PHENOMENOLOGICAL LIFEWORLD RESEARCH: A PROPOSED PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE LIFEWORLD OF NEW MIGRANTS

A thesis submitted by

Nicholas James Lee
BA (Hons), GradDipEd, MEd

For the award of

Doctor of Philosophy

2022

ABSTRACT

The following assignment develops, justifies and applies a distinctive phenomenological research methodology: The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology. It is tailored to address a number of criticisms of existing phenomenological research methodologies put forward, most cogently, by phenomenological philosopher Dan Zahavi.

Phenomenological lifeworld research: A proposed phenomenological research methodology has two primary aims. Firstly, it aims to develop a phenomenological research methodology that is demonstrably phenomenological. It sets out to justify all of its major components in relation to the philosophical-phenomenological tradition. Secondly, it aims to present itself in a manner that is clear enough to be understood and then applied by prospective phenomenological researchers, from a range of academic fields, with no philosophical background.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is centred around four pillars. Each of these pillars is distinctive and essential to the research process. Three are derived from elements within Max van Manen's *hermeneutic phenomenological method* (van Manen, 2016a, 2016b): the framing concept of the lifeworld, the adoption of insight cultivators within the interview process, and the use of five existentials to organise research and data analysis. The fourth pillar, inspired by Amedeo Giorgi's call for phenomenological research to be a science (Giorgi, 2009), demands the inclusion of a series of propositions relating to the five existentials, which are to be tested through the interview phase of the research.

The efficacy of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology will be tested and assessed within the context of investigating the lifeworld of recent Russian migrants to Australia.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, after its application, will be demonstrated to be a robust, versatile methodology. Nonetheless, those areas of development will be highlighted in the final section of the assignment.

Key words:

Phenomenology, Dan Zahavi, Max van Manen, Qualitative Research, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger.

CERTIFICATION OF THESIS

This thesis is entirely the work of *Nicholas James Lee* except where otherwise acknowledged. The work is original and has not previously been submitted for any other award, except where acknowledged.

Principal Supervisor: Dr Jan Du Preez

Associate Supervisor: Prof. Peter McIlveen

Student and supervisors' signatures of endorsement are held at the University

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number of people I would like to acknowledge for their role in assisting me complete this thesis.

My wife, Georgie: Thank you for your selfless patience over so many years. Quite simply, this thesis would never have neared completion without your support. I love you.

My mother, Beryl: Thank you for putting up with my repeated monologues about the finer points of the thesis over ZOOM. Thank you, also, for your constant love and support.

My principal supervisor, Jan Du Preez: Thank you for your supportive ear over these six years. I really did enjoy our fortnightly talks. I have always admired your capacity to distil my ramblings into meaningful points.

My associate supervisor, Peter McIlveen: Thank you for your valuable input at various stages over the research process. A particular thank you for being so obliging with the detailed advice in the latter stages of writing the thesis.

My Grandfather, Ken Pearson and sister, Kate Lee: In your different ways you have both inspired and motivated me.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my father, Geoff Lee. I still feel the presence of your absence.

RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS AND PAPERS PRESENTED

Lee, Nicholas. (2018, December 5th-7th) *Redefining migration: A phenomenological perspective.* Poster presentation at the Australian Society for Philosophy and Psychology Conference: Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preface

In March 2002 I was sitting opposite an old woman on a suburban bus. It was the day after I arrived in Moscow and was the first time I had ventured outside my apartment. The scene outside the window was strange. On both sides of the bus there were rows of identical, soviet-era apartment blocks that took up my entire field of vision. The only respite my eyes got from these apartment blocks came in the form of the occasional glittering golden dome of a church. Periodically, when I got tired of looking out the window, I glanced over at the old woman. Over the course of the journey her expression did not change. For her this was the beginning of a normal day. A day, just like thousands of other days before. For her, there was nothing interesting to see.

I have frequently recalled my experience on the bus that day. The old woman and I were co-inhabiting the same, small part of the physical world. Yet, palpably, we inhabited different worlds. I, recently arrived, was trying to make sense of what I was experiencing. I was developing a frame of reference that would assist me in making future journeys on the bus, identifying distinguishable landmarks that would remind me where I needed to get off, as well as trying to ascertain which door I needed to get out of, nervous in the anticipation of my first metro underground journey. Such concerns would never have entered her head.

In subsequent years, my experiences in Moscow engendered an interest in me in considering the nature of people's lived experiences during the early stages of migration. This interest had been sustained by conversations with people who had migrated to Australia. There seemed, anecdotally at least, to exist elements of lived experience that I shared with these migrants. Sparked within me was a desire to investigate these shared elements at a more formal level.

A number of years ago I developed an interest in the philosophical movement known as phenomenology. The phenomenologists impressed me from the outset with their focus on systematically investigating the nature of lived experience from the first-person perspective. Not for them, the aim of describing the physical world from some objective, "God's eye" perspective. What I liked about the phenomenologists was their desire to investigate the world as experienced by the individual anchored within the world, laden, with all of his/her experiential baggage. Adopting a phenomenological approach, I thought, would provide me with the means to successfully investigate the lived experiences of recent migrants.

In 2017, at the conclusion of the confirmation presentation of my research project as it was then: *The unseen migration: A phenomenological examination of how migrants experience aspects of the world and other people,* one of the panel members asked which research methodology I would adopt. I responded: a "phenomenological one", she replied that there was more than one and suggested that I consider adopting *interpretive phenomenological analysis* (IPA; Smith et al., 2012).

After conducting some background research on IPA, I concluded that it would not provide me with the resources to extract the depth and richness of lived experience data that I was looking for. It didn't appear to incorporate enough elements to make it genuinely phenomenological.

I looked at a second phenomenological research methodology, Amedeo Giorgi's *descriptive phenomenological method* (Giorgi, 2009). Again, I concluded that it would not provide me with the necessary tools to dig out the kind of qualitative, lived experience data that I knew could be accessed with the right approach. Unlike IPA, however, descriptive phenomenological analysis seemed too concerned with preserving its link to its philosophical phenomenological predecessors. This concern seemed to come at the expense of the necessary flexibility required when attempting to elicit experiential data from interviewees

interested neither in understanding, nor working within, a framework that incorporates many of the finer and more esoteric elements of philosophical phenomenology.

Finally, I looked at Max van Manen's *hermeneutic method* (van Manen, 2016a, 2016b; see also Zahavi, 2019b). Here, it seemed, was a phenomenological research methodology that occupied the "Goldilocks zone". Unlike IPA it wasn't lacking in philosophical foundation. Yet, unlike descriptive phenomenological analysis, it didn't appear too wedded to philosophical concepts of little relevance outside the sphere of philosophy.

Still, I wasn't wholly satisfied. Van Manen's research methodology needed to be tinkered with. Although, van Manen (2016a, 2016b, 2016c) provided most of the required elements required to conduct successful phenomenological research, I didn't consider that these elements were held together by a methodological framework that was clear enough.

This investigation of phenomenological methodologies caused a change of focus in my research. In order to conduct a phenomenological investigation of the lived experience of new migrants, I needed to develop a phenomenological research methodology that was fit for purpose. To this end, the revised purpose of the research project became the development of a phenomenological research methodology (subsequently named the *phenomenological lifeworld research methodology*) that was able to successfully thread the needle between being distinctively phenomenological, yet, accessible enough to be adopted by researchers with little grounding in phenomenological philosophy.

1.2 Objective of Thesis

The first primary objective of this thesis is to develop, justify and apply a genuinely phenomenological research methodology. This methodology is named the *phenomenological lifeworld research methodology*. It is intended to provide the researcher with the appropriate phenomenological tools to systematically investigate subjects' conscious experiences of the

world within a given socio-cultural context or *lifeworld* (van Manen, 2016b; Zahavi 2019b; Husserl, 1970).

The second primary objective of this thesis is to utilise the *phenomenological lifeworld research methodology* by applying it to the lifeworld of new migrants. In doing so, the goal, established at the beginning of the doctoral research phase, will have been achieved. Although the application of the methodology to the lifeworld of new migrants is a significant component of this thesis, its application will not take place until part two.

It is intended that this research methodology will be developed, justified and applied in a manner that is accessible to prospective phenomenological researchers, from a range of academic backgrounds with little or no background in philosophical phenomenology.

The requirement for developing such a phenomenological methodology has been explicitly made by leading contemporary phenomenological philosopher, Dan Zahavi (2019a, 2019b, 2019c). In the recent literature, Zahavi has expressed concerns with the three most prominent phenomenological research methodologies developed by Amedeo Giorgi, Max van Manen and Jonathan Smith (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 122).

However, rather than as Zahavi suggests, looking "beyond the different proposals currently found within the qualitative research literature" (2019c, p. 904) it will be argued that most of the required elements for a philosophically rigorous yet accessible phenomenological research methodology lie within the extant writings of Max van Manen.

After developing and justifying the major elements of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, its efficacy will be tested. It will be applied to the lifeworld of new migrants. By doing so, any weaknesses that manifest in the application stage of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology will be highlighted.

To summarise, the objectives of this thesis are to:

1. Develop a philosophically justified yet broadly accessible phenomenological research methodology: The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology. This will be achieved by building on elements within existing phenomenological research methodologies, in particular the hermeneutic method of Max van Manen (2016a, 2016b).
2. Ensure that the developed research methodology may serve as a template, flexible enough to be applied in a wide range of academic disciplines.
3. Test the efficacy of the developed research methodology by applying it in a real-life research context: The lifeworld of new migrants.

1.3 Organisation of Thesis

This thesis will be divided into three parts. The first part seeks to develop and justify the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology. The second, in a bid to test its efficacy, applies it within a research context. The third part analyses and discusses the effectiveness of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology in its application.

1.3.1 Part one: Development of methodology

The thesis begins with a summary of the history and aims of philosophical phenomenology. An initial summary will be given of the four essential components that distinguish phenomenology as a general investigative approach. After this, a brief outline will be offered of the phenomenological approaches adopted by two of its most influential and well-known practitioners. A brief outline will be given of the central elements of the classical phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, as expressed in his work *Ideas* (Husserl, 2012) as well as the central elements of Martin Heidegger's as expressed in *Being and Time* (Heidegger, 2008).

A summary of the benefits in adopting a phenomenological research approach will then be given. In addition, objections that might be levelled at the adoption of such an approach will be outlined. Where relevant, responses to these objections will be provided.

A summary of how phenomenology is currently applied within the context of qualitative research will then be outlined. This overview will include an introduction to the most recognised phenomenological research methodologies as set out by Jonathan Smith (2012), Max van Manen (2016a, 2016b), and Amedeo Giorgi (2009).

A critical comparison of these three research methodologies will then be given. Subsequently, it will be argued that, within the writings of Max van Manen (to a greater degree than the other two methodological founders) there exists a number of elements of value to the prospective phenomenological researcher.

As a result of this critical comparison, the *four pillars* (the four essential features) of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology will be outlined.

In the final section of part one, in preparation for its application in part two, an outline of how the four pillars and the remaining elements of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology relate to one another will be set out. Finally, a step-by-step illustration of how these elements will be utilised within the research process will be offered.

1.3.2 Part two: Application of methodology

Part two begins with a justification of the application of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology to the lifeworld of new migrants. A review of the existing phenomenological literature relating to the lifeworld of new migrants will then be set out.

Following the literature review, Study one, a formative autobiographical study of the lifeworld of a new migrant will be conducted. This study will begin with a series of reflections relating to the researcher's experiences within this lifeworld. These reflections will be followed by analysis, resulting in the development of a series of *propositions* (testable

statements relating to the essential features of the lifeworld of early migration) that will guide the interview process in study two.

Study two, a summative interviewee study of the lifeworld of new migrants will then be set out. This study will test the propositions developed in the first study. This will be done in a bid to draw conclusions relating to essential structures of conscious experience within the lifeworld of a new migrant. This will be followed by an analysis of this study and a discussion as to how the data from this research may contribute to, or serve as a foundation for, future research.

1.3.3 Part three: Discussion of methodology

Part three will be a discussion on the efficacy of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology based on its application into the lifeworld of new migrants. In this section, those elements within the proposed research methodology that were shown to be effective will be highlighted, as well as those found to be in need of amendment.

1.4 Summary

In summary, the proposed research serves to advance a novel phenomenological approach suitable to being utilised within a migrant studies context. The focus of this thesis will now turn to providing an exposition of the key elements of phenomenology.

PART ONE: DEVELOPMENT OF METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING PHENOMENOLOGY

2.1 What is Phenomenology?

The primary objective of this research project is to elaborate an accessible phenomenological research methodology. An outline of those elements that distinguish phenomenology as an investigative approach is a necessary first step. This section provides such a preliminary account.

Taken literally, the term *phenomenology* can be understood as the study or "science of phenomena" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 50). Unfortunately, this seemingly obvious account belies the difficulty in providing a workable outline that discerns phenomenology's central elements. Indeed, it is evident, particularly within the field of phenomenological research, that there are different assumptions regarding the question "what is phenomenology?". Van Manen states, "The term *phenomenology* occurs in a confusing abundance and range of qualitative studies" (van Manen, 2017, p. 775). The phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2014) states in the oft-sited preface to *Phenomenology of Perception,* that a lack of clarity regarding this issue has dogged philosophy, commenting "the hurried reader will give up trying to pin down a doctrine that has said everything and will wonder if a philosophy unable to define itself merits all the commotion made around it" (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xxi).

It is agreed, with Zahavi (2019b), that the account of phenomenology provided by Merleau-Ponty in his preface serves as an ideal starting point (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 64). There are two reasons behind this isolation of Merleau-Ponty' s characterisation. Firstly, Merleau-Ponty, along with Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger is considered to be one of the most significant practitioners of phenomenology (Ihde, 1986, p. 14). Secondly, the account of

phenomenology provided by him, discerns those elements *common* to the earlier major phenomenological practitioners Husserl and Heidegger (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 64).

The following exposition, directly referencing Merleau-Ponty's (2014) preface, outlines four elements required for a method of investigation to be justified as phenomenological.

Phenomenology reflects from the first-person perspective.

Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty (2014) suggests, takes as its starting point the first-person perspective. It is, he states, "the attempt to provide a direct description of our [own] experience such as it is" (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xx, my square brackets). Phenomenology, therefore, does not seek to transcend the individual's subjective experiences of the world in the name of providing some objective, bias free description of a mind independent physical world (as some might suggest is the aim of the physical sciences) (Zahavi, 2019b. pp. 65-66). Instead, it attempts to closely investigate the nature of those subjective experiences themselves (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, pp. xxi-xxii). As Merleau-Ponty (2014) states, phenomenology seeks to provide an account of the world as it is experienced. In his words, it provides "an account of 'lived' space, 'lived time' and the 'lived' world" (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xx).

Phenomenological reflection, therefore, is a special kind of critical reflection from this first- person perspective. It allows the reflector to, in some sense, "step back" (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xxvii) from his/her previous lived experiences in order to discern clearly, the central elements of those previous experiences.

Phenomenology aims for description.

The phenomenological method requires a close description of those reflected upon conscious experiences (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xx). It is descriptive insofar as it does not seek to explain or analyse those conscious experiences. It has no "consideration of its

[conscious experience's] psychological genesis or of the causal explanations that the scientist, historian, or sociologist might offer of that experience" (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xx, my square brackets). The practice of phenomenology, therefore, does not aim at inferring why those conscious experiences are as they are. Rather, it focuses on describing these experiences "just as they are given" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 65).

Phenomenology suggests conscious experience is intentional.

Within the context of phenomenological investigation, one assumes that conscious experience is "intentional" (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xxxi). This means that conscious experience is characterised by an active directedness towards some "object" of experience. Philosophers may argue with the term "object" because it might presuppose an object existing in the mind independent, physical world. Nonetheless, as stated by Husserl (Husserl, 2012, pp. 67-68) it is an accurate enough characterisation if "object" is taken to mean some focal point of conscious experience. This object of experience might be an object of perception, for example a tree or, an object of reflection, for example the memory of a particular experience when one was in the park as child. This intentional element implies that all conscious experience must, necessarily, refer to something other than itself. There can, for the phenomenologist, be no such thing as an empty conscious experience (Husserl, 2012, p. 67).

Phenomenology seeks to uncover essential structures of conscious experience.

Phenomenology is not content with the simple "amassing of experiential descriptions" (Zahavi, 2019c, p. 902). On the strength of particular descriptions, it attempts to discern essential elements of conscious experience more generally. Merleau-Ponty highlights the importance of this fact by beginning his preface by stating; "Phenomenology is the study of essences, and it holds that all problems amount to defining essences, such as the essence of - perception or the essence of consciousness" (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xx).

In this regard, the phenomenological method can be viewed as an attempt to be a kind of science. By closely examining particular conscious experiences, the phenomenologist aims to infer essential elements true, more generally, of human conscious experience. Merleau-Ponty (2014), like Husserl (Husserl, 2012, p. 19) did not shrink from this goal when he stated of phenomenology that it was a "philosophy that aspires to be an exact science" (Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. xx).

2.2 Phenomenology Unpacked

Zahavi (2019c) and van Manen (2017) both suggest that in order to conduct phenomenological research, one must have some grounding in phenomenological philosophy**.** It is here suggested that there are two phenomenological philosophers and, more particularly, two texts by these two philosophers that one should have a grounding in. The first is *Ideas* (Husserl, 2012) by Edmund Husserl and the second is *Being and Time* **(**Heidegger, 2008) by Martin Heidegger. The reasons are given below.

Firstly, Husserl and Heidegger are the phenomenologists referred to most frequently by the three founders of the major existing phenomenological research methodologies: Jonathan Smith, the founder of interpretive phenomenological analysis, Amedeo Giorgi, the founder of descriptive phenomenological analysis, and Max van Manen, the founder of the hermeneutic method. In their main works these three founders refer to Husserl and Heidegger in excess of all other phenomenologists. (Giorgi, 2009; Smith, 2012; van Manen 2016a, 2016b). In addition, Don Ihde (1986) and Dan Zahavi (2016b), two contemporary philosophers who have written extensively on the connection between phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological research also make clear the centrality of these two thinkers in understanding the phenomenological movement more broadly.

By having a grounding in some of the central elements of Husserl's early thought as expressed in *Ideas* (2012) as well as Heidegger's, as expressed in *Being and Time* (2008), the prospective phenomenological researcher will derive a number of benefits.

Firstly, it will provide him/her with an understanding of the elements of continuity between Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological approaches. In addition, it will make explicit those areas in which Heidegger departed from Husserl's early thought. This will help provide a greater understanding of which elements might be suitable for adapting into the context of phenomenological research and which elements, if adapted, are likely to be problematic.

Secondly, it is necessary to have an understanding of the key ideas present in these two foundational phenomenological texts in order to better understand how the elements of thought contained within the works of subsequent phenomenologists such as Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Paul Ricoeur, as well as the later work of Husserl, may be appropriately adapted into a broader phenomenological research methodology. Indeed, as Ihde (1986, p. 14) attests, both texts serve as a foundational reference point for the phenomenological systems of those later thinkers.

2.3 Summarising Husserl

Reflection from the first-person perspective.

Central to Husserl's early phenomenology as expressed in *Ideas* is the requirement for the investigator to reflect upon past conscious experiences from the first-person perspective (Husserl, 2012, p. 149). As Ihde (1986) points out; the Husserlian mode of investigation is reflective, "Husserl maintained that phenomenological reporting was done in terms of a modification of reflective thinking, a thinking about experience that presupposes some other form of experience as its [object]" (Ihde, 1986, p. 45, my square brackets). The content of any previous conscious experience one has had, even one as seemingly prosaic as, "looking with

pleasure in a garden at a blossoming apple tree" (Husserl, 2012, p. 185) can be subject to phenomenological investigation. As Husserl suggests, phenomenological examination involves the first-person reflective "analysis of the experience in which we treat the experience as an object" (Husserl, 2012, p. 149).

The description of previous experiences.

For the Husserl of *Ideas,* the phenomenological demand is to eliminate any presuppositions and assumptions and, through the process of reflection, accurately describe those past conscious experiences just as they were experienced. (Husserl, 2012, p. 143) Husserl suggests that the requirement of phenomenology is to describe past experiences just as they are experienced**.** In other words, the phenomenological goal is to eliminate any interpretive elements and accurately describe those past experiences (Husserl, 2012, pp. 143-144). This needs to be done without the projection onto those past experiences of any theoretical or explanatory element (Husserl, 2012, p. 144).

Reflection upon pre-reflective and reflective experiences.

Husserl allows the scope of phenomenological reflection to include both "pre-reflective" and "reflective" conscious experiences (Husserl, 2012, p. 151). For the Husserl of *Ideas*, there are two kinds of conscious experience that one might investigate. Firstly, there are "pre-reflective" conscious experiences. These are the kinds of conscious experience in which one is engaged in the act of perceiving some object or other. One might be engaged, for example, in the act of experiencing a chair or a window. Secondly, there are "reflective" conscious experiences. These are the kinds of experience when one *reflects* upon pre-reflective conscious experiences. In such reflective experiences one may, for example, reflect phenomenologically upon the conscious experience when one was, in that conscious experience, reflecting upon one's perception of a chair or a window. Husserl, comments:

"…reflexions are experiences, and as such can furnish the basis for new reflexions…" (Husserl, 2012, p. 149).

The epoche is invoked.

Husserl acknowledges in *Ideas* that there will always be the temptation, in phenomenological reflection, to go further than simply *describe* previous conscious experiences (Husserl, 2012, p. 144). There may, for example, be the impulse to *explain why* these objects present in conscious experience are present. In order to resist this, Husserl suggests that any inquiry related to what *lies behind* conscious experience (i.e. the mind independent physical world) needs to be "bracketed off" (Husserl, 2012, p. 59). In Husserl's terminology, an epoche needs to be performed (Husserl, 2012, p. 34). This epoche requires that all questions focused on the relationship between a mind-independent physical world and the content of conscious experience are set aside or "abstained" from (Husserl, 2012, p. 34). Husserl, makes clear the implications of the epoche, when he speaks of the status of his conscious experience of an apple tree, "we have no such question to put as whether anything responds to it [the "apple tree"] in "the" real world. This posited… reality, if our judgment is to be the measure of it, is simply not there for us" (Husserl, 2012, p. 186, square brackets mine).

This invocation of the epoche forces the individual reflecting phenomenologically to reject what Husserl terms the "natural standpoint" (Husserl, 2012, p. 9). This standpoint can be understood as the default setting of humans. This is the common sense view that when one speaks of objects that are present to consciousness one is, in fact, referring to objects in the mind-independent physical world (Husserl, 2012, p. 56). There is also the assumption, within the natural standpoint that these objects exist, as we perceive them, independent of our conscious experience (Husserl, 2012, p. 59). To clarify, when, from the natural standpoint, I talk of a "brown book on the shelf with gold lettering", I (and those with whom I am

speaking) take me to be referring to an object existing "out there", independent of my conscious representation of it. This standpoint, for Husserl, contains too many assumptions. There is, for example, no guarantee that those qualities (e.g. colours) that the object in the physical world possesses are those self-same qualities that I perceive when that object is represented within conscious experience. Better, Husserl suggests, for the phenomenologist to perform the epoche and restrict the parameters of investigation to that which is manifest and indubitable, i.e that which is present to, and which lies entirely within, conscious experience (Husserl, 2012, pp. 56-57).

Equal attention is paid to "veridical" and "non-veridical" conscious experiences.

Husserl, in *Ideas,* demands that the phenomenological reflector pay equal descriptive attention to all forms of conscious experience (Ihde, 1986, p. 33). It is, in other words, immaterial whether the object, present to conscious experience is, "not real" from the natural standpoint (Husserl, 2012, p. 186). An object present within conscious experience which might, under ordinary circumstances, be dismissed as a hallucination or an illusion ought to be afforded the same focused, descriptive attention as a representation ordinarily termed true. There is therefore, within the Husserlian phenomenological method, as expressed in *Ideas*, no distinction to be made between objects of conscious experience based on the likelihood of their existence in a mind-independent physical world.

For Husserl however, this does not necessarily mean, that there aren't any phenomenological differences between what, from the natural standpoint, might be termed a "hallucination" as opposed to a "true perception". Husserl states, "It may be that phenomenology has also something to say concerning hallucinations, illusions, and deceptive perceptions generally, and it perhaps has a great deal to say about them" (Husserl, 2012, p. 186). Within the context of Husserl's method, it is simply the case that any distinction to be

made between conscious experiences, must reside within the conscious experiences themselves (Solomon, 1988, p. 134).

All conscious experiences are intentional.

For Husserl, as expressed in *Ideas,* all conscious experiences must be *of* something, they must always be directed towards some object. For Husserl, it is important that "object" is not understood to be some object in the physical world but as an object within conscious experience (Husserl, 2012, pp. 67-68). Husserl terms this characteristic directedness of conscious experience, *intentionality* (Husserl, 2012, p. 67).

One might, for example, currently have as an object of conscious experience, an orange cup. Previously in the day, one may have summoned up the vague representation (a memory) of one's teacher's face on the first day of school. The particular qualities of both conscious experiences differ in many ways. The conscious experience of the orange cup is likely to be perceived with more clarity and sharpness than the somewhat hazy image of the memory of one's former primary school teacher. Nonetheless, both conscious experiences share a directedness or intentionality towards some object of experience.

Consciousness, therefore, in Husserl's view, is the necessary pre-condition for the experience of objects of experience to take place. However, consciousness, without some object towards which it is directed, is, quite literally, nothing (Husserl, 2012, p. 69).

Within each intentional conscious experience, Husserl acknowledges two inseparably linked elements. He dubs these elements *correlates* (Husserl, 2012, p. 184). The object or reference point of every intentional conscious experience is, for Husserl, the *noemetic correlate* (Husserl, 2012, p. 185). This object (for example a book or a tree), however, is always experienced in a certain way. It is never engaged with neutrally. The *noetic correlate* or *noesis* relates to the manner or mode in which the object of consciousness is experienced

(Husserl, 2012, pp. 184-185). As Ihde (1986) suggests, this manner or mode of experience, "gives color (sic) and shade to the whole experience" (Ihde, 1986, p. 43).

An example of an object towards which consciousness might be directed is an apple. The noemetic correlate is the object of consciousness itself (the apple), the *noetic* correlate is the manner or mode in which this apple is experienced. So, the apple could be experienced through a mood of relief (that it may sate my hunger) or, perhaps, through a mood of aesthetic appreciation (if one intends to paint it). "Every intentional experience" states Husserl, "thanks to its noetic phase, is noetic, it is its essential nature to harbour in itself a 'meaning' of some sort" (Husserl, 2012, 154).

So, within each intentional conscious experience, Husserl, discerns two invariable elements: Firstly, it is always directed towards an object, and secondly, the object is always experienced in a certain mood.

It seeks out essential structures of conscious human experience.

According to Husserl, through the close examination of particular conscious experiences, one may derive essences true of all conscious experience (Husserl, 2012, pp. 14-16). Husserl, in *Ideas,* is not interested, simply, in describing the particularities of specific conscious experiences (Husserl, 2012, p. 13). In adopting Husserl's method there is always an eye to using those particular descriptions as a means to uncovering essential structures true of conscious experience more generally.

For Husserl, the phenomenological process is a kind of science (Husserl, 2012, p. 1). However, unlike the natural scientist, instead of deriving generalisable laws about the mind independent physical world, the phenomenologist searches for what s/he terms the *eidos* or essential elements contained within the sphere of conscious experience (Husserl, 2012, p. 14). The phenomenological method, in Husserl's view, allows one, "In one's own experience" to "realize the nature of everyone else's experience as well" (Solomon, 1988, p. 130).

2.4 Summarising Heidegger

Reflection from the first-person perspective.

Heidegger makes clear that his phenomenological method, like Husserl's adopts the first-person perspective as its starting point (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 60-62).

The description of previous conscious experiences is not purely descriptive.

Heidegger disagrees with Husserl regarding the latter's view that in phenomenological reflection a pure and disinterested reflective gaze is possible (Husserl, 2012, p. 143). In contrast, Heidegger suggests that the reflective act *itself*, like all other conscious acts, has an interpretive component. For Heidegger, even when engaged in the act of formal phenomenological reflection, the reflector is, simultaneously, engaged in an act of interpretation (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 61-62). So, for Heidegger, unlike Husserl there can be no privileged, purely descriptive phenomenological reflective gaze (Heidegger, 2008, p. 59).

Reflection upon both reflective and pre-reflective conscious experiences.

Like Husserl (2012), Heidegger allows scope to reflect upon both pre-reflective and reflective forms of conscious experience. Heidegger doesn't appear to make this distinction explicitly but rather assumes that reflection on previous acts of experience is one of the experiencing human being's fundamental modes of experience (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 78-86).

The epoche is not invoked.

According to Heidegger, in *Being and Time* (2008), human consciousness is always situated in, and inseparably wedded to, some part of the world. It should be noted that Heidegger uses the term *Dasein* and resists using terms like conscious experience because of the connotations it carries that the conscious mind and the external world can be clearly divided**.** These two elements (consciousness and the physical world) form, what he terms, a "unitary phenomenon" (Heidegger, 2008, p.78). It is for this reason that there can be no epoche, or bracketing off, of the mind-independent external world (Solomon, 1988, p. 157).

Heidegger appears to infer that Husserl, in invoking the epoche, reinforces the view that the sphere of conscious experience *can be separated* from the physical world. This, for Heidegger, is a false dichotomy (Heidegger, 2008, p. 78). The consequence of accepting this view, according to Heidegger is that one cannot help but see consciousness as if it exists behind a pane of glass through which it "looks out" into the world as if it were a spectator (Solomon, 1988, pp. 157-159; Steiner, 1987, pp. 85-86). This view, according to Heidegger, fundamentally misunderstands the active and necessary outside engagement with the world that is essential to the way that human beings consciously experience the world (Heidegger, 2008, p. 89).

Equal attention is paid to "veridical" and "non-veridical" forms of conscious experience.

It is true that, for Heidegger there can no epoche, no bracketing off of conscious experience from the physical world (Heidegger, 2008, p. 78). However, like with Husserl, in phenomenological reflection, equal attention can still be paid to all forms of conscious experience. Even if those experiences might traditionally be labelled as false. Heidegger states, "Behind the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 60). In other words, within the context of phenomenological investigation, Heidegger suggests that it is impossible to transcend one's conscious experiences to somehow provide a "God's eye" perspective of those conscious experiences. He states as much when he comments, "Least of all can the Being of entities ever be anything such that 'behind it' stands something else 'which does not appear'" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 60).

For Heidegger in *Being and Time*, like with Husserl in the *Ideas*, the act of phenomenological reflection seeks to outline elements of previous conscious experiences (although Heidegger never uses the term "conscious experiences"). For Heidegger (2008), however, unlike Husserl, these reflected upon conscious experiences are always inseparable

from the physical world. Nonetheless, in agreement with Husserl, for Heidegger, the phenomenologist is bound by this first-person perspective and cannot seek to gain an elevated perspective above it (Steiner, 1989, p. 83). For Heidegger (2008, pp. 413-415), like with Husserl (2012, pp. 45-47) there is no question of the status and value of those forms of scientific investigation that seek to investigate the physical world independent of the human experience of it. It is just that this is not what the phenomenologist is seeking to do.

All conscious experiences of the world are intentional.

Heidegger agrees with Husserl in viewing all conscious experiences as possessing an intentional directedness (Heidegger, 2008). However, rather than using the term intentionality Heidegger uses the term *concern* when conveying the characteristic outward directedness of conscious experiences (Heidegger, 2008, p. 83). For Heidegger, this concern may take an informal form, such as the scanning around one involved in an everyday activity (such as walking down the street) or a more formal, theoretical and focused form (such as studying cells under a microscope) (Heidegger, 2008, p. 83). Indeed, concern, may be understood as an umbrella term for all of the possible modes with which one may intentionally engage with the world. Heidegger outlines some of the different modes of concern thus, "producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering*"* (Heidegger, 2008, p. 83).

It seeks out essential structures of conscious human experiences of the world.

Heidegger in *Being and Time* (2008) assumes that the phenomenological method can allow him to derive essential structures, true of all people's conscious experience of the world. As Gelven states, "It is obvious that Heidegger thinks he is describing what universally belongs to every Dasein [human being], and certainly not that which belongs merely to Heidegger's own private Dasein" (Gelven, 1989, p. 43, my square brackets). Those

essential structures of human experience are considered, by Heidegger, to be true of all humans' conscious experiences of the world.

It sets out essential structures of conscious human experiences of the world.

Heidegger, in *Being and Time* (2008), does not simply outline what the phenomenological method is (although, as has been made clear, there are important elements on which he disagrees with Husserl), rather, he uses the phenomenological method in order to construct an ontology or, an account, of the essential ways in which human beings experience the world (Heidegger, 2008). Indeed, *Being and Time*, is Heidegger's account of these essential structures (Heidegger, 2008, p. 27). The following is a selection of essential structures as expressed in *Being and Time.*

The most frequent way of experiencing the world is pre-theoretical rather than theoretical.

Heidegger argues that a vast majority of conscious experiences of the world are pre-theoretical. He suggests that human beings' most fundamental kinds of conscious experiences do not involve the kind of "knowing" that theoretically analyses, evaluates and scrutinises objects of experience (Heidegger, 2008, p. 95). He acknowledges that humans *have the capacity* for these theoretical modes of conscious experience, but they are neither the most fundamental nor are they the most frequent (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 98-99).

A majority of the time, in Heidegger's view, humans' conscious experience is tied up with average everyday activities. These are routine activities such as climbing stairs, opening doors or putting dishes away. He notes that, when one reflects phenomenologically upon such conscious experiences one becomes aware that there is no "knowing" going on at all. For example, when one is looking at the stairs as one climbs them, one does not evaluate them, one simply climbs them. Similarly, when opening a door, one does not investigate the door-knob as one turns it, one simply turns it (Heidegger, 2008, p. 98).

In asserting that the conscious human being (or, in Heidegger's words, Dasein's) most frequent or *primordial* (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 274-275) way of experiencing the world is when it is engaged in such average everyday activities, Heidegger sets himself in opposition to the philosophical tradition. He argues that most thinkers in the tradition placed an exaggerated emphasis on human beings as essentially and fundamentally knowers of the world. Such theoretical knowing is, according to Heidegger, one way of experiencing the world but it is secondary to, and can only be derived from, this more fundamental, pre-theoretical, average everyday mode of experiencing the world. Indeed, according to Heidegger, "It is before we step back and take notice of what we are doing and what we are using that we recognise our primary involvement in the world" (Solomon, 1988, p. 158). Heidegger suggests that the preceding philosophical tradition's obsession with viewing humans as knowers, denies the truth that all of people, most of their lives (even the most abstract and intellectually inclined) are immersed in practical ways of experiencing the world. In such experiences people are not set apart or, at a distance from the world of experience but rather are immersed in those objects of experience with which they are engaged (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 95-98).

In pre-theoretical conscious experiences of the world, objects are experienced as ready-to-hand.

Heidegger suggests that, in these pre-theoretical conscious experiences, objects are, in his words, experienced as equipment that is *ready-to-hand* (Heidegger, 2008, p. 98). This means that objects encountered in pre-theoretical experience are intuited simply as being able to be used. To give an example; as one is typing an essay on a computer, the keys on the keyboard are not experienced as separate and distinct keys but rather, in Heidegger's view as ready to be incorporated into the activity currently immersed in (Heidegger, 2008, p. 98).

Heidegger contrasts this ready-to-hand mode of conscious engagement, with the more theoretical engagements that one might have with those objects. In such theoretical instances one experiences these objects of experience as *present-at-hand* (Heidegger, 2008, p. 101). In such instances one, in a sense, takes a step back from the object of experience and scrutinises it as an object (Heidegger, 2008, p. 101). The obvious example of when one might do this is when one is investigating the nature of an object through a microscope or telescope. For Heidegger, although this is a relatively frequent mode of conscious experience it is secondary to the more primordial mode of experience where objects are experienced as ready-to-hand.

Objects experienced ready-to-hand are experienced as a totality.

When one reflects upon these pre-theoretical conscious experiences where objects are experienced as ready-to-hand, in Heidegger's view, one does not experience those objects *as* discrete, individual objects.

When, for example, one is immersed in ironing one's shirt, one does not experience the shirt being ironed as a shirt. Heidegger argues that, in such experiences, one is not conscious of the shirt as in individual, discrete object at all. Instead, specific objects play a part in forming a "totality of experience" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 99). In conjunction with the shirt, the iron, the hand guiding the iron, and the ironing board all form a unified whole.

For Heidegger, it is only when something goes wrong with the task that one is immersed, in that one is likely to investigate the shirt or iron as a discrete object of inquiry. It might be when, in the middle of action of ironing, the iron sticks to the shirt, that one might separate or distance oneself from the immersion of the task and theoretically investigate the bottom of the iron by examining its constituent elements as a specific object (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 102-103).

In pre-theoretical experience other human beings are experienced differently to other objects.

In one's pre-theoretical conscious experiences of the world, according to Heidegger, one does not simply encounter other objects but also other human beings. He adds, that these other human beings are experienced in a way that is essentially different to the way other objects in the world are experienced (Heidegger, 2008, p. 154). Heidegger suggests that, in the experience of another human there, is a fundamental recognition that this other object of experience, itself experiences the world in a largely identical manner. Heidegger states, "in characterizing the encountering of *Others*, one is again still oriented by that Dasein [human being] which is in each case one's *own"* (Heidegger, 2008, p. 154, my square brackets).

So, for Heidegger, to understand only how we consciously experience non-human objects in the world will present, at best, a *partial* picture of the ways in which humans consciously experience their world (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 153-157).

In pre-theoretical experience, space is experienced differently to when it is experienced theoretically.

Heidegger also suggests that within the context of pre-theoretical conscious experience space is experienced differently than it is within a theoretical context (Heidegger, 2008, p. 138). In everyday pre-theoretical experience, space is not experienced geometrically as it might be treated by a designer or an architect. In most pre-theoretical cases the felt nearness or farness of an object is not governed by measurable, objective distance but rather, more often, by a kind of hierarchy of relevance (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 141-142). To illustrate, if I am birdwatching and catch a glance of a bird in my binoculars, the felt proximity of that bird will be closer than the sandwiches I packed for my lunch that are sitting, ignored, beside me.

Pre-theoretical experiences are framed by the past and the future.

Finally, Heidegger understood that conscious experiences of the world are always temporally framed. They are, in other words, governed or given context, mostly, by one's future *projections* (Heidegger, 2008, p. 185) but also one's past conscious experiences

(Heidegger, 2008, pp. 434-439). In ordinary conscious engagements with the world, say in opening a door, one experiences the door, the door handle etc with the view to the future opening the door and getting in the room. Heidegger characterises this as the "for-the-sake-of-which" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 185). Heidegger, readily acknowledged that these projections aren't consciously considered, nonetheless, they frame and add meaning and significance to the present conscious experience that one is having. (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 404-405). In relation to past experiences, one's previous experiences of what may have happened when one opens a given door, could also serve to frame and inform one's current experience as one opens a door (Heidegger, 2008, p. 441).

2.5 Summary

This chapter has outlined the four essential elements that distinguish phenomenology as an investigative approach. In addition, it has summarised the salient elements of two of its most influential adherents: Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. The thesis will now turn to addressing the benefits and concerns inherent in adopting a phenomenological research approach.

CHAPTER THREE: ASSESSING PHENOMENOLOGY

3.1 Adopting a Phenomenological Methodology: The Benefits

Phenomenology is, increasingly, finding a home outside of philosophy and within the sphere of qualitative research (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 122; van Manen, 2016a). Van Manen confirms this suggesting that:

> Phenomenological research in psychology, education, nursing, medicine, geriatric care, preventative health care, counselling, pedagogy, and human ecology is increasingly pursued by a breed of scholars who have strong backgrounds in their own disciplines, but who possess perhaps less grounding in philosophical thought. Yet, they are interested in and aiming to 'do' phenomenology (van Manen, 2016a, pp. 22-23).

Zahavi also acknowledges the increasing scope of phenomenological inquiry, "Within the last few decades, phenomenology has also been an important source of inspiration, not only for theoretical debates within qualitative research but also for ongoing research within the cognitive sciences" (Zahavi, 2019a, p. 1). The benefits of adopting a phenomenological approach to research are increasingly being recognised. In this section, a summary of what benefits it provides will be outlined.

It provides the tools to investigate pre-theoretical experiences.

A phenomenological approach acknowledges and equips the researcher with the methodological tools, to investigate humans' pre-theoretical experiences of the world. By focusing primarily (but not exclusively) on these pre-theoretical engagements, a phenomenological approach draws attention to those modes of conscious experience whose existence has been largely neglected within a research context (van Manen, 2007, p. 21). Even within the qualitative research sphere, there has been an emphasis on examining those more cognitive or theoretical modes of conscious experience. (van Manen, 2007, p. 21). Of

course, these theoretical modes of conscious experience can still be examined phenomenologically, yet, it is this pre-theoretical species of conscious experiences that a phenomenological approach provides the researcher with privileged access to.

One of the benefits of a phenomenological approach to qualitative research, therefore, is that it shines a light on and validates the existence of this pre-theoretical mode of experiencing the world that all of us, spend a majority of our time engaged in (Gelven, 1989, p. 34). Van Manen (2007) suggests that many research approaches have a focus on the examination of, "the conceptual, objective, measurable features of something" (van Manen, 2007, p. 21). He provides the example of architectural spaces, where most current research approaches would frame any investigation into "the architectural or physical space, such as a school or church, in terms of its dimensional properties and measures" (van Manen, 2007, p. 21). Such approaches do not provide the researcher with either the language or the grounding assumptions necessary to fully investigate the interesting and rich pre-theoretical felt elements of these experiences.

Van Manen speaks of those highly changeable intuited elements of pre-theoretical experience that the individual brings with him/her to every experience of the world (van Manen, 2007, pp. 21-22). One might, for example experience a room into which one has walked quite differently depending on one's mood or disposition. On a Monday morning a particular room might be experienced with a mixture of weariness and resignation, on a Friday afternoon in contrast, with the promise of an imminent weekend, that same room may be experienced with energy and anticipation. Van Manen suggests that; "such spaces also have their atmospheric, sensual, and felt aspects [which] are not fixed but subject to change like moods of a landscape" (van Manen, 2007, p. 21).

It develops a language that can describe pre-theoretical conscious experiences.

Because pre-theoretical modes of conscious experience have been neglected within a research context, it necessarily follows that the language available to characterise these modes of experience is also impoverished (van Manen, 2007, p. 22). By having a shared framework for phenomenological research, a framework that is now lacking (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 137) phenomenological researchers will have the opportunity to develop a systematic and commonly understood phenomenological research language that better conveys the intricacies of, in particular, pre-theoretical conscious experiences.

Phenomenological researchers may develop a shared language including terms such as *lifeworld* (Husserl, 1970) to characterise the, mostly pre-theoretical, experiencing of the physical world within a given lived context. Also, the shared usage of clearly defined terms such as *ready-to-hand* (Heidegger, 2008)*, present-at-hand* (Heidegger, 2008)*,* and *framing horizon of meaning* (Heidegger, 2008) (see glossary in Appendix C) may be utilised. Such shared language provides the researcher with the means to investigate and effectively communicate many of the more nuanced details of this sphere of pre-theoretical experience.

Within the context of phenomenological research, the more research that is conducted within a mutually understood framework that has shared working assumptions, the clearer and more accessible the phenomenological research language will be. Even if this language, as Zahavi (2019b) suggests is not utilised in precisely the same way is it might be in phenomenological philosophy (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 137).

It can complement quantitative research approaches.

As suggested by Gillett (2009, p. 83) and Tallis (2011, p. 15), in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of human beings, a total reliance on reductionist, quantitative research approaches is not enough**.** Van Manen (2016b) referring to Wilhelm Dilthey (1985), distinguishes between two types of scientific methodological programs: The *natural science*

program and the *human science program* (van Manen, 2016b, pp. 3-4). The approaches for each of these programs, of necessity, differ. Van Manen states:

> At the risk of oversimplification one might say that the difference between natural science and human science resides is in what it studies…natural sciences…study "objects of nature," "things," "natural events", and "the way that objects behave" Natural science approaches are quantitative, they employ "detached observation, controlled experiment, and mathematical or quantitative measurement (van Manen, 2016, p.4).

In contrast, the human sciences, which include phenomenology, study "persons", or "beings" that have "consciousness" and that "act purposefully" in and on the world by creating objects of "meaning" (van Manen, 2016, p. 4). Human science approaches, therefore, need to employ different forms of analysis. Forms of analysis that include, "description, interpretation, and self-reflective or critical analysis" (van Manen, 2016b, p. 4).

To gain a more rounded understanding of humans, the former, natural science approach, with its reliance on quantitative research is indispensable but it is not sufficient. Heidegger makes clear that human beings have a particular and distinctive way of existing, a unique way of, as he terms it, "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 78). Therefore, to understand, in more detail, that entity which is a human being, it is not sufficient to only adopt quantitative research methods. Such methods reduce the scope for the investigation of human beings to the same as the investigation for all other objects in the world. Whilst recognising the value of these quantitative methods, one may, simultaneously understand that the particularities of the human way of existing require adjunct, human science approaches, such as phenomenology. Approaches, that make use of "their own metaphors, models, signifiable events or moments, and their own timescales and relationships" (Gillett, 2009, p. 83).

As van Manen suggests, if a natural science criteria of rigour is imposed upon a human science (i.e., phenomenological) research methodology "the human sciences may seem rather undisciplined" (van Manen, 2016, p. 15), however the criteria applicable to natural science research, simultaneously "define the horizons and pose the limits on what we can study…" (van Manen, 2016, p. 15). In other words, if researchers restrict themselves solely to natural science approaches to research, they are simultaneously blocking off avenues of possible enquiry.

Tallis notes that qualitative, human science approaches such as Heidegger's phenomenology shouldn't be seen to be in opposition to quantitative, natural science approaches (Tallis, 2011, p. 352). Nonetheless, as Tallis, himself a medical scientist argues, a total reliance on forms of data that are accrued through quantitative, natural science approaches leads to a skewed and one-dimensional understanding of what it is to be human (Tallis, 2011, p. 15). As he suggests, one can still be a scientist yet reject "scientism". Scientism being the blinkered acceptance of only those forms of data that meet the criteria of the natural sciences (Tallis, 2011, p. 15).

Descriptions may reverberate with the experiences of the reader.

Phenomenological research involves the reflection upon and then description of (primarily pre-theoretical) conscious experiences. Good descriptions, as van Manen suggests are valuable for their own sake. They have the capacity to "resonate with our [the readers'] sense of lived life" (van Manen, 2016b, p. 27, my square brackets). They can zero in on the intrinsically interesting but often "ignored obviousness" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 103) of experience as it is lived. Done well, phenomenological descriptions offer glimpses of shared types of experience that are, in the busyness of day-to-day life, experienced, glossed over and then moved on from. They draw the gaze of the reader to such experiences and, in doing so, reverberate with their lived experiences (van Manen, 2016a, p. 249).

