SITING VOICE IN STORIES OF TRAUMA AND CONFLICT

Introduction: ‘voice’ and ‘site’

It has been said that the historian’s point of view is always ‘outside’: an historical period has “an inside and an outside, a kind of surface available to the historian and a kind of inwardness belonging to those who live the period in question” (Danto, 1981, p. 205). Bakhtin suggests that “the historical time-sequence is measured by different standards of value, other kinds of events take place in it, it has no interior aspect, no point of view for perceiving it from the inside out” (Bakhtin, 1981 (1937-73), p. 170). Ethnography, on the other hand, enables the researcher to gain at least some understanding of a particular world as seen from the insider’s point of view (Rock, 2001, p. 32), a way of “looking out from the inside” (Handwerker, 2001, p. 4).

This chapter takes the idea of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ perspectives as a difference in the location of ‘voice’ – the historian’s voice, the voice of community or of the individual storyteller who speaks from experience. The focus is on the role of voice in communication, and how its location, inside or outside, carries particular significance in the communicating of stories of conflict and trauma. I use the idea of ‘site’ to reimage ‘location’ or ‘place’, drawing on the concept of ‘social site’ to locate the voice of history, of collective memory and of individuals at different kinds of site with differently entangled temporal, material and ethical-political dimensions.

The idea of the ‘social site’ was developed by Marston et al (2005) to replace the scalar description of the world in terms of global/local, stronger/weaker, larger/smaller. Social sites have the temporal quality of continually coming into being through practices and interactions between the natural and non-natural world; they are the places where “ideas are formed, actions are produced, and relationships are created and maintained” (Marston et al., 2005, p. 427): “…a given site is always an emergent property of its interacting human and non-human inhabitants” (Marston et al., 2005, p. 425).

Approaching ‘voice’ from the perspective of an ethnographer and oral historian, I use Mazzei’s reflections on the location, or de-location, of voice to examine different voices at different sites. Mazzei critiques an idea of voice that, she argues, is common in qualitative research, that is voice as “what can be listened to, understood, or made sense of as a result of [qualitative research] methods … that which can be attributed to a rational, individual humanist subject” (Mazzei, 2016, p. 2).

Because “voice” cannot be thought as existing separately from the milieu in which it exists, it cannot be thought as emanating “from” an individual person. There is no separate, individual person to which a single voice can be linked—all are entangled (Mazzei, 2016, p. 158, emphasis added).

Rather than ‘a thing’, voice is an assemblage or entanglement of human and non-human agents from the past, present and future, “no longer bound to instants or places or subjects” (Mazzei, 2016, pp. 2, 4, 5). However in discussing voice at it speaks of trauma and conflict, I use the idea of ‘site’, in Marston et al’s sense, rather than Mazzei’s ‘assemblage’ or ‘entanglement’. Like Mazzei’s assemblage, a site is also a “complex network…that exceeds

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1 ‘Collective memory’ is used throughout this chapter as synonymous with ‘social memory’: the shared memory within a community based on mutually accepted understandings of the past. Social memory, suggests Harald Welzer, may exist ‘between subjects and not within them’ (2010, p. 5).
the traditional notion of the ‘individual,’ the ‘body,’ the ‘person’” (Mazzei, 2016, p. 5), but, more clearly than ‘assemblage’ or ‘entanglement’, it gives us a way of seeing the processual, changing and accretive quality of such assemblages over time. It will allow us to see an individual’s life as a ‘site’ where trauma accumulates and can be re-visited and re-experienced (Palmer, 2014). In the examples below, I argue specifically that in communicating traumatic events such as World War II or the 30-year civil conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, the voice of history and the voice of collective remembering are sited differently from the voice of the individual; voice at the site of an individual’s life has both an interiority and a relationality involving the listener that sets it apart. The voice of trauma that emanates from, and is part of, this site produces a particular relationship of trust and responsibility with the listener (ethnographer or oral historian), and calls for an ethical commitment to bear witness.

In contrast, the voices of history and collective remembering function more clearly as Mazzei’s (2016) ‘voice without subject,’ that is, voice not located in a specific place and time, voice not emanating from an individual. The confluence of social, economic and political forces and of the human and non-human in the voices of history and collective memory are illuminated when we look at their purposivity. They are voices that respond to the needs of the present and the future, and, in Mazzei’s terms (2016, pp. 4-5) speak for a shared past, present and future, rather than those of an individual.

