

1 Is it safe to cross? Identification of 2 trains and their approach speed at level 3 crossings

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4 Highlights:

- 5 • Drivers' perceptions of oncoming trains and decision making regarding their crossing
6 behaviours were examined
- 7 • Drivers identified the presence of trains 2km away and their movement at 1.6km
8 away, with high variability between participants
- 9 • Most participants underestimated the speed of oncoming trains, particularly when
10 they were travelling at higher speeds

11 Abstract

12 Improving the safety at passive rail crossings is an ongoing issue worldwide. These
13 crossings have no active warning systems to assist drivers' decision-making and are
14 completely reliant on the road user perceiving the approach of a train to decide whether to
15 enter a crossing or not. This study aimed to better understand drivers' judgements regarding
16 approaching trains and their perceptions of safe crossing. Thirty-six participants completed a
17 field-based protocol that involved detecting and judging the speeds of fast moving trains.
18 They were asked to report when they first detected an approaching train, when they could
19 first perceive it as moving, as well as providing speed estimates and a decision regarding
20 when it would not be safe to cross. Participants detected the trains ~2km away and were
21 able to perceive the trains as moving when they were 1.6km away. Large differences were
22 observed between participants but all could detect trains within the range of the longest
23 sighting distances required at passive level crossings. Most participants greatly
24 underestimated travelling speed by at least 30%, despite reporting high levels of confidence
25 in their estimates. Further, most participants would have entered the crossing at a time when
26 the lights would have been activated if the level crossing had been protected by flashing
27 lights. These results suggest that the underestimation of high-speed trains could have
28 significant safety implications for road users' crossing behaviour, particularly as it reduces
29 the amount of time and the safety margins that the driver has to cross the rail crossing.

30 **Keywords:** rail level crossing; passive crossing; speed perception; speed estimates; motion
31 perception; gap acceptance

32 1. Introduction

33 Crashes between trains and road vehicles at rail level crossings are a substantial safety
34 issue for road and rail operations. Such crashes accounted for 45% of the overall fatal rail
35 incidents during 2014-2015 (Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator, 2015), although
36 they accounted for less than 1% of the overall fatal road incidents in Australia (Bureau of

37 Infrastructure Transport and Regional Economics, 2014; Office of the National Rail Safety
38 Regulator, 2015). The consequence of collisions between trains and road vehicles can be far
39 greater than those between road vehicles. While crashes between trains and road vehicles
40 are relatively infrequent, when they do occur, those involved are more likely to suffer fatality
41 or serious injury (Australian Transport Council, 2010). That is, train and road vehicle crashes
42 have higher per-crash casualty rates and are associated with a substantial economic cost of
43 116 million AUD a year (Evans, 2013). The economic and importantly, the human costs of
44 train and road vehicle crashes are clearly substantial and reducing these incidents is an
45 important priority for both rail and road safety. On every day for the last ten years,
46 approximately one person was fatally injured at level crossings in the European Union and in
47 the United States, close to one was seriously injured in the EU, and three injured in the US
48 (European Railway Agency, 2012b; Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety
Analysis, 2016). These trends have not improved worldwide in the last decade.

49 The intersection between road and rail and use of rail level crossings is common. For
50 example, there are currently 23,500 rail level crossings in operation in Australia (Rail
51 Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2015). Rail level crossings are typically categorised
52 into two types of crossings based around the level of control at the crossing. Active
53 crossings employ automatic devices (e.g., flashing lights, with or without boom gates) that
54 are activated shortly before the arrival of a train and are designed to alert vehicle drivers of
55 an approaching train and prevent them from driving through the crossing when the train is
56 approaching. On the other hand, passive crossings employ static signage (e.g., crossbucks,
57 'give-way', or 'stop' signs) and are designed to warn the driver of the possibility of an
58 approaching train at any time, but require the driver to make the decision regarding whether
59 it is safe to cross. The majority of rail crossings around the world are passively protected.
60 Passive crossings represent 67% of public crossing in operation in Australia (Railway
61 Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2009), 75% in the United States (National
62 Transportation Safety Board., 1998), and 47% in Europe (European Railway Agency,
63 2012a). Passive crossings are mainly located in rural areas, where train speeds are
64 generally faster (e.g., Laapotti, 2015; Rudin-Brown et al., 2014).

65 To ensure that a road user who is stopped at a passive crossing has sufficient time to safely
66 traverse the crossing, a minimum sighting distance is required. This sighting distance is the
67 minimum distance at which an approaching train must be seen in order for the vehicle to
68 proceed and clear the crossing by the required safety margin. This is calculated for each
69 individual crossing taking into account its particular characteristics such as types of vehicles,
70 geometry, and train speed (Standards Australia, 2015). In particular, the required sighting
71 distance becomes greater with higher train speeds, where decisions regarding entering the
72 crossing need to be taken when trains are at relatively long distances away from the driver.

73 **1.1 Factors Associated with Drivers' Crossing Behaviours**

74 Collisions at level crossings tend to be the result of a combination of factors. Vehicle-related
75 factors have been shown to be relatively uncommon in railway level crossing collisions and
76 environment-related factors rarely occur in isolation from driver-related factors. Numerous
77 train crash investigations have found that driver errors rather than deliberate violations are
78 primarily responsible for train and road vehicle crashes (Baysari et al., 2009; Caird, 2002;
79 Salmon et al., 2013). Observational studies of actual rail level crossings report that 57-77%
80 of drivers will cross (the rail crossing) in the presence of an approaching train (Kasalica et
81 al., 2012; Tey et al., 2011). Additionally, observational studies identify that the majority of
82 drivers slow down and perform visual scanning behaviours as they approach the rail tracks,

83 prior to crossing (Kasalica et al., 2012; Meeker and Barr, 1989). The obvious checking for
84 the behaviour of trains exhibited by drivers supports the suggestion that perceptual errors
85 rather than deliberate violations underlie many train and road user crashes.