It is true that phenomenological descriptions are particular. They are unique to the person describing the experience. Yet, lying behind this particularity (perhaps even because of it) they have the capacity to resonate with the particular experiences of the reader (van Manen, 2016c, pp. 6-7). Van Manen uses the metaphor of an icon, to characterise such descriptions. Like the icon, the particular description allows the reader to see *through* the particularities of the experience being described, to something deeper, transcendent and personally relevant to them (van Manen, 2016b, p. 122)

After migrating to Canada from Poland, Eva Hoffman provides the following description of her first experience of the mountainous Canadian terrain, "These peaks and ravines, these mountain streams…hurt my eyes-…. They're too big, too forbidding" (Hoffman, 1989, p. 100). This description is particular to Hoffman's experience. Yet, it points to a more universal type of experience. The particularities of experience had by, for example, a migrant moving to Australia from Russia will be different. Their eyes are less likely to be "hurt" by "peaks and ravines", but the resonance of Hoffman's description, in which the unfamiliar natural environment "hurts one's eyes" might still ring true. Such a description might also, perhaps, reverberate with the individual who, immediately having changed her place of work, finds that the different layout of her new place of work "hurt's her eyes" due to the, still present, ingrained visual attachment she still has to the topography of her previous workplace. Smith, citing Mary Warnock suggests such descriptions, "may take us into the universal because it touches on what it is to be human at its most essential. The specifics are unique, but they are hung on what is shared and communal" (Smith et al., 2012, p. 38).

Indeed, much of the power of phenomenological descriptions such as Hoffman's is that they are "hung on what is shared and communal". Hoffman's description nods to the near universal experience of the aftermath of some form of rupture in one's life (whether it be

geographical or relational) and the perceptual shock that is co-existent with this experiencing of the new landscape.

Descriptions may enrichen the subsequent experiences of the reader.

Good research data is often seen as disseminating new information on a given topic. As Zahavi suggests, it is viewed as adding "to our empirical knowledge" (Zahavi, 2019a, p. 1). According to this view, after having assimilated research data the reader, all going well, will have gained several units of new knowledge which will have safely been "deposited" into the ever expanding "vault" of the mind (Freire, 1996, p. 54). The educational theorist Paulo Freire terms such an understanding of knowledge acquisition as the "banking concept" of knowledge (Freire, 1996, p. 54).

This view of knowledge acquisition reinforces a certain view of the conscious mind, i.e. as a passive entity, waiting to be filled up (Gillett, 2009, p. 141). If one were to accept that all knowledge is gained in such a manner, it would be easy to dismiss the value of phenomenological data. One may, with some cogency, argue that phenomenological data, at best, provides the researcher with the knowledge of someone else's subjective experiences. Knowledge which is of little utility.

If, however, one accepts an alternative (phenomenologically oriented) conception of the conscious mind as an *active entity*, one may appreciate the potential educational value of phenomenological data (Gillett, 2009, p. 189). By bearing witness to the close description of another person's conscious experiences of the world, the reader is presented with the space to reflect upon the nature of their own (often similar) conscious experiences (van Manen, 2016b, pp. 62-63). As a consequence, they are given the opportunity to consider possible ways in which they may actively re-engage or re-attune with the world. Van Manen such a view when he suggests "In bringing to reflective awareness the nature of the events

experienced in our [pre-theoretical] natural attitude, we are able to transform or remake ourselves in the true sense of *Bildung* (education)" (van Manen, 2016b, p. 7).

A number of researchers have commented upon the power of phenomenological data to encourage readers to reflect upon their own lived experiences (van Manen, 2016b; Smith et al., 2012). Phenomenological data, therefore, should not be seen as new, factual information, from which the reader may build up his/her theoretical knowledge base (Zahavi, 2019a, p. 1). Rather, it could be viewed as a potential springboard, providing the reader with the impetus to reflect upon their own personal experiences and, perhaps, as a consequence, re-engage with the world more positively. Van Manen neatly sums up this inversion when he states:

> Some may argue that phenomenology has no practical value because "you cannot do anything with phenomenological knowledge…to paraphrase Heidegger, the more important question is not; Can we do something with phenomenology? Rather we should wonder: Can phenomenology, if we concern ourselves with it, do something with us (van Manen, 2016b, p. 45).

Reflection may enrichen the subsequent experiences of the reflector.

Phenomenological reflection provides the reflector the space to stop and closely examine, describe and therefore discover elements of experience that s/he would, ordinarily, gloss over without pausing (van Manen, 2016b, pp. xiii-xiv).

Phenomenology makes no claims regarding the existence of any form of unconscious mind. Yet, by phenomenologically focusing on previous conscious experiences, the interviewee may still find, throughout the interview process, much that is as revelatory. Heidegger speaks of the importance of the phenomenological method because of, what he considers, the inherent "covered-up-ness" of one's past conscious experiences (Heidegger, 2008, p. 60). The idiosyncratic aspects of conscious experience, addressed by phenomenology, are mostly ignored or "hidden in plain sight" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 60).

Within an everyday context, conscious experiences, when spoken about are mostly done so in a utilitarian manner. Specifics are recalled and the details of these experiences are rarely dwelt upon. Cliched language is often used and, as a consequence, there is a danger of this "covered-up-ness" being further embedded itself within our understanding of that conscious experience (van Manen, 2016b, p. 61). As Heidegger suggests, in such instances; "It gets understood [by the reflector] in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 61, my square brackets).

A phenomenological approach encourages the reflector to stop and grasp the richness and detail of his/her previous conscious experiences. In some instances, the reflector may even reveal to him/herself, elements of those conscious experiences which, although they were present all along, are discovered to be new and revelatory (van Manen, 2016b, pp. 77-78).

All conscious experiences are treated equally.

Phenomenology allows the researcher with a "free pass" to pay equal attention to all forms of conscious experience. Even though there is disagreement about whether or not the *epoche* should be invoked (see chapters 2.3 and 2.4), all phenomenologists agree on rejecting the view that there exists a true world "behind the scenes" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 14) beyond conscious experience. Phenomenology begins and ends from the first-person perspective. Therefore, there is no requirement to transcend the descriptions attained from this first-person perspective in the name of gaining some "archimedian view from nowhere" (Gillett, 2009, p. 350). As a result, even conscious experiences such as hallucinations and dreams, which may, summarily, be dismissed as being false, are entitled the same investigative rigour as "normal" perceptions (Ihde, 1986, pp. 33-34).

A phenomenological approach to research grants one the liberty to examine and describe one's (and others') reports of conscious experiences without the attendant concerns of

having to justify the origins of these conscious experiences and having to determine the veracity of their relationship to the mind independent, external world, "for now" as Solomon states, "we are in a position to appreciate it [consciousness] in full without the distorting judgements about the reality or the importance of things" (Solomon, 1988, p. 136).

Such freedom is, as Gillett (2009) makes clear, of value in instances when ordinarily the researcher might intuitively pathologize a conscious experience. By adopting a phenomenological approach, one is, for example, permitted to describe an hallucination. One can, unashamedly and without distraction, explore the logic and structure of these "false" perceptual experiences. Indeed, as Gillett suggests (2009), if one does adopt a phenomenological approach one may, gain fruitful rewards. He states that there can be, if one has the investigative will, a purely phenomenological distinction that may be made between objects of consciousness when presented within different types of conscious experience "A common theme in phenomenological analyses of conscious experience is the phenomenological difference between imagination, perception and memory. The differences radically alter the gestalt of a conscious event such that a normal thinker does not mix them up" (Gillett, 2009, p. 124).

As a happy bi-product of the equal value attributed to the objects of all conscious experiences, the researcher is permitted a non-judgmental stance when adopting the phenomenological approach. S/he is granted the luxury of simply reflecting upon their own (or an interviewee's) description of a conscious experience without being forced, either directly or indirectly, into a position whereby s/he must make a judgment regarding the truth value of that description.

Conscious experiences are active rather than passive.

For all phenomenologists, conscious experiences are understood to be active and intentional. The individual, according to this model, does not, as is the case in the

philosophical-empiricist model of the mind, passively receive his/her experiences (Gillett, 2009, p. 141). By adopting a phenomenological approach, the researcher is working within a framework of understanding that acknowledges what many people already intuitively know, i.e. objects present to consciousness are never simply "revealed".

A phenomenological approach to research implicitly recognises that within every intentional conscious experience there is a "mood" giving element giving "color to the immediate context" (Ihde, 1986, p. 43). Phenomenology recognises that human beings do not passively or neutrally experience the world, they are always engaging with it with some or other interpretive attitude.

A phenomenological approach to research, therefore, provides the researcher with the means to acknowledge and systematically investigate the different ways in which objects of consciousness may be imbued with meaning. To give an illustrative example. Within a school context, on a given day a particular classroom door may be experienced by a student with an attendant sense of dread due to a humiliating experience she was subjected to in the previous lesson. The following week, due to subsequent more positive dealings within the classroom, that door may be imbued with another, far more positive meaning.

Many people have, quite likely, reflected upon the fact that how they perceive the world depends, to a large degree, on what kind of mood they are in. A phenomenological approach to research allows the investigator to take this intuition seriously. In recognising this strength of phenomenology one, at the same time, is obliged to recognise the limitations of only using positivistic investigative methods (Tallis, 2011). Such methods purport to transcend the first-person perspective in order to investigate a consciousness-independent objective reality. Such methods, when used in isolation, will always provide an impoverished and incomplete picture of the world as it is experienced by humans, due to their inability to

capture the myriad ways in which consciousness actively imbues objects of consciousness with meaning (Tallis, 2011, pp. 11-15).

3.2 Adopting a Phenomenological Methodology: The Concerns

Zahavi suggests that phenomenology has been enjoying something of a renaissance over the past few decades (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 2). It is also true, however, that, in the latter decades of the twentieth century, phenomenology fell from favour within philosophical circles (Solomon, 1988, pp. 194-196). Among the reasons behind this, are a range of concerns related to perceived flaws within the phenomenological method as well as assumptions held by phenomenologists, that are considered questionable (Steiner, 1996, p. 181).

In this section a number of these concerns will be addressed. Several relate to the problems concerning phenomenology as a methodology. The others, to the problems concerning the application of phenomenology within a qualitative research context. Where appropriate, responses to these concerns have been provided.

A phenomenological approach cannot be applied in a qualitative research context.

The suitability of applying phenomenology, a philosophically derived method into a non-philosophical, qualitative research context may appear questionable. It is evident that the primary aims of phenomenological philosophy are quite different to the aims of phenomenological research (Zahavi, 2019, p. 900).

Phenomenological philosophy, for example, appears to have more general aspirations. Husserl in *Ideas* (2012) was focused on developing a method for philosophers to uncover essential elements of *all* conscious experience (Solomon, 1988, pp. 130-131). Heidegger, similarly, had a general focus in *Being and Time* (2008) seeking the development of an exposition of the essential ways in which *all* humans experience the world (Gelven, 1992, p.

43). Contrastingly, the phenomenological researcher is interested in deriving data, primarily, within a more closely circumscribed context.

As a consequence, it might be argued that phenomenology as an investigative approach is appropriate only in seeking out general essential structures (as intended by its early philosophical practitioners such as Husserl and Heidegger). It may be suggested that it is an inappropriate fit for application in more specialised, non-philosophical research contexts.

Response to concern.

Zahavi, acknowledges this concern (2019b, pp. 137-138) yet suggests that there is no reason why phenomenology, if appropriately utilised cannot be adopted within specific research contexts (p. 137). Indeed, Zahavi points out that even within the realm of philosophy, its markedly different applications suggest that one of phenomenology's most appealing features is its versatility (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 103**).**

What is clear, however, is that if phenomenology is going to be utilised within a qualitative research context, one should not simply adopt fully, and without question, all of the elements of one or other of its philosophical practitioners (Zahavi, 2019c, p. 905**).** This is due to the likelihood of many of those elements and assumptions being tailored to the specific aim of that philosopher. If a researcher is to adopt phenomenology within a research context it is incumbent on that researcher to outline clearly:

1. Which philosophical-phenomenological elements and assumptions are implicit within their chosen phenomenological research methodology.
2. A justification of why these elements and assumptions have been incorporated into their research methodology.
3. An outline of how those elements and assumptions have been be incorporated into the chosen phenomenological research methodology.

So, in response to this concern, it is suggested that phenomenology can be adapted

successfully within a qualitative research context. Yet, that does not mean that the elements adopted by one or other philosophical phenomenologist can simply be taken "off the hook" and applied successfully within this new context. As Zahavi (2019b, 2019c) suggests, a degree of flexibility and pragmatism is required in the construction of a phenomenological research methodology (2019b, p. 137). In developing an effective phenomenological research methodology it is necessary to search out elements contained within the work of *different* philosophical phenomenologists with an eye on gauging how effective these elements may work within a different investigative context.

The terminology of phenomenology can be impenetrable.

The terminology adopted by phenomenological philosophers can be difficult to grasp (Ihde, 1986, p. 16). It may, therefore, be the case that a prospective phenomenological researcher wants to acknowledge specific elements and assumptions of a given philosophical phenomenologist, yet cannot get beyond the often dense terminology.

Response to concern

The clear explanation and, where necessary, simplification of key terminology is an important part of the process of adapting phenomenological philosophy into a phenomenological research context (Zahavi, 2019c, p. 905). Those who are developing a phenomenological research methodology should ensure that every effort is made to explain any terminology that is potentially ambiguous. They should also adopt language that avoids unnecessary jargon and is able to be grasped by interested non specialists who are willing to engage with the explicated terminology (Ihde, 1986, pp. 17-20).

It may be that the case that such clarifying explanations and/or simplifications result in less precision in relation to some fine-grained philosophical concepts. Yet, they are justified because:

1. Within the context of phenomenological research, the degree of precision required when using these elements and assumptions is unlikely to need to be as finely grained as that required within a philosophical context. (Zahavi, 2019c, p. 905)
2. Simply repeating the terminology of some or other philosopher, within the context of phenomenological research may confuse and alienate the prospective phenomenological researcher (Ihde, 1986, p. 20)
3. Different philosophers often use identical terms but use them with a different implied meaning. (See Merleau-Ponty's exposition of all of the different ways in which "phenomenology" has been understood, (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. xx-xxi).
4. By translating the terminology of the phenomenological philosopher into simpler, (yet still accurate) language, ensures that those developing the research methodology *themselves* have a good understanding of the elements and assumptions that they have incorporated.

Ideally the setting out of the central elements implicit within a phenomenological research methodology should serve as a stepping-stone, for the prospective phenomenological researcher. Over time, as more research is conducted, the more experienced researcher's understanding of those elements will become more finely tuned. They then, should be able to approach the original texts, within which these elements are contained, with a greater degree of confidence and understanding**.**

Existing phenomenological research methodologies misrepresent phenomenology.

Zahavi (2019a, 2019b, 2019c) questions the manner in which several established phenomenological research methodologies, in particular those put forward by van Manen and Smith have synthesised philosophical phenomenological elements. He states, "I think van Manen and Smith are both to blame for promoting various confusions concerning the nature of phenomenology" (Zahavi, 2019c, p. 900).

Additionally, in recent exchanges van Manen (2017) and Giorgi (2010, 2011) have also questioned the legitimacy of Smith's phenomenological methodology. With Giorgi even questioning whether Smith's *Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis* even warrants the label "phenomenological" (Giorgi, 2010, p. 6).

In light of such concerns, Zahavi reaffirms the importance of phenomenological research methodologies maintaining a direct link with philosophical phenomenology. (Zahavi, 2019a, p. 2).

Response to concern.

In order for a phenomenological research methodology to be phenomenological, as suggested by both van Manen (2017, p. 775) and Giorgi (2010, p. 3) it must maintain a clear and lucid link to philosophical phenomenology. The fact that there exists question marks regarding the phenomenological credentials of several high profile research methodologies that bear the name, reinforces the importance, of developing a research methodology that:

1. Makes explicit the elements that it draws on from philosophical phenomenology.
2. Effectively translates those elements. This ensures that the developer of the methodology provides evidence of his/her own understanding of these elements. It also ensures that it is accessible for any prospective researcher who may wish to adopt it.

Phenomenological research relies on descriptions provided by interviewees with no grounding in phenomenology.

The capacity to provide good phenomenological descriptions is, according to Ihde, akin to a craft. In order to do it well, he suggests, it needs to be practised over a long period of time (Ihde, 1986, p. 13). This raises a concern for the phenomenological researcher in relation to the conducting of interviews. It is one thing for a professional phenomenological

philosopher or trained phenomenological researcher to provide rich phenomenological descriptions derived from their own reflections, but, quite another to expect them from untrained interviewees.

Response to concern.

It is evident that, within the context of phenomenological research, some form of allowance must be made for the lack of phenomenological grounding of the interviewees.

There are three types of responses to this concern offered within the literature. Firstly Giorgi (2009) suggests that the researcher allows the interviewee to continue when detailing relevant elements and to steer interviewees back only when detailing irrelevant components of their experience (Giorgi, 2009, p. 122). Secondly, the researcher may provide "training" in an introductory interview (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 136). Thirdly, there exists the possibility of organising the interview process in accordance with a semi-structured question template that leads the interviewees towards responses that are more likely to be phenomenological (See Zahavi, 2019b, p. 136).

Phenomenology perpetuates a form of idealism.

There have been charges of idealism directed towards, in particular, Husserlian phenomenology (Iosifides, 2011, p. 103). Idealism, in this context amounts to either a denial or scepticism of the existence of a mind-independent physical world. Iosifides, characterises this objection when he, citing Craib suggests that "phenomenology conflates perceptions of reality with reality itself, there is nothing left to be studied, discovered or explained beyond agents' perception" (p. 102). He continues, "Thus, according to this premise the real world resides not outside but inside human consciousness" (p. 102).

According to this objection the findings arrived at through the use of phenomenology are problematic due to the approach's underlying denial of the mind-independent, physical world.

Response to concern.

In relation to this charge, phenomenology (as exemplified by both Husserl and Heidegger) can be defended.

It is true that Husserl in *Ideas* enacts the bracketing off of questions related to the mind-independent physical world, implicit in the epoche. Yet, Husserl isn't making a claim as to whether the mind-independent physical world exists or not. Rather, he is attempting to clarify and define the scope of his investigation. He states as such, "emphatically that this attempt to doubt everything should serve us only as a device of method, helping us to stress certain points" (Husserl, 2012, p. 57). The imposition of the epoche, therefore, can best be viewed as a kind of methodological tool allowing the investigator to sweep aside any potentially distracting questions which might stand in the way of one's description of conscious experience.

In the case of Heideggerian phenomenology, it is even more evident that any charge of idealism cannot be levelled. Heidegger's insistence that the conscious, experiencing human being is always and fundamentally embedded within the physical world precludes the possibility of any scepticism of the existence of any external world (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 91-95; Gelven, 1992, p. 60).

Phenomenological descriptions cannot be externally verified.

Phenomenology, with its reliance upon reflection from the first-person perspective, precludes the possibility of external verification. An independent observer, in other words, cannot check out whether or not an individual's conscious experience was as they described it (Iosifides, 2011, pp. 102-103). This objection suggests that any credible investigation of conscious experience should adhere to the principles of verification demanded in the natural sciences. Phenomenological descriptions don't adhere to these principles. The objection therefore concludes, phenomenological data lacks the rigor of data harvested within a natural science context.

Response to concern.

It is true, that phenomenological descriptions of one's own past conscious experiences cannot be externally verified. Yet, to engage in research relating to conscious human experience using exclusively quantitative research methods would mean that something fundamental about conscious human experience has been left out (Tallis, 2011, p. 15). As Zahavi suggests, if the question "what is conscious human experience?" is reduced to a question that can only "be understood by physics, chemistry, neurophysiology etc" (approaches that adopt quantifiable, externally verifiable approaches) it is evident that something significant within that question is being lost (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 48). Indeed, Zahavi summarises three such approaches that seek to undermine the rigor of data gained through phenomenological means. Reductionism, which explains conscious experience in terms of neurophysiology, Eliminativism, which rejects the existence of conscious experience, or Scientific Naturalism which suggests the only type of knowledge is "objective knowledge gained by natural scientific means" (Zahavi, 2019b, pp. 48-51).

Frank Jackson's "Mary's Room" (Jackson, 1982) example demonstrates how, even the most detailed description of all the externally verifiable physical processes that underlie a given conscious experience will never fully capture everything that there is to know about that conscious experience (Jackson, 1982). Such a description, Jackson argues, will always suffer from an "explanatory gap", a failure to account for the real, but necessarily subjective elements of that conscious experience (Jackson, 1982).

It is therefore helpful (as was made clear in 3.1) to see a phenomenological approach as belonging to the human sciences, which stands alongside, and is complementary to natural scientific approaches. Phenomenology should not therefore, be seen as offering a competing scientific explanation of human beings but rather as an approach that is geared towards the

examination of the human world of experience which "has its own criteria of validity and truth and does not have to await the approval of science" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 52).

Such an understanding of the value of a phenomenological approach alongside quantitative approaches to understanding consciousness and the mind can be seen coming from those such as Gillet (2009) and Tallis (2011) who in their respective roles within medical science, are both steeped in an understanding of the physiological processes underlying conscious experiences. Yet, in spite of, perhaps even because of, the roles they have, both understand the limitations of an exclusive reliance upon externally verifiable, quantitative methods of investigating the conscious mind.

In Heideggerian phenomenology, the act of reflection is interpretive rather than descriptive.

The phenomenological method purports to give an account of the essential structures of conscious human experience. What complicates this, within the context of Heideggerian phenomenology, is that the act of reflection is understood to be interpretive (Heidegger, 2008, p. 61) rather than descriptive. Gelven notes:

> The difficulty is that many phenomenologists argue that Heidegger's 'hermeneutic [interpretive] phenomenology' is a contradiction in terms. They maintain, and with a certain amount of cogency, that in the tradition of Edmund Husserl-the father of modern phenomenology-the whole purpose of this method is to achieve a vision of consciousness untainted by 'systems' or interpretations (Gelven, p. 38, 1989, square brackets mine).

This leaves the prospective phenomenological researcher, who accepts Heidegger's premise in a bind. Gelven expresses this tension when he states:

> Heidegger and other hermeneutic thinkers want to be true to both terms of their descriptive methodology: to let the facts speak for themselves; and at the same time to claim that there are no such things as uninterpreted facts (Gelven, 1992, p. 38).

Response to concern.

This objection appears to condemn the Heideggerian phenomenological approach. Thus, leaving Husserl's phenomenological approach, which suggests that the reflective act must be purely descriptive (Husserl, 2012) as the only viable alternative for the phenomenological researcher.

However, it can be suggested that Heidegger's interpretive premise provides the phenomenological researcher with a more realistic starting point. If one accepts, in agreement with Heidegger, that in the act of reflection (like in all conscious experiences) one is, of necessity, actively engaged with that conscious experience, one accepts that one can never fully, step back and take a purely objective, dispassionate stance on that previous experience.

Furthermore, if the prospective phenomenological researcher accepts this interpretive premise, it ensures that the researcher is always kept mindful of the, often subtle, ways in which any pre-existing assumptions maybe being played out (van Manen, 2019b, pp. 180-181). By being aware of the interpretive elements within the reflective process, the phenomenological researcher is more likely to be in a position to explicate them and see them for what they are (van Manen, 2019b).

So, rather than simply accepting, as Husserl (2012) appears to, that in the act of phenomenological reflection, one is capable of dispassionately describing previous conscious experiences, one ought to accept the Heideggerian premise (2008) that the reflective act is always and, of necessity, interpretive. In saying this, the phenomenological researcher should *strive* towards the ideal of description. However, in agreement with van Manen (2019b) in order to get as close as possible to achieving this stance, it will require a constant awareness of the manner in which pre-existing assumptions may stand in the way as well as a method of explicating these pre-existing assumptions**.**

In phenomenology there is the assumption that there exists a pure sphere of consciousness.

There appears, in particular within Husserl's phenomenology as expressed in *Ideas* (2012), to be the assumption that there exists a pure realm of consciousness. A sphere understood to be independent of the relativising impact of language, social convention and historical context (Solomon, 1988, pp. 130-131). There also appears to be the assumption that, through a close phenomenological description, the universal elements of this realm of consciousness, true of all people, at all times, may be accurately conveyed (Solomon, 1988).

In opposition, it has been suggested that there exists no such sphere. According to this objection, consciousness is heavily influenced by social or linguistic structures that are relative and external to the experiencing subject (Solomon, 1988, pp. 194-195). Van Manen summarises this objection when he states:

> Under the influence of post-modernism, deconstructionism, and other language-oriented human science approaches, the epistemology of experience and perception has been moved over somewhat to make space for an epistemology of language and text…the main thrust of this shift of epistemologies is the realization that lived experience is soaked through with language (van Manen, 2016b, p. 38).

Due to consciousness being "soaked through" (or at least influenced) by these external, impersonal structures, the objection continues, that there should be a decreased focus on avenues of investigation, such as phenomenology, which adopt the "unreliable" first person perspective. Instead, there should be a renewed focus on investigating those linguistic or cultural structures that influence that first person-perspective.

Response to concern.

The acceptance of the premise that there exists no "pure" sphere of consciousness need not necessitate the rejection of a phenomenological investigative approach. Indeed, the later Husserl in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Husserl, 1970) rejected his earlier view (expressed in *Ideas)* that consciousness is

"transhistorical". He accepted that consciousness is always embedded in, and operating within, a world of influencing structures that are socially and historically relative (Husserl, 1970, pp. 138-139).

Subsequent phenomenologists have accepted the later Husserl's socially and historically permeated understanding of consciousness. Alfred Schutz in *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1972), for example, acknowledges the "sedimentation" of social and cultural elements into conscious experience yet does not let this acknowledgement undermine his belief in the value of a phenomenological approach (Schutz, 1972, pp. 78-80). He argues that people within a given social group are likely to share common "sedimented" elements in their conscious experiences of the world (Schutz, 1972, pp. 142-143). These elements are "inter-subjective", they are shared by members of a given social group due to their shared inheritance of these social and cultural traditions (Schutz, 1972, pp. 142-143).

Schutz (1972) and the later Husserl (1970) suggest that the phenomenological method may be applied to describe the essential ways in which members of a given social group experience the world within a given context or *lifeworld* **(**Husserl, 1970, p. 139; Schutz, 1972). The phenomenologist, as a consequence, is still valuable insofar as s/he is able to unpack the ways in which the influence of that social world "reveals and manifests itself in [those] intentional experiences" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 106).

Berger et al., (1966) share Schutz' contention that consciousness is "sedimented" by external, historically relative structures. (Berger et al., pp. 67-72) Their focus, however, is on language; "language becomes the depository of a large aggregate of collective sedimentations" (Berger et al., 1966, p. 69).

For the prospective phenomenological researcher, therefore, it is possible to accept that consciousness is permeated by contingent features such as cultural tradition and language, yet still accept that phenomenology remains a viable investigative approach. By

accepting that different members of a given social group are likely to share certain modes of experiencing the world (due to the identical sedimentation that takes place within that social context) the phenomenologist, through the close description of those conscious experiences, is in a privileged position to also describe the nature of consciousness within that particular social context, or lifeworld**.**

So, although it may be the case that human conscious experience is influenced by cultural traditions and language (although it is suggested that there is no imperative for the prospective phenomenological researcher to delve too deeply into this debate) this acceptance, as Zahavi suggests, should not lead to "the facile dismissal of the subject of experience in favour of a focus on sign systems, language games, discourses etc" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 141). The prospective phenomenological researcher need not accept that there is a pure realm if consciousness, rather, they can openly accept the premise that different social groups are likely to share essential structures of experience common to those groups.

It aims at deriving essential structures true of all conscious experience.

Phenomenology, as expressed in Husserl's *Ideas* (2012) and Heidegger's *Being and Time* (2008) appears to seek out essential structures of conscious experience. At first glance it appears that phenomenology is making the grand claim that, on the basis of one's own or a small number of interviewees', descriptions it is possible to arrive at essential structures of *all* people's conscious experience.

Solomon states as much when he suggests that the aim of Husserl's phenomenological method was to provide one with the "opportunity to see clearly and without doubts the essential structures of not only one's own consciousness but of every possible consciousness*"* (Solomon, 1988, p. 136). Gelven makes a similar point with reference to Heidegger when he suggests "It is obvious that Heidegger thinks [in Being and Time] he is describing what

universally belongs to every Dasein [experiencing human being], and certainly not that which belongs merely to Heidegger's" (Gelven, p. 4, 1989, my square brackets).

Gelven expresses some dis-ease when he remarks, "A very serious question may well be asked at this point:…is such a [phenomenological] procedure philosophically significant? Does it not remain always at best a kind of autobiography?" (Gelven, 1989, p. 42). This dis-ease is more fully expressed as an objection by Iosifides when he states:

> It is extremely difficult to comprehend the practical utility of phenomenological data given the overall premises of the paradigm…. phenomenological research findings are nothing more than subjective…. meanings attached to researchers' lived research experience. Therefore, we are left with no criteria for judging between different or contradictory findings of other phenomenological research teams (Iosifides, 2011 p. 103).

What, the critic might ask, gives the phenomenologist or the phenomenological researcher the right to generalise essential elements of conscious experience on the basis of *their own* descriptions of conscious experiences? As Steiner remarks:

> This incapacity to develop a persuasive model for the sharing of an intuitive consciousness of reality between individuals gravely flaws the whole phenomenological faith…Has it, ask even its sympathetic critics, escaped from solipsism from a narrative of the isolated ego (Steiner, 1996, p. 181).

Response to concern.

There are several responses to this objection.

Firstly, one might simply reject the objection and argue that, yes, there exist clearly defined essential structures true of all conscious experience, waiting to be unveiled by the phenomenologist or phenomenological researcher. Such a response, as inferred by Husserl in *Ideas* (2012), is unrealistic. There is such a range and scope of types of conscious experiences

that it would be presumptuous to claim that a single person (no matter how phenomenologically astute) is capable of reflecting upon their own conscious experience in order to arrive at what is essential of others' conscious experience regardless of gender, ethnicity or period in history (Solomon, 1988, pp. 194-197).

Secondly, one might reject that phenomenology aims for any form of essentialism at all. One might accept, as Hoffman appears to, that "There are shapes of sensibility incommensurate with each other, topographies of experience one cannot guess within one's own limited experience" (Hoffman, 1989, p. 205). In doing so, however, one is undermining one of the central tenets of phenomenology as spelt out by its leading practitioners; Husserl (1970, 2012), Heidegger (2008) and Merleau-Ponty (2012). By accepting this view, all one is left with are descriptions true only of those experiences themselves. Such descriptions, as Iosifides suggests, appear to be of little more than personal and subjective interest (Iosifides, 2011, p. 103).

Thirdly, as will be done within the context of the proposed research methodology, modify the framework within which one is attempting to derive essences structures. One might initially accept that the phenomenological investigator is not justified in deriving essential structures on the basis of his/her reflections alone. In order to infer more general structures of experience, the researcher is required to investigate the reported lived experiences of others. One might also accept (as suggested in 3.2) that there are no essential structures true of all people's conscious experience. One might have to acknowledge as was done by Schutz (1972) and the later Husserl (1970) that consciousness is historically and culturally framed.

The phenomenological researcher might, therefore, aim for deriving certain essential structures of experience within the members of a given social group that share a given

contextual lifeworld (due to members of that group sharing similar "sedimented" historical and cultural features).

By reducing the scope of investigation to a particular lived context or *lifeworld* within which individual members are likely to share horizons of meaning and modes of experiencing the world say, "new teachers", or "recent migrants", the phenomenological investigator is more likely to be in a position to derive elements essential to those lived contexts.

It is also necessary, as suggested by both Zahavi (2019b) and Giorgi (2009), to clarify what is meant by "essentialism"**.** Zahavi, distinguishes between forms of essence and suggests that, unlike "in pure mathematics and other exact sciences" (Zahavi, 2019b, p.46), phenomenological essences will always be characterised by "an essential vagueness" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 46), or "certain provisionality" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 45). Both Zahavi (2019b) and Giorgi (2009, p. 78), label the kinds of essences derived within a phenomenological context as being "morphological". (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 46). As a consequence of accepting this interpretation of an essence, there is the implicit acknowledgement that the kinds of essences arrived at are likely to be broader and less clearly defined than within mathematical or exact science research contexts.

This acknowledgement that phenomenological research aims at deriving essential structures of some kind rescues the whole enterprise from an easy relativism**.** Van Manen suggests that many involved in qualitative research may baulk at making such acknowledgements. He points to the, almost instinctive rejection of the possibility that there might exist essential aspects of human experience. He states:

> Do things have essences? For example is it correct to speak of the essence of humanness…This is an important question because "essence" and "essentialism" have become the ugly words of qualitative research, especially amongst poststructuralists.

> But why? What is wrong with the notion of essence? It would seem that the danger of the concept of essence lies primarily in the moral significance that is attached to it (van Manen, 2016b, p. xiv).

In response to this objection and, in keeping with the assumptions held by Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological researcher need not give up on the search for essential structures of human experience. By reducing the framework of investigation to context based lifeworlds and clarifying what is meant by "essence", the phenomenological researcher is able to stay true to the discipline's central tenet of deriving essential structures of human experience.

3.3 Summary

This chapter has set out the strengths and concerns inherent in the adoption of a phenomenological research approach. The focus of the thesis will now shift to providing an exposition of three of the most influential phenomenological research methodologies.

CHAPTER FOUR: PHENOMENOLOGY AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

4.1 Three Methodologies: An Overview

Three of the most popular, avowedly phenomenological research methodologies are those of Amedeo Giorgi, Max van Manen and Jonathan Smith (Zahavi, 2019b, pp. 122-123). Each methodology is self-declaredly phenomenological yet, in possession its own set of distinctive features (Zahavi, 2019b, pp. 122-123). In the following section a brief summary of the salient elements of each of the three phenomenological research methodologies will be set out.

4.1.1 Amedeo Giorgi's descriptive phenomenological method

Giorgi's *descriptive phenomenological method* is directly linked to the founder of the philosophical-phenomenological tradition, Edmund Husserl (1970, 1993, 2012). Indeed, it is reasonable to suggest that Giorgi's method is exclusively indebted to Husserl rather than Heidegger as there are no references to Heidegger in *The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology* (2009). Giorgi espouses Husserl's framework as offering the twin benefits of providing a sole focus on conscious experience while, simultaneously respecting the "spirit of science" (Giorgi, 2012, p. 4).

The overarching aim of the descriptive phenomenological research methodology is the elaboration of essential structures of human conscious experience within a given context (Giorgi, 2009, p. 111). The prospective researcher is able to apply the methodology set out by Giorgi within a clearly circumscribed lived context of their choosing (p. 115) and is achieved through the interviewing of a number of subjects (Giorgi, 2012, pp. 5-6).

Remaining true to his adoption of Husserlian phenomenology, Giorgi (2009) invokes the epoche (2009, p. 91). In principle, this move allows the contents of experience to be described, within a research context, while eliminating any possible distractions concerning the ontological status of the physical objects described or the nature of any causal role they

may have in one's conscious experience of them. As Giorgi states, "First of all… she [the researcher] must resist from positing as existing whatever object or state of affairs is present to her" (Giorgi, 2012, p. 4, my square brackets). Giorgi (2009, 2010, 2012), repeatedly makes clear that this "bracketing off" is a necessary element of the research process.

Giorgi also demands that the act of phenomenological reflection directed towards those previous experiential states is descriptive. By this, Giorgi means that, unlike interpretive reflection, "there is an acknowledgement that there is a 'given' [the raw material of the conscious experience] that needs to be described precisely as it appears and nothing is to be added or subtracted from it" (Giorgi, 2012, p. 6, my square brackets). The descriptive nature of phenomenological reflection, for Giorgi, stands in contrast to the interpretive nature of straightforward or "everyday reflection" which is "lived through but not noticed" (p. 6**).** The value of descriptive phenomenological reflection, therefore, lies in its capacity to firstly "detect the meaning-conferring or interpretive act [of a previous conscious experience]" and then, "once it is detected it can be described" (p. 6, my square brackets).

In keeping with his view that phenomenological research ought to be considered a science (p. 4), Giorgi suggests that the goal of the descriptive phenomenological methodology is to infer contextually circumscribed essential structures of conscious human experience. Giorgi, unlike the early Husserl (2012) appears sceptical of the existence of transcendental essential structures true of all human conscious experience and suggests that the researcher should aim for essential structures in "context-similar situations" (Giorgi, 2009, p. 111). He, nonetheless, does not go further in explaining what is meant by this. Therefore, in Giorgi's view, if phenomenological reflection is conducted appropriately, there exists the possibility of the researcher arriving at and writing down, those contextually determined essential structures of human conscious experience (Giorgi, 2012, p. 10).

For Giorgi, the types of conscious experience that are the object of phenomenological reflection appear not to be exclusively pre-reflective. Giorgi's inclusive approach is reinforced when he suggests simply that what is sought in an interview is "as complete a possible description of the experience that a participant has lived through" (Giorgi, 2009, p. 122). By inference, reflective lived experiences may therefore be investigated**.**

Within the context of Giorgi's research methodology, the process of data analysis after transcription, involves an initial reading of the experiential descriptions of the interviewees "as a whole" (Giorgi, 2012, p. 5). Following this, translations into "expressions that are more directly revelatory of the psychological import of what the subject said" (p. 5) take place. Finally, the "essential structures may then be derived" (p. 5).

To ensure that the interviewee is describing his/her previous conscious experiences in sufficient detail and not engaging in unnecessary theorising (which is in contradiction to the phenomenological enterprise), according to Giorgi, the interviewer should simply guide the interviewee back to a focus on description (Giorgi, 2009, p. 121).

4.1.2 Max van Manen's hermeneutic method

In agreement with Giorgi (2009), van Manen's *hermeneutic method* makes explicit the importance of the researcher's familiarity with the philosophical phenomenological tradition (van Manen, 2016b, p. 7). Yet, van Manen (2016b, p. 7) also makes clear that in order to conduct phenomenological research, the researcher need not possess the level of knowledge of the tradition that one would need should one be a professional philosopher. Indeed, he cites the danger "for the non-philosophical researcher to drown in such expansive philosophical literature" (2016a, p. 74).

Van Manen's methodology draws on the work of a wider corpus of phenomenological philosophers than Giorgi's. There are three phenomenological philosophers whom van Manen appears draws on most extensively. Alongside Edmund Husserl he appears to derive

much from the writings of Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Evidence of the extent of these three phenomenologists' influence can be seen when one considers that in both of van Manen's major books: *Researching Lived Experience* (2016b) and *Phenomenology of Practice* (2016a), these three thinkers occasion far more references than any other phenomenologists. (2016a, pp. 404-405; 2016b pp. 198-200).

The fact that van Manen is more eclectic in his phenomenological references is by design. He suggests that the employment of a "variety of philosophers and human science scholars" allows a phenomenology of practice not to "get trapped in dogma and over-simplifying schemas" (van Manen, 2016a, pp. 15-16).

Like Giorgi, van Manen makes repeated reference to the *epoche.* In fact, in *Phenomenology of Practice* (2016a)*,* he makes mention of more than one type: the *epoche-reduction* (2016a, p. 222) and the *heuristic epoche-reduction* (2016a, p. 223). By way of justification, he asserts: "it [phenomenology] requires that we understand the various aspects and practices of the epoche and the reduction proper" (2016a, p. 32, my square brackets).

Within the context of van Manen's research program, the act of phenomenological reflection is, and must necessarily be interpretive (2016b, pp. 180-181). Yet, van Manen also appears to suggest that phenomenological reflection should strive towards description. He remarks, "To avoid awkward phrases, throughout this text, the term phenomenology should usually be taken as hermeneutic or interpretive-descriptive phenomenology" (2016a, p. 26). Van Manen explicitly distances himself from Giorgi's perspective when he comments:

> strict followers of Husserl's transcendental method would insist that phenomenological research is pure description and that interpretation (hermeneutics) falls outside the bounds of phenomenological research. Some human scientists who follow this strict program of Husserl (e.g., Amedeo Giorgi, 1985) maintain that the object of phenomenological description is fully achieved 'solely' through a direct

> grasp (intuiting) of the essential structure of phenomena as they appear in consciousness (van Manen, 2016b, p. 26).

Within van Manen's hermeneutic method, phenomenological reflection has, as its sole object pre-reflective lived experiences. He insists that "phenomenology is the study of the lifeworld-the world as we immediately experience it pre-reflectively rather than as we conceptualize, categorize, or reflect upon it" (van Manen, 2016b, p. 9). This is in contrast to Giorgi (2009), who appears to allow the reflective phenomenological gaze to be directed towards reflective *as well as* pre-reflective experiences. As Zahavi makes clear, "he [van Manen] repeatedly insists that the task of phenomenology is to describe how we experience the world pre-reflectively, prior to any classification and taxonomization" (van Manen, 2016a, p. 30; Zahavi, 2019b, p. 125, my square brackets).

On the basis of phenomenological research, on one level, van Manen appears to hold that one is not entitled to derive essential aspects of all conscious experience. He declares, "Phenomenology does not allow for empirical generalizations…. The only generalization allowed by phenomenology is this: Never generalize! Generalizations about human experiences are almost always of troublesome value" (van Manen, 2016b, p. 22). Yet, as Zahavi points out, there does appear to be a generalising tendency within van Manen's writings:

> Sometimes van Manen emphasizes the extent to which phenomenology is a philosophy of the unique, of that which is not replaceable (van Manen, 2016b, p. 7) But he also says that phenomenology goes beyond an interest in mere particularity, and that it should aim to capture the essential aspects of lived experience (van Manen, 2016b, p. 62; Zahavi, 2019b, pp. 123-124).

Indeed, such ambivalence on the issue of whether or not one may generalise on the basis of particular descriptions is reinforced when van Manen declares them to be "neither

mere particularity, nor sheer universality" (2016b, p. 23) and when he states that: "a good phenomenological description is something that we can nod to, recognizing it as an experience that we have had or could have had*"* (2016b, p. 27). So, ostensibly, van Manen resists the call for the researcher to search out essential structures within lived experience yet seems open to the possibility of the phenomenological researcher tentatively deriving essential "meaning structures" (2016b, p. 41).

The suggestions that van Manen offers the prospective researcher are, by design, general. There isn't, for example, within either of his major works, *Researching Lived Experience* (2016b) or *Phenomenology of Practice* (2016b), a specification as to how many interviewees the prospective researcher should conduct his/her interviews with. Neither does there appear an ideal number of interviews that the researcher should conduct with the interviewees.

Van Manen does, however, provide guidance as to how, the prospective researcher can best, draw out, valuable phenomenological material from interviewees. He elaborates and justifies a style of questioning, capable of encouraging the interviewee to keep his/her descriptions concrete and experiential (2016a, pp. 298-299). He also, provides guidance for the prospective researcher in effectively preparing interviews (2016a, pp. 314-315).

4.1.3 Jonathan Smith's Interpretive phenomenological analysis

There are few clear and definitive links made between Smith's research methodology; *Interpretive phenomenological analysis* (IPA*),* and the phenomenological philosophical tradition. Unlike Giorgi (2009), and in parallel with van Manen (2016a, 2016b), however, Smith does mention a range of philosophical phenomenologists. At the beginning of *Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis,* he refers to the work of four major phenomenological philosophers: Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-

Ponty, and Jean-Paul Sartre. (Smith et al., 2012, pp. 12-21) and makes clear his "pluralist" approach (p. 12) sets him apart from Giorgi. He states:

> A significant difference between IPA and Giorgi's approach is that Giorgi is attempting as close a translation as possible of Husserl's phenomenological method, while as indicated elsewhere, IPA draws from the wider corpus of phenomenology and is not attempting to operationalize a specific version of it" (2012, p. 200).

While Smith refers to a range of phenomenological thinkers, as Zahavi (2019b) states, there is little evidence of their thought directly impacting upon IPA. He comments, "Whereas the phenomenological orientation of Giorgi's and van Manen's approaches are distinct and recognizable, the phenomenological origin and character of IPA is somewhat more questionable" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 126). There is the suggestion that this distancing of IPA from the philosophical phenomenological tradition is a conscious move on the part of Smith who remarks, "While philosophy has made an enormous contribution to understand the process of examining experience it is important to realize that philosophy does not own phenomenology" (2012, p. 32).

The *epoche*, repeatedly referred by both Giorgi and van Manen is not made mention of by Smith (Smith & Osborn, 2007, Smith, 2010, Smith et al., 2012). Indeed, there appears, within IPA, to be no requirement for the implementation of any form of *epoche*.

Smith, in common with van Manen, suggests that the act of phenomenological reflection is, and can only be, interpretive rather than descriptive (Smith, 2012, p. 201). Distinguishing IPA from the descriptive approach adopted by Giorgi, Smith affirms "while IPA is avowedly interpretive, Giorgi (1997) emphasizes that his approach is descriptive" (p. 200).

The object of phenomenological reflection, within the context of Smith's research framework appears to be reflective conscious experiences. In this regard, Smith's

methodology is unique and differs markedly from both van Manen and Giorgi. Smith distinguishes between four states within the natural attitude of everyday experience, "level 1, pre-reflective reflexivity, level 2: the reflective 'glancing at' a pre-reflective experience; level 3: attentive reflection on the pre-reflective; and level 4: deliberate controlled reflection". (Smith, 2012, p. 188). Smith appears to confine IPA to the examination of the more reflective lived experiences when he suggests "Level 3…is, of course, the site where the material for an IPA analysis is primarily located, and, as we have said, the reflection here occurs spontaneously (that is without deliberate self-conscious prompting) as participants reflect on and try to make sense of what is happening to them" (Smith, 2012, p. 190).

So, where van Manen appears to focus phenomenological research primarily on pre-reflective conscious states, Smith's application is concerned primarily with unselfconsciously reflective states. The focus on this, more cognitive sphere of lived experience is highlighted when Smith suggests "We are arguing that cognition is and can be a significant site for phenomenological inquiry" (Smith, 2012, p. 191).

Smith, initially appears to reject the possibility of essential structures of conscious experience being derived through phenomenological research. He states "IPA is committed to the detailed examination of the particular case. It wants to know in detail what the experience for this person is like, what sense this particular person is making of what is happening to them (2012, p. 3). Yet, like van Manen, Smith appears to demur. He hints at the future possibility of essential structures being uncovered. He remarks:

> For Husserl it was important to move from the individual instances to establish the eidetic structure or essence of experience. This is of course a noble aim. For IPA, however, the prior task of detailed analyses of particular cases of actual life and lived experience remains the priority *at this time* (2012, p. 38).