These distinctions become clear in the stories of conflict and trauma that were recounted to me by the old people of Aceh during my fieldwork there in 2008-2009. Life stories of the old in Aceh reflect a history of prolonged privation and chronic trauma, of which the Japanese occupation formed a very significant part. During World War II, the Japanese invaded and occupied Aceh and other Indonesian provinces during 1942, and evacuated suddenly in August 1945 after news arrived of the US nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Japanese Emperor’s surrender. Many of my Acehnese interviewees who lived through this period had also lived as children through the time of the Dutch occupation (up to 1942), the 1945-46 Tjumbok rebellion which overthrew the Acehnese ruling class of ulëëbalang, the sometimes brutal 1950s Darul Islam movement for Acehnese independence, the 1965-66 anti-Communist mass killings by the Suharto-led Indonesian military, and then 30 years of bitter and brutal conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)) and the Indonesian military, which officially ended in 2005. Three of the four villages where I conducted interviews had been inundated and completely destroyed by the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in the Indian Ocean, resulting in the deaths of many or most family members and the destruction of homes and livelihoods.

In talking with the old Acehnese, there are common (shared) stories of joy in the Japanese surrender and their rapid departure from Aceh – these have become a collective memory with shared emotional ‘frames’ (Welzer, 2010, pp. 6, 15) and themes that suggest a purposive reinforcement of a particular perspective on this part of history; other stories were of personal privation and fear during the occupation that caused distress in the telling, and for others, the experiences were too bitter to describe – “I have no words”. The latter stories suggest that a de-located ‘voice without subject’ in Mazzei’s terms may elide the burden borne by individuals who are asked to speak about a past they would prefer to forget. Portelli (2003, p. 70) suggests that “the condition for the existence of oral sources” is transmission from

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speaker to listener (unlike the historian’s ‘emission’); I suggest that ‘transmission’ here functions also as a kind of purpose, different from that of history, and one that is comprehensible only when ‘voice’ is located at a site with a particular past, present and future – that of an individual’s life.

The following sections explore history and collective memory through the lens of purposivity, in order to make visible some of the multiple human and non-human forces that assemble to produce ‘voice’.

**History’s voice**

[Indonesian Communist writer DN Aidit’s] history was not intended primarily as an account of events leading to a current situation but rather … as a pattern for organizing thought. It provided a past which was a model for the future not simply in terms of recommended action but in categories of perception, presenting certain ways of looking at things and excluding others (McVey, 1979, p. 349).

The selective narrative that is constructed by the historian must credibly and “acceptably” lead to its end (Danto cited in Ricoeur, 1984, p. 150), and is part of “collaborative world-making” in the present (Tsing, 1999, p. 27). This can be seen most obviously in nationalist histories which foreground, for example, those past events that unite rather than divide a society, or in remediating histories which seek to represent hitherto unheard populations or untold events. Anthony Reid notes that other principles of historical understanding, including reliance on evidence, may even be overruled in a politically precarious environment such as the early independence period in Indonesia:

> The historical orthodoxy therefore acquired a somewhat brittle quality which did not invite too rich an elaboration. Its central elements … were great Hindu kingdoms bringing political unity to the archipelago, followed by 350 years of Dutch oppression dignified by the resistance at some time or another of each Indonesian region and people (Reid, 1979, pp. 297-298).

The shared past thus constructed may become, John Bowen suggests, the “primary trope” of national identity (1989, p. 691), although it should be noted that a dominant historical voice can exist alongside other voices such as Saskia Wieringa’s work (2002) on sexual politics in Indonesia, which includes an alternative to the official account of events leading up to and during the military-led anti-Communist purges of 1965-66.

One way in which history exercises this purposivity is through its role in constructing the recollections of individuals. Hewer et al’s (2010) research involving interviews with Polish people about their understanding of the legacy of World War II, and the invasion of Poland by Russia, concluded that history and memory are both psychological constructs that are ‘culturally engineered’ (Hewer & Kut, 2010, pp. 20, 29). The researchers argued that the act of remembering “is a social action because what is recalled is influenced by and located within a framework of cultural belief and ideology”:

> [W]e remember what we are told to remember; we commemorate what we are told to commemorate and we forget what we have not been told to remember (Hewer & Kut, 2010, pp. 29, 30).

