book, *The Åland Islands*, under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. He was concerned about the Åland Islands' historical vulnerability to powers such as Germany, once the latter re-emerged as a power that could project its influence.[64]

Contemporary geopolitical and strategic conditions set much of the context for UK interwar historians' work about Germany's reshaped borders. UK historians believed that the new circumstances of the Russian Revolution, and the revolutions that had erupted in Germany at the end of World War I, ensured that Germany would seek to be closer aligned and politically oriented toward the Soviet Union.[65] In the early interwar era, the British ambassador to Germany, D'Abernon, noted the importance of German Chancellor Joseph Wirth and the Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau, who ratified the Treaty of Rapallo. This Treaty established diplomatic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union on 16 April 1922. Historians reported that the German elite emphasised to their compatriots that the country's isolation required it to secure allies.[66] The Soviet Union was the only power left that met Germany's requirements. France threatened Germany's western borders, and new polities created by the Versailles Settlement threatened the country's eastern and

*Reichsdeutsche*. People of German ethnicity outside of the Reich's borders were known as *Volkdeutsche*.

[64] Fisher prepares No.48, 1920, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of H. A. L. Fisher*, MS. 167. Fisher.

[65] Lord D'Abernons's Memorandum to Lord Curzon, November 1922, The National Archives (UK), *D'Abernon Papers* Add MS 48925 B. p. 3.

[66] *Ibid*., p. 2.

south-eastern frontiers.[67] D'Abernon asserted that British policy stabilised those called the 'Western Party' in Germany.[68] These circles sought to deepen the economic relationship with the United States of America and the UK.[69]

Many Britons rationalised that Germany's renewed prowess would provide a bulwark against Communism, and should be supported with this aim in mind.[70] Historians saw the relationship between Germany's borders and Communism as an intersection between British interests and ideology. Historians gave the impression that their comments were uniquely informed by virtue of their occupation as historians and public intellectuals. They received news about what the specifics of Communism might mean for the UK. Historians' perspectives about Communism varied, though they continued to lobby and disseminate their views widely. At the end of World War I, German military formations had suppressed Communist uprisings within Germany; one example of the Weimar Republic's catalogue of political turmoil and economic crises.[71] The Soviets' triumph in Russian Civil War became a reference point in UK historians' deliberations about Communism.[72] The emergence of Nazism would later be seen as a counterweight to forces sympathetic to Communism. For many within the UK, the Soviet Union represented sinister challenges that exceeded the threat from Nazi Germany.[73] UK historians held that the dangers of Communism threatened the global needs of the British Empire, significantly affecting the UK's policy towards Nazi Germany.[74]

Some UK historians observed that Nazism's hostility to Communism entitled it to the UK's acceptance above any other considerations. Public intellectuals' suspicion of Communism was reinforced by the re-emergence of conservative ideas

[67] *Ibid*.
[68] *Ibid*.
[69] *Ibid*.
[70] Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, *The Appeasers*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963, p. 7.
[71] R. B. McCallum, *Public Opinion and the Last Peace*, London, Oxford University Press, 1944, p. 62.
[72] Frank Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 316-317.
[73] Derek Wilson, *The Astors: Landscape with Millionaires, 1763-1992*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993, p. 265.
[74] Gilbert and Gott, *The Appeasers*, p. 7; See also: Ian Kershaw, *Hitler: 1889-1936: Hubris*, New York, W. W. and Company, 1999, p. 553.

in Weimar Germany, as well as respect for Hitler's achievements.[75] Just after the Nazis solidified their position in Germany, the Comintern proclaimed that trade unions, Socialists, and Communists should cooperate to defeat Fascism.[76] Peace groups that historians had earlier associated with, however, now mostly viewed Communism with either neutrality or sympathy. Peace groups on 'the Left' remained distrustful of each other's motives, and were very mindful of having their agendas co-opted.[77]

Germany's reshaped borders set part of the context for UK historians' analyses regarding spheres of influence and ideology. Herbert Butterfield contributed 'his only projection into the public sphere in these years' in 1933, when he wrote his views on aspects of Communism in the *Scrutiny* magazine.[78] Butterfield was hostile to how Communism seemingly elevated what was termed 'science', but dismissed religion.[79] He believed the writer, Herbert George [H. G.] Wells wrote in a manner that harmed his notion of God in history.[80] He was opposed to what he saw as the increasing acceptability of Communist conceptions of history and progress, which accelerated in the later years of the interwar era.[81]

Historians' knowledge of the Soviet Union influenced their perspectives of UK politics. Gooch's left-orientated opinions provide one example of this, which were shared by many in the Liberal Party, of which he was a member. He appreciated the Labour Party's goals and was hostile to the Conservative Party's platforms. Gooch's frustration with the Liberal Party related to what he believed was its ineffectual stance towards the Soviet Union.[82] Furthermore, in December 1937,

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[75] Stefan Berger, 'William Harbutt Dawson: The Career and Politics of an Historian of Germany', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 465, 2001, p. 100.
[76] Harry Harmer, 'The Failure of the Communists: The National Unemployed Workers' Movement, 1921-1939: A Disappointing Success', in Andrew Thorpe (ed.), *The Failure of Political Extremism in Interwar Britain*, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 1988, p. 41; The Comintern was an international Communist organisation controlled from Moscow.
[77] Cecilia Lynch, *Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements in World Politics*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1999, p. 36.
[78] Michael Bentley, *The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield: History, Science and God*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 111.
[79] *Ibid*.
[80] *Ibid*., p. 294.
[81] *Ibid*.
[82] Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, pp. 316-317.

Temperley presented a segment on BBC radio entitled 'Revolution in Russia – Twenty Years after the Bolshevik Triumph'.[83] The BBC asked Temperley to narrate the show because they held him to be a detached commentator on political issues. Temperley presented the program, however, some UK listeners thought that he was overly generous in his portrayal of the Soviet Union.[84] This was notable as Temperley remained nominally opposed to the Soviet Union.

UK historians analysed Germany's diplomacy and retained their interest in the formation of global alliances.[85] On 27 November 1922, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord George Curzon, was informed by his staff that Germany would only approach the Soviet Union for a Treaty if rejected by other powers. Historians argued that Germany preferred to be associated with neutral and strong countries. If Germany was threatened by other powers that sought its encirclement, then Germans' only choice was to adopt a policy of 'close intimacy with her great neighbour on the East'.[86] D'Abernon emphasised that if the UK or the United States of America declined closer associations with Germany, then Germans would 'unquestionably' seek help from the Soviet Union.[87] Yet, he noted with relief, that the Germans had misgivings and suspicion about the Soviets. D'Abernon, and others, were encouraged by Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno's moves to seek closer relationships westwards. However, D'Abernon felt that the chief of the Russian section of the German Foreign Office, Baron Ago von Maltzhan, would seek to stymie such moves.[88]

UK historians were cognisant of the salience of realist impulses throughout history, and were aware that forces within Germany that were dissatisfied with the new borders would seek to reassert themselves once stronger. UK historians, such as Pollard, used interwar concepts of reshaped frontiers to analyse German power

[83] John D. Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1992, p. 240.
[84] *Ibid*.
[85] Ephraim Maisel, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926*, Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 1994, p. 76.
[86] On the Treaty of Rapallo, 27 November 1922, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 4.
[87] *Ibid*., p. 4.
[88] *Ibid*.

beyond its borders. Pollard was exasperated as he explored the precepts that guided British foreign policy towards German sovereignty. He wrote, '[w]hat is it? As a whole?'[89] The solutions to the query encapsulated the dilemmas of public intellectuals whose investigations of interwar German sovereignty overlapped with the attention now given to international relations in academia. Some of these perspectives emphasised states' existence within an anarchical system. One of Pollard's answers to this question included British Foreign Secretary George Canning's classically realist comment that it was a case of 'every nation for itself'.[90]

For UK historians, Germany's relationship with France epitomised the quandaries that were associated with dealing with reshaped borders and sovereignty. D'Abernon hinted that French motives had sinister applications, since they coveted the coke reserves of the Ruhr.[91] Regions such as the Ruhr had much technology located within their boundaries, demonstrating the potential of Germany's post-war power.[92] The French knew of the significance of the Ruhr in wartime, and the UK suspected that they wanted the whole industrial region of Germany annexed. D'Abernon ominously noted that such an occurrence 'would affect the whole balance of power in Europe'.[93]

Historians in the early interwar period discussed Germany's reshaped borders in the context of Germany's relations with France. On 10 August 1922, Sanders affirmed that the UK was determined to see that its rights were honoured by both Germany and the Allied powers.[94] On 7 October 1922, the UK journalist and political advisor Sir Malcolm Fraser wrote to Sanders and mentioned a recent meeting with the former ambassador to France, Lord Derby. At the meeting, Derby had informed Fraser that he was 'strongly' opposed to the UK's foreign policy,

[89] Pollard Notes, 13 January 1921, *Pollard Papers*, MS 860/44/1.
[90] *Ibid*.
[91] Lord D'Abernons's Memorandum to Lord Curzon, November 1922, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 203.
[92] Bernhard Rieger, *Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany, 1890-1945*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 225.
[93] Lord D'Abernons's Memorandum to Lord Curzon, November 1922, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 203.
[94] Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II. Dep. D. 75, p. 67.

especially towards France. Sanders communicated his displeasure to the incoming Lord Privy Seal and the Leader of the House of Commons, Austen Chamberlain, who had studied for a period in Berlin.[95] On 7 February 1923, D'Abernon wrote from Berlin,

> [i]n Germany, the invasion of the Ruhr has strengthened the belief that political and territorial advantages were the real objective, and this conviction has featured largely in recent speeches of German statesmen.[96]

The fluidity of Germany's borders was represented in the fate of its non-self-governing territories. Dawson and Beazley claimed that the dispossession of its non-self-governing territories was unjustified, and unreasonable given its consequences for Germany's public space. They asserted that the 'ruthlessness' of the measure corresponded to a continuation of war.[97] They lamented the public feelings after World War I that was 'typical of Versailles and of 1919'.[98] The British, French and Italians claimed to have annexed Germany's territories legitimately at the beginning of World War I. Dawson and Beazley reasoned that '[no] minds, indeed, except those dominated by strong hatred and total ignorance could have accepted the extravagant and unproved indictment'.[99] Following World War I, Germans imagined their national borders to have been violated, and many worried that their humiliation correlated to the colonial treatment that was given to 'non-European countries'.[100] In their memorial to Prime Minister Baldwin, Dawson and Beazley wrote,

> [t]he argument (we used so freely at Versailles and since Versailles) that the German colonies of little value, and therefore might well be confiscated *in toto* ('They never would be missed') is

[95] *Ibid*; Documents from the Diaries of Sir Robert Sanders (Lord Bayford) including copy of Letter from Mr. Lloyd George to Mr. Bonar Law, 2 November 1918, on his conviction that there be a General Election. Dep. C. 673/1.
[96] Berlin, Lord D'Abernons's Memorandum to Lord Curzon, 7 February 1923 *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 19.
[97] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[98] *Ibid*.
[99] *Ibid*.
[100] Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 151-152.

> worthless except as a piece of macabre humour. It is unworthy of serious politics in the civilised world, and we protest against its cynicism and its hypocrisy. On broad grounds of political decency, we submit, it is right – on grounds of statesmanship it is entirely wise - to refuse to adopt an absolute stone-wall attitude on this question. Are we asked to restore all? Are we determined to refuse anything?[101]

UK historians involved in government agreed that if British overtures to the French to desist from annexing German territory proved ill-starred, then they would have to independently open another communication channel with the Germans. Sanders noted that Lloyd George thought that if the French were intransigent in the Ruhr, then 'European opinion' would have forced French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré to change his policy.[102]

Historians were aware that their country had to balance competing interests when it came to assuaging Franco-German disputes, and this reinforced views in favour of closer Anglo-German realignment. UK historians characterised French actions as a strategy to build its industrial capacity at Germany's expense. They thought that French politicians and military officers drove efforts to bring the Lorraine and Ruhr industries under French control.[103] In 1923, Sanders wrote that the French were 'more difficult than ever' to deal with.[104] He commented that '[w]e shall have to take a line that the French will want', rather than risk overt opposition.[105]

D'Abernon noted the likelihood that the notion of the Balance of Power would predominate in Europe again.[106] However, he feared that Germany's

[101] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[102] Sunday, 15 July 1923, Diary of the Late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II, Dep. D. 753, p. 65; See also: G. P. Gooch, 'German Views of the State', in G. P. Gooch et al (eds), *The German Mind and Outlook*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1945, p. 2.
[103] D'Abernon's views about French aims in Germany, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 202.
[104] 'Sanders wrote what Lord Curzon was told, Wednesday, 4 July 1923, Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol II Dep. D. 753, p. 65.
[105] *Ibid*; 'Wednesday, 4 July 1923', Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, Vol. II., Dep. D. 753, p. 65.
[106] Disarmament, 7 February, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 194.

disarmament had created a security vacuum in Europe by 1922, because the Commission of Control had succeeded so dramatically to reduce the strength of Germany's army and navy.[107] In response, Germans hoped for a pliable 'line of buffer states from the Baltic to the Black Sea' to separate it from the Soviet Union.[108] While Germany was disarmed, other European powers did not.[109] Germany had emerged from World War I as the most powerful of the beaten powers, but many worried that the costs of victory had made the UK 'war shy'.[110]