He continues, “Of course we do not see this as the end of the story. It will be possible with time to establish larger corpuses of cases and this may lead to consider the essential features of particular phenomena” (p. 38).

Regarding the structure and format of the interview process, Smith doesn’t offer a specific number of interviewees as ideal (p. 51). He does, however, make clear that, because of IPA’s focus on the in-depth examination of individual experiences, fewer rather than more participants should be interviewed. He gives a suggestion of between 3-6 interviewees (p. 51). Smith infers that there should be one interview conducted per interviewee and the interviews should last between 45 minutes and 90 minutes (p. 60). The structure of the interview should, in Smith’s view, be semi-structured (p. 62) and be organised around six to ten open ended questions with possible prompts (p. 60).

4.2 Three Methodologies: A Critical Comparison

As has been made evident in the previous chapter, there exist significant points of divergence between the three phenomenological research methodologies. Nonetheless, it is agreed with Smith who infers that these three methodologies do have elements in common (Smith, 2012, p. 200). In this section a critical comparison of the three methodologies will be outlined. Firstly, the common elements will be foregrounded and then the points of difference.

4.2.1 Points of similarity

Phenomenological research is qualitative.

All three methodologies acknowledge that phenomenological research is qualitative. Smith remarks, “IPA is a qualitative research approach committed to the examination of how people make sense of their major life experiences” (2012, p. 1). Van Manen (2017, p. 775) as well as Giorgi (2009, pp. 128-129), also explicitly state that phenomenological research is a qualitative mode of research.

Phenomenological research asserts that conscious experience is intentional.

Each of the three methodologies' founders agree that the conscious experiences that are the object of examination are "intentional" (van Manen, 2016, p. 181), (Giorgi, 2012, p. 9), (Smith, 2007, p. 53).

Phenomenological research involves reflection from the first-person perspective.

Giorgi, van Manen, and Smith all agree that the intentional conscious experiences which form the basis of phenomenological research are to be accessed through the process of first-person reflection. Giorgi (2012) highlights the essential nature of this reflective component, stating, "in straightforward perception the act is lived through but not noticed. It takes an act of reflection to detect the meaning-conferring or interpretive act and once it is detected it can be described" (Giorgi, 2012, p. 9). Van Manen too stresses the centrality of the reflective act for the phenomenological method stating that it is, "a method of abstemious reflection on the basic structures of the lived experience of human experience" (van Manen, 2016a, p. 26). In a similar vein, Smith highlights the centrality of first-person reflection within the phenomenological research process (2012, pp. 32-33).

Phenomenological research avoids the imposition of theoretical schema

Each of the researchers agrees that, within the context of first-person phenomenological reflection, the reflector aims to describe previous experiences while resisting the temptation to impose any formal theoretical schema upon those experiences (Giorgi, 2012, p. 4; Smith, 2012, p. 32; van Manen, 2016b, p. 9).

Phenomenological research relies on interviewees to gain data.

Each research methodology makes clear that an essential component of the phenomenological research process is the conducting of interviews (Giorgi, 2009, pp. 95-96; Smith 2012, p. 51; van Manen, 2016a, pp. 297-299). There is no consensus regarding the ideal number of interviewees**.** Nonetheless, it is clear that each research methodology

recognises the centrality of the role of the researcher in assisting the interviewees' successful eliciting of rich and relevant descriptions from those conscious experiences being reflected upon.

4.2.2 Points of difference

Different levels of indebtedness to philosophical phenomenology.

Giorgi (2019) and van Manen (2016a, 2016b) both pointedly acknowledge their methodologies' indebtedness to the philosophical phenomenological tradition. Giorgi's indebtedness is largely limited to the thought of Husserl (2012, p. 4). Van Manen acknowledges a debt to a wider range of phenomenological philosophers. Alongside Husserl he repeatedly refers to Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2016b, pp. 196-202). Although, like van Manen, Smith acknowledges the phenomenological roots of IPA (2012, p. 6), he draws a less explicit connection between the development of his research programme and the specifics of the thought of his philosophical-phenomenological predecessors (Smith, 2012).

Different attitudes towards the adoption of the epoche.

The *epoche*, as a methodological tool is adopted fully within Giorgi's (2009) methodological framework**.** Van Manen also adopts and applies the concept, yet appears to interpret in several ways (2016a, pp, 218-228). There is no mention of the epoche within the work of Smith (2012).

Different kinds of conscious experiences reflected upon.

Van Manen suggests that phenomenological research is primarily concerned with pre-reflective conscious experience. He states, "phenomenology is the study of the primal, lived, prereflective, prepredicative meaning of an experience" (2017, p. 776). He reaffirms this when he suggests, "To say the same thing differently: phenomenology is the study of the

lifeworld-the world as we immediately experience it pre-reflectively rather than as we conceptualize, categorize, or reflect upon it" (2016b, p. 9).

In contrast, Smith suggests that phenomenological research should, primarily, focus upon the examination of reflective conscious experiences. So, although allowing for the examination of pre-reflective conscious states, he suggests that IPA is *chiefly* concerned with examining those reflective conscious experiences where, "participants reflect on and try to make sense of what is happening to them" (2012, p. 190). Giorgi remains open to the investigation of both reflective and pre-reflective forms of consciousness (2009, p. 107).

Different views on phenomenological reflection: Descriptive or interpretive?

There are differences in relation to each methodology's view regarding whether the act of phenomenological reflection is interpretive or descriptive.

Giorgi suggests that the reflective phenomenological gaze is (and can be) purely descriptive (2012, pp. 6-8). Smith, however, claims that the reflective gaze is interpretive (2012, p. 35). He suggests that there is a "double hermeneutic" at work within phenomenological research, "The researcher is making sense of the participant, who is making sense of x" (p.35). Van Manen (2016a, 2016b) adopts something of a middle path between these two perspectives. He infers, albeit, sometimes indirectly that there should be a striving for a description of those reflected upon phenomena, while simultaneously recognising that the descriptions of these phenomena are always, unavoidably, framed by interpretive suppositions (2016a, p. 26).

It is manifest that Smith's view regarding the interpretive nature of the reflective gaze is unambiguous. It stands in clear and direct contrast to both Giorgi and van Manen. On closer inspection Giorgi's understanding of the nature of phenomenological reflection, however, may be more closely in line with van Manen's than initially appears to be the case. Giorgi appears to understand the term "descriptive" more broadly than does van Manen. As

such, it may be that Giorgi's and van Manen's views on this issue, despite the difference in language, closely cohere (Giorgi, 2012, p.6).

Different views on the derivation of essential structures

Giorgi's descriptive phenomenological methodology acknowledges the possibility of deriving essential structures true of all conscious human experience within a given context (2009, pp. 114-115). Van Manen appears to vacillate (2016a, p. 10, 2016a, p.22) and Smith seems to reject the possibility of such structures being arrived at (2012, p. 38).

4.3 Summary

This chapter has outlined the key elements of the three most widely applied phenomenological research methodologies. It then provided a critical comparison, drawing out their similarities and differences. This thesis will now turn to advocating van Manen's *hermeneutic* approach as being the most appropriate template for the *phenomenological lifeworld research methodology*. It will also set out the four central pillars of the proposed research methodology as well as its other essential features.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONSTITUTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL LIFEWORLD RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.1 Advocating van Manen

In this section it will be argued that van Manen's research methodology, more than Giorgi's and Smith's, serves as the most appropriate template for a phenomenological research methodology.

Three main reasons will be put forward in advocating van Manen's research methodology. Firstly, it embodies the flexible pragmatism called for by Zahavi (2019b, p. 137). Secondly, van Manen's methodology takes account of the objections that may be levelled at phenomenology and provides a methodological framework that, accounts for them. Finally, several inconsistencies notwithstanding, van Manen successfully conveys the salient elements of a workable phenomenological research methodology in a manner that can be understood by a prospective researcher who does not have a background in philosophy.

Van Manen identifies the need for a flexible pragmatism.

Zahavi (2019b, p. 137) suggests that an effective phenomenological research methodology needs to be pragmatic**.** Van Manen recognises this, identifies and then adopts a suite of relevant elements derived from different phenomenological philosophers. Unlike Giorgi (2009), van Manen's lived experience research methodology is not constrained by a strict adherence to the tenets of one philosopher's interpretation of phenomenology. One can identify within van Manen's work, a constant effort to identify, adapt and integrate relevant elements from different phenomenological philosophers.

Van Manen (2016a, 2016b), for example, identifies the concept *lifeworld* from the later work of Husserl**.** He acknowledges for it, a central place within phenomenological research and adopts it. From the Heidegger of *Being and Time* (2008)*,* van Manen (2016a, pp. 302-310) adopts and adapts the concept *existential*, recognises its potential value and attributes a central role for it**.** From Merleau-Ponty, van Manen recognises an aspect of lived

conscious experience – the lived experience of the body – overlooked by Heidegger and Husserl and integrates it into his research framework (2016a, p. 304). Van Manen even recognises the value in incorporating phenomenological elements that are not, strictly speaking, philosophical. Van Manen's concept of the *insight cultivator* (2016a, pp. 324-327) involves the integration into the research process of passages of text from fiction. Van Manen highlights the novels of Sartre, Proust, and Dostoevsky (2016b, p. 70) in order to cultivate in the (often inexperienced) phenomenological reflector the capacity to give rich, developed phenomenological descriptions.

Van Manen acknowledges objections to phenomenology and responds to them.

Objection one: The existence of essential elements of conscious experience.

Unlike Giorgi (2009), who appears to unquestioningly accept the Husserlian assumption that there exist essential structures of experience waiting to be discovered (2009, p. 111), van Manen is clearly aware of the philosophical risks related to making such a claim (2016b, pp. xiv-xvi). Unlike Smith (2012, p. 29), however, van Manen still recognises that, in order for a phenomenological research methodology to be properly phenomenological, it must seek to go beyond providing singular descriptions of particular conscious experiences (pp. xiv-xvi). Smith describes IPA as an *idiographic* enterprise, an enterprise focusing on the particularities of specific conscious experiences (p. 29). He re-emphasises IPA's focus on examining the particularities of individual experiences of the world when he contrasts the idiographic nature of IPA's approach with the nomothetic approach to research that one is more likely to encounter in quantitative research and which is "concerned with making claims at the group or population level" (p. 29).

So, van Manen, in spite of some seemingly contradictory passages (2016a, p. 10, 2016a, p. 22), does appear to acknowledge that phenomenological research does need to go beyond the provision of particular descriptions. In saying this, however, he could have been

less unambiguous in stating that "essential structures" must, in some capacity be sought, within phenomenological investigation.

Objection two: That a purely descriptive reflective gaze can be achieved.

Van Manen (2016a, 2016b), again unlike Giorgi (2009), acknowledges the problems in accepting the early Husserlian premise that phenomenological reflection can achieve a purely descriptive stance.

Giorgi suggests that the act of phenomenological reflection should (and indeed can) be descriptive (2012, p. 6). Smith (2012, p. 3), contrastingly, argues that the reflective gaze is interpretive. The reflector is, in phenomenological reflection, simultaneously "making sense" of his/her past conscious experiences.

Van Manen appears to occupy a considered mid-point. On the one hand he acknowledges the existence of pre-existing assumptions and presuppositions that must, *necessarily* stand in the way of the reflector achieving a purely dispassionate descriptive stance (2016b, pp. 280-281). Yet, on the other hand, he is aware of the need to strive towards the descriptive ideal and the importance of eliminating, where possible, the imposition of interpretive, theoretical elements onto the reflective process. As a result, van Manen arrives at, what might be termed as a "descriptive-interpretive" position (pp. 280-281).

Van Manen's seemingly paradoxical stance on this issue not only makes sense, but is pragmatically workable. He, clearly cannot accept the premise that a purely descriptive phenomenological stance is possible when, because of his understanding of the philosophical-phenomenological tradition, he is aware of the obstacles that, *necessarily* stand in the way of such a stance. Yet, he also knows that, in the name of academic rigour the reflector must seek, where possible to eliminate the imposition of interpretive elements or schema onto those reflected on conscious experiences.

Van Manen writes in a manner that inculcates a desire to conduct phenomenological research.

Van Manen writes in a manner that succeeds in cultivating in the prospective phenomenological researcher, the desire to want to engage in phenomenological research.

Van Manen's self-declared approach to conveying his research methodology is similar to a craftsperson with an apprentice in a workshop (2019, p. 3)**.** As he himself suggests, a thread running throughout all of van Manen's work is his continual attempt to orient and encourage his audience to actively *do* phenomenology rather than to inculcate in his audience a theoretical knowledge of it (p. 3).

It is true that Zahavi holds van Manen to account for some confusion in the expression of his theoretical understanding of phenomenology. He comments, "van Manen's own account and description of phenomenology is a vivid example of how that tradition has been 'poorly understood'" (Zahavi, 2019c, p. 901). He cites examples such as van Manen's assertion that phenomenological research deals exclusively with pre-reflective experience (pp. 903-904), as well as van Manen's somewhat vague interpretation of the *epoche* (p. 902) as cases in point of a perceived sloppiness in van Manen's theoretical understanding of phenomenology.

This point raised by Zahavi does contain some merit. In van Manen's writings there does appear to be a certain lack of clarity on a number of theoretical points. Although, of course, attention should be paid to these points, it is suggested that van Manen's writings are of considerable value insofar as they have the capacity to inculcate in his audience the impetus to do phenomenology. In other words, van Manen knows well what phenomenological philosopher Ihde (1986) states explicitly, that, "Without doing phenomenology, it may be practically impossible to understand phenomenology" (Ihde, 1986, p. 14). A prospective footballer or runner is more likely to be inspired to play football

or run by seeing another well-trained person *actually* play football or run. In the same way, the prospective phenomenological researcher, as van Manen grasps, is more likely to want to engage wholeheartedly in the process of phenomenological research, when s/he sees an experienced and competent practitioner put it into action.

Van Manen, in his introduction to *Writing in the Dark* (2016c) suggests that to prepare to engage in research, the prospective phenomenological researcher ought to "read many examples of phenomenological writing. The person interested in human science research needs to learn textually how others reflect and write and address the topics of their interest" (van Manen, 2016c, p. i). Indeed, the van Manen edited publication *Writing in the Dark* is an attempt to facilitate this. A compilation of phenomenological reflections by researchers on different lifeworlds, this work is not designed to provide the reading audience with a theoretical account of the requisite philosophical assumptions required for academically rigorous phenomenological research. Rather, these reflections serve to evoke, in the audience, a deeper sensitivity to the lived experience of the lifeworlds covered. Van Manen remarks as such in the introduction:

> These chapters are not necessarily full-fledged phenomenological research studies. They make no claims to perfection. In fact, the chapters are as interesting for what they do not contain as for what they do contain. They serve as openings for phenomenological discussion about selected human phenomena" (van Manen, 2016c, p. ii).

In other words, they serve to help generate in the prospective phenomenological researcher the momentum to go out and conduct phenomenological researcher him/herself.

Throughout the range of van Manen's (2016a, 2016b, 2016c) works there is a consistent return to the presentation of concrete, phenomenological recollections. Van Manen's teacherly intuition recognises that, in order for the audience to be most able to

conduct their own phenomenological research, they need to be *shown* phenomenological examples rather than simply be *told* what needs to be done. Van Manen articulates the importance of this "show and then do" approach to the cultivation of the *techne* (art) of doing phenomenology when he refers to Spiegelberg's (1975) "workshop approach" (van Manen, 2019, p. 3).

Indeed, van Manen's writings from *Researching Lived Experience* (2016b) to *Phenomenology of Practice* (2016a) and *Writing in the Dark* (2016c) can be viewed as an attempt to embody this "workshop approach". Van Manen's repeated inclusion of concrete, phenomenological readings demonstrates his awareness that, it is (in part at least) through the engagement with others' concrete lived experiences that the prospective researcher becomes better equipped to successfully present their own.

In stating this, it is evident that van Manen does somewhat underplay the importance of a clear stated set of theoretical guidelines that serve as a framework for prospective phenomenological researchers. He states, "The systematizing and argumentative work may be needed to critically develop the foundational conditions for innovating and establishing certain methodological assumptions for phenomenology and selected issues. But that is only half the story" (van Manen, 2019, p. 2). It is true, that the establishment of clear theoretical and "methodological assumptions for phenomenology" is only half the story. Yet, it is suggested, in agreement with Zahavi, that their establishment is necessary and their presentation needs to be as unambiguous as possible.

5.2 The Four Pillars of Phenomenological Lifeworld Research

The four pillars central to phenomenological lifeworld research will be outlined in this section. Three of these pillars are derived directly from van Manen's research methodology. The fourth is inspired by Giorgi. These four pillars, taken together, will be shown to be the

spine around which a clear, accessible and systematic research methodology can be constructed.

Firstly, it will be shown that by incorporating the concept of the *lifeworld,* complete with the two articulations of its meaning, the phenomenological researcher will be provided with an appropriate framing assumption within which they may conduct their phenomenological research. Secondly, it will be demonstrated that by adopting *existentials* (van Manen, 2016b) of conscious experience, the phenomenological researcher will be provided with an appropriate means of extracting data from within the context of their chosen *lifeworld*. Thirdly, by utilising *insight cultivators*, as understood by van Manen (2016b), the prospective phenomenological researcher will be provided with the tool to enable them to extract richer, more detailed qualitative data from his/her interviewees. Finally, by developing a series of *propositions* (or testable statements) prior to the main study, that outline potential essential structures, the research process can be seen to be more akin to a science. A view whose importance is reinforced by both Giorgi (2012, p. 4) and Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. xx).

5.2.1 The lifeworld

The concept *lifeworld* is adopted by Van Manen (2016b, pp. 182-183) from the later works of Husserl (1970) as well as the later phenomenologists Berger and Luckmann (1966). By attributing it with such significance, van Manen recognises its capacity to provide the prospective phenomenological researcher with a framing set of methodological assumptions within which phenomenological research can take place.

As stated by Carr in his translation of Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy,* the term lifeworld has many, often inconsistent, interpretations (Husserl ,1970, p. xli). While, it is true, that not all of these interpretations are consistent with one another, there are two mutually consistent ones inferred by van Manen that neatly

summarise bedrock assumptions that need to be had by prospective phenomenological researchers (van Manen. 2016b, pp. 182-183).

The first accepted interpretation of the concept lifeworld is that it simply refers to the daily and taken for granted world as it is consciously experienced rather than the physical world independent of conscious experience (Husserl, 1970, pp. 123-124) In this regard, the concept lifeworld allows the phenomenological researcher to distinguish the scope of their investigation from those engaged in quantitative, natural science research. This is the interpretation made explicit by both Giorgi (2009, pp. 110-111) and Zahavi (2019b, p. 145)

The second, mutually accepted interpretation, is that there exist different lifeworlds. A person's lifeworld is dependent on the framing horizon of meaning or as the later Husserl describes it "world horizon" (Husserl, 1970, pp. 138-139) that serves as a framing background for all of his/her conscious experiences within that context (pp. 138-139). To illustrate, it might be that two individuals work in an identical part of the physical world (i.e., they work in the same office in a building) yet, due to the nature of their position at work (one is an employer, the other is an employee) their work lifeworld would be different. The employer, for example, would view the physical objects and people around her with the framing horizon of meaning that comes with her being in a position of responsibility. The employee, on the other hand, would view those same people and objects with a quite different set of framing assumptions.

Van Manen reinforces the contextual nature of this second interpretation of lifeworld when he remarks that within the different lifeworlds, "of the teacher, the parent, the researcher, the administrator and so forth" (van Manen, 1990, p. 101) there exist different "experiential qualities" (van Manen, 2016b, p. 101).

Van Manen makes clear that the lifeworld that one inhabits is constantly changing. He comments:

> we can even speak of the multiple and different lifeworlds that belong to different human existences and realities. And so, we know that the lifeworld of the child has different experiential qualities from the lifeworld of the adult…And each of us may be seen to inhabit different lifeworlds at different times of the day, such as the lived world of work and the lived world of the home (van Manen, 2016b, p. 101).

This, second interpretation of lifeworld acknowledges the importance of those background, context giving elements of an individual's conscious experiences. These elements, such as the individual's goals, hopes, expectations and past experiences, in most instances, do not serve as objects of experience. Rather, they provide a framing context within which those objects of experience are attributed meaning and purpose. Indeed, it is likely that those individuals within a given lifeworld share many of these background framing elements and, through a proper phenomenological investigation, they may be brought to light.

5.2.2 The existentials

Van Manen's four *existentials* (2016b*)* provide the prospective researcher with the means to investigate the qualitative nature of the chosen lifeworld of his/her interviewees. In positing them, a structured starting point is provided, which allows for a more focused investigation into a given *lifeworld* to take place.

The term existential, in this context, is borrowed by van Manen from Heidegger's *Being and Time* (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 33-34). Heidegger understood an existential as being an element of the conscious experience of the world that is inseparable from every experiencing human being. Existentials stand in opposition to what Heidegger termed "éxistentielles". Existentielles being elements of conscious experience that are contingent to particular contexts or experiencing individuals (Heidegger, 2008, p. 33).

Van Manen acknowledges four existentials and suggests their application within a phenomenological research context. These four existentials he suggests, "probably pervade

the lifeworlds of all human beings, regardless of their historical, cultural or social situatedness*"* (van Manen, 2016b, p. 101). Their adoption provides the researcher with an effective investigative starting point which, regardless of the lifeworld under investigation, helps structure the research process. In the initial stages of the interview process, their usage allows for a more focused development of research questions and, later on, in the analysis stage they can be used as basis of comparison for the different interviewee's conscious experiences within the given lifeworld. By structuring research interviews and the analysis of these interviews around these existentials, the research process is given focus by providing a foundational basis of comparison between different interviewees descriptions within a given lifeworld. This reduces the risk, highlighted by Zahavi, of phenomenological research amounting to the simple "amassing of experiential descriptions" of particular individuals' experiences within a lifeworld (Zahavi, 2019c, p. 902).

Van Manen highlights four existentials, namely: "lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time (temporality), and lived human relation (relationality or communality)" (van Manen, 2016b, p. 101). Each of these existentials will be introduced and explained below.

The existential of lived space.

As opposed to geometric or objective space, van Manen suggests that "lived space is felt space" (2016b, p. 102). When researching lived space within the context of a given lifeworld, one is not concerned with describing those objective, spatial dimensions of, for example, a house, apartment or the distance between two cities: dimensions that can be summarised in the language of metres or kilometres. Such quantitative descriptions, van Manen suggests disregard the felt, qualitative, dimensions of space (p. 102). For example, an interviewee is reflecting upon is given of walking alone in a foreign city for the first time. A description that accounts only for those quantitative, objectively measurable aspects of

walking these streets ignores the palpably real but strictly qualitative "sense of lostness, strangeness, vulnerability, and possibly excitement or stimulation that most, if not all new arrivals, will experience their new and exotic surroundings with" (p. 102).

The space surrounding one may be experienced as close and constricting or open and spread out depending on one's mood, or even, who one is sharing that space with. By elaborating the existential of "lived space" van Manen provides the researcher the means to investigate this significant sphere of the interviewee's lifeworld.

The existential of the lived body.

In outlining the existential of the lived body, Van Manen suggests that one's own body is experienced as an object in the world, but as a fundamentally different type of object. He states that we "are always bodily in the world" (2016b, p. 103) which means that all people, regardless of the particularities of their lifeworld, experience their own bodies (or parts of it) as kinds of objects. However, there is an essential difference in how on experiences one's own body as opposed to other objects in the world. In short, one experiences one's own body as part of oneself. Indeed, one's body is experienced as the part of oneself that can also be experienced by others.

To simply describe one's own body in the objective, spatial language of geometry is to ignore the fact that the lived body is experienced differently by oneself in different contexts. When, for example, one is engaged in a skill that one has mastered a skill such as driving a car or hammering with a hammer (Heidegger, 2008, p. 98) one doesn't notice one's body, one simply uses it to engage with the world. On the other hand, as Sartre (1972) observes, when one is aware of one's physical body being watched by others when performing that skill, it is likely that the lived experience of one's body will be significantly different (Sartre, 1972, pp. 280-281).

The existential of lived time.

The everyday mode of expressing time is in the standardised language of seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months and years. Although universally understandable, such descriptions according to van Manen, necessarily miss out on the particularities of time's felt dimensions (2016b, p. 104). Felt time, for example, quickens when immersed in a task or when one is enjoying oneself and slows down when one is feeling anxious or bored (p. 104). The present time is also experienced differently as a consequence of one's past experiences and future goals. To illustrate; a young person "oriented to an open and beckoning future" might experience the present time quite differently to an elderly person having already experienced a majority of his/her life (p. 104). In the case of the former, the present time is experienced with the constant co-existence of a future of possibility and openness. The latter, primarily in co-existence with the past of a life, already, much lived.

The existential of lived human relationality (the lived other).

Van Manen's existential of lived relationality acknowledges the conscious experience of other human beings as a distinctive sphere of human experience. Echoing Heidegger, van Manen suggests that it is distinctive insofar as it recognises that one's experience of other people differs fundamentally from the experience of other objects in the world (Heidegger, 2008, pp. 156-157)**.** Other people, unlike inanimate objects such as doors, windows and cups, are experienced, by the perceiver, as *also* having the capacity to experience, judge, and make choices. Van Manen acknowledges that an account of a given lifeworld that acknowledges this assumption is able to foreground this element of lived reality in a way that a purely quantitative, geometric description would fail to do (van Manen, 2016b, pp. 104-105).

Taken together van Manen suggests that these four existentials designate four universal spheres of any given lifeworld (2016b, p. 105). This means that by investigating one's chosen lifeworld, in turn, through each existential, the researcher is provided with the tools to, firstly, outline focused and specific questions that encourage the interviewee to reflect deeply on

their experiences in each of the four existential spheres of their lifeworld. They also allow for a standardised basis of comparison between interviewees both within a given lifeworld as well as between different lifeworlds.

5.2.3 The insight cultivators

Van Manen acknowledges that within the context of phenomenological research, participants may have had little experience in reflecting phenomenologically (2016a, p. 324). As such, he introduces, the notion of *insight cultivator.*

The insight cultivator comes in the form of short phenomenological-style descriptions of particular conscious experiences within the context of the lifeworld under investigation. They are most, often, provided by skilled writers such as novelists, philosophers or poets.

The value of such descriptions, as van Manen remarks, lies, firstly, in their capacity to provide a jolt of recognition for the participant (p. 324). With this jolt, the interviewee may be encouraged to elaborate further upon his/her own similar conscious experiences. Van Manen remarks as such when he comments, "we find insight cultivators in reading the reflective writings of philosophers and other scholars of the arts, humanities and human sciences. Insight cultivators give us the sense of, 'Oh, now I see!'" (p. 324). Even if the description does not strike a chord with the conscious experiences of the interviewee. It can be valuable insofar as it provides the interviewee with the impetus and motivation to explain in more detail how their own conscious experiences in the lifeworld might *stand in contrast* to the insight cultivator provided.

Secondly, insight cultivators act as a model, to the interviewee, of how good phenomenological-style descriptions may be presented. The capacity to provide descriptions of conscious experiences, sensitive to the richness of the experience itself can be difficult. Indeed, it is a capacity that many interviewees will need to develop as the interview process continues. By being repeatedly exposed to good insight cultivators within the context of a given

lifeworld, the interviewee is provided with a series of templates that point to the type of descriptions that they, themselves, may provide**.**

Van Manen advocates a broad range of source material from which insight cultivators may be selected. He comments, "The titles of some celebrated works such as *Crime and Punishment, Nausea, The Trial,* and *Remembrance of Things Past*, announce fundamental life experiences which are available to our interpretive reading" (2016a, pp. 318-319).

By utilising a few, carefully selected, insight cultivators the researcher is providing the interviewee with a context within which they may frame their own descriptions of conscious experiences in the lifeworld under investigation. It can be intimidating, for an interviewee, from the beginning of an interview process, to simply be expected to provide in-depth descriptions of their own conscious experiences**.** What the insight cultivator provides is material that acts as impetus for the interviewee to respond to.

A range of well-chosen insight cultivators, as has been demonstrated, can help relax the interviewee by modelling phenomenological-type responses, they can succeed in unlocking elements of previous conscious experiences that may not have been able to be accessed otherwise and they can assist in providing context for the interview process.

5.2.4 The propositions

The final of the four pillars relates to the call by Giorgi (2012) which echoes the assertion made by Merleau-Ponty (2014) in the introduction to *Phenomenology of Perception* that phenomenological investigation should strive to be a kind of science.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology invokes this scientific approach (albeit within a human science context) with the introduction of testable *propositions.* These propositions are akin to testable hypotheses that one would utilise within a natural science context.

These propositions are derived after the literature review and, where appropriate, the formative autobiographical study. They are testable statements that reflect *possible* essential structures within the lifeworld under investigation. The primary purpose of the subsequent main summative interviewee study will be to test these propositions.

These derived propositions will be presented in relation to the four existentials of lived time, lived space, lived self, and lived other as well as a fifth: lived objects**.**

After having been tested against the lived experiences of the interviewees within the chosen lifeworld these propositions may be supported, modified or rejected as being (provisionally) essential structures of the lifeworld under investigation.



Figure 1: Summary of the Four Pillars of Phenomenological Lifeworld Research

The value of these propositions lies primarily in their capacity to help the researcher calibrate and focus his/her inquiry questions in the second, main summative interviewee study. By deriving these propositions or *possible* essential structures from the experiences of the researcher him/herself (in the case of the formative autobiographical study) or from the lived

experiences of others (in the case of the literature review), the researcher has material with which to question his/her interviewees and to give the semi-structured interview process a sense of structure and coherence.

5.3 Other Elements of Phenomenological Lifeworld Research

Phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, although indebted to features of van Manen's hermeneutic method, stands alone as distinct. It contains distinctive assumptions and elements. The most significant of these will be made explicit and justified in this section.

Zahavi makes clear that in order to conduct phenomenologically informed qualitative research "employing a comprehensive theoretical framework*"* is of the utmost importance. (2019c, p. 906). Yet, in order to develop such a framework the grounding philosophical assumptions within that framework need to be brought to light.

By making explicit his/her core theoretical assumptions, the developer of a phenomenological research methodology is required to put him/herself in a position to defend the right to make those philosophical assumptions. S/he is forced to look critically at the philosophical-phenomenological tradition from which these assumptions are derived and to consider the objections directed towards them. It is because of this the following philosophical assumptions, as well as other key elements contained within the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology will be presented and defended.

The features of phenomenology outlined in the introduction are assumed to be true.

The four essential elements of phenomenological investigation outlined in the introduction are assumed to be true. These assumptions are as follows:

1. Phenomenological investigation involves reflection on one's own previous conscious experiences from the first-person perspective.

2. Phenomenological investigation assumes that those reflected upon conscious experiences are intentional. (i.e., they are always directed towards some object of experience).
3. Phenomenological investigation is descriptive insofar as it refuses to impose theoretical or explanatory schemas onto those reflected upon conscious experiences.
4. Phenomenological investigation seeks to uncover essential structures related to those reflected upon conscious experiences.

The assumptions made explicit in points one and two are considered to be uncontroversial and will not be further justified. Those assumptions evident in points three and four do, however, require further justification. These two assumptions will be examined below.

Phenomenological lifeworld reflection strives for description.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology accepts that all accounts of reflected upon conscious experiences should aim for description while simultaneously acknowledging the existence of underlying presuppositions or assumptions that might colour those descriptions. Looked at this way, what phenomenological descriptions should (and can) avoid is the imposition of any *explicit* theoretical, explanatory that seeks to explain why those conscious experiences are as they are. Such schemas might be psychoanalytic, biological, or chemical.

On this issue, phenomenological lifeworld research largely agrees with van Manen (2016b) when he suggests that the reflective gaze is "descriptive" insofar as it attempts to remain true to the lived experience that is given as possible (by not imposing any theoretical schema on to those lived experiences), yet "interpretive" insofar as it is impossible to completely eradicate all presuppositions and assumptions (2016b, pp. 180-181). This position, accepted by the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, avoids the

implications of insisting as Smith does, that phenomenological reflections are purely interpretive (Smith et al., 2012, pp. 34-35). Such a position, taken to its extreme may lead to the acceptance of the position that phenomenological descriptions are nothing more than the reflector's subjective perspective or opinion upon the reflected upon phenomena**.**

Phenomenological investigation seeks to uncover essential structures within a lifeworld.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology accepts that the researcher is seeking to derive essences of conscious experience. It is clear that, if one reads Husserl (1970, 2012), Heidegger (2008) or Merleau-Ponty (2012) this assumption is non-negotiable**.** Where the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology goes further is by, agreeing with the later Husserl (1970, p. 139) that there exist essential structures of conscious experience within given lifeworlds. Lifeworld, in this instance, is understood to mean a particular socio-historical context where members of that group will share a similar framing horizon of meaning (Husserl, 1970, p. 139). Examples of lifeworlds where there are assumed to exist essential structures of conscious experience might be the lifeworld of the first year school-teacher, the lifeworld of a person recently diagnosed with a severe illness or the lifeworld of an adolescent school pupil who has recently changed schools.

Additionally, when the term "essential structure" is used within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, it is understood in the "morphological" sense suggested by Zahavi (2019b, p. 46). It is therefore accepted that the essential structures arrived at as a consequence of the research will not possess the same clarity and sharpness as might be found in mathematics or the natural sciences**.**

The essential structures are not the final word.

The essential structures presented after the main interviewee study should not be viewed as a definitive summary of the essential structures of that lifeworld. Rather, they should be viewed as a starting point for future, related investigations.

In this regard the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology remains true to the aim outlined by Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. xx) and Giorgi (2012, p. 2) of being a kind of science. Popper (2005) suggests that for a theory in the natural sciences to be properly scientific (as opposed to pseudo-scientific) it should be capable of being tested and "falsified" (proven false) in future independent experiments (Popper, pp. 353-359, 2005). It is here suggested that the essential structures as a result of phenomenological lifeworld research fulfil a similar role. Like Popper's view of good scientific theories, the essential structures shouldn't be considered "true". Instead, they should be considered the best approximation at the time of research. The essential structures remain open to being "falsified" in future studies insofar as they may be refined in light of further investigation, confirmed or even rejected.

There is no requirement to invoke the epoche.

Within the context of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, for both researcher and interviewee, there is no need to interpret or apply the *epoche* in any way. In agreement with Zahavi (2019a) who argues that the specialist philosophical use of the epoche by Husserl (1970, 2012**)** not to mention the dizzying array of interpretations (van Manen, 2016a, pp. 222-227) means that the invocation of any kind of epoche would unnecessarily complicate issues. Rather, than the phenomenological researcher attempting to conduct research, there is every likelihood s/he will be agonising over whether or not the interpretation and application of the epoche that they are propounding is acceptable. Indeed, Zahavi (2019b, pp. 32-37)*,* spends considerable time outlining the ways in which the epoche has been misunderstood.

The author of this thesis admits to some confusion regarding the correct interpretation of the epoche. It has, hitherto, been interpreted as involving an *abstaining* of the question of the existence of a mind independent world. This, it seems to this author, is clearly stated by

Husserl in his earlier work *Ideas* (Husserl, 2012, p. 34)**.** While, it is true in Husserl's later work (1970), there appears to a milder interpretation of the *epoche* which does not appear to involve such an abstention, this overall lack of clarity serves to underly why there need not be an epoche within phenomenological research.

The overarching point of the epoche is, it appears clear, to purify the reflective gaze, to weed out any possible everyday assumptions that might stand in the way of describing those experiences. Within the context of phenomenological research, however, this can be achieved simply by frequently reminding oneself and one's interviewees to describe and not interpret their reflected-on experiences.

For this reason, there is no reason why the epoche needs to be explicitly mentioned. In order to focus the interviewees' reflective energies on accurately describing the previous conscious experiences, it is better that the researcher use appropriate questioning, examples and insight cultivators. Better also, to assume (as the interviewees' default setting will most likely be) that the conscious experiences that they are reflecting upon are of the physical world (an assumption which the interpretation of the epoche accepted here, suggests should be abstained from). As Zahavi points out, it serves no purpose for either researcher or interviewee getting bogged down in any distracting metaphysical speculation (2019a, p. 10). Additionally, the elimination of any reference to the epoche allows for a ready made response to criticisms of phenomenological research methods, such as that levelled by Iosifides, which suggests that they lead to a form of "idealism" (Iosifides, 2011, p. 103) or a denial of the existence of the external, physical world (p. 103).

A focus on both theoretical and pre-theoretical conscious experiences.

The range of conscious experiences that will be reflected upon within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research are assumed to be both pre-theoretical and theoretical conscious experiences.

Pre-theoretical experiences are those everyday modes of experiencing the world, where there is no formal cognitive attempt to understand that part of the world that is being engaged with. It is accepted, within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research, that *most* of the conscious experiences described will be of this form. Theoretical experiences are those more rarified and formal modes of conscious experiencing of the world, where one is consciously investigating or scrutinising a certain part of the world (as, for example, a carpenter might when checking if the chair that has just been made sits square on the ground).

Van Manen, on occasion, seems to infer that phenomenological research need focus exclusively on the pre-theoretical modes of experience (2016b, p. 9). It is agreed, with van Manen, that in investigating lifeworlds one is *primarily* investigating conscious experience[s] of the world that are pre-theoretical**.** Nonetheless, it is evident that many lifeworlds (such as the lifeworld of the research scientist) would, *as a matter of course* require an investigation of those more theoretical modes of conscious experience. In any case, it is here argued that there is no need to limit the scope of investigation, when this limitation prevents the gathering of potentially rich descriptions related to people's lived experience of the world.

A focus on both reflective and pre-reflective conscious experiences.

Within the context of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, the scope of conscious experience reflected upon will include *both* pre-reflective and reflective conscious experiences. Pre-reflective conscious experiences are those experiences when one is directly engaged (either pre-theoretically or theoretically) with the physical world. In contrast, reflective experiences are those kinds of experience *which themselves* have other previous conscious experiences as their object. Philosophical phenomenologist Jean-Paul Sartre provides an example that neatly distinguishes between these forms of experience. He asserts that, when one is meeting a friend and one is wholly engaged in the experience of that meeting, one is having a pre-reflective conscious state. Later on, when, from the perspective

temporal distance, one reflects upon that experience of the warmth and intimacy of that meeting, one is engaged in a reflective conscious experience (Sartre, 1972, p. 164).

This distinction is significant insofar as Smith's IPA (2012), distinguishes itself with an avowed focus on those reflective conscious experiences when one is trying to make sense of one's previous conscious experiences (Smith et al., 2012, pp. 189-190).

So, unlike Smith, whose investigative attention is drawn to reflective conscious experiences, the scope of investigation within phenomenological lifeworld research includes both pre-reflective conscious experiences, when one is actively and unreflectively engaged with the world, *as well as* reflective conscious experiences, when one is reflecting upon previous experiences, are both recognised as being worthy of systematic investigation.

It is assumed that consciousness is historicist in nature.

Phenomenological lifeworld research assumes an historicist perspective of human consciousness. It does not adhere to the view that there exists a pure realm of consciousness that contains essential elements, true of all people at all times of history all. A view that is assumed by the early Husserl in *Ideas* (2012). Rather, it assumes that human consciousness is always influenced and given context by the concrete historical and social context within which it finds itself, as assumed by the later Husserl (1970). It is further assumed that the conscious experiences had by those members of a given lifeworld will be framed by a socio-culturally influenced "horizon of meaning" shared by other members within that lifeworld.

Therefore, those essential structures being sought within phenomenological lifeworld research are considered to be true only of that *particular* socio-culturally influenced lifeworld rather than of a trans-historical, pure sphere of consciousness. In this it echoes the words of the later Husserl in *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy* (1970) when he states that the, "life-world does have, in all its relative features, a *general structure*. This

general structure, to which everything else that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative" (Husserl, 1970, p. 139).

The literature review of the lifeworld should be broad.

Given that there is so little agreement within qualitative research circles regarding what constitutes phenomenology, the researcher is required to be pragmatic and flexible when reviewing the extant literature on the lifeworld under investigation.

The primary purpose of the literature review is to isolate what has already been stated regarding possible essential structures within the given lifeworld. In this way the literature review plays a significant role in the development of propositions to be tested in the major summative study. Secondly, it acts as a potential source for insight cultivators to be used later in the interview process. The following suggests the kinds of literature that may be consulted in the literature review.

Firstly, the researcher should locate any existing academic phenomenological research conducted on the given lifeworld. In doing so, however, the researcher needs to be mindful of the different assumptions held by phenomenological researchers**.**

Secondly, the researcher should locate those examples of research on the given lifeworld that, although, not overtly phenomenological may, nonetheless, contain rich phenomenological descriptions. Such literature might include examples of psychological or sociological research related to the lifeworld in question**.** Although, it needs to be noted that the investigation of psychological or sociological literature into the relevant lifeworld needs to be undertaken with caution. Descriptions of lived experiences that are contained within such literature tend to be imbued with a theoretical schema which undermines the phenomenological demand for the description rather than explanation of conscious experiences.

Finally, literary autobiographies and fictional literature, as stated by van Manen (2016a, pp. 318-319) often contain rich descriptions of conscious experiences written by skilled authors. Such descriptions may be of as much or more use than the descriptions provided in non-phenomenological qualitative literature.

The propositions may be partially derived from a formative autobiographical study.

If the researcher has had experience in the lifeworld under investigation, alongside the literature review, the preferred method for deriving propositions is through an initial formative autobiographical study. If the researcher has experienced the lifeworld him/herself, it is likely that, already embedded within his/her thinking, there exist presuppositions regarding its essential structures. It is, therefore, beneficial to explicate these presuppositions before the interview process begins in the major summative study study. By doing this, the researcher is able to guard against the possibility of, unknowingly, leading interviewees towards certain responses.

Secondly, the researcher may learn more about that lifeworld by systematically reflecting upon and then describing his/her own conscious experiences within it. As stated by Zahavi (2019b, p. 103) phenomenological descriptions focus on experiences that are, frequently, glossed over and ignored. Indeed, it is likely that in carefully detailing his/her remembered conscious experiences within that lifeworld, the researcher is going to learn more about those experiences.

Thirdly, by reflecting upon his/her own conscious experiences phenomenologically within the given lifeworld, the researcher is able to tentatively derive possible essential structures. These tentative findings will assist in the main summative study where the researcher, through appropriate questioning can elicit whether his/her conscious experiences are verified by the experiences of the interviewees. It is of course, important, in agreement

with Giorgi (2009, p. 123) that in doing this the researcher guards against the possibility of "leading" his/her interviewees towards certain responses.

The formative autobiographical study should include a series of descriptions.

Phenomenological style descriptions in the formative autobiographical study would be valuable for a number of reasons. Firstly, by carefully setting down particular descriptions of conscious experiences within the given lifeworld, the researcher is forced to reflect upon the underlying nature of those experiences more generally. Taking the time to do this is a necessary first step before being able to tentatively infer the essential structures of those conscious experiences. Secondly, these descriptions may be valuable to the reader for their own sake. As stated in chapter 3.1**,** a good phenomenological description has the power to reverberate with the readers own conscious experiences. Thirdly, some of the phenomenological descriptions set down in study one may serve as *insight cultivators* for the interviewees in study two.

*The number of existentials should be increased from four to five***.**

In the interests of clarity there should be five existentials that guide the reflection process in the formative autobiographical study and the summative interviewee study. Van Manen, suggests that there are four existentials (elements of conscious experience present regardless of socio-historical context). The value of these existentials within the research process has already been stated.

Van Manen outlines the four existentials as follows: "lived time", "lived space", "lived self" and "lived relationality" (2016b, pp. 101-106**)**. It is, however, suggested that the final of these existentials may be unclear. Therefore, within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research "lived relationality" will be divided into two: "lived other" (as in other person or people) as well as "lived objects" (including inanimate objects such as buildings, cars, doors etc and can even encompass landscape features such as trees, mountains or

clouds.) Such a division captures the distinction made by a number of phenomenological philosophers, notably Heidegger (2008), Sartre (1972) and Levinas (1969), that the conscious experience of another person is fundamentally different to the conscious experience of other objects in the world.

For background perspectives on the lived experience of each of these existentials, alongside Heidegger in *Being and Time* (2008), the researcher can examine the work of phenomenological philosophers. Jean-Paul Sartre provides a number of perceptive accounts of the lived experience of the other and of objects in *Nausea* (1965) *and Being and Nothingness* (1972), Otto Bollnow (1961) writes extensively on the lived experience of space and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012) on the lived experience of self.

The existentials are embedded into the research process.

Although van Manen speaks of the value of using existentials as a tool to aid the researcher in accessing interviewees' accounts of a given lifeworld (2016b, pp. 101-106), he doesn't provide a clear and systematic way in which they might be effectively utilised. Within phenomenological lifeworld research, the five existentials play three central and clearly defined role within the research process. The three roles are as follows:

1. Each of the testable propositions, derived as a result of the formative autobiographical study and literature review will be organised in relation to one of the five existentials.
2. The interview process in the major study will be organised around each existential. By organising the interviews around each existential, the researcher will be given the parameters to develop more focused interview questions which, in turn will (hopefully) elicit clearer, more focused responses on the part of the interviewees.
3. The concluding data will be grouped according to existential. This will provide future phenomenological researchers with a framework with which to utilise, critique, or develop the findings obtained within the research.

It is acknowledged that organising lived experience data in this way does, to a degree, misrepresent lived experience. It is true, for example, that one does not experience "lived time "in isolation from "lived space". In saying this, these existentials do provide the researcher with an effective means of accessing the data that lies within the hitherto undifferentiated reflections they have before them.

Insight cultivators incorporated into interviews two and three.

Insight cultivators, those short descriptive reflections gleaned from the literature review or the formative autobiographical study will be incorporated into interviews two and three.

These insight cultivators (which should be brief and number only four or five) are to be perused by the interviewee in several minutes, shortly prior to the interview. Should they not be perused before the interview, they may be given at the start of the interview. The interviewee should be given several minutes alone (without the presence of the researcher) to read the insight cultivators. At the beginning of the interview the researcher will ask whether one, some or all of the reflections perused resonated with the conscious experiences of the interviewee within the context of the particular lifeworld under investigation.

The purpose of the insight cultivators is to assist the interviewee in calibrating his/her own reflective gaze**.** It is hoped that by doing this, their subsequent interview responses might be enrichened. In a sense the interviewees' engagement with the insight cultivators are similar to a physical warm up before a sporting fixture or a vocal warm up before a performance**.**

The researcher wants the interviewee to resist the temptation of stock, cliched responses and to delve more deeply into reflecting upon their conscious memories than they will previously have done**.** The insight cultivators help facilitate this. As stated in chapter 3.1**,** a good phenomenological description is capable of reverberating with the experience of the reader (even if reader has not experienced anything similar). If any of the insight cultivators

provided at the beginning of the interview are successful, such reverberations may succeed in "quickening" the interviewees reflective gaze rather than deadening it (as might be the case if the interviewer read through a list of stock questions)**.**

The existence of the insight cultivators, at the beginning of interviews two and three, act as a transition into the more rarefied atmosphere of the interview proper**).** They also model, for the interviewee, the kinds of descriptive reflections required in relation to the lifeworld in question. Finally, they act as a spur to the interviewee in developing their own reflective descriptions. If their experiences were similar they will be motivated to provide descriptive examples, if they were different, they will be motivated to explain how (with descriptive examples) they were different**.**

The interviews should be semi-structured.