86 Several studies have found that short sighting distances and obstructed sighting lines are
87 associated with train-vehicle crashes (Caird, 2002; Laapotti, 2015). Notwithstanding the
88 issues associated with sighting distances, the ability of a driver to accurately perceive a
89 moving train with clear and unobstructed sightlines is still an under-researched area at rail
90 level crossing. Decision making related to gap acceptance is associated with sighting
91 distances and the ability to perceive a moving train. This is the amount of time or distance
92 that a driver judges acceptable to allow them to perform the crossing manoeuvre. Gap
93 acceptance has been studied predominately in relation to road vehicles merging into the flow
94 of traffic or driving through an intersection. These on-road and simulated driving studies
95 have found that shorter time of arrival at a junction, smaller gap distance, and faster
96 oncoming traffic speeds reduce the likelihood of a gap being judged to be acceptable and
97 the driver not performing the manoeuvre (e.g., Beanland et al., 2013; Bottom and Ashworth,
98 1978; Hunt et al., 2011). Similar results are reported by studies at rail level crossings where
99 the perceived time of arrival of the train, the distance, and/or the train speed are associated
100 positively with traversing a rail level crossing (e.g., Meeker and Barr, 1989; Meeker et al.,
101 1997; Tey et al., 2011). However, little research has examined gap acceptance in terms of
102 when drivers perceive it safe (or unsafe) to cross a rail level crossing when a train is
103 approaching.

104 Another factor related to gap acceptance is the speed of an oncoming train. Underestimation
105 of the speed of a train approaching a rail level crossing could put road users at risk of being
106 involved in a crash (Leibowitz, 1985; Meeker et al., 1997). For an observer, the travelling
107 speed of a large object typically appears slower than that of a smaller object travelling at the
108 same speed: this is known as the size-speed illusion (Leibowitz, 1985) and has been
109 confirmed using several rail simulator studies (e.g., Clark et al., 2013; Clark et al., 2016;
110 Cohn and Nguyen, 2003).

111 Field studies are critical to fully understand the ability to detect moving trains, accurately
112 judge their oncoming speeds and hence make safe crossing decisions. While simulator or
113 video-based studies provide some evidence regarding the difficulty of accurately detecting
114 moving trains, the lack of a three dimensional visual perspective and the fact that factors like
115 field of view, lighting and shading and other key variables cannot be accurately reproduced
116 by these approaches limits the transferability of findings to the real world. To date, only two
117 studies have specifically examined drivers' visual scanning behaviours at level rail crossing
118 (i.e., Grippenkoven and Dietsch, 2015; Young et al., 2015). These studies focused on the
119 approach to active rail level crossings in urban areas. They inform our understanding of
120 visual search strategies of drivers that are approaching rail level crossings (i.e. where drivers
121 look) but do not provide insight into the ability of drivers to accurately detect trains, estimate
122 speeds or judge whether it is safe to cross (i.e. what they perceive).

123 **1.2 Aims and research questions**

124 The present research aimed to understand road users' perceptions of approaching trains
125 and their decisions relating to when it is no longer safe to enter a passive rail level crossing
126 using a unique field-based paradigm. This study specifically answered the following research
127 questions: (i) at what distance are drivers first able to detect trains and when they are

128 moving?; (ii) are drivers capable of accurately estimating train speeds?; (iii) are drivers able
129 to judge their own speed estimation performance?; and (iv) does drivers' performance in
130 detecting trains and their movement affect their decisions to enter level crossings? A novel
131 methodology was developed to answer these research questions in a field study paradigm.

132 2. Method


133 2.1 Trial site

134 The site selected for data collection was located on a rail maintenance track off Rennie St,
135 Corio, Victoria, on the Werribee line between the Lara and Corio stations, in the State of
136 Victoria, Australia. This site was selected from a number of potential sites because it
137 provided a long straight rail track with visibility above the longest sighting distances required
138 in Australia, relatively high train frequency during peak hours (3 tracks), and train speeds
139 over 100km/h (see Fig. 1). The site was located between two active level crossings,
140 importantly, however, the level crossings were more than 2km away from the testing site and
141 their active equipment could not be seen or heard by participants. The research team and
142 the research participants were located further down the maintenance track off Rennie St (at
143 the observation point in Fig. 2), in order to ensure that the participants were not distracted by
144 the nearby road traffic.



146

147 **Fig. 1.** Left: the trial site, trains were approaching from the right of the track; top right: the faster train,
148 a VLOCITY train; bottom right: slower train, a P class locomotive.



149

150 **Fig. 2.** GoogleMaps top view of the trial site. The section of the track that could be seen by
151 participants is demonstrated with the measurement bar along the length of the rail tracks.

152 Visibility on one side was obstructed by bridges thus the site was appropriate for the study
153 on one direction; only trains from Melbourne (i.e. west bound) were therefore included. On
154 this side, the rail track was straight, and west bound trains could be seen as far as 2.5 km
155 away (see Fig. 2). The layout of the rail tracks allowed for trains travelling from that direction
156 to always be visible in the unlikely case of multiple trains arriving at this location at the same
157 time, with trains on this line travelling at speeds between 100 – 140 km/h.

