Concluding remarks [to La contrattazione costituzionale dei livelli di autonomia: modelli per una comparazione]

Concluding remarks [to La contrattazione costituzionale dei livelli di autonomia: modelli per una comparazione]

The aim of this collection was to evaluate the development of a sample of decentralised constitutional systems. The project focused on cases from Australia, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the USA. All these analyses show that regionalism and federalism are pragmatic responses to social and fiscal stimuli.

The debate over finding the optimum balance between flexibility and the stability of public institutions is an old chestnut in constitutional theory. However, there is a general consensus that, in rapidly evolving societies, institutions should be perceived to act for the common good. Businesses, for instance, are competing in a global market and require a tax system that delivers services proportional to their overseas competitors, or at the very least, comparable to their neighbouring regions. Central institutions, which are committed to delivering core public services, also have an interest in holding onto regional entrepreneurs who might easily relocate overseas. One of the reasons for the economic decay in Northern Ireland is related to the inability of the Northern Irish counties to compete with the Republic of Ireland’s business-friendly fiscal system.

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