Improving Efficiency and Scalability of Service Network Graph by Re-routing Service Routes

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Abstract

Inter domain service routing is an element in the success of Next Generation Network. Service requests, such as the INVITE request in Session Initiation Protocol [21] may need to be redirected. Service Path (SPath) can be used to hold the server paths and service information. The length of SPath increases as the number of hops in a redirection increases. The overhead for service routing which uses SPath also increases. Thus it is desirable to optimize SPath to ensure efficiency and scalability of protocols involving service routing. In this paper, we propose a re-routing strategy to optimize service routing, and demonstrate how this strategy can be applied to SPath to enhance the efficiency and scalability of Service Network Graph (SNG). The formal proof for SPath optimization also forms the basis of Authentication Delegation in SNG.

1. Introduction

Service redirection is one of the key elements in inter domain service routing. Models and architectures such as Semantic Overlay Based service Routing [7] or Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [21, 22] requires redirection of service requests. The service request redirection can be accomplished with multiple redirections of only one hop each. Service Network Graph (SNG), a remote authentication protocol, requires redirection of a service request using single redirection via multiple hops.

SPath was proposed to hold the server path and service information during service request redirection. As the service network grows and redirection path gets longer, SPath may become unmanageable. The overhead for establishing authentication and service access will escalate. This makes SPath not scalable. As a result we have to optimize the SPath as the service network grows.

In this paper, we proposed a re-routing strategy to optimize SPath in the context of SNG and a formal justification using the symbols and approach presented by Lampson in his paper [17] is presented. The formal proof for SPath optimization also forms the basis of Authentication Delegation in SNG.

This paper is organized into six sections. We will review Service Network Graph in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce some axioms and theorems established by Lampson in [17]. In Section 4 we briefly introduce the format of SPath first and then we present our proposition. We prove the proposition by proposing and proving four lemmas. In Section 5, we mention how to implement the optimization of SPath. In the Conclusion section, we summarize our work in this paper and our work in the future.

2. Overview of Service Network Graph

Globalization of world economy means that we are no longer confined to a geographical location. But the reality is we are confined to use services provided by our home network and we cannot access services offered in different autonomous networks may due to the fact that we are not aware of the services; or we do not know how to access them; or we are simply not allowed to access them. It would be desirable if one network can join another network and share their services to their home users. Under this scenario, one of the immediate problems is how to authenticate users of the participating networks. Issues such as information privacy, network platforms and resources make the sharing of user authentication information of all participating networks prohibitively hard or difficult.

Towards a solution, the use of X.509 certificates [1], trust recommendations [4, 8, 18, 20] trust establishment [6, 19, 2, 3, 5] and Kerberos [9] are developed. Nevertheless, none of them is widely accepted as a viable solution to the problem. We first proposed Service Network Graph (SNG) in 2005 [16, 12, 11] and extended SNG to mobile users in [15]. SNG enables the linking of heterogenous networks in an ad

hoc manner to form a Service Network Graph. Within the service network graph, home users of individual networks can share the services provided by other networks within SNG. To enhance the security of the authentication process, SNG can include Dynamic Password [10] as one of its authentication scheme, and thereby forming an authentication protocol suite for heterogenous aggregation of ad hoc networks.

Let us briefly review the SNG and its workings. To participate in an SNG, the authentication server AS_1 of $Network1(N_1)$, is required to share a secret key with the authentication server AS_2 of Network 2 (N_2) which is part of an SNG as shown in Figure 1. A self-authenticating encryption channel [14] is set up between two joined networks. Communications between authentication servers are protected by encryption using the shared key. Suppose N_2



Figure 1. Network 1 joins Network 2 in an SNG

offers service Srv_2. When the service Srv_2 is shared with N_1, we need to indicate that this service is offered by N_2. This can be done with the Service Access Path (SAPath) field in a Service Path (SPath). Obviously, the SAPath in N_2 is simply the address of N_2 while SAPath of the same service in N_1 must include the address of Network 1 and the address of N_2. When other networks join in, we may have an SNG as shown in Figure 2. The SAPath field of Srv_2 in Network 3 (N_3) should include the addresses of N_2, N_1 and N_3.

3. Basic Axioms and Theorems

In this Section, we will present some of the Axioms and Theorems established in [17]. The symbols used are listed below:



Figure 2. Graphical representation of an SNG

Symbol	Meaning
s	a statement
$\vdash\ s$	s is an axiom of the theory or s is provable form the axioms.
$\rightsquigarrow$	speak for
$\Rightarrow$	imply
$\wedge$	and

Axiom 1

$\vdash (P_A\ \mathbf{says}\ (P_B \rightsquigarrow P_A)) \Rightarrow (P_B \rightsquigarrow P_A)$

This Axiom says that principal P_A can establish a "speak for" relationship with principal P_B when he declares P_B speaks for him.