158 **2.2 Observed trains**

159 Six trains were scheduled to pass the trial site during the study observation period (between
160 13:45 and 16:40). The first two trains seen by participants were used as practice trials to
161 become familiar with the site configuration and the study procedures. Data was not recorded
162 during this practice phase. Following the two practice trains, four more trains were scheduled
163 to pass through the trial site (referred to as Trains 1 to 4); these four trains were used for
164 data analysis. Specifically, Trains 1, 2 and 4 were VLocity trains, which were faster trains
165 running around 130km/h at the location of the study (see top right panel of Fig. 1), while
166 Train 3 was a P class locomotive and was a 20km/h slower train running at 110km/h at the
167 site (see bottom right panel of Fig. 1).

168 **2.3 Study design**

169 This field study involved high velocity trains in locations with high sighting distance. By
170 nature, it was not feasible to observe more than four trains, as such trains are very
171 infrequent. Therefore, the study design focused on specific context rather than train diversity
172 and controlled for as many factors as possible (participant visual characteristics, lighting
173 conditions, distraction). A repeated measures design was therefore used with train
174 occurrence and multiple observation points per train as a within-subject factor. All
175 participants completed one testing session, which included visual acuity testing, practice and
176 test observations. In addition to the observational study, each participant completed a
177 demographic questionnaire and a retrospective questionnaire.

178 **2.3.1 Visual acuity testing**


179 To ensure that drivers satisfied the visual requirements for an Australian driving licence, all
180 participants underwent visual acuity tests in an established Optometry practice in Geelong.
181 Visual acuity was assessed both monocularly and binocularly with participants wearing the
182 spectacles/contact lenses that they normally wore for driving using a standard logMAR chart
183 at a working distance of 3 metres. Participants were required to read the letters as far down
184 the chart as possible, guessing was encouraged and scoring was on a letter by letter basis.
185 Contrast sensitivity was measured in the same testing room using a Pelli-Robson chart at a
186 working distance of 1 metre with a +1.00D lens used to correct for the working distance;
187 scoring was as recommended on a letter by letter basis.

188 **2.3.2 Observations**

189 Participants were instructed to look for approaching trains from the East direction five
190 minutes before a train was due. At that moment, a laser range finder was pointed toward the
191 track and ready to measure train distance and speed (see left panel of Fig. 1). When the
192 train was 2.5km away, the laser range finder was activated for automated measurements of
193 distance and speed every second. These measurements were recorded and used to
194 estimate the time needed for the train to reach three pre-determined distances (1,100m,

195 750m and 350m). These time estimates were updated at each new measurement obtained
196 from the laser range finder.

197 Participants reported the word 'Train' when they first saw the train, and this was immediately
198 recorded by the research assistant on the smartphone app. As soon as the participant
199 perceived that the train was moving they reported this with an estimate of the train speed
200 (rounded to the nearest 10km/h). The observation of train movement was immediately
201 recorded by the research assistant on the app, and then the speed estimate was recorded
202 on an observation sheet. At the three additional pre-determined distances, the smartphone
203 app sounded the phone's alarm at which point the participant provided three additional
204 speed estimates. Lastly, participants were requested to report the word 'Unsafe' when they
205 considered that, when stopped at the entrance of a passive crossing, they would not
206 traverse the level crossing due to the proximity of the approaching train. This was also
207 immediately recorded on the smartphone by the research assistant. Once the train passed
208 participants, they were requested to provide their confidence about the speed estimates they
209 had provided. This process is summarised in Fig 3. The ambient illumination (referred to as
210 lighting conditions in the remainder of the document) at the site was recorded in lux after
211 each train, both in the vehicle and outside, and provided the range of ambient illumination
212 observed during data collection as well as the variability of these measures between the
213 different data collection days.



214
215 Fig 3. Participants' activities as a train is approaching.

216 2.3.3 Demographic questionnaire

217 The demographic questionnaire assessed the participant's driving background and relevant
218 demographic information, such as age, gender, driving experience and experience with both
219 active and passive rail level crossings (including near-miss incidents).

220 2.3.4 Retrospective questionnaire

221 The retrospective questionnaire asked participants to reflect on their performance during the
222 trial. It covered participants' changes in confidence during the trial. The confidence in their

223 estimates of train movement detection and speed estimates was evaluated on a 7-point
224 Likert scale with higher values indicative of greater confidence (from *Extremely unconfident*
225 to *Extremely confident*, as described in Fig 7). Participants also responded to questions
226 about how difficult they found detecting and judging the speed of the oncoming trains, as
227 well as factors that might have influenced their ability to detect trains and judge their speed.

228 **2.4 Participants**

229 Participants were 36 healthy licensed adult drivers who were recruited from the general
230 public in the Geelong region of Victoria, Australia (closest city to the trial location). Power
231 calculation demonstrated that this sample size was required to attain a power of .9 at level
232 alpha .05 with medium size effects .25 with a correlation among repeated measures of .5.
233 Recruitment was stratified to obtain a participant population with an equal gender split and a
234 variety of ages and driving experience. All participants were required to have habitual visual
235 acuity (either with or without optical correction) that met Australian driving licensing
236 standards of 6/12 binocularly. Ethical clearance to conduct the study was obtained from the
237 QUT Human Ethics Committee (approval number 1500000219).