In order to have the best chance of successfully extricating this descriptive information from the interviewees, the interviews should be semi structured. To further elaborate what is meant by "semi-structured": The interviews should be structured insofar as there needs to be a clear order and sequence of identical central questions to be asked in each of the interviews. If there is no uniformity with the questioning, there can be no clear basis for effectively comparing and contrasting the data gained from the different interviewees**.** This is not to say, however, that the phrasing and ordering of these questions might not change depending on the nature and flow of the interviews. It may, for example, be the case that an interviewee, when asked a question about one particular existential, develops a response that details his/her lived experience in relation to *another* existential. In such instances the sensitive interviewer will recognise that the interviewee should be allowed to continue because the likelihood of a developed and perceptive description of his/her experience of that existential is more likely to be given now than if s/he was interrupted and asked about it later in the interview or in the next interview.

Within the scope of the semi-structured interview process, there also needs to be an openness for the researcher to pursue avenues of inquiry as they are revealed by the interviewee**.** In other words, there needs to be room for the interviewee to pursue the thread of their own recollections (even if that means pursuing a question set for later on if the interviewee stumbles upon a response while detailing a response to a different question).

There should be a significant number of interviewees.

There should number between ten to twelve interviewees. This number ensures that any inferences relating to the essential structures of experience within that lifeworld can be made with adequate evidence.

Additionally, the participants involved in the research should be as homogenous (in relation to language spoken, age, gender) as possible. There is the framing assumption within phenomenological lifeworld research that those members of the lifeworld are likely to share the socio-cultural influences that might structure their conscious experiences within that lifeworld.

There should be three interviews.

There should be three interviews each lasting an hour. The reasons are as follows:

1. It allows the first interview to be general and introductory.
2. It allows the second and third interviews enough time to focus on and then question, in requisite detail, the five existentials which serve as the organisational frame of the research process.

Further justifications are given below.

The first of the three interviews should be general.

The first of the three interviews will be designed with general questions aimed at acquainting the interviewee with the different expectations or “rules of the game” in reflecting phenomenologically. A specific focus on each of the five existentials should only

be pursued in the second and third interviews. The assumption on the part of the researcher must be that the interviewees have never taken part in phenomenological research before and this first (approximately hour long) interview should be designed to encourage the interviewee to feel comfortable providing phenomenological-style descriptions. The interviewer can help facilitate this by the asking of relevant but quite general questions that are phrased along the lines of; “How did it feel when….?”, “How did it seem when….?”, “what was the impression of…like for you?

Additionally, this first interview should touch on the background behind the interviewee’s experience within that lifeworld. This provides the opportunity for the researcher to gather contextual data that may assist later in the data analysis stage when the researcher is seeking to uncover patterns or themes.

The second and third interviews should directly address the five existentials.

The five existentials serve as the structural and organisational backbone of the interview process. In the summative interviewee study, interviews two and three should focus on explicating the interviewees’ conscious experiences of lived time, lived space, lived self, lived others and lived objects within the selected life world.

The order in which these existentials are addressed can be left up to the researcher’s discretion. In saying this, as inferred by van Manen (2016b, pp. 101-106) lived time and lived space may be seen to fit well together in one interview due to their more abstract nature leaving the other, more concrete existentials to be addressed in the final interview.

The data needs to present the essential structures of the researched lifeworld.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology aims to reveal essential structures of conscious experience within the selected lifeworld. The data that results from the major study in the research must reflect this. This data will be grouped according to existential.

5.4 Phenomenological Lifeworld Research: Step-By-Step

Step 1: Introduction.

In the introduction, there are two primary objectives. Firstly, an explanation from the researcher as to why this particular lifeworld has been chosen. Secondly, an outline of the specific aims of the investigation into this particular lifeworld.

Step 2: Literature review.

The literature review reviews phenomenological research already conducted in relation to the chosen lifeworld. There will, in the literature review, be a particular focus on linking research findings to the five existentials. The literature review, as already stated and justified**,** may include within its scope:

1. Explicitly phenomenological research conducted on the given lifeworld.
2. Non-phenomenological research on the given lifeworld that has phenomenological import (for example psychological and sociological research).
3. Literary autobiographies and fiction.

Step 3: Formative autobiographical study.

This step involves, where appropriate, a series of phenomenological style reflections from the researcher that closely describe his/her own particular conscious experiences within the given *lifeworld*.

*Step 4: Analysis of formative autobiographical study***.**

This step involves a summary of the testable propositions developed as a result of the literature review and the formative autobiographical study. Each of these propositions will need to be explained and justified.

Step 5: Selection process and recruitment of interviewees.

This includes criteria for selection, the number of interviews, and an outline of the details of the interview process.

Step 6: Outline of semi-structured research questions for the three interviews.

This includes the outline of insight cultivators for interviews two and three.

Step 7. The interview process for the major summative interviewee study.

Step 8: Analysis of summative interviewee study.

This step involves the analysis of the data gained over the three interviews. The data will be categorised in reference to the propositions to be tested at the beginning of the research. At this stage the proposed essential structures of the chosen *lifeworld* will be set out and justified.

Step 9: Conclusion.

This step includes overall judgments that can be made on the data and how the research process and data may lead to inform further studies within the context of the given lifeworld/associated lifeworld.



Figure 2: Phenomenological Lifeworld Research: Key Stages

5.5 Role of Formative Autobiographical Study

It is stated in step three that, should the researcher have experienced the lifeworld under investigation, a formative autobiographical study should take place. In some respects this study appears similar to an authethnographic study (Ellis et al., 2011). In this section, firstly, the key elements and function of this autobiographical study will be set out. Secondly,

it will be shown which elements it has in common with an autoethnographic study and thirdly, those elements that distinguish it from an autoethnographic study.

Its function and key elements.

In order to derive propositions that are to be tested in the major summative study a significant amount of research is required. There are two possible sources of data that may be approached for the development of these propositions. The first is the descriptions offered within the extant literature on the lifeworld under investigation. The second, if relevant, is a description of the researcher's experiences within that lifeworld should s/he have experienced it.

In this formative autobiographical study, the researcher outlines a series of close descriptions of his/her experiences within that lifeworld. These descriptions should be phenomenological in style insofar as they seek to describe rather than explain the nature of the researcher's experience within that lifeworld.

Its autoethnographic elements.

The formative autobiographical study plays an integral role in the overall research process in a similar way to an autoethnographic study. (Ellis et al, 2011, p. 273). There is, within the context of the formative autobiographical study, the recognition that, contained within the lived experiences of the researcher, there may be material that contributes to the process of identifying essential structures within the lifeworld. This is similar to Ellis's summary of autoethnography's capacity to "use elements of personal experience to illustrate facets of cultural experience" (Ellis et al, 2011, p. 276).

The formative autobiographical study in phenomenological lifeworld research, should like an autoethnographic study in Ellis's view, be considered a product in its own right (Ellis et al 2011, p. 273). There is the hope that the autobiographical descriptions within a phenomenological lifeworld context may, in some sense, stand alone. Like a good

autoethnographic study, the descriptions offered should “bring readers into the scene” (Ellis et al, 2011, p. 277) in the sense of conveying the lived experiences of someone who has experienced that lifeworld ‘from the inside”.

In addition, as suggested by Du Preez (2008), akin to an autoethnographic study, the formative autobiographical study provides the means for the researcher to “locate themselves within the research” (Du Preez, 2008, p. 3). This is achieved through the formative autobiographical study’s capacity to provide the researcher with the space to consider their, hitherto unacknowledged, biases regarding the lifeworld under investigation. By becoming aware of such biases, the researcher, in the major summative study, will be aware when, for example, a line of questioning being pursued may be leading the interviewees to responses that are particular to the researcher’s lived experiences within the lifeworld under investigation rather than the interviewee’s. Primarily however, the descriptions offered in the formative autobiographical study are designed to point to possible elements of the researcher’s particular experiences which may have a more universal resonance. They may therefore contribute to the derivation of propositions to be tested against the lived experiences of the interviewees in the major summative study.

Why it is not an autoethnographic study.

The reticence within phenomenological lifeworld research about using the term autoethnographic study relates primarily to accepted notions of validity. Within an autoethnographic study, according to Ellis, “validity means that a work seeks verisimilitude; it evokes in readers a feeling that the experience is lifelike, believable and possible” (Ellis, 2011, p. 282). Within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research it is hoped that the descriptions provided do evoke these feelings. It needs to be stressed, however, that the findings derived from the formative autobiographical study are, in essence, only hypotheses about to tested on interviewees in the major summative study. Therefore, the findings derived

from the formative autobiographical study aren't findings in any substantive sense and should not be termed as such. It is for this reason that the term *formative autobiographical study* has been used to denote this initial study of the lifeworld under investigation. This is in contrast to the main *summative study* from which essential structures are derived from the descriptions offered by a significant number of interviewees all of whom are inhabitants of that lifeworld.

Phenomenological lifeworld research accepts and acknowledges the limitations of an autobiographical study. It is readily acknowledged that the single autobiographical study within phenomenological lifeworld research has "no rightful purchase on generalisability" (McIlveen, 2008, p. 5). Rather, this study should be viewed as playing a significant role in the development of testable propositions that will be tested against the descriptions of experiences presented by many other participants in the lifeworld under investigation. Within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research, the perspective offered by the researcher in the formative autobiographical study is treated as one perspective among many. It is intended that this one perspective is not afforded any more strength than the others in the derivation of essential structures at the conclusion of the research process.

5.6 Summary of Part One

In part one, in a bid for clarity, the essential elements of phenomenology were set out. This was followed by a summary of the phenomenological interpretations of (the early) Edmund Husserl (2012) and Martin Heidegger (2008).

After this examination of phenomenology's philosophical roots, the benefits and concerns in applying a phenomenological investigative approach was established. Then, a critical exposition of the three dominant phenomenological research methodologies was set out. At the conclusion of this exposition it was argued, concerns notwithstanding, that Max van Manen's *hermeneutic method* (2016a, 2016b) was the most suitable foundation from which to develop a robust and flexible phenomenological research methodology.

Building on elements of van Manen's hermeneutic method, the key elements of the proposed research methodology were outlined. These key elements centred on the establishment of the four essential pillars of phenomenological lifeworld research.

Developing and justifying a research methodology in the abstract, as has been done in part one is, of course, necessary. Yet, in agreement with Giorgi (2009, p. 139) it is only in its application that its efficacy can be properly assessed. In part two the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology will be applied to the lifeworld new migrants. Then, in part three, the efficacy of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology will be assessed in light of this application.

PART TWO: APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY.

CHAPTER SIX: LITERATURE REVIEW

Before the main literature review is set out in chapter 6.5 a background establishing the rationale, aim and scope of the intended research will be set out. Throughout the remainder of this thesis, when referring to personal autobiographical experiences relating to the lifeworld of being a new migrant, the first-person perspective will be adopted. In all other instances the third person perspective will be continued.

6.1 Background

Over the past two decades I have lived, for extended periods of time, in several locations around the world. After each move, I noticed a qualitative shift in the way that I experienced my surroundings. In a way, these qualitative differences were like a leit-motif. There seemed to be similarities in the way that, after each move, my mode of engagement with my new surroundings evolved.

Of all of my migration experiences, however, the one that foregrounded this qualitative shift most of all was when I moved to Moscow. Here, unlike the previous moves to countries with similar linguistic and cultural traditions to my own, the qualitative shift was presented, in the “major key”. The change in the way that I engaged with my environment, in previous moves, could, more easily be passed over, due, perhaps, to the relative ease with which I could immerse myself unthinkingly into my new life. They could not be so easily passed over in Moscow.

Unfortunately, I did not have the time to pursue, in detail, the nature and make-up of the differences in my mode of experiencing the world. Instead, I had to devote my energy to adjusting and adapting to the wholly new and strange context I found myself in. Now, however, with the benefit of some temporal and spatial distance, I do have the time to

systematically investigate the nature of my own experience within the lifeworld context of being a new migrant.

In subsequent discussions, I spoke with migrants (in particular those who have migrated to countries whose primary language is not their first language) and found, that the qualitative shift in experience that I had, in many instances, was shared by them. When I spoke of how I experienced and engaged with elements of my new environment, there would often be a glimmer of recognition. There would also be a retelling of their own, similar, experiences. It was from these repeated conversations where, personal anecdotes founded on similar perceptions of a new world were shared, that the idea of conducting a formal phenomenological investigation into the lifeworld of new migrants began.

6.2 Aim of Research

The aim of the intended research is to derive essential structures of conscious experience that exist within the context of the lifeworld of new migrants. All essential structures derived will be presented in relation to each of the five existentials of lived time, lived space, lived objects, lived other, and lived self.

6.3 Scope of Research

Before the research takes place, it is required to establish the scope of the research. The aim of the research is to derive essential structures of the lifeworld of new migrants. Yet, what is meant by “migrant” needs to be further clarified.

Within the scope of this investigation the understanding of migrant is similar to that proposed by Grinberg and Grinberg (1989, p. 17) Bhugra and Becker (2005, p. 18) and Niedomsyl and Fransson (2014). Each of whom suggest that a migrant is an individual who has relocated to a different physical location for an extended period of time.

To this will be added three further criteria. Firstly, the migrant has relocated to a different country. Secondly, in this country a different language is spoken. Thirdly, the relocation is voluntary.

These refinements are necessary so as to distinguish the scope of the current research from other related but distinct *lifeworlds.* These related lifeworlds might be of the tourist (where there is no intention to remain in the new location for an extended period of time), the asylum seeker or exile (where the relocation cannot be considered voluntary) and the internal migrant (who moves within the borders of their own country).

To summarise, the scope of his research is to derive the essential structures from the lifeworld of *new migrants who have voluntarily moved to another country where a different language is spoken.*

6.4 Research Sample: Justification

The proposed research will include two studies. The first, formative autobiographical study will relate to the author of this thesis' migration experience in Moscow, Russia. The second, main summative interviewee study will involve 12 Russian migrants who migrated to Australia.

It may be considered presumptuous to suggest that essential structures of the lifeworld of *all* migrants who have relocated to another country with another language can be derived on the basis of a researcher and 12 Russian migrants' experiences. The reasons for choosing such a homogeneous sample is set out below:

1. The intended research is a point of departure into investigating the lifeworld of new migrants. The essential structures derived from the research are designed to be refined, confirmed or rejected in future studies focused on different migrant groups. They are not presented as the final word on the lifeworld.

2. The examination of the lifeworld of Russian migrants serves as a counterpoint to the author of this thesis' own migrant experience in Russia. By focusing on Russian migrants, the author will better able to eliminate those contingent elements of the lifeworld of new migrants that are particular to Russian migrants coming to Australia or that were particular to the author's migration experience in Russia.
3. By focusing on a homogenous group it will make it easier for future researchers to gauge which essential structures derived may be particular to Russian migrants moving to Australia.

6.5 Introduction to Literature Review

This literature review has two primary purposes. The first is to review the extant relevant phenomenological literature on migration. This is done with a view to justifying the value of the proposed phenomenological lifeworld research investigation into the lifeworld of new migrants. This literature review will, therefore, demonstrate that the proposed research fills a gap within the current phenomenological literature into migration.

Secondly, the literature review will outline what descriptive data has been identified within both the relevant research and non-research literature relating to the lifeworld of new migrants. This will be done with the aim of assisting in the development of propositions related to the five existentials of the lifeworld of new migrants. These propositions will be tested in the main summative interviewee study.

This literature review will have four sections:

1. The first section will provide a review of the literature that justifies the value of a broadly qualitative approach to researching the phenomenon of migration.
2. The second section will outline existing phenomenological research that is focused on the phenomenon of migration. In so doing, it will be demonstrated that the proposed research fills an investigative gap. There is an investigative gap insofar as there is no

evidence of any extant phenomenological research into the lifeworld of new migrants (or migrants more generally) that seeks to derive essential elements with reference to the descriptions offered by migrant interviewees.

3. The third section will outline a range of other approaches concerned with the lifeworld of migrants. This will be done with an eye to locating relevant phenomenological type descriptions to aid in the development of propositions to be tested in the main summative interviewee study. By doing so, the value of surveying literature outside the formal, qualitative research sphere will be demonstrated. In addition, the limitations of referring to investigations into the lifeworld of migrants that adopt psychological or sociological methodologies will be highlighted.
4. Fourthly, with reference to the five existentials of the lifeworld of new migrants, a summary of points will be made that may contribute to the development of propositions to be tested in the main summative interviewee study.

6.6 The Value of Qualitative Research into Migration

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is a definitively qualitative approach to research. In this section a summary of the reasons why such a qualitative research approach to migration should be considered valuable will be offered. All of these justifications will be derived from the writings of active researchers within the sphere of migration research.

Three main reasons reinforcing the value of qualitative research into the phenomenon of migration will be derived. They are as follows:

1. Qualitative research assists quantitative research in providing a full and balanced perspective on the phenomenon of migration.
2. Qualitative research reveals the limitations in approaching the phenomenon using purely quantitative approaches.

3. Qualitative research, by investigating the phenomenon of migration from the subject's perspective, assists in humanising the migrant.

Qualitative research assists quantitative research in providing a full and balanced perspective on the phenomenon of migration.

It is suggested by Leese et al., (2013) that a qualitative research approach to the phenomenon of migration adds balance and perspective to dominant (non-migrant) perspectives that prevail in contemporary discourse (p. 10). He reinforces that, "what migrants say about themselves is as important, or as irrelevant, as what social investigators, legislators or journalists have said about them" (p. 11). Similarly, Fedyuk and Zantai (2018, p. 174) highlight the capacity for qualitative approaches to migration to provide a "thickness of data" (p. 174) that cannot be attained through solely quantitative means. King (2018, p. 36) reinforces the importance of the researcher understanding context within the sphere of migration research. He goes further by suggesting that in order to have an appropriate grasp of the migrant's context, the researcher must have an understanding of the perspectives of that migrant. Gu (2013), similarly, reinforces the importance of the researcher "understanding the subject's life experiences" (507) in order to have a fuller understanding of the migrant's context.

Iosifides (2011) suggests that qualitative research within the sphere of migration offers balance to quantitative approaches by highlighting the alternative "dimensions of migratory phenomena" (p. 1) that are accessible only through a qualitative investigative approach. These dimensions include "meaning making and interpretive understanding" (p. 1) that can only be grasped through a qualitative approach to investigating migration. In a similar vein, Düvell (2012) suggests that qualitative research into migration has the capacity to uncover "not the quantitative dispersal of patterns" (p. 6) but rather, "patterns and types of [subjective] decision making experiences and processes" (p. 6, my brackets). Xenitidou and

Sapountzis (2018) point to qualitative investigative approaches' capacity to demonstrate how migrants engage with the achieving of the migrant specific goals within their new context (p. 76).

As a cautionary point, however, Singleton (1999) highlights a danger in justifying the value of qualitative research solely in virtue of its ability to provide balance to data gained using quantitative means. He suggests that such a view can lead to the implicit understanding that qualitative research into migration is simply supplementary or inferior to quantitative approaches (p. 52).

Qualitative research reveals the limitations in approaching the phenomenon using purely quantitative approaches.

The capacity of qualitative research to capture features of the lifeworld of the migrant rather than of the objective physical world is a point that is made by Morawska (2018, p. 7). Indeed, she reinforces the value of qualitative research within the context of migration studies by highlighting its capacity to "render more accurate representations of the actual life-worlds of those who inhabit them than purely quantitative survey and analyses can" (p. 7). This point is reiterated by Zapata-Barrero and Yalaz (2018) who cite the capacity for qualitative modes of investigation to shine a light on the lived experiences or, "voices of social actors and immigrant groups" (Zapata-Barrero & Yalaz, 2018. p. 2), as well as Boccagni (2012) who states that a qualitative approach to research provides an understanding of "a particular degree of 'embodiment' within migrant life-worlds" (p. 305).

Niedomsyl and Fransson (2014, p. 357) highlight the limitations of singularly quantitative approaches in grasping what the phenomenon of migration properly amounts to. They "problematise" the concept of migration by suggesting that it cannot be properly understood in purely quantitative, "spatio-temporal terms" (i.e., as simply being the physical relocation of a person to a different space for an extended period of time). Carling (2012, p.

139) reinforces this limitation. He tries (in vain) to elaborate a workable quantitative definition of migration (Interestingly, a problem which would be solved if the *subjective* intent of the migrant to remain in their current location was factored in).

Oxford (2012, p. 415), Singleton (1999, p. 2), and Castles (2012, p. 10) all reinforce the limitations of quantitative data regarding its inflexibility. Within the context of migration, Oxford (2012) suggests quantitative researchers often rely on data collected by government agencies. Data, she suggests, is often tailored to governmental needs and is general. Such data often fails to meet the needs of the migration researcher who may be interested in researching a specific and nuanced element that is missed by such "one size fits all" quantitative data collection methods. Such specific and nuanced elements of migration, she suggests, may be more easily addressed through a flexible, qualitative approach.

Qualitative research into migration assists in humanising the migrant

Within the migration literature that espouses the benefits of a qualitative approach a repeated point made is that qualitative research, by its very nature, "humanises" the subjects that it researches. Leese et al., (2013) reinforce this capacity of qualitative research to lead to a deeper understanding of migrants who might, in quantitative research be understood simply as, "an arrow on a chart" (p. 10). Düvell (2012) also recognises this humanising capacity of qualitative research when he suggests that it has the capacity to "capture the research subject's unique voices, hence their individual expressions, ideas and emotions" (p. 6).

6.7 Extant Phenomenological Research into the Lifeworld of Migrants

In this section it will be demonstrated that the proposed phenomenological lifeworld research into the lifeworld of migration fills a gap within the existing phenomenological migration literature. It will be shown that there is no evidence of any extant phenomenological research into the lifeworld of migrants that seeks, firstly, to derive essential structures of the lifeworld, as well as, doing so with reference to descriptions

provided by a number of interviewee participants of that lifeworld. It will be demonstrated that the extant phenomenological research into the lifeworld of migrants fits into one of two categories:

1. Phenomenological research that seeks to establish the essential structures of the lifeworld of the new migrant. Yet, it does so on the basis of the researcher's descriptions alone.
2. Phenomenological research that only provides a partial investigation into the lifeworld of the new migrant. It does not seek out the essential structures of the lifeworld.

Phenomenological research into the lifeworld of migrants that derives essential structures on the basis of the researcher's descriptions alone.

Within the extant phenomenological literature there exists a small, philosophically oriented collection of works that do seek to derive essential structures of the lifeworld of migrants.

Perhaps the most comprehensive and influential investigation into the lifeworld of the new migrant is that offered by Schutz in *The Stranger* (1944). In *The Stranger,* Schutz makes a number of points that, intuitively, appear to point to essential structures within the lifeworld of a migrant. He speaks, for example, of the stranger's ("migrant's") distanced, almost "spectator" view of others within the context of his/her new lifeworld (p. 502). He also speaks of the framing horizon of meaning, whereby the migrant in his/her experience of objects is always setting them up in contrast to objects from his/her previous, pre-migration life (p. 502).

What is apparent, however, is that this phenomenological treatment of the lifeworld of the new migrant offered by Schutz, appears to derive these essential structures *on the basis of the lived experiences of Schutz himself.* At no point does Schutz verify the essential structures presented with reference to the lived experiences of any interviewees. So, as

phenomenologically astute as the essential structures presented by Schutz are, one may, for the same reason Gelven questioned Heidegger's phenomenological analysis in *Being and Time* (2008) ask, "Does [this analysis] not remain always at best a kind of autobiography?" (Gelven, 1989, p. 42, my square brackets).

Bollnow (1961) offers a philosophical-phenomenological treatment of "lived space". Like Schutz, prima facie, there is much that is of relevance to the lifeworld of new migrants. He remarks that in one's house or private dwelling, "walls carve out of universal space a special and to some extent private space and this separates an inner space from an outer space. This duality of inner and outer space is fundamental to the creation of the total lived space" (Bollnow, 1961, p. 3).

In a similar way to the examples given by Schutz (1944), the almost sacred value ascribed by Bollnow to this "safe" inner space, seems to touch on a truth of the new migrant's lifeworld. However, also like in the case of Schutz, it can only be assumed that this generalisation is drawn only from the personal experiences of Bollnow himself. There are no references to the lived experiences of interviewees.

In *Qualitative Methods in Migration Studies* (2011), Iosifides, highlights a concern relating to the problem of generalising findings within the bounds of phenomenological research into migration. He suggests, "It is extremely difficult to comprehend the practical utility of phenomenological data given that phenomenological findings are nothing more than subjective or intersubjective meanings attached to researchers' lived experiences" (2011, p. 103). He continues, that in phenomenological approaches to migration research, "we are left with no criteria for judging between different or contradictory findings of other phenomenological research teams on the same topic" (p. 102). He concludes by suggesting that the "presuppositions of phenomenology preclude any evaluation of findings regarding their validity" (p. 103).

Iosifides concern, holds true for the works of Schutz and Bollnow. Within phenomenological research (as opposed, perhaps, to phenomenological philosophy) the researcher is not justified in generalising essential structures on the basis of his/her conscious experiences alone.

Partial research into the lifeworld of migrants that does not seek to derive essential structures.

A vast majority of the extant phenomenological research into the phenomenon of migration offers, in different ways, a partial investigation of the lifeworld of new migrants. Within the phenomenological literature focused on migration, there is a significant amount of research that is partial insofar as it seeks simply to provide particular descriptive accounts without attempting to derive essential structures on the basis of those descriptions. Batuchina's (2015) phenomenological investigation of an aspect of the lived experiences of migrants adopts an interpretation of van Manen's hermeneutic method. This interpretation leads her to reject any attempt to derive essential structures (Batuchina, 2015, p. 8). Indeed, Batuchina makes plain that there will be no generalising of essential structures when she remarks, "according to M. van Manen (2014b) the text in phenomenology is the main result" (Batuchina, 2015, p. 9).

Timotejivic and Breakwell justify their rejection of the derivation of essential structures by referring to Smith's IPA (2000, p. 361). Therefore, like Batuchina, they are not interested in anything more than the provision of close descriptions of particular interviewees' descriptions of their lived experiences within the lifeworld of migration. It is a matter of interest that, in their conclusion, Timotejiivic and Breakwell appear to recognise the limitations of a research methodology that refuses to generalise essential structures on the basis of interviewees' descriptions. They comment, "The choice of method may…point to the possible problem in generalising from the current data" (2000, p. 369).

Unlike Timotejivic, Breakwell and Batuchina, Wu (1991) provides evocative descriptions of her own lived experiences as a migrant. However, like Timotejivic and Breakwell and Batuchina there is a reticence to go beyond these descriptions and infer essential structures within the lifeworld.

Partial research into the lifeworld of migrants that focus on a small migrant group or restricted aspect of the lifeworld

There are examples of phenomenological investigation into the lived experiences of migrants that do, broadly speaking, seek to draw essential structures on the basis of descriptions offered by interviewees. These investigations, in their different ways, however, do not investigate the lived experiences of new migrants per se. Instead, their focus is partial. They focus on the lived experiences of a narrow cross section of migrants (e.g, children or nurses) or on a specific element of the lived experience of migrants (e.g, the lived experience of time and space).

Kirova (2016) cites van Manen as a methodological template (p. 1) but unlike Batuchina (2015), seems to interpret him in a manner that allows for the derivation of essential structures (p. 3). Kirova, however, restricts her focus to the derivation of essential elements related to the lifeworld of child migrants**.** Jackson (2018) restricts his focus to Sierra Leonian migrants to the UK. Omeri and Atkins (2001) as well as Troy et al. (2007) phenomenologically investigate focus the lived experiences of migrant nurses and, in the case of Shubin, (2015) the focus is squarely on a phenomenological investigation of the migrant experience of space and time (Shubin, 2015, p. 351).

Summary of the phenomenological literature into the lifeworld of migration

It is important to note that much of the research literature presented provides valuable and perceptive descriptive accounts relating to the lifeworld of new migrants. As was demonstrated, however, none of the literature set out to do what the proposed research

intends to do, that is, derive the essential structures of the lifeworld of new migrants that is justified with reference to descriptions provided by a number of participants within that lifeworld.

6.8 Other Qualitative Investigations into the Lifeworld of Migrants

An important component of the literature review within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research is to investigate a broad range of research and non-research literature (van Manen, 2016a, pp. 318-319) with a view to gaining descriptions that may assist in developing propositions to be tested in the main summative study.

It is important to reiterate that phenomenological investigation demands the *description* rather than *explanation* of conscious experiences (see chapter 2.1). Therefore, in order to uncover relevant material outside the sphere of phenomenological research one must be careful. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, a significant proportion of the qualitative literature concerned with the lifeworld of migrants seeks to go *beyond* the phenomenological call for description.

Autobiographical investigations into the lifeworld of new migrants.

A number of works that may be termed literary autobiographies were found to contain descriptions relevant to the lifeworld of the new migrant that possess phenomenological significance. They may therefore assist in the derivation of possible propositions.

Eva Hoffman's *Lost in Translation* (1989) provides many fine-grained descriptions of the lived experiences of a migrant in her new world. Evocative descriptions that characterise the shock of a migrant arriving to Canada from Poland, experiencing new objects within a new context are evident, descriptions such as, "These are not friendly fields, the farmyards of Polish countryside, this is vast, dull and formless*"* (Hoffman, 1989, p. 100) are frequent throughout the work.

Said's writings on the lived experiences of migrants in *Reflections on Exile* (2012) and *Out of Place* (2000), like Hoffman, provide a number of descriptions related to the lifeworld of a migrant that possess phenomenological value. Said, for example, speaks of the framing of present conscious experiences within the new world of migration with the background presence of memories from the world recently left behind, "The line-straight street streets, the forest of tall buildings…contrasted starkly with Cairo's meandering, leisurely, much more disorganized and yet unthreatening style" (2000, p. 134).

Philosopher, Alain de Botton's *The Art of Travel* (2014) might also be termed an autobiography. Although not specifically about the lifeworld of migrants, it contains a number of close descriptions of objects and others in an environment presented from the perspective of an individual who is new to that environment.

Not all autobiographical accounts of migration, however, were found to be equally valuable. *A Different Light: Ways of Being Australian* (Chryssides, 1995) provides a number of autobiographical reflections from the perspective of migrant Australians reflecting upon their early migration experiences. Evocative as these reflections are, they are of limited phenomenological value insofar as there is a repeated tendency for the migrants interviewed to *explain and justify* the nature of their experiences rather than simply *describe them.*

Fictional investigations into the lifeworld of new migrants.

Fictional literature containing close descriptions relevant to the lifeworld of the new migrant was also located. It is acknowledged that these descriptions are not, ostensibly, derived from the lived experiences of the author. Yet, many of the descriptions presented do appear to have a resonance with the lifeworld of new migrants.

Kafka's *The Castle* (1997) is referred to by Stonebridge (2019) as a "migrant story". In it, Kafka provides a series of descriptions that depict the kinds of experiences one might have when one has moved to a new context and decided to move there permanently, "K

constantly had the feeling that he had lost his way…where even the air held no trace of home" (p.41).

Camus', *The Outsider* (1982) and Sartre's *Nausea* (1965) although, both not ostensibly migration novels also provide descriptions pertinent to the lived experiences of migrants who are required to engage with others without possessing a background understanding of the necessary rules for those engagements. The protagonist Meursault, for example, in *The Outsider* remarks:

> I noticed at this point that everyone was meeting and welcoming everyone else and chatting away, as if this were some sort of club where people are happy to find themselves in a familiar world. That was how I explained the peculiar impression I had of being out of place, a bit like an intruder (1982, p. 82).

Sartre's "phenomenological novel" *Nausea* (1965) is doubly valuable insofar as that it also provides a model of how to provide accurate phenomenological style descriptions shorn of all of the potentially obfuscating philosophical-phenomenological jargon of works such as his major philosophical work *Being and Nothingness* (1972). One of the most evocative and richest fictional descriptions of the lifeworld of the new migrant, however, is *The Arrival* (Tan, 2006). A graphic novel without text that seeks to capture the lived experience of strangeness that is characteristic of new migrants' lived experience of their new world.

Research conducted within other qualitative fields.

Within other fields of qualitative research into migration, there is also a focus on the first-person, lived experiences of migrants. However, descriptions given within other qualitative research contexts often serve some underlying theoretical end and are, therefore, of less phenomenological value (Madison, 2009, p. 23). The descriptions provided in, for example, psychological research are often attached to and intertwined with, some underlying psychological theory (Madison, 2009, p. 23).

Psychological research into the lifeworld of new migrants

In Grinberg and Grinberg's *Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Migration and Exile* (1989) there are a number of descriptions related to the lifeworld of migrants derived, from interviews with patients**.** Yet such descriptions of the way the lifeworld is experienced are at the service of attempting to explain, in psychological terms, why the migrant experiences their new world in the mode that they do. In Grinberg and Grinberg's instance, there is the underlying supposition that the act of migration, like birth, is a traumatic event (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1989, pp. 13-15) and that describing the migrant's lived experiences may assist the researcher in discerning the effects of this trauma (p. 12). Although there are a number of relevant descriptions given from the perspective of new migrants, a number of others are intwined with analytic theory.

Kristeva (1991) too, makes a number of relevant descriptive points related to the lived experiences of migrants. She, for example, speaks of the sense of freedom a migrant experiences with regards their sense of self within their new context (p. 21). Yet, like Grinberg and Grinberg she links this descriptive point to an underlying psychological theory. In this instance it is the liberation of oneself from the "challenge of parental overbearance" (Kristeva, 1991, p.21).

Bhugra and Becker (2005), also, provide descriptions of the lived experience of migration but, in their case, the descriptions are offered through the psychological lens of "cultural bereavement" (Bhugra & Becker, 2005, p. 19).

In Oberg's *Culture Shock* (1960), descriptions presumably derived from interviewee accounts, are presented through a "stage based" lens. These stages run from the "honeymoon stage" to the "almost complete adjustment stage" (p. 143).

Of all of the literature related to the psychology of migration, the most phenomenologically oriented is Madison (2005, 2007, 2009). Madison repeatedly

acknowledges his indebtedness to Heideggerian phenomenology (Madison, 2009, pp. 25-27) and provides many close descriptions relevant to the lifeworld of the new migrant. Although Madison does focus on providing phenomenological-style descriptions he does so in a characteristically psychological bid to "move beyond the surface appearances" (p. 14) after the descriptions are given.

The research conducted within the psychology of migration is unified in that most (but not all) of the descriptions are presented as a means to support some form of underlying psychological theory. This, tendency as demonstrated in chapter 2.1 runs counter to the phenomenological goal of the *describing rather than explaining* the nature of conscious experiences.

Sociological research into the lifeworld of new migrants.

Some of the descriptions provided within the qualitative sphere of the sociology of migration were also found to be phenomenologically appropriate. In the case of many of these descriptions however, they were offered as a vehicle to investigate what underlying social and cultural factors may have caused or come about as a consequence of those experiences.

Simmel (1950), for example, provides a descriptive account of the stranger's (migrant's) engagement with others within the lifeworld of migration (Simmel, 1950, p. 1). He suggests that s/he engages with others, "with the specific attitude of objectivity…it is a particular structure comprised of distance and nearness" (p. 2). Yet in making this descriptive point, there is an overarching desire to make a sociological point, i.e of the subsequent ambivalence of the relationship between the migrant and the society of which they are now a part (p. 2).

Amelina (2017, p. 3) speaks of the sociology of migration's focus on the nature of migrants' identity after migration takes place. In such instances, descriptive accounts are of

service in answering such sociological questions. She also speaks of the increasing focus in the sociology of migration on the "gendered nature of migration processes" (p. 5). Again, descriptive accounts of the modes in which male and female migrants experience their new world may be used as a vehicle for elaborating theories in related to these migration processes.

Ahmed (1999) provides a number of phenomenologically astute descriptions from the research perspective of cultural studies. She, for example, speaks of the comfort experienced in airports within the context of migration, "There was always something comforting, familiar about airports…they gave me a sense of purpose and security, I was there with a definite destination" (p. 330).Yet, again like the non-phenomenological, qualitative research treatment presented, such descriptions are provided within the framing context of answering a theoretical question. In this instance by asking how migration complicates the migrant's notion of what "home" means (p. 330).

Summary of other qualitative investigations into the lifeworld of new migrants.

It has been demonstrated that phenomenologically appropriate descriptions of aspects of the lifeworld of new migrants are given outside of the phenomenological research sphere.

It became evident throughout the collection of relevant literature that the non-research literature, comprising autobiographies and literary fiction was the most fruitful place to uncover phenomenologically appropriate descriptions relating to the lifeworld of new migrants.

It was also demonstrated that the qualitative disciplines of the psychology and sociology of migration do contain many phenomenologically appropriate descriptions (particularly within the works of Grinberg and Grinberg (1989) and Madison (2009)) relating to the life world of new migrants. What was also demonstrated, however, was that in these

research disciplines many of the descriptions afforded from the migrant's perspective are intertwined with some underlying explanatory psychological or sociological theory.

6.9 Research Literature and the Five Existentials

One of the main functions of the literature review within the context of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is to isolate relevant phenomenologically appropriate descriptions. These descriptions come from a range of sources and, collectively, may assist in the development of the propositions to be tested in the main summative interviewee study. The following is a brief summary of some of the points raised in the literature review that are relevant to the five existentials of the lifeworld of new migrants.

The existential of time

- Point 1: Hoffman (1989) and Said (2000), based on their own experiences of migration, point to the continual presence of their past, pre-migration experiences that framed all of their present experiences while they were new migrants.
- Point 2: Grinberg and Grinberg (1989, p. 63) point to (their migrant clients) experiencing of the present framed by the projection into the future of remaining in this new and, for them, strange location.

The existential of space

- Point 3: Ahmed (1999, p. 330) and Rapport and Dawson (1998) speak of the comfort for migrants in what they call "liminal spaces". These are spaces of transition and departure. Spaces such as airports and train stations.
- Point 4: Bollnow (1961, p. 3) draws a marked distinction between the lived experience of "inner" spaces (such as the home or the apartment) and the "outer" spaces outside of the harm.

The existential of objects

- Point 5: De Botton (2016, p. 69) hints at the initial strangeness and exoticism of objects particular to the place that has been moved to.
- Point 6: Madison (2009, p. 37) hints at a different relationship with those objects that may be used unthinkingly in a pre-migration context (due to a lack of awareness of how they are used).

The existential of others

- 7. Schutz (1944, pp. 500-501) suggests that the perspective of the new migrant to others is, initially, akin to a spectator rather than a participant.
- 8. Tan's illustrations (2006) suggest that strangers to a new migrant are experienced as "more other" than strangers in a pre-migration context.

The existential of self

- 9. Kristeva (1991) infers that the new migrant experiences him/herself as possessing a heightened degree of freedom.
- 10. Wu (1991) suggests that the new migrants have a heightened self-consciousness in public spaces.

6.10 Summary

This literature review has demonstrated that there is a role for qualitative research (of which phenomenological research is a representative) within the context of migration research. It has also demonstrated that the proposed phenomenological lifeworld investigation into the lifeworld of new migrants fills an investigative gap. There exists no phenomenological research that seeks to derive the essential structures within the lifeworld, on the basis of interviewee descriptions. It has also demonstrated that, within the broader literature (both research and non-research) there exists a wealth of relevant phenomenologically appropriate descriptions that can contribute to the development of testable propositions. Finally, a number of general points have been raised, on the strength of

the relevant literature, that may contribute to the development of propositions to be tested in the main summative interviewee study.

The thesis will now set out the formative autobiographical study. It will firstly set out the framework for the study and will then present relevant descriptions from the lifeworld of a new migrant.

CHAPTER SEVEN: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STUDY

7.1 Framework

The primary objective of study the formative autobiographical study, is to contribute to the derivation of testable propositions from the lifeworld of a new migrant. These propositions will be derived from phenomenological descriptions of the author's own conscious experiences in the first year of living as a migrant in Moscow, Russia. These propositions will then serve as hypotheses to be tested against the descriptions of conscious experiences provided by the migrants interviewed in study the major summative study. The process adopted in order to arrive at these descriptions and subsequent propositions is set out as follows:

Step one: Sketching conscious reflections.

Particular conscious experiences that come to mind when reflecting upon the entirety of the migration experience are sketched out. Some sketches are a few sentences in length, some a few words. All elements are jotted down so they were not forgotten later on.

Step two: Adding detail to conscious reflections.

In this step, attention is given to each sketch in turn. Time is taken to focus on the experiential details and to develop these reflections from rough sketches into more developed descriptions of conscious episodes. Energy is spent on ensuring that each conscious experience described goes beyond being a vague outline. Specific colours, objects, smells etc. are included.

The language is kept as neutral as possible. Any use of emotive language or language that infers causal factors lying behind the conscious experiences is avoided. This is done repeatedly. Each episodic reflection is refined and added to over a period of time.

Step three: Organising conscious reflections into chronological order.

The completed phenomenological descriptions of conscious experiences are set out in chronological order and presented.

Step four: Analysis of conscious reflections according to existential.

After the descriptions have been presented, they are analysed according to each of the five existentials. This is done in order to arrive at tentative essential elements to be used as propositions to be tested in the major summative study.

Step five: A summary of propositions is presented.

A summary of those testable propositions derived from the reflections is given. These will act as hypotheses to be tested in the major summative study will and inform the questions asked to the interviewees.

7.2 Descriptions

The following is a collection of descriptions relating to my experiences in the early stages of migration. They are derived from my experiences in Moscow, Russia in the period between 2002 and 2004.

7.2.1 Arriving

Late in the afternoon. Sitting on a plane. Descending through grey cloud. The ground is becoming visible for the first time. There is snow flecked with dirt lying on the muddy fields. Stretching to the horizon there are small clusters of blue, green and brown houses. They are sitting tightly together along sections of narrow roads. Their colours are new, different and surprising: greens, blues and reds. They all have white, lace like window frames.

A woman is sitting next to me. She is tense. Glancing quickly at her face: her eyes are closed. She is breathing sharply. Looking out the window again. Vapour is trailing from the plane's wing. A long way below the vapour, square cars are moving on roads. Seeing the

windows of the cars, looking closely in the windows. There are shapes of people moving inside them.

Dropping below the level of the tallest airport buildings. Looking directly into the glass façade of one of them. Lower still. The tyres hit the tarmac. Sensing the tension of the woman next to me. Speeding on the ground past the main terminal. Catching a glimpse of the letters on the top of the terminal building. The **III** stands out.

Slowing down. The plane nears the end of the runaway. Applause. The volume of the engine reduces but the hum remains. The plane is looping back towards the main terminal building. Accompanying the hum of the engine is the hubbub of relaxed conversation. I don't understand the words, but the tone is familiar, "What time do you think we'll get home?", "I can't be bothered going back to work tomorrow". I know these conversations. They are framed by a confidence in next steps. I don't have confidence in my next steps.

Coming to a stop outside the terminal. The engine is still humming. Looking inside: rows of empty seats facing out over the tarmac. Evening is coming. The lights of the terminal building is highlighting the fact that snow is falling. "Was it snowing before?", "No, it can't have been" The tarmac only has the thinnest coating of white.

The engine stops. The relaxed conversation continues. The seatbelt lights go off followed by a chime. Everyone stands up. The overhead lockers are being opened. Coats are being retrieved. The coats are all sombre in colour and most of them have hoods that are framed in light coloured fur.

7.2.2 Travelling from the airport

Night-time. Being driven in a taxi from the airport to my apartment. Looking around me. There is nothing distinctively Russian about the car, the highway, the driver, or the coldness of the night. From a distance, there doesn't appear to be anything distinctively Russian about the advertising billboards.

The first billboard approaches. Black background, a white wrist and a silver watch. The form and content are familiar. The driver is bathed in the light of the billboard. Suddenly, the shock of the **Ж**. It hits me hard. Previously, this symbol has been experienced as an oddity in a Russian language guide. It had been experienced at a safe distance.

The billboard recedes into the background. I am trying to sound out one of its words in my mind. More billboards. This mental translation is turning into a game. As each billboard approaches, I try to compute what the letters of the shortest words add up to. This stops after five or six attempts. I can't do it.

Looking at the taxi driver, "He has effortless, automatic access to the words on those billboards", "If I asked him what that says he could tell me without taking his eyes off the road".

More billboards passing by. Frustration replaced by anticipation. Projecting into the future. An imagining, "A future journey, largely identical to this one. On this journey I will, like the taxi driver, be able to unthinkingly grasp the meaning of the words on these billboards".

7.2.3 Entering my bedroom for the first time.

Late at night. At the end of the small hallway, Roma is extending his arm towards the door. "Bedroom". Pushing the door open. walking into my new room. Shutting the door. It is dark inside. The only light coming into the room is through the semi-transparent curtains. The scraps of light are from the windows of the apartment building opposite. Feeling for the light switch on the wall beside the door. There is nothing. Reaching further along the textured wallpaper… feeling the texture of ... a rug!?

Running my hand even further along the wall, taking a couple of steps. The rug is continuing its journey along the wall, almost to the corner of the room. No light-switch. Returning to the door. Feeling, once more, for a switch. A sensation on my shoulder, a small,

bell shaped plastic toggle dangling down from the ceiling. I pull it: “duk, duk”: the lights go on.

The shock of the light. It has a different quality. A low double bed with an old-fashioned burgundy duvet. A dozen or so teddy bears are scattered about the bed’s pillows. Sitting beside the bed. To my right, a duchess, containing more soft toys and…crystalware!? The windows behind the semi-transparent pink curtains are reflecting the bed, the teddy bears, the rug on the wall and me. I’m standing in the middle of the room.

7.2.4 Coming home on the bus

Mid-afternoon. Sliding into a seat behind the central exit doors on the 792 bus. Looking out the window. Making no distinction between buildings, bus stops or street corners. Everything outside the bus is an irrelevant whole. The bus is moving.

Descending an overpass. The bus swings sharply 180 degrees. The middle of the bus concertinas back on itself. Continuing past a kiosk. Yes, I passed that blue ice-cream kiosk last time.

Each corner, is being turned with the hope that the subsequent view will be familiar. Turning another corner. “I don’t recognise that building”, “Has the bus taken a different turn?”. Looking through the window on the other side of the bus. “This is unfamiliar” The bus is slowing down. Relief, “This bus stop is familiar”

Turning a corner. There’s *the* bus stop at the end of the road. The semi sheltered seats opposite the mini supermarket with the bright red roof.