UK historians used past conflicts as a point of reference to rationalise Germany's assertiveness about its interwar borders. D'Abernon recorded that the geography of the German border made French concerns about the Ruhr understandable. He informed Curzon that the geography of the Franco-German border meant that each neighbouring country was compelled to defend 'two passages or defiles – one 70 miles broad – the Palatinate and the Cologne Neck'.[111] He acknowledged that the French had made 'determined efforts…to secure the Palatinate', which was an historical route for invasions.[112] However, his telegram to Lord Curzon stated that the German public was opposed to British troops evacuating Cologne. The telegram declared that the feeling was prominent in 'military and socialistic circles'.[113] France's vulnerability over the Cologne Neck was dealt with by the French troops' 'persistent occupation of the Rhine ports, Duisburg, Ruhort and Düsseldorf'.[114] Gooch viewed this from the German point of view, by arguing

[107] *Ibid*.
[108] A Memorandum from Colonel Wade to Sir Esme Howard of the Peace Delegation of the British Embassy in Paris, 31 January 1919, The National Archives (UK), *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 608/58/2.
[109] Disarmament, 7 February, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 194.
[110] Arnold Toynbee, *Experiences*, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 221.
[111] Lord D'Abernon to the Marquise Curzon of Kedleston on the geographical conditions which govern the frontier problem between France and Germany, The National Archives (UK), [C5588/5588/18] No. 304. Berlin 12 April 1922 – Memorandum, Former reference CP 4043 'Frontier Problems between Germany and France.
[112] *Ibid*.
[113] D'Abernon from Berlin, *D'Abernon Papers*, Add MS 48925 B. p. 187.
[114] Memorandum from Lord D'Abernon to the Marquise Curzon of Kedleston on the geographical conditions which govern the frontier problem between France and Germany, Berlin, 12 April 1922., [C5588/5588/18] No. 304.

that the country's geography impressed upon its people that they had 'open' borders that were vulnerable to encirclement by potentially hostile powers.[115]

Temperley underlined the centrality of sovereignty in contexts where potential population movements were considered. Temperley wrote to Keynes that the Germans had 'played their cards very badly' on matters that concerned reparations. He noted that this complicated their positions when they had argued against Germany being dismembered. Temperley affirmed that 'upper Silesia…must remain with Germany', because this would make reparations more manageable.[116] Other locations of substantial German populations were not resolved so easily, however. Germans had settled in Eastern Europe for centuries, but felt that their historical presence was disregarded following World War I.[117]

Migration and its aftereffects contributed to a number of later works by UK historians, as they grappled with questions about Germany's borders and sovereignty. Upwards of a 'million former citizens' of Germany felt marooned by the effects of the Treaty of Versailles.[118] Dawson and Beazley were indignant at the effects of 'secret treaties' that they believed had created such conditions.[119] Afterwards, German communities in new states were coined as 'unreal' or 'minorities of fate'.[120] Before World War I, Germans had formed transnational communities that 'reached beyond Germany's borders'.[121] UK interwar historians explicitly connected migration with German power outside its borders.

Significant circles within interwar Germany wanted the Peace Settlement and Germany's reshaped borders revised.[122] Furthermore, World War I and its aftermath

[115] Gooch, 'German Views of the State', p. 2.
[116] November 1920, Cambridge University: King's College Archive Centre, *The Papers of John Maynard Keynes*, JMK CO/11/209.
[117] Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland*, p. 42.
[118] *Ibid*., pp. 26-27.
[119] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[120] Cf. Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland*, pp. 26-27.
[121] *Ibid*.
[122] *Ibid*., pp. 28-29.

brought forth a period of migratory flows in Europe.[123] Germany was a migratory country, and Germans had settled overseas in great numbers over several centuries.[124] After the war, however, pan-Germans sought to spark Germany's 'national awakening' by repositioning millions of Germans who resided outside its borders.[125] Labour migration had been the majority experience of German migration before World War I, but the early interwar era was a time of 'forced population movements'.[126] Again, UK historians maintained that the position of German migrants should have elicited their compatriots' sympathy.

UK historians included migration, colonies and German power beyond its frontiers as related subjects that they used to excite opinion in the public space. Dawson and Beazley noted that the requirements for the peace agreement in December 1918 had called for the dispassionate resolution of all issues regarding colonies. They recalled comments by the American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, who had stated that such requirements had been 'completely ignored' and that President Wilson agreed to measures undertaken with reluctance.[127] Dawson and Beazley continued to argue the connections between the colonial issue and migration, when they wrote

> [t]his is proved by the fact that, after expropriation had been determined on, he [President Wilson] yet pressed for such a restoration of colonial territory to Germany as would make her independent in the matter of tropical raw materials, and give her reasonable scope for emigration… Since the war no question has been discussed more generally and more actively in Germany than this of the colonies.[128]

UK historians were cognisant of the 'vital importance' with which Germany regarded the Polish issue. Historians understood the reasoning behind the British goal to prevent Germany from becoming overly ambitious, and sought to direct

[123] Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922*, p. 9.
[124] *Ibid*., p. 22.
[125] *Ibid*.
[126] *Ibid*., p. 9.
[127] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[128] *Ibid*.

German power towards aims that did not threaten the UK. A large part of their activities included analysing the new states of Central and Eastern Europe, such as the contested legitimacy of Poland.[129] Critically, the many Germans within the borders of newly-made states made the plight of their compatriots living beyond its borders a priority for the Weimar and Nazi governments.[130]

Historians deliberated on the fact that Germans were at the heart of the post-war migration flows. Some thought that a restrengthening of Germany's geopolitical situation could see Germany 'make up in the East for all that she has lost in the West'.[131] Many Germans who were disillusioned with the Weimar Republic did want to migrate to the Baltics and areas of the Soviet Union.[132] Polish assertiveness, and German hostility to them, complicated how the British dealt with migratory issues.[133]

UK interwar historians participated in academic networks and exchanges that examined aspects of migration in interwar contexts. The Second Anglo-Polish Conference was conducted on 10 and 11 March 1935, and included the visit of Polish historians to Cambridge. On 11 March 1935, Temperley gave a speech on 'British Policy towards Poland during the War', as well how the Versailles Peace Settlement had affected the realities of German power beyond its frontiers.[134] Changes to Germany's borders presented clear challenges to the Weimar Republic. Countries warred over where borders were positioned and attempted to have migratory movements controlled.[135] Winson Chu reveals the visceral nature of how borders were discussed in the public space. He wrote that:

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[129] A Memorandum from Colonel Wade to Sir Esme Howard of the Peace Delegation of the British Embassy in Paris, 31 January 1919, The National Archives (UK), *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 608/58/2.
[130] Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922*, p. 121; Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland*, p. 3.
[131] A Memorandum from Colonel Wade to Sir Esme Howard of the Peace Delegation of the British Embassy in Paris, 31 January 1919', FO 608/58/2.
[132] *Ibid*., p. 2.
[133] A Memorandum from Colonel Wade to Sir Esme Howard of the Peace Delegation of the British Embassy in Paris, 31 January 1919, The National Archives (UK), *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 608/58/2.
[134] March 1935, Second Anglo-Polish Conference and discussions with Temperley', BUTT/8.
[135] Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922*, p. 3.

> [a] common tool of suggestive cartography was the geo-organic portrayal of the state as a living organism. The lost eastern territories were shown as being brutally ripped from the body of the German Reich, thus reinforcing political catchphrases such as 'bleeding borders'.[136]

[136] Cf. Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland*, p. 47.

# CHAPTER 6: ETHICS, MORALITY AND THE NAZI PARTY

UK interwar historians' views of Nazi Germany emphasised their own difficult positioning in public space. As intellectuals, UK historians sought to shape views on the Nazi Party by contextualising current events through contemporary and historical analyses. This chapter shows how the historians' work contributed to the UK public's discussions of the Nazi Party, and sought to interpret the phenomenon of Nazism in the interwar period. The chapter argues that UK historians' analyses can be characterised by two central approaches. The first explores sympathy for Germany, whose later manifestations became associated with the policy of appeasement. The second investigates UK historians' hostility towards Nazi Germany, as disagreements developed between the two countries. The chapter argues that UK interwar historians' interpretations of the Nazi Party reinforced their public role, notwithstanding their differing perspectives.

UK historians' analyses of ethics, morality and the Nazi Party consolidated their role as public intellectuals. This drew on their previous credibility through public and private networks. Their analyses of Germany within the interwar period's parameters of Nazism (from 1933 to 1939) show how themes of ideology, security, sympathy and hostility were incorporated in their work to show the distinctiveness of the Nazi Party within the firmament of interwar Germany.

## Understanding the Nazi Ideology

UK interwar historians believed that they could best promote their country's interests by analysing the motives that underpinned the Nazi ideology. UK historians emphasised the importance of ideology in their investigations of the Nazi Party's origins. Their commentary entwined Germany's internal situation with broader concerns regarding Anglo-German diplomacy and interwar totalitarianism. In doing so, they acknowledged that their analyses of Nazism were strongly influenced by Germany prior to World War I.

Historians acknowledged that pragmatism was central to the British public's perceptions of the Nazi Party's morality. Philip Noel-Baker believed that Germany could have been made to re-enter the League of Nations after its withdrawal from that body in October 1933, but that the option was unlikely to succeed without 'getting rid of Hitler'.[1] He wrote that '[t]he basic fact was that too many people in Britain' desired the Nazi Party to remain in power.[2] Noel-Baker continued that many Britons 'wanted Hitler to fight the Communists. They believed the only way to do this was smash up Russia and the communist regime was to let the Nazis do it' [*sic*].[3] The involvement of British diplomats, of whom a large number were historians, was seen as necessary for the maintenance of peace at a time of international tension.[4] According to Robert Sanders' diary, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin 'spoke of an agreement' that set out key understandings between the UK and Germany should relations become hostile.[5] Historians such as William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley, however, maintained that 'national opinion' in the UK was on their side, and supported their advocacy of 'friendly cooperation' between the UK and Nazi Germany.[6]

The more sympathetic historians, such as Dawson and Beazley, sought to emphasise that cooperation was to both country's benefit. They impressed upon Baldwin the view that Adolf Hitler was 'earnest' in his desire for 'amicable cooperation' with the UK.[7] Some Germans noted that their plans for victory in a near future conflict would depend on the UK's neutrality.[8] Henry Wickham Steed agreed

[1] The Conclusion of a tape made by the Right Honourable Philip Noel-Baker with Mr Liddle in London in 1974, 'in the last minutes of the tape he was asking him about the League of Nations and the Thirties', Leeds University Library: Special Collections, *Liddle Collection*, CO 067 Philip Noel-Baker Tape 209, p. 1.
[2] *Ibid*.
[3] *Ibid*.
[4] Lucie A. Zimmern, 'To the Editor: Great Britain in Geneva', *The Newsletter: The National Labour Fortnightly*, Vol. 6, No. 7, 22 December, 1934, p. 112.
[5] Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, 21 April, 1935, Vol II (1921-1940), Dep. D. 753, p. 135.
[6] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Stanley Baldwin's Private Papers*, Baldwin 91-96.
[7] *Ibid*.
[8] German Admiralty Archives, Washington Microfilm, 'German Naval Staff Memorandum, Berlin, May 1925 1936, London School of Economics Archives: British Library of Political and Economic Science, *Professor Donald Cameron Watt*, GB 097 CAMERON WATT, p. 105; The documents asserted that British, Dutch, American and Japanese neutrality was preferred. They predicted French and Belgian hostility.

with this view, and cautioned that the UK's non-involvement in Europe would encourage Germans to take greater risks. Steed wrote '[a]nother great war, from which we could not hold aloof, would be the inevitable result of a British policy of now neutrality'.[9] Henry Wickham Steed was born on 10 October 1871. Wickham Steed attended Sudbury Grammar School, Winchester College, and New College, University of Oxford. He was also educated at the universities of Berlin, Jena, and Paris. He was an historian newspaper editor and journalist. In 1896, Steed was employed by *The Times* and worked as a foreign correspondent. Part of his assignments based him in Berlin and Vienna. He became foreign editor of *The Times* in 1914, as well as editor for additional, varying periods. Between 1923 and 1930, Steed edited *Review of Reviews*. Steed died on 13 January 1956.

UK historians sought to contextualise Germany's apparent return to assertiveness. UK historians considered Germany's rearmament to reflect the Nazi government's aim to produce armed forces that could achieve the power they felt Germans were entitled to. Sanders recorded that Hitler had revealed his intentions to expand the German army and navy.[10] Philips Price also maintained that Germany appeared to be on a course to re-establish its formidable army. He suggested that the initial task was to reimpose domestic stability. After that, he predicted its reorientation to project power.[11]

Historians continued to use their earlier post-war prominence to analyse Nazism. In early 1933, Dawson observed that the growth of Nazism was understandable given the Treaty of Versailles, and felt that its aim to erase

[9] A Letter from Wickham Steed to E. Rivers Macpherson, 6 November 1937, British Library, *Wickham Steed Papers*, Add MS 74134.
[10] Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, 21 April 1935, Vol II (1921-1940), Dep. D. 753, p. 135; The diary extract proceeds: 'Quite lately things have been going badly for the government. The Peace Propaganda undoubtedly did little? Harm...Things are looking up a bit just at moment. Employment is improving – Chamberlain's budget has made a good impression. But the greatest point in his ...has been Herr Hitler's escalation on germane re-armament. Bubly himself told me [*sic*] Hitler made me Hitler made his intentions to himself and the navy quite easy to obtain – I never know our historical? [*sic*] It is how we all talked as they were in February. They looked on no result as safe. Baldwin made a very good speech at the NU Peace in his days. He said Hitler showed some sense of uniform ability but Goering and Goebbels were merely gangsters of his. He spoke of an agreement for what proves to make us known him by would want against Germany if she became aggressive'.
[11] Philips Price, 'The New Situation in Germany', *The Highway*, Vol. 25, November, 1932, p. 14. pp. 13-14.

