Adam Smith's treatment of the Greeks in The theory of moral sentiments: the case of Aristotle

Adam Smith's treatment of the Greeks in The theory of moral sentiments: the case of Aristotle

To question the role of nature and virtue in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is to question Adam Smith's reliance on the classical authors who integrated a concept of nature into their teaching on moral virtue. Given that Smith was
well versed in the classics and was a scholar of both Greek and Latin (Stewart, [1793] 1982, p. 10; Smith, [1759] 1984, Introduction, p. 5; Foley, 1974, p. 220; Vivenza, 2001, p. 36), it is not surprising that he refers to Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. What is surprising is the quite brief treatment that he gives to them; in particular to Aristotle, whose doctrine
of moral and intellectual virtue depends upon definitive concepts of nature and human nature. Why does Smith treat Aristotle in this manner? Is his reference to Aristotle's doctrine a means to an end, a device chosen to lend authority to his own (McNamara, 2004, p. 185)? Is it an example of the 'indirect' influence of the classics on Smith (Vivenza, 2001, p. 2)? Could it be that Smith is presenting a radical theory with no foundation in a theory of human nature (Rothschild, 2004, p. 116)? Finally, could it be that Smith, as he asserts, adopts wholly, or in part, Aristotle's concept of nature and thereby implies correspondence of his teaching with it? The purpose of this chapter is to seek answers to such questions by comparing the relationship between nature and virtue in The Theory of Moral Sentiments with that evident in Aristotle. While important, Smith's treatment of Plato and the Stoics is not addressed.

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