The Impossibility of a Bayesian Liberal?
Article
Article Title | The Impossibility of a Bayesian Liberal? |
---|---|
ERA Journal ID | 18893 |
Article Category | Article |
Authors | Bosworth, William (Author) and Taylor, Brad (Author) |
Journal Title | The Journal of Politics |
Journal Citation | 84 (4), pp. 2023-2033 |
Number of Pages | 11 |
Year | 2022 |
Place of Publication | United States |
ISSN | 0022-3816 |
1468-2508 | |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1086/716286 |
Web Address (URL) | https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/716286 |
Abstract | Aumann’s theorem states that no individual should agree to disagree under a range of assumptions. Political liberalism appears to presuppose these assumptions with the idealized conditions of public reason. We argue that Aumann’s theorem demonstrates they nevertheless cannot be simultaneously held with what is arguably political liberalism’s most central tenet. That is, the tenet of reasonable pluralism, which implies we can rationally agree to disagree over conceptions of the good. We finish by elaborating a way of relaxing one of the theorem’s axioms that arguably lends itself to a coherent account of political liberalism, namely, the condition of indexical independence. |
Keywords | Aumann’s agreement theorem, political liberalism, Bayesian reasoning, public reason, indexical theory of value |
ANZSRC Field of Research 2020 | 440811. Political theory and political philosophy |
500321. Social and political philosophy | |
Public Notes | File reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher/author. |
Byline Affiliations | Australian National University |
University of Southern Queensland | |
Institution of Origin | University of Southern Queensland |
https://research.usq.edu.au/item/q7qx9/the-impossibility-of-a-bayesian-liberal
Download files
84
total views69
total downloads1
views this month1
downloads this month