'monarchy and militarism' had clearly failed.[12] Dawson noted at the time that Germany's President, Paul von Hindenburg, and the new Chancellor, Hitler, had been soldiers, and that they were 'both at heart staunchly monarchist in sentiment'.[13] Dawson regarded the affection which Germany's young had acquired militarism as a form of poison.[14] He also believed that Nazi Germany could be restrained in its ambitions, if the UK extended sufficient overtures of goodwill. Public intellectuals such as these maintained that the Treaty of Versailles was the source of troubles for Anglo-German relations. In the event that the Treaty's negative aspects were rescinded, then they imagined that Nazi Germany would adopt a 'much more reasonable' posture.[15]

UK interwar historians hoped that Nazism might be moderated. On the Nazi Party's assumption of power, some historians perceived it to be just another German government that would moderate over time and with diplomacy. Other historians, however, suspected that Nazism represented a more sinister iteration of German history. George P. Gooch openly opposed 'the Nazi leaders' in July 1933, when he addressed a public gathering of the National Peace Congress in Oxford.[16] The UK historian and former foreign editor of *The Times*, Steed, similarly viewed Nazism with hostility.[17] Steed's series of lectures included talks to the League of Nations Union (LNU), as well as a joint Anglo-American group.[18] The later interwar machinations of Nazi Germany confirmed the doubts of many historians. Yet many of their number drew a distinction between Germany as they liked to have perceived it, and the manifestations of Nazism.

Germany's potential power made analysis of Nazism all the more crucial. Historians observed that Britons' support for Nazi Germany increased after the

[12] William Harbutt Dawson, *Germany under the Treaty*, Freeport, Books for Libraries Press, 1933, p. 416.
[13] *Ibid*.
[14] *Ibid*.
[15] Stefan Berger, 'William Harbutt Dawson: The Career and Politics of an Historian of Germany', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 465, 2001, p. 100.
[16] Felix E. Hirsch, 'George Peabody Gooch', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1954, p. 268.
[17] Andre Liebich, 'The Antisemitism of Henry Wickham Steed', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2012, p. 193.
[18] *Ibid*., p. 194.

Rhineland was remilitarised.[19] The Nazi movement itself drew on the past to excite support. Nazism affirmed that aspects of its culture that related to Germany occupied the zenith of 'Nordic and European civilisation'.[20] Baldwin regained the prime ministership within two months. Historians underscored that Germans believed that it was their duty, indeed their destiny, to reinvigorate Europe.[21] Harold Temperley supported the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, in his actions with Germany, and Chamberlain referred to Temperley's books on nineteenth-century British diplomacy as a guide for his discussions with Nazi German leaders at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg and Munich.[22] Herbert Butterfield respected how Nazism had restored many Germans' self-confidence. In late 1938, he had lectured in Germany in late 1938, and was friends with many German historians.[23] The historians continued to draw on their personal networks to access privileged information and to produce high impact analysis of the new Germany.

Historians were able to suggest why Germans responded to Nazism as part of broader trends in German history. It was known that the former establishment and upper-class German elites still supported ideas that had been ascendant before World War I.[24] More typically, however, the UK historian, elected representative and well-known Labour commentator, Price, suggested that 'Hitler's crowds contain people who, if they leave him, as they may in the future, will go straight to the Communists'.[25] Alfred Zimmern also highlighted the malleability of apparently rigid ideologies, and suggested that this was part of Germans' evolution in response to so many traumatic events.[26] H. A. L. Fisher concurred that the growth of 'Hitlerism' was attributable to the effects of Germany's defeat in World War I, rather than solely

[19] Catherine Anne Cline, 'British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles', *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1988, pp. 56-57.
[20] Aristotle A. Kallis, 'To Expand or Not to Expand? Territory, Generic Fascism and the Quest for an "Ideal Fatherland"', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2003, p. 246.
[21] *Ibid*.
[22] John D. Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1992, p. 285.
[23] Michael Bentley, *The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield: History, Science and God*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 119.
[24] E. L. Woodward, *The Origins of the War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, p. 22.
[25] Philips Price, 'The New Situation in Germany', *The Highway*, Vol. 25, November, 1932, p. 14. pp. 13-14.
[26]Alfred Zimmern, *Europe in Convalescence*, London, Mills and Boon, 1922, p. 56.

the Treaty of Versailles.[27] Fisher felt that his fellow Britons had exaggerated the permanence of Germans' sense of being defeated. He claimed that the interwar period was an incubator for militaristic movements in Germany in general, and any hope to resist it was 'unfortunately, wrong'.[28] Price had come to similar conclusions earlier when he wrote in 1932 that

> [i]t is all too clear that the spirit of militarism has shifted from Paris to Berlin… Poincaré's mischiefs in the Ruhr and our 'National' Government's obstruction at Geneva have sown dragon's teeth which are sprouting in Potsdam. There is a danger that public opinion is not fully alive to the gravity of the situation in Germany. It is easy to regard the Papen regime as the lesser of two evils, when compared with a possible Hitler regime. Papen does at least stand for a Government which observes the decencies and formalities of our civilisation. Political murder gangs were the curse of Germany when I lived there after the war. The situation is worse now. But if the Papen regime is making some attempt to prevent Germany from sinking into the conditions of the Thirty Years War, it is almost more dangerous than Hitler in other ways, because it is led by able men with the mentality of last century.[29]

UK historians' sought to explain the development of Nazi ideology in the context of their broader understanding of German history. The elevated importance of ethnicity in Nazi philosophy was recognised to be connected closely to conceptions of soil.[30] The notion of blood and soil [*Blut und Boden*], encapsulated the significance of ancestry and territory. Bucolic signifiers such as these were perceived to be embodied in the German peasantry and in notions of Germanness, such as *Heimat*.

> This program…revives the age-old characteristics of the German people and refers back to pagan myths and prehistory. It is bitterly opposed to Communism. National Socialism, then, is a creed of racial nationalism, in which a Nordic *Volk* triumphs over everything. Blood and soil produce supermen who together form a community in which the individual counts for nothing. Only as a

[27] E. L. Woodward, *The Origins of the War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, p. 22.
[28] *Ibid*.
[29] Price, 'The New Situation in Germany', p. 13.
[30] James Kerr Pollock, *The Government of Greater Germany*, New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1938, p. 52.

member of the community does the individual have any meaning.[31]

Some UK historians considered Nazi Germany as existing beyond the rules normally governing states. Butterfield's 1938 interview with the Czechoslovak leader, Edvard Beneš, informed his impression of the dynamism of Nazi totalitarianism. Beneš worried that 'there is this danger in a totalitarian state – there is no press, no public questioning, no parliament, they can mobilise in an hour'.[32] The historian and diplomat, Harold Nicolson, wrote a letter to his colleague Fisher on 29 September 1938, and derided what he perceived as Prime Minister Chamberlain's timidity in the face of the Nazis. In the instance mentioned, Nicolson evidenced Anglo-Italian relations as an example.

> [t]he Prime Minister has not really got much understanding of dictatorial authority, although he seems to have a marked sympathy for it. It was only under very great pressure inside and outside the Cabinet that he was induced to mobilise the Fleet and I gather that even now he does not understand that it was this action which frightened Mussolini.[33]

Historians' public characterisation of totalitarian movements related closely to their analyses of British foreign policy. Anthony Eden's diplomacy was lauded by Zimmern in an editorial, characterising Eden's 'masterly' approach to the 'Saar problem' as an activism that was absent elsewhere in British foreign policy.[34] Noel-Baker later concurred, and thought that World War II would have been avoided if Eden's more assertive approach to Germany had been adopted.[35] Fisher monitored the development of ideological movements and how they affected the UK's interests.

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[31] *Ibid*.
[32] Interview with Beneš, 1938, Temperley: Notes, mostly on the life and career of H. W. V. Temperley, consisting in part of copies and extracts from his correspondence and diaries, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, MS Butterfield BUTT/8.
[33] A Letter from Harold Nicolson to H. A. L. Fisher, 29 September 1938, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of H. A. L. Fisher*, MS. Fisher 77.
[34] Zimmern, 'To the Editor: Great Britain in Geneva', p. 112.
[35] Philip Noel-Baker Tape 209, CO 067, p. 2.

The then-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, replied to Fisher's concerns about having 'belligerent rights' bestowed upon the Spanish leader, Francisco Franco.[36] He assured Fisher thus, 'I fully understand your anxieties on the subject of the granting of belligerent rights to General Franco. The position has never changed and has been made clear twice in the House of Commons.'[37]

UK historians' international networks and solidarity were vital to their conceptualisation of the UK's international role during the rise of Nazism in Germany. This frequently involved the nurture of connections with historians from countries under Nazi control. In 1941, historians at the University of Cambridge were approached to hold a conference with other historians, or 'historical workers' as they were termed, from European countries that were engaged in the common fight against Nazi Germany.[38] They were asked to help the relevant authorities so that the conference could be explicitly organised between non-Nazi German historians.[39]

## The Nazi Seizure of Power

UK historians responded to events around the Nazis' seizure of power, and its subsequent consolidation, with a diversity of opinion. Historians' reactions to the attainment of power of the Nazi Party was itself predicated on the domestic context of the interwar UK.[40] In the UK, the National Government, formed in 1931, included leading Foreign Office personnel who argued that the Treaty of Versailles should be revised to forestall an inevitable German overthrow of the post-World War I settlement. Historians were aware that the withdrawal of Reparations at the July 1932 Lausanne Conference was championed by many within the UK, as Germany was unable to resume instalments. However, British desires for reconciliation with Germany were shaken by the Nazis' willingness to suppress their internal opponents in the initial years after they attained power.[41] Historians had varying attitudes about

[36] 'Halifax replies to Fisher's letter of 22 November 1938 and when Halifax returned from Paris', 29 November 1938, MS. Fisher 77.
[37] *Ibid*.
[38] J. H. Clapham, Vice-Provost of King's College wrote to unknown, undated, but before 21-23 March 1941, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Sir Herbert Butterfield: Papers*, BUTT/51 Allied Historians, 1941-44.
[39] *Ibid*.
[40] Dan Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 3.
[41] William R. Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, London, Edward Arnold, 1977, p. 36.

the causality and significance of these developments, and of their relevance for the UK.

Hitler triumphed in the elections of November 1932 and assumed the office of Chancellor on 30 January 1933.[42] The Reichstag Fire on 27 February led to Hitler's portrayal of himself as Germany's protector.[43] The 23 March Enabling Act was legislated by the Reichstag and gave Hitler executive authority.[44] Political violence that had featured at various levels throughout the previous Weimar Republic revealed itself in 'the Night of the Long Knives', an event which Lewis Namier described as a series of 'massacres'.[45] On 30 June 1934, the SS, who comprised the Nazis' exclusive elite, destroyed the leaders of the SA, including its co-founder, Ernst Röhm.[46] In this event, army General's von Bredow and von Schleicher were also dispatched.[47] Namier viewed the 30 June 1934 violence as the 'Blood Purge' and remarked how the event transformed the army into an instrument of Hitler's will.[48] Afterwards, the SS replaced the SA, and Heinrich Himmler became its Reichsführer, who was accountable to Hitler. The SS composed a more organised and loyal formation than the SA, and would seek to become a counterbalance to the army.[49] Hitler maintained that he had fulfilled his duty to preserve Germany from treason.[50]

Germany under the Weimar Republic set the context for the political upheaval in Germany in 1933 and 1934. William Harbutt Dawson had foreseen the fragility of events in Germany following World War I. He commented that 'thirteen years after the enforcement of a Treaty' which was designed to simultaneously dissolve both the monarchy and the martial culture, 'Germany is today governed by a

[42] Lewis Namier, *Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration, 1936-1940*, Gloucester, Peter Smith, 1963, p. 13.
[43] Fritz Stern, *Five Germanys I Have Known*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006, p. 106.
[44] Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, p. 36.
[45] Namier, *Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration, 1936-1940*, p. 13.
[46] Stern, *Five Germanys I Have Known*, p. 106; The SA was a paramilitary organisation, the *Sturmabteilung*.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] Lewis Namier, *Personalities and Powers: Selected Essays*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1955, p. 139.
[49] William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, London, Arrow, [1960] 1998, p. 226; the SS was a major paramilitary organisation, the *Schutzstaffel*.
[50] Stern, *Five Germanys I Have Known*, p. 106.

soldier-president and a soldier-chancellor, both at heart staunchly monarchist in sentiment, though faithful to the Republic so long as it lasts'.[51] He noted that the attempts of Germany's World War I adversaries to hobble the country were rapidly failing and that the policies adopted at the Treaty of Versailles led to the re-emergence of militarism and to the appearance of the Nazis, whom he called an 'intensely nationalist movement'.[52] The forces at work in Germany to which Dawson referred existed in a spirit of revisionism. For instance, Friedrich Thimme was the chief editor of *Die Grosse Politik*.[53] As well as a publisher, Thimme was an historian who published the first collection of Germany's pre-war diplomatic documents, and formed the diplomatic record from which much of the history could be ascertained.[54] Thimme avowed that any 'apologetic tendency, whether nationalist or of another kind' was absent in the publication. In his personal moments, Thimme was inspired to work for 'a substantial rehabilitation of the old regime and, morally at least, of the Kaiser'.[55]

There were qualifications and complexities that defined each historians' individual viewpoints about the Nazis in the early 1930s. Interwar Britons who followed Anglo-German relations in the years after the Nazis assumed power recognised that there was extensive 'sympathy for some of the aims and aspirations of Nazism (or at least, those aims as they were understood)', that were maintained 'among British intellectuals and politicians'.[56] In July 1933, for instance, Dawson wrote that the political troubles that Germany experienced was due to the country being 'encircled and disarmed', and that this situation had spawned a 'dictatorship'.[57] The Republican system was doomed, with centrist political forces without any

