China and peripheral conflicts

China and peripheral conflicts

[Abstract]: China’s enormous size and stature as a new hub of economic growth in tandem with its military modernisation make China a rising power. The strategic consequences of China’s economic growth synergised with its military muscles are multiple and profound, especially, for the neighbours in its conflict-prone periphery. The aim of this dissertation is not only to assess the importance and complexities of conflicts in the periphery of China, but also about the necessity for the neighbours to coexist with a more powerful China. At the same time, in the Chinese geopolitical context, domestic stability and hence, the CCP’s legitimacy has been perpetually paramount, and external threats or conflicts are usually perceived in the context of aggravating domestic and international stability, thereby hampering its strategic aim of achieving global economic command and power-projection military capability.
With the dawn of 21st century, China is grooving to an exuberant global beat, the intensity of conflicts along China’s periphery has dimmed to such an extent that its political, economic, and social order will probably not disintegrate into chaos in the near future. Instead, China’s rapidly growing economic capacity and its soaring prestige in faraway capitals like Washington and Paris has meant an expansion of Chinese “soft power”, i.e., an assertive China with an ability to get what it wants by attracting and persuading others to adopt its goals, instead of blunt economic and military coercion. And, China could reasonably be expected to manage most, if not all, the conflicts in its periphery to its own advantage. These include: efforts to augment its military capabilities in a manner commensurate with its increased economic muscle and acquire new allies and underwrite the protection of others in its periphery. It is unlikely that the PRC will actually acquire new or reclaim old territory for China’s resources or for symbolic reasons by penalizing, if necessary, any opponents or bystanders who resist such claims. While it may wish to redress past wrongs it believes to have suffered; or attempt to rewrite the prevailing international “rules of game” to better reflect its own geostrategic interests; or in the most extreme policy choice, perhaps even ready itself for preventive war or to launch predatory attacks on its foes on the pretext of the “cult of defence,” – all of which have been seen as the bedrock of the contemporary China’s strategic culture, however, it is ii
probable that China will not pursue these at the cost of its future economic and/or social security agenda.