Where alternative histories are unacceptable or unavailable, collective memory becomes “not a remembering but a stipulating: that this is important, and this is the story about how it happened” (Susan Sontag quoted in Zurbuchen, 2005, p. 27).
A powerful example from Indonesia of remembering manipulated by history is the official narrative of the Suharto Government concerning the anti-Communist purges of 1965-66. It is an example of the cultural engineering of memory which largely prevails today (Cribb & Ford, 2010; Geertz, 1973; Kine, 2017). Questioning this narrative remains difficult within Indonesia, and the memories of old people I interviewed in Aceh largely reflect an understanding that the PKI [Partai Komunis Indonesia] rather than the military was the source of the mass violence during that period. One interviewee who lives close to Indrapuri, a town outside Banda Aceh, spoke in some detail of events during the period which all of the old Acehnese referred to as ‘the PKI’:

Ibu A-h (74)³

Well, I felt frightened during the PKI. Because they took many people, and they never came back. They took people to the well and threw those bodies there alive or dead, some of them were tortured, their body was cut into pieces. People said, they took many people from Banda Aceh, carried in a truck to a well in Indrapuri and threw them there, by the PKI. You know, because we’re Muslim so they killed us. That happened during Suharto, many big people [people with good position] were killed in Jakarta.

There is no historical evidence that the PKI performed these acts in Aceh, where 3000 suspected PKI members were executed during 1965-66 (Grayman, Good, & Good, 2009, p. 292, citing James Siegel). However the story strongly parallels alleged events in 1965 at Lubang Buaya (‘crocodile pit’) as broadcast by the military. The story told by Ibu A-h above, in which mutilated bodies were thrown down a well in a place not far from the capital city (in this case the capital city of Aceh), bears a striking resemblance to the military’s narrative about the deaths of the generals in Lubang Buaya near Jakarta. This and other stories told by my interviewees in which the 1965-66 mass murders were attributed to the PKI, are examples of the ways in the voice of history can construct a collective memory, and hence the recollection of individuals.

Particularly in the case of traumatic events such as war and civil conflict, histories can be used to reinforce, and are reinforced by, shared memories that reflect a dominant and ‘acceptable’ narrative. History here is not the voice of a single historian, but a voice that emerges from a site of political and social, human and non-human forces that shift over time.

The voice of collective memory

There is an enormous and lasting reservoir of memories of torture, violence, and displacement enacted against communities and individuals in Aceh. Profound loss and a potent sense of injustice are remainders of the violence. Careful consideration should be given to specific efforts to work through these memories as a part of the ongoing peace process in the context of rebuilding Aceh (M.-J. D. Good, Good, Grayman, & Lakoma., 2007, p. 76).

In the statement above, Good is referring both to the memory of individuals and to the memory of a community or a nation, the kind of social memory or collective memory that is the subject of commemoration in community memorials and museums (Auschwitz in Poland, Ground Zero in New York, Hiroshima in Japan (Hirsch & Spitzer, 2009; Saito, 2006)).

³ Names have been anonymized to protect the safety of individuals amid continuing unrest and insecurity in Aceh.

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Commemorative narratives, suggests Yeh (2016) are an example of “mnemonic work” undertaken by a community wanting its members “to remember their shared past, present and future” (pp. 2, 14).

Moreover, as with history, different voices may emerge “to correct alleged misapprehensions or distortions in existing understandings”; re-telling is one way of fixing these distortions (Goodall, 2000). The conditions which enable such accounts to alter convincingly over time are, suggests Bain Attwood, those that connect ‘remembering’ to a new historical narrative, and to emerging changes in wider political and cultural discourse (Attwood, 2001, p. 198). These enable new “frames of meaning” (Welzer, 2010, pp. 6, 15) that develop within a community through acts of “memory communication” to produce a moral and emotional congruence between the recollections of individuals that together constitute a collective voice.

In the case of Acehnese recollections of the departure of the Japanese in 1945, there are common themes of the Japanese ‘running’, the Acehnese chasing them and the Acehnese taking their supplies. The emotional or evaluative ‘frames’ of these stories might include the courage of the Acehnese, justified delight in Japanese humiliation, the need to commemorate freedom, or the justness of Acehnese actions in taking Japanese supplies. These frames help us to see the complex social site from which the voice of collective memory emerges.

Ibu A-w (90)

I remember [the day the Japanese left], but you know, I didn’t witness it by myself, I was at home, but I heard people were talking about that. Men were gathering in the market, they said that the Japanese left like they were being chased by ghost or something, they were throwing everything that they held in their hand and ran away.

Bapak R-z (84)

The day when [the Japanese] left, ehmm, I was following them to Lhoknga.

Q: You chased them alone?
No, we did it altogether with the villagers.