[51] William Harbutt Dawson, *Germany Under the Treaty*, New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1933, p. 416.
[52] *Ibid*.
[53] Annika Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus*, London, Longman, 2002, p. 61.
[54] Herbert D. Andrew, 'Bismarck's Foreign Policy and German Historiography, 1919-1945', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1965, p. 345. Pp. 345-356.
[55] Peter Lambert, 'Friedrich Thimme, G. P. Gooch and the Publication of Documents on the Origins of the First World War: Patriotism, Academic Liberty and a Search for Anglo-German Understanding, 1920-1938', in Stefan Berger, Peter Lambert and Peter Schumann (eds), *A Dialogue of the Deaf? Historiographical Connections between Britain and Germany, c. 1750-2000*, Göttingen, 2002, p. 19.
[56] Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust*, p. 4.
[57] William Harbutt Dawson, 'The Urgency of Treaty Revision', *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 144, 1933, p. 17.

influence. Dawson, however, suggested that, far from being destroyed, 'monarchism' was rising alongside the recreation of 'militarism'.[58] Dawson called German nationalism 'the nursery of militarism'.[59] In his work, he mentioned how 'influential men' had made 'disturbing threats of violent measures' to reverse what they saw as the prostration of Germany, and that Germany's politics were a reflection of that.[60]

The anxiety about Germany's influence on European stability was shared by G. P. Gooch. In September 1933, Gooch wrote of the Nazi assumption of power as a revolution that had put the countries bordering Germany in a state of 'justifiable' anxiety.[61] He noted that 'our nerves are quivering under the impact of these successive shocks' and that his country's government seemed unsure of maintaining a coherent policy towards Germany.[62] Following the 30 June 1934 Night of the Long Knives, Gooch wrote an essay in the August edition of *The Contemporary Review*, in which he condemned the propensity for violence of the new government in Germany. He held that those in the UK should continue to regard Germany as 'a great and friendly nation' and that the purge in that country not be associated with the German people.[63] He urged his compatriots to maintain basic liberties in the UK, through which 'better captains' of Germany could be inspired to emulate.[64]

By the 1930s, most adherents in the UK of shared forms of Anglo-Saxonism were opposed to Nazi Germany's employment of 'science' to discriminate.[65] From the mid-1930s, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin supported a policy of 'wait and see' towards developments happening in Germany, a sentiment shared by many within the UK.[66] In the months before 1934, Baldwin had considered mediators' advice of

[58] *Ibid*.
[59] William Harbutt Dawson, *The Future of Empire and the Price of World Peace*, London, Williams and Norgate, 1930, p. 161.
[60] Dawson, 'The Urgency of Treaty Revision', p. 17.
[61] G. P. Gooch, 'Preface', in G. P. Gooch (ed.), *In Pursuit of Peace*, London, Methuen, 1933, p. vi.
[62] *Ibid*.
[63] Frank Eyck, *G. P. Gooch: A Study in History and Politics*, London, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 416-417.
[64] *Ibid*.
[65] Bradley W. Hart, 'Watching the "Eugenic Experiment" Unfold: The Mixed Views of British Eugenicists toward Nazi Germany in the Early 1930s', *Journal of the History of Biology*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2012, p. 59.
[66] Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, p. 1.

travelling to Germany to meet with Hitler, a journey he did not take.[67] In 1934, however, Henry Wickham Steed was adamant that Nazi Germany 'had declared war' on whomever they perceived as their political opponents.[68]

The events within early 1930s Germany drove how many within the UK saw the undefined nature of Anglo-German relations. A measure that involved the commentary of UK historians and public intellectuals was the steady rearmament of the UK onto a martial footing in the 1930s. This directed UK historians' knowledge towards engagement with the press, and it was in the context of uncertainties over Germany's increasing power that the UK started to rearm in 1935. The measures that the UK undertook included having the Committee of Imperial Defence enact plans for wartime propaganda, part of which included a Ministry of Information.[69] Baldwin, however, was optimistic about Germany when he wrote that the 'future is open'. He sadly noted how Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations was the biggest 'disappointment' for all who had hoped for peace since the start of World War I.[70]

Historians were among those who were open-minded about the direction of events in Germany, but they recognised that their analyses would be seen by Germans as that of foreign observers and outsiders. Herbert Butterfield was cautious in his outlook on the emergence of the Nazi Party as the government of Germany in 1933. His interpretations of Nazism were mixed in the years after their takeover of power, and like many of his contemporaries, he refrained from examining Germany from a narrow focus. It was noted of Butterfield that

> [l]ike most people Butterfield did not 'study' the German situation but heard stories about it from those who had visited or who had German friends. It is all too easy to see the 1930s as a decade of

[67] Keith Robbins, '"Experiencing the Foreign: British Foreign Policy Makers and the Delights of Travel", in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (eds), *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 35-36. Pp. 19-42.
[68] Liebich, 'The Antisemitism of Henry Wickham Steed', p. 195.
[69] Nicholas John Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American 'Neutrality' in World War II*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 13.
[70] Stanley Baldwin, *This Torch of Freedom*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, [1933] 1937, p. 313.

> German obsessions when in fact the Nazi problem often remained at the edge of consciousness whilst people got on with their lives in a more familiar and palatable milieu.[71]

Butterfield gave a paper entitled 'Morality and the Historical Process' at Columbia University in 1956, in which he stated that 'some things we must leave to Providence'.[72] Butterfield was asked the question 'what should the West have done with Hitler in 1934 and after?' to which he answered 'we had to wait'.[73] He was then asked to elaborate his answer with the question 'should we have waited, even in 1939'? He replied that 'the West did have to wait until the dangers became overt'.[74]

Before the period of the later 1930s most associated with appeasement, there was a range of views held by UK historians about Nazi Germany. Within Germany itself, public responses to the Night of the Long Knives were diverse. The causality of the event was met with curiosity by many Germans, though acceptance of the event's justification gradually spread among the population.[75] The disorganised thuggery of the SA unnerved apolitical Germans and the old guard of the army. Indeed, the SA appeared to have been an impediment to order, and a desire for order was what prompted enough Germans to vote for the Nazi Party.[76] Historians, such as Gooch, did not hold Nazism and the German people as synonymous, and later backed appeasement because they felt that the policy would weaken the standing of the Nazi Party. Gooch opposed the anti-Semitic aspects of Nazism, and in 1934, he was supported by his German wife when he shunned cooperation with the German Embassy in London.[77] Gooch publicly condemned the 'Nazi leaders' who he predicted would be remembered negatively.[78]

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[71] Bentley, *The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield: History, Science and God*, p. 127.
[72] John D. Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, Newark, University of Delaware Press, 1992, p. 293.
[73] *Ibid*.
[74] Fair, *Harold Temperley: A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm*, p. 293.
[75] Martin Whittock, *A Brief History of the Third Reich: The Rise and Fall of the Nazis*, London, Constable and Robinson, 2011, p. 69.
[76] *Ibid*.
[77] Richard J. Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 116.
[78] Hirsch, 'George Peabody Gooch', p. 268.

The distinction between historians and other intellectuals mentioned became less pronounced as the variety of their views about the Nazis showed. John Wheeler-Bennett was born in 1902, and was employed by Chatham House and League of Nations Union.[79] In 1929 he travelled to Germany to establish a horse stud, a venture that facilitated his access to the German upper classes. Wheeler-Bennett was unpopular with the Nazi Party, and he was targeted by Stormtroopers in the Night of the Long Knives. His life was spared on account of a visit to Switzerland, and he did not reappear. Afterwards, he wrote books, including a biography of Hindenburg, *The Wooden Titan* (1936).[80] In World War II, Wheeler-Bennet was employed by the Foreign Office, following which he conducted research at Oxford University. Wheeler-Bennet died in 1975.[81]

The real and perceived achievements of Nazism in its early years of rule complicated how its admirers in the UK should express their approval of the movement in Germany.[82] In 1934, the Foreign Office ensured that Dawson insert changes in the second edition of a book about Germany. The changes were about portraying Germany in a more benign light. Dawson henceforth defended Germany in his second edition.[83] Lord Lothian mentioned Hitler's presumed desire for amity between Germany and its neighbours. He noted how he thought that the experience of the previous World War would minimise the reoccurrence of conflict. Lothian postulated that, 'I think Herr Hitler wants twenty-five years' peace. He has often said: "I will never fight a war again about a frontier. It would be madness. No frontier can be worth the price of a modern war"'.[84]

Once Germany started to become assertive again, however, some historians began to doubt Germany's innocence about the causality of World War I and the injustice of the subsequent Treaty. The notion of 'shared war guilt' began to lose some supporters because of Nazi Germany's perceived aggression after it came to

[79] Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent*, p. 117.
[80] *Ibid*.
[81] *Ibid*.
[82] Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust*, p. 192.
[83] Berger, 'William Harbutt Dawson: The Career and Politics of an Historian of Germany', p. 98.
[84] The Marquess of Lothian, 'Germany and the Rhineland: III', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1931-1939)*, Vol. 15, No. 6, 1936, p. 51.

power.[85] Following the Nazi takeover of power in 1933, critiques of Hitler and the Nazi Party as embodying a teleological end-point in German history were promoted by 'exiled historians'.[86] This revelation was preceded by UK historians' knowledge of Nazi Germany's future direction. Sanders' opinion of senior German leaders such as Hermann Göring and Joseph Göbbels was that they 'were merely gangsters' of Hitler's entourage.[87] Gooch held with pride his name's appearance on the English Black List of Heinrich Himmler.[88]

Historians' sought to envelop the nuances of the contexts that they moved across, and used these experiences to provide what they hoped would be seen as trenchant analyses, although there was a diversity of opinion. The Nazi regime promoted Germnaness to be the antithesis of the cosmopolitanism that represented the Weimar Republic. Germanness, according to the National Socialists, was held to be grounded in features that were reminiscent of Nordic folklore.[89] UK historians' desire to inform audiences about Nazi ideology coincided with their activities in the public space. To this end, Dawson and Raymond Beazley gave advice on how Germany ought to be approached, and stated that '[w]e earnestly plead' that the importance of Nazi Germany ideology was 'a point [to]…which we ought not to be indifferent'.[90] Sander's recounted that Stanley Baldwin had mentioned that Hitler had exhibited a degree of 'uniform ability' in 1935.[91] Some historians increasingly adopted a stronger anti-Nazi stance as the 1930s unfolded, however, their hostility grew in a context where many Britons viewed the betterment of Anglo-German relations to lead towards the general good. The diversity of opinion between historians showed that a monolithic view of Nazi Germany was absent. Historians'

[85] Cline, 'British Historians and the Treaty of Versailles', p. 55.
[86] Stefan Berger, 'A Return to the National Paradigm? National History writing in Germany, Italy, France, and Britain from 1945 to the Present', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 77, No. 3, 2005, p. 637.
[87] Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, 21 April 1935, University of Oxford: Bodleian Library-Special Collections, *Papers of Robert Arthur Sanders*, Vol II (1921-1940), Dep. D. 753, p. 135.
[88] Hirsch, 'George Peabody Gooch', p. 269.
[89] Wilfred Van der Will, 'Culture and the Organisation of National Socialist Ideology, 1933-1945', in Rob Burns (ed.), *German Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 115.
[90] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[91] Diary of the late Col. Sir Robert Arthur Sanders, 21 April 1935 Vol II (1921-1940), Dep. D. 753, p. 135.

views shifted to accommodate new realities, and changed according to the circumstances.

> [a]nd Germany, under Nazi control, did begin to revive. Numerous British visitors in the early years of the Nazi regime returned with glowing reports of Germany's gathering vitality. These and favourable press accounts generated a certain appreciation for the Germans' ability to 'get things done'…And they were reinforced by a belief, fostered alike by British historians and German propagandists, in basic Anglo-German responsibility for the First World War – the idea that different courses of action by those two nations could have averted that catastrophe – and the feeling that, in combination, it was quite within their power still to control the European situation to their mutual benefit.[92]

Perceptions about the singularity of an Anglo-German relationship were complicated by the web of interwar, continental European statecraft. Carr perceived the emergence of the Nazis as indicative of a trying period that coexisted with a world economy that was collapsing.[93] E. H. Carr and Namier recognised the fluidity of military power in Europe as they pondered the UK's responses to Germany's dynamism. Carr observed that Nazi Germany's strength emanated from military power, and that Hitler was a 'revolutionary' whose focussed too narrowly on the German people.[94] Namier observed with disapproval the UK's objection in July 1934 to uphold European nation's borders, and to provide a guarantee.[95] Carr wrote, 'I remember clearly that I refused to be indignant about Hitler's re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 (which coincided with my exit from the F. O.)'.[96] Carr thought that 'the Western powers had asked for what they got' and that it was only

[92] Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, p. 43.
[93] Michael Cox, 'E. H. Carr and the Crisis of Twentieth-Century Liberalism: Reflections and Lessons', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2010, p. 528.
[94] Daniel Kenealy and Konstantinos Kostagiannis, 'Realist Visions of European Union: E. H. Carr and Integration', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 221, 2013, p. 234.
[95] Namier, *Europe in Decay*: A Study in Disintegration, 1936-1940, p. 13.
[96] E. H. Carr, 'An Autobiography', in Michael Cox (ed.), *E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000, p. xix.