Standing up. The bus is slowing. Looking through the window of the bus behind the mini supermarket with the bright red roof. A dozen or so identical looking apartment blocks. “Which is mine?”. Recounting the formula, “Off the bus, behind the mini supermarket with the red roof, past a corrugated iron car garage, two apartment blocks and then in with code 1984” Opening the zip on my rucksack and getting my apartment keys out.

7.2.5 Buying something for the first time.

Opening the swinging doors that separate the inside of the local metro station from the outside. Both sides of the short underground passageway are lined by kiosks selling perfume, C.Ds and DVDs.

Walking to the end of the passage-way. Pausing in front of a kiosk. The upper windows have steamed up. Approaching the kiosk. I notice, through the lower windows, a range of pastries. A pastry, on a tray at the front, has a plastic label embedded in it. I recognise the Russian word construction: “with cheese”. “What is it with cheese?”. I look again. A sloika with cheese. “I can pronounce that”

Moving down towards the opening in the glass. Uttering quietly to the impassive attendant, “*sloika sirom*”. Without looking at me, she reaches down, picks up the pastry, takes the label out and slides it into a plastic bag. Placing it down on the receptacle, she says, “five”. I place a five rouble coin on the receptacle. Taking my pastry and walking up the steps. While waiting for the bus I take a bite. It tastes good.

7.2.6 Coming home on the bus: Several weeks later

Mid-afternoon. Nearing home on the bus. Entering a roundabout on a recently thawed piece of unused land. When I first arrived, the piece of land had a large circus tarpaulin on it. Noticing a sign covering the top two levels of an apartment building on the perimeter of the roundabout. The sign is the only feature distinguishing it from the dozens surrounding it. “Was it there the last time I was on the bus?”

On the sign, “Новокосино” (Novokasino). The name of the suburb I am staying in. It is easily understood. Below the text, an eight or none year old girl is raising her arms in celebration. She is holding a scarlet handkerchief, being bathed in the light of the sun which casts its glow on the array of apartment buildings behind her. Alongside the girl is written an adjunct sentence. The bus is passing the sign now. Not understanding the sentence. Anxiety.

“I have to understand the sentence before the bus turns the corner”. The words, “suburb”, “rising”, “sun” step forward from the sign. Click. I understand it. “Novokasino: Suburb of the rising sun”.

Turning the corner out of the roundabout on to road with my bus stop. Happy. Knowing that I know a little more than I knew before. The familiar expanse of woodland is on my left. At the end of the road on the right-hand side, the mini supermarket with the bright red roof.

7.2.7 Getting used to St Basil’s

Lesson completed. I am being waved through the exit of the building by a security man in a perspex-windowed kiosk. Emerging onto a narrow street running alongside the Moscow River. Smelling petrol fumes.

A large rectangular building is standing on the opposite bank. It has a dark tinted glass façade. From this building, my vision starts sliding left. It follows the contours of a rise in the ground, leading to the brick red stems sprouting out the rainbow domes of St Basil’s Cathedral. Whenever I look over to the other side of the river, my vision begins with the rectangular building and ends up resting on St Basil’s. The church’s backdrop is unmoving grey cloud. Most of the domes are obscured by scaffolding.

To the left of St Basil’s. A trickle of people walking up and over the cobble-stoned horizon line on to Red Square. Together, St Basil’s and Red Square look like a recently hung landscape painting that I haven’t gotten used to yet.

Continuing along the narrow street running parallel to the river. My artery road is approaching. It will take me to my yellow metro station. It leads left, *away* from St Basil’s. I reach the artery road. I surprise myself. I am turning *right*. Walking over the bridge and up the rise *towards* St Basil’s.

Looking back, I see the window, behind which, I was sitting looking up *here*. Continuing. St Basil's is standing directly to my right now. The proximity of the building means that its domes are no longer visible. Looking down, a spot on the ground, directly beside the base of the building. Beside the foundational stones, an empty, uncut patch of grass. I could sit down on it if I wanted.

Walking to the far end of Red Square, looking back at St Basil's from the other side. "That's the postcard view" Descending between two red buildings. Exiting Red Square, a red "M". Entering through the swing doors of the metro station. The chill outside is being replaced by the stuffy warmth of the underground.

7.2.8 Not noticing St Basil's

Sitting down, opposite my teacher in her office. We are sitting beside the window. Proceeding through answers in a textbook. "e, not ye", "No, do that with your mouth", "No! e not ye!" You sound like a Georgian when you say that!". Looking over at my teacher's normally stony-faced assistant. She's looking down and giggling.

A Russian adult student comes in. He addresses my teacher with deference. She responds curtly. He leaves. "So, v means 'in' and 'na' means 'on', geez, I don't even know what that is in English" My teacher says, "Maybe you need to be studying English as well then" All three of us are laughing. The phone rings. After speaking for a few seconds, my teacher puts her head away from the receiver; "We'll continue on Thursday, do these pages".

Walking out. Acknowledging the security man sitting behind the perspex. Walking along the narrow street parallel to the river. Walking left towards my yellow metro station. Walking into the glass doors of the Metro station.

Realising that I didn't even notice the domes of St Basil's Cathedral through the windows of my teacher's office.

7.2.9 Looking for food in the kitchen

Opening the cupboard above the bench in the kitchen. The green font on the yellow packaging is familiar, “Maggi”. The same green font on yellow packaging as when I opened the kitchen cupboard at my Grandparents when I was a child.

Opening the fridge. “Pepsi” on the plastic labelling of the half-finished bottle. Reaching in. Grasping the bottle by the lid. Turning it around. On the alternate side, “Пепси” (Pepsi).

7.2.10 Walking into McDonalds

Late morning. Walking along a central street. The yellow arches clash with the more subdued colours of the other shops. “That kind of yellow isn’t normally used here” Looking up at the sign: “Макдональдс” (McDonalds). “The “k” is out of place, the “д” shouldn’t be there either.

Opening one of the glass double doors, “like doors in shops at home” The smell, the arrangement of the furniture. All familiar. Feeling less foreign.

Waiting in line. Two people in front of me, then one, then me. “Dva hamburger”. I receive a vacant look. Repeating the request, “dva hamburger”. She’s blanky shaking her head. She’s shrugging her shoulders. Feeling the eyes of the people in the line behind me. “What to say?”, “Where to start?”, “How to salvage this?”, “Do I walk out?” From over my shoulder “Dva Gamburgera”. A click of recognition on her face. The familiarly dressed attendant, retrieves the familiar hamburgers and places them on the familiar tray.

7.2.11 Trying to wash my hands

Early in the afternoon. Just stepped off a suburban train out of Moscow and am in the countryside. A dusty dirt road. Walking with Anya, her two daughters and twin sons. We are all holding bags: Rainbow striped storage bags, backpacks and plastic bags.

Putting the bags down, picking them up again, altering my grip. The two boys, Dennis with both arms in a cast, and Leo, begin running. Still holding their bags, they disappear into a fenceless block on the left-hand side of the dirt road.

The rest of us reach the dacha (holiday house). It is a one storey, roughly painted dark green and surrounded on each of its four sides by overgrown grass. The front door has flaking green paint. Reaching into the pocket of her dress, Anya pulls out her keys. She brings them close to her eyes and chooses the correct one. She says “Ahhhh”.

Inside, Anya is still in her sandals, she is floating around the perimeter of the house pulling back the curtains and opening the windows. The children are outside. Whooping and laughing. Stern older sisters’ voices are being directed at younger brothers.

Sitting down behind a table piled with books and magazines. Underneath the pile of magazines… A novel in English. Flicking through the first few pages. “English words are easy”.

Standing up. Seeing a hand basin. Above it, a plastic bowl with a hole in the bottom and a long metal pin protruding through it. Moving over to the bowl. Looking into the bowl. There are several centimetres of water in it. There is a bar of soap. Examining the contraption. Examining it all over. Shaking the bowl. No water is coming out. Shaking the bowl more firmly. Still nothing. Still no water coming out of the bottom. I twist the pin around. Still nothing. Returning to the table and my english book. The nagging question: “How am I going to wash my hands?”

Anya comes in and strides to the basin. Absently, she pushes the pin up with the palm of her hand. A trickle of water drops onto her other hand which she cups to hold the water. She grabs the soap and creates a lather with both hands. Easily and automatically, she pushes up the pin, releases the water, and rinses the soap off her hands.

7.2.12 Reaching the front door

Late in the afternoon. Walking home from the bus stop. Walking between two, identical, tall apartment buildings. It is head-achingly cold but snowless. Walking along the curve of the communal driveway past the second apartment building. The third apartment building is mine. Over the rise of the kerb. Approaching the entry door of my apartment building.

The door is large, heavy and metal. To its left, at eye level, the security key-pad. I forgot about this. The key-pad doesn't always work. I don't want to have to wait for someone to exit the building. I don't want to have to slide in behind them before the door shuts. That raises the possibility of confrontation. "I really don't want that"

PIN. (In English), "1", "9", "8", "4, "George Orwell. The Soviet Union didn't go to those Olympics". Pause. A piercing sound and a click. Satisfaction and relief. "Still not finished though".

Walking past the alcove with dozens of small, blue identical post boxes. Not paying them any attention. Reaching the entry to the two lifts. Press the arrow pointing upwards. Waiting. A low rumbling noise. The lift on my left opens. Relief. It's empty. I step in, press 16, and the lift starts going up. There is no new graffiti scratched on to the wooden panelling to the left of the buttons. The 16th floor. The lift stops. I exit.

The final obstacle. The flimsy double doors that separate the lift exit from the three apartments that are on this level. Inserting the mobile phone re-charge card between the doors. Click. The latch of the locked door is eased away from the snib of the door. (This door opening operation is easy now. I can do it thoughtlessly.) Turning right. *My* apartment door.

Although, it is identical to all the other apartment doors in the complex, *this* door is different. Sliding the key in. Click. Opening the door. Familiar, domestic warmth and smells. The light is on in the kitchen. I can hear the television. Beside the door are my slippers.

7.2.13 Coming home early

Early afternoon. Entering the front door. Shoes off, slippers on. Carrying the rucksack into my room. Passing the wooden framed double doors that enter into my flatmate Lena's room. They have been left open, "That's unusual". The normally dark corners of the apartment are being flooded by natural light. The light is illuminating the dust particles.

Sitting on my bed. Thinking back to my arrival. Everything in the flat is organised as it was when I arrived several months ago. Things are different though. Thinking back to the first night when I was lying on my bed. Then, I was looking at the light coming through the crack at the corner of the door. I was listening to the voices from the kitchen. Then, it felt as if I was separated from the kitchen by a chasm. Now, the kitchen is only a few steps away.

7.2.14 Finding my way in the metro

Coming home from school. I need to get back to my yellow station. This is a red station. Approaching the ticket gate. Card in and card out. Swept up in a mass of people. Walking down the passageway towards the platforms. I can't step to the edge and check my metro map. Being pushed forward by the flow of people.

Approaching a fork in the passageway. "Decision time". Not long to make it. "Down the passageway under the green line or the passageway under the red line? Green? Red?".

Walking down the green passageway. A long way. "A long way to go back if this is the wrong passageway" The escalator down to the platform is deep. "A long way to go back if this is the wrong escalator" Exiting the escalator on the left and waiting on the platform.

Waiting on the platform. "I'm going on the next train no matter what" Hearing the rumble of a train coming. Glancing at the wall on the opposite side of the tracks. A list of the upcoming stops. Next stop is a yellow stop. I recognise the letters. Relief. "It's my yellow metro station" The train comes rushing in and blocks out the list.

Stepping onto the train with purpose and confidence. Stepping off at the next stop with purpose and confidence. Following the corridor to a passageway marked in yellow. Here is a point of familiarity. Here is a point where I have been many times before. My surroundings recede into the background. I began thinking about the day I have had.

7.2.15 Meeting my teacher at university

Going up the escalator towards the entrance of the University Metro station. It is early in the afternoon. I am meeting my teacher, Tatyana Yurevna, at the student centre at the base of the University building at 2.00. *There* is the "Avtomat" cash machine. It is directly opposite the top of the escalator. This was our point of departure when she walked me through the route on our first lesson. I need to retrace those steps.

Exiting through the giant swinging metro doors. Confronted with a bric-a-brac arrangement of kiosks and fruit stalls. Something alluring: Trellis tables, piled high with books. Moving towards the tables, then… The pedestrian-crossing alarm is sounding a short distance away. Walking with a young crowd over the pedestrian-crossing. They're wearing multi coloured ski-jackets and jeans.

On the other side. Walking under the shadow of the building where I know my lesson will take place. Continuing along the footpath. Underneath a column of trees. "Are these trees familiar?", "Yes". The scene lies flush with the memory of my previous, accompanied, journey. Turning right down an alleyway. "Is this alleyway familiar?", "Yes" At the end of the alleyway, the bright yellow internet café. "Task fulfilled"

An hour between now and the beginning of the lesson. Doubling back. Retracing, in reverse, the route that I have just followed. Re-crossing the busy road. Returning to the trellis tables with books.

7.2.16 Waiting in the metro after a lesson

It is late in the evening. I have completed my final lesson. I am one of the few passengers descending the escalator. Exiting on to the long train concourse. I am alone waiting. Reflecting.

Teaching didn't come easily today, neither did communicating. Everything seemed slow and out of synch. Things didn't come easily yesterday either. In fact, the day before that was difficult as well.

"But a good day normally follows a bad one", "Worst case scenario, a good day must follow two bad ones. But, I have just had three bad days in a row. My operating logic is faulty. I am tired. "What if there are no more good days?".

7.2.17 Ringing home

Late morning. Outside, it is grey and the ground is covered in snow. Sitting in the armchair in the small hallway. Facing the wooden double doors entering into Lena's bedroom. Dialling the number on the phone's dialling wheel. The dial tone echoes. It sounds like it is echoing into the distance.

"Hello, Nicholas?". It's mum. Picturing her leaning over the arm rest of the olive-green couch that sits beside the telephone at home. "Can you hear me?", "I can hear you" A pause. Picturing her relocating to the couch proper. "So, how are you?"

I find it easy, in my mind's eye, to see what mum is doing right now. What I am unable to bring to mind, however, is that mum is talking to me at 8.00 in the evening. I *know* that it is 8.00 in the evening at home. Even so, I picture her talking to me at the same time there as it is here. We talk.

"I'll just get your father" Footsteps diminishing. New footsteps, much heavier, approaching the phone. The picture in my mind of the house is not the house, as it was when

I left. The living room, hall and my parents' bedroom are drawn from a collage of periods of time before my departure.

The footsteps stop. The phone is being exchanged. The slight scratch of phone on whiskers and then, "Nickel-arse- how are you?". I picture Dad standing by the couch. He stays standing, leaning over the phone. We talk.

"I'll get your mother for you.…"Bye, bye…bye…bye…bye" Putting the receiver down. The door next to where I am sitting is the door to Roma's bedroom. It is closed. "He must still be sleeping".

Rising. Shuffling the couple of steps to the kitchen. Craning my head around the door frame. Seeing Lena fishing something out of a floral saucepan of boiling water. Returning to my room. Gathering my textbook. Putting it in my rucksack. Gathering passport and roubles and sliding them into my hip bag. The hip-bag is slid under my trousers. Ready to go out.

7.2.18 Going home

Late at night. Lying in bed. I can't get to sleep. I am going home. I am going to leave. Getting out of bed. Turning the light on, "duk-duk". Everything in the room looks different after making this decision. Turning the light off. Opening the door to my bedroom. It is late at night. All of the lights are off in the apartment except the light coming through the frosted glass in the doors of Lena's room. The light shines on to the telephone and fax machine. Going to the bathroom. Returning to bed. Falling asleep. Certain that I am going home.

Wake up the next morning. Certain that I am going to stay.

7.2.19 In the car

It is Saturday morning. Waiting directly in front of the entrance of the apartment building. Lena is about to drive me to her flower shop on the other side of the city.

She is approaching in the car. The perfume sachet is swinging below the rear vision mirror. She is slowing down. She stops. She reaches over to the passenger door and lifts the lock to let me in.

I throw my rucksack onto the floor of the passenger's side of the car, sit down and slam the door shut. She says, "Quieter, more gentle".

Before leaving, she remembers something that she needs out of the boot of the car. I jump out. I run to the boot of the car, retrieve the required bag, slam the boot shut, step in the car and slam the passenger door shut. Looking at Lena. She is rolling her eyes.

We are setting off slowly around the semi-circular driveway that leads to the external road. Reaching with my right hand over my left shoulder, I grasp the seat belt buckle, pull it across me. I am feeling for the buckle's repository by my right thigh. "There is nothing there". I feel the absence of the seat belt repository. All I feel is the material of the car seat. I try again. Nothing.

Lena is pointing to the dash in front of me, "air bags".

7.2.20 Watching television

Late in the evening. Sitting on a stool, behind a table in the kitchen. On the other side of the table is a small television set with and old black and white photo of Roma and Lena's late father in military uniform on top of it. Beside the small photo are two, skinny, crooked yellow wax candles protruding from a small crystal glass flower vase. Sitting in front of me is my cup of tea. No milk. A slice of lemon floating on top. No lessons tomorrow. Tomorrow is mine.

Lena is speaking in the phone in the hallway, I understand some phrases. Her voice has a clipped, official tone. It is something related to her work in the flower shop.

Watching the television. I recognise this film: *Enemy at the Gates*. I quite like it. Lena comes into the kitchen, wearing her dressing gown on, her slippers flapping on the kitchen

floor. She shoos me off the stool, sits down and watches for a couple of minutes. Getting up she changes the channel: “It looks silly”.

7.2.21 Anya’s russian lesson

Midmorning. Walking alongside Anya in the adult language school. Anya stops, then opens the door to a classroom. A crowd of faces look up grumpily from desks. Not there. She tries the one next door. The faces look up in curiosity. No, not there either.

Continuing further down the high-ceilinged corridor. Wooden, brick shaped tiles arranged diagonally on the floor. Humming, Anya opens, and then shuts, every door. Walking several paces behind her now. Nearing the end of the corridor she opens a door and cranes her neck around, “Perfect”.

We are sitting on either side of a student’s desk at the front of the classroom. Setting my exercise book out in front of me. She looks at my messy transliteration of a piece of Cyrillic text, “Good, good, that will help”.

Anya is beginning: “Mookha, mookha, takhatookha pazaluchinia brukha” (the first lines of a famous Russian nursery rhyme). Saying the words loudly, she is reinforcing the appropriate stress by slapping her leg and stamping her sandled feet on the ground. She nods at me. Speaking quietly. Swallowing my words. Self-conscious.

Anya joins in. Volume is rising. We are both slapping our knees and stamping our feet: “Mookha po polu pashla, mookha, denushku nashla”. Returning to the start. Volume increasing. Self-consciousness evaporating. Anya is closing her eyes and nodding in time with the stress of every word. I am rolling my “rs” and hissing my “khs”. “What’s that?”. A noise in the back corner of the room.

A door is being opened. Anya stands and walks around the protruding section of the wall. This section of the wall hides the back door from view. A female voice is speaking with agitation. I understand very little. Anya is responding evenly. A middle-aged woman is now

poking her head around the protrusion in the wall. She is looking at me. Feeling a hot sense of shame.

Anya returns to the desk, “let’s continue”. I ask, “What just happened?”. “There’s a meeting next door. They couldn’t concentrate. We might need to be a bit quieter”.

7.2.22 Going to the market

Early on a warm Saturday morning. Sitting in Lena’s car. The sky is blue and cloudless. The blueness of the sky is softer than it is at home. She is driving around the carpark of the large undercover market building a five minute drive from our apartment. The sun is shining off all the reflective surfaces. Walking together through the carpark towards the building. We are chatting easily.

Business like, with minimal engagement with the stall keepers, Lena buys bread and meat. After receiving her plastic or paper wrapped parcels, she passes them on to me. Moving to the vegetable section.

Lena is leading, walking past identical stalls set out with fruit and vegetables. All of the produce is set out at a 45 degree angle from stern, unsmiling women. Lena has stopped and asks several questions. I am looking at the tomatoes and spring onions.

Lena is engaging with the stall-keeper. Handing over vegetables, the stall keeper is weighing them and returning them to Lena. Lena is passing them on to me. I’m not listening.

The tone of their conversation has changed. The brown eyes of the stall-keeper are fixed on me. A rapid stream of words are following her gaze. Trying to understand. I catch *“*molchat” and “doorag” (quiet and fool). I am feeling the eyes of the surrounding stall keepers. Feeling a hot sense of shame.

Lena is speaking. Cool and business like. I am trying not to understand. Thrusting several notes out of her purse, Lena begins leaving with a punchy, staccato series of words. Like bullets. Lena is leading me away.

Returning to the car. Lena sing-songs airily, “She was trying to cheat us. It always happens”.

7.2.23 Getting my haircut

It is mid-afternoon and overcast. Walking, from the bus stop, to the entrance of my apartment building. I notice the word парикмахерская (hairdressing salon) on the window of a shop adjacent to my apartment building. Approaching the window. Trying *not* to make it obvious that I am peering inside, I peer inside.

The lights are out. The salon is closed. I manage to see inside. The interior layout synchronises with the hairdressers I am familiar with. There are rows of overblown helmet like hairdryers and black, plastic wash basins set behind reclinable chairs.

Stepping back. Making my way back to the apartment building. Now, not noticing anything around me. Focusing on words. Russian words. “Which words?”, “Which words can I pronounce?”, “Which combinations of words?”, “Which sentences?” “Trim”, “scissors”, “don’t need to wash”. I resolve to get my haircut tomorrow.

The next morning. A quick breakfast. Casually informing Roma and Lena that I’m getting a haircut as I leave the kitchen. A wave of the hand and “See you soon”.

The path from the exit of the apartment to the hairdresser is familiar. I walk it everyday. Walking along the path. Now, I am turning right (not left as I normally do). The guardrails of routine have fallen away.

Arriving at the semi-covered porch at the top of the steps. Looking through the glass door. The lights are on (My secret wish that the lights would be off and the hairdresser would be closed has been scuppered). “No one has seen me yet”, “Still time to turn back”. Reaching my hand up, pulling the door handle down, pushing the door open. The loud jingle-jangle of the doorbell. The three women hairdressers have all stopped working and are looking at me. “No going back now”.

7.2.24 Getting my haircut again

Just after opening time. Opening the door to the hairdressing salon. It jingle-jangles loudly. The two hairdressers are looking at me. The one who cut my hair last time is motioning with her hand to come over to the seat and sit down.

She places the protective cape around my neck in silence. She walks away and tends to an issue at the front desk. The silence remains. It's a long silence. I call out: "It seems Spring has arrived!". The silence continues. Several moments later the woman behind the counter echoes to her colleague beside her smiling: "It seems Spring has arrived" They continue chatting. Finally, she makes her way behind me. I say, "A trim, use scissors and no razor please" She cuts my hair wordlessly.

7.2.25 Meeting friends

Early afternoon. On a metro platform. Waiting for the next train with English speaking friends. Words flow between us. Stepping onto the train.

Standing next to the entry/exit doors in the middle of the carriage. Immersed in conversation, I don't notice who is standing or sitting around us. I don't notice us stopping. One of the friends says, "this is us". We exit the carriage just in time.

Talking and laughing. Up the long, steep escalator. Tickets inserted in the exit gates without any of us breaking stride or conversation. Out of the metro station.

Running across the busy road adjacent to the entrance. Arriving at the sportsbar. After ordering pitchers of beer we sit down. Other friends and colleagues arrive. The fast and comprehensible chatter and laughter rolls around us. I look at my watch, "5.00pm already?" "Just another 30 minutes". Looking at my watch again. "6.00 pm already?".

Wrenching myself away. It is still light when I get outside. Walking along the busy road adjacent to the metro station. I don't think to run across the busy road. Although I am still light-headed with beer I feel exposed again. Going down the long, steep escalator, I put

my hand on the moving black hand-rail. I notice the periodic bump as it travels over the metal rollers underneath.

7.2.26 A packed bus

It is early evening. Emerging on to street level at my local metro station. Joining the crowd waiting for the 792 or 811 bus. The crowd is dense. It spills from the footpath onto the road of the bus stop. The 792 bus is arriving. It is slowly veering towards the curb, the crowd divides itself into two: The front group surround the front door, the back half swarm the double doors in the middle of the bus.

The sharp sound of air being released. A split second later the doors come crashing open. I am in the middle, of the two groups. Merging with the back group, I have resigned myself to being on the wrong side of the bus doors when the bus reaches capacity. The doors stay open and I step on.

Stepping up three steps on to the central aisle of the bus. No seats are free. No looped leather straps dangling from the ceiling are free.

Extending my arm. Grasping the narrow silver pole holding the ticket-validating machine. The bus is setting off. The bus is slowing down again. “More passengers?”. Looking out the window. I see a group whose number appears too great to fit on the bus. The bus slows stops. Both doors open. One person, then a second, a third and then more force themselves on to the bus. The door in the middle of the bus slams shut on an arm. The door reopens, the arm moves inside the bus, then the door shuts again. The weight of the new numbers shuffles me up towards the back of the bus. I lose my grip on the pole.

Joltingly, the bus sets off. I lurch, full bodied, into the side of an unsmiling middle-aged woman. Turning around and leaning over a seated passenger, I stretch my hand, all five fingertips spread, against the window. Ungainly but semi-permanent balance is achieved.

Time and space to reflect. “How many people in this bus would be able to respond to me if I spoke to them in English?”. Looking at dozens of high-rise apartment buildings with thousands of lit windows. “How many people, in all of those lit windows, in all of those apartment buildings will have given a moment’s thought to my home country?”, “How many would have even heard the name of the small city that I spent the first two decades of my life in?”.

The bus is stopping. People weaving their way down the aisle and off the bus. Several more stops. Spaces appear in the aisles. Sitting on a seat in the half empty bus. The bus is turning the final corner into my street.

7.2.27 Going to my teacher’s apartment

Early afternoon. Standing on the trolleybus that left from the green metro station. “I need to go straight down the main road and get off opposite the old brown cinema”.

Looking outside the window. It is hard to see through the film of ice covering the outside of the window. “That’s better”. Now, looking through a patch of window that remains transparent. Everything outside is grey and white. It is hard to distinguish where the overcast sky finishes and the snow-covered ground begins. The black tyres of the other cars on the road are constantly turning over the same dirty snow. It looks like sand on a beach. “What is sand in Russian?”, “Yes, pesok”.

Walking from the bus stop past the old brown cinema facing the main road. Walking along the path behind the old brown cinema. Facing apartment buildings. Lower than the apartment buildings where I live. Everything is quiet and still. Can’t hear the traffic on the main road on the other side of the old brown cinema. The snow on the playground in front of the apartment buildings is thick and untouched. On the side of the path is packed snow pitted, here and there, with dog poo.

Walking up the three concrete steps to the metal front door of the complex. It has been left ajar. Stamping my feet in their black shoes on the sack cloth just inside the entrance. Now walking the few steps to the wooden front door of my teacher's ground level apartment.

Knocking on the door. Tatyana Yurevna (my teacher), opens the door. Warmth and the smell of cabbage soup follows her out the door. Small, fair, in a skirt, stockings and slippers, she is adjusting her hair and (as always) asks "kak dela?" (how are you?). I reply, "khorosho" (good).

Shoes coming off, slippers going on. Coats coming off. Putting them on a hook that is overcrowded with other coats. She is leading me into the kitchen.

Textbooks are neatly piled on the table. A bowl of pretzel like crackers are also on the table. The table is directly underneath the window that looks out on to the yard. The smell of the cabbage soup is mixing with the warmth inside the apartment. The saucepan that the soup is in is identical to Lena's at home. Sitting on the stool beside the table. It is darker outside and the snow is falling again.

7.2.28 Buying tickets

Early afternoon. With my friend from home. Waiting in line to buy return tickets to St Petersburg. He arrived several days ago. I have been preparing for this transaction since before his arrival.

Standing silently with passports and cash in our hands. Running through the range of questions that may be asked when I engage with the teller at the window.

A woman is walking away from a window. The teller at that window is looking at me. She is nodding. Arriving at the window with my friend standing directly beside me.

The words flow, feeling smooth and comprehensible. Yes, "two tickets", yes, "the day after tomorrow", yes, "leaving in the morning", yes, "returning on Thursday evening". I notice a questioning look on the teller's face. She is saying something that I don't understand.

Going off script. She repeats herself. Stressing the word *"Thursday".* To avoid further discussion, I say *"that's right".* Shrugging her shoulders, she tells me the sum that needs to be paid. Collecting the money, I slide the required amount under the window. She collects the money and replaces it with both tickets. Relief. Considering what the conversation would have looked like from my friend's perspective. It would have looked fairly good.

Walking out the door of the ticket office. Stopping, looking at the tickets. Departure: Monday, Return: Tuesday. "Oh no, Tuesday!" I look at my friend's, it says the same. "Tuesdays and Thursdays, I've confused them again. That hasn't happened in so long. Why did it have to happen now?".

I tell my friend that I need to fix something. Re-joining the line. Counting the people in front of me. Counting the number of tellers' windows in service. Hoping I won't have to face the same attendant who served me before.

The counter at the opposite end becomes vacant. Relief. She repeats after me, "Two tickets from St Petersburg on Thursday night". Without looking up, she asks "No tickets to Petersburg?". She gives the sum. I pay. She gives the tickets. I look at the tickets. We walk out. Check the tickets at the door, "Exactly as required".

Walking into the sun with my friend we begin chatting easily.

7.3 Analysis of Data: Summary of Propositions

The following is a summary of the propositions derived from the data collected in the formative autobiographical study and the literature review of the lifeworld of new migrants. They are organised according to each of the five existentials. These propositions will be tested against the experiences of the interviewee migrants in the main summative interviewee study.

The existential of time.

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Proposition 1: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of permanence.
- Proposition 2: Conscious experiences are framed by the shadow of pre-migration experiences.
- Proposition 3: Reflections upon pre-migration experiences are precipitated by contact with home.
- Proposition 4: Time is experienced as passing more slowly.

The existential of space.

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Proposition 5: In the initial stage all spaces are experienced as other.
- Proposition 6: After the initial stage, space is demarcated between safe and other.
- Proposition 7: Safe spaces become more numerous and larger.

The existential of objects.

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Proposition 8: Attention is paid to the exoticism of unfamiliar objects.
- Proposition 9: Initially exotic objects soon become backgrounded.
- Proposition 10: Objects in safe spaces are experienced differently to objects in other spaces.

The existential of others.

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Proposition 11: Strangers are experienced with an exaggerated lack of knowledge regarding the rules governing interaction.
- Proposition 12: After the initial stage, the space around trusted people becomes a safe space.
- Proposition 13: Strangers are experienced as more other.
- Proposition 14: Other native first language speakers are experienced as a cue to relax.

*The existential of self***.**

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Proposition 15: There is a heightened awareness of taking up space in other space.
- Proposition 16: There is an experience of a dual self on the arrival of friends/family from pre-migration.
- Proposition 17: The sense of self-confidence is more volatile than in pre-migration.
- Proposition 18: In the initial stage, one experiences ones' sense of self with a heightened degree of freedom.
- Proposition 19: After the initial stage, one's sense of self is experienced as more fixed and in alignment with the pre-migration self.

7.4 Analysis of Data: Explanation of Propositions

7.4.1 The existential of time

Proposition 1: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of permanence.

The implicitly understood horizon of meaning of remaining in this new location, framed all conscious experiences. It was the case that this understanding was never the *object* of any particular conscious experience. Yet, lying outside, but informing, all conscious experiences, was the background understanding that a resolution had been made to remain indefinitely in this new location.

The particular significance of this framing horizon of meaning can be seen in the one instance where it was absent. This was demonstrated in description 7.2.18 (Going home) when the (later revoked) decision to leave and go home was made. The description referred to the point where "everything in the room seemed to change". What had changed was the framing understanding that I would remain, indefinitely, in the presence of these items. A similar change in the way familiar objects are experienced after making a decision to leave them is referred to in Sartre's *Nausea* (1965). In this case, Sartre describes the qualitative

shift in experience of the protagonist, Roquentein. He states, after having made the decision to leave a town, that the buildings he had known and gotten used to "are buildings and nothing more…I understand: the town is abandoning me first. I haven't left Bouville and already I am no longer here*"* (1965, p. 240). Such was my experience, as described in 7.2.18. The next morning, after having revoked the decision to leave, those objects reverted to being experienced as they were previously.

Proposition 2: Conscious experiences are framed by the shadow of pre-migration experiences.

This shadowing of pre-migration experiences, again, never served as the object of any conscious experience but was an ever-present framing element of the conscious experiences of my new world throughout the early stages of migration.

There was the constant experiencing of the present through the comparative lens of the pre-migration past. It was this feature that, particularly at the start of the migration experience, underlay the shock of the otherness inherent in many of the conscious experiences described. Many things experienced were other in virtue of how different they were to what I had experienced before. The shock of the symbols "ш" and "ж" in reflections 7.2.1 (Arriving) and 7.2.2 (Travelling from the airport) stemmed from the fact of the absence of any previous exposure to these symbols.

This framing shadow of pre-migration experiences also informed the anxiety of engaging in public interactions with other people. Initially, at least, there were no framing experiences that could inform how these exchanges "were done". There was only the framing (though not explicitly conscious) knowledge of the rules of such public exchanges from my pre-migration experiences. As can be seen in reflection 7.2.5 (Buying something for the first time) when the conscious experience of buying something for the first time was given, I was

having a conscious experience of purchasing something but *simultaneously* logging the procedure or rules involved so they, in turn could frame similar future social engagements.

As time progressed, the framing presence of these pre-migration experiences became weaker. They were, increasingly, replaced by a bank of framing and informing conscious experiences gained after migration.

As the process of migration continued, the explicitness of the pre-migration experiences framing current conscious experiences became less marked . There were, however, more instances of *conscious* reflection and rumination upon pre-migration experiences. In these instances, those pre-migration experiences became the *object* of reflection. Such an example can be seen in 7.2.9 **(**Looking for food in the kitchen) where the noodles in the cupboard triggered something akin to a proustian experience of standing outside my grandparents' kitchen cupboard.

Proposition 3: Reflections upon pre-migration experiences are precipitated by contact with home.

Although the pre-migration past was an ever-present frame lying behind all conscious experiences, there were contexts which precipitated pre-migration experiences becoming the reflective *object* of conscious experiences.

This was particularly evident when speaking with people from home. An example of this can be seen in reflection 7.2.17 (Ringing home). In this instance, an involuntary rush of clear and distinct memories of home accompanied the discussion that was taking place with my parents when they were at home in New Zealand. After the conversation ceased, it took some considerable time to re-engage fully with the world around me and for the clear and distinct memories to subside.

Proposition 4: Time is experienced as passing more slowly.

In the early stages of the migration experience, time was experienced as moving more slowly than in the pre-migration period. Additionally, as the migration experience proceeded, time was experienced as proceeding more quickly. It was also harder to discern between particular or discrete conscious experiences in the latter stages of migration. Indeed, a majority of the conscious experiences remembered in detail and described in the formative autobiographical study occurred in the initial stage of the migration experience.

7.4.2 The existential of space

Proposition 5: In the initial stage of migration all spaces are experienced as other.

At the beginning of the migration experience, all space was experienced as other. Spaces that, after a short period, would transition into safe spaces were, at the beginning, engaged with as strange and stress inducing. Even, on the night of my arrival, my *own room* was experienced as strange. This can be seen in the description 7.2.3 (Entering my bedroom for the first time). This initial otherness of, soon to be familiar aspects of the world, is also apparent in description 7.2.4 (Coming home on the bus).

Proposition 6: After the initial stage, space is experienced as being demarcated between safe and other.

After the initial phase, where all space was experienced as other, it was demarcated into islands of safety or other. Those “islands of safety” were spaces within which I felt secure and safe. They were experienced as a refuge from which I could re-energise and recuperate before venturing out into the other spaces. These islands of safety were spaces where I both understood the layout of objects within the space as well as an understanding of the accepted social expectations within that space.

The initial island of safety was the apartment. After, initially *itself* being experienced as other as can be seen description 7.2.3 (Experiencing my bedroom for the first time) it soon became the primary island of safety.

The secondary islands of safe space were the language school where I taught and studied, as can be seen in description 7.2.8 (Not noticing St Basil's), my teacher's apartment, referred to in description 7.2.27 (Going to my teacher's for apartment) buses, referred to in description 7.2.6 (Coming home on the bus: Several weeks later) trains and metro stations, as can be seen in description 7.2.16 (Waiting in the metro station after a lesson). These spaces became the spaces of refuge from which I could launch out into the other, less safe, more unknown spaces.

This experiencing of spaces within the context of migration as being distinguished between safe and other is reminiscent of the distinction put forward by Bollnow (1961). Bollnow sets out and distinguishes the difference between "inner" and "outer" spaces. He states that the "duality of inner and outer space is fundamental to the erection of the total lived-space, indeed for human life in general" (1961, p. 3)

The front door was experienced as the "frontier" or dividing line between the primary safe space (the apartment) and the "other" spaces. This experiencing of the front door as the "frontier" is demonstrated in description 7.2.12 (Reaching the front door).

Proposition 7: As the migration experience progresses, safe spaces become more numerous and larger.

The islands of safety became larger and more numerous as the period of migration progressed. As illustrated in 7.2.3 (Entering my room for the first time), on arriving, my room was experienced as other. Within the first week it had transitioned into being experienced as the primary safe space. Shortly after, this primary safe space extended to the entire apartment as illustrated in 7.2.13 (Coming home early).

Buses, trains and the metro stations, after a short period of time, also transitioned into (secondary) safe spaces. They were safe spaces insofar as the layout of those spaces quickly became familiar and the rules for engaging successfully in this context were easy to follow.

As an awareness of how to conduct myself simple interactions with others became clearer, the spaces in which these interactions occurred became islands of safety. This can be seen in descriptions 7.2.5 (Buying something for the first time) and 7.2.10 (Walking into McDonalds).

The larger the number of variables, and the less known about the social rules adhered to within these spaces, the more other they were experienced as being. Such other spaces were engaged with anxiety and trepidation. Descriptive examples of such "other" spaces, where the "rules of engagement" were not yet clear can be seen in descriptions 7.2.28 (Buying tickets), 7.2.23 (Getting my haircut), and 7.2.24 (Getting my haircut again).

As the space outside these islands of safety became more familiar and were traversed with more frequency they became subsumed into those ever-enlarging islands of safety. The process of enlarging this island of safety is illustrated in description 7.2.7 (Getting used to St Basil's). In this case, a new route was taken and as a consequence, a familiarity was developed with a space that was, hitherto experienced as other.

In these islands of safety my conscious attention was able to transition from solely focusing on the negotiation of objects and people in the surrounding physical environment, to being able to reflect more abstractly on the nature of my experiences in general. The decision to go home was made in the safe space of the bedroom as can be seen in description 7.2.18 (Going home). The capacity to reflect upon how the interior of the apartment had changed over my period of time was captured while reflecting in the safe space of the apartment (See 7.2.13, (Coming home early). As seen in description 7.2.16 (Waiting in the metro after a lesson), the ability to reflect on the nature and relative success of my day could only be effected when I had arrived in the safe space of a metro station that I had already become familiar with. As illustrated in 7.2.26 (A packed bus), my ruminations upon the strangeness of my position as a foreigner became manifest when I had become comfortable on the bus.

All of these spaces became safe spaces when I became familiar with the layout and expected protocols within this space. In short, these safe spaces were spaces in which I was not going to be surprised.

7.4.3 The existential of objects

Proposition 8: Attention is paid to the exoticism of unfamiliar objects.

In the early stages of migration, when all space was experienced as other, I was explicitly conscious of the strangeness of new and unfamiliar objects in contrast with objects that I had frequently encountered in pre-migration experiences. The framing shadow of pre-migration experiences provided a clear comparative canvas which reinforced the strangeness of the "ш" as the plane was landing in description 7.2.1 (Arriving) as well as the "ж" as I was being driven to my new apartment in a taxi past a billboard (as seen in description 7.2.2, Travelling from the airport). Even the contrast in interior design of my bedroom was evident due to the framing shadow of pre-migration experiences (as seen in description 7.2.3, Entering my new bedroom).

Proposition 9: Initially exotic objects soon become backgrounded.

Initially exotic objects of experience transitioned from being the focus of conscious attention to being backgrounded. In other words, after a short time, these objects were experienced as no more than a peripheral presence that had no conscious attention paid to them. This "backgrounding" of initially strange and exotic objects is illustrated in descriptions 7.2.7 (Getting used to St Basil's) and 7.2.28 (Not noticing St Basil's). The language learning centre where I worked and studied was located directly opposite the river from St Basil's Cathedral. In the initial days and weeks of my presence in the language learning centre, whenever I looked out of the window my eyes would always be drawn to St Basil's (see 7.2.7). After a short period of time (as illustrated in 7.2.8). St Basil's served only as a background canvas for my day-to-day experiences, whose presence often wasn't even

noticed at all. This transition from being object of conscious attention to "background canvas" was true of a number of large and initially exotic landmarks in central Moscow.

Proposition 10: Objects in safe spaces are experienced differently to objects in other spaces.

The initial strangeness of all new and unfamiliar objects was soon replaced in the new safe spaces. This can be understood in two ways.

The first way in which objects were experienced differently is that they ceased to be viewed as objects of interest or curiosity and became objects to be utilised. In Heidegger's parlance, objects in these safe spaces transitioned from being experienced as being "present-at-hand" (Heidegger, 2008), when they were experienced with detached interest and curiosity to being experienced as "ready-to-hand" (Heidegger, 2008), when they were able to be utilised unthinkingly. Ticket machines in metro stations, no longer needed to be considered when passing on or passing out of the station (as illustrated in 7.2.25, Meeting with friends). The "ш" and the "ж" that, on my first day instilled in me the sense that I was in a strange and exotic location, in time began not to be noticed. Indeed, such symbols began not even to be "seen" when interpreting the information conveyed in the advertisements, in Cyrillic, that dotted the metro trains and metro stations. Additionally, the rug covering the wall in my room, initially experienced as strange and out of place (see description 7.2.3, Entering my bedroom for the first time), transitioned into a comforting background element that served to provide me with a series of reassuring visual patterns that I went to sleep to and woke up seeing.

The second way in which my conscious experiences of objects in these safe spaces changed was, in my being able to place these objects of experience into a broader context of space. I knew what lay *beyond the immediate space* in which I was located. This knowledge ensured that my experience of the objects in these safe spaces was not as anxiety inducing as it would be in other spaces. To illustrate, when ascending from my local underground Metro

station (see description 7.2.5, Buying something for the first time), I understood the entrances within the broader context of where they lead to in the surrounding streets. The stairs that I climbed coming out of the metro were experienced as leading somewhere familiar and well-trodden. This can be seen in contrast to the experience of objects after the plane landed on my arrival. The fur-lined jackets referred to in description 7.2.1 (Arrival) were experienced as linked to a hitherto, unexperienced, strange and exotically cold world outside the just landed aeroplane.

7.4.4 The existential of others

Proposition 8: Strangers are experienced with an exaggerated lack of knowledge regarding the rules governing interaction.

All engagements with others in the initial phase of migration were mediated by the absence of a background or framing knowledge of the conventions of interaction. In a pre-migration context, most engagements with strangers are experienced with an implicit understanding of how "how this is done". There were two factors that prevented this and created a sense, almost of vertigo, when in a position when communicating with an absolute stranger (such examples can be seen in descriptions 7.2.23, (Getting my haircut) and 7.2.24, (Getting my haircut again). Firstly, there was the total lack of knowledge of the language which, initially made any basic communication impossible. Even after a small level of language acquisition took place, there was the awareness that the background, implicitly accepted conventions for engaging with strangers (and even acquaintances) were different. There was a reliance on the good grace of strangers to be understanding of my knowledge deficit in this respect (good grace that wasn't always forthcoming).

Proposition 12: After the initial stage, the space around trusted people becomes a safe space.

As the initial phase of migration progressed, there developed a group of other trusted individuals whose presence marked de facto safe spaces. Interactions with these individuals

(individuals such as my flatmates Roma and Lena, my teacher, Tatyana Yurevna, and friend Anya) automatically became safe. When with these individuals I was afforded the opportunity to, firstly, observe and listen to the nature of their engagements with others in this safe space (examples are 7.2.20, Watching television and 7.2.11, Trying to wash my hands). Relieved of the pressure to "participate" in the lifeworld. I was able to, for a time, observe these skilled practitioners within these social contexts. Secondly, on the basis of these observations, I could experiment with these individuals. I could for instance, speak a slowly improving Russian with none of the self-consciousness that would have marked my speech in the other space with strangers.

When venturing into the other space, these individuals became like mobile islands of safety. They acted as lanterns leading the way and showing how the complexities of the outer space could be navigated (See description 7.2.22, Going to the market).

Proposition 13: Strangers are experienced as more other.

Within a pre-migration context, when engaging with strangers in public spaces, I felt more capable of inferring successfully (for the purposes of social interaction) what they were thinking. Within the migration context, I found it significantly harder to make such inferences.

This inability served, in some instances, as a liberating tool. In instances where I mis-stepped in public or singled out in public (instances such as 7.2.22, Going to the market) or 7.2.21, Anya's Russian lesson), although I felt an acute and immediate sense of shame, I found it difficult to grasp just how silly I would have looked to those strangers who were observing and judging me. Sartre (1972) suggests that, in shame one becomes aware of oneself as "frozen" as an object under the gaze of the other (Sartre, 1972). He says, "Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me" (1972, p. 222). In other words, one, for a moment, "catches oneself" as the other would see one. In my *pre-migration*

experiences I would have been able to infer, more or less, what kind of object the other would have been perceiving me. As a consequence the sense of shame would have been greater. In the early phases of migration at least, I struggled, due to a singular lack of knowledge of the socially shared horizon of assumptions that would have guided the judgments and how I was being perceived by these strangers. I had no clear grasp as to what kind of foolish looking individual I would have been perceived by these strangers as being.

The (post) phenomenological philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1969) suggests that the other *in all contexts* is inalterably other**.** In his view, one can never, on the basis of the structures of one's own conscious experience, infer the structure of conscious experiences in another. I felt this inability acutely in the early stages of migration.

Proposition 14: Other native first language speakers are experienced as a cue to relax.

When engaging with other English speakers there was the framing (and seductive) understanding that, without trying, everything I was saying was being understood. This framing understanding stood in contrast to the framing understanding of those engagements with others in all other contexts. The attraction of being able to lose myself in engagements with other native English speakers can be seen in 7.2.25 (Meeting friends). It was as if a thread of familiarity was pulling me towards these individuals. When engaged in communication with them, I was able to become lost in the luxury of communicating freely and easily. Such an experience was impossible in other contexts. When communicating with others in my slowly improving Russian, I hadn't approached a level of proficiency where I was able to lose myself in conversation. When engaging with locals, there was a framing understanding that the mode of language and presentation needed to be different than with a native English speaker.