238 **2.5 Materials**

239 **2.5.1 Laser range finder**

240 A laser range finder was used to measure train distances and speed. The Newcon LRB
241 4000 CI laser range finder was used (see Fig. 1) and set to record the distance and the
242 speed of detected objects. The measuring range of this equipment was 20 to 4,000m, with
243 an accuracy of +/- 1m. Speed measurements operated in the 5-400 km/h range, with an
244 accuracy of +/-2km/h. Each of the measurements took up to 0.3s and was taken
245 automatically every second. The output data were collected on a computer connected to the
246 device via a RS232 port. The computer was used to trigger measurements without touching
247 the device in order to avoid vibrations. The laser range finder was mounted on a Manfrotto
248 475B digital pro tripod, with associated Manfrotto 128LP head. A heavy tripod was used in
249 order to ensure that the device was in a stable position during testing.

250 **2.5.2 Smartphones**

251 Four Samsung S4 smartphones were used to record the participants' responses when they:
252 (i) first detected an approaching train; (ii) when they first judged that the approaching train
253 was moving; and (iii) considered it was no longer safe to enter the level crossing (see Fig 4).
254 A fifth Samsung S4 smartphone was used to create a portable Wi-Fi hotspot, which created
255 a network between the four other smartphones and the computer linked to the laser range
256 finder. The data from the smartphones and the laser range finder was synchronised with the
257 software RTmaps version 3.4.10.



258

259 **Fig 4.** Graphical interface of the app developed to record participants responses

260 **2.6 Procedure**

261 Each session involved testing four participants simultaneously. Participants were recruited
 262 from the general public through advertisement on local university job websites,
 263 advertisement to volunteer groups, and snowballing effects. Participants were individually
 264 instructed about the activities and procedures involved in the study. Participants who usually
 265 wore corrective lenses or spectacles for driving were asked to wear them during the study.

266 Four participants were assigned to one of the four vehicles which were positioned side by
 267 side, 80cm apart, and staggered to provide a comparable view from each driver's seat of
 268 approaching trains along the rail corridor. The participant sat in the driver's seat and was
 269 accompanied by a research assistant who was seated in the passenger seat to record the
 270 participant's responses on the smartphones.

271 Five minutes before a train was due, the measurement equipment was started including: the
 272 smartphone apps (developed and used to record participants' responses), the tripod-
 273 mounted laser range finder in position to measure a trains distance and speed at a
 274 predetermined position, located 2km downstream from the participants and RTmaps (the
 275 software used to synchronise the data from all the devices used in this study). As the train
 276 approached the predetermined location, automated measurements from the laser range
 277 finder were triggered and occurred every second. The head of the tripod was turned when
 278 required to follow the movement of the approaching train.

279 Between Trains 2 and 3, participants completed the demographic questionnaire. The
 280 retrospective questionnaire was completed after the last train (Train 4).

281 **2.7 Data Analyses**

282 Generalised Linear Mixed Models with log link to take into account the lack of normality of
 283 the sample data collected, and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) were used to
 284 analyse the data. Generalised Linear Mixed Models were run on R version 3.1.1 and
 285 MANOVAs were run on SPSS version 21. These analyses were used to evaluate the effect
 286 of train speeds and location of the train on the dependent variables. The main dependent
 287 variables were the detection distances at which the train was (i) first recognised as a train,
 288 (ii) judged to be moving; (iii) when the participants considered it was no longer safe to enter

289 the level crossing; and (iv) the participants' estimates of the train speed and their confidence
290 in their estimates of train speed.

291 **3. Results**

292 **3.1 Participant demographics**

293 The majority of participants (58.3%) held a full open licence with the remaining participants
294 holding a Provisional licence (first 2 years of unsupervised driving). A total of 20 males and
295 16 females completed the study, representing 55.6% and 44.4% in each category
296 respectively. The age of participants ranged between 18 and 63 years, with a mean age of
297 30.4 years (SD=14.2). All participants had completed high school with approximately half
298 having completed an undergraduate degree. The number of kilometres driven in a month
299 recorded by participants ranged from 40 to 4,500km, with a mean of 1,162km (SD=981).
300 Almost all (86.1%) participants had previously crossed an active rail level crossing with a
301 frequency of once a month or more and two thirds of participants reported having previously
302 crossed a passive railway crossing once a month or more. Over half of the participants said
303 they used train travel once a month or more, with approximately one quarter using rail travel
304 once a week or more. Two participants reported having previously experienced a near-miss
305 at level crossings and six participants were aware of someone else who had an incident with
306 a train at level crossings.

307 **3.2 Participants' visual acuity**

308 The participants' visual acuity and contrast sensitivity with spectacles/contact lenses if
309 habitually worn for driving are shown in Table 1. The mean habitual visual acuity in the right
310 eye was -0.16 logMAR, left eye -0.16 logMAR, and binocular was -0.18 logMAR. The mean
311 contrast sensitivity was 1.96 log units, and the range of contrast sensitivity was 1.90 and
312 2.05. These results demonstrate that participants had normal levels of visual acuity and
313 contrast sensitivity and all met the visual acuity requirements for driving.