Germany's 1938 occupation of Austria that he 'began to think of Hitler as serious danger.[97] No doubt I was very blind'.[98]

Carr did not oppose Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, and labelled it 'a rectification' for a wrong that had been imposed upon Germany.[99] However, he opposed Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938.[100] Carr had travelled to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1937, and later informed listeners at Chatham House that Nazi Germany was 'almost a free country as compared with Russia'.[101] Lothian regarded electoral democracy in the UK as militating against another Anglo-German war, as 'no government' could bring the country into a conflict against Germany without public opinion demanding it.[102] Carr noted that Germany's revived strength ensured that its approach to 'morality' would necessitate Germans to be 'completely cynical' about geopolitics.[103] Germans advocated that the role of justice between states was important, but that Germany's interests were better served by power.

> [B]y the time Germany regained her power, she had adopted a completely cynical attitude about the role of morality in international politics. Even though she continued to base her claims on grounds of justice, she expressed them more and more clearly in terms of naked force; and this reacted on the opinion of the status quo countries, which became more and more inclined to forget earlier admissions of the injustices of the Versailles Treaty and to consider the issue exclusively as one of power.[104]

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[97] *Ibid*.
[98] *Ibid*.
[99] Alan Chong, 'Lessons in International communication: Carr, Angell and Lippmann on Human Nature, Public Opinion and Leadership', Review of International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2007, p. 618.
[100] *Ibid*.
[101] Brian Porter, 'Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the Spirit Ironic: A Comedy of Errors', *International Relations*, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, p. 89.
[102] Lothian,' Germany and the Rhineland: III', International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1931-1939), p. 52.
[103] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, London Macmillan, [1939] 1946, p. 221.
[104] *Ibid*.

Certainly, the ways in which Nazism was defined by observers in the UK was 'hotly contested'.[105] Before 1937, the opposition to appeasement with Germany was not substantial and closer relations with Germany were perceived to be harmless.[106] Moreover, before World War II, attitudes about Nazism within the UK were often contextualised into what implications it may have for the British Empire and for domestic politics, as well as for improving Anglo-German relations.[107] Butterfield, for instance, was not against appeasement, as he perceived the UK at that time to not possess the will or the ability to confront Germany. He observed the UK to be 'relatively' weak, and that this weakness must be remedied to augment any diplomatic effort it could muster.[108] Namier described World War II as 'the Unnecessary War'.[109]

Historians' backgrounds influenced how they perceived Nazism and the reasons for its emergence. Namier was driven by incentives that he perceived would gain him 'high social acceptance'. He was closely involved with the Prime Minister's Office, and was periodically approached by 'Oxford inner-circle people' who had previously ignored him.[110] Likewise, R. W. Seton-Watson was among those writers whom Richard Evans described as intellectuals 'of action'.[111] These men's enthusiasm for European and German history was interlinked with 'the increasingly violent and chaotic present'.[112] The character of Namier and his intensity which he regarded his employment represented the contradictions of the interwar era, as he simultaneously embodied being an 'exile and misfit'.[113] Namier was notable for the historical technique which he popularised. He analysed government by way of public figures daily characteristics, rather than ideas and pronouncements. He inspired a number of historians who followed his methdology, named the 'Namierities', who argued that historical methodology based on numerous biographies, known as prosopography, was scientific. The Oxford English dictionary included the verb 'to

[105] Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust*, p. 190.
[106] Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, p. 55.
[107] Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust*, p. 190.
[108] Ian Hall, 'Power Politics and Appeasement: Political Realism in British International Thought, c. 1935-1955', *BJPIR*, Vol. 8, 2006, pp. 184-185.
[109] *Ibid*.
[110] Chris Wrigley, *A. J. P. Taylor: Radical Historical of Europe*, London, I. B. Taurus, 2006, p. 260.
[111] Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent*, pp. 108-109.
[112] *Ibid*.
[113] Linda Colley, *Lewis Namier*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1989, p. 105.

namierise' in 1976.[114]

Historians' responses to the Nazi takeover of power allowed them to comment upon Anglo-German relations during the high point of appeasement in the later 1930s. The Night of the Long Knives provided historians with an event from which they could contrast publicly their views about Nazi Germany. Later, in World War II, historians transferred aspects of their expertise to matters of Allied grand strategy. A. J. P. Taylor argued that an opening of a Second Front in Europe would increase some difficulties for the Allied War effort.[115] Communists opposed this reasoning in 1942. Taylor dealt with objections to his views on U.S. forces' progress in Tunis in February 1943, when he mentioned that they were then unable to complete the tasks assigned to them. The senior members of the Ministry of Information removed him from their roll of orators.[116] Taylor believed that politicians responded to Germany haphazardly rather than preparing an agenda in advance.[117] In the 1930s, the extent of radio broadcasting increased, and later in World War II, A. J. P. Taylor delivered 'propaganda broadcasts', while other UK historians were employed in intelligence duties and codebreaking.[118] The study of recent German history was incentivised by the relevance of events in that country, as Richard Evans commented.

> The war ripped a number of dons away from their normal academic pursuits and plunged them into an unfamiliar, exciting and in many ways extraordinary world that they naturally wanted to write about after the war was over.[119]

[114] *Ibid*., p. 1.
[115] A. J. P. Taylor, *A Personal History*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1983, p. 165.
[116] *Ibid*.
[117] Kathleen Burke, *Troublemaker: The Life and History of A. J. P. Taylor*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 288.
[118] Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent*, p. 133.
[119] *Ibid*.

## Media Climate

The British media offered a number of perspectives on German politics from which UK historians could both consume and contribute. Historians were publicly involved with the British press in the 1930s. Pierre Bourdieu observed that, 'without being necessarily conceived as such', intellectuals' work in the public space evolved from involvement in journalism and the media, including in the 'production of newspaper articles, participation in petitions or demonstrations, etc).[120] *The Times* had a wide readership for those interested in British foreign policy formation, and was regarded as 'the most influential newspaper in Britain'.[121] As the newspaper did not have a position for foreign editor, its editor, Geoffrey Dawson, directed the news associated with foreign, and particularly German, developments. Dawson was well connected, and collaborated on Anglo-German issues with Lord Lothian, Philip Kerr, a public intellectual and government functionary.[122]

The *Daily Mail* was sympathetic to aspects of Nazism in the early thirties, however, its proprietor, Viscount Rothermere, severed support for Mosley's BUF in 1934.[123] The *Economist*, *The Yorkshire Observer*, and the *Liverpool Daily Post* published views that were hostile to appeasement to Nazi Germany. The *Manchester Guardian* was an authoritative source about foreign developments from a Liberal framework. Its views on Nazi Germany were set in a context of defiance of appeasement and opposition to Germany. Furthermore, Liberal policy was expressed by widely circulated *News Chronicle*.[124] *The Times* was a newspaper that a prominent German journalist regarded as 'the greatest paper of England and possibly of the world'.[125]

[120] Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, Peter Collier (trans.), Stanford, Stanford University Press, [1984] 1988, p. 99.
[121] Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, p. 63.
[122] *Ibid*.
[123] Paul Addison, 'Patriotism Under Pressure: Lord Rothermere and British Foreign Policy', in Gillian Peele and Chris Cook (eds), *The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918-1939*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 1975, pp. 189-190.
[124] Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, p. 74.
[125] K. Gibberd, Citizenship through the Newspaper, London, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1939, pp. 6-7.

William H. Dawson received a private education and had wrote eleven books on Germany before the outbreak of World War I.[126] Dawson and his colleagues continued writing for the press in the interwar years, paradoxically seeking to influence opinions while maintaining a diversity of opinion amongst themselves. Hitler had convinced many among the upper and other classes who read newspapers that Germany under his rule was the only barrier between European civilisation and Communism. As soon as Hitler attained power, he set into motion policies that would regain Germany's pre-World War I strength and its confiscated territories. This was paralleled by the use of information and propaganda to justify Germany's regained assertiveness.[127] Apart from the Soviet Union, Germany remained the only country in Europe that had the potential to dominate the continent with its population and 'industrial war potential'.[128] *The Times* was a newspaper whose editorial line over the twentieth century largely correlated with the aims of whatever government was incumbent. This position held that of articulating the view of the government in 'the field of foreign affairs'. The Foreign Office Press Department's staff payroll included UK interwar historians.[129]

Alfred Zimmern maintained that the 'daily newspaper' of the 1920s was the main conduit by which public opinion was shaped.[130] According to Jonathon Rose, 'at any given point, the reading tastes of the British working classes consistently lagged a generation behind those of the educated middle classes, a cultural conservatism that often coexisted with political radicalism'.[131] The war's end and the resultant Peace Settlement's treatment of Germany propelled Dawson to seek revisions to what he saw as excessively punitive measures against Germany. His prescriptions in the standards of the time were considered 'revisionist'. One such book of Dawson's, for instance, was *Germany Under the Treaty* (1933). It advocated

[126] Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, London, Constable, 1980, p. 142; William H. Dawson was also twice married, in both cases to German women.
[127] Harold Butler, *The Lost Peace: A Personal Impression*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942, p. 118.
[128] Lewis Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939*, London, Macmillan, 1948, p. ix.
[129] D. C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1965, pp. 10-11.
[130] Alfred E. Zimmern, *Europe in Convalescence*, London, Mills and Boon, 1922, p. 61.
[131] Jonathan Rose, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001, p. 116.

the revision of ten localities in order to restore the balance back to Germany's sense of dignity and to prevent war.[132] Bavaria lost more autonomy than the other Reich states under the Weimar Constitution, and there was a customary aversion of Bavarian Catholics for Protestant Prussians. Part of this rivalry influenced how the Berlin and the Bavarian government disagreed on how to cooperate, and which led to differences that climaxed in the 'audacious revolt of Hitler and Ludendorf in 1923'.[133]

UK historians were public intellectuals who sought the growth of a well-informed citizenry. While the *English Historical Review* was produced at Cambridge University, the Historical Association produced the journal *History*, a publication which held discussions on pedagogy at school. The Historical Association promoted the development of civil society in the UK by fostering closer collaboration between the public and public intellectuals. These types of intellectuals had previously included school teachers who had history Honours degrees in the public and grammar schools. Historians G. M. Trevelyan and A. S. Turberville educational credentials did not exceed master level. A. F. Pollard, of London University's Institute of Historical Research, advocated for the normalisation of 'the expert historian' to educate the citizenry.[134]

Charles Webster perceived Butterfield to have a 'curious conception' of Hitler.[135] During the later 1930s, Butterfield objected to Nazi Germany being morally analysed, and hoped that 'Fascists' antagonists 'could be more gentle'.[136] Butterfield was criticised for his 'lecture tour' of Germany following the 1938 Munich Agreements. He apparently inferred that the UK had a degree of responsibility for how the geopolitical situation developed. He asked rhetorically, 'what did we do wrong? What could we have done to prevent the Germans from feeling that they

[132] Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, p. 142; William H. Dawson was also twice married, in both cases to German women.
[133] G. P. Gooch, *Germany*, London, Ernest Benn, 1926, p. 346.
[134] Ian Tyrrell, *Historians in Public: The Practice of American History, 1890-1970*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2005, p.143.
[135] Ian Hall, 'History, Christianity, and Diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, p. 726.
[136] C. T. McIntire, *Herbert Butterfield: Historian as Dissenter*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 105.

must turn to Hitler?'[137]

Historians were involved in developments that were reported as noteworthy because of their political association. The media climate of the 1930's UK showed that UK historians' interest in Germany was shared by their colleagues in the press, albeit from various viewpoints. In the later 1930s, advocates of appeasement were found outside government. The editor of *The* Times, Geoffrey Dawson, was notable for his support of the policy. Dawson avoided stories which could 'hurt' Germans' 'susceptibilities', while he inserted articles that mollified German opinion.[138] Following the Czechoslovakia crisis in March 1938, Butterfield accepted a proposal from the German embassy in London to talk in Berlin.[139] The initiative was suggested by Hans Galinsky, who was involved with the Department of English Studies in Berlin.[140] Galinsky was the Nazi Party's adjutant for the Hitler Youth movement and outreach, and he sought to build connections whilst he worked in London, and Manchester.[141] Butterfield had earlier accepted Galinsky's idea to give one address in Berlin. This plan changed when other German academics, who had affiliations with the Nazi Party, encouraged him to visit several other major German cities.[142]

Most of the books about the Nazi movement that targeted a popular audience were hostile towards the Third Reich. In 1936, the Left Book Club (LBC) had works published by Victor Gollancz. From 1938 onwards, 'sixpenny specials' achieved

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[137] *Ibid*., p. 112.
[138] Rock, *British Appeasement in the 1930s*, p. 63.
[139] Bentley, *The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield*, p. 141.
[140] *Ibid*.
[141] Martina Steber, 'Herbert Butterfield, der Nationalsozialismus und die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, (James Stenzel trans.),Vol. 55, No. 2, 2007, p. 288, pp. 269-307; The full passage as follows: '*Die Initiative zu einer Einladung Butterfields nach Berlin war dem Anglisten Hans Galinsky (1909-1991) ausgegangen. Dieser hatte mehrere Jahr in England verbracht und dort für die NSDAP als Adjudtant des HJ-Führers in London, Ortsgruppenleiter in Manchester und Schulunsleiter für Nordengland gearbeitet. Darüber hinaus verfügte er über vorzügliche Kontakte zur Geschüftsstelle des DAAD in London. An der Universität Berlin, an die er 1935 berufen wurde, leitete Galinsky die neu eingerichtete „Kulturpolitische Abteilung "der Anglistik. In ihm lernte Butterfield einen jungen Deutschen kennen, dem der englishe-deutsche Austausch sehr wichtig war und der zu jenen gehörte, „who still thought that the Nazi party would lead to the regeneneration of their country "'. Galinsky besuchte Butterfield im Gegenzug noch im März/April 1939 in Cambridge anlässlich eiener „Studienfahrt "' von HJ und Auslanderorganisation der NSDAP'*.
[142] Bentley, *The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield*, p. 141.

large print-runs. *Germany Puts the Clock Back* (1933) was written by Edgar Ansel Mowrer in the early thirties, and revised in 1939. 50,000 volumes were bought in its first week on sale. *What Hitler Wants* (1939), by Emily Lorimer, was distributed to politicians in the UK and its dominions, Ireland and the United States of America. It was also use in schools.[143] These publications contributed a wide variety of perspectives about Nazi Germany for the British public to consume. It continued the development of a context where much Conservative opinion was unfavourable towards France while growing closer towards Germany.[144]

## Security and Nazism's Rise

Some historians argued that sentimental attachment to a vague sense of Anglo-Saxon heritage risked obscuring the potential danger that Nazi Germany posed the UK. Underpinning their analyses was an awareness that Britons could not rely on a relationship that was built solely on Anglo-Saxon virtues and proclaimed, good intentions of Germany. Instead, they must integrate a recognition of the problems caused by the Versailles Treaty with the particularities of the new German leadership.