Ordinarily, my surroundings would have been experienced with a more heightened awareness of who or what was around me. However, when engaging with other native

English speakers, I was able to immerse myself wholly and singularly into conversation. This occurred to such an extent that the physical space around me become backgrounded. The extent of the contrast with my default way of experiencing my surroundings in public can be seen in 7.2.25 (Meeting friends). In this instance, the metro trip from our agreed meeting place to the bar (which would have taken at least 45 minutes) was not noticed. Afterwards, alone and leaving the bar, I reverted to my default conscious appraisal of elements of the physical world around me.

7.4.5 The existential of self

Proposition 15: There is a heightened awareness of taking up space in other space.

In other space, in contrast to pre-migration experiences, there was a heightened awareness of myself as taking up space. This was evidenced when the requirement to engage with others arose in public. Examples can be seen in descriptions, 7.2.5 (Buying something for the first time), 7.2.23 (Getting my haircut), and 7.2.24 (Getting my haircut again). In these instances, as soon as the requirement to engage became clear there was a marked self-consciousness. When the eyes of imminent interlocutor became fixed on me in expectation there was a change in my experience of myself. Sartre (1972) speaks of this palpable shift in self-awareness when one becomes aware of a pair of eyes being fixed on one (1972, p. 221). In such instances, I became aware of myself as a thing that took up space. As a consequence, all such engagements were embarked with the sole transactional intent of getting them completed as soon as possible. By completing the transaction I felt I could “escape the stage and return to the wings”.

These engagements in other space, in which I became aware of myself as taking up space, could be divided into two types: closed context engagements and open context engagements. The first, closed context engagements were, in time, experienced as relatively easy and I was able to experience myself as taking up space not as someone completely

different to everyone around me but as someone who could negotiate basic transactions in public. Engagements exemplified by 7.2.5 (Buying something for the first time), were ones in which the variables for engaging successfully in the public engagement were few, mutually understood and linear. I would approach, make a request, my interlocutor's response would be predictable and I could respond with ease and confidence. Such closed context encounters actually filled me with some confidence and, on occasion, to remind myself that I could, I would purchase some innocuous object, such as chewing gum or a CD to reinforce to myself that I was capable of conducting such transactions.

The experience of open context engagements was always more fraught. There was the constant awareness that the parameters for such engagements were looser and less linear. I had no way of predicting how they would proceed and there was the constant awareness that at any time the engagement might proceed down a path that I would not have the linguistic faculties to be able to negotiate. The descriptions given, in 7.2.23 (Getting my haircut) and 7.2.24 (Getting my haircut again) recalls this. The moment I opened the door and felt the eyes of the hairdressers upon me, I felt a sense that I was being viewed with an obligation to fulfil a set of transactional obligations that they had a clear understanding of and for me, were largely a mystery. When I applied the rules for engagement adopted from my pre-migration life (engaging in small talk by saying that "Spring had arrived") I was immediately aware that I was being viewed as a strange and different being who didn't know the language and social conventions that well.

Such a stark experience of self as taking up space were more profound in other space when engagement was necessary. Yet, even when in safe spaces (such as metro stations or trains) outside the home there was always the background framing awareness that such an engagement *may occur* and that I might, for some reason be singled out in this public space. The eye contact from a stranger (which was rare in the public space in Moscow), followed by

the first few steps approaching me were always experienced with a shift in self-consciousness. I became aware of myself as embodied, I took up space. I could not completely melt into the background. I knew such approaches were likely to be for either the time or directions, and so I would wait for a key word such as “time” or “where” and have a stock response at the ready, such as giving the time or saying “I’m sorry, I’m not sure”.

Proposition 16: There is an experience of a dual self on the arrival of friends/family from pre-migration.

On the arrival of my friend from home, there arose a duality in how I experienced my sense of self (See description 7.2.28, Buying tickets). In his presence, I was aware of myself as having a long and detailed history. This “pre-migration-self” ran counter to the sense of self I had developed in the early stages of migration. Up until this point, this “migration self” had been unencumbered by the ties that bound me to my pre-migration history.

The awareness of this duality of self, added a sense of self-imposed pressure. “Open-ended” engagements in “other space” were experienced with a sense of even more heightened anxiety. The description given in 7.2.28 (Buying tickets) was experienced as even more fraught than other similarly open-ended contexts because of the knowledge that it was being observed by a friend from home. I became aware of such engagements from “the outside looking in”. Indeed, I became aware that, after a year, it would not look good if I couldn’t do something as seemingly simple as buying a train ticket.

Proposition 17: The sense of self-confidence is more volatile than in pre-migration.

The sense of engaging with the physical world and others with a sense of confidence and authority fluctuated wildly and was far more volatile than within a pre-migration context.

In many respects it felt as if my sense of self confidence was conveyed to me externally. Indeed, it was as if the “confident” or “non-confident” self was given to me depending on the way that I woke up. Some days it felt as if I could negotiate often quite

complex situations thoughtlessly and others such situations were experienced as impossibly difficult. This sense of self confidence being externally "bestowed" can be seen in description 7.2.16, (Waiting in the metro after a lesson), and 7.2.18, (Going home).

These initially wild vacillations in self-confidence became moderated and more tightly circumscribed as the migration experience continued.

Proposition 18: In the initial stage, one experiences ones' sense of self with a heightened degree of freedom.

In the early stages of migration, I experienced my sense of self with a heightened sense of freedom and fluidity. Framing all of my conscious experiences was the knowledge that all of the individuals around me knew nothing of my personal, pre-migration history. As a consequence, I didn't feel the constraints that, pre-migration, came with the constant engagements with people with whom I had a long-standing association. In the pre-migration context, I experienced my sense of self as, in some sense, requiring to cohere with the expectations of those that came from those around me. There were no such expectations in the early phase of my migration. Julia Kristeva captures this sense of almost vertigo inducing liberty that I experienced myself as having in *Strangers to Ourselves* (1991), when she remarks about the "intoxicating" sense of freedom and independence that accompanies early migration (p. 21, 1991).

Indeed, in early migration, I experienced myself as having the freedom to *re-create my sense of self.* There was no framing understanding (never conscious, always in the background) of the expectations of others that were built up over time. I felt free to respond differently in contexts than I would have in my pre-migration life. Pre-migration, the weight of projected expectations would have gone a long way to dictating my responses in given situations. For example, the ease with which I threw my-self into singing and clapping a

nursery rhyme, as shown in description 7.2.11, (Anya's russian lesson) would never have occurred within a pre-migration context.

It was noticeable however, that this sense of freedom, diminished as the migration experience continued. As I developed a network of closer relationships with people. I became aware of these people developing a sense of my identity that was built up over a period of time. This self, though similar, was not identical to the pre-migration self.

Proposition 19: After the initial stage, one's sense of self is experienced as more fixed and in alignment with the pre-migration self.

As a group of individuals within the migration context (such as my flat mates Roma and Lena as well as my teacher) developed a more detailed understanding of me that was built up over a period of time. I became aware of being experienced by others who had a picture of me that transcended the vacillations of my behaviour on any given day. These individuals, increasingly, knew of my pre-migration history (conveyed to them by me). Around them I was able to develop a default "migration self" (not too far removed from the pre-migration self) that I could continually return to in these "safe spaces" regardless of what kind of day I had had. Such a safe space can be seen in the kitchen with Lena as shown in description 7.2.20 (Watching television). Other such safe spaces included incidental conversations over dubbed films and with my teacher in her kitchen over Russian language textbooks, see description 7.2.27, (Going to my teacher's apartment).

7.5 Summary.

This chapter set out the formative autobiographical study component of the *phenomenological lifeworld research methodology* investigation into the lifeworld of new migrants. Firstly, it presented descriptions derived from the new migrant lifeworld of the author of this thesis. It then set out and justified a number of propositions designed to be tested in the upcoming summative interviewee study. The thesis will now turn to the main

summative interviewee study. It will firstly, set out the process set in place for the recruitment of volunteers. It will then present and justify the essential structures of the lifeworld of new migrants that were derived from those interviews. Finally, it will provide a discussion of the findings derived from the investigation into the lifeworld of new migrants, providing suggestions as to how the data may be utilised in future studies.

CHAPTER EIGHT: INTERVIEWEE STUDY

8.1 Interviewee Selection Process

In order to promote homogeneity in the research, an initial request was made that called only for Russian male volunteers (given that the author's experience of migration was from the male perspective). After several weeks of few responses and little interest, it was expanded to include all Russian migrants to Australia over the age of 21 and who had been in Australia for over three years and who possessed good conversational English (See Appendix A).

Originally it was intended that interviews were to be face-to-face, however, with the imposition of COVID restrictions in March of 2020 this became unfeasible and all interviews were to be conducted over ZOOM. This proved to be of some benefit because it allowed for volunteers to take part who lived outside the Brisbane Metropolitan area.

Phone calls seeking interested volunteers were made to Russian clubs and institutions in the major metropolitan centres in Australia and posts were made (via the organisers) on social media websites (see Appendix A).

12 volunteer interviewees agreed to take part in the study. There were 9 women and 3 men. All the volunteers had Russian as a first language and grew up within the borders of modern Russia, with the exception of one, who was born and raised in Uzbekistan**.** All the volunteers had migrated to Australia over three years ago and possessed good conversational English.

All 36 interviews were conducted over the ZOOM platform, recorded and then fully transcribed. The first round of interviews was conducted from July – to August – 2020, the second was from September – to October – 2020 and the third from November- to December – 2020.

The semi-structured interview scripts and insight cultivators for each round of interviews can be found in Appendix A**.** The transcript for each of the 36 interviews are available on request.

8.2 Analysis of Data: Summary of Essential Structures

The following section outlines the essential structures of the lifeworld of new migrants as derived from the interviews. Most of these essential structures relate directly to those testable propositions that were set out subsequent to my autobiographical descriptions related to the phenomenological lifeworld of migration (as set out in 7.2).

In many instances, the propositions offered in 7.2 were reaffirmed as a result of the reflections offered in the interviews. In some cases, the essential structures presented have come about as a result of adapting or refining the propositions in light of the reflections offered by the interviewees. Some of the propositions have been rejected as not being essential to the lifeworld of new migrants. Some of the propositions, although not universally supported have been largely supported and, therefore, have tentatively been included as essential structures within the lifeworld of migration. Finally, there are several essential structures not directly related to the propositions that have been added in light of reflections made by the interview participants (this presents a methodological problem that will be further discussed in chapter 9.2).

The existential of time

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Essential structure 1: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of a degree of permanence.
- Essential structure 2: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of exaggerated anxiety for migrants with temporary visas or residency.

- Essential structure 3: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of reduced anxiety for experienced migrants.
- Essential structure 4: Conscious experiences are framed by the shadow of pre-migration experiences.
- Essential structure 5: Time is experienced as passing more slowly.

The existential of space

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Essential structure 6: In the initial stage all spaces are experienced as other.
- Essential structure 7: After the initial stage, space is demarcated between safe and other.
- Essential structure 8: Safe spaces become more numerous and larger.
- Essential structure 9: The transition of space from other to safe is faster for experienced migrants.
- Essential structure 10: The framing sense of where home is, differs according to migrant.

The existential of objects

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Essential structure 11: Attention is paid to the exoticism of unfamiliar objects.
- Essential structure 12: Initially exotic objects soon become backgrounded.
- Essential structure 13: Objects in safe spaces are experienced differently to objects in other spaces.
- Essential structure 14: Objects that allow communication with the home country reduce the framing starkness of the migration experience.

The existential of others

In the lifeworld of the new migrant:

- Essential structure 15: Strangers are experienced with an exaggerated lack of knowledge regarding the rules governing interaction.
- Essential structure 16: The rules governing interaction with others are learnt through conscious observation, internalisation, and imitation.
- Essential structure 17: Strangers are experienced as more other.
- Essential structure 18: Other native first language speakers are experienced as a cue to relax.

The existential of self

In the lifeworld of the new migrant

- Essential structure 19: There is a heightened awareness of taking up space in other space.
- Essential structure 20: In the initial stage, one experiences ones' sense of self with a heightened degree of freedom.
- Essential structure 21: The self is experienced differently when with friends/family from the home country.

8.3 Analysis of Data: Explanation of Essential Structures

8.3.1 The existential of time

Essential structure 1: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of a degree of permanence.

Proposition 1: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of permanence, was found not to be fully supported by the descriptions offered by the twelve Russian migrants interviewed. In some instances, the descriptions reinforced an implicitly understood horizon of long-term permanence but, overwhelmingly, there was a sense of provisionality and open-endedness about the long-term prospects of the migrants. What all the migrants interviewed

conveyed was a sense that all of their descriptions were framed by an implicit understanding that they were going to remain in their new location in the short to medium term.

In several instances there was conveyed a framing horizon of long-term permanence. In these instances it was clear that the decision to migrate was irrevocable. Alexandra, for example, commented, "you are a migrant, you understand that you are not just a guest – you are not just a tourist here….this is your place, you should understand that" (Alexandra, interview 2, p. 4), she continued, "…so it's feeling – it's not a responsibility but it's an obligation and if you want not to be a foreigner, if you want to live there you should understand where you live…" (Alexandra, 2, p. 4). This framing projection of making a life long commitment was also inferred by Lena who commented, "I was…I guess committed to this new life and every step was something new. Like getting the passport and the test and then the job and how to talk to people at work and how to, you know, behave yourself at lunch…" (Lena, 2, p. 3).

In a number of instances, however, there was a sense that the conscious experiences of early migration had a framing horizon of explicit short/medium term permanence.

There was, on the one hand, a clear inference made by the interviewees that their experiences were migrant experiences as opposed to *tourist experiences*. In this regard there existed a clear framing horizon of permanence *to a degree.* This distinction was drawn by Dmitri who remarked, early in his migration experience that he made a conscious decision to exist for a "couple of days" as a tourist. He commented, "I think it was like [the] first week after seven days, we decided we'd forget about finding a job or doing anything we need to do, we just imagined that we're tourists here and we'd just do what tourists would do. And we relaxed for a couple of days and….we were feeling like tourists and we didn't feel as vulnerable as after when we actually went to the city and when we had to do some stuff for us, say doing job interview and stuff like that" (Dmitri, 2, p. 7). Natalia, also, commented on

the difference in the nature of her conscious experience when she came to Australia as a tourist in 2011 as opposed to a migrant three years later. Remarking on the friend's place she stayed at on her arrival she stated, "Yeah it was a very different space because three years before, in 2011, it was me and my husband and we came to their place as tourists" (Natalia 2, p. 6).

This sense of conscious experiences being framed by a horizon of meaning of some form of permanence was reinforced by the shared recognition that conscious experiences, in particular within the context of public spaces, needed to engage with the people and objects around them with an eye to learning from these conscious experiences for the future. It was this sense of having to *get used to* the way things worked that distinguished these conscious experiences from the kinds of conscious experiences that tourists may have had. Dmitry made this explicit when he remarked "when it's not about tourism anymore it felt different, so you don't really pay attention to how beautiful [the] city is, you just try to brace yourself for what's coming because, the thing is, you don't know what's coming…you didn't pay attention to buildings, nothing, you just focused on yourself and trying to prepare yourself for that" (Dmitry, 2, p. 8). Maria Z. reaffirmed this framing projection of experiencing the world around her with an eye to having to remain in that world when she remarked, "I had to think about what I was doing. I had to think about the bus timetable and taking the right turn…So I was thinking about all those things and making sure I had everything with me that I needed and making sure I understood what, what else was happening. And then, of course, after a few months I could just walk around and think about other things" (Maria Z. 2, p. 14). Lena reiterated this, saying, "you need to learn how to do these steps, where to get this card, how to load the money, how to put it in the machine, when you get on the bus. Yes, its all very new and foreign and maybe, yeah, a but frustrating at the beginning" (Lena, 2. p.3).

As someone who had migrated several times previously, Ksenia suggested an awareness that the nature of her conscious experiences of these spaces would change in the future, "when you've recently moved. And this is really something that comes from your being an experienced migrator I guess you could say. So, you know that this is the space now. And that this is reflective of this space as it is when I've just moved here. And I know it's going to change at some stage in the future…" (Ksenia, 2, p. 3).

Yet, a sense of the conscious experiences of early migration being *framed by final and irrevocable* sense of permanence was, by no means, shared by all of the migrants interviewed. Ksenia commented, "I did move on a 3 year contract. So, there was a finish line...I knew if I perform well, then I will be converted to permanent position. So, there was not this feeling, oh in 2 years or 3 years for sure I'm leaving this country", she continued, "I still created those deadlines for myself. [But] It was more open-ended in comparison" (Ksenia, 2, p. 13). This sense of a framing open-endedness, of not having made an irrevocable and permanent decision was discernible with Olga and, in particular Maria K. Olga commented on her long-term plans, "We're considering Italy as a possible retirement place [and] Russia. It's cheap and we have some assets there" (Olga, 2, p. 13). This sense of a framing long-term horizon of open-endedness was also made explicit by Maria K, who stated baldly, "I never thought and I still don't think that I'm going to live here all my life" (Maria K. 2, p. 18).

Maria Z remarked that, unlike back in the familiar environment of home it was difficult to imagine oneself in the long-term future in this new environment. She remarked, "when you live in the same place for a while, the future becomes very easy to imagine, because you see others…living in a similar way and similar circumstances. So you can…easily imagine what kind of life you would have….And yes, of course, us moving to Australia meant that we kind

of just erased all of that. And then it's at that point, the future was open-ended…" (Maria Z, 2. p. 17).

Essential structure 2: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of exaggerated anxiety for migrants with temporary visas or residency.

This essential structure does not refer to a proposition. It became apparent throughout the course of the interviews.

For those migrants whose remaining in Australia relied upon visa/residency renewal, conscious experiences in the early stages of migration had a palpable horizon of anxiety. Natalia noted how this lack of long-term surety impacted upon her present conscious experiences when she said, "knowing that you are on the visa that's going to finish, I would never be able to be anywhere close to a normal person, I would always fear that" (Natalia, 2, p. 16).

This horizon of anxiety was also manifest for Lena who, on the one hand, had "committed to this new life" (Lena 2, p. 3) yet was unable to get her permanent residency because of not securing a pass on the international language test (Lena 2, p. 14). During this period Lena commented that, "it's like a rubber [band], it's never ending, you stretch them, you stretch them, and you don't get any result" (Lena 2, p. 14). Lena expressed this period where her conscious experiences were framed by the horizon of anxiety related to the lack of surety in the following, lyrical manner, "you are like a bird trying to find the window to get out from the house and you knock on this window and its closed and you're not sure, should you push it?" (Lena 2, p. 15).

This ever-present horizon of anxiety can be contrasted with those migrants who had external parties (companies etc) who addressed their visa/residency requirements. Alex commented, "with some external help that didn't really give me too much need to worry…because I had a whole company to help me out with this" (Alex 2, p. 11).

Essential structure 3: Conscious experiences are framed by a horizon of reduced anxiety for experienced migrants.

This essential structure does not refer to a proposition. It became apparent throughout the course of the interviews.

For the more experienced migrants there was an understanding of how their relationship to the new environment would evolve and change into the short and medium term future. This meant that their present conscious experiences were not experienced with the same level of anxiety as first-time migrants. Ksenia reiterated this when she commented, "this is really something that comes from your being an experienced migrator I guess you could say…that this is the space now. And this is reflective of this space as it is when I've just moved here. And I know it's going to change at some stage in the future" (Ksenia 2, p. 3).

This, being an "experienced migrator" and knowing how the nature of one's experiences will change over time was remarked upon by Maria K, who contrasted her experience as a migrant with that of being on holiday. She commented, "it's like a [an] extended holiday…it's a normal thing, you know what's happening, you know [the expectation]….when you're *moving* to a new place, I know that I'm going to be moving here for a minimum of four years and I was kind of , yep, okay, I need to do something about it…" (Maria K, 2, p. 6, my square brackets).

Essential structure 4: Conscious experiences are framed by the shadow of pre-migration experiences.

Proposition 2: Conscious experiences are framed by the "shadow" of past, pre-migration experiences, was broadly confirmed throughout the interview process.

The, still fresh, memories of the migrants' past, pre-migration experiences acted as a kind of external shadow, providing contrast to many of their present conscious experiences.

This framing "shadow", cast from conscious experiences in pre-migration life, reinforced the sense of strangeness that would often characterise the migrants' experience of their surroundings and, in particular, objects within those surroundings. Ksenia articulated how this framing shadow of pre-migration operates when experiencing certain, seemingly innocuous aspects of her new world, "you start noticing these tiny, tiny differences in objects. Or how things are organised. And when you live in one country for a long time, you don't even think that things could be different. So, one discovery, for me, in Australia was the [plug] sockets…the little switches on the sockets" (Ksenia, 2, p. 3).

In Maria Z's case, the aspects of this new world, invisible and taken for granted by the long-term resident or citizen but set up in contrast to the framing memory of her pre-migration life were the bare white walls that confronted her in her new apartment in Australia, "what really struck me was the white walls. The white walls in the apartments. This generic kind of white, light colour without any wallpaper or any prints…because in Russia…at least 15 years ago, most apartments still had wallpapers and they had patterns and they were all different colours" (Maria Z, 2, p. 4) The shock of the new experience of bare walls in the new environment also made an impact on Lena who stated, "in Russia, when you walk in someone else's home they [walls] will all be different. Like each apartment will be different and people will go with some crazy wallpaper…Whilst here you most likely find that same…neutral kind of eggshell colour, whatever you call it" (Lena, 2, p. 6).

Essential structure 5: Time is experienced as passing more slowly.

Proposition 4: Time is experienced as passing more slowly, was reinforced throughout the interview process. All migrants remarked that, throughout the early stages of migration, their lived experience of time was experienced as progressing more slowly than those periods of time, previous and subsequent to, early migration.

Maria K remarked that time in the early months of migration was experienced to have "stretched". She stated, "It [time] was a bit of a stretch, maybe not for a whole year but for the first couple of months for sure…" (Maria K, 2, p. 13). Alex too commented on this seeming slowing down of time, "it [time] definitely felt slower…there was (sic.) new events, new environments…it definitely felt slower" (Alex, 2, pp. 8-9). Natalia spoke of the experience of time in the early stages as being "gluey", "I felt like everything's very slow…and everything's sort of gluey or, what is the word, gluey in a way…" (Natalia, 2, p. 13).

It was commented by many of the interviewees that, after the initial experience of time slowing down, it subsequently was experienced as speeding back up again. In many instances it sped back up to a degree that was similar to pre-migration. Viktoriya captured this return to the pre-migration experience of time being experienced when she remarked, "It's interesting, yeah, they [time] become (sic.) more routine and the time turned into how it was before in Russia" **(**Viktoriya, p. 12). Andrei too commented that the experience of time, after an initial slowing, returned to that pace which he had experienced previous to migration, "Once again, back in Russia, it [time] was somewhat similar to what it is now" (Andrei, 2, p. 11). This experiencing of time reverting back to the previous speed and rhythm was remarked upon by Natalia, "…my personal time has increased…I caught myself the other day, when people tell me that – Australians tell me that their days go by very quickly and my days go by very quickly" (Natalia, 2, p. 13).

8.3.2 The existential of space

Essential structure 6: In the initial stage all spaces are experienced as other.

Proposition 5: In the initial stage all spaces are experienced as other, was largely confirmed. There was, amongst the interviewees who articulated a perspective, broad consensus that, in the initial, short period of time, all spaces, *including* those private,

domestic spaces such as houses, apartments and even bedrooms, were experienced as being strange and other. Speaking of the strangeness of the walls and layout of her new room, Maria Z remarked, "what really struck me was the white walls….this generic kind of white, light colour without any wallpaper or any prints…and it did feel a bit sterile and for a long time I felt like I was living in a hotel room" (Maria Z, 2, p. 4). Lena too spoke of the strangeness of the blank walls and also of the difference of layout within her new domestic and private space, "…yeah I did like the place [that she lived in] and the layout, like even though the colours were that muted. But the layout was very different to what I would normally see in Russia, like it has that entryway and that formal whatever the room with the fireplace and the couch" (Lena, 2, p. 6).

Essential structure 7: After the initial stage, space is demarcated between safe and other.

Proposition 6: After the initial stage, space is experienced as being demarcated between safe and other, was largely supported by the responses provided by the interviewees. After an initial experiencing of all space as strange and other, within a short time many of the migrants interviewed reinforced the view that some, predominantly domestic, private spaces transitioned into being experienced as safe inner spaces and other, often public, spaces were experienced as less safe outer spaces.

The demarcation point between these safe inner spaces and less safe outer spaces differed from migrant to migrant. Indeed, it depended largely on the nature of their living situation during the first year of their migration.

For those like Lena, Dmitri and Alexandra who, in the initial stages of migration, lived in shared houses, the safe inner space was limited to the confines of their bedrooms. Lena highlighted the limited scope of her safe inner space when she remarked, "…yeah, I needed to pass all that formal living, dining [room], staircase and go into my room, close the door and jump on the bed. That's where…no one sees me, I don't have to have any

interaction or like say ‘hi, how are you’...I walked through all those common areas where you may see someone and you may need to talk but once I go into my room and close the door, that’s where I can relax and do whatever” (Lena 2, p. 8).

Alexandra expressed the tension that she experienced in the communal space of the shared house outside the confines of her bedroom, stating, “there are public and private spaces. Of course your room…yes nobody is going to disturb you. Of course, the living room is a public space …I couldn’t speak back then properly, so it was difficult and then you are trying to make a conversation….it’s interesting, but it’s [the living room] a public space [which] means tension” (Alexandra, 2. p. 6).

The sense of the safe inner space existing only within the limited confines of the bedroom of a shared house was made stark by Dmitri , who stated, “So yeah, the kitchen definitely didn’t feel comfortable, we didn’t like being there for a long time, so we just grab a bite, come back to the room and inside the room, right on the first day, it was the safe place for us where we can stay and be safe essentially” (Dmitri, 2, p. 5).

For others, who didn’t have a communal living arrangement in the first year of migration, this safe inner space extended to the entirety of the premises in which they lived. When asked about where that safe inner space began for her, Viktoriya, categorically responded, ‘After I closed the front door [of the house] behind myself” (Viktoriya, 2. p. 9). She continued that, “[she] had to get inside. Everything outside the door [felt strange], even the moment you step out the door, even the corridor outside…but once you’re out of the door everything looks different” (Viktoriya, 2. p. 9, my square brackets).

This sense of the broader house/apartment *in its entirety* serving as the safe inner space, was reinforced by Maria Z. who stated, “It did feel like a refuge and… I definitely remember living inside a little bubble…I definitely remember this feeling of being in a bubble and everything was kind of distorted around me…It was a very hot summer…being in

this sort of small airconditioned space…I didn't leave the house much for the first few weeks and when I did leave it was going into a slightly bigger bubble outside…there was the heat…the foreign street…I did feel safe inside, but it did feel like a refuge" (Maria Z, 2, p. 6)

Essential structure 8: Safe spaces become more numerous and larger.

Proposition 7: Safe spaces become more numerous and larger, was reinforced by the interviewees' descriptions. From, the initial experiencing of all space as "other" (including, what would later become, the safest of the safe spaces such as the bedroom) to the development of small "footholds" of safe space, in early migration, the migrants spoke of slowly, almost incrementally developing the number and increasing the size of these safe spaces. Almost like a "sallying forth" from their safe refuges, the migrants slowly navigated and domesticated those areas external to their primary safe space, in time, and often with difficulty, turning those, initially other spaces into safe spaces as well.

For those, like Alexandra, who lived in shared contexts, the process of enlarging the size and number of these safe inner spaces began *within* the four walls of her shared house. She spoke of learning to domesticate the implicit rules and expectations of this shared space, "They [flatmates] were trying to comfort me, to relax me and all these things, but yes still there is a tension of talking to them…so space is teaching and the interaction happens in the living room because people after they work they come back home. They have dinner and they are watching TV so again it's a show itself. It's interesting but it's public space means tension. I mean because you feel challenged" (Alexandra 2, p. 6).

With Ksenia, who also began within a shared house context, the progression of enlarging and domesticating space to make it "safe" also worked outwards from her bedroom. She stated, "I think it [experience of space] changes over time. I think it begins with a smaller sort of space that you feel is home. Maybe your room. Then it grows larger. As you spend

more time in the house, then the house becomes this area…So from your bedroom, to the house, then to the larger neighbourhood" (Ksenia, 2, p. 8).

The sense of domesticating the immediate neighbourhood surrounding one's house was captured by Dmitry when he spoke of his local Coles or Woolworths supermarkets as becoming safe spaces. He commented, "Yeah, I think the local Coles or Woolworths were the most comfortable public spaces because you do it every second or every third day and at some point [after] a couple of weeks…it feels like you've been here forever" (Dmitry, 2, p. 9). Maria Z also spoke of the enlarging of the safe space in the areas immediately outside the house, commenting, "…it [experience of space] changed…I would come back home for lunch and just make myself lunch in the kitchen. But it [my house] stopped being my base-like my nest and…became just a place I lived but I had life outside that space. So, yeah, the bubble kind of expanded and changed" (Maria Z. 2, p. 8, my square brackets).

The process of domesticating these external spaces and making them safe spaces, according to the accounts given by the migrants, often required the assistance of others. Lena's first trip into the city necessitated a trusted guide to help her. She said, "Yeah, so I still remember [the] first time I went to Sydney city…Marion…took me there…she needed to go there to the doctor's appointment and okay we'll go together, I'll show you how. So, she showed me how to use the bus and which bus like 380, whatever, 386 (I still remember those numbers), and you buy *this* card and you put it in *that* machine. So, she showed that to me and when we arrived, she was like this is the city and you kind of see it" (Lena, 2, p. 9).

Additionally, this process of enlarging and multiplying these domesticated spaces was experienced as a difficult process as well as an experience that involved a great deal of trial and error on the part of the migrants. Mila spoke of the stress of getting off at the wrong bus stop and losing her way, "If I get off in (sic.) the wrong stop, just you know, didn't press the button…that would be absolutely terrible…because I would have to come back by foot…I

definitely wouldn't want to do that…" (Mila, 2, p. 13). Maria Z spoke of the initial forays out of her safe space of home as "adventures", "everything was kind of [an] adventure but…not in a good way…it had to be planned…I had to think about the bus timetable, and taking the right turn…" (Maria Z, 2, p. 14). Yet, despite this pre-planning, the process of domesticating these external spaces involve, *necessarily,* numerous mistakes and social faux pas. Maria Z commented, "Often, I had to go back home…I would realise that I did something wrong or I didn't bring something and then I would have to go back home…So I did that a lot actually. So, all those tasks…they stretched in that way. And I remember feeling especially, sort of, humiliated at some point" (Maria Z, 2, p. 15).

When these safe spaces had been domesticated, an understanding of the implicit rules and expectations within these spaces meant that conscious thought and engagement with elements within those spaces was no longer required to the same degree as in other spaces. Mila encapsulated the nature of this experiential shift in the experiences of these spaces, "…it's actually quite funny because like, in the beginning, initially you feel like, oh, you're a little stranger [in this space] and you're by yourself…there is a big system and there is a big city…and you just like have to somehow survive. Whereas now I feel like I'm local…I know myself, how to react to that and what to do. Plus, I know where to go, who to ask and who to talk to and I know the rules here…So yeah, you feel absolutely different" (Mila, 2, p. 13). Maria Z, also captures the ease and comfort associated with these newly domesticated inner safe spaces in public, "I think [in these spaces] it's just…a matter of not needing to think about what you are doing. So, you can space out…you can just let your body bring you home. Your legs bring you home…So, just being able to focus on other things and kind of drift into other, other thoughts and plans…" (Maria Z, 2, p. 14, my square brackets).

Essential structure 9: The transition of space from other to safe is faster for experienced migrants.

This essential structure was derived as a result of the interview process. The process of becoming familiar with and domesticating spaces thereby transitioning them from threatening "outer" spaces into safe spaces occurred more quickly with those migrants who had migrated previous to migrating to Australia.

What was evident amongst the recollections was that the process of familiarisation or "domestication" of the migrants' surrounding spaces was less fraught for those who had previously undergone a migration experience. For these individuals, there was apparent, in their descriptions, a framing awareness that the nature of their conscious experience of the surrounds would change. For them, there was an understanding that the otherness that they were presently confronted with would transition into a more comfortable mode of experiencing their surroundings. A mode of experiencing that, although not exactly the same, was more akin to their experiencing of their surrounds pre-migration.

There was also an awareness (though not necessarily explicit) of the steps that could be put into place so as to domesticate their surrounds quickly and effectively.

Those that had migrated previously to other countries before migrating to Australia, such as Maria K and Ksenia, from the beginning implemented a process of systematically domesticating their surrounds. Beginning with their immediate rooms and apartments and, from here, radiating outwards. Maria K acknowledged the importance of cultivating a safe, inner space, stating, soon after arrival, "I need to be comfortable in this space, like I have to make sure I'm very comfortable in it. And that happens to me every time when I'm moving to a different place as well, so when I'm moving apartments or something, or like houses, whatever it is, I always need to make sure, like my first thing that I do is my bedroom" (Maria K, 2, p. 6).

Ksenia too, spoke of the importance of systematically domesticating space, beginning with her house, "…before an international move you sort of strip your old life off of

you…The house doesn't feel a home for a long time. So, it feels very bare. It feels like it doesn't have my mark on it…so it feels just like a house. And then with time, maybe I print out some photos, and put them on walls…If I can make holes in walls if I'm renting the place. I get some flowers, potted plants or something like that. And so, with time, the space is no longer as bare, and 'identiless'. Like lacking identity anymore. So, it becomes more of my place, rather than just a box" (Ksenia, 2, p. 3). Then moving on to the broader neighbourhood. After this domestication of the house, "…you learn where the university is…and you get to know that route. So, you…draw those connections, these streets in your internal mind map. And then…the space around the house…I don't limit myself to the house. I think the whole neighbourhood becomes more familiar and smaller because of that, because you know where the different places are. And they become more recognisable" (Ksenia, 2, p. 7). This process of domestication, Ksenia suggested took her about a year, "…I think it always took about a year for the whole town to feel like a home. And get that feeling, 'I'm home', when you're coming back from another city" (Ksenia, 2, p. 8).

Ksenia, however, was at pains to make clear that this process of "domestication" although in a sense systematic and informed by her previous migration experiences wasn't thought through *explicitly*, "…I don't think I thought this through, and thought, oh, I need to do this, to make it a home. I don't think I did that" (Ksenia, 2, p. 8).

These examples of self-directed and systematic domestication of space from Maria K and Ksenia can be seen in contrast to the conscious experiences of first-time migrants Dmitry and Maria Z. In both instances, there was a lack of awareness in the initial stages that the space surrounding them *would transition* into becoming domesticated. A sense that reinforced the sense of their living in a "bubble" (Maria Z, 2, p. 6). Of course, in both instances, increasingly, over time the space in their homes and radiating out from their homes become domesticated, become safe "inner spaces" but because there was no *initial awareness*

(based on previous migration experiences) that this was inevitable, the descriptions given of this transitioning of space into becoming "safe" is given with almost revelatory detail. (Dmitry, 2, pp. 7-9), (Maria Z, 2, pp. 9-11**).**

Essential structure 10: The framing sense of where home is, differs according to migrant.

This essential structure was derived as a result of the interview process. There is no corresponding proposition. In relation to the lived experience of space (understood in the more abstract sense) the interviewees differed concerning the framing understanding of where home was.

In the first year of migration, many (but not all) of the Russian migrants who broached this issue still thought of Russia, and in particular their hometowns as the "centre" of their worlds or their homes. What was also made manifest by the migrants is that this sense of Russia being their centre gradually diminished over subsequent years.

Ksenia, who had migrated to a number of countries after leaving Russia, still considered Saratov, where her family still lives to be her home. She remarked, "I never lived in a single place for more than 4 years outside of Russia. So, Russia is still home base" (Ksenia, 2, p. 16). She continued that, this notion of Saratov being her "global home" may change, should she remain in Australia for an equivalent period of time, she suggested, "Maybe if I live in one place for a very long time. Maybe if I stay in Australia for 20 years, and then it sort of becomes equal to the time that I had spent in Russia, then yeah [Australia may become the "home"]" (Ksenia, 2, p. 16, my square brackets).

Viktoriya, when asked where she considers her home to be now (after many years of living in Australia) she replied, "…I do feel home here…I don't feel I belong there [Russia] anymore because it's been a long time and it's changed, different" (Viktoriya, 2, p. 11). It was clear that her central reference point in the first year of migration, however, was Russia, she affirmed that everything was perceived in relation to Russia (Viktoriya, 2, p. 12).

Mila reiterated that, *at present,* after several years of living in Australia, things had changed in regards to where she considered the centre of her world from home in Russia to Sydney (where she was living at the time.), She commented, "I feel that my home is here like me, just by myself…But of course there is a big part of, you know, relatives and everyone who drags you there" (Mila, 2, p. 15). Again, however, just like in Viktoriya's instance, this experiencing Australia as her home was not the case in her first year. Also, like in Viktoriya's case this change in the framing of her perception happened gradually after having been in Australia for a number of years. She commented, "I wouldn't say it [change in perception of home] happened within like even the first three years, maybe a little later on. (Mila, 2, p. 16, my square brackets).

Yet, this experiencing of Russia as the framing, emotional centre/reference point throughout the first year of migration was not shared by all who spoke of it. Alexandra, (a musician) speaking, partially with reference to her Russian/German heritage but also the fact of her being a musician suggested that home or her centre was wherever she could deeply and meaningfully in music and the arts. She remarked, "So, no matter where, if you are going to play some jazz and we can do it together, I feel home…So if I can do it [play music with others] in this space and there is much more opportunity to do it here…So this is home" (Alexandra, 2, p. 14).

Maria Z also spoke of not considering Russia to be her centre in her first year. Yet, her justification for this perspective was different, highlighting that, in some ways she felt like a foreigner back in Russia as well. She remarked, "I feel like being sort of uncomfortable everywhere is actually a part of me…I don't think I need to belong to one place…I want to be able to go anywhere and I'm fine with being a foreigner everywhere because now it's now a part of me" (Maria Z, 2, p. 11).

8.3.3 The existential of objects

Essential structure 11: Attention is paid to the exoticism of unfamiliar objects.

Proposition 8: Attention is paid to the exoticism of unfamiliar objects, was largely supported by the responses offered by the interviewees. During the earliest phase of migration, when all space is experienced as other, attention is focused on the otherness of objects that, in relation to pre-migration experiences are new, different, and unfamiliar. Frequently the objects focused on are, to the local population, small, innocuous or non-descript. Nonetheless, these objects appear to jar with the migrants in the early stage of migration.

Maria Z and Lena's attention was drawn to the bare white walls within their respective rooms and apartments. The walls' absence of colour and design drew Maria Z's attention immediately after her arrival, stating, "…what really struck me was the white walls. The white walls in the apartments. This generic kind of white, light colour without any wallpaper or any prints…the white walls were very unusual. And it did feel a bit sterile and for a long time I felt like I was living in a hotel room" (Maria Z, 2, p. 4). The otherness of these walls was also noted by Lena who remarked on her first house that, "…I noticed that everything [inside the house] was the same colour…that neutral kind of eggshell colour whatever you call it…" (Lena, 2, p. 6).

Dmitry emphasised the attention drawn to the difference in objects and the associated surprise that such objects could, in fact, be different. In Dmitry's case, his attention was drawn to the differences in tap design, "…going to the bathroom and just trying to find the tap to turn on the water, we [in Russia] didn't have so much variety of the taps like we have here. We went to Sydney at some point and I couldn't find the switch to turn on the water and it turns out …you have to press your foot on the switch at the bottom. And people were washing their hands and I was like what they hell, how do they do that?" (Dmitry, 3, p. 7).

Andrei too was struck by this particular design idiosyncrasy, "…when you try to use, for example, a sink with two taps instead of a mixer, it's kind of, 'how is it supposed to work?'. But then you start thinking why doesn't it work for me? How does it work for other people?" (Andrei, 3, pp. 5-6).

Ksenia dwelt on this attention paid to the striking differences in appearance or design of objects that she encountered early in her migration experience. Speaking generally about the fact of her attention being drawn to these differences, she remarked, "[when you migrate] you start noticing those tiny, tiny differences in objects. Or how things are organised. And when you live in a country for a long time, you don't even think that things could be different" (Ksenia, 2, p. 3).

After making this general point, like Dmitry, she outlined in some detail how striking and strange it was for her to experience the two individual "hot" and "cold" taps that she was confronted with soon after her arrival. She commented, "…in the bathroom...the sink had two faucets. So…they were not connected. There was no mixer…to mix the cold and the hot water…I'd seen pictures of these. But for me…this was how it was done in the olden days" (Ksenia, 2, p. 4)**.**

Ksenia's focus on the otherness of objects in the early stages of migration extended to the strangeness of the design and appearance of the electric sockets she noticed on the walls of her earliest dwelling. She stated, "So, one discovery for me in Australia, was the sockets right…the little switches on the sockets. So, I've not seen it anywhere else. But those little switches, that was interesting…and that made me think. Oh, is it for safety? Or is it for some sort of electricity conservation?" (Ksenia, 2, pp. 3-4).

Essential structure 12: Initially exotic objects soon become backgrounded.

Proposition 10: Initially exotic objects become backgrounded, was shown to be supported by the interviewee responses. Objects initially experienced as exotic, that were

experienced as strange curiosities, transitioned into either being experienced instrumentally or, they receded into the background of migrants' conscious experiences of the world around them.

This shift in the experience of these unfamiliar objects/aspects of the world was captured by both Maria Z and Dmitry who spoke, early on in their respective migration experiences, as experiencing objects and aspects of the world around them as a "tourist" (Maria Z, 2, p. 10), (Dmitry, 2, p. 8).

Maria Z spoke of her initial experience of objects and aspects of the world around her, "…I felt like a tourist…like in a tourist destination because…everything was new and shiny and attractive. And there were fountains and pleasant views everywhere. So, it [Canberra] didn't feel like a city [where] one could live. It felt like a city one could visit…So it was very touristy. It felt like a tourist place. For me, that was my association" (Maria Z, 2, pp. 9-10).

Maria Z contrasted this "touristy" mode of experiencing objects and aspects of the world with her experiences of the same aspects of the world and objects *after a period of time.* She reflected, "…at some point I stopped being a tourist and I just started living there and using all those things…I didn't feel like they were some kind of commodities…that I paid for as a tourist. No, they were just there because they were part of life…" (Maria Z, 2, p. 11).

This transition to experiencing objects and aspects of the world not as interesting curiosities but of instrumental value was captured by Lena when she spoke of her increasingly effortless engagement with public transport ticket machines, "…they're [ticket machines] very efficient but you need to learn how to do that. These steps…where to get this card, how to load the money, how to put it in the machine, when you get on the bus. Yes, it's all very new and foreign and maybe, yeah, a little frustrating at the beginning" (Lena, 2, p. 3).

Alex spoke of the transitioning of the sky deck building into an instrumental point of reference and navigation after a period of time having lived in Melbourne. After a period of time Alex spoke of the Eureka sky deck as being, "…like a landmark for me because I knew that wherever I am in Melbourne, if I see it in the distance, this is where home is. Like a 10 minute walk from there" (Alex, 2, p. 13).

This transition from experiencing objects and aspects of the world in a "touristy" way, where they are experienced from a detached almost theoretical perspective into a more pragmatic instrumental mode of experiencing was expressed by Dmitry when he commented that, in time, he was able to place objects and aspects of the world within a broader context. He was, due to past conscious experiences of the *surrounding objects and aspects of the world* able to link previously discrete objects and aspects of the world into a broader whole. He stated, "…maybe it's just we've got the context behind all the places here, but before that it felt differently because it was all new for us and now, sometimes, I drive over the same streets and I sort of remember how it was before and comparing (sic.) to what and how ot feels now and sort of different" (Dmitry, 2, p. 8).

This distinction was captured more generally by Viktoriya, Dmitry, and Maria Z. Viktoriya was caused to reflect on this disjuncture in the nature of her experiencing objects and aspects of the world after a period of time when she spoke of returning to the place where she first lived after having moved to Melbourne from Russia. She infers that she experienced aspects of the world in a way that was akin to a child experiencing the world. She remarked, "…when I come back now to the place where we started our first year, it feels like home. The whole area…it's like the place when you're a child and then you come back, I grew up here" (Viktoriya, 2, p. 16). Dmitry captured this distinction between the earlier and later modes of experiencing aspects of the world in his recently moved to city when he commented, after a period of time, "It was after…when it's not about tourism any more it felt

different, so you don't really pay attention to how beautiful [the] city is, you just brace yourself for what's coming…" (Dmitry, 2, p. 8). Maria too suggested something similar when contrasting the experience of aspects of the world and objects in the earliest stages of migration when she stated that, "…for a long time, it felt this kind of foreign and brand new, as if it was, like, made to attract people" (Maria Z, 2, p. 10) as opposed to the experience of these same objects and aspects of the world after a period of migration, "And of course, over time that feeling kind of disappeared and now just, it just feels normal" (Maria Z, 2, p. 10). *Essential structure 13: Objects in safe spaces are experienced differently to objects in other spaces.*

Proposition 9: Objects in safe spaces are experienced differently to objects in other spaces, was broadly supported by interviewee responses.

The migrants' reflections suggested that what made a safe space safe, was their capacity to engage with the objects located within that space instrumentally or unthinkingly. To coin Heideggerian terminology, a space become safe when those objects and aspects of the world located within it transitioned from being experienced "present-to-hand" to "ready-at-hand". Those objects, in other words, were no longer experienced theoretically or, as some new and different curiosity. Rather, these objects transitioned into, in a sense, *not really being noticed at all*. They were simply experienced instrumentally, for whatever purpose they were designed for. Through the process of becoming familiar with objects located in, previously other space, gradually these spaces were rendered safe.

Ksenia articulated this process of familiarisation of objects and aspects of the world in hitherto "outer space" that caused the domestication of these spaces, "when you move to an unfamiliar place, it's like -you used the word blank slate. So, it's exactly like it. And then you put one point on it, and that's your house. And -then you learn where the university is…and you get to know that route. So, you draw these connections, these streets in your internal

mind map…I think the whole neighbourhood becomes smaller because of that, because you know where the different places. And they become more recognisable" Ksenia elaborated, "It's not smaller in a bad sense. It's not smaller, like it's encroaching on you. It's smaller maybe in the cosy sense. But it becomes more familiar" (Ksenia, 2, p. 7).

This sense of domesticating space by becoming familiar with the objects and aspects of the world within it was reiterated by Dmitry. "…[Melbourne] feels smaller actually, the same streets they feel smaller for some reason now. Because you know like right another 500 metres there's going to be this street or that street and it feels like you know the space, but before…we were on the bus and we thought Melbourne is huge, but now it's not; so you know what I mean?" (Dmitry, 2, p. 8, my square brackets).