314 **Table 1**

315 Participants' visual acuity results

Eye tests	Mean	Standard deviation	Range
Right visual acuity (logMAR)	-0.16	.06	-0.26 to -0.06
Left visual acuity (logMAR)	-0.16	.05	-0.22 to -0.06
Binocular visual acuity (logMAR)	-0.18	.04	-0.20 to -0.08
Binocular contrast sensitivity (log units)	1.96	.08	1.90 to 2.05

316

317 **3.2 Lighting conditions**

318 Table 2 provides details of the lighting conditions. Light levels ranged between 900-19,000
 319 lux for measurement outside the vehicles, and 300-10,000 lux inside the vehicle at the
 320 driver's position. The mean values typically decreased over the duration of the testing period
 321 within a given day and, the clear and bright conditions gradually reduced as the evening
 322 approached. Data was collected during clear weather conditions.

323 **Table 2**

324 Lighting conditions during observations


Train	Time	Lighting in vehicle (lux)		Lighting outside (lux)	
		Mean (SD)	Range	Mean (SD)	Range
T1	14:45	4,100 (1,872)	1,200-7,000	12,429 (4504)	7,000-19,000
T2	15:20	2,833 (2,016)	500-7,000	8,656 (5890)	900-19,000
T3	16:10	2,622 (2,288)	800-8,000	9,578 (6619)	1,500-19,000
T4	16:42	1,868(3,308)	300-10,000	4,288 (6062)	900-19,000

325

326 **3.3 Detection of train and train position when it becomes unsafe to cross**

327 Given that data was collected with four participants at the same time, the vehicle and
 328 participant position in the vehicle was assessed to see if it affected the outcomes. No
 329 statistical differences were found in responses ($p=.69$ for vehicle 2, $p=.30$ for vehicle 3 and
 330 $p=.06$ for vehicle 4, where vehicles are numbered from left to right). Therefore, results from
 331 all participants are considered together regardless of which vehicle they were seated in
 332 when completing the study.

333 Overall, trains were identified as a train by participants at an average distance of 2,149m
 334 (SD=306), with train movement being identified by participants at an average distance of
 335 1,644m (SD=411). Participants reported that it was no longer safe to enter a level crossing
 336 when the train was at a distance of 594m (SD=271) on average. The mean distances for
 337 each of the individual trains are presented in Fig 5.



338

339 **Fig 5.** Average distance at which each individual test train was detected (green), judged as moving
 340 (orange) and reported as too close to safely enter the level crossing (red). Error bars represent
 341 standard errors.

342 Statistical analysis conducted with Generalised Linear Mixed Models showed that while
 343 distances for Train 1 and 2 were similar, the third and fourth trains were both detected at
 344 longer distances (i.e. earlier). The first two trains were identified at an average distance of
 345 2,089m from the participant, while Train 3 was identified 169m sooner ($t=2.46$, $DF= 95$,
 346 $p=.016$), and Train 4 was detected 137m sooner ($t=2.16$, $DF= 95$, $p=.034$). It is possible that
 347 the difference for Train 3 is due to the fact that that train was different from the others, using
 348 a slower locomotive (see Fig. 1). However, even if data from Train 3 is excluded -
 349 participants' detection ability improved with practice, with detection 153m further in the last
 350 two trials (7% further for Trains 2 and 4 relative to Train 1).

351 A similar analysis was performed for the distance where train movement was first detected
 352 and where participants reported it was no longer safe to cross. No improvement was
 353 observed for either of these variables with practice, and performance was consistent for the
 354 four different trains for the detection of train movement and the estimation of the location
 355 where it became no longer safe to enter a level crossing.

356 Importantly, these averages mask large differences between participants, which can be seen
 357 in Table 3. This table presents percentiles of the average distances where the train was first
 358 perceived. This distance ranges between 1,347 and 2,526m. The table also presents
 359 percentiles of the distance where the train movement was detected, which ranged between
 360 821 and 2,384m; and the distance where participants reported it was no longer safe to cross
 361 – ranging between 205 and 1,411m.

362 **Table 3**

363 Variability in performance between participants, as highlighted by the percentiles of train and train
 364 movement detections, and moment when it is no longer safe to cross.

Percentile	Train detected		Train movement detected		No longer safe to cross	
	Distance (m)	Time (s)	Distance (m)	Time (s)	Distance (m)	Time (s)
0%	1,347	39	821	24	205	6.1
15%	1,851	58	1,154	33	381	10
50%	2,276	67	1,680	49	505	15
85%	2,399	71	2,059	63	877	26
100%	2,526	73	2,384	71	1,411	39

365


366 Table 3 shows the time it would take the train to reach the crossing, calculated from the
 367 speed and distance of the train. This is of particular interest for the time when the
 368 participants reported it was not safe to enter the crossing. On average, participants reported
 369 they would no longer enter the crossing when the train was 17.0s away on average
 370 (SD=8.0), with values ranging from 6.1 to 39.4s. The large majority of participants (29),
 371 corresponding to 80.6% of the sample, would have entered the crossing at a time when the
 372 lights would have been activated if the level crossing had been protected by flashing lights
 373 (i.e. 24s before the train reached the crossing). It should be noted that 6 participants (17% of
 374 the sample) reported that it was no longer safe to enter the crossing when the train was less
 375 than 10s away.

376 The eight participants who reported having experienced a near-miss or being aware of
 377 someone else who had experienced a near-miss were combined into a sub-group. Their
 378 responses regarding the detection of the train, its movement or the moment when it was
 379 judged no longer safe to enter the crossing were compared to the remaining participants.
 380 Statistical analyses did not highlight any significant difference for any of these dependent
 381 variables, therefore results from all participants are considered together.