Q: Where did they run to, where did they go?
We arrived at Lampisang, when we heard the sound of gunshot from Lhoknga; we stopped and didn’t continue the chase to Lhoknga.

Bapak I-s (80)

Well, I don’t know how to describe it, but when they left everyone was scrambling for whatever things that were left by the Japanese. Everything that they left, we took them all … even the thing that we didn’t know what it was, we just took it. You know … the whistle; we were struggling to get it (laughing) Wires and everything, we took them all.

Bapak S-h (78)

I remember because … uhm … It happened very fast. Everyone is leaving to Seulimeum. And suddenly the Japanese were running and had thrown away all of their belongings, some of their guns were thrown in the rivers … you know … they even threw their rice, in that time they used the red rice. They also left many cables [wires?] … the villagers collected all of them.

Q: Did he see some of them? Was he there?
I was there, I saw it. They left rice in the big warehouse, the oil, the benzene and everything. They just ran very fast, these Japanese.

Acehnese courage, the definitive routing of an enemy, and a sense of ultimate justness or rightness in events as they unfold, are aspects of community ‘voice’ that connect the events of the past with a desirable present and future. Smith (2015, p. 14) for example points out that narratives of bravery in Aceh are seen as “a powerful source of intergenerational resilience”.

The resulting convergence of memories results in a “process of narrative repetition and accretion” (Attwood, 2001, p. 193) which, with a receptive cultural milieu, enables the emergence of a new or revised history. Those memories of the Acehnese described above reflect in part the way the Japanese occupation is imagined today, and a shared ‘Acehnese voice’ that serves the present and the future.

*The voice of trauma*

The distinctions between the voice of individual experience, of collective memory and of history might appear to be found in considering the emotional “affective, subjective, submerged, even silent – feelings, perceptions, apprehensions, misapprehensions” (Hirsch & Spitzer, 2009, p. 161) which are part of a subject’s remembering:

… memories … were laid down in particular circumstances and hold those original feelings, interpretations and associations within them (Biggs, 1999, p. 217).

However the Acehnese term *seungsara* provides an example of the difficulties in basing the distinction between the historical, the collective and the individual on emotional associations. For the Acehnese, *seungsara* is a kind of all-encompassing and prolonged suffering that is experienced by individuals, for example during extended periods of privation, illness or fear and insecurity, but it is also an integral aspect of the struggles and heroism of Aceh’s history. An understanding of this history of *seungsara* informs the identity, beliefs, and experience of Acehnese individuals throughout their lifetimes 4 and *seungsara* inflects not only the voice of personal tribulation but also that of social memory and Acehnese history.

However where traumatic experience is recollected by an individual, the distinction between remembering and re-experiencing also becomes a difficult one. Hirsch et al make the point that survivor testimonies record “the psychological and emotional milieu of the struggle for survival, not only then, but also now” (Hirsch & Spitzer, 2009, p. 155, quoting Geoffrey Hartman). Studies by Van Der Kolk et al suggest that traumatic scenes are “re-experienced [in nightmares] over and over again without modification…[W]e saw an unmodified reliving of traumatic episodes of ten, twenty, or thirty years ago…” (Van Der Kolk & Van Der Hart, 1995, p. 172) (see also McFarlane, 2004). Grayman et al note that many of the dreams of Acehnese post-conflict fitted the “textbook definition” of a post-trauma nightmare as one “that repeats either an exact or a nearly exact version of past lived experience during the conflict” (2009, p. 310). They suggest that these dreams could be more properly described as “intrusions of memory” rather than nightmares (p. 311).

Because remembering evokes the emotions associated with the remembered event, recollection, and hence giving voice, may fail to function where the emotions and senses

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4 I am indebted to anthropologist Catherine Smith, Australian National University, and Dwi Rinanda, Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda Aceh, for conversations about the nature of *seungsara*.
associated with it are too traumatic, where “the need to know [is] at odds with a desire to close down the senses” (Sebald, 2003, p. 23; quoted in Zurbuchen, 2005, p. 7). In such circumstances, the official history of the anti-Communist purges by the Indonesian military has been able to dominate memory and remain relatively uncontested within Indonesia.

Traumatic memory, unlike other recollection, is often involuntary or passive (in Indonesian, *tingat* – to be in a state of remembering - rather than *ingat* – to remember or recollect):

[I]n contrast to narrative memory, which is a social act, traumatic memory is inflexible and invariable. Traumatic memory has no social component; it is not addressed to anybody, the patient does not respond to anybody; it is a solitary activity (Van Der Kolk & Van Der Hart, 1995, p. 163).