Theorem 1

$\vdash\ (P_A\ \rightsquigarrow\ P_B) \Rightarrow ((P_A\ \mathbf{says}\ s)\ \Rightarrow\ (P_B\ \mathbf{says}\ s))$

This theorem tells us that if principal P_A speaks for principal P_B, then whenever P_A says something, P_B would have said the same thing.

In this paper, we are concerned with authentication authority of a principal. Hence we will use a qualified "speak for" relation. When we qualify "speak for" relationship with the role "as Authentication Agent" ("as AA" for short), we have a qualified version of Theorem 1 as shown in Theorem 2 below.

Theorem 2

$\vdash\ (P_{A\ asAA}\ \rightsquigarrow\ P_{B\ asAA})\ \Rightarrow$
$((P_{A\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s)\ \Rightarrow\ (P_{B\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s))$

Theorem 3

$\vdash ((P_C\ \rightsquigarrow\ P_A)\ \wedge\ (P_C\ \mathbf{says}\ (P_B\ \rightsquigarrow\ P_A))) \Rightarrow$
$(P_B\ \rightsquigarrow\ P_A)$

This is called the HandOff rule by Lampson et al in [17]. In this theorem, the first condition requires $(P_C\ \rightsquigarrow\ P_A)$.

Using Theorem 1, whatever P_C says, P_A would have said the same. Hence the second condition of Theorem 3 can be rewritten as $(P_A \ \mathbf{says} \ (P_B \ \Rightarrow \ P_A))$. Using Axiom 1, if P_A declares P_B speaks for him, we can arrive at the conclusion $(P_B \ \Rightarrow \ P_A)$.

4. Optimization of Service Path (SPath)

In this section we will prove that Service Paths can be optimized and in the next section, we will show how to implement the optimization of SPaths.

To illustrate our discussion, we will use a freely sharable FTP service provided by network N_A for a cost of 215 units as an example. The authentication server for N_A has an IP address of 10.1.1.1. The server providing the service is called FTPSer.

4.1. Format of SPath

When network N_A offers a service, the service is listed as an SPath of the form

$< SOpt : SAPath/Ser/Srv >:< C >$

where

SOpt:	Sharing Option
SAPath:	Service Access Path
Ser:	Name of Server
Srv:	Name of service
C:	Cost for using the service

The SAPath field in this case is simply the network address of the authentication server (AS) of N_A.

$< SOpt : add_{N_A}/Ser/Srv >:< C >$

So the SPath of our example FTP service listed in the service providing network N_A looks like:

$< F : 10.1.1.1/FTPSer/FTP >:< 215 >$

When network N_B joins an SNG by attaching to network N_A, N_A delegates its authentication authority to N_B. N_A will also pass the SPath of the FTP service to N_B. Home users of N_B can now use the FTP service offered by N_A if they are authenticated by N_B. N_B will list all the shared service as SPaths by pre-pending the address of its authentication server to the SAPath fields of all SPaths shared by N_A.

$< SOption : add_{N_B}/add_{N_A}/Ser/Srv >:< Cost >$

The SPath for FTP service in N_B looks like:

$< F : 10.1.2.1/10.1.1.1/FTPSer/FTP >:< 215 >$

As the SAPath field will be pre-pended with a network address every time it is shared with another network, the SAPath of an SPath gets longer each time the service is shared with another network. When users try to authenticate and access a service, the overhead for authentication and setting up a service gets larger as the SAPath gets longer. It is imperative to keep the SAPath to an optimal length for both efficiency and scalability. To optimize an SPath is the transformation of the SAPath field of an arbitrary SPath to its optimal form. In the next subsection, we will discuss the theoretical basis of optimizing SPaths.

4.2. Optimization of SPath

We will start to prove that SPaths (SAPath field) can be optimized with some definitions regarding Authentication Delegation in SNG context.

Definition 1 ***Authentication Delegation***

If network N_A attaches to network N_B which is a member of an SNG, then we define N_B delegates its authentication authority to network N_A.

If a network N_B delegates its authentication authority to another network N_A, then we represent it as

$N_{B\ asAA} \ \mathbf{says} \ (N_{A\ asAA} \ \Rightarrow \ N_{B\ asAA})$

This formalized the definition of Authentication Delegation in an SNG. When authentication authority is delegated, we have to keep track of the delegatee and the delegator relationships. they are recorded in Authentication Delegation Paths. Every time when a delegation occurs, the new delegatee address is pre-pended to the Authentication Delegation Path. So an Authentication Delegation Path would have the address of the delegatee network as the leftmost address and the delegator network address as the right most address. In between are intermediate networks which were delegatee networks at certain time in the authentication delegation process.