382 **3.4 Participants' estimates of train speed**

383 Participants consistently underestimated the speed of trains, with the exception of one
 384 participant who consistently overestimated train speed. In determining the level of
 385 underestimation in train speed this outlier was removed. Fig 6 demonstrates the mean km/h
 386 by which participants underestimated the train speed at each location and for each train.
 387 Overall, there was a significant main effect of Train Order [$F(2.36,47.09) = 59.55, p < .001$,
 388 Partial Eta² = .75, $\epsilon = .79$]; with post hoc analyses demonstrating that estimations were more
 389 accurate for the slower moving Train 3 than Trains 1, 2 and 4 ($p < .001$). No other
 390 comparisons were significant. There was also a significant main effect of Train Location (first
 391 seen moving, 1,100m; 750m and 350m) [$F(1.53,30.57) = 19.17, p < .001$, Partial Eta² = .49,
 392 $\epsilon = .51$], however post hoc analysis demonstrated that there was no significant difference
 393 between speed estimates when the train was first judged to be moving and at 1,100m away
 394 ($p = .118$). At these locations, errors of 47% and 41% were observed (averaging to 44%, as
 395 no statistical difference was observed). Participants became more accurate with their speed
 396 estimate as the train became closer. When the train was 750m from the participant
 397 estimates were significantly more accurate than when the train was first judged to be moving
 398 ($p = .003$) or at 1,100m from the participant ($p < .001$), with error rates decreasing to 36%. At
 399 350m, the mean speed estimate was significantly more accurate than at 750m ($p = .015$),

400 1,100m ($p = .001$) and when the train was first seen to be moving ($p = .001$), with error rates
401 decreasing to 29%.




402

403 **Fig 6.** Mean km/h underestimation of train speed. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

404 3.5 Participants' confidence in their estimates of train speed

405 Participants were asked how confident they were with their judgement that the train was
406 moving and how confident they were with their speed estimates. Confidence ratings were
407 made on a 7-point Likert scale, with higher scores indicating more confidence in the
408 estimate. Overall, the participants reported they were moderately confident that the train was
409 moving; however, they were less confident, on average, with their estimation of the speed of
410 the trains (see Fig 7). The participants' confidence ratings that the train was moving and the
411 confidence in speed estimates were compared across the different trains. Some departures
412 in normality were present with the participants' confidence reports and thus, non-parametric
413 Friedman ANOVAs were used. No significant differences were found with participants' mean
414 confidence ratings of the train is moving decision [$\chi^2(3) = 3.14, p = .37$] and confidence of
415 the speed decision [$\chi^2(3) = 6.17, p = .10$] between trains.

416 A further examination of the participants' confidence in their speed estimates was performed
417 using bivariate correlations to examine the relationships between participants' confidence
418 levels in their speed estimates and the actual level of underestimation of those speed
419 estimates when they were the most accurate (i.e. when trains were 350m from the
420 participants). Spearman's rho bivariate correlations were performed due to the non-normal
421 distributions of the data. The correlations between participants' confidence and the level of
422 speed underestimation for Train 1, 2, 3, and 4 were $r_{rho} = .16, p = .41, r_{rho} = .31, p = .07, r_{rho} =$
423 $.31, p = .06,$ and $r_{rho} = .02, p = .92$ respectively. Regardless of train speeds, participants'
424 confidence levels of their judgements were not correlated to their actual speed
425 underestimation.



426
427 **Fig 7.** Mean confidence of train moving and train speed estimates for each train. Error bars
428 represent standard error of the mean.

429 **3.6 Retrospective questionnaire**

430 The majority of participants (86.1%) reported that they had no difficulty detecting the trains.
431 In contrast, four participants reported some difficulties detecting the trains; two of the four
432 participants reported these difficulties were only with the initial train sighting and that it was
433 easier to detect subsequent trains. The other two participants reported that their difficulty
434 was due to “objects next to the track” or with “distinguishing lights of the railway line from the
435 lights of the train”. Regarding the speed estimations, generally, all participants reported that
436 estimating the speed of the train was easiest when the train was closest (i.e., 350m mark)
437 and three quarters of participants (72.2%) found that speed estimation became easier as the
438 study progressed. This however, was not confirmed by the analysis of the speed estimates,
439 as no improvement was observed throughout the study. Paradoxically, two thirds of
440 participants (63.9%) reported it was harder to estimate the speed of the slow train (i.e., Train
441 3), even though their estimates of train speed for Train 3, were the least inaccurate overall.
442 Nonetheless, three participants found it harder to estimate the speed of the fast trains and
443 10 found the estimation of speed to be the same for both fast and slow trains. Overall, the
444 study results suggest participants were not entirely accurate with their speed perception of
445 fast travelling trains and the incongruity between the participants’ retrospective reports of
446 task performance and their actual task performance was substantial.

447 **4. Discussion**

448 The current study examined drivers’ perceptual abilities at identifying Australian high-speed
449 trains (100-140km/h). This included when the train was judged as moving as well as drivers’
450 decisions regarding gap acceptance for crossing manoeuvres in a field-based study. Data
451 was collected for four participants at the same time, in four separate vehicles. No difference
452 was observed due to the positioning of vehicles, which is not unexpected given that any
453 advantage of a particular vehicle position is small: the furthest vehicle was 15m further away
454 from the approaching trains than the closest vehicle, which was a small difference compared
455 to the distances of interest in this research (hundreds of metres). The position of the vehicle
456 was therefore not considered to be a confounding factor.