This is Culbertson’s “persistence of the past in its own perpetual present” (Culbertson, 1995, p. 170), and raises the issue of whether severe trauma can ever “really be integrated, be made part of one’s autobiography” (Van Der Kolk & Van Der Hart, 1995, p. 178). Culbertson argues that ordinary narrative is in any case inadequate to the task of describing past trauma. There were many occasions in my interviews in Aceh when the interviewee was unable to find words:

Ibu A-w (90)

How I should describe this …?
Oh dear, the Japanese time was very bitter, don’t know how to say it.

Ibu A-n (74)

I can’t even think about how hard that history was.

Bapak I-h (82)

I don’t know what to say, it’s really difficult. I have no words to describe…
I don’t know how to describe this anymore, because it’s too sad.

Bapak I-s (80)

I don’t know how to say it, you know, because my mind wasn’t in it.

Others have written of more extreme examples of the inability to express the past in narrative form. Hirsch et al report the case of a former concentration camp inmate who, when questioned about his experiences by a war crimes prosecutor, fainted and entered a coma for several weeks (2009, p. 154). While the implications of this are debated in terms of the nature and value of eyewitness testimony as evidence in court, this response by the testifier suggests that some experiences such as those of Holocaust victims lie within an “unspeakable and unrepresentable realm that … can only be transmitted through the body language and the non-verbal performance of the traumatized witness” (2009, p. 154):

The ultimate truth, … the ultimate act of witness, comes from inside the gas chamber and from the mute testimony of memory emerging from the body (Hirsch & Spitzer, 2009, p. 158).

Moreover, an involuntary memory, suggests one anthropologist, might sometimes occur
unmediated by words; its articulation “no more than a scream”\(^5\):

… a cry, which cannot be called a description, which is more primitive than any
description, for all that serves as a description of the inner life (Wittgenstein,
1972, p. 189).

The connection between the past and present of the individual, especially in the case of
traumatic memory, is the foundation of psychiatric and sociocultural theory about the impact
of trauma, including its impacts on the body:

The continued experience of pain long after the fracture or injury has healed can
arise because pain remains a central element of the undigested memory of the
traumatic event (McFarlane, 2007, p. 560)

The body telling is the body then and the body now as well, the passage of events
and time not clear at first, but established in the course of creating the story
(Culbertson, 1995, p. 190).

Traumatic memory accumulates both in the body as physical pain and as psychiatric
symptoms such as depression or anxiety. In psychiatric medicine, the physical symptoms of
stress disorders and depression include aches and pains and lack of sleep (B. Good, 2009),
headaches, rashes, hyperventilation, diarrhoea, tremor and tachycardia (Pearn, 2000, pp. 435-
436). In Aceh, many of the old people I interviewed experienced chronic pain in their limbs,
tremor, headaches, and difficulty breathing:

Ibu S-I (71)

… well, I am kind of afraid, my heart is unstable [hatee ka goyang]. When the
wind blows, I feel scared, also when the rain is falling. I am thinking, what kind
of disaster you give us again dear God … while I am sitting, I am crying.

Bapak A-b (69)

But now, I don’t go fishing any longer, I can’t walk, I feel exhausted huh, and I
have no strength anymore.
After tsunami happened. I stay at home, I couldn’t walk, ka leumoh [feeling
weak, lost the spirit of life etc].

Bapak S-f (82)

I could not go anymore, I am exhausted…
If I stand under the heat of the sun, I am shaking.

Many such reports of illness and pain formed part of life stories in Aceh, which also include
descriptions of mental and physical trauma. The symptoms my interviewees described are
very similar to those reported in a recent study of conflict impacts in Aceh including: loss of
spirit or energy, exhausted for no reason, crying often, unable to work, helplessness, fearful,
shaking uncontrollably, weakness, body hurts, frequent headaches and “it feels as if my heart
has fallen” (Grayman et al., 2009, p. 299).

The relationship between experience and the body has been described as one of
“sedimentation”, where the body *enacts* the past in a way that is not governed by intention

\(^5\) I thank anthropologist Daniel Birchok, University of Michigan, for this insight.
… the body does not merely act in accordance with certain regularized or ritualized practices; it is this sedimented ritual activity; its action, in this sense, is a kind of incorporated memory.

One need only consider how racial or gendered slurs live and thrive in and as the flesh of the addressee (Butler, 1997, pp. 154, 159, citing Bourdieu).