Definition 2 ***Authentication Delegation Path for Self-Authentication***

The Authentication Delegation Path of network N_A in network N_A itself is defined as:

$add_{N_A}/$

It simply means N_A performs authentication itself.

Definition 3 ***Authentication Delegation Path in Remote Networks***

If N_A delegates its authentication authority to another network N_B, then we define the Authentication Delegation Path for N_A in N_B to be

$add_{N_B}/add_{N_A}/$

within the SNG context. The delegated authentication authority can further be delegated. That is to say, if N_A delegates authentication authority to N_B which in turn delegates the authentication authority of N_A to another network N_C, the Authentication Delegation Path looks like

$add_{N_C}/(add_{N_B}/add_{N_A}/)$

which is equivalent to

$add_{N_C}/add_{N_B}/add_{N_A}/$

Hence we can generalize our Authentication Delegation Path definition to the following definition.

Definition 4 ***Authentication Delegation Path***

The Authentication Delegation Path is defined as the network path which traces the authentication delegation sequence from the delegator network to the final delegatee network in the form of

$add_{N_{delegatee}}/.../add_{N_2}/add_{N_1}/add_{N_{delegator}}/$

With the definitions in place, we can now make the proposition that SPaths can be optimized.

Proposition 1 ***(Optimization of SPath)***

Service Path of the form

$$< SOpt : SAPath/Ser/Srv >:< Cost >$$

can always have the SAPath optimized to a two-address format

$$add_{N_{home}}/add_{N_{service}}/$$

and the resulting SPaths have the form

$$< SOpt : add_{N_{home}}/add_{N_{service}}/Ser/Srv >:< Cost >$$

We will prove this proposition by working through a sequence of Lemmas.

Lemma 1 ***(Transitivity of "speak for" relation)***

$\vdash (N_{A\ asAA} \leadsto N_{B\ asAA}) \wedge (N_{B\ asAA} \leadsto N_{C\ asAA})$
$\Rightarrow (N_{A\ asAA} \leadsto N_{C\ asAA})$

PROOF:

From the first condition in the Lemma and Theorem 2, we have

$(N_{A\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s) \Rightarrow (N_{B\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s)$

Similarly, the second condition in the Lemma yields

$(N_{B\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s) \Rightarrow (N_{C\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s)$

So the predicate of the logic becomes:

$((N_{A\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s) \Rightarrow (N_{B\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s)) \wedge$
$((N_{B\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s) \Rightarrow (N_{C\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s))$

Transitive property of the "⇒" relation allows us to replace the predicate with

$((N_{A\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s) \Rightarrow (N_{C\ asAA}\ \mathbf{says}\ s))$

which is precisely what we will get when we apply Theorem 2 to the conclusion of the Lemma. ■

Lemma 2 ***("Transitivity of Authentication Delegation in SNG)***

Suppose N_A delegates the authentication authority to N_B. When N_B delegates the authentication authority to N_C, the authentication authority for N_A will also be delegated to N_C.

PROOF

When N_A delegates authentication authority to N_B, by Definition 1 and Axiom 1, we have

$(N_{B\ asAA} \leadsto N_{A\ asAA})$

When N_B delegates authentication authority to N_C, by Definition 1 and Axiom 1, we have

$(N_{C\ asAA} \leadsto N_{B\ asAA})$

These two authentication delegations satisfied the conditions of Lemma 1 and so we can conclude from Lemma 1 that

$(N_{C\ asAA} \leadsto N_{A\ asAA})$ ■

Lemma 3 ***(Authentication Delegation Path)***

If $N_{A\ asAA}$ delegates its authentication authority to another network $N_{B\ asAA}$, then N_B will have the Authentication Delegation Path for N_A and all Authentication Delegation Paths N_A has with the address of N_B prepended:

$add_{N_B}/add_{N_A}/.../add_{N_3}/add_{N_2}/add_{N_1}/$

PROOF

When N_1 delegates its authentication authority to N_2, by Definition 3, N_2 will have a Authentication Delegation Path

$add_{N_2}/add_{N_1}/$

Similarly, when N_2 delegates its authentication authority to N_3, from Lemma 2, Definition 3 and Definition 4, N_3 will have two Authentication Delegation Paths

$add_{N_3}/add_{N_2}/$
$add_{N_3}/add_{N_2}/add_{N_1}/$

We keep on applying Lemma 2 and Definition 3 and 4 every time a network delegates its authentication authority to another network, until, finally N_A delegates its authentication authority to network N_B. From Lemma 2, all authentication authority already delegated to N_A, and the authentication authority of N_A itself, will be delegated to N_B. When authentication authorities are delegated to N_B all the Authentication Delegation Paths will have the address of N_A pre-pended by Definition 3. ■