457 **4.1 Detection of trains and their movements**

458 All participants could identify trains travelling at 100-140km/h at long distances, which were
459 far beyond the longest sighting distances required at passive level crossing in Australia. It is
460 possible that trains were easy to detect even at a distance because they had daytime
461 running headlights (e.g., Cairney, 2003). Further, the distance that the participants first
462 detected the presence of a train on the rail tracks increased after the second observed train,
463 suggesting that the distance at which trains can be detected may be subject to practice
464 effects. That is, the participants might have learnt where the trains were due to appear on
465 the railway tracks in the distance, as well as the trains' particular features (such as the
466 headlights).

467 This study has shown that the movement of oncoming trains is much harder to detect than
468 simply perceiving the presence of a train in the distance. On average, the four trains were
469 perceived as moving 1,644m away, which was on average 505m closer to the participant
470 than when the trains were first perceived on the rail track. The present findings are
471 consistent with previous research that has demonstrated that it is difficult to visually
472 discriminate the movement of an approaching object, particularly when that object is a long
473 distance away as the rate of change in the optical size of the object is initially quite small
474 (Schiff and Oldak, 1990).

475 Large variability was observed between participants for the detection of trains and their
476 movement. The participant with the lowest performance identified that the train was moving
477 at a distance of 821m, which is within the range of the longest sighting distances required at
478 Australian level crossings (Standards Australia, 2015), demonstrating that drivers have the
479 ability to detect trains before it becomes dangerous to enter a passively protected level
480 crossing. At this distance, it would take approximately 23s for the faster VLocity train
481 travelling at 130km/h to arrive at the rail level crossing. Should the level crossing have had
482 an active level crossing device such as flashing lights installed, these lights would have
483 activated one second earlier (i.e., 24s before the train reached the crossing) than the train
484 would have been judged as moving for that particular participant.

485 **4.2 Accuracy of train speed estimations**

486 While participants were able to detect trains and their movement at the distances deemed
487 safe to make an informed decision regarding whether to enter a passively protected level
488 crossing, this study has demonstrated that participants were unable to accurately estimate
489 train speeds at any of the distances investigated. Speed was underestimated by at least
490 30% at all distances, and this underestimation was at its highest for the furthest distance,
491 reaching 44%. The speeds reported by participants were similar to those of motorway traffic,
492 suggesting that participants did not appreciate that trains can travel faster. Furthermore, this
493 underestimation did not improve with practice (results are similar for the four trains
494 observed). Speed estimations were more inaccurate at longer distances and for faster trains
495 (130km/h versus 110km/h). Numerous studies that have examined either speed perception
496 or the related concept of time-to-arrival of moving vehicles, have typically found speed
497 estimates are inaccurate (Caird and Hancock, 1994; Meeker et al., 1997; Savage, 2006).
498 Moreover, several studies have demonstrated that time to arrival estimates of approaching
499 vehicles is increasingly poorer the further away the approaching vehicle is from the driver
500 (Caird and Hancock, 1994; Schiff and Oldak, 1990).

501 **4.3 Self-assessment of speed estimations**

502 The present study demonstrates that participants' level of confidence with their estimates of
503 train speed was high, and not correlated with their actual level of underestimation/accuracy
504 for identifying the speed of the train.

505 **4.4 Effects on decisions to enter level crossings and safety**

506 The present study demonstrates that participants largely underestimated the speed of trains.
507 This means that drivers' ability to assess their risk of traversing a passive crossing will be
508 poor. In effect, when a driver erroneously believes they have sufficient safety margins to
509 traverse the crossing because of an underestimation of the travelling speed of a train, they
510 might cross with very limited safety margins (see Table 3). When stopped at a level crossing,
511 participants seem to make decisions about entering the crossing as if they were at a road
512 intersection, without appreciating that trains are very different (mass, ability to stop and
513 change direction) and travel at different speeds. For example, six participants reported that
514 they would enter the crossing when the train was less than 10s away. More generally, the
515 majority of participants (80.6%) reported that they would enter the crossing during a time
516 when flashing lights would be activated at an active level crossing. This underestimation of
517 speed may go some way to explaining results from previous research, where a substantial
518 proportion of drivers (57-77%) were observed to cross a passive rail level crossing when a
519 train approached (Kasalica et al., 2012; Tey et al., 2011). The decision a driver must make
520 about when it is safe to cross will be influenced by how confident they feel about their
521 perception of the train speed, which was shown in this study to be quite high, despite poor
522 performance. This study has also shown that experiencing a near-miss incident at level
523 crossings – or knowing someone who experienced such an event – did not make
524 participants more cautious in terms of deciding when it is safe to enter the crossing.

525 Potential solutions for improving safety at passive rail level crossings are limited. Certainly,
526 rail authorities in Australia are constantly upgrading rail crossings across the network;
527 however, it is impractical to upgrade all passive rail crossings to active rail level crossings
528 due to costs incommensurate to the level crossing risk, as such crossings are very
529 numerous, located in remote locations with no electricity and with low road/rail traffic. Thus,
530 improved knowledge and/or behaviours of road users is a more appropriate countermeasure
531 (e.g., Savage, 2006). It is unlikely that training drivers how to estimate train speeds would be
532 beneficial as participants' estimates of the trains speed did not improve with practice. In
533 contrast, the ability to detect the presence of trains did improve with practice. Australian road
534 rules require drivers do not enter a crossing when a train is approaching and there is a
535 danger of collision, leaving the evaluation of the risk to the driver. Therefore, training and
536 education campaigns should consider informing drivers about the human limitations of
537 accurately estimating oncoming train speeds and provide advice not to enter a level crossing
538 when a train is visible. Additional signs could also be placed at passive rail level crossings to
539 inform the driver that high-speed trains travel on this railway line and that speed estimation is
540 typically more difficult with high-speed trains. These countermeasures could result in safer
541 decision-making at passive level crossings. Indeed previous research has documented the
542 increased safety effects (i.e., speed approach reductions) of additional signage at rail level
543 crossings in both simulator (e.g., Lenné et al., 2011) and field-based studies (Ward and
544 Wilde, 1995).

