|ERA Journal ID||18672|
|Journal Title||Constitutional Political Economy|
|Journal Citation||24 (2), pp. 166-172|
|Number of Pages||7|
|Place of Publication||United States|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI)||https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-013-9134-y|
|Web Address (URL)||http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10602-013-9134-y|
Brennan and Hamlin provide a normative justification for dispositional conservatism based on the concave value functions which give rise to quasi-risk aversion. This note modifies this argument for 'analytic conservatism' by allowing jurisdictional exit in response to institutional decline. By providing a welfare floor which limits the cost of failure, exit reverses the normative implications of Brennan and Hamlin’s argument, making risk-neutral agents quasi-risk seeking and justifying a radical disposition to reform under some circumstances.
|ANZSRC Field of Research 2020||380113. Public economics - public choice|
|380119. Welfare economics|
|440811. Political theory and political philosophy|
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|Byline Affiliations||Australian National University|
|Institution of Origin||University of Southern Queensland|
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