Alex reinforced this notion of the transitioning an other space into a safe space through the familiarisation and change of experience of the objects contained within that space when he spoke of the initial "safe space" islands of his home and his work. Of his initial place of residence on moving to Australia he remarked, "…in this [his] apartment building you have like the entrance…there is elevators, there is mailboxes…so probably this area…I'm in my building and I'm in my place. And the second point, probably would be the office, because I was spending most of my time working…so [the] office was like this familiar, safe environment…it felt secluded from this environment around, and also felt more comfortable, like a second home in a way" (Alex, 2, p. 6). As time progressed, Alex became familiar with objects and aspects of the world in other, hitherto, unsafe "other spaces", he stated, "…probably in the first month it was really for me, just going from the apartment to the work…I was not stopping out or going out…or like not as much as later…well maybe three months in, I'd be keen to go to winter markets, for example, the Victoria market or something like this. But in the first three months it was office or home, it's just the way from one to another" (Alex, 2, p. 6).

This gradual process of familiarisation and domestication of objects and aspects of the world within a given space – rendering it a safe space was also captured by Maria Z, who suggested that those moments of awareness of the newly acquired safeness of a certain space, typically occurred when she unthinkingly walked down a familiar route with a stranger, she stated that such moments of awareness occurred when, "I walked home, but with someone else…and I realised, you know, [that] I was familiar with the environment. I knew where to go" (Maria Z, 2, pp. 9-10).

A concrete and specific example of the change in the mode of experiencing objects and aspects of the world from merely strange and unusual to unthinking and instrumental was given by Dmitry. Dmitry spoke of the speed with which he felt comfortable within the space of his local Coles and Woolworths supermarkets. He said, "Yeah, I think the local Coles or Woolworths were the most comfortable public spaces because you do it every second day or every third day and at some point [after] a couple of weeks the same shop, it feels like you've been here forever" (Dmitry, 2, p. 9).

Essential structure 14: Objects that allow communication with the home country reduce the framing starkness of the migration experience.

This essential structure was elaborated after the interview process.

Almost unanimously, the interviewed migrants agreed that the existence of technological objects such as Zoom, Skype, Whatsapp etc reduced the framing anxiety of their conscious experiences in the period immediately after they were used.

For Maria Z the preference for, and capacity to communicate with, her relatives back home via the medium of Skype was made explicit insofar as it presented the capacity for her to reinforce a sense of closeness with her family, "…before we had a reliable connection [I] did call parents and everyone on the phone, and it was a weird experience. Like the voices sounded different- very distant. So, I didn't like that at all. I felt the internet was much better

and that felt like they were actually I the same room" (Maria Z, 3, p. 15). Indeed, in the early stages of Maria Z's migration experience, the computer screen, offering the promise of a connection home, served as something akin to a lifeline within the "bubble" (Maria Z, 2, p. 6) of her first house, "…I felt safe near my computer we had because that was my communication channel with the world and…back home, mostly" (Maria Z, 2, p. 6).

Although a near unanimous preference for visual as well as oral "technological objects" of communication home, in the case of Alexandra the preferred "technological object" was the telephone with her suggestion that images and pictures might be a distraction to the conversations being had, "…it's [telephone communication] maybe…more intimate perhaps…it's just telling stories, what's happening in your life, what's happening in my life and pictures…are quite distracting to that" (Alexandra, 3, p. 13).

For Olga, the existence of these technological objects made the migration experience easier insofar as that she was still, to a degree, able to participate in the lives of her relatives at home stating, "…at least I know what's happening there…like renovating their house… they send me pictures and I know how it looks like. And they also ask me some advice, how to put some tiles and how it happens here, so I still participate in it [life at home]" (Olga, 3, p. 15, my square brackets).

Similarly, for Natalia the existence of these technological objects allowed a participatory relationship with friends and family at home to be maintained. Although, for Natalia, the emphasis appeared to be on her relatives being able to participate in her life, "…Skype was my preferred method because I could see people and…even most importantly, I could show them my place, so I could show the house where I lived, outside our beautiful nature" (Natalia, 3, p. 14).

This sense of these technological objects providing a participatory, supporting role (through the constant contact with friends and relatives from home) that eased the

subsequent conscious experiences of their new migrant world was also reinforced by Dmitry, "…the first year those sessions helped a lot, so you don't feel lost…you feel purpose in life…I don't know why, it's just that we spend so much time together so we're used to the fact that they're always there…but if you disconnect like that, yeah, at the end of the week you just felt like you were here on your own and you don't have anyone and it's very upsetting. But once you start talking, right after that call in Skype you feel perfect, that just gives you…some boost in your energy levels and [you] feel totally different after that" (Dmitry, 3, p. 14).

Mila also acknowledged the capacity that these technological objects played in maintaining a (lesser) participatory role in the life that she had left. Speaking of her choice to leave Russia and the capacity of these technological objects to maintain some form of presence, she stated, "…I feel a little bit sad sometimes, but it's just a choice, so I either have to stay or come back…so once I made this choice I keep this connection, I keep this interaction. That's what I can do…keep connected and…keep that life too. Sort of in two places at the same time; in two worlds at the same time" (Mila, 3, p. 23).

On this sense of technological objects allowing a participatory role in the life that they had migrated from, the migrants were not unanimous. For Viktoriya the technological objects, rather, seemed to reinforce her inability to participate in the life that she had left, "It's good to be connected…even though, like I'm saying I cannot participate…you still want to be with them somehow" (Viktoriya, 3, p. 13).

However, the existence of these technological objects, the migrant responses reinforced, did not fully compensate for their absence from family and friends. Even though these objects allowed for a framing sense of comfort in their ensuing conscious experiences, they did not allow for the maintenance of the deep, rich relationships.

For Dmitry, this manifested in these technological objects not being capable of providing the same face to face encounter that would have been the case in person, “But it [technological objects] doesn’t give you the same experience like face to face communication, it’s just different anyway. So, when you talk through the screen you can’t look at their eyes because if you start looking at the camera you won’t be able to see their face and that’s how you can look at their eyes like that, that’s different. They should invent something, I don’t know” (Dmitry, 3, p. 10).

For Mila, the lack of perceived body language and shared physical space made the conversations less organic and more artificial. With the shared physical space that is characteristic of “in person” communication being eliminated as a variable which may contribute to the conversation taking place. She stated, “It’s just I miss…when you’re sitting and talking to someone it’s body language, it’s physical presence…and it’s maybe decisions on the spot…Oh, why don’t we go there?...Why don’t we do this?...it’s usually (with technological objects) you have to pre-think what you’re talking about…yeah that makes it a little bit artificial…” (Mila, 3, p. 20).

For Ksenia, there was still a reticence in engaging in deeper conversations using these technological objects, even with those close friends and family, “It was absolutely different…it’s not the same experience. You still sense the things that you are saying, the topics you are covering. Whenever I go back to visit, and I will talk to my friends, or family who I do speak during the time that I’m away over skype. And still, there will be so many things to talk about. The things I didn’t want to talk about over skype….I feel like the most personal things are reserved for face to face communication. In person. A face to face over skype doesn’t count” (Ksenia, 3, p. 11).

Both Alexandra and Mila also spoke of these technological objects’ capacity to allow them be aware and, to a degree, participate in the development and evolution of their home

country. Both remarked that, for those many Russians who had migrated before the advent of this technology, the Russia they had left had become "frozen" in their minds. Alexandra remarked, "…if we didn't have this technology it would be a constant nostalgia; the thoughts about coming back; the lack of information; the lack of this cultural touch perhaps. Then with this technology you don't have this loneliness or probably less loneliness" (Alexandra, 3, p. 13). Mila reiterated this when she said, "So when people migrate and they just absolutely cut connection…they still live in that frozen world that they have left back then…And so when people migrate and don't have connection, don't have updates all the time, that's what happens…" (Mila, 3, p. 25).

8.3.4 The existential of others

Essential structure 15: Strangers are experienced with an exaggerated lack of knowledge regarding the rules governing interaction.

Proposition 11: Strangers are experienced with an exaggerated lack of knowledge regarding the rules governing interaction was reinforced by the perspectives offered by the interviewees.

There was a sense that engagements with locals were framed with the implicit understanding that the locals were all aware of the unwritten "rules of the game" of social engagements (rules that were different to the implicit rules that the interviewees thought framed the expected behaviour of social engagements back home in Russia).

As Dmitry remarked, "…you're new to the place right, and all the people they seem to be normal, they don't behave strange and when you compare them to yourself I felt that I'm a bit off…and essentially it felt like everyone knows how to behave and I'm just the one or we're just the family which don't know what to do and don't know where to go and what to say and stuff like that" (Dmitry, 3, p. 2).

This sense of learning anew, the accepted but unspecified rules of interaction was reinforced by Andrei, "…I'm saying it takes more effort to, more time and more effort to learn the rules…" (Andrei, 3, p. 10).

Alexandra spoke, at length, of her early experiences of other people and how these engagements were mediated by a set of unwritten rules, the nature of which she had little idea of, "Unwritten rules, I think this is the essence of actually the migrant's experience. That you are immersed in a situation that you have never been and, of course, it's estranged from you. It's something you are getting into extra-terrestrial civilisation. You are just exploring...any experience [with others] like going shopping, using public transport, asking people questions…" (Alexandra, 3, p. 2).

These unwritten rules that she felt so estranged from, Alexandra got the repeated impression that, for her local interlocutors, these rules were adhered to automatically and unthinkingly, "Yeah so [local] people don't reflect, they do that automatically then you are…just thinking what am I supposed to do that's right?" (Alexandra, 3, p. 2).

Maria Z fleshed out some of the specific unwritten rules of engagement that she found difficult to comprehend in the early stages of her migration experience, "I think in Russia it felt like people spoke in certain scripts…connecting words and emotions and gestures in a certain way, so you know exactly, straight away, what people mean by saying this or by acting this way. And, of course, here, all the scripts are different…overall, I found people were…a bit confusing to me…they seemed too open or too eager to socialise and too easy in terms of socialising. They would just say, oh yeah, 'let's meet for coffee', and I thought, 'I only just met this person'. It's just so weird, it's just so weird to go and have coffee with them" (Maria Z, 3, p. 10).

Viktoriya highlighted her experiences in cafes to reinforce the ambiguity of some of the rules of engagements with others within a social context, "…if you're walking into the

cafes….you sit down and you wait for the waiter to come over to or [do you] just go and straight away order or something like that? You don't have that…rules to follow…so you definitely have to be thinking what needs to be done…so you kind of think of every move of yours" (Viktoriya, 3, p. 5).

Olga was specific in outlining several different contexts in which she found specific rules of engagement with others difficult to understand. The first was the "long good bye" in social situations, "…I had to plan if I want to leave at 7.00…I have to start leaving at 6.45 to spend this 15 minutes…informing everyone that I'm leaving" (Olga, 3, p. 3). The second was the accepted pause length before speaking in a conversation so as not be seen as interrupting, "…it's like a group of people, how to not interrupt, but also say your opinion. So it's like a second, not a second and a half, just a second, a very short distance to not interrupt and also jump in with your next [sentence]" (Olga, 3, p. 5, my square brackets). The third was the propensity for people to say "sorry" on hearing of an unfortunate situation related to their interlocutor, "…I learnt how people reply, what kind of response they expected, for example, if something bad happened you should say 'sorry to hear it', but when I heard this [the] first time, I thought it's kind of my fault. For example, someone lost their dog and someone else] said 'I'm sorry about this'…And then I just learned that it's actually like "I feel sorry for your loss', it's not like it's my fault. So, I'm learning these life situation responses I guess, and the more situations I experience, then [the] more adaptable I am" (Olga, 3, p. 6).

Lena highlighted, for her, the problematic nature of the social rule of indirect criticism. She commented, "…here, you will never hear anyone accusing anyone of anything directly…I think that's another skill. How do you present a problem in the way that it's camouflaged and snowed under and it's not that obvious that there's 'poop under the snow' and we need to talk about the poop politely" (Lena, 3, p. 11).

Maria K also spoke of the complexities associated with grasping these unwritten rules of engagement. She also, however, spoke of the added complexity of understanding the more subtle distinctions in the "unwritten rules" *within particular social groups*. She spoke of the differences that existed within the tertiary education setting that she found herself, "…I've got a lot of people, everybody had their own groups, everybody kind of talked to each other, but then there are groups, bigger groups and then smaller and smaller, and you kind of want to find your ways within them…I like those people…like I want to get to know them a little bit better, you kind of don't want to look like a stupid person in front of them as well…" (Maria K, 3. p. 7).

The particular rule or script that many of the migrants highlighted as the most difficult to adhere to in their first year of migration was the expectation of "small talk" to be conducted with unfamiliar people.

Lena, a self-described "chatty person" found this social rule particularly difficult to induct herself into, "…the situation around, you know, small talk, that first, 'hi, how are you? How was your weekend?' dah-dah-dah-dah-dah. So, we don't do that in Russia…It's quite obvious that's a norm here but yes, in the beginning, I felt awkward because even though I'm a very chatty person, I haven't done that before in my life…it's a very superficial chat, very on the surface and I still have to remind myself to stay there on the surface. Don't go deeper because no one needs that…" (Lena, 3, p. 2).

Alex, who had lived in China previously, commented that, although significantly different, the social rules he needed to adhere to in Australia were far more similar to those mediating interaction in Russia. That is, with the exception of "small talk". "Yeah, but the main exclusion [In similarities between Russia and Australia] is, like this, talking to strangers on a street or an elevator, like chat talk or light talk, it's much more common here…and it's something to get used to, from the very beginning" (Alex, 3, p. 3).

Mila too drew attention to the "rule" of small talk (Mila, 3, p. 12) but developed the point further by explaining the consequences of taking a conversation *beyond this* initial small talk. She noted that shortly after conversations developed beyond the small talk, within an Australian context, often, "…they joke and switch to another topic" (Mila, 3, p. 12).

This lack of confidence of the rules governing social engagement was exacerbated by a lack of confidence with language. Natalia spoke of a sense of relief in the early stages of her migration experience when conversations drew to a conclusion, "Usually I [was] relieved when the conversation finished and it was like my duty. I had to do it. I didn't so much enjoy it because I didn't relax fully" (Natalia, 3, p. 4).

Andrei too reinforced the compounded difficulty he found in adhering to these unwritten social rules due to the language barrier, "…what happens when you are in a new environment…the way people are used to do things compared to what happens differently back…in your previous place…in can be communicating to people, it can be trying to do whatever it is, like make a phone call within a payphone…But anyway you're trying to do things and things don't work out as expected. People don't understand you, don't understand what you want…You think, 'What did I do or what have I just said and why didn't it get through?'…What am I doing wrong? When I did it this way back in Russia, it used to work" (Andrei, 3, p. 4).

For Ksenia, an experienced migrant, this added linguistic complexity to the social "rules" of engagement turned such interactions into something akin to a game, she remarked, "…there are social situations [in migration] that can be different. And you can, sort of reveal your foreignness, through a slip up. And slip ups can be different- different things. It may be a linguistic slip up. Something that you say…ir it could be that you don't know how certain things act…there was [a] linguistic sort of passing. And actually, I was interested in that…Like when I went to the bank, or went shopping, and I had a short interaction with the

people…And I would always reflect on it afterwards. And I would think, 'Did I pass for a native speaker. Did they think that I'm local? Or, did they think I'm a migrant? So…that almost became a game for me" (Ksenia, 3, p. 3).

As a result of the difficulty in in comprehending and adhering to these unwritten social rules of engagement with others, there was a tendency to avoid interactions with others more generally in the public space. Alex consciously did this in supermarkets in his first year, "…I would prefer the self-serve shops, like where I didn't need to interact with a person…Because then I can just go to the aisles, pick up the stuff that I need, go to the machines, like check it out, and go without much interaction…So, like for example….I wouldn't… use shops like ALDI or IGA, for example where you have a clerk, but I would prefer Coles or Woolworths because I can just come and do everything in the self-serve" (Alex, 3, pp. 7-8).

Alexandra too expressed her initial discomfort in actively engaging with others in the public space, "…even though I had some level of English, yes, but my level wasn't that good anyway, so I was actually reluctant to do very simple operations… [For] me and my partner, it was a discussion. 'Who is going to the shops today?'. Because I said, I don't want to do that because I knew what was going to happen. So, it's a silence, people are looking at you and I can see what's happening in their eyes, it's like, 'Who are you'?" (Alexandra, 3, p. 2).

Essential structure 16: The rules governing interaction with others are learnt through conscious observation, internalisation, and imitation.

This essential structure was developed as a result of responses provided throughout the interview process.

Dmitry referred to the process of observing others closely so that, as a result, he might adhere to the same rules as "tuning up" (Dmitry, 3, p. 4). He remarked, "…when you don't know the rules and you're trying to adjust and you're trying to tune up yourself to be on the

same page with other people…you're always…trying to blend in essentially" (Dmitry, 3, p. 4).

Maria Z explained what she learnt as a result of this detached, theoretical observation of others adhering to social rules, "And so, I learnt to smile, smile to strangers on the streets, smile to people in the lift. And again, it comes to scripts of…saying, you know, 'it's hot', or you know, 'it's winter' or 'it's something else'. Like sharing in these little bits of common knowledge" (Maria Z, 3, p. 11)

Olga too spoke of the necessity of careful, theoretical analysis of the behaviour of those around her, "Yeah, I had to learn them [the rules of engagement] and maybe sometimes asking my husband how it works and what I should do, copy others…" (Olga, 3, p. 3).

This process of detached observation manifested, in Natalia's case with linguistic turns of phrase. She commented, "…I tried to listen to what people say and then, maybe copy their words, and then I started to notice mistakes in other people's speech and then I had a dilemma…whether I should repeat their mistakes or just speak my Grandad's English" (Natalia, 3, p. 5).

Mila spoke of the mental notes taken in her close descriptions and her conscious effort to mimic those in future social engagements. As a result of those close observations in the early period of her migration she knows, "…where to stop or where I can continue…now I understand the pattern I would say better" (Mila, 3, p. 16) This came about as a direct result of a close observation of the "dance" of other people engaging with one another socially, "Yes, I could see from [the]interaction that different people had with each other. So it's like I'm looking from aside" (Mila, 3, p. 16) This was followed by the application, "…and then I'm putting myself into the same position like next time when I'm talking to a person I feel okay, that's what's happening and now it's happening with me. And that's what I should do" (Mila, 3, p. 16)

Essential structure 17: Strangers are experienced as more other.

Proposition 13: Strangers are experienced as more other than in a pre-migration context was largely, but not quite, unanimously supported by the migrants who participated in the research.

This lack of a capacity to infer what is happening inside the mind of others, while in the early stages of migration, was summarised thus by Andrei, "…back in Russia, in a typical scenario, when I come across a complete stranger, I can very easily judge the person on their look and behaviour, and I can understand fairly well what to expect from that person. I can fairly well judge what they expect from me. Even though the situation, by itself, may be not easy…I still kind of understand what's going on" (Andrei, 3, p. 9). Andrei continued, "Yes…in the first five seconds [when meeting a stranger in Russia] you get a full measure of what they are. And 99 percent [of the time] you are absolutely right…In Australia, it might take several minutes to get that measure and it's still likely to be wrong" (Andrei, 3, p. 9).

Viktoriya reflected, in depth, on her initial inability to infer the thinking and, as a consequence, the subsequent behaviour of Australian strangers she encountered, stating, "…you don't have any sorts of predictions of other people's behaviour, of reactions, or when people laugh at different things. Somethings make me laugh but not for them. So no, definitely you cannot. That's something you actually gain through the communication and takes longer than one year because we're talking about the first year. So, in the first year, you can't predict…what would they think because I guess we do [in Russia] have some sort of pattern…So you cannot predict anything unless you actually spend more and more time there" (Viktoriya, 3, p. 7).

Maria Z was definitive in expressing her lack of initial understanding of the inner workings of the minds of Australian strangers she came into contact with, "…I had no idea what people were thinking…Yeah, so it was very hard. I felt the way people were acting was

sometimes logical or completely unpredictable…I often had trouble understanding their motivations and why they did certain things. And, right now, looking back, it's very hard for me to understand why it was such a problem" (Maria Z, 3, pp. 9-10).

Alexandra too reflected on this initial difficulty in inferring the thoughts of others within the context of migration, "I think [in Australia] it's like a scientific observation I would say. So, you are just watching people, then back in Russia you wouldn't do it because you just need half a second to understand what's the profile of this person…then here, it's like Sherlock Holmes, like he is looking at people and he sees this pattern…and there is total absolute unknown. I can't say total, I know, but this is the game actually and trying to understand what can you tell about this person just by looking at her or him…and, it's like, well, not a lot" (Alexandra, 3, p. 9).

Mila gave a concrete description of an instance when she *misread* the inner thoughts of an Australian when she provided the following particular description, "Well, the funny thing is sometimes I would have no idea…because I would like say and act how I feel like and I didn't actually realise that I have to think actually what they think…until one day when there was me, another Russian lady friend…and our Australian friend as well…and we were sitting…discussing something for a long time…and she [the Australian friend] started saying some jokes…that were not a continuation of the conversation and sounded a little bit off topic. And then my friend said to me, like a little bit quietly in Russian, '…Susan is getting a little bit bored of that', and I actually didn't realise that. I could continue this topic forever" (Mila, 3, p. 15).

Maria K (who had previously migrated to the United States) also found this capacity to infer the thinking of others within the Australian migration context to be difficult. In her case, however, it was magnified because of her relationship with an Australian in the first year of migration. On this she commented, "…yeah, they're saying that men are from Venus,

women are from Mars or whatever, vice versa…like made a lot of sense to me when I came here…like yeah because that never happened to me with Russians…because there is still a shared background, a cultural background, there is a shared understanding. And I think that we also have a bit of, unspoken rules about stuff, and I know that if…my partner…they're making some moves or something, like I understand what they are, like I know where they are going, whereas he [the Australian partner] was completely different" (Maria K, 3, p. 15).

In saying that the general consensus amongst those interviewed was the initial difficulty in inferring the thinking of Australians within the initial stages of the migration context, Ksenia, who had migrated to several countries previous to coming to Australia, was able to infer *similarities* in the inner thought processes, "…I think that often I focus on the differences [in thinking]. But there are also some similarities between people in different countries as well…I feel like although the surface details maybe different, the process maybe different, the important things are similar" (Ksenia, 3, p. 9).

Essential structure 18: Other native first language speakers are experienced as a cue to relax.

Proposition 14: Other native first language speakers are experienced as a cue to relax, was affirmed by the responses offered by the interviewees.

Viktoriya remarked that, on occasion, she would meet up with groups of Russian with whom she was studying, "We were learning English together and there were lots of Russians so we make good friends. And then when we were in our group, all of that would go away and you forget and you're just being yourself. And even if you're obviously in public like we would go to the aquarium – I remember that one – lots of people…they attract my attention more than people outside me, therefore I am becoming less self-conscious, so I'll do things…I enjoy and forget what happens around me I guess" (Viktoriya, 3, p. 5).

Dmitry too spoke about his almost instinctive reaction when he engaged with other Russians within this new migration context, "they [fellow] Russians went through the same and they knew how hard it is or what we felt, so they gave us some hints and tips, what we need to do and helped us enormously and we felt much more comfortable essentially. Some people say it's not a good idea to make friends with, say, Russians, with your national people because it sort of stops you from evolving in your new place, you really should talk with locals in English and that gives you much faster progress; but it was so hard, so we just didn't really care about that advice, so we just had to make friends" (Dmitry, 3, p. 6).

Maria K spoke of "using" Russian gatherings as a cue to be able to relax more fully, "…He [a Russian friend] invited me to these Russian gatherings every Friday, I went there once, I met a bunch of people, never went back again, like for another year or so….and that's probably where I've felt most comfortable because it's Russians" (Maria K, 3, pp. 9-10). She continued, "…I liked it but then I knew exactly what it's going to be like" (Maria K, 3, p. 11).

Mila also spoke of the capacity to relax linguistically when engaging with other Russians. But, like with Maria K, this initial sense of comfort soon wore off. Mila spoke of the inevitable (more subtle) cultural differences that would manifest after short periods of comfortable engagement with fellow Russians. She spoke of the differences and complexities in engaging with Russian speakers who had lived in Australia for many years (some since childhood), "…with those ones who grew up here I just thought that because, like, yes we're Russians, yes, we speak the same language, but we don't share the same culture…and I, of course, speaking my language….but I can't last more than 10 minutes even if I put a lot of effort" (Mila, 3, p. 10)

Ksenia, who had migrated previously, found, in amongst the linguistic comfort in the process of speaking with other Russians, she became aware of her *unrussianness*, she said, "There is the foreignness of me being Russian in Australia. But there is also the foreignness

of me being a Russian that lives in Australia. And then the degree of your non-Russianness also becomes quite obvious when you speak to other Russians. I would even say that there is a gradation of Russianness right" (Ksenia, 3, p. 7).

8.3.5 The existential of self

Essential structure 19: There is a heightened awareness of taking up space in other space.

Proposition 15: There is a heightened awareness of taking up space in other space, was largely shared by the interviewees. In particular, those contexts in which self-consciousness was most manifest was, in speaking with others/understanding the social rules when engaging with others and when engaging with new and unfamiliar objects.

Mila affirmed this sense of self consciousness, this awareness of herself "from the side", when speaking English in the public sphere. She remarked, "In terms of what I'm saying, yes [I was more self-conscious], because as I said I was very uncertain if I'm using the correct word…so that was in terms of what I'm speaking, yes, definitely, absolutely" (Mila, 3, p. 6).

Alex too, felt a heightened awareness of himself as being observed by others, not only when speaking English, but also with regards to the body language he was manifesting, "Yes, definitely, I can definitely concur with this. It was much more often that I was able to sort of feel like I observed myself from aside, I was more focused on intonation of the voice, by the way how I moved or sit, all of these small details, so I did feel more conscious…" (Alex, 3, p. 5).

Andrei spoke explicitly of this "looking at himself" whilst in he process of communicating, "Basically, what happens when you are in a new environment, once again, it can be communicating to people…But anyway, you're trying to do things and things don't work out as expected. People don't understand you, don't understand what you want. It triggers that self-consciousness. You think, 'what did I do and why are people staring at me

because of that? When I did it that way back in Russia it used to work'…so it looks like that type of self-consciousness…it will trigger fairly often…But yes, it all requires looking at yourself from outside and trying to understand what's wrong with this guy who cannot communicate" (Andrei, 3, p. 5).

Lena remarked that this self-consciousness while speaking in the public sphere, has continued years after her arrival in Australia, "…yeah, I could never relax even now, even in the coffee shop or somewhere when we talk to people I have to focus hard so I look as correct and as well spoken as possible and all this translation going on in my head and what kinds of rules of grammar I should have…I'm always focused and I'm always mindful of how people hear, see [me]…Yeah, yeah, I still feel like someone can hear what I'm talking about and I'm maybe making some funny mistakes and they may have a laugh at me" (Lena, 3, p. 6). Lena contrasted this with her capacity to totally immerse herself in conversation while in public when in Russia, "No [when speaking in Russia], I wouldn't care, I would just focus on the person who I had a conversation with, like yourself and I couldn't care less what my neighbour [was thinking]" (Lena, 3, p. 6).

Natalia spoke, not only of self-consciousness when using language, but also when attempting to act in accordance with those unwritten, assumed rules of social engagement, "So, I was always self-aware and self-conscious about my linguistic expression, so I try to speak as natural as possible, I mean, as close to authentic…also, manners. I was very conscious and I still am about manners and I felt that I never considered myself rude, but when I migrated and it is still the case that I feel that I am rude, in a way. For example, a person can come to my home and I will not offer them water…we don't drink water in Russia, we don't need it there that much and it's still not my habit and I forget to offer things to people, show, oh, if you want this or that. So, this sort of thing, so I'm trying to behave

properly, so I remember, I try to remember, oh, what have I forgotten, something like offering water or if people come to my house" (Natalia, 3, p. 5).

Maria K, too, soke of a kind of general, all embracing self-consciousness when in the public sphere, "And then I'm just kind of like…conscious that others are looking and judging…when I know nothing of that sort is probably happening" (Maria K, 3, p. 5). She elaborated by saying, "I just felt like everybody's looking at me and then I had to behave in a specific way you know…yeah, as if, I'm constantly on a podium and people are staring at me, but I think I've made it [up] in my head" (Maria, 3, p. 6)

Yet, this heightened sense of self consciousness and of noticing oneself taking up space in the public sphere wasn't true of every social context. Mila commented of being less self-conscious regarding clothing and posture, she commented, "…the funny thing is back in Russia, I was more self-conscious about how I'm standing…what's my posture than [I am] here…I still have that, you know, Russian perception in my mind but here…from day one or week one, I don't know, I felt more relaxed about it" (Mila, 3, p. 7).

Essential structure 20: In the initial stage, one experiences ones' sense of self with a heightened degree of freedom.

Proposition 16: In the initial stage one experiences oneself with a heightened sense of freedom was largely reinforced. The essential structure presented, however, needed to be refined in light of the fact that the only interviewees who drew attention to this increased sense of freedom were migrants that travelled over individually, independent of families and significant others.

Maria Z, contrasted, on the one hand her palpable awareness of not knowing the social/linguistic rules of engagement with, on the other, the constant awareness of the lack of expectations imposed upon her by those who might have known her background and past history. She commented, " I think definitely just going about, sort of daily activities, I felt

self-conscious and I felt like people were judging me or people were looking at me and noticing me – just because I thought I didn't belong, and I was a stranger. But on the other hand…you get used to a certain anonymity that you don't have at home or in a place where you grew up….at some point you get used to the fact that people treat you as a stranger and people actually don't notice you. And most people don't know you…They don't know what you're capable of or any of your problems and that gives you a certain freedom" (Maria Z, 3, p. 5). Maria Z related this freedom to the knowledge that those around her either didn't have any explicit expectations of her, or, at the least, she was unaware of what those expectations were, "Other people, there were no expectations. I wasn't limited by anyone's expectations, because in Russia, I guess, I got used to people having certain roles and people -like, straight away, you usually take one glance at a person, you understand, sort of what kind of person this is…I felt like I didn't have those kind of expectations holding me back…So, yeah, I felt, at some point, I realised it was liberating" (Maria Z, 3, pp. 6-7).

Mila also felt an increased capacity and sense of freedom to express herself anew within her new context in spite of her stated self-consciousness in relation to social and linguistic norms. In seeing others around her expressing themselves linguistically and through body language that had not been acceptable previously, Mila found permitted herself more freedom to be expressive within the public sphere, "Yes, I was actually more free here than back in my country…Because, as I said, you reflect what people are expressing around you…and they were a million times more emotional than me and then I realised, oh actually, I have all these emotions that I'm usually hiding when I'm like talking to someone who I don't know or maybe don't know very well, I can actually express them now" (Mila, 3, p. 7).

Essential structure 21: The self is experienced differently when with friends/family from the home country.

Proposition 17: There is an experience of a "dual self" on the arrival friends/family from pre-migration was supported to a degree. In saying this, none of the migrants referred to any form of "dual self". Instead, there was simply a sense of experiencing themselves *differently* on the arrival of friends/family.

Maria Z. spoke of the shift in in relation to her perspective of herself after her sister arrived to visit her in the first year of her migration experience. Recounting this she stated, "My sister visited in the first year…and it was great because I felt, like, you know…like a local because I was showing her around and explaining her things. Things that I had found confusing at first. So, well, I felt more confident. I felt great…Yeah, I guess before she came to Australia, I felt like everyone else was more experienced…knew more than me about what was going on around me. And when she came, she didn't know what was going on and I did. I felt more knowledgeable, more experienced. I felt like I [had] actually learnt something within that first year. So that was the first time I actually felt confident. Showing her around" (Maria Z, 3, pp. 9-10).

For Mila, having friends arrive also initiated a change in her mode of experiencing herself. For her, in the bid to make them more comfortable she constantly had to revert to experiencing her, now familiar environment, through the fresh eyes she had immediately after she arrived to Australia from Russia. Like in the case of Maria, their arrival reinforced the extent to which she had become accustomed to her new environment. She commented, "Yeah, so I always try to put myself into the shoes… when I first came here; my first days because I thought that [would be how] they would see this or that…So, I'm used to this location, I'm used to many, many, many things and I try to put myself into the shoes when I just arrived to just give some direction" (Mila, 3, p. 13).

Natalia also experienced a change in perspective in relation to her sense of self after the arrival of family members to Australia from Russia. What distinguished her experience

was that these family members *were coming to stay.* She remarked, "I felt responsibility, more responsibility for them, and I was not, so much self-conscious, I was thinking how to get everything right and it still is the case" (Natalia, 3, p. 10).[1]

8.4 Discussion of Findings

It is hoped that the 21 derived essential structures of the lifeworld of new migrants, as well as the accompanying explanations may be used as a starting point for future phenomenological investigations into the lifeworld of migrants. As was made clear in 5.3 these essential structures are not presented as the final word. As a consequence, it is to be hoped that, at some point in the future they will tested, amended, contradicted or added to.

The data provided may be utilised in a number of ways.

8.4.1 Future comparative research topics

It was made clear during the course of the research that the lifeworld of the new migrant stands alongside *but is distinct from* the lifeworld of other individuals residing away from their homeland. The data derived from this study could be utilised as a point of comparison in phenomenological lifeworld studies examining:

1. The lifeworld of asylum seekers.
2. The lifeworld of tourists.
3. The lifeworld of internal migrants (migrants who have shifted within the borders of their country.

[1]Note that proposition 18: In early migration the sense of self-confidence is more volatile than in pre-migration, and proposition 19: In early migration after the initial phase, the sense of self is experienced as more fixed and in alignment with the pre-migration self were not tested through the interview process. Time constraints prevented the required time being devoted to testing these propositions.

8.4.2: Future related research topics

The interested researcher is at liberty to use the data presented and apply it in myriad, more directly related, research topics. The following questions and possible lines of investigation revealed themselves during the research process:

1. The question of whether or not the outlined essential structures of new migrants would be confirmed by a study of Russians that migrated to destinations other than Australia?
2. The question of to what degree would the outlined essential structures of new migrants be confirmed by a study into other migrant groups who have migrated to Australia?
3. The research has brought up a difference in the phenomenological experiences of experienced migrants (migrants who have migrated previously) as opposed to first time migrants. The research has suggested that a future study comparing the lived experiences of a selection of *experienced* as opposed to *first time* migrants to Australia might be a valuable addition to the literature.
4. As a result of a point made by one of the interviewees (Ksenia) who has a Chinese migrant partner**,** an investigation of the lifeworld of "visually different" migrants as opposed to European migrants might also be a valuable addition to the literature.
5. A number of interviewees remarked that the experience "going the other way" (for Australians migrating to Russia) would be a great deal harder than for Russians coming to Australia. To this end, a detailed investigation of the early migration lifeworld of Australian migrants to Russia would be a valuable addition to the literature.
6. It was made clear that an incapacity to speak the language fluently increased levels of anxiety with regards to engaging with others. An investigation of the

phenomenological experiences of migrants moving to a country with an identical language alongside the phenomenological experiences of migrants moving to a country with a different language may also serve as an interesting comparative research investigation suitable for the application of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology.

8.5 Summary of Part Two.

Part two saw the application of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology within the context of the lifeworld of new migrants. Firstly, the rationale, scope and aim of the research was established. This was followed by the literature review which established a justification for the proposed research. Subsequent to this, the formative autobiographical study and summative interviewee study were presented complete with findings and suggestions for future research.

The thesis in part three will provide a critical discussion of the *phenomenological lifeworld research methodology* in light of its application to the lifeworld of new migrants. The successful elements as well as the elements to be developed will be set out.

PART THREE: DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER NINE: PHENOMENOLOGICAL LIFEWORLD RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: REFLECTIONS

This chapter is designed to summarise the key findings arrived at as a consequence of applying the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology to the lifeworld of new migrants. Firstly, those elements deemed successful will be set out, then those elements worthy of further development or consideration will be expressed.

9.1 Successful Elements

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is demonstrably phenomenological.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is underpinned by an adherence to the four necessary elements of phenomenology set out in chapter 2.1**.**

Firstly, it is a research methodology that involves reflection from the first-person perspective. Both the formative autobiographical study and the summative interviewee study, centre on descriptions derived from first person reflections.

In addition, the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology aims for the description rather than explanation of those first-person conscious experiences. In the summative interviewee study, in particular, there was a consistent effort, through questioning, to encourage interviewees to describe their conscious experiences rather than to try and invoke possible underlying causal factors for those conscious experiences.

Thirdly, it is a methodology that accepts that consciousness is intentional. With its focus on investigating the conscious experiences of recent migrants in relation to the five existentials, the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology acknowledges the inseparability of conscious experiences from its objects of consciousness.

Finally, the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, in contrast to Smith's *Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis***,** explicitly and self-consciously seeks out essential structures of conscious experience**.** By positing propositions derived in an initial investigation, before the major research investigation, the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology provides a clear, accessible and practical means for the phenomenological researcher to set about deriving those essential structures of conscious experience within a given lifeworld.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology adopts terminology that is appropriate but accessible.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology adopts terminology that is grounded in philosophical phenomenology yet is clearly explained and accessible to phenomenological researchers with a limited background in philosophical phenomenology.

The manner in which pieces of (often misunderstood) terminology have been interpreted has been made explicit. The way in which phenomenology has been understood, for example, has been made explicit in chapter 2.1. Specialist phrases such as, "ready-at-hand" and "present-to-hand" have been interpreted in chapter 2.4**,** and "lifeworld" and "framing horizon of meaning" in chapter 3.2**.**

As a consequence, any future researcher interested in adopting the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology has a guide as to how they might interpret and apply these important phenomenological concepts into their own research.

*The four pillars provide a clear and non-negotiable set of elements indispensable to phenomenological lifeworld research***.**

The notion of the *lifeworld* with its two underlying assumptions (as articulated in chapter 5.2.1**,** provide a clear and definable parameter within which research is able to take place. Firstly, the notion lifeworld carries the assumption that there are certain essential

characteristics within given and specific lived contexts. In this instance the lived context of the recently arrived migrant. Secondly, the notion lifeworld carries the implicit assumption that what is sought through the interview process is a series of descriptions of the world as *it is experienced within that lived context* rather than of the world described, somehow, independent of the interviewees' experience of it.

The incorporation of the *five existentials* as one of the pillars of phenomenological lifeworld research, ensures that there is a bulwark against interviews descending into an undifferentiated mass of descriptions with few, if any, connecting threads.

By grouping the propositions to be tested in the second study into the five existentials and focusing on one after another, the researcher/interviewer is provided with more time to explain, in detail, what might be meant by this or that existential. The existence of these existentials also allows the researcher/interviewer to keep the questions in the interview more targeted.

It is acknowledged that there exists a fluid dividing line between the five existentials. People's lived experience of the world do not make such distinctions. As a result, there will always be some cross pollination in how one divides up the lived experiences. Under which existential, for example, might one put "the experience of others through technological objects"? (the existential of objects or of others?). Nonetheless, the five existentials were shown to be an invaluable focusing and calibrating tool. They focus the interview questions, and allow for structure and direction in the collection and analysis of data.

The use of *insight cultivators*, as another of the pillars, also aids the interview process. By beginning each of the interview sessions with a series of quotations related to several of the existentials within the relevant lifeworld, momentum is developed. Interviewees are provided with the opportunity to agree with and explain how their own, conscious experiences within the lifeworld were similar to the one presented in the insight cultivator.

Alternatively, the interviewees are given the opportunity to explain how their own conscious experiences contradicted the insight cultivator, often using a counter example. As Zahavi remarks, Phenomenological research deals with "ignored obviousness", that sphere of experience that is instinctively passed over in everyday conversation (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 103)**.** One of the difficulties of phenomenological research, is how to encourage participants to dwell for an extended period of time upon this sphere. By beginning an interview session with insight cultivators, the interviewees are provided with an example, from another individual, speaking on a sphere of experience that they, themselves have experienced but, in many instances had not spoken about in such terms**.**

The inclusion of *propositions* ensures that the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is, in a recognisable sense, scientific. By deriving propositions, from an autobiographical study (or from the other means outlined in 5.3) testable statements are arrived at that may be tested against the descriptions offered by others who have experienced that lifeworld.

Unlike in the phenomenological ontologies of, say, Sartre and Heidegger, where (what are claimed to be) essential structures true of all human experience are derived from the philosopher's own conscious experiences, the essences derived from the researcher's phenomenological descriptions within the selected lifeworld are simply *a starting point.* The propositions derived from these phenomenological descriptions are, in effect, hypotheses to be further tested against the lived experiences of others who have lived within that lifeworld. Where the phenomenological philosopher generalises essences on the basis of his/her own experiences (Gelven, 1989, p. 42) the phenomenological researcher is compelled to investigate the veracity of the "essential structures" derived from their experiences *in more detail*. They are used as a starting point "tested" on the basis of a number of interviewees with other members of that lifeworld.

By doing this, phenomenological lifeworld research demands a kind of humility from the researcher. The researcher's personal experiences within a given lifeworld are an investigative starting point. They are a springboard into investigating the essential structures of that lifeworld more generally. After having postulated propositions derived from their own experiences, as well as experiences posited in the literature, the researcher *must then closely attend to the conscious experiences of others.* This needs to be done in the spirit of openness. As a result of the bearing witness to others' conscious experiences the researcher is at liberty to, update/refine the propositions derived from their own experiences, reject their proposition as an essential structure of that lifeworld, confirm the proposition as an essential structure of that lifeworld or, add essential structures of that lifeworld on the basis of the descriptions offered by the interviewees. In the latter case, evidently, the descriptions offered by others can reveal to the researcher, elements of their own experience within that lifeworld that they may have overlooked.

Unnecessary and potentially confusing elements have been eliminated.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology made a point of eliminating unnecessary and largely peripheral phenomenological considerations. This means that the research methodology does not get bogged down in technical considerations more relevant to the practice of phenomenological philosophy than applied phenomenology conducted within a research context.

By eliminating the (contested) notion of the *epoche,* as suggested by Zahavi (2019c) at one stroke, the necessity of having to explain precisely what it means was avoided. Additionally, by not utilising the *epoche* there is no issue of the researcher having to explain their understanding of what it means to the interviewees. Asking interviewees to "bracket off" questions relating to the nature of the external world independent of their experience of it would only have served to overwhelm the interviewees. By the researcher modelling

phenomenological descriptions (through use of insight cultivators) and gently reminding them that they are interested in how aspects of the world seem to the interviewees and that they needn't worry about "what the world was actually like" achieved much the same purpose but without the unnecessarily technical vocabulary.

Similarly, by not asking the interviewees to focus on only one of either pre-reflective or reflective conscious experiences within the chosen context, the interviewees are given free-reign to reflect upon all of their conscious experiences within the given lifeworld. Likewise, there is no demand that the interviewees focus on either theoretical or pre-theoretical modes of conscious experience within the chosen context. In the case of the research conducted in this thesis, the distinction between theoretical and pre-theoretical modes of conscious experience became particularly significant to many of the interviewees**.** Had there been a focus, for example, only on pre-theoretical modes of experience this important point of contrast for the interviewees would have been lost.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology recognises and supports the pedagogical role played by the interviewer.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology recognises that interviewees, until this point, naïve in the ways of phenomenological reflection have to learn to reflect phenomenologically. As suggested by van Manen **(**2019, p. 3) this learning cannot be done theoretically. Simply providing the interviewees with definitions of the relevant concepts associated with phenomenology cannot lead to rich descriptive accounts. Innovations such as the insight cultivators and the structuring of questions around the five existentials, scaffold and reinforce the necessarily pedagogical role played by the interviewer in phenomenological research.

An apt metaphor for the role of the interviewer in phenomenological lifeworld research is as a "Socratic midwife". The philosopher Socrates claimed that his questioning

was not designed to elicit any new knowledge in his interlocutors (Plato, trans. 2005) and similarly the phenomenological interviewer is not seeking to derive anything from the interviewer which s/he is not already aware of**.** Instead, acting as a "midwife" the interviewer is required, through careful questioning, to draw out from the interviewee *that which always lies within the interviewee*. The goal of the questions is for the interviewee to articulate that habitually glossed over, "ignored obviousness" (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 103) of their experiences within the targeted lifeworld.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology recognises that the descriptions given by interviewees are not fully phenomenological.

Although the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is avowedly phenomenological it is clear that what is required from the interviewees is not fully "phenomenological".

What the interviewees must do is provide close descriptions of their own conscious experiences within the selected lifeworld. As was made clear in 5.2.3, with the provision of *insight cultivators***,** the role of the interviewer in order to achieve this end is significant. Nonetheleless, as Zahavi points out phenomenological research is more than the amassing of the descriptions of *particular* experiences. It aims to elicit essential structures of conscious experience more generally.

Within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research, the interviewees do not have to elicit these essential structures. As was made clear by van Manen, questions within the phenomenological interview process should not seek from the interviewees "empirical or descriptive generalizations" (van Manen, 2016a, p. 298). Their single role is to closely describe the particularity of their own experiences. *It is the role as the researcher /interviewer* to look for the essential structures within and across the descriptive reflections of the interviewees and draw links and shared elements between them. Nonetheless, to

successfully achieve this, the interviewer is wholly reliant on the ability of the interviewee to articulate in as much detail as possible the particularities of his/her lived experiences within the context of the chosen lifeworld.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology acknowledges that the interviewer should reframe expectations with regards the descriptions provided by interviewees.

The interviewees, notwithstanding, the input of the pedagogical role of the interviewer are not phenomenologists and, as such, they won't always provide clear, easy to comprehend descriptions.

As a consequence, the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology acknowledges that the interviewer is required to reframe their expectations. The interviewer should not expect the quality of polished phenomenological descriptions encountered in the works of the phenomenological philosophers. For example, Sartre in the phenomenological novel *Nausea* (1965) gives detailed, concrete, and particular descriptions of; the root of a tree (p. 188-189), the seat in a bus/trolleybus (pp. 180-181) and the encounter with other people (pp. 68-71). It is evident that such descriptions are tailored by philosophers, steeped in phenomenology and are refined and adapted over myriad drafts. Obviously the interviewer should not expect and demand such detailed responses from their interviewees.

When interviewing, the researcher should be satisfied with responses that begin with, "Often…", "On occasion it seemed…", "Sometimes it felt", "On Thursdays I experienced…". These repeated experiences are still particular enough within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research.

It is acknowledged that the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology seeks out essential structures of conscious experience, but it has also been made explicit that, these essences are "morphological". They are less precise and detailed than those expected to be found in mathematics or the natural sciences (Giorgi, 2009, pp. 196-197; Zahavi, 2019b, p.

46)**.** By reframing these expectations it means the balance can be struck between deriving common elements within different participants experiences within a given lifeworld without having to demand explicit and specific descriptions from all interviewees.