545 **4.5 Strengths and limitations**

546 The present study used a unique real-world field study design which was specifically
547 designed to address the research questions. This approach overcomes many of the
548 limitations faced by similar studies that have been conducted in simulators or with videos,
549 which while being easier to conduct from a practical perspective, have limitations in terms of
550 validity and generalisability. Importantly, this study involved the development of a completely
551 novel methodology for the field evaluation of drivers' perceptions of a train's presence and
552 speeds and their decision-making at level crossings. These effects were assessed in a
553 sample of licensed drivers, stratified across age, whose results highlighted the inaccuracy of
554 their perceptions and decision-making.

555 There were, however, some limitations of the present study that should be considered when
556 interpreting the results. Participants were looking for trains over a longer period of time than
557 is typical under normal driving conditions and were primed for the approaching trains –
558 therefore the data represents that of an alerted driver and thus the driver's capacity to
559 correctly detect trains may be overestimated.

560 In order to achieve adequate sighting distance, train speeds and train traffic, it was not
561 possible to conduct the study at an actual passive level crossing due to safety and traffic
562 flow considerations. Thus, the data was collected at the side of a rail track rather than an
563 actual passive level crossing. Due to reduced train traffic and train variety in such
564 environment, it was not feasible to collect data with a higher variety of train and train speeds,
565 which would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of driver performance at
566 level crossings.

567 The purpose of this study was to explore for the first time perception and decision-making of
568 drivers regarding approaching trains in a field-based setting. We included a stratified sample
569 of participants to ensure representation of all ages of drivers up to 63 years old and who had
570 normal levels of visual acuity, (which also met the visual requirements for driver licensing)
571 and contrast sensitivity and were free of eye disease. The sample size of this study was not
572 sufficient to evaluate the effects of age on drivers' performance and decisions to enter level
573 crossings. We have therefore not looked at this particular issue, which, while of interest, is
574 outside the scope of this paper.

575 In addition, the study was performed during clear weather conditions only; it is possible that
576 different weather conditions or night conditions could result in different effects.

577 Lastly, the study results cannot be generalised to passive crossings with give-way signs as
578 all participants were in stationary vehicles during the study, or to other road users, such as
579 truck drivers.

580 **4.6 Future directions**

581 Further studies should seek to address the present study's limitations to better understand
582 the effects these different factors might have on the visual performance and decision-making
583 at level crossings.

584 In particular, our study only considered drivers alerted to the approach of a train. Drivers
585 stop at level crossings for short amounts of time, and may suffer from a range of distractions
586 while driving (such as speaking with other passengers, phoning, and even looking for trains

587 on the other side of the crossing). It would be of interest to understand how such effects
588 reduce the performance that we found in this study.

589 Given the specificities of trucks (longer vehicle frames and reduced acceleration capabilities)
590 and the extended risk they face at level crossings compared to typical sedan, there are
591 additional factors which need to be considered for truck drivers when crossing passive level
592 crossings, and further research should evaluate how such factors affect the results
593 presented in this paper.

594 This study focused on passive crossings with stop signs. Passive crossings with give way
595 signs present specific challenges (moving vehicle, sighting from a distance to the crossing)
596 and driver performance for such crossing should also be investigated. This would require the
597 development of a specific methodology.

598 **5. Conclusions**

599 The aim of the current study was to examine the accuracy of drivers' perceptual ability in
600 detecting the presence and movement of a train at a distance, and examine whether drivers'
601 performance in detecting trains affected their decisions to enter level crossings.

602 Distance from which drivers are first able to detect trains and their movement

603 The results demonstrated that participants were able to perceive a train at a distance of
604 ~2km and were able to determine that the train was moving after the trains had travelled
605 approximately 500m towards the participants' observation area. All participants were able to
606 detect the train at distances that are considered by Australian Standards allow drivers to
607 make safe decisions regarding entering the crossing.

608 Drivers' accuracy in estimating fast train speeds

609 All but one of the participants underestimated the travelling speed of the trains and the
610 magnitude of underestimation was greatest for the faster moving trains. The underestimation
611 was always greater than 30 percent below the actual train speed.

612 Drivers' evaluation of their speed estimates

613 The decision a driver must make about when it is safe to cross will be influenced by how
614 confident they feel about their perception of the train speed. This study has shown that
615 drivers were very confident in their speed estimates, despite poor performance by all drivers.

616 Drivers' decisions related to entering level crossings

617 Overall, the underestimation of train speed combined with the lack of drivers' knowledge
618 about their inaccurate perceptions could have significant safety implications with road users
619 crossing behaviours, with drivers entering level crossing with reduced safety margins. This
620 was highlighted in this study by the fact that most drivers reported they would enter the
621 crossing at a moment when it would have been activated if the crossing had active
622 protections. Further research is needed to examine if drivers decision making at rail
623 crossings can be improved and thus, increase the safety of both rail and road users.

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