Veena Das notes moreover that the body itself can act as testimony, as the ‘condensed expression of the trauma of individuals’ (Das, 1995, p. 181) and hence as tacit political criticism:

The somatic states that bore witness to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in China … for instance, came into being in a world wherein speech was silenced. They are criticisms of the historical wrongs that the individual has been made to suffer (Das, 1995, p. 181).

However the embodiment of trauma does not necessarily entail a return to the unitary humanist ‘subject’ that Mazzei (2016) sees as improbably disconnected from its milieu. The body’s manifestations of trauma, its capacity to bear witness to past conflict, form part of a complex assemblage over time, where experience is cumulative, and trauma particularly can be re-visited in nightmares and re-experienced over and over again; this the site of an individual’s life. Voice called up at this site, and the ethnographer’s role in so calling it, demand a kind of awareness and responsibility that is very different from that required in the assembling of historical voice or collective, community voice. Where trauma and conflict have been experienced, the site of an individual’s life and its entanglement with forces that now include the listener or ethnographer, is, ethically-politically, another kind of site altogether.

Bearing witness to the eye-witness

Grayman et al (2009) discovered in gathering personal accounts from Aceh about the impacts of the recent 30 year conflict with the Indonesian military, that relating stories of conflict and post-conflict experience is often accompanied by an urgency and emotional force; the voice in this case is the voice of testimony, where testimony arrives with the force of an event that might, for some testifiers, be ‘the very secret of survival and of resistance to extermination’ (Felman & Laub, 1992, p. 62). The role of the researcher in listening carries great moral weight in these circumstances; Felman suggests that witnesses are talking ‘to somebody: to somebody they have been waiting for for a long time’ (1992, pp. 70-71) and that memory ‘is conjured…essentially in order to address another, to impress upon a listener, to appeal to a community’ (1992, p. 204):

The absence of an empathic listener, or more radically, the absence of an addressable other, an other who can hear the anguish of one’s memories and thus affirm and recognize their realness, annihilates the story (Felman & Laub, 1992, p. 68).

My interviews with old people in Aceh thus consist not only of stories about an often traumatic past, but the difficult act of storytelling as an event in its own right. Each speaker presented their past experience in an effortful and sometimes painful performance. The cost of remembering is clear in almost all of the interviews:
Bapak A-b (69)

Of course I still think about that accident. I remember that.
I remember the day of the accident when the landslide happened and I was buried, I remember and am scared, it’s so real.

Bapak A-y (80+)

But don’t tell them [the military or the GAM] OK. Don’t bring your mind there
I am happy, I never quite think about all of that stuff.

Ibu R-a (65)

Sad. If I remember what it’s like in the past, I am sad.

Ibu S-p (65)

Yes, I do think about it sometimes, during the chaos, I cry when I remember, thinking about my relatives that were hit by them…

Here, where giving voice is painful, the researcher carries responsibility as both instigator and listener, a responsibility that is the subject of institutional ethics protocols, and the researcher’s own commitments to care. This relation between listener and speaker reinforces the distinction between the voice of history or collective memory on the one hand, and the voice of individual traumatic experience on the other; the purpose of the latter is an effort of transmission that is more than the meaning of the words. The site from which such a voice emerges, while encompassing social, political, human and non-human forces similar to the site of history’s voice or collective voice, also encompasses a particular relation with the listener, with moral and ethical dimensions that can only be understood when we locate voice at the site of an individual’s life.

Conclusion

Voice as it emerges in history and in the collective memory of communities can be seen as ‘voice without subject’: located instead at a site that is an ongoing entanglement of both human and non-human forces. The purposivity of history and collective memory throws light on some of these entanglements: connections between past, present and future, and the socio-political, cosmological and material forces that form what Mazzei calls an assemblage, and what this Chapter has called the ‘site of voice’.

Such entanglements also reside at the site of an individual’s life; however at the site of a life, traumatic events, such as those that form part of war or conflict, accumulate and may be re-visited and re-experienced. It places the voice at a site, one that includes the listener, which is very different from that of historical or collective voice. The potential for the voice that emerges from the site of a life to be a voice of suffering, and to cause further suffering, is elided in the idea of a ‘voice without subject’. Enabling such voice however, through life story ethnography or oral history work, allows us to understand more fully the cumulative and iterative nature of trauma; it also requires us to acknowledge the feat of transmission that places the speaker and listener in a unique relation of responsibility and trust.
References