Hitler had declared in a speech on 30 January 1937 that Germans were seeking to revise the interwar order on Germany's former non-self-governing territories. Dawson and Beazley maintained to Prime Minister Baldwin that it was 'unwise' to misjudge the importance of 'the Fuehrer's statement'.[145] Dawson and Beazley believed that Germany was entitled to an area of land that corresponded to the needs of its population. They noted that whereas France had only 40 million people, Germany's 70 million citizens were 'confined' to a smaller land size.[146] Not everyone agreed with this. Dickinson, for example, thought that a European polity was needed, but that it would risk becoming a world power that could harm British

[143] Stone, *Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933-1939: Before War and Holocaust*, p. 5.
[144] M. George, *The Hollow Men: An Examination of British Foreign Policy Between the Years 1933 and 1939*, London, Leslie Frewin, 1967, p. 55.
[145] Baldwin 91-96.
[146] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April, 1937, Baldwin 91-96.

interests.[147]

Historians regarded Germans' support for the Nazi Party to be directly related to Germans' sense of restored honour. Dawson and Beazley, for example, interpreted Hitler's motives as being shaped by inattentiveness for 'strong national feeling, national pride, and national need' following World War I.[148] In the case of non-self-governing territories, they postulated that Hitler was 'indifferent' to the issue of colonies when he produced his 'famous book', *Mein Kampf*.[149] In the same year of 1937, an organisation called 'The Link' was formed in the UK to foster closer ties with Nazi Germany, and Beazley took a leading role in it.[150] Dawson and Beazley suggested that Hitler was driven by many of the same considerations that had driven the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck.[151] Some in the UK even connected 'Nazi anti-Semitism' to be a response to Germany's debarment from colonies.[152]

UK historians were increasingly concerned by Germany's growing strength in the later interwar era. The former Prime Minister, Macdonald, warned of the dangers of the UK's unilateral disarmament given continental powers' rearmament. He continued that even a 'pacifist' nation and government would be compelled by public opinion to undertake preparatory defences to protect the UK.[153] Yet, the two countries continued to cooperate in military matters. In 1935, the UK and Germany had signed the Anglo-German Naval agreement, which regulated the size of the *Kriegsmarine* [German navy] relative to the UK's Royal Navy.[154] It was in the spirit of conciliation that Fisher addressed the leaders of Nazi Germany in the late 1930s. He declared, '[w]e appeal above all to the leaders of the great German Reich at this

[147] G. L. Dickinson, *The Choice Before Us*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1918, p. 172.
[148] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April, 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[149] *Ibid*.
[150] Ian Kershaw, *Making Friends with Hitler: Lord Londonderry and Britain's Road to War*, London, Penguin, 2004, p. 247.
[151] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[152] Willeke Sandler, 'Deutsch Heimat in Afrika: Colonial Revisionism and the Construction of Germanness through Photography', *Journal of Women's History*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2013, pp. 44-45.
[153] Rt. Hon. Ramsay J. Macdonald, 'Peace and Defence', *The Newsletter: The National Labour Fortnightly*, Vol. 6, No. 7, 22 December, 1934, p. 101.
[154] Memorandum on a discussion at the Foreign Office on February 13 1937 at 11:00 a.m. about naval questions, GB 097 CAMERON WATT.

moment of power and influence in their history', and called on them to use their influence to foster international stability.[155] The capacities of historians such as Fisher were advanced by widespread interwar public support to avert war.

## Sympathy to Nazi Germany

UK interwar historians argued in the public space that British policy should tolerate a more assertive Germany in Europe, and observed that the priorities of the UK and Germany could coincide as much as they differed. They sought to reach a common Anglo-German understanding so that that the solidarity and cohesion between the two peoples could be reawakened. Some UK historians adopted appeasement, and presented the policy as concessions that aligned with a long-standing strategy of restraint on the part of both the UK and Germany. While the details of the Treaty of Versailles were scantly remembered by many Britons, Germans remained preoccupied with its contents.[156] In this manner, men such as A. L. Kennedy presented Nazism as a response to Germany's having been given just three days to agree to their opponents' terms or risk invasion by the French.[157] The German delegation had not been welcomed to Paris in the opening months of the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles. They were given three weeks to submit written suggestions, but had not been allowed to engage in oral consultations.[158] By the 1930, all Germans retained an intense desire to revise the Treaty of Versailles. The main distinction centred on the means, and not the end.[159] 'Hitlerism', as regarded by *The Times*' assistant foreign editor Kennedy, was 'largely a revolt against Versailles'.[160] This view was held up as a 'fundamental truth' that had to be observed in order to preserve European peace.[161]

UK interwar historians largely sympathised with the policy of appeasement, given their examination of Germans' response to military defeat. The belief that

[155] A Short Note by Fisher that gave no Further Context, MS. Fisher 77.
[156] A. L. Kennedy, '1935', in Gordon Martel (eds), *The Times and Appeasement: The Journals of A. L. Kennedy, 1932-1939*, London, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 176-177.
[157] *Ibid*.
[158] *Ibid*.
[159] Woodward, *The Origins of the War*, p. 23.
[160] Kennedy, '1935', pp. 176-177.
[161] *Ibid*.

World War I was not won by any one power grew substantially among Britons in the interwar period, particularly among members of the elite.[162] Noel-Baker emphasised the importance of the Disarmament Conference, and how its failure in 1932 made it foreseeable that Hitler and his Nazi Party would dominate Germany.[163] After the Nazi Party's assumption of power, some UK historians asked to what extent the Germans' change of government would affect their role in the public space. Their responses, of course, differed depending on their perspectives. '[T]he question', Noel-Baker suggested, 'was at what point did you want to have trouble with Germany and how much'.[164] Such debates directly informed the policy of appeasement, given the historians' presence. A contributor to one of Gooch's edited works at the end of the interwar period suggested that empathy played a role.

> [i]t is worth speculating for a moment on what would happen in England – if she ever lost a war. English people would certainly not take a defeat lying down! There would be plots and revolts and revolutions until England had once again won her place in the sun. This speculation should, therefore, help us to look a little more kindly and objectively on the spirit of defiance, the desire for another fight and for revenge, which went along with the pessimism in Germany immediately after the First World War.[165]

Some historians argued that there were areas where Anglo-German priorities could coincide and that Germany could be incentivised to have modest ambitions. Arnold Toynbee argued that appeasement could be characterised by 'high-minded men who had gone to unusual lengths in putting ethical principles into power politics'.[166] Noel-Baker felt that 'half of them [the elite] were appeasers and half of them were bar politics men'.[167] Detractors of Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of *The Times*, insinuated that he was unfamiliar with Germany's history or the German language because but

[162] Williamson Murray, 'Britain' in Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds), *The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 112.
[163] Philip Noel-Baker Tape 208, CO 067, p. 12.
[164] *Ibid*.
[165] S. D. Stirk, 'Myths, Types and Propaganda, 1919-1939', in G. P. Gooch et al (eds), *The German Mind and Outlook*, London, Chapman Hall, 1945, p. 126.
[166] Cf. Lord William Strang, *The Moscow Negotiations*, 1939, Leeds, Leeds University Press, 1968, p. 4.
[167] Philip Noel-Baker Tape 209, CO 067, p. 2.

he had studied non-Germanic subjects at Oxford. He was nonetheless reputed by many to favour revising the post-World War I settlement for Germany's benefit.[168] Noel-Baker informed Mr Liddle that he viewed British civil servants, Tom Jones and Horace Wilson, as 'ghastly'.[169] Noel-Baker maintained that Jones, Wilson and their colleagues 'honestly believed that Hitler was a nice, good man and if you treated nicely with him and were only fair to Germany and gave them some colonies, you could perfectly well get on with him without any quarrel'.[170]

A. J. P. Taylor opposed appeasement in the interwar period, but understood that 'an independent and powerful Germany had somehow to be fitted into Europe'.[171] Taylor was born on 25 March 1906, at Birkdale in Lancashire. Taylor's education included his time at Oriel College, Oxford University, and attained First Class Honours with his graduation in 1927. Taylor often viewed Germany from the perspective of what Viennese opinion was, but he had stayed in Berlin in 1928 and resented the experience. He disapproved of the Nazis. Taylor's colleague, Namier, had a level of scorn for Germany that predated World War I.[172] Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, A. J. P. Taylor and Lewis Namier both maintained opinions that were negative about Germans.[173] Taylor died on 7 September 1990.

In contrast, Dawson and Beazley contended that they advocated simply for sympathetic interpretations of Germany's actions in the interwar period. They affirmed that their actions in the public space were informed by 'a love of good faith, moderation and justice; and most of all by a deep consciousness of the importance of the issues involved'.[174] Gooch was similarly held to have a 'sympathetic' empathy for Germans' historical and contemporary experiences.[175] One of the colleagues of

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[168] A. L. Rowse, *All Souls and Appeasement: A Contribution to Contemporary History*, London, Macmillan, 1961, p. 6.
[169] Philip Noel-Baker Tape 209, CO 067, p. 2.
[170] *Ibid*.
[171] Lord William Strang, *The Moscow Negotiations*, 1939, Leeds, Leeds University Press, 1968, p. 4.
[172] Wrigley, *A. J. P. Taylor: Radical Historian of Europe*, p. 70.
[173] *Ibid*., p. 71.
[174] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[175] Felix E. Hirsch, 'Stresemann and Adenauer: Two Great Leaders of German Democracy in Times of Crisis', in A. O. Sarkissian (ed.), *Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography*, London, Longmans Green, 1961, p. 266.

historians of this thesis, Arthur Bryant, was even considered for internment on account of his alleged pro-German sympathies.[176] A number of Britons sympathetic to Germany met near Birmingham in 1938, where they exchanged views, socialised and danced. Historians, such as Beazley, were prominent among them and they remind that sympathy for Germany was not isolated in society.[177]

In 1937, Mr Myers, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's private secretary, described Dawson and Beazley in a short note that was attached to the memorial that they had forwarded to be viewed by the prime minister.

> [I] have not met R. Beazley but I know Mr Harbutt Dawson very well before the war. (He did special work for the [*sic*] B. S. T. and found it difficult to conceal his information with official methods!) He is a close student of German thought, probably taking a rosy view of current manifestations. His friends in Germany would not be among the close adherents of Hitler. But I have no reason to doubt that what he says in the memorial accurately reflects the views of the older and more thoughtful Germans.[178]

Dawson and Beazley asserted in their memorial to Prime Minister Baldwin that their relative sympathy towards Germany was influenced by their 'knowledge of German opinion', and motivated by their 'sense of responsibility'.[179] They listed their credentials by addressing their proficiency on issues of hostility, morality and Nazism. Furthermore, they claimed their expertise derived from 'special study and personal contacts' in Germany that exceeded five decades.[180]

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[176] Stefan Collini, *Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 123.
[177] Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany*, London, Constable, 1980, p. 311.
[178] A Scribbled note from Baldwin's private secretary, Mr Myers, 15 April 1937, Cambridge University Library, Department of Manuscripts and University Archives, *Stanley Baldwin's Private Papers*, Baldwin 85.
[179] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[180] *Ibid*.

When Chamberlain received a copy of Fisher's book, *History of Europe*, he wrote in a letter that he had been too occupied with other matters to have found the time to read the work. He noted that '[a]t the present moment I am too busy trying to make the history of Europe to read about it, but when holiday time comes I am promising myself a long-deferred pleasure in reading your book which has earned such universal and enthusiastic praise'.[181] Baldwin had resigned his prime ministership in 1937, but kept up correspondences with UK historians. On 10 September 1939, Baldwin wrote to Fisher that 'the literary supplement the other day' had numerous inclusions of Professor [Arnold] Toynbee's works.[182] He desired to know if his books were 'suitable for a useless old prime minister in the long, dark winter days ahead? …If I can't improve my walking there's plenty of room for improvement of when I call my mind'.[183]

Many historians were eager to represent themselves privately as public intellectuals who could mediate Anglo-German discussions in the Nazi era. A correspondent to Fisher had written that British 'public opinion' was opposed to any 'aggressive policy' towards Germany.[184] He noted that the public was pacifist on the issue, and that this sentiment had grown in scope and loudness.[185] Historians were directly enlisted to bring the betterment of Anglo-German relations to the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax. Although the exact identity of the author of this letter is unknown, being signed only as 'Dawson', his close knowledge of key historians strongly suggests it was written by William Harbutt Dawson. In his letter, he had written,

> [i]n the opinion of the government the prospects of peace would be served if a letter were published [and] signed by certain representative people who had no present contact with politics...if you agree to sign it, which I hope you will, you might sign this copy and send it straight back to Halifax at the Foreign Office. The

[181] A Letter from Neville Chamberlain to H. A. L.. Fisher on receiving a copy of his book, *A History of Europe*', '21 March 1938, MS. Fisher 77.
[182] A Letter from Stanley Baldwin to H. A. L. Fisher, 10 September 1939, MS. Fisher 77.
[183] *Ibid*.
[184] Dawson of 32 Wimpole Street wrote to Fisher, 24 January 1939, MS. Fisher 77. [I am not sure if it is William Harbutt Dawson or another correspondent with a similar surname. There was just a name 'Dawson'.]
[185] *Ibid*.