In the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology the process of conducting research is easier because its underlying philosophical assumptions have been made clear.

The philosophical assumptions contained within the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology have been explicitly set out. This means that these assumptions do not need to be defended throughout the research phase.

Key amongst these assumptions are:

1. That there exist *lifeworlds* (Husserl, 1970)*,* such as the lifeworld of the new migrant, within which there exist essential structures of experience that may be uncovered.
2. That these essential structures are "morphological" in nature. That is, they are less clear and discrete than the kinds of essences to be found in the maths and sciences. (Giorgi, 2009; Zahavi, 2019b)
3. That when reflecting upon their conscious experiences within this lifeworld, the interviewee should, as far as is possible, strive towards description. Yet, it is acknowledged that this act of reflection can never be pure in the sense of it being purely disinterested and, as such, will always have an interpretive element (van Manen, 2016b, pp. 180-181).
4. That the kinds of conscious experience reflected upon within the chosen lifeworld include the pre-theoretical and theoretical modes of experience as well as the pre-reflective and reflective modes of experience.

It is possible that a phenomenological researcher might take issue with one or more of these assumptions. Indeed, it may also be the case that any such critique will contain a measure of strength forcing a revision in that assumption or assumptions. Nonetheless, the

phenomenological lifeworld research methodology has “set out its stall” and made clear that these assumptions have been reflected upon and are able to be defended.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is flexible. It can be adapted without losing its defining characteristics.

By insisting on the four pillars of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology; namely, the framing concept of the *lifeworld,* the structuring concept of the *five existentials*, the interviewing tool of the *insight cultivators* as well as the insistence that the main study (with interviewees) tests pre-established *propositions*, ensures that the remaining elements of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology may be adapted as the situation demands. This ensures that the methodology fulfils the requirement of pragmatism set forth by Zahavi (2019b, p. 137).

The structure of the phenomenological research lifeworld methodology study presented involved an initial autobiographical study. Within this context such an initial study was justified because the researcher had experienced the lifeworld in question.

However, lifeworlds that the researcher has never experienced may also be investigated using the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology. For example a male educator may wish to investigate the lifeworld of female teachers within a boys’ school context. In such an instance, an initial autobiographical study is not appropriate. Yet there are other means of developing propositions to be tested in the main study. A development of propositions within such research maybe derived solely from a literature review containing, amongst other sources, non-fiction accounts of female teachers or from other qualitative research related to the lifeworld.

A researcher adopting the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology may also see fit to reduce the number of existentials. An appropriate instance might be when a researcher is seeking to investigate a more specific lifeworld *within* a lifeworld (van Manen,

2016b, p. 101). If, for example, one were to investigate the lifeworld of visually different recent migrants to Australia, a point raised by Ksenia in one of the interviews (Ksenia, 2, p. 3) one may reduce the number of existentials to be focused on to the existential of others and the existential of self, due to these being the existentials most likely to be experienced differently within this, more specific, lifeworld.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology provides a clear, systematic process for the derivation of essential structures.

The derivation of essential structures within the *phenomenological lifeworld research methodology* is a process that involves a number of clearly defined stages.

The first, literature review stage, offers the researcher the opportunity to get a general feel for what the essential structures of the lifeworld might be. General points that hint at possible essential structures gained from insightful descriptions from autobiographical, fictional and research literature are set down. In the case of the literature review presented, for example, many of the descriptions made by, in particular Schutz (1944), Bollnow (1961), Grinberg and Grinberg (1989), Tan (2006), and Madison (2009) hinted at these essential structures (see chapter 6.8).

Then (where appropriate), the formative autobiographical study involves the systematic description and derivation of testable propositions. These propositions involve adding to, developing, refining or rejecting those general points that emerged in the literature review.

Finally, these propositions are tested and then added to, developed, refined, or rejected with reference to the descriptions offered by the interviewees in the main study. The essential structures are then arrived at.

As was made clear in chapter 5.3, this process does not end with the derivation of essential structures. Rather, those essential structures of the focused on lifeworld that

emerged vaguely in the literature review and acquired greater clarity through the formative and main studies, will undergo further adding to, development, refining, and rejection in future studies conducted by other researchers.

The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology offers the researcher the incentive to actively read the works of the phenomenological philosophers and to incorporate their insights into the research process.

As the phenomenological lifeworld researcher increases their familiarity with the major phenomenological philosophers, they will be able to incorporate their phenomenological insights more effectively into the research process. In particular, these insights may be used to help guide, inform and draw out responses from the interviewees**.**

In the research presented in this thesis, for example, Heidegger's insights relating to the distinction between objects experienced as "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand" respectively (Heidegger, 2008) were repeatedly invoked when asking how the interviewees experienced the existential of other objects.

In addition, Sartre's distinction between how experiencing individuals experience other humans as opposed to other objects in the world (Sartre, 1972) and how experiencing humans become aware of themselves differently when subject to the "gaze" of other human beings (Sartre, 1972), also informed the framing of questions given to the interviewees.

Within different lifeworld contexts the insights offered by other significant phenomenological thinkers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2012) who provides numerous insights into the nature of the lived body, Emmanuel Levinas (1969) on the experience of other human beings and Simone de Beauvoir (1953) who provides a detailed exposition of the particularities of the female experience, may also be incorporated.

9.2 Elements to Develop

There could have been fewer, more targeted questions throughout the interview process.

Due to a fear that interviewees might provide cursory responses to the questions provided a significant number of questions were set down for each of the tree interviews (see appendix b). In a majority of cases, this fear was unfounded, almost without exception, each of the interviewees, over their three interviews, did not have time to respond to all of the questions set out. It is clear therefore that fewer questions may be established as part of the semi-structured interview process.

In addition, the fewer questions offered could have been more closely aligned to the propositions derived from the formative autobiographical study and the literature review. There was concern that the interviewees would struggle to understand what kind of descriptive responses would be required from them so, for each existential, there were a number of introductory questions that were somewhat peripheral. It became evident that once comfortable, the interviewees produced responses that were appropriately descriptive. Such peripheral, introductory questions were, therefore, not required. Indeed, in future research endeavours, it will make it easier to organise, analyse, and evaluate the resulting data if those peripheral questions are eliminated.

The phenomenological lifeworld researcher should consider referring to three or four descriptions as representative of an essential structure.

During the data analysis stage of the research conducted for this thesis it became manifest that not all interviewees *explicitly* provided descriptions that reflected an essential structure. For example, not all interviewees stated explicitly that time, in the initial stages of migration was experienced as slowing down**.**

It was clear that some interviewees were more able to speak comfortably about certain existentials than others. Also, some interviewees were able to describe their conscious experiences with more exactitude, richness and detail. Therefore, the phenomenological lifeworld researcher should be aware that, in the data analysis stage, it may be necessary to

cite several descriptions that are taken to be reflective of what the entire cohort are suggesting even though others within the cohort might not say so explicitly.

The question remains, how many interviewees' descriptions should be used? In the research presented, the number of three or four was arrived at. In saying this, the researcher must judge whether those descriptions utilised chime or "ring true" with the overall feel of the descriptions provided by the cohort in general. For example, within the context of the research conducted for this thesis, several interviewees said *explicitly* that they avoided engaging with strangers in public spaces in early migration. Even though not all of the interviewees stated this explicitly. This reticence was *implicitly inferred* by a number of the other migrants.

The phenomenological lifeworld researcher must allow perspectives that counter to essential structures be heard.

In seeking essential structures within a lifeworld it may became tempting to overlook descriptions offered by individual interviewees that appear to contradict the perspectives of the majority.

Levinas (1969) understood the danger of trying to "reduce" the particular, concrete and specific experiences of another into the contours of one's own experiences (Levinas, 1969, p. 47). The phenomenological lifeworld researcher needs to guard against this also. The phenomenological lifeworld researcher needs to be open to the possibility of the irreconcilable otherness of some of the interviewees' experiences within a given lifeworld. The researcher must not be afraid to acknowledge and draw attention to this particularity and irreconcilability.

When, within the context of the research conducted for this thesis, for example, Viktoriya, unambiguously stated that the availability of technological objects that allowed communication with friends and family back home did *not* promote her sense of participating

in family life back home (as it did with all the other interviewees) it could have been possible to overlook this as anomalous. But to do so would have been disingenuous and would have run counter to the authenticity to concrete lived experience that is the hallmark of phenomenological research.

Indeed, as with Viktoriya's description, it may be that an interviewee's description being offered cannot be "shoe-horned" into a broader essential structure within a given lifeworld. There is, therefore, a place for descriptions offered by interviewees that don't point to or reflect a possible essence within the lifeworld under investigation. In the bid to subsume the experience being described as fitting under the banner of a particular type of essential experience within that lifeworld, there is a danger in something being lost.

The researcher must therefore, let the interviewees' descriptions breathe. The novelist Dostoevsky famously adopted a "polyphonic" approach. This allowed his characters' the freedom to possess viewpoints that didn't cohere with his own. Bakhtin, states, "he was able to visualize and portray personality as another, as someone else's personality, without…merging it with his own voice" (Bakhtin, 1984, pp. 12-13). The phenomenological lifeworld researcher, similarly, must, while still seeking out essential structures of a given lifeworld, allow for perspectives that don't cohere to the broader essential structures that emerge from the majority of interviewees.

In the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, further elaboration of what is meant by an essential structure is required.

By stating that the essential structures being sought within the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology are "morphological" there is the acknowledgement that there is not the level of precision being sought as in the maths or the sciences. Yet, there is still a tension. The phenomenological method demands a search for essences, structures that are true of *all* experiences (in this case, within a given lifeworld). Yet, what repeatedly became

clear throughout the research process, is that although generalisations could be made, such generalisations often precluded the lived experiences of one or two of the interviewees (see the previous point).

This raises the question as to whether the researcher is justified in claiming these as "essential structures"? For the purposes of the current research, the answer was yes. It is evident, however, that more consideration of what is meant by "essential structure" is required in future research.

In the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology there needs to be development on how the existential of time may be addressed within the interview process.

Time, the most abstract, of the existentials, was the most difficult to address in anything other than a superficial way throughout the interview process. Questions, for example, related to how the past may impact upon conscious experiences within a given lifeworld as well as how the anticipation of the future, might impact upon conscious experiences within a given lifeworld were difficult to frame in any comprehensive way.

As a consequence, further thought needs to be given as to how interviewees may be guided in providing detailed descriptions of their experience of the existential of time.

In the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology there needs to be a clearer template relating to how the autobiographical study should be written.

It was difficult to settle on a style of writing that accurately captures concrete lived experiences within a given lifeworld. If the descriptions were too detailed (using large numbers of adjectives and adverbs) those descriptions tended to appear forced and sentimental.

It is suggested that something approaching an "impressionistic" approach to the writing down of these descriptions may stand the best chance of capturing the sense of those descriptions being lived. Approaching the descriptions in this way, the scenes are quickly

sketched down while fresh in the mind. They are then revisited and refined frequently with reasonable intervals in between each refinement.

In making this suggestion, a more coherent approach still needs to be cultivated. Inspiration however should be taken from the experts, phenomenological philosophers such as Heidegger, Sartre and de Beauvoir who all expressed phenomenological ideas effectively through concrete descriptions**.**

In the interview process of phenomenological lifeworld research there needs to be a balance struck between patience and purpose.

The actively pedagogical role of the interviewer in phenomenological lifeworld research is of more significance than in many other kinds of research interviews. In recognising the success of innovations such as the insight cultivators, however, there are still a number of areas that the researcher must be aware of throughout the interview process.

During interviews rich descriptions may be missed due to a clumsy question or a lack of patience. The phenomenological lifeworld researcher must cultivate something akin to an "active patience". This includes the capacity to intuit, for example, when to remain quiet. As van Manen suggests (2016b, p. 68) the interviewer does not always need to fill in the silence or explain, in detail, a point about to be discussed.

It is also clear that with interviewees the level of recall and quality of descriptions depend largely on mood and level of comfort. In the author of this thesis' process of reflecting the experiences within the lifeworld of early migration, there was the sensation that certain, memories were, like a coin that has fallen down a narrow gap and just out of reach. In such instances, frustratingly, the coin be brushed over by the fingertips but resists being grasped. Like the coin, the interviewees memories of certain events might, initially be out of reach. If this is the case, through sensitive questioning, the interviewee may, gently, be worked around so that, finally, they may be in a position grasp them. If, however, these

memories are approached too directly, too bluntly, they will fall further down the gap and out of reach.

In the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology there needs to be an awareness of the adjustments in interviewing technique required when conducting interviews over a digital platform.

The nature of the interaction between interviewer and interviewee over a digital platform is different to when interviews are conducted face to face. Within the context of the research for this thesis, several interviewees remarked, when describing interactions with home that were conducted and maintained online (Mila, 3, p. 20; Lena, 3, pp. 16-17), that it was harder to develop and maintain deep interactions. The same, likely, holds true when research interviews are conducted online.

Also, due to the interviewer's lack of awareness of the external factors that may have been evident had the interviews been conducted face to face, the conducting of interviews online provides an extra layer of complexity that the researcher/interviewer needs to be mindful of.

In the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology there needs to be discernment when recording interviews.

A large portion of the interviews, in particular during the initial relationship building stage, do not need to be recorded for transcript purposes.

To aid in the efficiency of the later data analysis stage as well as the financial implications of having interviews transcribed, the researcher/interviewer should be discerning and pro-active in stopping and starting the recording of interviews.

9.3 Concluding Remarks

Phenomenological lifeworld research: A proposed phenomenological research methodology set out, firstly, to design a demonstrably phenomenological research

methodology. Secondly, it set out to develop a phenomenological research methodology that could be understood, utilised and, if need be, adapted by prospective phenomenological researchers with little or no background in phenomenological philosophy.

With regards to the first aim, the assignment has, to a large degree, been successful. The phenomenological lifeworld research methodology justified its phenomenological credentials by adhering to the essential elements of phenomenology as set out in the preface to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception.* It also, with particular reference to phenomenological researcher, Max van Manen, drew heavily on central central elements within several major canonical phenomenological texts, most notably, Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* (2008), Edmund Husserl's early work: *Ideas* (2012) and his later work: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1970).

In relation to the second aim, the assignment may also be considered successful. One of the most challenging requirements was to present the key elements of the phenomenological lifeworld research in manner that wasn't rendered impenetrable with obscure phenomenological jargon. It was clear that this end could not solely be achieved through an abstract explanation of the key elements of the proposed research methodology alone. In order to adequately grasp the key elements of the research methodology, it needed to be applied.

The key elements of the phenomenological lifeworld research were, therefore, presented in the form of an application to the lifeworld of new migrants. The application of this methodology, centred around four foundational pillars which were applied to derive essential structures within this lifeworld.

The application of the methodology also brought to light a number of issues that need to be addressed if phenomenological lifeworld research is to be adopted in future studies.

There is a recognition that the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is in its formative stages. It needs refinement and development. Nonetheless it is hoped that, in response to the concerns put forward by Zahavi (2019a, 2019b, 2019c) this refinement and development may now take place on secure methodological and philosophical foundations. Through its applications in different lifeworlds, it is suggested that improvements will be made to the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology that will allow it to be even more accessible to prospective phenomenological researchers.

Even more importantly, it is hoped that the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology will serve as a vehicle that will allow other researchers to make new and interesting discoveries within different lifeworlds without having to get bogged down in those distracting technical disagreements that pre-occupy many within the realm of phenomenological philosophy**.**

To conclude, Heidegger (2008) characterised much of modern speech as “idle talk” (pp. 211-214). Happily, when reflecting upon the 36 interviews conducted, it is evident that the talk in each of the interviews could be considered its opposite. The migrant volunteers delved deeply and openly into their past experiences. Their descriptions, as has been demonstrated, were revelatory for research purposes. Just as satisfying, however, was the repeated remark that the descriptions were just as revelatory for the interviewees themselves.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND

APPENDIX A

Are you a Russian Migrant toAustralia?

Are You Interested in Becoming a Volunteer Research Participant?

I am looking for adult Russians who have migrated to Australia:

- Willing to volunteer up to 3 hours of their time
- Happy to take part in an interview about their early experience of being amigrant in Australia.

Criteria to be eligible to participate

- You are aged over 21
- You were born in Russia
- You are comfortable in an English-speaking interview environment
- You are to have lived in Australia for more than a year

What to expect if you agree to participate

- You will have 3 x 1 hour interviews over three months
- These interviews will involve conversations about your early experiences as amigrant in Australia

About the study

This study is authorised by University of Southern Queensland to fulfil the completion of a Doctoral Thesis (Psychology and Counselling); Ethics approvalnumber H20REA065

If this is of interest to you, or somebody that you know, please contact Nicholas Lee via thecontact details below.

Nicholas Lee

USQ Student ResearcherMobile: [redacted]

Email: [redacted]

Dr Jan Du Preez

Project Supervisor

Email: [redacted]

To whom it may concern,

I hope this e-mail finds you well. I am contacting you, at _____, with a request for assistance.

My name is Nick Lee and I am a PhD student at the school of Psychology and Counselling at the University of Southern Queensland. I am currently writing my thesis on how Russian migrants experience the world immediately after they move to a new country.

In order to conduct my research I require 12 Russian migrant volunteer interviewees over the age of 21. I was wondering if you would be able to help in getting word of my research out to the_____ migrant community.

I am aware of the importance of confidentiality and would just like to contact those individuals who are recognised leaders of their migrant or social group. These leaders will be able to disseminate information related to my research so that those interested in volunteering can contact me directly.

Any volunteer would be required for 3x1 hour interviews which will take place from July to December of this year (There will be at least two months between each interview).

Due to the ongoing COVID 19 restrictions, there will be provision for these interviews to be conducted over a video link (using a platform such as Zoom or Skype).

I have conditional Ethics Approval for this project and am in the process of gaining full Ethics Approval. The Human Research Ethics Approval Number is H20REA065. I am also attaching a flyer which provides some additional information about the project and can be distributed to interested individuals.

Thank you again for taking the time to read this e-mail. Any help at all would be gratefully received. I would be happy to e-mail/phone you and outline the specifications of the research in more detail. My mobile phone number is 0431089047. My research supervisor's name is Jan Du Preez and he can be contacted at Jan.DuPreez@usq.edu.au.

Thank you for your time and I look forward to hearing from you.

Kind regards,

Nick Lee

University of Southern Queensland

Consent Form for USQ Research Project Questionnaire

Project Details

Title of Project:	Phenomenological Lifeworld Research: A Proposed Phenomenological Research Methodology with an Application to the Lifeworld of New Migrants.
Human Research Ethics Approval Number:	H20REA65

Research Team Contact Details

Principal Investigator Details

Mr Nicholas Lee

Email: [redacted]

Telephone: (mobile) [redacted]

Supervisor Details

Dr Jan du Preez

Email: jan.dupreez@usq.edu.au

Telephone: (07) 4631 1672

Statement of Consent

By signing below, you are indicating that you:

• Have read and understood the information document regarding this project.	☐Yes / ☐ No
• Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction.	☐Yes / ☐ No
• Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research team.	☐Yes / ☐ No
• Are over 18 years of age.	☐Yes / ☐ No
• Understand that any data collected may be used in future research activities.	☐Yes / ☐ No
• Agree to participate in the project.	☐Yes / ☐ No

Participant Name	
Participant Signature	
Date	

Please return this sheet to a Research Team member prior to undertaking the questi

University of Southern Queensland

Participant Information for USQ Research Project Interview

Project Details

Title of Project: Phenomenological Lifeworld Research: A Proposed Phenomenological Research Methodology with an Application to the Lifeworld of New Migrants.

Human Research Ethics Approval Number:

Research Team Contact Details

Principal Investigator Details

Mr Nicholas Lee

Email: [redacted]

Telephone:(Mobile: [redacted])

Supervisor Details

Dr Jan du Preez

Email: jan.dupreez@usq.edu.au

Telephone:(07)4631 1672

Description

I would like to invite you to take part in this research project.

The aim of this study is to examine the lived experience of migrants in their first year of settlement in a new country.

This study will explore how recent migrants experience their world by encouraging them to reflect upon their experiences in their first year of migration. The following are the six elements of experience that will be focused on:

1. Participants will be asked to reflect upon their experiences of **time** in their first year of migration (e.g., Did time seem to go faster or slower during the early stages of migration? If so, when?)

2. Participants will be asked to reflect upon their experiences of **space** in their first year of migration (e.g., Were there any experiences, in the early stages of migration, where space seemed to narrow or spread out? If so, when?)

3. Participants will be asked to reflect upon their experiences of their **own selves** (e.g., Where there any experiences, in the early stages of migration, where the participant felt him/herself being more or less noticeable? If so, when?)

4. Participants will be asked to reflect upon their experiences of **other people** (e.g., Were other people experienced in the same way as they were in the participants' home country in the early stages of migration? If not, in what contexts?)

5. Participants will be asked to reflect upon their experiences of **other objects** (e.g., Did certain objects become more/less significant during the early stages of migration? If so, which objects?)

6. Additionally, participants will be asked about the nature of their **reflections/memories** during the early stages of migration (e.g., Did particular reflections/memories of the home country repeatedly come to mind? If so, in what contexts?)

This study will explore these concepts by conducting face to face interviews with a small number of participants, aged over 21, identify as Russian, and possess good conversational English.

The interviews will be audio recorded, transcribed and analysed using established methods.

This project is being undertaken as part of a Doctoral Thesis. Results of the study will be published in a thesis and potentially in future academic articles.

Participation

- Your participation will involve an initial interview that will take approximately 60 minutes of your time. You will also be required to take part in a second and third interview (both also lasting 60 minutes).

- The interview will involve questions relating to your first year of migration (refer to 'Interview Outline' handout for example questions).

- The interview will take place via Zoom or Skype at a mutually convenient time arranged by the researcher.

- If Zoom or Skype are unsuitable for any reason, a mutually convenient and secure meeting room at another location can be negotiated.

- The interview will be audio recorded and then transcribed for analysis. Transcription will be completed by a professional transcription company with provisions in place to ensure confidentiality, or by the researcher, and checked for accuracy by the supervisor. All information gained from the interviews will be confidential and stored on a password protected computer.

- Participants may request to be sent a copy of the transcribed interview and provided the opportunity to remove or amend any responses that do not accurately represent the participant's opinion or experience. To do so, you can

contact the researcher on the phone number or email provided in this information sheet.

- Any information obtained in connection with this project and that can identify you will remain confidential. The data will be analyzed and published using pseudonyms to maintain anonymity; participants may nominate a pseudonym of their choosing.

- The data you contribute may be used in the future in non-identifiable format (e.g., as material produced by the supervisor for training purposes; as part of datasets from other projects to be analysed to address related research questions).

- Participants may request a summary of results from the study – a postal or email address will be required for this option.

- Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. **If you do not wish to take part you are not obliged to**. If you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are free to withdraw from the project at any stage. You may also request that any data collected about you be destroyed. If you do wish to withdraw from this project or withdraw data collected about you, please contact the Research Team (contact details at the top of this form).

- Your decision whether you take part, do not take part, or to take part and then withdraw, will in no way impact your current or future relationship with the University of Southern Queensland.

- Before you make your decision, please ask the researcher any questions you have about the research project. Sign the Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask your questions and have received satisfactory answers.

- Please notify the researcher if you decide to withdraw from this project.

- Should you have any queries regarding the progress or conduct of this research, you can contact the researcher or supervisor on the numbers or emails listed at the beginning of this information sheet.

Expected Benefits

- Personal reflection has many benefits and it is anticipated that, despite the personal nature of the research topic, the interview process will be a generally positive experience which may assist you in gaining further clarity on your experience/s. It is understood that you may feel personally invested in the research topic given your experience, and you may feel the benefit of contributing in a meaningful way to current research.

- It is also anticipated that the research project will benefit the field of psychology by providing insight into an area that, to date, has not been explored by other studies. As this is an exploratory study (a study generating ideas and themes), results may provide some useful foundations and concepts for further research in the area.

- At the completion of the interview process you will be eligible to receive a Visa Debit card payment at the rate of $50 per hour or part hour. The purpose of this payment is to compensate participants for loss of potential work time.

Risks

There are minimal risks associated with your participation in this project. The risks identified are as follows:

- Firstly, there is a time imposition (as outlined in the 'Participation' section above), however the researcher will endeavor to minimize this imposition by arranging a time and location that is mutually convenient.

- Secondly, given the reflective (and hence, personal) nature of the research topic, there is a chance that recalling difficult or sensitive issues may lead to heightened emotions and possible distress. If this occurs, the interview will be stopped and you will be able to withdraw from the study at any time. If you need to talk to someone about this immediately, please contact Lifeline on 13 11 14. You may also wish to consider consulting your General Practitioner (GP) for additional support.

- All procedures in this study are monitored by the supervisor, Dr Jan du Preez (contact details listed at the beginning of this information sheet).

Privacy and Confidentiality

All comments and responses will be treated confidentially unless required by law.

- You can request to be sent a copy of the transcribed interview and you may remove or amend any responses that do not accurately represent your opinion or experience. To do so, you can contact the researcher on the phone number or email provided at the beginning of this information sheet.

- The audio recordings will be retained by the supervisor on a secure, password protected computer file for the requisite 5 years - also to ensure that the data is available for verification and/or auditing purposes if required.

- The only persons with access to the audio recording will be the student researcher, the supervisor and an employee of the transcription company who will be transcribing the interview for analysis by the student researcher.

- For accuracy of information and reporting, it is essential that the interview/s be audio recorded. If you do not consent to this, you will be unable to participate in the project.

Any data collected as a part of this project will be stored securely as per University of Southern Queensland's Research Data Management policy.

Consent to Participate

- We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your agreement to participate in this project. Please return your signed consent form to the researcher prior to participating in your interview.

Questions or Further Information about the Project

- Please refer to the Research Team Contact Details at the top of the form to have any questions answered or to request further information about this project.

Concerns or Complaints Regarding the Conduct of the Project

- If you have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the University of Southern Queensland Ethics Coordinator on (07) 4631 2690 or email ethics@usq.edu.au. The Ethics Coordinator is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an unbiased manner.

Thank you for taking the time to help with this research project. Please keep this sheet for your information.

APPENDIX B

Interview 1: The Objectives of the Interview

Primary Objective of the Interview

1. To have developed a relationship with the interviewee so that in the two subsequent interviews s/he feels able/comfortable to articulate relevant elements of his/her lifeworld (in the form of the five existentials) as a migrant.

Secondary Objectives of the Interview

1. By encouraging the interviewee to reflect generally on their migrant experience, specific information pertaining to the five existentials of the experience may be elicited.

2. By encouraging the interviewee to reflect generally on their migrant experience, information will be elicited that will provide a starting point for the more specific questions related to the five existentials to be raised in the following two interviews.

Interview Sections

1. Providing the interviewee space for general reflections on their experiences of Russia before they migrated.

2. Providing the interviewee space for general reflections on their experiences of Australia immediately after s/he migrated.

3. Providing the interviewee space for general reflections on the time period around their decision to migrate.

4. Providing the interviewee space for general reflections on what they consider the differences in experience might be between themselves as a migrant, a tourist and a born and raised citizen.

5. General/Miscellaneous Questions (if time)

Interview 1 Script:

Preamble

Firstly, thank you very much for agreeing to speak with me about your experiences as a migrant in Australia. Just a reminder that our discussion will not be longer than an hour and that it will be recorded. Also, you are free at any point to have a break or stop the meeting.

This meeting will be the first of three and is aimed at gaining your general perspectives of being a Russian migrant in Australia. The following interviews will be more specific in nature and examine different aspects of your migration experience. In this interview there will loosely be five sections:

1. Your experiences in Russia before you migrated.

2. Your experiences in Australia just after you migrated.

3. Your experiences around the time you made the decision to migrate.

4. Your perspectives on how your experiences in Australia would be different to an Australia born and raised citizen and a Russian tourist.

5. General/Miscellaneous Questions

Section 1: Reflections/Memories of Russia

1. Firstly, could you please tell me which part of Russia you are from. Which part of Australia you are living in and how long you have been in Australia for.

2. Could you please imagine that you are speaking to an Australian who is interested in living in the part of Russia that you are from but has never been here before. S/he asks you to describe those particular **objects** (buildings, vehicles, landscape features) that they will find different to what they are used to in Australia. Could you describe them as best you can and explain why a newcomer from Australia might find them so different to what they are used to.

3. Could you please imagine that you are speaking to an Australian who is interested in living in Russia but has never been here before. S/he asks you to describe those particular **smells/tastes** (incl.food/drink) that they will find different to what they are used to in Australia. Could you describe them as best you can and explain why a newcomer from Australia might find them so different to what they are used to.

4. Could you please imagine that you are speaking to an Australian who is interested in living in Russia but has never been here before. S/he asks you to describe those particular **customs/mannerisms** that they will find different to what they are used to in Australia. Could you describe them as best you can and explain why a newcomer from Australia might find them so different to what they are used to.

5. When I ask you to think of home/Russia, what images/memories/experiences present themselves to you?

6. Have you returned home since your migration? If so, were the places identical to how you remembered them? If they were different how were they different?

7. Some people living away from their native country say that certain sights, smells and tastes trigger vivid memories of home. For example biting into a particular kind of cake. Can you tell me if there are any smells/tastes or sights here that trigger memories of home to come back? If so, can you describe particular instances for me?

8. If you were to go back to Russia to live now, which parts of life there do you think would take you time to get used to again?

Section 2: Reflections/Memories of Australia in the First Year

1. Could you please imagine that you are speaking to a fellow Russian who is interested in migrating to Australia but has never been here before. S/he asks you to describe those particular **objects** (buildings, vehicles, landscape features) that they will find

different to what they are used to in Russia. Could you describe them as best you can and explain why a newcomer from Russia might find them so different to what they are used to.

2. Could you please imagine that you are speaking to a fellow Russian who is interested in migrating to Australia but has never been here before. S/he asks you to describe those particular **smells/tastes** (in foods, drinks etc) that they will find different to what they are used to in Russia. Could you describe them as best you can and explain why a newcomer from Russia might find them so different to what they are used to.

3. Could you please imagine that you are speaking to a fellow Russian who is interested in migrating to Australia but has never been here before. S/he asks you to describe those particular **customs/mannerisms** that they will find different to what they are used to in Russia. Could you describe them as best you can and explain why a newcomer from Russia might find them so different to what they are used to.

4. When I ask you to think of your experiences in (roughly) your first year here in Australia what images/memories/experiences present themselves to you?

5. If you were to go back to Russia to live now, which parts of life here in Australia do you think you would miss?

6. Now that you have been in Australia for a while, how do you think you see life differently to when you first arrived/in your first year?

7. Did you have any dreams of home in the first year that you were in Australia? If you did, could you please tell me a little bit about the nature and frequency of those dreams.

Section 3: The Migration Decision

1. Can you please describe for me when you made the decision to migrate? Can you remember where you were when you made the decision? Were you in Russia or Australia? Was there a sudden decision or had you been thinking about it for a while.

2. Some migrants suggest that making a commitment to migrate changes the way they experience things around them? Did the decision to migrate change the way that you experienced things around you? If it did, can you please describe how it changed your experience of things around you?

Section 4: How is Being a Migrant is Different to Being Born and Raised Citizen or Tourist?

1. Some people suggest that migrants see their world a differently to people who have lived all of their life in one place. Do you agree with this? If so, why? If not, why not? How, for example, do you think your experience of living in Melbourne is different to someone who was born and raised in Melbourne.

2. Some people also suggest that migrants experience a place differently to visitors or tourists. Can you give me some ways in which living in a foreign country is different from simply visiting it? How, for example, do you think your experience of living in

Melbourne is different to a friend who might come over and visit you here from Russia?

Section 5: Miscellaneous Questions

1. Were there any parts of the experience of being a migrant that **were less challenging** than you anticipated? Can you explain what they were?

2. Were there any parts of the experience of being a migrant that were **more challenging** than you anticipated? Can you explain what they were?

3. What do you understand by the word **toska**? How might you use it in relation to your experience of being a migrant?

4. Lastly, do you have any questions for me?

Conclusion

Thank you very much for agreeing to speak with me. I will get in touch with you in the next few weeks about organising a time for our second meeting

Interview 2: Insight Cultivators: Migrant Reflections on Time, Space and Objects

Below are five reflections made by migrants in the early stages of their migration experience. Take your time and read them. Are there any reflections that relate to your experience in the early stages of your migration?

Reflection 1

Even the simplest daily tasks, shopping, banking, taking a tram, are consciously reviewed as to how they can be accomplished without words…..I find myself intrigued and exhausted, vacillating between my refuge in the courtyard apartment and the attraction and excitement of the alien environ[ment] waiting to envelop me.

Reflection 2

The spaces [of my new house] are so plain, low-ceilinged, obvious; there are no curves, niches, odd angles, nooks or crannies.

Reflection 3

I ventured to the street alone…. I suddenly felt my heart pumping excessively hard. What an unusual feeling. There seemed to be no reason for being nervous. I knew where to go and how to get back….. I even felt my steps were not even and steady as usual…It was a little bit like being in a dream, and the surroundings were dazzling for a moment….

…I bought what I wanted and returned to the hotel safely. I still remember that when I came back to my door I had a feeling of relief…. I did seem to feel "home" there at that moment.

Reflection 4

When you feel that a street is not foreign to you, only then does the street stop looking at you like you're a foreigner.

Reflection 5

A plug socket, a bathroom tap, a jam jar or an airport sign may tell us more than its designers intended, it may speak of the nation that made it.

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Interview 2: The Objectives of the Interview

Objectives of the Interview

1. Encouraged the interviewee, through targeted questions, to reflect on the *lived space* existential of their migration experience.

2. Encouraged the interviewee, through targeted questions, to reflect on the *lived time* existential of their migration experience.

3. Encouraged the interviewee, through targeted questions, to reflect on the *lived objects* existential of their migration experience.

Interview Sections

1. Interviewees are provided with reflections from other migrants in the early stages of their migration experience. These are designed as fertile/momentum building statements that provide the interviewees with the means to respond to these statements by either developing or reacting in contrast to some aspect of the points made.

2. Provide interviewees to reflect upon their *lived space* existential of their migration experience.

3. Provide interviewees to reflect upon their *lived time* existential of their migration experience.

4. Provide interviewees to reflect upon their *lived objects* existential of their migration experience.

Interview 2 Script:

Preamble

Thank you for agreeing to speak with me a second time about your experiences as a migrant in Australia. Just a reminder that our discussion will not be longer than an hour and that it will be recorded. Also, you are free at any point to have a break or stop the meeting.

This meeting will be the second of three and is aimed at gaining your perspectives on how you experienced space, time and objects within the context of your migration experience.

1. Firstly, I would like you (for five minutes) to have a look at some statements made by other migrants about their experiences of time, space and objects. After you have looked at these I would like you to tell me whether or not any of the statements relate to your personal experiences.

2. Secondly, I will ask you questions about how you experienced different aspects of *space* in your migration experience.

3. Thirdly, I will ask you questions about how you experienced different aspects of *time* in your migration experience.

4. And fourthly, I will ask you questions about how you experienced different *objects* in your migration experience.

Interview 2 Script: Time/Space/Objects

Section 1: Insight Cultivator

Below are five reflections made by migrants in the early stages of their migration experience. Take your time and read them. Are there any reflections that relate to your experience in the early stages of your migration?

Section 2: Space

Geometric space and lived space are different. When we experience the space around us, we experience it in different ways. In some instances, for example, we might feel the space around us as being narrower than it really is, and sometimes it might feel as more open or extended.

Private Space

1. In general (not specifically related to your experience of being a migrant), can you describe for those contexts/situations when space tends to feel more enlarged/expanded than it really is. Could you also describe and contexts/situations when space tends to feel more narrow/constricted than it really is.

2. Describe for me your experience of the first home/apartment that you lived in in Australia. What memories do you have of the first days after your arrival? How did the space in the home/apartment feel to you in those early days after arrival? (safe, strange, foreign)

3. Where there any spaces within your home/apartment where you felt more comfortable in than others?

4. Where there any spaces within your home/apartment where you felt less comfortable in than others.

5. How did the home/apartment space *feel after you lived* in it for a while? In what way did your experience of that space change after you became more familiar with it?

Liminal/In-Between Space

1. When you arrived home after being out, was the feeling of returning home the same as when you were living in Russia? At what point did you feel that you arrived "home"?

Public Space

1. Describe for me the first trip that you remember around the city/town where you migrated. How did the space (perhaps compared to your home city) around you feel?

2. Were there any public spaces that you felt more or less comfortable in than in others? How did you feel in those spaces?

3. How did the city/town feel *after you lived in it for a while*? In what way did your experience of that space change after you became more familiar with it?

Section 3: Time

Clock time and lived or felt time are different. On occasion, for example, one might feel time flow more quickly and more slowly. Also, unlike clock time, one experiences one's present time through the lens of one's past experiences as well as one's future possibilities.

1. In general (not specifically elated to your migration experience), as you get older, do you feel as if time passes more quickly or more slowly?

2. As you reflect on your migration experience to Australia how did time in the first year you were here, seem to pass? More quickly or more slowly than *before* you migrated here? More quickly or more slowly than *the years after the first year* you migrated here?

3. Can you think of any particular situations/contexts in your early period of migration when time felt as if it were passing slowly or quickly?

4. Early in your migration do you think that you spent more time dwelling on your *past* life/memories than normal? Can you provide some examples?

5. Early in your migration do you think that you spent more time thinking about *future* expectations/possibilities/anxieties than normal? Can you provide some examples

Section 4: Objects

Objects are experienced differently according to the uses and importance we place on those objects. Also, objects are seen the lens of previous experiences we have had with those objects.

1. When you reflect on the first year of your migration are there any particular objects that carry major significance for you? What significance do they hold?

2. In your first year of migration what objects often came to mind when you reflected on your life back in Russia?

Interview 3 Insight Cultivators: Migrant Reflections on Self and Others

Below are five reflections made by migrants in the early stages of their migration experience. Take your time and read them. Are there any reflections that relate to your experience in the early stages of your migration?

Reflection 1
I feel self-conscious… like I stick out, it seems that everyone here knows the unwritten rules of what to do and how to act but I'm not sure of what they are. In this social situation, at home, I would be able to deal with it easily. It seems obvious to everyone else but not for me.

Reflection 2
I noticed at that point that everyone was meeting and welcoming everyone else and chatting away, as if this were some sort of club where people are happy to find themselves in a familiar world. That was how I explained the peculiar impression I had of being out of place, a bit like an intruder.

Reflection 3
It occurred to me, seeing more people thronging those streets than I had ever seen before, that five million people could walk past my nose and I wouldn't find one familiar face; and then it occurred to me that this was worse than being in the desert…

Reflection 4
A shopping trip is a success when my foreignness…can be disguised and I can escape, purchases without a difficult scene.

Reflection 5

> [I have] envy for those who stay behind, whom I see on my return, their faces unshadowed by dislocation or what seems to be enforced mobility

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Interview 3: The Objectives of the Interview

Objectives of the Interview

1. Encouraged the interviewee, through targeted questions, to reflect on the *lived experience of self* existential of their migration experience.

2. Encouraged the interviewee, through targeted questions, to reflect on the *lived experience of others* existential of their migration experience.
    a. **Interview Sections**
3. Interviewees are provided with reflections from other migrants in the early stages of their migration experience. These are designed as fertile/momentum building statements that provide the interviewees with the means to respond to these statements by either developing or reacting in contrast to some aspect of the points made.

4. Provide interviewees to reflect upon their *lived experience of self* existential of their migration experience.

5. Provide interviewees to reflect upon their *lived experience of others* existential of their migration experience.

6. Provide interviewees to reflect upon their lived experience of *technological objects* in their migration experience.

Interview 3 Script:

Preamble

Thank you for agreeing to speak with me a third time about your experiences as a migrant in Australia. Just a reminder that our discussion will not be longer than an hour and that it will be recorded. Also, you are free at any point to have a break or stop the meeting.

This meeting will be the third of three and is aimed at gaining your perspectives on how you experienced yourself and others within the context of your migration experience.

6. Firstly, I would like you (for five minutes) to have a look at some statements made by other migrants about their experiences of themselves and others. After you have looked at these I would like you to tell me whether or not any of the statements relate to your personal experiences.

7. Secondly, I will ask you questions about how you experienced different aspects of *yourself* in your migration experience.

8. Thirdly, I will ask you questions about how you experienced *other people* in your migration experience.

9. Fourthly, I will ask you questions about your experience of *technological objects* within the context of your communication to Russi

Interview 3 Script: Self/Others/Technological Objects

Section 1: Insight Cultivator

Below are five reflections made by migrants in the early stages of their migration experience. Take your time and read them. Are there any reflections that relate to your experience in the early stages of your migration?

Section 2: Self

We experience ourselves in different ways in different situations. Sometimes, we are self-conscious; we become aware of ourselves as being seen by others. At other times we don't even notice ourselves; we are simply immersed in whatever task it is that we are doing.

1. In general, what kinds of experiences cause you to become self-conscious or self-aware?

2. In general, in what kinds of situations do you become immersed in whatever it is that you are doing and not aware of yourself?

3. In your first year of migration, can you recall any moments when you became self-conscious or self-aware?

4. Did you feel self-conscious or self-aware more/less frequently in your first year than you had previously/afterwards?

5. In your first year of migration can you recall any moments when you became wholly immersed in what you were doing and didn't feel self-conscious or self-aware at all?

6. In the first year of migration, in what kinds of situations did you feel most self-conscious or self-aware? When you were alone? With other people? With friends? Strangers?

7. When you were with other Russians who migrated to Australia did you experience yourself differently than when you were with other Australians?

8. Did you have any friends/relatives visit you from Russia in your first year of migration? When you were with them (publicly or privately) did you experience yourself differently in any way? If so, can you please describe how?

Section 3: Others

In our lived experience other people are experienced differently to other objects in the world. Sometimes, for example, when we are aware of someone looking at us, we become self-conscious or self-aware in ways that we don't when someone is not looking at us.

General

1. When we communicate with others, we can often infer what they might be thinking. Did you find it easier/more difficult to do this in your first year of migration?

Strangers

1. Were strangers experienced, in any way, differently in the first year of your migration experience than when you were in Russia?

2. Were there any situations in which strangers were experienced as more/less threatening than in identical situations at home?

3. Could you make out other Russian strangers in public before you heard them speak? If so, what was it about them that allowed you to discern they were Russian?

4. Was there anything significant in your experience of Russian strangers in your first year of migration?

Colleagues

1. Were work colleagues experienced differently in the first year of your migration experience than they were in Russia?

Relatives/Friends

1. When you experienced relatives/close friends over technology (phone/facetime etc) was your experience of them different than it was previous to your first year of migration?

2. Was your experience of family inside the home different to your experience of them previously?

Section 4: Technological Objects

Technology allows us to keep in contact with home in ways that we couldn't in past years.

1. In your first year of migration what different ways of communicating with friends and family in Russia did you use? (Phone, skype, zoom?)

2. Did you feel more comfortable with one mode of communication rather than another?

3. How was your experience during communication with family/friends?

4. How was your experience immediately after communication with family/friends? (Did it take time to get back into normal life?)

5. Did the existence of these forms of technology make your migration experience more or less comfortable in the first year?

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY OF IMPORTANT TERMS RELATED TO THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL LIFEWORLD RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Epoche: There is some conjecture as to what this term means**.** It is here understood to mean that all questions focused on the relationship between a mind-independent physical world and the content of conscious experience are set aside or "abstained" from. (Husserl, 2012, p. 34). Within some phenomenological research methodologies, the epoche needs to be invoked. Within the context of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology, the epoche does not need to be invoked.

Essential Structures: The goal of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology is to derive essential structures from the lifeworld under investigation. These essential structures are arrived at by testing propositions formulated before the interview process. These essential structures should be understood as being "morphological". They are not as precise as essential structures understood within a natural science or mathematical context.

Existential: An existential is an element of the conscious experience of the world that is inseparable from every experiencing human being. Within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research there are understood to be five existentials, "lived time", "lived space", "lived objects", "lived others", and "lived self".

Framing horizon of meaning: Within a given "lifeworld", objects and other people are experienced with a series of background or framing assumptions. These assumptions are not consciously thought of when experiencing of the world, nonetheless, they provide meaning and context to the individual's experiencing of the world. For example, a recent migrant would experience his/her world with the "framing horizon of meaning" that s/he will be remain permanently within that world.

Insight Cultivator: A short description of an element within the lifeworld under investigation. A number of these are provided at the beginning of the second and third interviews. Their purpose is to encourage the interviewee to reflect upon his/her own experiences within that lifeworld. Insight cultivators may motivate interviewees to provide their own, similar, descriptions or outline a description that outlines how their experiences within that lifeworld were different.

Lifeworld: The concept "lifeworld" within the context of phenomenological lifeworld research has two implicit components. The first is that it is simply the world *as it is consciously experienced* rather the physical world independent of conscious experience. The second component is that there exist different "lifeworlds". An individual's "lifeworld", at a given time, is dependent on the "framing horizon of meaning" that serves as a background for all of his/her conscious experiences within that context.

Pre-reflective conscious experiences: These are the kinds of conscious experiences in which one is engaged in the act of perceiving some object or other. One might be engaged, for example, in the act of experiencing a chair or a window.

Pre-theoretical conscious experiences: Human's most frequent mode of experiencing the world around them. This mode of conscious experience does not involve the kind of "knowing" that theoretically analyses, evaluates and scrutinises objects of experience. One is engaged in pre-theoretical conscious experiences when one is *engaged in the world* in such routine activities as climbing stairs, opening doors or putting dishes away.

Present-at-hand: How objects tend to be experienced within theoretical conscious experiences. In such instances one, in a sense, takes a step back from the object of experience and scrutinises it *as an object.* For example, an objects is experienced as "present-at-hand" when it is scrutinised through a microscope or telescope.

Proposition: A testable statement or hypothesis that guides the questioning of interviewees during the interview process of the phenomenological lifeworld research methodology. These propositions may be derived from a formative autobiographical study or from the extant literature on the lifeworld.

Ready-to-hand: How objects tend to be experienced in pre-theoretical conscious experiences. Objects encountered in pre-theoretical experience are intuited simply as being able to be used. For example, as one is typing an essay on a computer, the keys on the keyboard are not experienced as separate and distinct keys but rather, simply, as "ready" to be incorporated into the activity currently immersed in.

Reflective conscious experiences: These are the kinds of experience when one *reflects* upon pre-reflective conscious experiences. In such reflective experiences one may, for example, reflect upon the conscious experience when one was engaged in the act of experiencing a chair or a window.

Theoretical conscious experiences: The mode of experiencing the world when one is at "one remove" from the world. One is engaged in a theoretical conscious experience when one examines objects *as objects* for example, when one is examining an object through a microscope or telescope.

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