Lemma 4 ***(Equivalence of Authentication Delegation)***

Authentication Delegation Path of the form

$add_{N_{home}}/.../add_{N_3}/add_{N_2}/add_{N_1}/add_{N_{service}}/$

is equivalent to

$add_{N_{home}}/add_{N_{service}}/$

PROOF

Authentication Delegation Path

$add_{N_{home}}/.../add_{N_3}/add_{N_2}/add_{N_1}/add_{N_{service}}/$

indicates $N_{service}$ delegates its authentication authority to N_1 (Definition 4) which in turn delegates its authentication authority to N_2. From Lemma 2, the authentication authority for N_{sevice} will also be delegated to N_2. By Definition 4 the Authentication Delegation Path of $N_{service}$ in N_2 is

$add_{N_2}/add_{N_1}/add_{N_{service}}/$

When the authentication authority for N_{sevice} is delegated to N_2, using Definition 1, we have

$N_{service\ asAA}$ **says** $(N_{2\ asAA} \hookrightarrow N_{service\ asAA})$
By Axiom 1, we have
$(N_{2\ asAA} \hookrightarrow N_{service\ asAA})$
And by Definition 3, the Authentication Delegation Path for the delegation listed above is
$add_{N_2}/add_{N_{service}}/$
Hence we can transform Authentication Delegation Path from
$add_{N_2}/add_{N_1}/add_{N_{service}}/$
to a shorter form
$add_{N_2}/add_{N_{service}}/$
Every time we apply the argument to the address triplets on the left hand side of an Authentication Delegation Path, we will get one address less. By repeating the process just described to an Authentication Delegation Path argument, we can arrive at its optimized form:
$add_{N_{home}}/add_{N_{service}}/$ ■

PROOF of Proposition 1

SAPath inside a SPath is the authentication Delegation Path of the service to the user's home network. Hence by Lemma 4, all Authentication Delegation Path can be reduced to the form
$add_{N_{home}}/add_{N_{service}}/$
and hence we have the optimized form of an SPath. ■

5. Implementing SPath Optimization

In this section, we will discuss how to achieve the SPath optimization in an SNG context.

When network N_A joins an SNG, it shares a secret key K_1 with a member network, N_B of the SNG for establishing a self-authenticating encryption channel. In N_A the Authentication Delegation Path for N_B is
$add_{N_A}/add_{N_B}/$
When another network N_C links with N_A to join the SNG, the key shared between N_A and N_C is K_2. In N_C the Authentication Delegation Paths are
$add_{N_C}/add_{N_A}/$
$add_{N_C}/add_{N_A}/add_{N_B}/$
Proposition 1 allows us to optimize the second Authentication Delegation Path to
$add_{N_C}/add_{N_B}/$
N_C has a shared key with N_A. N_B has a shared key with N_A and N_B has no shared key with N_C. The optimized SPath $add_{N_C}/add_{N_B}/$ works only when there is a shared key between N_A and N_C. The shared key will be used to establish a self-authenticating encryption channel between N_C and N_B. So N_C must share a key K_3 with N_B before optimizing any SPath in which the service is provided by N_A. As the optimized Authentication Delegation Path indicates that N_B has delegated the authentication authority to N_C, N_B would be willing to share a common key with N_C and establish an encrypted channel. This can be done via the original encrypted Authentication Delegation Path or simply uses the same procedure as when N_C initially links with N_A. By sharing a key with N_B, N_C is now linked directly with N_B. Figure 3 shows that N_A shares a



Figure 3. Sharing of key before SPath optimization

key K_1 with N_B and the key indices for K_1 are K_1^A and K_1^B in N_A and N_B respectively. The shared between N_A and N_C is K_2. The key indices for K_2 are K_2^A and K_2^C in N_A and N_C respectively. The implementation is valid for all SPaths which has the SAPath field optimized to the two-address format. add_{N_C} and add_{N_B} are now replaced by $add_{N_{home}}$ and $add_{N_{server}}$. The home network has to initiate the sharing of a key with the service providing network. The addresses which appear in the original SAPath have no affect on the optimization process as shown in Figure 4.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed how to optimize Service Routing paths and a formal justification was given. Without optimization, SPath and hence protocols such as SNG which require service routing may not be scalable and thus restricting their service routing capability for the general ad hoc aggregation of networks. With optimization, not only the scalability of SPath, the performance for service routing will also be improved due to the shorter access path and hence less overhead involved. The optimized SPath will have a shorter SAPath, and this makes maintenance and network trouble shooting more manageable.

Our next step is to look at the correctness of the Service Network Graph which can provide user authentication



Figure 4. SPath optimization in general

across heterogeneous networks of different administrative domain without sharing user authentication information.

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