> men who were not at the meeting and who in addition to yourself are being communicated with are – Derby, G. M. Trevelyan, Major Temperley, Grant Robinson, Jeans, Edington, Lutyens, Vaughn Williams, John Masefield, Michael Sadler, Eustace Percy, Claude Elliot, P. H. B. Lyon and Burghley (representing athletics).[186]

On 16 June 1939, Fisher penned a letter to Halifax in which he asked if other initiatives for improving the UK and German relationship had been explored. Fisher aimed to ensure that his familiarity and networks within the British government would lead to the improvement of Anglo-German ties. Fisher conveyed to Halifax his understanding that Nazi Germany's grievances were not insurmountable. He continued that the UK might rely in similar personal contacts to his own as a point of departure for further discussions. He had written,

> [i]s there not anyone in England with a perfect knowledge of German and a powerful temperament who could talk to Hitler as man to man and explain to him in suitably energetic language what the actual position of the British government is, what vast risks he is running, and how easy it would be to avoid them...I thought perhaps you might like to have these impressions, but of course I do not expect an answer.[187]

Halifax replied on 21 June 1939, 'I have tried to think of such a man as you mention to talk to Hitler, but have not yet succeeded in hitting on anyone to fit the bill'.[188] Historians' actions were not primarily motivated by sentimentality about Germany, and although many felt goodwill for Germans, they still sought to serve the UK's vital interests. Moreover, UK interwar historians maintained lines of communication that crossed the public and private spaces. Halifax's willingness to defer to his judgement reveals the extent of Fisher's embedded presence, and the trust he commanded. Halifax continued '[i]f you can think of anybody, I would be very

[186] *Ibid*.
[187] A Letter from H. A. L. Fisher to Foreign Secretary Halifax, 16 June 1939, MS. Fisher 77.
[188] A Reply from Foreign Secretary Halifax to H. A. L. Fisher, 21 June 1939, MS. Fisher 77.

grateful if you would let me know'.[189]

Nazi Germany's incremental occupation of Czechoslovakia reinforced UK interwar historians' commitment to speak out in public forums. The British politician, senior member of the Independent Labour Party and pacifist, Reginald Clifford Allen, appealed to Fisher because of latter's status in the public space. Fisher's fellow academic and politician, Sir Arthur Salter, also played a role in seeking Fisher's assistance in the public space. He noted,

> [D]ear Dr Fisher, Sir Arthur Salter has been spending the weekend with me, and we both feel it essential that some useful letter should be sent to *The Times* at this critical moment about Czechoslovakia. You will realise that the draft which we submit to you studiously avoids all the usual ferocious demands that the British government should commit itself in any form whatsoever. On the other hand it makes a practical proposal which we believe would be of enormous service both to our own government and to the governments of Germany and Czechoslovakia. I enclose the list of the people to whom we have submitted the letter, and we both feel it should be headed, for purposes of publication in *The Times*, by your own name as by far the most eminent among us. I should esteem it a very great favour if you could let me have your answer by return of post, Allen of Hurtwood.[190]

Historians also maintained their professional contacts overseas. Men, such as Butterfield, criticised the professionalization of Polish and Czech historians and attested that some of their functionaries were 'on the fringes of historical work'.[191] Butterfield maintained that such historians should have instead become integrated in government, so that they could better handle 'peace negotiations' for when World War II ended.[192] J. H. Clapham concurred, agreeing that many such historians were overly emotional with a penchant for 'political pronouncements'.[193] Clapham wanted

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[189] *Ibid*.
[190] A Letter from Clifford Allen to H. A. L. Fisher, 20 July 1938, MS. Fisher 77.
[191] A Letter from Butterfield to Miss Cam from Peterhouse on the formation of a British National Committee, 12 November 1941, BUTT/51 Allied Historians, 1941-44.
[192] 'Butterfield to Miss Cam from Peterhouse on the formation of a British National Committee on 12 November, 1941', BUTT/51 Allied Historians, 1941-44.
[193] A Letter from J. H. Clapham to Butterfield on account of the meeting, 12 March 1942, BUTT/51 Allied Historians, 1941-44.

to have such 'research' analysed, and suggested cynically to Butterfield '[l]et us kill the bear before dividing his kill'.[194] On 23 March 1942, Resolution II of the Informal Conference of Historians at Cambridge noted 'that the resolutions carried out at this conference should not be published, but may be communicated privately by delegates to their own governments'.[195]

## Hostility to Nazi Germany

As UK historians' analyses oscillated between sympathy and hostility, their awareness of the strategic threat Nazi Germany posed gradually overrode considerations of Anglo-Saxon kinship. They were cognisant that assertions about the danger of Germany outweighed any sympathy for that country, and risked making their claims about Anglo-German cohesion seem exaggerated.

Historians were aware that characterising Germany as a predator centred attention on the needs of British security. Pollard was opposed to the notion of *Der Staat ist Macht*, and worried about states' focus on an arms race. Pollard blamed the German Kaiser for setting the conditions for interwar Anglo-German relations. He wrote '[m]y protest was against his Prussianisation of England'.[196] Pollard used aspects of the *Sonderweg* approach to argue that a sequence of non-democratic elements ran through Germany's history, facilitating the Nazi Party's assumption of power.[197] In this manner, they argued that notions of *Heimat* which had earlier attracted UK historians and given German regions their distinctive particularities, were now used by the Nazi Party to centralise power.[198]

Dawson and Beazley used the social capital that they had acquired by writing and speaking in the public space to influence political decision makers; they did so in

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[194] *Ibid*; Dr. Jan Opočenský wrote to Butterfield on Czech ministerial paper on the 13 March 1942 and thanked him for the weekend that he and his colleagues spent in Cambridge.
[195] *Ibid*.
[196] Pollard's Lecture Notes, 'Blood and Iron', 24 February, University of London: Senate House Library, *Pollard Papers*, MS 860/19/4 Pollard [The state is power].
[197] William Brustein and Marit Berntson, 'Interwar Fascist Popularity in Europe and the Default of the Left', *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1999, p. 160; [special path or way].
[198] Eric Storm, 'Nation-Building in the Provinces: The Interplay between Local, Regional and National Identities in Central and Western Europe, 1870-1945', *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2012, p. 652.

such a manner as to emphasise their capacities as private men. The final paragraph of their petition called for greater efforts to be made to ensure that Nazi Germany's interests were treated with sensitivity and equality. They wrote,

> [r]eading the shallow, sometimes puerile, and invariably egoistic reasons which are so flippantly advanced in the public press and on political platforms for refusal to consider the German colonial claims, we confess to feelings of amazement and anxiety. It is absolutely disastrous that so little regard should be paid to future Anglo-German relations or to the security of the peace of Europe. What could be worse than a renewal of antagonism? No one knows better than you, Sir, with your vast experience, balanced judgment and deep human sympathy, that a sound statesmanship like your own must look far ahead, and anticipate difficulties. We are profoundly convinced, as a result of intimate knowledge of German opinion, that willingness to meet Germany on this question would do more than anything else to deepen and strengthen the foundations of our friendship, and that it would win to our side a powerful coadjutor in the service of world peace, settlement, and stability. We beg to add the assurance that this memorial has not been prepared with any thought of publicity, and will not be so used. We are Sir, with great respect, Yours faithfully, Raymond Beazley, William Harbutt Dawson.[199]

When the UK declared war on Germany in 1939, all things Germanic became interchangeable with Nazi Germany.[200] The interwar Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Robert Vansittart, moved to ensure that the consistency of his opposition to Germany was reflected in any documents published. Vansittart wrote to Anthony Eden on 6 February 1943, worried that the documents he had received there was '[n]one of the memoranda and minutes of warning which I continually showered upon successive governments'.[201] He lamented that his contribution was only shown in an 'interview with Ribbentrop', and in how Vansittart had encouraged Germany to

[199] William Harbutt Dawson and Raymond Beazley's Memorial to Baldwin, 14 April 1937, Baldwin 91-96.
[200] Wilfred Van der Will, 'Culture and the Organisation of National Socialist Ideology, 1933-1945', in Rob Burns (ed.), *German Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 103.
[201] Extracts of Vansittart's Correspondence with Eden, 8 January 1947, The National Archives (UK), *Foreign Office Papers*, FO 370/1497B; 'Possible misrepresentation of the part played by himself in the inter-war period. This point has arisen because of the publication of the 1923-39 documents regarding our relations with Germany', 8 January 1947. State Papers File no. 227.

be associated with the Soviet Union.[202] He had earlier sought to see Germany cooperate with the Soviets, and had 'congratulated' Ribbentrop on the agreed Anglo-German Naval Pact.[203] Vansittartism, according to the historian, Noel Annan, 'resembled the doctrine of original sin'.[204] Thus, in respect of Nazi Germany, 'Germans were born bad and grew worse. Had they not started five wars in the space of a century'?[205] Vansittart continued to disseminate his particular construct of Germanophobia in broadcasts from 1940.[206]

Vansittart claimed retrospectively that he had 'nothing to do' with the Anglo-German Naval Pact, and that he 'did not really approve' of it.[207] With regards to the Soviets, he had tried 'to make the best of a *fait accompli* in the Russian interest'.[208] Eden's reply included his assurances that their colleague, the historian E. L. Woodward, would have ensured that Vansittart was portrayed benignly in matters that concerned his interactions with members of the Nazi Party. He wrote,

> [I] can assure you that in preparing this collection, regard will be paid to the point you have mentioned. E. L. Woodward, who is editing the documents, tells me that, as long as he is responsible for this work, he will undertake that nothing in them will lay you open to misrepresentation, and that, if he has the least doubt on the matter, he will seek permission to consult you.[209]

UK historians understood that the shifts in sympathy and hostility to Nazi Germany drew on long-standing British attitudes. Historians were cognisant that many Britons' animosity towards Germans was clearly the product of the very recent history of World War I.[210] UK historians, such as Steed, believed that the Nazi

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[202] *Ibid*.
[203] *Ibid*.
[204] Cf. Van der Will, 'Culture and the Organisation of National Socialist Ideology, 1933-1945', p. 103.
[205] *Ibid*.
[206] Nicole Brunnhuber, 'Explaining the Enemy: Images of German Culture in English-Language Fiction by German-Speaking Exiles in Great Britain, 1933-45', *Seminar*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2006, p. 278.
[207] Extracts of Vansittart's Correspondence with Eden, 8 January 1947, FO 370/1497B.
[208] *Ibid*.
[209] Anthony Eden replies to Vansittart, Extracts of Vansittart's Correspondence with Eden, 2 March 1944, FO 370/1497B.
[210] Van der Will, 'Culture and the Organisation of National Socialist Ideology, 1933-1945', p. 103.

Party's beliefs represented 'the negation of Christ and the affirmation of Odin'.[211] He continued that Germany under the Nazi Party revealed the intolerance of Germans. Steed used the Nazis' hostility to Judaism as a basis for his attacks on the Nazi movement. At King's College, London, Steed gave lessons that were later published in multiple editions in book format. This prefaced many other works on Hitler and the Nazi Party by Steed, which were later incorporated in books, journals, magazines, and broadsheet newspapers. Steed advocated that the 'Nordi**c** Legend' was one of the keys for understanding the Nazi Party.[212]

A little more than a month after Britain's declaration of war against Nazi Germany, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Field Marshal Jan Smuts, wrote a letter to Fisher in which he sought to encourage his colleague about the upcoming conflict with Nazi Germany. He invoked their nation's common friendship and camaraderie during World War I, as well as the gravity of the task that confronted historians such as Fisher and his colleague, Gilbert Murray.

> Once more we clasp hands in the darkness. When this war broke out I thought of your modest confession in your great history that you had failed to discover a clear clue to our human story. And today the mystery is all the greater, and more poignant than ever. Twenty five years after! Still this is a vale of soul making, and perhaps human souls and personality are being hammered out by the blows of fate. This war makes me think of the old Christian conception of Anti-Christ. It is Anti-Christ we are up against, and now that the anti-God forces of Nazism and Bolshevism seem to be joining hands we are up against a double Anti-Christ. We must assume victory for the Cross, and plan a better international order for the future. Our Versailles mistakes should not be repeated. Cannot you high thinkers begin now already to put on your thinking caps and plan the new world? My own mind is in a haze, and besides every bit of my time and energy is locked up in preparation for the struggle. You and Gilbert Murray and other men of good will may begin your planning.[213]

[211] Cf. Liebich, 'The Antisemitism of Henry Wickham Steed', p. 194.
[212] Andre Liebich, 'The Antisemitism of Henry Wickham Steed', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2012, p. 194; The first book was entitled, *Hitler: Whence and Whither?* London, Nisbet, 1934.
[213] A Letter from Jan Chrisiaan Smuts from Pretoria to H. A. L. Fisher, 7 October 1939, MS. Fisher 77.

UK historians expressed concern and disappointment with the conduct of interwar Anglo-German relations from various angles, but sought not to damage the relationship permanently. Throughout their analyses, historians considered the need to avoid another war as paramount, and they acknowledged that this influenced their earlier interpretations about Nazi Germany. As a public intellectual, Grant reserved his harshest critiques for the privacy of his diary. Grant regarded the Nazi Party's assent to power with sadness. However, much of his despondency was directed against the conditions that had created war. He wrote that everything in his life that he had worked for was now imperilled.[214] Grant despaired of the likelihood of the impending conflict. In depression, he repeatedly wrote the saying: *Si jeunesse savait; si vieillesse pouvait* [If youth only knew, if age only could] in his diary.[215] World War II's progression past the first months into 1940 troubled him, and he lamented events in his diary in English, French and Latin. Grant's anguish manifested itself in moments of self-doubt, such as when he wrote that 'I have interpreted the world wrong. I have believed in the strength of humanity, love, truth and how can they make head against sheer brutality'?[216] With pain he wrote that, '[a]ll that I wanted in public life is lost'.[217]

[214] Arthur James Grant, Professor of History, University of Leeds, 1897-1927; a Biographical Essay by John R. H. Moorman (Bishop of Ripon', Leeds University Library: Special Collections, *Arthur James Grant Papers*, MS 451, 47 ff in 1 envelope, p. 42.
[215] *Ibid*., p. 20.
[216] *Ibid*., p. 42.
[217] *Ibid*; *Hora novissima: tempora pessima sunt; vigilemus.*

# CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This thesis has provided an account of UK historians' important roles during the interwar period. It situated their analyses of Germany within the history of the interwar UK, and considered the extent of their influence on perceptions within the UK. The thesis itself is situated as an examination of historians' roles in the public space. The thesis used the historical context of the interwar era to analyse what was foremost in UK historians' minds on the issue of Germany. It suggested that the historians' contributions to the public debate on Germany were recognised because of their unique attributes. This recognition ensured that historians were at the fluid interface of the public and private space in the interwar UK.

The central research question asked 'what were UK historians' roles in analysing Germany, and how did they analyse that country in the interwar period?' An analysis of UK interwar historians' role shows that the flexibility of their occupations enabled the public nature of their work. The extent of their influence on public debate was also contingent on their role in the shifting public space. The thesis discovered that interwar UK historians' interest in Anglo-German relations played a significant role in the evolution of the public space. Historians found that their portrayal of post-World War I Germany raised that country's profile in a manner that remained sensitive to Britons' perceptions. It was in this capacity as public intellectuals that they were able to be persuasive across the multiple contexts in which they worked.

UK historians' work in the interwar era was bounded by particular spaces, time and issues. Historians' work in the nexus of public policy and politics provided the subtext for their movement across both literal and figurative spaces of public debate. A core aspect of the thesis was premised on how UK historians employed their intellectual skills to fulfil various roles, but also how they used social networks and norms to advance their views. Historians took up multiple responsibilities and roles by occupying liminal spaces, but their cultural and social capital remained bounded. In essence, the thesis was about men who had a unique combination of

social and cultural capital in the interwar era.

The thesis has found that UK interwar historians' engagement with Germany was derived from significant breadth and depth of knowledge. UK historians' engagement with public life raises a question about what made these public intellectuals different from other university-trained scholars, such as philosophers. The different fields of knowledge that historians worked across made them cognisant of the extent to which disciplines, such as philosophy, informed policy. However, it was the fluidity of historians' professional influence that enabled relationships between politicians and academics. UK historians' work was itself a product of the context of the post-World War I years, when conditions optimised the need for their unique skills. Their sex also facilitated their influence, but there remained something unique about historians as a profession.

Education underscored historians' credibility, and assisted their pursuits across time and space. Public schools, Oxford, Cambridge, as well as other universities and colleges, continued to be centres imbued with social and cultural capital.[1] Undoubtedly, the historians' proximity with such 'citadels of power and influence' aided their introductions to 'clubs and other all-male institutions'.[2] These gatherings found expression in 'old boy network[s]' that were similar in outlook.[3] As public intellectuals, they benefited from the flow of ideas within the interwar UK. Historians' ideas resonated most when their views on Germany coincided with popular sentiment. Historians had come from varying circumstances, but their views excited support from a range of audiences.

As public intellectuals, the historians sought to increase the profile of Anglo-German relations in both public and private audiences. From the early interwar period, many public intellectuals sought to persuade people that there could be no peace in Europe unless the UK focused on Germany's concerns. They believed that it

[1] R. D. Anderson, *Universities and Elites in Britain since 1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 44.
[2] *Ibid*.
[3] *Ibid*.

was in the UK's interests that public intellectuals prioritised Germany for public debate, and that a renewal of European conflict was unlikely if the UK and Germany became partners.[4] The thesis explored how historians' pursuit of Anglo-German understanding aided in their accruement of social and cultural capital. Thus, UK historians' work about Germany increased the value with which audiences viewed the salience of their opinions.

Much of the interrelationship between the elite and public aspects of British culture was set within a context provided by the Commonwealth of Nations.[5] It was as public intellectuals that UK historians analysed the significance of the British Empire's early twentieth-century development.[6] This environment provided the context for historians' various activities in seeking to influence international relations. They participated in the formation of foreign policy, the press and civic associations. Historians' participation in groups, such as the Union of Democratic Control and the League of Nations Union, affected the policies of the UK's political parties.[7] Historians conducted themselves as public intellectuals who were proponents of the League of Nations, and who sought to promote perspectives of pacifism and international comity.[8]

UK historians 'interpretations of Germanness structured historians' analyses of Germany in the public space, as explored in Chapter 3. As noted, Germans had earlier been blamed for actions that their detractors represented as primitiveness.[9] In contrast, the Weimar Republic sought to distance itself from legacies associated with Prussian militarism. The Republic promoted the culture represented by Goethe and Schiller as exemplars of how Germany sought to be portrayed.[10] Perceptions of

[4] Colin Storer, *Britain and the Weimar Republic: The History of a Cultural Relationship*, London, I. B. Taurus, 2010, pp. 38-40.
[5] W. David McIntyre, *The Britannic Vision: Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 22.
[6] *Ibid*.
[7] Philip Towle, *Going to War: British Debates from Wilberforce to Blair*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 49.
[8] *Ibid*.
[9] James Latham, 'The Kaiser as the Beast of Berlin: Race and the Animalising of German-ness in Early Hollywood's Advertising Imagery', *West Virginia Philological Papers*, Vol. 1, 2003, p. 18.
[10] Gisela Argyle, *Germany as Model and Monster: Allusions in English Fiction, 1830s-1930s*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002, p. 161.

Germans' characteristics that conditioned many Britons understandings of Germany included Anglo-Saxon heritage, ethnicity, confessionalism, and militarism. Historians' judgment provided a context through which events of the period were interpreted and perceived.

UK interwar historians investigated the panoply of contested interpretations of Germannness, as outlined in Chapter 4. These included interpretations that revolved around ethnic identity, confessional perceptions, militarism, and a recognition of Germany's particular political culture. UK historians raised the significance of Germans' perceptions of injustice and failure following World War I, and articulated the risks of taking advantage of their temporary vulnerability to humiliation. Their views evolved in tandem with wider society, and attitudes that favoured conciliation with the former enemy.

UK historians noted how the politics of reparations and revisionism informed Germans' resentment both inside and outside Germany. In this sense, some UK historians became enthusiasts for international norms and institutions, morality and law. They analysed Germany's transition to democracy by examining concepts of democratisation, history teaching, and the German revolution. They observed that the chances of Germany achieving a viable democratic system were complicated by the legacy of the 1919 Versailles Treaty and its associated War Guilt Clause. Historians' views about German democracy were informed by their studies of the British and German parliamentary systems. As this thesis examined in Chapter 5, these studies facilitated their contributions to the public space.

UK historians saw interwar Germany's ability to project its power beyond its borders as a marker of Germans' sense of renewed dynamism after World War I, as profiled in Chapter 6. Germany's defeat and the occupation of parts of its territory in the aftermath of the conflict struck at Germans' sense of military superiority. Historians' concern for the past electrified their interests in the interplay of contemporary and future events. UK historians saw that the confiscation of Germany's overseas empire weighed hard on Germans' sense of injustice. Historians

analysed Germany by focusing particularly on the importance of renegotiating Germany's borders by means of the League of Nations and return of Germany's colonies. They described the forced reshaping of Germany's borders and people movement as challenging Germans' sense of their country's territorial integrity.

Historians similarly scrutinised the Nazi Party through prisms of security, sympathy and hostility, as charted by Chapter 7. The need to structure a better relationship with Germany provided historians with an opportunity to occupy an otherwise fluid public space in the UK. They worked consciously to take advantage of their capacity to move across contexts to maximise the impact of their commentary and analyses about Nazi Germany. These later activities built upon the advances that they had made during the experience of the Weimar Republic.

The preceding chapters have explored the position and impact of UK interwar historians as public intellectuals. It was argued that their adaptability and flexibility in the public space enabled them to respond to contemporary Britons' interest in Germany. Their work across different fields of knowledge allowed them to adopt multiple identities and roles. While this thesis analysed UK historians collectively, the historians themselves responded to the serious issues relating to Anglo-German relations with varying levels of enthusiasm and commitment. Nonetheless, their common background and emphasis on Germany makes them definable as a collection of individuals. As a particular group of public intellectuals, many of them formed collaborative relationships to influence the UK's policy towards interwar Germany. As a result of this collaboration, these academic networks facilitated historians' access to the public space. Ultimately, in some respects the scope of their input to the public space exceeded the brief which they would normally have been expected to occupy as historians. Yet, as historians they enjoyed a unique flexibility. This increased their ability to pass across political and social barriers.

One of the theoretical assumptions that underpinned the thesis suggests that historians' influence, and ability to deploy social capital, was connected to the relationships and conduits that their roles afforded them. In this sense, it offers an

insight into historians' willingness to adopt flexible and adaptive roles across the duration of their careers. From this viewpoint, their work on Germany resonated within the public space, and accentuated the connectivity between the public space and foreign policy. Admittedly, UK historians' contributions to the consolidation of the public space paralleled the development of the mass society of the interwar period. It was historians' roles as credible analysts that bestowed social and cultural capital upon them, and which provided them with the authority to actively commentate on Germany in a variety of ways.

The thesis shows that there were intellectuals whose affiliations with universities appeared remote, yet their occupations gave them access to the public space. Their reputation sometimes exceeded the work of their colleagues whose connections to universities appeared deeper.[11] Nonetheless, up until the end of World War I, the 'last entirely elite generations' submitted honours theses in order to be employed in government.[12] They envisioned that their efforts would be recognised by the body of their thinking compatriots. Perceptions of the value of their social position also drew on the education many of them received at the public schools and at Oxbridge.[13]

The conclusions arrived within this thesis help to demonstrate the relationship between intellectuals and their publics. UK historians shared an intense curiosity about Germany. As this thesis has demonstrated, UK historians used interwar Germany as a means to influence the public space and to highlight the counterproductive treatment of Germany after World War I. This manifested itself into a cause and effect relationship, whereby historians sought to promote a positive image of Germany to prevent a repeat of World War I. An analysis of historians' diaries, correspondence, and government minutes authored by them, make clear that they were very cognisant of Germany's significance in the UK's public spaces.

[11] Julia Stapleton, 'British Intellectuals: Identity, Diversity and Change', *Twentieth Century Britain*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2007, p. 395.
[12] Reba N. Soffer, *Discipline and Power: The University, History, and the Making of an English Elite, 1870-1930*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1994, pp. 10-11.
[13] Patrick Joyce, *The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 287.

UK historians' connection with Germany enabled them to bring foreign affairs to the attention of Britons in the public space. Germany was central to historians' interests, and resonated with the public given the events of World War I. The thesis considered UK historians and their ability to apply themselves to tasks of analysis, prescription and advocacy. In this way, UK historians' roles in guiding the UK's public opinion and foreign policy about interwar Germany was decisive. Historians contributed to an emerging form of the public space as it reconfigured itself after World War I.

The thesis is concerned with UK historians and public intellectuals of interwar Germany. This is to determine the degree to which their histories and public commentary informed British public opinion and foreign policy towards Germany. The thesis argued that there was a synergy between influencing public opinion and affecting foreign policy options. Furthermore, it suggested that UK historians' scholarship of interwar Germany comprises a singular case study of public intellectuals who influenced private, public and political opinions.[14]

The thesis analysed the ways in which interwar UK historians discussed the geopolitical significance of interwar Germany. Historians' careers at the time emanated from a culture where historians' roles at university level were particularly flexible. Historians had enough latitude to pursue careers in universities without being assessed and conducting research, despite often engaging in both. As public intellectuals, they published their research in a number of publications. A thread that links this thesis' historians is that they were periodically employed within both academia and the government. The labours of public intellectuals were themselves a product of the UK's social realities.[15] British civil servants' work was informed by the aim that their service should result in 'a public good'.[16] To this end, historians

[14] Collini, '"Every Fruit-juice Drinker, Nudist, Sandal-wearer…": Intellectuals as Other People', in Helen Small (ed.), *The Public Intellectual*, p. 209.
[15] Soffer, *Discipline and Power: The University, History, and the Making of an English Elite, 1870-1930*, pp. 10-11.
[16] Joyce, *The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800*, p. 287.

challenged Germany's responsibility for World War I, as well as the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles. Problems for future research around this theme would necessitate how aspects of in-group loyalty, such as nationality, be considered as a means of public intellectuals' work.

UK interwar historians were people from whose ranks came public intellectuals whose analyses of interwar Germany changed how that country was perceived. The nuances of argument, which they displayed in their portrayal of Germany, became emblematic of their combination of prescriptive, analytical and advocacy skills. Through it all, they were the embodiment of the high ideals set out in the interwar years. They were hopeful yet disappointed, idealistic and sincere, even when their hopes were dashed and their recommendations on Germany were overtaken by events. Among their number included UK historians who used interwar Germany as a means to engage with the UK's changing public space, who strived to be acknowledged – and succeeded.

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